Method and apparatus for authentication

By generating message authentication codes and response parameters, the authentication and key negotiation process of zero-power terminal devices is simplified, the problem of insufficient computing power is solved, and secure authentication and key negotiation with the network side is realized.

WO2024239231A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-28GUANGDONG OPPO MOBILE TELECOMMUNICATIONS CORP LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/CN2023/095769
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-23
Publication Date
2024-11-28

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing technologies, zero-power terminal devices lack sufficient computing power and a clear authentication and key negotiation scheme when performing authentication and key negotiation with the network side.

Method used

By generating a message authentication code based on the first key generation algorithm and parameters, the authentication network element is authenticated. After successful authentication, response parameters are generated to perform the authentication response, simplifying the authentication and key negotiation process.

Benefits of technology

It reduces the computational complexity of zero-power terminal devices and enables secure authentication and key negotiation with the network side.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present application provides a method and an apparatus for authentication. The method comprises: a first device receiving a first authentication request from an agent node, wherein the first authentication request comprises a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element; the first device generating a second message authentication code on the basis of a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; the first device authenticating the authentication network element on the basis of the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code; the first device generating a response parameter in the condition that the authentication network element is successfully authenticated; and the first device sending a first authentication response to the agent node, wherein the first authentication response comprises the response parameter, and the response parameter is configured for authenticating the first device.
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Description

Authentication method and device Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, and more specifically, to an authentication method and device. Background Art

[0002] To improve communication security, terminal devices can perform authentication and key negotiation with the network before communicating with the network. However, after the introduction of a first device (such as a zero-power terminal), due to the low computing power of the first device, there are currently no clear regulations on how the first device should perform authentication and key negotiation with the network.

[0003] Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides an authentication method and device. The following is a detailed introduction to various aspects of this application.

[0005] In a first aspect, an authentication method is provided, including: a first device receives a first authentication request from a proxy node, the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element; the first device generates a second message authentication code based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; the first device authenticates the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code; when the authentication network element successfully authenticates, the first device generates a response parameter; the first device sends a first authentication response to the proxy node, the first authentication response includes the response parameter, and the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device.

[0006] According to a second aspect, an authentication method is provided, including: a proxy node sends a first authentication request to a first device, the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; the proxy node receives a first authentication response from the first device, the first authentication response includes a response parameter, the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and the response parameter is generated when the authentication of the authentication network element is successful.

[0007] According to a third aspect, an authentication method is provided, including: an authentication network element generates a first message authentication code and an expected response, the expected response is used to authenticate a first device, the first message authentication code is generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; the authentication network element sends a first authentication request to the proxy node, the first authentication request includes the first message authentication code, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, and the second message authentication code is generated by the first device.

[0008] In a fourth aspect, an authentication method is provided, including: an access network device sends a first authentication request to a first device, the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; the access network device receives a first authentication response from the first device, the first authentication response includes a response parameter, the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and the response parameter is generated when the authentication of the authentication network element is successful.

[0009] In a fifth aspect, a device is provided, which is a first device, and the first device includes: a receiving unit for receiving a first authentication request from a proxy node, the first authentication request including a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element; a generating unit for generating a second message authentication code based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; an authentication unit for authenticating the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code; the generating unit is also used for the first device to generate a response parameter when the authentication network element is successfully authenticated; a sending unit for sending a first authentication response to the proxy node, the first authentication response including the response parameter, and the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device.

[0010] In the sixth aspect, a proxy node is provided, including: a sending unit, used to send a first authentication request to a first device, the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; a receiving unit, used to receive a first authentication response from the first device, the first authentication response includes a response parameter, the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and the response parameter is generated when the authentication of the authentication network element is successful.

[0011] In the seventh aspect, an authentication network element is provided, including: a generation unit, used to generate a first message authentication code and an expected response, the expected response is used to authenticate a first device, the first message authentication code is generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; a sending unit, used to send a first authentication request to the proxy node, the first authentication request includes the first message authentication code, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, and the second message authentication code is generated by the first device.

[0012] In the eighth aspect, an access network device is provided, including: a sending unit, used to send a first authentication request to a first device, the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; a receiving unit, used to receive a first authentication response from the first device, the first authentication response includes a response parameter, the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and the response parameter is generated when the authentication of the authentication network element is successful.

[0013] In a ninth aspect, a device is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory to execute the method described in the first aspect.

[0014] In a tenth aspect, a proxy node is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store programs, and the processor is used to call the programs in the memory to execute the method described in the second aspect.

[0015] In the eleventh aspect, an authentication network element is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory to execute the method described in the third aspect.

[0016] In the twelfth aspect, an access network device is provided, comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store programs, and the processor is used to call the programs in the memory to execute the method described in the fourth aspect.

[0017] In a thirteenth aspect, a device is provided, comprising a processor for calling a program from a memory to execute the method as described in any one of the first to fourth aspects.

[0018] In a fourteenth aspect, a chip is provided, comprising a processor for calling a program from a memory so that a device equipped with the chip executes the method described in any one of the first to fourth aspects.

[0019] In a fifteenth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a program is stored, wherein the program enables a computer to execute the method as described in any one of the first to fourth aspects.

[0020] In a sixteenth aspect, a computer program product is provided, comprising a program, wherein the program enables a computer to execute the method as described in any one of the first to fourth aspects.

[0021] In the seventeenth aspect, a computer program is provided, which enables a computer to execute the method as described in any one of the first to fourth aspects.

[0022] A first device receives a first authentication request from a proxy node, where the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element; the first device generates a second message authentication code based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; the first device authenticates the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code; if the authentication of the authentication network element is successful, the first device generates a response parameter; the first device sends a first authentication response to the proxy node, where the first authentication response includes the response parameter, and the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device.

[0023] This application generates a message authentication code (such as a second message authentication code) based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter to authenticate the authentication network element, thereby providing a clear solution for authentication between the first device and the network side. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0024] FIG1 is a wireless communication system 100 used in an embodiment of the present application.

[0025] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of an initial authentication process.

[0026] FIG3 is a schematic diagram of a process for generating an AKMA key.

[0027] FIG4 is a schematic diagram of a process for generating an application key.

[0028] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of the derivation process of various keys involved in an embodiment of the present application.

[0029] FIG6 is a schematic diagram of a method for generating various parameters involved in an embodiment of the present application.

[0030] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of a hybrid communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0031] FIG8 is a communication system based on 3GPP security credentials provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0032] FIG9 is a communication system based on non-3GPP security credentials provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0033] FIG10 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0034] FIG11 is a flow chart of an authentication method based on a proxy node and 3GPP security credentials provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0035] FIG12 is a schematic diagram of a process of generating an AKMA key based on FIG11 .

[0036] FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram of a process of generating an application key based on FIG. 12 .

[0037] FIG14 is a flow chart of another authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0038] Figure 15 is a flowchart of an authentication method based on 3GPP security credentials provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0039] FIG16 is a schematic diagram of a process for generating an application key based on FIG15 .

[0040] FIG17 is a flow chart of another authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0041] FIG18 is a flow chart of an authentication method based on a proxy node and non-3GPP security credentials provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0042] Figure 19 is a flow chart of another authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0043] Figure 20 is a flowchart of an authentication method based on non-3GPP security credentials provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0044] Figure 21 is a schematic block diagram of a first device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0045] Figure 22 is a schematic block diagram of a proxy node provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0046] Figure 23 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication network element provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0047] Figure 24 is a schematic block diagram of an access network device provided in an embodiment of the present application.

[0048] Figure 25 is a structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The technical solution in this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0050] Figure 1 illustrates a wireless communication system 100 used in an embodiment of the present application. The wireless communication system 100 may include a network device 110 and a terminal device 120. The network device 110 may be a device that communicates with the terminal device 120. The network device 110 may provide communication coverage for a specific geographic area and may communicate with the terminal device 120 within the coverage area.

[0051] FIG1 exemplarily shows a network device and two terminal devices. Optionally, the wireless communication system 100 may include multiple network devices and each network device may include another number of terminal devices within its coverage area, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.

[0052] Optionally, the wireless communication system 100 may further include other network entities such as a network controller and a mobility management entity, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

[0053] It should be understood that the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as: fifth generation (5G) system or new radio (NR), long term evolution (LTE) system, LTE frequency division duplex (FDD) system, LTE time division duplex (TDD), etc. The technical solutions provided in this application can also be applied to future communication systems, such as the sixth generation mobile communication system, satellite communication system, etc.

[0054] The terminal device in the embodiments of the present application may also be referred to as user equipment (UE), access terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station (MS), mobile terminal (MT), remote station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, terminal, wireless communication device, user agent or user device. The terminal device in the embodiments of the present application may refer to a device that provides voice and / or data connectivity to a user and can be used to connect people, objects and machines, such as a handheld device with wireless connection function, a vehicle-mounted device, etc. The terminal device in the embodiments of the present application can be a mobile phone, a tablet computer, a laptop computer, a PDA, a mobile internet device (MID), a wearable device, a virtual reality (VR) device, an augmented reality (AR) device, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in self-driving, a wireless terminal in remote medical surgery, a wireless terminal in a smart grid, a wireless terminal in transportation safety, a wireless terminal in a smart city, a wireless terminal in a smart home, etc. Optionally, the UE can be used to act as a base station. For example, the UE can act as a scheduling entity that provides sidelink signals between UEs in V2X or D2D, etc. For example, a cellular phone and a car communicate with each other using sidelink signals. The cellular phone and smart home devices communicate without relaying the communication signal through the base station.

[0055] The network device in the embodiments of the present application may be a device for communicating with a terminal device, and may also be referred to as an access network device or a radio access network device. For example, the network device may be a base station. The network device in the embodiments of the present application may refer to a radio access network (RAN) node (or device) that connects a terminal device to a wireless network. A base station can broadly cover various names as follows, or be replaced with the following names, such as: NodeB, evolved NodeB (eNB), next generation NodeB (gNB), relay station, transmission point (TRP), transmission point (TP), master station MeNB, secondary station SeNB, multi-standard radio (MSR) node, home base station, network controller, access node, wireless node, access point (AP), transmission node, transceiver node, baseband unit (BBU), remote radio unit (RRU), active antenna unit (AAU), remote radio head (RRH), central unit (CU), distributed unit (DU), positioning node, etc. A base station can be a macro base station, a micro base station, a relay node, a donor node or the like, or a combination thereof. A base station can also refer to a communication module, modem or chip used to be set in the aforementioned device or apparatus. The base station can also be a mobile switching center and a device that performs base station functions in device-to-device D2D, vehicle-to-everything (V2X), and machine-to-machine (M2M) communications, a network-side device in a 6G network, or a device that performs base station functions in future communication systems. The base station can support networks with the same or different access technologies. The embodiments of this application do not limit the specific technology and specific device form used by the network equipment.

[0056] Base stations can be fixed or mobile. For example, a helicopter or drone can be configured to act as a mobile base station, and one or more cells can move based on the location of the mobile base station. In other examples, a helicopter or drone can be configured to act as a device that communicates with another base station.

[0057] In some deployments, the network device in the embodiments of the present application may refer to a CU or a DU, or the network device includes a CU and a DU. The gNB may also include an AAU.

[0058] The network equipment and terminal devices can be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, handheld or vehicle-mounted; they can also be deployed on the water; they can also be deployed in the air on aircraft, balloons, or satellites. The embodiments of this application do not limit the scenarios in which the network equipment and terminal devices are located.

[0059] It should be understood that all or part of the functions of the communication device in this application can also be implemented through software functions running on hardware, or through virtualization functions instantiated on a platform (such as a cloud platform).

[0060] Authentication and key management for applications (AKMA) architecture at the application layer

[0061] The UE and the application function (AF) can use the application key (K AF ) for communication, K AF Can be used to protect communications. AF The generation process involves multiple functional network elements, such as access and mobility management function (AMF), authentication server function (AUSF), unified data management (UDM), AKMA anchor function (AAnF), AF, etc. These functional network elements are introduced below.

[0062] The AMF is mainly used for mobility management and access management, and can be used to implement other functions of the mobility management entity (MME) in addition to session management, such as lawful interception and access authorization / authentication.

[0063] AUSF is used for authentication services, key generation, and bidirectional authentication of UEs, supporting a unified authentication framework. In the embodiment of the present application, AUSF is mainly used for mutual authentication between UEs and the network, and generates security keys for use in subsequent processes.

[0064] UDM can be used to process UE identification, access authentication, registration, and mobility management.

[0065] AF is used for data routing at the application layer, accessing network open functions, and interacting with the policy framework for policy control.

[0066] AAnF is used to generate the AKMA anchor key (K AKMA ), and application key (K AF ). AAnF and UE can generate K in the same way. AF . In generating K AF After that, AAnF can generate K AF Sent to AF. Thus, AF and UE can use the same key K AF To ensure the security of communication.

[0067] To generate K AF , UE can first perform initial authentication with the network side, and obtain a key (such as KAUSF) after the initial authentication is completed. The key can be used to generate K AF .

[0068] The following describes the initial authentication process in conjunction with FIG2 .

[0069] 2 , in step S202 , the UDM / authentication credential repository and processing function (ARPF) generates an authentication vector (AV).

[0070] UDM / ARPF can create a 5G HE AV for each authentication request message (such as Nudm Authenticate Get Request). UDM / ARPF can first generate an authentication vector with AMF "separation bit" as 1, and then calculate K AUSF Finally, UDM / ARPF can create a AUSF 5G HE AV.

[0071] In step S204, the UDM sends a UE authentication acquisition response message (e.g., Nudm_ueauthentication_Get Response) to the AUSF. The UE authentication acquisition response message includes a 5G HE AV and indication information, where the indication information is used to indicate that the 5G HE AV is used for 5G authentication and key agreement (AKA). If the authentication acquisition request message includes a subscription concealed identifier (SUCI), the UE authentication acquisition response message may include a subscription permanent identifier (SUPI).

[0072] In step S206, after receiving the UE authentication acquisition response message, the AUSF can temporarily save XRES* and the received SUCI or SUPI. The AUSF can also save K AUSF .

[0073] AUSF can generate a 5G AV based on the 5G HE AV received from UDM / ARPF. In addition, AUSF can calculate HXRES* based on XRES* and K AUSF Calculate K SEAF , then use HXRES* and K SEAF Replace XRES* and K in 5G HE AV respectively AUSF .

[0074] In step S210, the AUSF sends a UE authentication response (e.g., Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response) to the security anchor function (SEAF). The UE authentication response includes a 5G SE AV, which may include RAND, AUTN, and HXRES*, but not K. SEAF .

[0075] In step S212, SEAF sends an authentication request to the UE. The authentication request can be sent via a non-access stratum (NAS) message (such as Auth-Reg). The authentication request may include RANT and an authentication token (AUTN). The message may also include ngKSI, which can be used to identify K between the UE and AMF. AMFand some native security context. The UE may include mobile equipment (ME) and a universal subscriber identity module (USIM). After the UE receives the RANT and AUTN, the ME may forward the RANT and AUTN to the USIM.

[0076] In step S214, after the USIM receives the RANT and AUTN, it can check whether the AUTN is accepted to verify whether the authentication vector is up to date to resist replay attacks. If the verification is successful, the USIM can calculate the response RES and return the RES, encryption key (CK) and integrity key (IK) to the ME. The USIM can also calculate Kc (i.e., GPRS Kc) and send the GPRS Kc to the ME. If the GPRS Kc is calculated based on CK, IK and the conversion function c3 described in the third generation partnership project (3GPP) TS 33.102, the ME can ignore the GPRS Kc and the GPRS Kc should not be stored on the USIM or ME.

[0077] ME can calculate RES* based on RES, and calculate K based on CK||IK AUSF In addition, ME can also be based on K AUSF Calculate K SEAF If the ME accesses 5G, the ME may also check during authentication whether the "separation bit" of the AUTN's AMF field is set to 1, where the "separation bit" is bit 0 of the AUTN's AMF field. It should be noted that the "separation bit" in the AUTN's AMF field can no longer be used for operator-specific purposes.

[0078] In step S216, the UE sends an authentication response to the SEAF, which may include RES*. The authentication response may be sent via a NAS message.

[0079] In step S218, SEAF calculates HRES* based on RES*. SEAF may compare HRES* and HXRES* to determine whether the two values ​​are consistent. If the two values ​​are consistent, SEAF considers authentication successful from the perspective of the serving network. If the two values ​​are inconsistent, SEAF may proceed as specified in protocol 6.1.3.2.1. If the UE is unreachable and SEAF never receives RES*, SEAF may consider authentication to have failed and indicate the failure to the AUSF.

[0080] In step S220, SEAF sends a UE authentication request (such as Nausf_UE Authentication_Authenticate Request) message to AUSF. The UE authentication request message may include SUCI or SUPI.

[0081] In step S222, the AUSF receives a UE authentication request message, which may include RES*. The AUSF may verify whether the AV has expired. If the AV has expired, the AUSF may consider the authentication unsuccessful from the perspective of the home domain network. The AUSF may determine whether the authentication is successful by comparing the received RES* with the stored XRES*. If RES* and XRES* are consistent, the AUSF may consider the authentication successful from the perspective of the home domain network; if RES* and XRES* are inconsistent, the AUSF may consider the authentication unsuccessful from the perspective of the home domain network.

[0082] In step S224, AUSF indicates to SEAF whether the authentication is successful through the UE authentication response (such as Nausf_UE Authentication_Authenticate Response). If the authentication is successful, AUSF can send K SEAF If the authentication is successful and the AUSF receives SUCI from SEAF when initiating authentication, the UE Authentication Response message may also include SUPI.

[0083] If the authentication is successful, SEAF can use the key K received from the UE authentication response message SEAF As the anchor key. In addition, SEAF can be based on K SEAF , ABBA parameters and SUPI, calculate K AMF SEAF can provide K to AMF SEAF and ngKSI.

[0084] If SUCI is used for authentication, SEAF may provide ngKSI and K to AMF only after receiving UE Authentication Response message containing SUPI. AMF Before obtaining the SUPI, the serving network will not provide communication services to the UE.

[0085] After the initial authentication is completed, AUSF and UE obtain K AUSF , the K AUSF Can be used to generate K AF .K AFThe negotiation process can be triggered by the UE sending an AKMA key identifier (AKMA key identifier, A-KID) to the AF. AF The generation process of .

[0086] In step S302, after the initial authentication is completed, the UE and the AUSF can establish a AUSF Generate K AKMA And A-KID.

[0087] In step S304, the AUSF may send an AKMA anchor key registration request (such as Naanf_AKMA_AnchorKey_Register Request) to the AAnF. The AKMA anchor key registration request may include SUPI, A-KID and K AKMA .

[0088] In step S306, the AAnF may return an AKMA anchor key registration response (eg, Naanf_AKMA_AnchorKey_Register Response) to the AUSF.

[0089] 4, in step S402, after completing the initial authentication and generating K AKMA After that, the UE may send an application session establishment request to the AF. The application session establishment request may include the A-KID.

[0090] In step S404, the AF sends an AKMA application key acquisition request (e.g., Naanf_AKMA_ApplicationKey_Get Request) to the AAnF. The AKMA application key acquisition request may include an A-KID and an AF identity (AF-ID). The A-KID is the A-KID in the application session establishment request. In some embodiments, the AKMA application key acquisition request may also include a request for a UE identity (UE-ID). The UE-ID includes one or more of SUPI, SUCI, and a generic public subscription identifier (GPSI).

[0091] In step S406, after receiving the AKMA application key acquisition request, the AAnF can determine the corresponding K based on the A-KID. AKMA , and based on K AKMA Generate key K AF .

[0092] In step S408, AAnF sends an AKMA application key acquisition response to AF. The application key acquisition response may include K AF , K AF Validity period (K AF expTime), UE-ID, etc.

[0093] In step S410, the AF sends an application session establishment response to the UE.

[0094] It is understandable that the UE can also generate K in the same way as the AAnF. AF , that is, UE is based on K AKMA Generate K AF The method is similar to AAnF based on K AKMA Generate K AF Thus, UE and AF can use the same key K AF to communicate.

[0095] In the embodiment of the present application, the above-mentioned key (such as K AKMA、 A-KID, K AF The method for generating the key (e.g., a key derivation function, KDF) is not specifically limited. For example, a key derivation function (KDF) can be used to generate the key. The KDF can be any key derivation function that meets computational security requirements, such as HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SM3. The following uses KDF as an example to illustrate the key generation method.

[0096] For example, from K AUSF Generate K AKMA When , the following parameters can be used as the input S of KDF:

[0097] -FC=0xXX (e.g., 0x80);

[0098] -P0="AKMA";

[0099] - L0 = length of AKMA (e.g. 0x00 0x04);

[0100] -P1=SUPI;

[0101] - L1 = length of SUPI;

[0102] The key entered is K AUSF .

[0103] For example, from K AKMA Generate K AF When , the following parameters can be used as the KDF input S, which is referred to as method 1 below:

[0104] -FC=0xXX (e.g., 0x82);

[0105] -P0=AF_ID;

[0106] - L0 = length of AF_ID;

[0107] The key entered is K AKMA .

[0108] Wherein, AF_ID=AF's FQDN||Ua*security protocol identifier.

[0109] For another example, A-KID may include two parts: routing indicator (RID) and AKMA temporary UE identifier (A-TID). RID is included in SUPI, and A-TID can be based on K AUSF Generate. When AUSF When generating an A-TID, the following parameters can be used as the input S of the KDF:

[0110] -FC=0xXX (e.g., 0x81);

[0111] -P0="A-TID";

[0112] - L0 = length of "A-TID" (e.g., 0x00 0x05);

[0113] -P1=SUPI;

[0114] - L1 = length of SUPI;

[0115] The key entered is K AUSF .

[0116] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of the derivation process of various keys involved in an embodiment of the present application.

[0117] The NAS security context in the embodiment of the present application may include K AMF , subordinate derived key K NASint and K NASenc , and the key identifier corresponding to each key.

[0118] The access stratum (AS) security context in the embodiment of the present application may include K gNB , the subordinate derived key K RRCint , K RRCenc , K UPint and K UPenc , and the key identifier corresponding to each key.

[0119] The keys involved in the embodiment of the present application may also include confidentiality protection keys (or encryption keys) and integrity protection keys. As can be seen from Figure 5, the confidentiality protection keys and integrity protection keys can be composed of K AMF Generated by K gNB Generate. Among them, K AMF It is the shared key between AMF and UE, and it is the shared key between gNB and UE.

[0120] When generating confidentiality protection keys and integrity protection keys, the input parameters can be as follows:

[0121] -FC=0xXX (e.g. 00x69);

[0122] - P0 = algorithm type distinguisher;

[0123] - L0 = length of algorithm type distinguisher (e.g., 0x00 0x01);

[0124] P1 = algorithm identity;

[0125] - L1 = length of algorithm identity (e.g., 0x00 0x01).

[0126] The value of the algorithm type identifier entered varies depending on the key being generated, as shown in Table 1.

[0127] Table 1

[0128] Depending on the algorithm used, the value of the input algorithm identifier may also be different. The encryption algorithm used in the embodiment of the present application may include one or more of the following: NIA1, NIA2, NIA3, and the integrity protection algorithm may include one or more of the following: EIA1, EIA2, EIA3.

[0129] FIG6 shows a method for generating various parameters involved in an embodiment of the present application.

[0130] The UE can store a long-term key K and the public key of the home network, which can be used to encrypt the SUPI. The five important parameters calculated in the USIM may include the message authentication code (MAC), response (RES), CK, IK and AK. The calculation method of these parameters can be as follows: MAC = f1 K (SQN||RAND||AMF); RES=f2 K (RAND); CK=f3 K (RAND); IK=f4 K (RAND); AK=f5 K (RAND).

[0131] Zero-power communication

[0132] With the development of wireless communication technology, people hope to integrate wireless communication systems with various vertical industries such as logistics, manufacturing, transportation, and energy. For example, wireless communication systems can be integrated with industrial wireless sensor networks (IWSNs). Another example is the integration of wireless communication systems with smart logistics and smart warehousing. Another example is the integration of wireless communication systems with smart home networks.

[0133] However, in these industries, terminal devices are typically required to have low cost, small size (e.g., ultra-thin), maintenance-free, and long lifespan. Therefore, to meet these requirements, network equipment and terminal devices can use zero-power communication technology for communication. In this case, the terminal device can also be called a "zero-power communication terminal," "zero-power terminal," or tag.

[0134] After the introduction of zero-power terminals, there are currently two communication methods for zero-power terminals. The following describes these two communication methods.

[0135] The first communication method involves direct communication between the zero-power terminal and the base station. The base station can provide the zero-power terminal with a wireless power supply signal and a trigger signal. The wireless power supply signal can be used to provide energy to the zero-power terminal. The trigger signal can carry control information for the zero-power terminal. The zero-power terminal can transmit this information to the base station via backscatter.

[0136] The second communication mode is a hybrid communication mode, which includes cellular communication and sideline communication. In the actual deployment of zero-power communication systems, zero-power communication systems based on cellular communication and sideline communication can flexibly coexist or be used in combination, thus matching more potential application scenarios.

[0137] Figure 7 shows a hybrid communication system. The communication modes shown in Figure 7 include four types, which are described below.

[0138] Method 1: The zero-power terminal is provided with power supply signals and trigger signals by the terminal device, and the backscattered signal of the zero-power terminal is received by the base station.

[0139] In the second method, the base station provides a wireless power supply signal and sends a trigger signal to the zero-power terminal. The backscattered signal of the zero-power terminal is received by the terminal device, thus completing the sideline communication. In addition, the terminal device can send air interface data to the base station.

[0140] Method three: the terminal device provides a power supply signal to the zero-power terminal, the base station sends trigger information to the zero-power terminal, and receives the backscattered signal from the zero-power terminal.

[0141] In mode 4, the terminal device receives air interface signaling and data sent by the network device. The terminal device provides power supply signals and trigger signals to the zero-power terminal and receives the backscattered signals sent by the zero-power terminal to complete sideline communication.

[0142] For zero-power terminals, there is currently no clear solution on how to achieve security authentication between the zero-power terminals and the network side.

[0143] The current security standards for battery-efficient security for very low throughput machine type communication devices (BEST), machine type communication (MTC), and new radio-internet of things (NB-IoT) designed for low-throughput IoT devices are based on authentication and key agreement mechanisms such as AKA, generic bootstrapping architecture (GBA), and AKMA. These mechanisms present challenges with key architecture, interaction processes, and high security computational complexity. For example, the authentication method described above requires the terminal device to simultaneously support various functions f1-f5 during the generation of authentication vectors. MAC uses function f1, RES uses function f2, CK uses function f3, IK uses function f4, and AK uses function f5. Due to the low computing power of zero-power terminals, this method is not suitable for them.

[0144] For mixed cellular and sideline communication scenarios, current user equipment-to-network relay (UE-to-network relay) security has issues with proximity-based service communication (PC)5 security, U2N relay security key architecture, interaction process, and high security calculation complexity, making this security approach unsuitable for zero-power terminals.

[0145] In addition, the current International Organization for Standardization (ISO) radio frequency identification (RFID) security standards and tag and reader air interface security (TRAIS) security standards only support authentication and key negotiation between tags and readers, but not between tags and the network. In other words, these security standards cannot implement authentication and key negotiation between tags and the network.

[0146] To address the above issues, embodiments of the present application provide an authentication method and apparatus that can implement the authentication and key negotiation process in a simplified manner, thereby being applicable to security authentication between a first device (such as a zero-power terminal) and a network. The authentication method of embodiments of the present application only requires the first device to support one or two key generation algorithms to implement the authentication and key negotiation process between the first device and the network, thereby reducing the complexity of the first device.

[0147] In the embodiment of the present application, the first device may be a zero-power terminal. For example, the first device may be a tag or an ambient power-enabled internet of things (A-IoT) device.

[0148] Before introducing the authentication method provided in this application, the communication mode of the first device and the security credentials involved in this application are first introduced.

[0149] According to the different protocol stack designs of the first device, the communication modes of the first device can be divided into two categories: the first category is an indirect mode, and the second category is a direct mode.

[0150] For the non-direct mode, the first device does not support the application layer protocol, and the first device may be connected to the serving domain network element and / or the AF through a proxy node.

[0151] The service domain network elements in the embodiments of the present application may include, for example, one or more of the following: AMF, service management function (SMF), SEAF, A-IoT service-specific ambient network function (A-NF), etc. The proxy node may include, for example, a terminal device and / or an integrated access and backhaul (IAB) node, etc. The terminal device may be, for example, a UE.

[0152] In some implementations, the proxy node can forward authentication information between the first device and the network side (such as an authentication network element). In other implementations, the proxy node can also perform some processing on the authentication information. For example, the proxy node can transmit the authentication information via a NAS message (such as a NAS security context) or an AS message (such as an AS security context). For another example, the proxy node can decrypt some encrypted information during the authentication process (such as a hidden identity identifier of the first device). The specific processing method of the proxy node will be described in detail below in conjunction with specific embodiments.

[0153] For direct mode, the first device may support an application layer protocol (e.g., Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)). Alternatively, the media access control (MAC) layer or physical (PHY) layer of the first device may have functionality to support an upper layer protocol (e.g., an application layer), thereby enabling the first device to support application layer protocol functionality. In some implementations, the first device may connect to the AF via an application layer protocol.

[0154] In an embodiment of the present application, a secure communication link can be established between a first device and a third-party server (such as an AF). The third-party server can rely on the core network to authenticate and negotiate keys for the first device. Depending on the provider of the security credentials, the security credentials in the embodiment of the present application can be divided into two categories. One category of security credentials is 3GPP security credentials, and the other category of security credentials is non-3GPP security credentials.

[0155] The 3GPP security credential can be understood as a root key (K) shared between the first device and the authentication network element. If the security credential is a 3GPP security credential, the network side (e.g., UDM) can perform authorization management, such as storing the authentication result. This management authorization can be based on subscription credentials. The authentication result can include, for example, one or more of the following: a timestamp of the first device authentication, an ID of the first device, an authentication method of the first device, and an identifier of the security context of the first device.

[0156] Figure 8 illustrates a communication architecture based on 3GPP security credentials. The first device can perform authentication and key negotiation with the core network. In some implementations, the first device can communicate with a third-party server, and the third-party server can communicate with the core network.

[0157] The non-3GPP security credential may be a security credential provided by a third-party application server, such as a root key (K) shared between the first device and the AF or the network application function (NAF). The third-party application server (such as the AF or NAF) may perform authorization management. The authorization management may be application-layer-based authorization management. In a scenario involving a proxy node, the third-party application server may manage the mapping between the proxy node and the first device, and provide the security credential K to the authentication network element, or provide the authentication network element with a subordinate key derived from the security credential K.

[0158] Figure 9 shows a communication architecture based on 3GPP security credentials. Unlike Figure 8, the third-party server can communicate with the core network to provide the core network with security credentials K or subordinate keys derived from the security credentials K.

[0159] It should be noted that the security credentials in the embodiments of the present application can be understood as root keys.

[0160] The authentication method of the embodiment of the present application is described in detail below with reference to Figures 10 to 20. It should be noted that the following four examples and the solutions in different figures can be used in combination with each other if there is no conflict.

[0161] Example 1

[0162] In the solution of Example 1, the security credential is a 3GPP security credential, and the first device communicates with the network side through the proxy node.

[0163] Figure 10 is a schematic flow chart of an authentication method provided in an embodiment of the present application. Referring to Figure 10 , in step S1010, the authentication network element generates a first message authentication code and / or an expected response. The first message authentication code can be used to authenticate the authentication network element. The expected response can be used to authenticate the first device. In some embodiments, the first message authentication code can be represented by a first MAC, and the expected response can be represented by an XRES.

[0164] The embodiments of the present application do not specifically limit the method for generating the first message authentication code. For example, the first message authentication code can be generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter. The first key generation algorithm can be any function. The function can be any of the following: an f function, a KDF, or other lightweight function. The f function can be, for example, any of the f1, f2, f3, f4, and f5 functions defined by 3GPP. The KDF can be, for example, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SM3. The lightweight function can be, for example, ASCON.

[0165] The first parameter may include one or more of the following: a security credential, a first random number, a second random number, and a first key. For example, the first parameter may include the security credential and the second random number. For another example, the first parameter may include the security credential, the second random number, and the first key. For another example, the first parameter may include the security credential, the second random number, and the first random number. For another example, the first parameter may include the security credential, the second random number, the first random number, and the first key.

[0166] The security credential may be the 3GPP security credential or the non-3GPP security credential described above. The first random number (denoted as N2) may be a random number selected by the authentication network element or may be a shared key between the authentication network element and the first device. The first random number may be used to defend against replay attacks. The second random number (denoted as RAND) may be a random number selected by the authentication network element. The first key (denoted as N1) may be one or more of the following: a random number pre-shared by the first device and a network-side device (such as an authentication network element), a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, and a shared key between the first device and the base station. The shared key may be a physical layer key.

[0167] In some embodiments, the first message authentication code and the expected response can be generated based on the same key generation algorithm and different parameters, or the first message authentication code and the expected response can be generated based on different key generation algorithms and the same parameters, which can reduce the complexity of generating the first message authentication code and the expected response.

[0168] As an example, the key generation algorithm used to generate the expected response is the same as the key generation algorithm used to generate the first message authentication code. For example, the first message authentication code can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm and the first parameter, and the expected response can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm and the second parameter.

[0169] The second parameter may include one or more of the following: a security credential, a first random number, a second random number, and a first key. The first parameter is different from the second parameter to ensure that the generated expected response is different from the first message authentication code. For example, the first parameter includes the security credential and the first random number. The second parameter includes the security credential, the first random number, and the second random number. For another example, the second parameter includes the security credential, the first random number, and the second random number, and the second parameter includes the security credential, the first random number, the second random number, and the first key. For another example, the first parameter includes the security credential, the first random number, and the second random number, and the second parameter includes the security credential and the first random number.

[0170] As another example, the parameters used to generate the expected response are the same as the parameters used to generate the first message authentication code. For example, the first message authentication code can be generated based on a first key generation algorithm and the first parameters, and the expected response can be generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameters.

[0171] The first key generation algorithm and the second key generation algorithm are different to ensure that the generated expected response is different from the first message authentication code. The second key generation algorithm can be any function. For example, the second key generation algorithm can be any of the following: an f function, a KDF, or other lightweight functions. The f function can be, for example, any of the f1 function, f2 function, f3 function, f4 function, and f5 function defined by 3GPP. The KDF can be, for example, HMAC-SHA-256 or HMAC-SM3. The lightweight function can be, for example, ASCON.

[0172] Similarly, the first device may generate a second message authentication code and / or a response parameter. The second message authentication code may be used to authenticate the authentication network element, and the response parameter may be used to authenticate the first device. In some embodiments, the second message authentication code may be represented by a second MAC, and the response parameter may be represented by a RES.

[0173] In some embodiments, the second message authentication code is generated in the same manner as the first message authentication code. For example, the second message authentication code may be generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter. The first key generation algorithm and the first parameter are described above and are not further described here for the sake of brevity.

[0174] For example, the message authentication code can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: MAC = fK (RAND, N1, N2), MAC = f K (RAND), MAC = f K (RAND, N1), MAC = f K (RAND,N2).

[0175] The expected response can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: XRES = f K (RAND, N1, N2), XRES = f K (RAND), XRES = f K (RAND, N1), XRES = f K (RAND,N2).

[0176] Among them, MAC represents the first message authentication code or the second message authentication code, f represents the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm, RAND represents the second random number, N1 represents the first key, N2 represents the second random number, and K represents the security credential.

[0177] In some embodiments, the response parameters are generated in a manner consistent with the expected response. For example, the response parameters can be generated based on the second key generation algorithm and the first parameters, or the response parameters can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm and the second parameters. The specific method for generating the response parameters can be found in the method for generating the expected response described above and will not be further described here for the sake of brevity.

[0178] In some embodiments, a first device may receive a first message authentication code from an authentication network element. The first device may receive the first message authentication code from the authentication network element via a proxy node. The first device may compare the first message authentication code with a second message authentication code to authenticate the authentication network element. If the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are consistent, authentication with the authentication network element is successful; if the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are inconsistent, authentication with the authentication network element is unsuccessful.

[0179] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may receive a response parameter from the first device. The authentication network element may receive the response parameter from the first device via a proxy node. The authentication network element may compare the response parameter with an expected response to authenticate the first device. If the response parameter matches the expected response, authentication of the first device is successful; if the response parameter does not match the expected response, authentication of the first device fails.

[0180] In some implementations, the method shown in FIG. 10 may further include steps S1020 to S1070 .

[0181] In step S1020, the authentication network element sends a first authentication request to the proxy node, wherein the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code.

[0182] The authentication network element sending the first authentication request to the proxy node may refer to the authentication network element sending the first authentication request directly to the proxy node, or may refer to the authentication network element sending the first authentication request to the proxy node through other devices. The other devices may include, for example, a base station and / or a serving domain network element. The serving domain network element may include an AMF and / or an SMF.

[0183] In step S1030 , the proxy node sends a first authentication request to the first device.

[0184] In step S1040, the first device generates a second message authentication code based on the first key generation algorithm and the first parameter. The specific generation method can be found in the description above. In some embodiments, the first device may generate the second message authentication code before receiving the first authentication request, or after receiving the first authentication request.

[0185] In step S1050, the first device authenticates the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code. If the first message authentication code is consistent with the second message authentication code, the first device may determine that the authentication network element has been successfully authenticated; if the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are inconsistent, the first device may determine that the authentication network element has failed to be authenticated.

[0186] In step S1060, if the authentication network element successfully authenticates, the first device generates response parameters. If the authentication network element fails, the first device may not generate response parameters to reduce the computational complexity of the first device. Of course, in some embodiments, the first device may generate response parameters regardless of whether the authentication network element successfully authenticates. For example, the first device may generate response parameters before receiving the first authentication request.

[0187] In step S1070, the first device sends a first authentication response to the proxy node. The first authentication response may include response parameters.

[0188] In step S1080, the proxy node sends a first authentication response to the authentication network element. The first authentication response may include response parameters.

[0189] In some embodiments, the proxy node may send a response parameter to the authentication network element. After receiving the response parameter, the authentication network element may compare the response parameter with an expected response to authenticate the first device.

[0190] In order to improve the security of authentication, the embodiment of the present application can authenticate the first device from the perspective of the home domain network, the service domain network and the access network. For example, the response parameters may include one or more of the following: a first response parameter, a second response parameter and a third response parameter. The first response parameter can be used to authenticate the first device in the home domain network (or home domain network element), the second response parameter can be used to authenticate the first device in the service domain network (or service domain network element), and the third response parameter can be used to authenticate the first device in the access network (or access network device). The first response parameter can be recorded as RES1, the second response parameter can be recorded as RES2, and the third response parameter can be recorded as RES3.

[0191] For another example, the expected response may include one or more of the following: a first expected response, a second expected response, and a third expected response. The first expected response may be used for the home domain network (or home domain network element) to authenticate the first device, the second expected response may be used for the serving domain network (or serving domain network element) to authenticate the first device, and the third expected response may be used for the access network (or access network device) to authenticate the first device. The first expected response may be denoted as XRES1, the second expected response may be denoted as XRES2, and the third expected response may be denoted as XRES3.

[0192] In some embodiments, the expected response may include a first expected response and a second expected response to authenticate the first device from the perspective of the home domain network and the serving domain network. In some embodiments, the expected response may include a first expected response and a third expected response to authenticate the first device from the perspective of the home domain network and the access network. In some embodiments, the expected response may include a second expected response and a third expected response to authenticate the first device from the perspective of the serving domain network and the access network. In some embodiments, the expected response may include a first expected response, a second expected response, and a third expected response to authenticate the first device from the perspective of the home domain network, the serving domain network, and the access network.

[0193] The following describes the authentication methods for each network authenticating the first device.

[0194] The home domain network element may compare the first response parameter with the first expected response to authenticate the first device. The first expected response may be generated by the home domain network element, and the first response parameter may be generated by the first device. The first device may send the first response parameter to the home domain network element. If the first response parameter is consistent with the first expected response, the home domain network element may deem the authentication successful from the perspective of the home domain network. If the first response parameter is inconsistent with the first expected response, the home domain network element may deem the authentication failed from the perspective of the home domain network. The home domain network element may include an AUSF and / or a UDM.

[0195] The serving domain network element may compare the second response parameter with the second expected response to authenticate the first device. The second expected response may be generated by the home domain network element, which may send the second expected response to the serving domain network element. The second response parameter may be generated by the first device, which may send the second response parameter to the serving domain network element. If the second response parameter is consistent with the second expected response, the serving domain network element may deem the authentication successful from the perspective of the serving domain network. If the second response parameter is inconsistent with the second expected response, the serving domain network element may deem the authentication failed from the perspective of the serving domain network. The serving domain network element may include an AMF and / or an SMF.

[0196] The access network device may compare the third response parameter with the third expected response to authenticate the first device. If the third response parameter and the third expected response are consistent, the access network device may determine, from the perspective of the access network, that the authentication is successful. If the third response parameter and the third expected response are inconsistent, the access network device may determine, from the perspective of the access network, that the authentication has failed. The access network device may be a base station.

[0197] In some embodiments, the third expected response may be generated by a home domain network element, which may send the third expected response to the access network device. Alternatively, the third expected response may be generated by the access network device. The authentication network element may send the first expected response to the access network device, and the access network device may generate the third expected response based on the received first expected response. For example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the access network device, the access network device may generate the third expected response based on the first expected response and the first key.

[0198] In some embodiments, the third response parameter may be generated by the first device, and the first device may send the third response parameter to the access network device.

[0199] The following describes how to generate each response parameter and each expected response.

[0200] In some embodiments, the first response parameter and the second message authentication code (or the first message authentication code) are based on the same key generation algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of the first device. For example, the first response parameter can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm and the second parameter. In other words, the first device can generate the first response parameter based on the first key generation algorithm and the second parameter.

[0201] In some embodiments, the first response parameter and the second message authentication code (or the first message authentication code) are based on the same parameters to reduce the computational complexity of the first device. For example, the first response parameter can be generated based on the second key generation algorithm and the first parameter. In other words, the first device can generate the first response parameter based on the second key generation algorithm and the first parameter. The first response parameter can be generated in the same manner as the expected response described above.

[0202] For example, the first response parameter can be determined based on the following formula: RES1 = f K (RAND,N1,N2)

[0203] RES1 represents the first response parameter, f represents the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm, RAND represents the second random number, N1 represents the first key, N2 represents the second random number, and K represents the security credential.

[0204] In some embodiments, the second response parameter can be generated based on the first response parameter and the third parameter. In other words, the first device can generate the second response parameter based on the first response parameter and the third parameter. The third parameter may include one or more of the following: security credentials, service domain network name (SN name) (or service domain network identifier). In some implementations, the second response parameter and the first response parameter can be generated based on the same key generation algorithm, or the second response parameter and the second message authentication code (or the first message authentication code) can be generated based on the same key generation algorithm. For example, the second response parameter can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm, the first response parameter and the third parameter. For another example, the second response parameter can be generated based on the second key generation algorithm, the first response parameter and the third parameter.

[0205] For example, the second response parameter can be determined based on the following formula: RES2 = f K (RES1,SN name)

[0206] RES2 represents the second response parameter, f represents the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm, RES1 represents the first response parameter, SN name represents the service domain network name or identifier, and K represents the security credential.

[0207] In some embodiments, the third response parameter can be generated based on the first response parameter and the fourth parameter. In other words, the first device can generate the third response parameter based on the first response parameter and the fourth parameter. The fourth parameter may include the first key. In some implementations, the third response parameter and the first response parameter can be generated based on the same key generation algorithm, or the third response parameter and the second message authentication code (or the first message authentication code) can be generated based on the same key generation algorithm. For example, the third response parameter can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm, the first response parameter, and the fourth parameter. For another example, the third response parameter can be generated based on the second key generation algorithm, the first response parameter, and the fourth parameter.

[0208] For example, the third response parameter can be determined based on the following formula: RES3 = f N1 (XRES1)

[0209] RES3 represents the third response parameter, f represents the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm, RES1 represents the first response parameter, and N1 represents the first key.

[0210] The above-mentioned generation method of each response parameter is only an example and is not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application. For example, the second response parameter can be generated based on the third response parameter. For another example, the third response parameter can be generated based on the second response parameter.

[0211] The first expected response is similar to the first response parameter in generating method, the second expected response is similar to the second response parameter in generating method, and the third expected response is similar to the third response parameter in generating method, which will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.

[0212] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may generate a first anonymous key that can be used for secure transmission between the first device and the network side.

[0213] In some embodiments, to reduce the computational complexity of generating the first anonymous key, the first anonymous key can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm. For example, the first anonymous key can be generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a ninth parameter. For another example, the first anonymous key can be generated based on the second key generation algorithm and a ninth parameter. The ninth parameter can include one or more of the following parameters: security credentials, a first random number, a second random number, and the first key.

[0214] Taking the ninth parameter including the security certificate and the second random number as an example, the first anonymous key can be determined based on the following formula: AK = f K (RAND)

[0215] Wherein, AK represents the first anonymous key, K represents the security credential, RAND represents the second random number, and f represents the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

[0216] Formula AK=f K (RAND) is applicable to the case where the first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, and is also applicable to the case where the first key is sent by the proxy node to the authentication network element.

[0217] In some embodiments, in order to reduce the computational complexity of generating the first anonymous key, the first anonymous key can be generated by an XOR operation. For example, the first anonymous key can be generated by XORing the security credential and the first key. In other words, the first anonymous key can be determined based on the following formula: AK = K⊕N1

[0218] Wherein, AK represents the first anonymous key, K represents the security credential, N1 represents the first key, and ⊕ represents the exclusive OR operation.

[0219] The above formula AK=K⊕N1 is applicable to the case where the first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element. The authentication network element can generate AK based on the shared key N1.

[0220] Similarly, the first device may also generate a second anonymous key. The second anonymous key is generated in the same manner as the first anonymous key, and for the sake of brevity, details are omitted here.

[0221] Before receiving the first authentication request from the proxy node, the first device may send a second authentication request to the proxy node. In other words, the first device may trigger an authentication process between the first device and the network side by sending the second authentication request.

[0222] In some embodiments, the second authentication request may include a hidden identity of the first device. To ensure information security, the first device may anonymize the identity of the first device to obtain a hidden identity.

[0223] There are various ways to generate a hidden identity. For example, the hidden identity can be generated based on the identity of the first device and the first key. Another example is the hidden identity can be generated based on the identity of the first device, the first key, and the security credentials. The identity of the first device can be understood as the true identity of the first device.

[0224] The following describes in detail the method for generating the hidden identity identifier by taking the generation of the hidden identity identifier based on the identity identifier of the first device and the first key as an example.

[0225] In some embodiments, the hidden identity can be generated using an exclusive-OR operation to reduce computational complexity on the first device. For example, the hidden identity can be generated by performing an exclusive-OR operation on the first device's identity and the first key. In other words, the first device can perform an exclusive-OR operation on the first device's identity and the first key to generate the hidden identity.

[0226] For example, the hidden identity can be determined based on the following formula: DIDi=IDi⊕N1

[0227] Wherein, DIDi represents a hidden identity, IDi represents an identity of the first device, N1 represents a first key, and ⊕ represents an exclusive-OR operation.

[0228] In some embodiments, the hidden identity can be generated based on the identity of the first device, the first key, and a third key generation algorithm. In other words, the first device can generate the hidden identity based on the identity of the first device, the first key, and the third key generation algorithm. The third key generation algorithm can be the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of the first device.

[0229] For example, the hidden identity identifier can be determined based on the following formula: DIDi=f N1 (IDi)

[0230] Wherein, DIDi represents a hidden identity, IDi represents an identity of the first device, N1 represents a first key, and f represents a third key generation algorithm.

[0231] The first key can be a shared key (or random number) between the first device and the network side (such as an authentication network element), or a shared key between the first device and a proxy node, or a shared key between the first device and a base station. The shared key can be a physical layer key. If the first key is a physical layer key, the first device does not need to pre-store the first key, but can obtain the first key by extracting physical layer channel characteristics.

[0232] If the first key may be a shared key between the first device and the network side (such as an authentication network element), the authentication network element may send a new first key to the first device to update the hidden identity.

[0233] Depending on the first key, the first device may generate a hidden identity in different ways. For example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the network side, the hidden identity may be generated by the formula DIDi=IDi⊕N1. For another example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, the hidden identity may be generated by the formula DIDi=IDi⊕N1 or the formula DIDi=fN1 (IDi) is generated.

[0234] After receiving the second authentication request, the proxy node may send the second authentication request to the authentication network element. The second authentication request sent by the proxy node may include one or more of the following information: the first key, the identity of the first device, the hidden identity, and the identity of the proxy node. The identity of the proxy node may include one or more of the following: GPSI, SUCI, globally unique temporary identifier (GUTI), and SUPI.

[0235] In some embodiments, the proxy node may adopt different processing strategies based on the first key. As an example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the network, the second authentication request sent by the proxy node may include one or more of the following: a hidden identity and an identifier of the proxy node.

[0236] As another example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, the proxy node may de-anonymize the hidden identity to obtain the identity of the first device. For example, the proxy node may determine the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity.

[0237] If the hidden identity is generated by the first key and the identity of the first device through an exclusive OR method, the proxy node can determine the identity of the first device through the following formula: IDi=DIDi⊕N1

[0238] Wherein, DIDi represents a hidden identity, IDi represents an identity of the first device, N1 represents a first key, and ⊕ represents an exclusive-OR operation.

[0239] If the hidden identity is generated based on the first key, the identity of the first device and the third key generation algorithm, the proxy node can determine the identity of the first device by the following formula: IDi=f N1 (DIDi)

[0240] Wherein, DIDi represents a hidden identity, IDi represents an identity of the first device, N1 represents a first key, and f represents a third key generation algorithm.

[0241] After obtaining the identity of the first device, the second authentication request sent by the first device may include one or more of the following: the first key, the identity of the first device, and the identifier of the proxy node.

[0242] If the second authentication request includes the identity of the first device, to ensure information security, the proxy node may send the second authentication request message via a NAS message or an AS message. For example, the proxy node may send the second authentication request message via a NAS security context or an AS security context.

[0243] After receiving the second authentication request, if the second authentication request includes a hidden identity, the authentication network element may deanonymize the hidden identity to obtain the identity of the first device. For example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, the authentication network element may deanonymize the hidden identity based on the first key. For example, the authentication network element may obtain the identity of the first device using the formula IDi = DIDi ⊕ N1.

[0244] After obtaining the identity identifier of the first device, the authentication network element may use the identity identifier of the first device to generate a fourth key described below.

[0245] When the first device and the authentication network element are successfully authenticated, the first device and the authentication network element may generate a second key (denoted as Ks). The second key may also be understood as a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element. The second key may be generated based on a sixth key generation algorithm and a sixth parameter. The sixth key generation algorithm may be a first key generation algorithm or a second key generation algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of the first device. The sixth parameter may include one or more of the following parameters: a first anonymous key, a first key, a first random number, an identifier of the proxy node, an identifier of the first device, a name of the serving domain network, and an identifier of the home domain network.

[0246] For example, the second key can be determined based on the following formula: Ks=f AK (N1, N2, UE ID, IDi, SN name)

[0247] Among them, Ks represents the second key, AK represents the first anonymous key, N1 represents the first key, N2 represents the first random number, UE ID represents the identifier of the proxy node, IDi represents the identity identifier of the first device, SN name represents the name of the service domain network, and f represents the sixth key generation algorithm.

[0248] Generate AKMA key

[0249] The second key can be used to generate an AKMA key. That is, the first device can generate an AKMA key based on the second key. Alternatively, the authentication network element can generate an AKMA key based on the second key.

[0250] It is understood that the first device generates the AKMA key in the same manner as the authentication network element. The following describes the AKMA key generation method using the first device as an example. The AKMA key generation method for the authentication network element can be referenced to the AKMA key generation method for the first device, and for the sake of brevity, the description is not repeated.

[0251] The first device may generate an AKMA key based on the second key and a fourth key generation algorithm. The fourth key generation algorithm may be the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm to reduce computational complexity of the first device. In some embodiments, the first device may generate the AKMA key based on the second key, the fourth key generation algorithm, and a fifth parameter. The fifth parameter may include one or more of the following: the AKMA key and an identifier of the first device.

[0252] For example, the AKMA key can be determined based on the following formula: K AKMA =f Ks (“AKMA”, “IDi”)

[0253] Among them, K AKMA represents the AKMA key, Ks represents the first anonymous key, and IDi represents the identity of the first device.

[0254] In some embodiments, the second key can be used to generate a key identifier. In other words, the first device can generate a key identifier based on the second key. The key identifier may include, for example, an A-TID and / or an A-KID. For example, the A-TID may be generated based on the identity of the first device, the first anonymous key, and a seventh key generation algorithm. The seventh key generation algorithm may be the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

[0255] For example, A-TID can be determined based on the following formula: A-TID = f Ks (IDi)

[0256] Wherein, f represents the seventh key generation algorithm, Ks represents the first anonymous key, and IDi represents the identity identifier of the first device.

[0257] In some embodiments, the A-KID may be generated based on the A-TID. For example, the A-KID may be generated based on the A-TID and a seventh parameter. The seventh parameter may include one or more of the following parameters: a RID and a home network identifier (HNI). To reduce computational complexity of the first device, the A-KID may be obtained by concatenating the A-TID, the RID, and the seventh parameter.

[0258] For example, the A-KID may be determined based on the following formula: A-KID = A-TID | | RID | | HNI

[0259] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may send key parameters to the AAnF and / or a key management server (KMS), where the key parameters may include one or more of the following: an AKMA key, an A-KID, and an identifier of the first device.

[0260] In some embodiments, after receiving the AKMA key, the AAnF and / or AMF may generate an application key (denoted as K) based on the AKMA key. AF The application key may be generated based on an eighth key generation algorithm and an eighth parameter. The eighth parameter may include one or more of the following parameters: AF ID, IDi, an identifier of the proxy node, and A-KID. The eighth key generation algorithm may be the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm to reduce computational complexity of the first device.

[0261] For example, the application key can be determined based on the following formula: K AF =f Ks (AF ID, IDi, UE ID, A-KID)

[0262] Among them, K AF represents the application key, f represents the eighth key generation algorithm, AF ID represents the identifier of AF, IDi represents the identity identifier of the first device, and UE ID represents the identifier of the proxy node.

[0263] In some embodiments, the AAnF may generate an application key after receiving an application key request message from the AF.

[0264] It is understandable that the first device generates the application key in the same manner as the AAnF generates the application key, which will not be described here for brevity. In some embodiments, the first device may generate the application key after sending an application session establishment request message to the AF.

[0265] In some embodiments, the application key can be used to generate a third key, and the third key can be used for secure communication between the first device and the proxy node. In other words, the first device and the proxy node can communicate securely based on the third key.

[0266] In some implementations, the third key may include an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key. That is, the device and the proxy node may generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key based on the application key. The method for generating the integrity protection key and / or the encryption key based on the application key may be a method known in the related art and is not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0267] In some implementations, the third key may be generated based on the application key and the first key. The first key is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node. To reduce computational complexity on the first device, the third key may be generated by XORing the application key and the first key.

[0268] For example, the third key can be determined based on the following formula: Ku1 = K AF ⊕N1

[0269] Among them, Ku1 represents the third key, K AF represents the application key, N1 represents the first key, and ⊕ represents an exclusive-OR operation.

[0270] In some embodiments, a third key (such as Ku1) can be used to further generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key. The embodiment of the present application can provide a simplified way for mobility management of the first device by first generating a third key and then generating an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key. For example, if the first device moves, resulting in a change in the connected proxy node, the first device can directly generate a third key based on the shared key between the first device and the proxy node, and further generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key, thereby eliminating the need to perform the authentication and key negotiation process between the first device and the network side.

[0271] For example, if the proxy node connected to the first device changes from the first proxy node to the second proxy node, the shared key between the first device and the first proxy node is N1, and the shared key between the first device and the second proxy node is N3. When the first device and the first proxy node are in a connected state, the first device can generate a third key based on the application key and N1, and further generate an integrity protection key and / or encryption key for secure communication with the first proxy node. When the first device and the second proxy node are in a connected state, the first device can generate a third key based on the application key and N3, and further generate an integrity protection key and / or encryption key for secure communication with the second proxy node. As can be seen from the above, when the connected proxy node changes, the first device can skip the authentication and key negotiation process to generate different integrity protection keys and / or encryption keys, and instead can generate different integrity protection keys and / or encryption keys based on different first keys to securely communicate with different proxy nodes.

[0272] In the case where the first message authentication code needs to be generated based on the first random number, if the first random number is selected by the authentication network element, the authentication network element may also send the first random number to the first device so that the first device can generate the second message authentication code based on the first random number.

[0273] In some embodiments, to ensure the security of the first random number, the authentication network element may use a first anonymous key to protect the transmission security of the first random number. To reduce computational complexity, the authentication network element may perform an exclusive OR operation on the first anonymous key and the first random number to obtain a tenth parameter, i.e., the tenth parameter may be N2⊕AK. The authentication network element may send the tenth parameter to the first device, or the authentication network element may send the eleventh parameter to the first device, and the eleventh parameter may be N2⊕AK||MAC. MAC is the first message authentication code, N2 is the first random number, AK is the first anonymous key, and || represents cascade.

[0274] After receiving the tenth parameter or the eleventh parameter sent by the authentication network element, the first device may determine a first random number based on the first anonymous key. Then, based on the first random number, it may generate a second message authentication code. Furthermore, the first device may authenticate the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code.

[0275] In some embodiments, in the case where the first message authentication code is generated based on the second random number, the authentication network element may further send the second random number to the first device, so that the first device generates a second message authentication code based on the second random number.

[0276] The following is a detailed introduction to the authentication and key agreement process with the participation of a proxy node, with reference to FIG11 to FIG13.

[0277] Figure 11 illustrates the authentication process between a first device and an authentication network element. The first device can share a key K with the authentication network element. This key K is the security credential described above. The first device can share a key N1 with the base station and / or proxy node. This key N1 is the first key described above. This key N1 can be a physical layer key.

[0278] 11 , in step S1102 , the first device sends an authentication request to the proxy node. The authentication request may include a hidden identity identifier DIDi of the first device. The hidden identity identifier DIDi may be generated based on the identity identifier IDi of the first device.

[0279] There are two ways to generate the hidden identity identifier DIDi. If N1 is a key (or random number) pre-shared between the first device and the AUSF, DIDi can be determined based on the following formula: DIDi = IDi ⊕ N1. After establishing the security context of the first device, the AUSF can send a new first key to the first device to update DIDi.

[0280] If N1 is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node (such as a physical layer key), DIDi can be based on the formula DIDi=IDi⊕N1 or DIDi=f N1 (IDi) OK.

[0281] In step S1104, the proxy node sends an authentication request to the serving domain network element. In some implementations, the proxy node may send the authentication request to the serving domain network element via the base station. The serving domain network element may include one or more of an AMF, a SEAF, an SMF, and an A-NF.

[0282] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include the identifiers of the DIDi and the proxy node. For example, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, the authentication request may include the identifiers of the DIDi and the proxy node.

[0283] In some embodiments, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, the proxy node can deanonymize DIDi based on N1 to obtain the identity identifier IDi of the first device. The authentication request sent by the proxy node may include one or more of the following: IDi, the identifier of the proxy node, and N1.

[0284] The identifier of the proxy node may include one or more of GPSI, SUCI, and GUTI.

[0285] To ensure information security, the proxy node may send an authentication request via a NAS message. For example, the proxy node may send an authentication request via a NAS security context.

[0286] In step S1106, the serving domain network element sends an authentication request to the authentication network element. The authentication request may include the serving domain network name (SN name). The authentication request may also include DIDi and the identifier of the proxy node. Alternatively, the authentication request may include IDi, N1, and the identifier of the proxy node.

[0287] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include an identifier that indicates the authentication type. The authentication type identifier may be indicated by one or more of the following: BSF ID, A-NF identification type, IDi type, authentication type identifier (Auth_type_ID).

[0288] In step S1108, the authentication network element may confirm the authentication type.

[0289] The authentication network element may query the subscription credentials of the first device and the proxy node through the core network element (such as UDM). The core network element may check the subscription credentials of the first device and the proxy node based on IDi and the identity of the proxy node to determine whether the first device is authorized to use the A-IoT service.

[0290] The authentication network element can determine the authentication type based on the identifier that can indicate the authentication type, such as determining whether the authentication type is A-IoT authentication.

[0291] If the authentication request received by the authentication network element includes DIDi, the authentication network element may de-anonymize DIDi to obtain IDi. For example, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, the authentication network element may de-anonymize DIDi based on N1 to obtain IDi. For example, IDi may be determined based on the formula IDi = DIDi ⊕ N1.

[0292] The authentication network element may generate a first anonymous key AK. If N1 is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, the first anonymous key AK may be determined based on the formula AK=K⊕N1. If N1 is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node (the proxy node may send N1 to the authentication network element), or N1 is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, the first anonymous key AK may be determined based on the formula AK=f K (RAND) where RAND is a random number selected by the authentication network element.

[0293] The authentication network element may generate a first message authentication code (referred to as MAC) and a first expected response (referred to as XRES1). MAC and XRES1 may be based on the formula MAC / XRES1=f K (RAND, N1, N2) is determined. N2 can be a key shared between the first device and the authentication network element, or N2 is a random number selected by the authentication network element.

[0294] The parameters introduced in the above-mentioned MAC and XRES1 generation methods include RAND, N1, and N2, but this is only an example and is not specifically limited in the present embodiment. For example, the parameters introduced in MAC and XRES1 may include only RAND, or RAND and N1, or RAND and N2.

[0295] MAC and XRES1 are generated differently, resulting in different MAC and XRES1 values. For example, if the same function f is used to calculate MAC and XRES1, the parameters introduced can be different. For another example, if the same parameters are introduced to calculate MAC and XRES1, different functions f can be used.

[0296] Function f can be of various types. For example, function f can be any of the functions f1-f5 defined by 3GPP. For another example, function f can be a KDF (such as HMAC-SHA256). For another example, function f can be another lightweight function (such as ASCON).

[0297] If N2 is a random number selected by the authentication network element, then AK can be used to protect N2, for example, N2 can be encrypted by AK.

[0298] The authentication network element may generate a second expected response XRES2, which is material for the service domain network to authenticate the first device. XRES2 may be based on the formula XRES2=f K (XRES1,SN name) OK.

[0299] The authentication network element may generate a third expected response XRES3, which is material for the base station to authenticate the first device. XRES3 may be based on the formula XRES3 = f N1 (XRES1) confirmed.

[0300] The authentication network element may generate an authentication vector. The authentication vector may include multiple parameters generated and / or selected by the authentication network element. For example, the authentication vector may include one or more of the following: RAND, N2, AK, MAC, XRES1, XRES2, and XRES3. If N2 is selected by the authentication network element, then the authentication vector may include N2; if N2 is shared between the first device and the authentication network element, then the authentication vector may not include N2.

[0301] In some embodiments, the authentication vector may be AV=RAND||N2⊕AK||MAC||XRES1||XRES2||XRES3. In other embodiments, the authentication vector may be AV=RAND||AK||MAC||XRES1||XRES2||XRES3.

[0302] In some embodiments, the authentication vector may further include one or more of the following parameters: IDi, UE ID, SN name.

[0303] In step S1110, the authentication network element sends an authentication response to the serving domain network element. The authentication response includes an authentication vector AV. In some embodiments, the authentication response may also include IDi.

[0304] In step S1112, after receiving the authentication vector, the serving domain network element may store XRES2 in the authentication vector.

[0305] In step S1114, the serving domain network element sends an authentication request (or authentication response) to the base station. The authentication request includes an authentication vector. In some embodiments, the authentication vector may not include XRES2. In some embodiments, the authentication response may also include IDi.

[0306] In step S1116, if the authentication vector includes XRES3, the base station stores XRES3; if the authentication vector does not include XRES3, the base station may generate XRES3 based on XRES1.

[0307] In step S1118, the base station sends an authentication request to the first device via the proxy node. The authentication request may include RAND and MAC. Alternatively, the authentication request may include RAND and N2⊕AK||MAC. If N2 is a random number selected by the authentication network element, the AK can be used to protect the security of N2.

[0308] In step S1120, after receiving the authentication request, the first device may verify the MAC. After successful verification, the first device may calculate the first response parameter RES1, the second response parameter RES2, and the third response parameter RES3. In addition, the first device may also generate a key Ks. The key Ks may be based on the following formula Ks = f AK (N1, N2, UE ID, IDi, SN name) is determined.

[0309] In step S1122, the first device sends an authentication response to the base station via the proxy node, wherein the authentication response includes RES1, RES2, and RES3.

[0310] In step S1124, the base station compares RES3 and XRES3 to authenticate the first device. If RES3 and XRES3 are consistent, the first device is successfully authenticated. From the perspective of the access network, the base station considers the first device to be successfully authenticated.

[0311] In step S1126, after the first device is successfully authenticated, the base station sends an authentication response to the serving domain network element, which includes RES2 and RES1.

[0312] In step S1128, after receiving the authentication response, the serving domain network element can obtain RES2 from the authentication response. The serving domain network element compares RES2 with XRES2 to authenticate the first device. After successful authentication, the serving domain network element considers the first device to be successfully authenticated from the perspective of the serving domain network.

[0313] In step S1130, the serving domain network element sends an authentication request (or authentication response) to the authentication network element, where the authentication request includes RES1.

[0314] In step S1132, the authentication network element compares RES1 and XRES1 to authenticate the first device. After the authentication is successful, the authentication network element considers the first device to be successfully authenticated from the perspective of the home domain network.

[0315] The authentication network element can also generate a key Ks. The key Ks can be based on the formula Ks = f AK (N1, N2, UE ID, IDi, SN name) is determined.

[0316] In step S1134, the authentication network element sends a response message to the proxy node or the authentication network element sends a response message to the serving domain network element. In some embodiments, the authentication network element may send a response message to the proxy node via the serving domain network element and the base station.

[0317] In some embodiments, the authentication response may include a key Ks, which may be used by the proxy node to generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key.

[0318] FIG12 shows the process of generating an AKMA key after the initial authentication (or lightweight initial authentication) is completed.

[0319] 12, in step S1202, the authentication network element generates a key Ks, an A-KID, and an AKMA key.The first device generates a key Ks, an A-KID, and an AKMA key.

[0320] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may generate an A-TID based on the key Ks. As an example, the A-TID may be generated based on Ks and IDi. For example, the A-TID may be generated based on the formula A-TID=f Ks (IDi) OK.

[0321] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may generate an A-KID based on the A-TID. As an example, the A-KID may be generated based on the A-TID, the RID, and the HNI. For example, the A-TID may be determined based on the formula A-KID=A-TID||RID||HNI.

[0322] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may generate an AKMA key (denoted as K AKMA ). The AKMA key can be generated based on Ks. In this case, the role of Ks is the same as that of K in the related art. AUSF As an example, the AKMA key can be generated based on Ks, IDi and AKMA. For example, the AKMA key can be generated based on the formula Kakma=f Ks("AKMA", "IDi") confirmed.

[0323] In step S1204, the authentication network element may send a registration request to the AAnF or KMS, which may include one or more of the following information: AKMA key, A-KID, and the first device's identifier IDi. The registration request may be, for example, an AKMA anchor key registration request (e.g., Naanf_AKMA_AnchorKey_Register Request).

[0324] Similarly, in step S1202, the first device may generate a key Ks, an A-KID, and an AKMA key. The first device generates the A-KID in a manner similar to that of the authentication network element, and the first device generates the AKMA key in a manner similar to that of the authentication network element. For the sake of brevity, these details are not repeated here.

[0325] FIG13 shows the process of generating an application key.

[0326] 13 , in step S1302 , the first device sends an application session establishment request to the AF. The application session establishment request may include the A-KID. The application session establishment request may also be other communication requests.

[0327] In some embodiments, the application session establishment request may include a UE ID and a DIDi. The UE ID may be, for example, a GPSI. The UE ID is an identifier of the proxy node.

[0328] In step S1304, after receiving the application session establishment request, the AF sends an application key request to the AAnF or KMS. The application key request may include the A-KID. In some embodiments, the application key request may also include the UE ID and DIDi.

[0329] In step S1306, after receiving the application key request, the AAnF or KMS may generate an application key based on the A-KID.

[0330] In some embodiments, the application key K AF Can be generated based on Ks, AF ID, IDi, UE ID and A-KID. For example, the application key K AF Based on the formula KAF=f Ks (AF ID, IDi, UE ID, A-KID) OK.

[0331] In step S1308, the AAnF or KMS sends an application key response to the AF. The application key response includes K AF and K AF validity period.

[0332] AAnF or KMS can store K AF and K AF to facilitate mobility management of the first device.

[0333] In step S1310, the AF sends an application key response to the proxy node. The application key response includes K AF and K AF validity period.

[0334] In step S1312, the proxy node generates a key Ku1. The key Ku1 can be based on K AF As an example, Ku1 can be generated based on K AF and N1. For example, Ku1 can be based on the formula Ku1=K AF ⊕N1 is determined, where N1 is the shared key between the first device and the proxy node.

[0335] In step S1314, the proxy node sends an application session establishment response to the first device.

[0336] In step S1316, the first device generates an application key K AF And the key Ku1. The first device generates K AF Generate K using AAnF or KMS AF The manner in which the first device generates the key Ku1 is similar to the manner in which the proxy node generates the key Ku1, and for the sake of brevity, details are not repeated here.

[0337] In step S1318, the first device may send a response message to the proxy node.

[0338] The key Ku1 can be used to generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key, which can be used to ensure secure communication between the first device and the proxy node. Later, if the first device uses another device (such as UEx) as a proxy node, the shared key Nx between the first device and UEx and K AF , generating a subordinate key Kux. This Kux can be used to further generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key. Thus, when the proxy node changes, the first device does not necessarily need to perform the first device authentication and key negotiation process, thereby reducing the complexity of the first device.

[0339] Example 2

[0340] In the solution of Example 2, the security credential is a 3GPP security credential, and the first device does not need to communicate with the network side through a proxy node, that is, the first device can communicate directly with the network side.

[0341] The difference between Example 2 and Example 1 is that: 1. no proxy node is involved, and 2. the authentication information does not include information of the proxy node (such as the identifier of the proxy node or the UE ID).

[0342] The solution of Example 2 is basically similar to that of Example 1. For matters not described in detail in Example 2, please refer to the description of Example 1.

[0343] FIG14 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application. Referring to FIG14 , in step S1410 , the authentication network element generates a first message authentication code and / or an expected response. The generation method of the first message authentication code and the expected response can be referred to the description of Example 1.

[0344] In step S1420, the authentication network element sends a first authentication request to the access network device. The first authentication request may include a first message authentication code.

[0345] The authentication network element sending the first authentication request to the access network device may refer to the authentication network element sending the first authentication request directly to the access network device, or may refer to the authentication network element sending the first authentication request to the access network device through another device. The other device may include, for example, a service domain network element. The service domain network element may include, for example, an AMF and / or an SMF.

[0346] In step S1430, the access network device sends a first authentication request to the first device.

[0347] In step S1440, the first device generates a second message authentication code based on the first key generation algorithm and the second parameter.

[0348] In step S1450, the first device authenticates the network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code.

[0349] In step S1460, when the authentication network element succeeds in authentication, the first device generates a response parameter.

[0350] In step S1470, the first device sends a first authentication response to the access network device, wherein the first authentication response includes response parameters.

[0351] In step S1480, the access network device sends a first authentication response to the authentication network element, wherein the first authentication response includes response parameters.

[0352] In some embodiments, the access network device may send a response parameter to the authentication network element. After receiving the response parameter, the authentication network element may compare the response parameter with an expected response to authenticate the first device.

[0353] In some embodiments, before receiving the first authentication request from the access network device, the first device may send a second authentication request to the access network device. In other words, the first device may trigger an authentication process between the first device and the network side by sending the second authentication request.

[0354] In some embodiments, the second authentication request may include a hidden identity of the first device. To ensure information security, the first device may anonymize the identity of the first device to obtain a hidden identity.

[0355] After receiving the second authentication request, the access network device may send the second authentication request to the authentication network element. The second authentication request sent by the access network device may include one or more of the following information: the first key, the identity of the first device, and the hidden identity.

[0356] In some embodiments, the access network device may adopt different processing strategies based on the first key. As an example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the network side, the second authentication request sent by the access network device may include a hidden identity.

[0357] As another example, if the first key is a shared key between the first device and the access network device, the access network device may deanonymize the hidden identity to obtain the identity of the first device. For example, the access network device may determine the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity.

[0358] If the hidden identity is generated by using the first key and the identity of the first device through an exclusive OR method, the access network device can determine the identity of the first device using the following formula:

[0359] IDi=DIDi⊕N1

[0360] Wherein, DIDi represents a hidden identity, IDi represents an identity of the first device, N1 represents a first key, and ⊕ represents an exclusive-OR operation.

[0361] If the hidden identity is generated based on the first key, the identity of the first device and the third key generation algorithm, the access network device can determine the identity of the first device by the following formula: IDi=f N1 (DIDi)

[0362] Wherein, DIDi represents a hidden identity, IDi represents an identity of the first device, N1 represents a first key, and f represents a third key generation algorithm.

[0363] After obtaining the identity of the first device, the second authentication request sent by the first device may include one or more of the following: the first key and the identity of the first device.

[0364] After the first device completes authentication with the authentication network element, a second key Ks may be generated. The second key may also be understood as a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element. The second key may be generated based on a sixth key generation algorithm and a sixth parameter. The sixth key generation algorithm may be the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm to reduce the computational complexity of the first device. The sixth parameter may include one or more of the following parameters: a first anonymous key, a first key, a first random number, an identifier of the first device, and a name of the service domain network.

[0365] For example, the second key can be determined based on the following formula: Ks=f AK (N1,N2,IDi,SN name)

[0366] Among them, Ks represents the second key, AK represents the first anonymous key, N1 represents the first key, N2 represents the first random number, IDi represents the identity of the first device, SN name represents the name of the service domain network, and f represents the sixth key generation algorithm.

[0367] 15 and 16 , the authentication and key negotiation process without the participation of a proxy node is described in detail below.

[0368] Figure 15 illustrates the authentication process between a first device and an authentication network element. The first device can share a key K with the authentication network element. This key K is the security credential described above. The first device can share a key N1 with the base station. This key N1 is the first key described above. This key N1 can be a physical layer key.

[0369] The method shown in FIG15 is basically similar to the solution shown in FIG11 . For matters not described in detail in FIG15 , reference can be made to the description in FIG11 .

[0370] 15 , in step S1502 , the first device sends an authentication request to the base station. The authentication request may include a hidden identity identifier DIDi of the first device. The hidden identity identifier DIDi may be generated based on the identity identifier IDi of the first device.

[0371] In step S1504, the base station sends an authentication request to the serving domain network element.

[0372] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include DIDi. For example, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, the authentication request may include DIDi.

[0373] In some embodiments, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the base station, the base station may deanonymize DIDi based on N1 to obtain the identity identifier IDi of the first device. The authentication request sent by the base station may include one or more of the following: IDi and N1.

[0374] In step S1506, the serving domain network element sends an authentication request to the authentication network element. The authentication request may include the name of the serving domain network (SN name). In some embodiments, the authentication request may also include DIDi, or the authentication request may include IDi and N1.

[0375] In step S1508, the authentication network element may confirm the authentication type.

[0376] In some embodiments, if the authentication request received by the authentication network element includes DIDi, the authentication network element may deanonymize DIDi to obtain IDi.

[0377] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may generate a first anonymity key AK, a first message authentication code, a first expected response, a second expected response, and a third expected response.

[0378] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may generate an authentication vector. The authentication vector may include multiple parameters generated and / or selected by the authentication network element. For example, the authentication vector may include one or more of the following: RAND, N2, AK, MAC, XRES1, XRES2, and XRES3. If N2 is selected by the authentication network element, then N2 may be included in the authentication vector; if N2 is shared between the first device and the authentication network element, then N2 may not be included in the authentication vector.

[0379] In some embodiments, the authentication vector may be AV=RAND||N2⊕AK||MAC||XRES1||XRES2||XRES3. In other embodiments, the authentication vector may be AV=RAND||AK||MAC||XRES1||XRES2||XRES3.

[0380] In some embodiments, the authentication vector may further include one or more of the following parameters: IDi, UE ID, SN name.

[0381] In step S1510, the authentication network element sends an authentication response to the serving domain network element, wherein the authentication response includes an authentication vector AV.

[0382] In step S1512, after receiving the authentication vector, the serving domain network element may store XRES2 in the authentication vector.

[0383] In step S1514, the serving domain network element sends an authentication request (or authentication response) to the base station. The authentication request includes an authentication vector. In some embodiments, the authentication vector may not include XRES2.

[0384] In step S1516, if the authentication vector includes XRES3, the base station stores XRES3; if the authentication vector does not include XRES3, the base station may generate XRES3 based on XRES1.

[0385] In step S1518, the base station sends an authentication request to the first device. The authentication request may include RAND and MAC. Alternatively, the authentication request may include RAND and N2⊕AK||MAC. If N2 is a random number selected by the authentication network element, the AK can be used to protect the security of N2.

[0386] In step S1520, after receiving the authentication request, the first device may verify the MAC. If the verification is successful, the first device may calculate the first response parameter RES1, the second response parameter RES2, and the third response parameter RES3. In addition, the first device may also generate a key Ks. The key Ks may be based on the following formula Ks = f AK (N1, N2, IDi, SN name) confirmed.

[0387] In step S1522, the first device sends an authentication response to the base station, which includes RES1, RES2, and RES3.

[0388] In step S1524, the base station compares RES3 and XRES3 to authenticate the first device. If RES3 and XRES3 are consistent, the first device is successfully authenticated. From the perspective of the access network, the base station considers the first device to be successfully authenticated.

[0389] In step S1526, after the first device is successfully authenticated, the base station sends an authentication response to the serving domain network element, which includes RES2 and RES1.

[0390] In step S1528, after receiving the authentication response, the serving domain network element can obtain RES2 from the authentication response. The serving domain network element compares RES2 with XRES2 to authenticate the first device. If the authentication is successful, the serving domain network element considers the first device to be successfully authenticated from the perspective of the serving domain network.

[0391] In step S1530, the serving domain network element sends an authentication request (or authentication response) to the authentication network element, where the authentication request includes RES1.

[0392] In step S1532, the authentication network element compares RES1 and XRES1 to authenticate the first device. After the authentication is successful, the authentication network element considers the first device to be successfully authenticated from the perspective of the home domain network.

[0393] The authentication network element can also generate a key Ks. The key Ks can be based on the formula Ks = f AK (N1, N2, IDi, SN name) confirmed.

[0394] In step S1534, the authentication network element may send a response message to the serving domain network element.

[0395] After obtaining the key Ks, the authentication network element and the first device may generate an AKMA key according to the method shown in Figure 12. In addition, the authentication network element may send a registration request to the AAnF or KMS, which may include one or more of the following information: the AKMA key, A-KID, and the identifier IDi of the first device.

[0396] FIG16 shows the process of generating an application key.

[0397] Referring to Figure 16, in step S1602, the first device sends an application session establishment request to the AF. The application session establishment request may include an A-KID. The application session establishment request may also be other communication requests. In some embodiments, the application session establishment request may include a DIDi.

[0398] In step S1604, after receiving the application session establishment request, the AF sends an application key request to the AAnF or KMS. The application key request may include the A-KID. In some embodiments, the application key request may also include the DIDi.

[0399] In step S1606, after receiving the application key request, the AAnF or KMS may generate an application key based on the A-KID.

[0400] In some embodiments, the application key K AF Can be generated based on Ks, AF ID, IDi and A-KID. For example, application key K AF Based on the formula K AF =f Ks (AF ID, IDi, A-KID) confirmed.

[0401] In step S1608, the AAnF or KMS sends an application key response to the AF. The application key response includes K AF and K AF validity period.

[0402] AAnF or KMS can store K AFand K AF to facilitate mobility management of the first device.

[0403] In step S1610 , the AF sends an application session establishment response to the first device.

[0404] Afterwards, the first device and AF can be based on K AF Establish a secure connection (such as a TLS connection).

[0405] Example 3

[0406] In the solution of Example 3, the security credential is a non-3GPP security credential, such as the security credential is a shared key between the first device and the application function network element, and the first device communicates with the network side through the proxy node.

[0407] Figure 17 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application. Referring to Figure 17, in step S1710, the first device sends an authentication request to the application function network element. In some embodiments, the first device may send the authentication request to the application function network element through a proxy node.

[0408] The authentication request may include one or more of the following information: a hidden identity of the first device, an identity of the first device, an identity of the proxy node, and a first key. In some embodiments, the authentication request may include the hidden identity of the first device and the identity of the proxy node. In other embodiments, the authentication request may include the identity of the first device, the identity of the proxy node, and the first key.

[0409] In step S1720, the application function network element performs an authorization check on the first device and / or the proxy node. For example, the application function network element may check whether the first device is authorized to use a certain service (such as an A-IoT service). For another example, the application function network element may check whether the proxy node is authorized to provide a service (such as an A-IoT service) as a proxy for the first device.

[0410] In some embodiments, the application function network element may manage a mapping between the whitelist of the first device and the proxy node.

[0411] When performing authorization check on the first device, the application function network element may perform authorization check on the first device based on the identity identifier IDi of the first device. When performing authorization check on the proxy node, the application function network element may perform authorization check on the proxy node based on the identifier of the proxy node (such as UE ID).

[0412] The identity identifier of the first device and the identifier of the proxy node may be sent by the proxy node to the application function network element.

[0413] In some embodiments, the first device may send an authentication request to the proxy node, where the authentication request may include the hidden identity DIDi of the first device. The proxy node may deanonymize the hidden identity DIDi to obtain the identity of the first device.

[0414] The proxy node may send an authentication request to the application function network element, wherein the authentication request may include the identity identifier IDi of the first device and the identifier of the proxy node. To ensure information security, the proxy node may send the authentication request via a NAS security context or an AS security context.

[0415] In step S1730, if the authorization check of the first device and / or the proxy node is successful, the application function network element sends an authentication request to the authentication network element.

[0416] If the authorization check of the first device and / or the proxy node fails, the application function network element may not send an authentication request to the authentication network element, that is, the subsequent authentication and key negotiation process may not be performed.

[0417] In the embodiment of the present application, the application function network element can first perform an authorization check on the first device and the proxy node. Only when the authorization check is successful can the subsequent authentication and key negotiation process be performed, which is conducive to reducing the computational complexity of the first device. For example, if the authorization check is performed after the authentication and key negotiation process is completed, the authorization check may fail, which will invalidate the authentication and key negotiation process of the first device, resulting in a waste of resources and not conducive to reducing the computational complexity of the first device.

[0418] In some embodiments, the hidden identity may be generated based on the first key N1. The first key may be a shared key between the first device and the application function network element, or a shared key (such as a physical layer key) between the first device and the proxy node.

[0419] If the first key is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, the proxy node can deanonymize the hidden identity based on the first key to obtain the identity of the first device. If the first key is a shared key between the first device and the application function network element, the application function network element can deanonymize the hidden identity to obtain the identity of the first device.

[0420] For example, the identity identifier IDi of the first device can be obtained by the formula IDi=DIDi⊕N1 or the formula IDi=f N1 (DIDi) OK.

[0421] If the first key is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, the authentication request sent by the proxy node to the application function network element may include the identity of the first device, the identity of the proxy node, and the first key. If the first key is a shared key between the first device and the application function network element, the authentication request sent by the proxy node to the application function network element may include the hidden identity of the first device and the identity of the proxy node.

[0422] In some embodiments, the application function network element may send the security credential K to the authentication network element, or the application function network element may send the authentication network element a subordinate key (denoted as Kb) of the security credential K. The subordinate key is a key generated based on the security credential K. The authentication network element may determine the security credential K based on the subordinate key.

[0423] The subordinate key can be generated based on one or more of the security credential K, the first key (denoted as N1), and the first random number (denoted as N2). For example, the subordinate key Kb can be generated based on the formula Kb = K⊕N1 or the formula Kb = K⊕N2. N2 can be a shared key between the first device and the AF, or it can be a random number selected by the AF.

[0424] If the authentication network element receives a security credential K, the authentication network element may generate parameters required for the authentication process based on the security credential K. These parameters may, for example, be parameters included in the authentication vector. These parameters may include, for example, one or more of the following: a first anonymous key, a first message authentication code, an expected response, a key Ks, and the like. The key Ks is a shared key generated after the first device and the authentication network element are successfully authenticated.

[0425] In some embodiments, the first anonymous key AK can be generated based on the security credential K and a target parameter. The target parameter may include RAND and / or N1. For example, the first anonymous key AK can be generated based on the formula AK=f K (RAND) or the formula AK=K⊕N1.

[0426] In some embodiments, the first message authentication code may be generated based on the security credential K and a target parameter. The target parameter may include one or more of the following: RAND, N1, and N2. For example, the target parameter includes RAND. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N1. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N2. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND, N1, and N2.

[0427] For example, the first message authentication code can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: MAC = f K (RAND, N1, N2), MAC = f K (RAND, N1), MAC = f K(RAND, N2), MAC = f K (RAND).

[0428] In some embodiments, the expected response may be generated based on the security credential K and a target parameter. The target parameter may include one or more of the following: RAND, N1, and N2. For example, the target parameter includes RAND. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N1. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N2. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND, N1, and N2.

[0429] For example, the expected response can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: XRES = f K (RAND, N1, N2), XRES = f K (RAND, N1), XRES = f K (RAND, N2), XRES = f K (RAND).

[0430] The key Ks can be generated based on the security credentials K and target parameters. The target parameters may include one or more of the following: AK, N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, HNI, and SN name. For example, the target parameters may include AK, N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, and HNI. For another example, the target parameters may include AK, N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, and SN name.

[0431] For example, the key Ks can be based on the formula Ks=f AK (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, HNI) or the formula Ks = f AK (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, SN name) is determined.

[0432] If the authentication network element receives the key Kb, the authentication network element may generate parameters required for the authentication process based on the key Kb. The parameters may be, for example, parameters included in the authentication vector. The parameters may include, for example, one or more of the following: a first message authentication code, an expected response, and the key Ks.

[0433] The first message authentication code may be generated based on the key Kb and a target parameter. The target parameter may include one or more of the following: RAND, N1, and N2. For example, the target parameter includes RAND. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N1. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N2. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND, N1, and N2.

[0434] For example, the first message authentication code can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: MAC = f Kb (RAND, N1, N2), MAC = f Kb (RAND, N1), MAC = f Kb (RAND, N2), MAC = f Kb (RAND).

[0435] In some embodiments, the expected response may be generated based on the security credential K and a target parameter. The target parameter may include one or more of the following: RAND, N1, and N2. For example, the target parameter includes RAND. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N1. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND and N2. For another example, the target parameter includes RAND, N1, and N2.

[0436] For example, the expected response can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: XRES = f Kb (RAND, N1, N2), XRES = f Kb (RAND, N1), XRES = f Kb (RAND, N2), XRES = f Kb (RAND).

[0437] The key Ks can be generated based on the security credentials K and target parameters. The target parameters may include one or more of the following: AK, N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, HNI, and SN name. For example, the target parameters may include AK, N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, and HNI. For another example, the target parameters may include AK, N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, and SN name.

[0438] For example, the key Ks can be based on the formula Ks=f Kb (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, HNI) or the formula Ks = f Kb (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, SN name) is determined.

[0439] In some embodiments, the first device may generate one or more of the following parameters: a first anonymity key, a second message authentication code, a response parameter, a key Ks, etc., in the same manner as the authentication network element. For example, the second message authentication code may be generated in the same manner as the first message authentication code. For another example, the response parameter may be generated in the same manner as the expected response.

[0440] In some embodiments, the expected response may include a first expected response, a second expected response, and a third expected response. The first expected response may be generated in the manner described above. The second and third expected responses may be generated based on the first expected response. For specific generation methods, see the description in other examples.

[0441] In some embodiments, the response parameters may include a first response parameter, a second response parameter, and a third response parameter. The first response parameter may be generated in the manner described above. The second and third response parameters may be generated based on the first response parameter. For specific generation methods, see the description in other examples.

[0442] The f in the above formula may be the same key generation algorithm, or may include a first key generation algorithm and a second key generation algorithm. For example, the first key generation algorithm is used to generate a first message authentication code or a second message authentication code, and the second key generation algorithm is used to generate an expected response or response parameters.

[0443] After obtaining Ks, the first device and the authentication network element can generate one or more of A-TID, A-KID, and AKMA key based on Ks. For specific generation methods, please refer to the description of other examples above.

[0444] Since the application function network element participates in the authentication and key negotiation process, the application function network element can directly receive the application key sent by the AAnF. For example, after generating the application key, the AAnF can directly send the application key to the AF without the AF sending an application key request to trigger it.

[0445] After receiving the application key, the AF may send the application key to the proxy node, which may be used by the proxy node to generate a third key (eg, Ku1).

[0446] The manner in which the AAnF generates the application key and the manner in which the proxy node generates the third key can be found in the foregoing description and will not be repeated here.

[0447] The authentication and key negotiation process between the first device and the network side involved in the scheme shown in Figure 17 can be similar to the scheme in the previous text. For matters not described in detail, please refer to the previous description. For the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.

[0448] The following describes in detail the authentication and key agreement process with the participation of a proxy node in conjunction with Figure 18. In the solution shown in Figure 18, the first device may share a key K with the AF.

[0449] 18 , in step S1802 , the first device sends an authentication request to the proxy node. The authentication request includes the hidden identity DIDi of the first device. The hidden identity DIDi can be generated based on the identity IDi of the first device.

[0450] There are two ways to generate the hidden identity identifier DIDi. If N1 is a pre-shared key (or random number) between the first device and the AF, DIDi can be determined based on the following formula: DIDi = IDi ⊕ N1. After establishing the security context of the first device, the AF can send a new first key to the first device to update DIDi.

[0451] If N1 is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node (such as a physical layer key), DIDi can be based on the formula DIDi=IDi⊕N1 or DIDi=f N1 (IDi) OK.

[0452] In step S1804, the proxy node sends an authentication request to the AF.

[0453] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include the DIDi and the identifier of the proxy node. For example, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the AF, the authentication request may include the DIDi and the identifier of the proxy node.

[0454] In some embodiments, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, the proxy node can deanonymize DIDi based on N1 to obtain the identity identifier IDi of the first device. The authentication request sent by the proxy node may include one or more of the following: IDi, the identifier of the proxy node, and N1.

[0455] The identifier of the proxy node may include one or more of GPSI, SUCI, and GUTI.

[0456] To ensure information security, the proxy node may send an authentication request via a NAS message. For example, the proxy node may send an authentication request via a NAS security context.

[0457] In step S1806, the AF may perform authorization management.

[0458] In some embodiments, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the AF, the AF can de-anonymize the first device using N1 to obtain the identity IDi of the first device. For example, IDi can be obtained by the formula IDi=DIDi⊕N1 or the formula IDi=f N1 (DIDi) OK.

[0459] In some embodiments, the AF can check whether the first device is authorized. In some embodiments, the AF can check whether the proxy node is authorized to provide services (such as A-IoT services) for the first device. In some embodiments, the AF can also check the mapping relationship between the first device and the proxy node. The AF can manage the mapping between the first device's whitelist and the proxy node list.

[0460] In some embodiments, if the authentication request received by the AF includes IDi, the identifier of the proxy node, and N1, the AF may directly perform an authorization check and manage the mapping between the first device and the proxy node.

[0461] In step S1808, the AF sends an authentication request to the authentication network element. The authentication request may include the security credential K or a subordinate key Kb derived from the security credential K. In some embodiments, the authentication request may also include one or more of the following information: IDi, UE ID, AF ID.

[0462] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include one or more of the following: K, K||N1, K||N1||N2, and K||N2. N1 may be a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, or N1 may be a shared key between the first device and the AF. N2 may be a shared key between the first device and the AF, or N2 may be a random number selected by the AF.

[0463] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include one or more of the following: Kb, Kb||N2, Kb||N1.

[0464] If Kb is generated based on K and N1, the authentication request may include Kb||N2; if Kb is generated based on K and N2, the authentication request may include Kb||N1.

[0465] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include an identifier that can indicate the authentication type. The authentication type identifier can be indicated by one or more of the following: AF ID, IDi type, and authentication type identifier (Auth_type_ID).

[0466] In step S1810, the first device performs authentication (such as AKA authentication) with the authentication network element. The authentication method can be described in the above description, such as the description of FIG11.

[0467] The proxy node may forward the authentication message between the first device and the authentication network element.

[0468] The authentication network element may query the subscription credentials of the first device and the proxy node through the core network element (such as UDM). The core network element may check the subscription credentials of the first device and the proxy node based on IDi and the identity of the proxy node to determine whether the first device is authorized to use the A-IoT service.

[0469] The authentication network element can determine the authentication type based on the identifier that can indicate the authentication type, such as determining whether the authentication type is A-IoT authentication.

[0470] The authentication network element generates an authentication vector. The authentication network element may select a random number RAND, which may be used to generate the authentication vector.

[0471] If the authentication request received by the authentication network element includes one or more of K, K||N1, K||N1||N2, and K||N2, the authentication network element may generate authentication parameters based on K and RAND. The authentication parameters include one or more of the following: a first anonymity key AK, a first message authentication code MAC, an expected response XRES, and an authentication vector AV.

[0472] The first anonymous key AK can be expressed by the formula AK=f K (RAND) or the formula AK=K⊕N1.

[0473] The first message authentication code MAC can be based on the formula MAC=f K (RAND, N1, N2) is determined.

[0474] The expected response XRES can be calculated based on the formula XRES = f K (RAND, N1, N2) is determined.

[0475] The authentication vector may be AV=RAND||AK||MAC||XRES.

[0476] MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same function f and different parameters. Alternatively, MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same parameters and different functions f.

[0477] If the authentication request received by the authentication network element includes one or more of Kb, Kb||N1, and Kb||N2, the authentication network element may generate authentication parameters based on Kb and RAND. The authentication parameters include one or more of the following: a first message authentication code MAC, an expected response XRES, and an authentication vector AV.

[0478] The first message authentication code MAC may be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: MAC=f Kb (RAND, N1, N2), MAC = f Kb (RAND), MAC = fKb (RAND, N1), MAC = f Kb (RAND,N2).

[0479] The expected response XRES can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: XRES = f Kb (RAND, N1, N2), XRES = f Kb (RAND), XRES = f Kb (RAND, N1), XRES = f Kb (RAND,N2).

[0480] The authentication vector may be AV=RAND||MAC||XRES.

[0481] MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same function f and different parameters. Alternatively, MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same parameters and different functions f.

[0482] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may send an authentication response to the first device via a proxy node. The authentication response may include RAND and a first message authentication code. In some embodiments, if N2 is a random number selected by the AF, the authentication response may also include AK⊕N2 or Kb⊕N2, where AK and Kb are used to protect N2 to ensure secure transmission of N2. In some embodiments, the authentication response may include the AF ID and IDi.

[0483] The first device may calculate the second message authentication code and compare the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to authenticate the network element. After successful authentication, the first device may generate a key Ks. The key Ks may be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: Ks = f AK (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, SN name), Ks=f AK (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, HNI), Ks = f Kb (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, SN name), Ks=f Kb (N1,N2,IDi,UE ID,AF ID,HNI).

[0484] In some embodiments, the first device may generate an A-TID. The A-TID may be based on the formula A-TID=f Ks(IDi) is determined. In some embodiments, the first device may generate an A-KID, which may be determined based on the formula A-KID=A-TID||RID||HNI. In some embodiments, the first device may generate an AKMA key, which may be determined based on the formula K AKMA =f Ks ("AKMA", "IDi") confirmed.

[0485] In some embodiments, the first device may generate a response parameter RES, which is calculated in the same manner as XRES.

[0486] The first device may send an authentication response to the authentication network element via the proxy node. The authentication response may include a response parameter RES. The authentication network element may compare RES with XRES to authenticate the first device. If RES and XRES are consistent, authentication of the first device succeeds; if RES and XRES are inconsistent, authentication of the first device fails. After successful authentication of the first device, the authentication network element may generate one or more of the following parameters: Ks, A-TID, A-KID, and AKMA key. The authentication network element generates these parameters in the same manner as the first device.

[0487] In step S1812, the authentication network element provides key material to the AAnF, where the key material may include an AKMA key and an A-KID.

[0488] In step S1814, the AAnF generates an application key K based on the AKMA key. AF Application key K AF Based on the formula K AF =f KAKMA (AF ID, IDi, UE ID) confirmed.

[0489] In step S1816, the AAnF sends a response message to the AF and / or proxy node. This message may be a successful response message. The response message may include the application key and / or the validity period of the application key. In some embodiments, the response message may also include a newly selected first key (or random number). The new first key can be used to update the hidden identity.

[0490] In step S1818, the proxy node generates a key Ku1.

[0491] In step S1820, the first device generates a key Ku1.

[0492] The key Ku1 can be generated based on the application key. The specific generation method can be found in the above description.

[0493] In some embodiments, the proxy node may send a response message to the first device. The response message includes one or more of the following information: A-KID, validity period of the application key, newly selected first key, message integrity check (MIC). The response message may be protected by a key, such as integrity protection and / or encryption protection. The key may include one or more of the following: K AF , Ku1, by K AF Derived subordinate key, subordinate key derived from Ku1.

[0494] The shared key N1 between the first device and the proxy node can be used for mobility management. For example, the first device and the proxy node can use N1 and K AF Generate the key Ku1, and then generate the integrity protection key and / or encryption key based on Ku1. Afterwards, if the first device uses another device (such as UEx) as a proxy node, the shared key Nx between the first device and UEx, and K AF , generating a subordinate key Kux. This Kux can be used to further generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key. Thus, when the proxy node changes, the first device does not necessarily need to perform the first device authentication and key negotiation process, thereby reducing the complexity of the first device.

[0495] Of course, in some embodiments, the authentication network element may also generate XRES1, XRES2 and XRES3 in the manner described above, and the first device may generate RES1, RES2 and RES3 in the manner described above.

[0496] Example 4

[0497] In the solution of Example 4, the security credential is a non-3GPP security credential, such as the security credential is a shared key between the first device and the application function network element, and the first device communicates directly with the network side.

[0498] Figure 19 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present application. Referring to Figure 19, in step S1910, the first device sends an authentication request to the application function network element.

[0499] The authentication request may include one or more of the following information: a hidden identity of the first device, an identity of the first device, and a first key. In some embodiments, the authentication request may include the hidden identity of the first device. In other embodiments, the authentication request may include the identity of the first device and the first key.

[0500] In some embodiments, the hidden identity may be generated based on a first key N1. The first key may be a shared key between the first device and the application function network element.

[0501] In step S1920, the application function network element performs an authorization check on the first device. For example, the application function network element may check whether the first device is authorized to use a certain service (such as an A-IoT service).

[0502] In some embodiments, the application function network element may manage a whitelist of the first device.

[0503] When the application function network element performs an authorization check on the first device, it may perform an authorization check on the first device based on the identity identifier IDi of the first device. In some embodiments, the authentication request may include a hidden identity identifier DIDi of the first device. The application function network element may deanonymize the hidden identity identifier DIDi to obtain the identity identifier of the first device. For example, the application function network element may use the first key N1 to deanonymize the hidden identity identifier DIDi to obtain the identity identifier of the first device. For example, the identity identifier IDi of the first device may be obtained by the formula IDi=DIDi⊕N1 or the formula IDi=f N1 (DIDi) OK.

[0504] In step S1930, if the first device authorization check is successful, the application function network element sends an authentication request to the authentication network element.

[0505] If the authorization check of the first device fails, the application function network element may not send an authentication request to the authentication network element, that is, the subsequent authentication and key negotiation process may not be performed.

[0506] In the embodiment of the present application, the application function network element can first perform an authorization check on the first device. Only when the authorization check is successful can the subsequent authentication and key negotiation process be performed, which is conducive to reducing the computational complexity of the first device. For example, if the authorization check is performed after the authentication and key negotiation process is completed, the authorization check may fail, which will invalidate the authentication and key negotiation process of the first device, thereby wasting resources and not conducive to reducing the computational complexity of the first device.

[0507] In some embodiments, the application function network element may send the security credential K to the authentication network element, or the application function network element may send the authentication network element a subordinate key (denoted as Kb) of the security credential K. The subordinate key is a key generated based on the security credential K. The authentication network element may determine the security credential K based on the subordinate key.

[0508] The subordinate key can be generated based on one or more of the security credential K, the first key (denoted as N1), and the first random number (denoted as N2). For example, the subordinate key Kb can be generated based on the formula Kb = K⊕N1 or the formula Kb = K⊕N2. N2 can be a shared key between the first device and the AF, or it can be a random number selected by the AF.

[0509] If the authentication network element receives a security credential K, the authentication network element may generate parameters required for the authentication process based on the security credential K. These parameters may, for example, be parameters included in the authentication vector. These parameters may include, for example, one or more of the following: a first anonymous key, a first message authentication code, an expected response, a key Ks, and the like. The key Ks is a shared key generated after successful authentication between the first device and the authentication network element. The specific generation methods for these parameters can be found in the description of Example 3 and are not detailed here for the sake of brevity.

[0510] If the authentication network element receives the key Kb, the authentication network element may generate parameters required for the authentication process based on the key Kb. These parameters may, for example, be parameters included in the authentication vector. These parameters may include, for example, one or more of the following: a first message authentication code, an expected response, and the key Ks. The specific generation methods of these parameters can be found in the description of Example 3 and are not detailed here for the sake of brevity.

[0511] In some embodiments, the first device may generate one or more of the following parameters: a first anonymity key, a second message authentication code, a response parameter, a key Ks, etc., in the same manner as the authentication network element. For example, the second message authentication code may be generated in the same manner as the first message authentication code. For another example, the response parameter may be generated in the same manner as the expected response.

[0512] In some embodiments, the expected response may include a first expected response, a second expected response, and a third expected response. The first expected response may be generated in the manner described above. The second and third expected responses may be generated based on the first expected response. For specific generation methods, see the description in other examples.

[0513] In some embodiments, the response parameters may include a first response parameter, a second response parameter, and a third response parameter. The first response parameter may be generated in the manner described above. The second and third response parameters may be generated based on the first response parameter. For specific generation methods, see the description in other examples.

[0514] The f in the above formula may be the same key generation algorithm, or may include a first key generation algorithm and a second key generation algorithm. For example, the first key generation algorithm is used to generate a first message authentication code or a second message authentication code, and the second key generation algorithm is used to generate an expected response or response parameters.

[0515] After obtaining Ks, the first device and the authentication network element can generate one or more of A-TID, A-KID, and AKMA key based on Ks. For specific generation methods, please refer to the description of other examples above.

[0516] Since the application function network element participates in the authentication and key negotiation process, the application function network element can directly receive the application key sent by the AAnF. For example, after generating the application key, the AAnF can directly send the application key to the AF without the AF sending an application key request to trigger it.

[0517] After receiving the application key, the AF may send the application key to the proxy node, which may be used by the proxy node to generate a third key (eg, Ku1).

[0518] The manner in which the AAnF generates the application key and the manner in which the proxy node generates the third key can be found in the foregoing description and will not be repeated here.

[0519] The authentication and key negotiation process between the first device and the network side involved in the scheme shown in Figure 19 can be similar to the scheme in the previous text. For matters not described in detail, please refer to the previous description. For the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.

[0520] The following describes in detail the authentication and key agreement process without the participation of a proxy node in conjunction with Figure 20. In the solution shown in Figure 20, the first device may share a key K with the AF.

[0521] 20, in step S2002, the first device sends an authentication request to the AF. The authentication request includes the hidden identity identifier DIDi of the first device. The hidden identity identifier DIDi can be generated based on the identity identifier IDi of the first device.

[0522] If N1 is a key (or random number) pre-shared between the first device and the AF, DIDi may be determined based on the following formula: DIDi=IDi⊕N1. After establishing the security context of the first device, the AF may send a new first key to the first device to update DIDi.

[0523] In step S2004, AF may perform authorization management.

[0524] In some embodiments, if N1 is a shared key between the first device and the AF, the AF can de-anonymize the first device using N1 to obtain the identity IDi of the first device. For example, IDi can be obtained by the formula IDi=DIDi⊕N1 or the formula IDi=f N1 (DIDi) OK.

[0525] In some embodiments, the AF may check whether the first device is authorized. In some embodiments, the AF may also manage a whitelist of the first device.

[0526] In step S2006, the AF sends an authentication request to the authentication network element. The authentication request may include the security credential K or a subordinate key Kb derived from the security credential K. In some embodiments, the authentication request may also include the AF ID and IDi.

[0527] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include one or more of the following: K, K||N1, K||N1||N2, and K||N2. N1 may be a shared key between the first device and the proxy node, or N1 may be a shared key between the first device and the AF. N2 may be a shared key between the first device and the AF, or N2 may be a random number selected by the AF.

[0528] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include one or more of the following: Kb, Kb||N2, Kb||N1.

[0529] If Kb is generated based on K and N1, the authentication request may include Kb||N2; if Kb is generated based on K and N2, the authentication request may include Kb||N1.

[0530] In some embodiments, the authentication request may include an identifier that can indicate the authentication type. The authentication type identifier can be indicated by one or more of the following: AF ID, IDi type, and authentication type identifier (Auth_type_ID).

[0531] In step S2008, the first device performs authentication (such as AKA authentication) with the authentication network element. The authentication method can be described in the above text, such as the description of FIG11.

[0532] The authentication network element may query the subscription credentials of the first device and the proxy node through the core network element (such as UDM). The core network element may check the subscription credentials of the first device and the proxy node based on IDi and the identity of the proxy node to determine whether the first device is authorized to use the A-IoT service.

[0533] The authentication network element can determine the authentication type based on the identifier that can indicate the authentication type, such as determining whether the authentication type is A-IoT authentication.

[0534] The authentication network element generates an authentication vector. The authentication network element may select a random number RAND, which may be used to generate the authentication vector.

[0535] If the authentication request received by the authentication network element includes one or more of K, K||N1, K||N1||N2, and K||N2, the authentication network element may generate authentication parameters based on K and RAND. The authentication parameters include one or more of the following: a first anonymity key AK, a first message authentication code MAC, an expected response XRES, and an authentication vector AV.

[0536] The first anonymous key AK can be expressed by the formula AK=f K (RAND) or the formula AK=K⊕N1.

[0537] The first message authentication code MAC can be based on the formula MAC=f K (RAND, N1, N2) is determined.

[0538] The expected response XRES can be calculated based on the formula XRES = f K (RAND, N1, N2) is determined.

[0539] The authentication vector may be AV=RAND||AK||MAC||XRES.

[0540] MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same function f and different parameters. Alternatively, MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same parameters and different functions f.

[0541] If the authentication request received by the authentication network element includes one or more of Kb, Kb||N1, and Kb||N2, the authentication network element may generate authentication parameters based on Kb and RAND. The authentication parameters include one or more of the following: a first message authentication code MAC, an expected response XRES, and an authentication vector AV.

[0542] The first message authentication code MAC may be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: MAC=f Kb (RAND, N1, N2), MAC = f Kb (RAND), MAC = f Kb (RAND, N1), MAC = f Kb (RAND,N2).

[0543] The expected response XRES can be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: XRES = f Kb (RAND, N1, N2), XRES = f Kb (RAND), XRES = fKb (RAND, N1), XRES = f Kb (RAND,N2).

[0544] The authentication vector may be AV=RAND||MAC||XRES.

[0545] MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same function f and different parameters. Alternatively, MAC and XRES can be calculated using the same parameters and different functions f.

[0546] In some embodiments, the authentication network element may send an authentication response to the first device via a proxy node. The authentication response may include RAND and a first message authentication code. In some embodiments, if N2 is a random number selected by the AF, the authentication response may also include AK⊕N2 or Kb⊕N2, where AK and Kb are used to protect N2 to ensure secure transmission of N2. In some embodiments, the authentication response may include the AF ID and IDi.

[0547] The first device may calculate the second message authentication code and compare the first message authentication code with the second message authentication code to authenticate the network element. After successful authentication, the first device may generate a key Ks. The key Ks may be determined based on one or more of the following formulas: Ks = f AK (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, SN name), Ks=f AK (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, HNI), Ks = f Kb (N1, N2, IDi, UE ID, AF ID, SN name), Ks=f Kb (N1,N2,IDi,UE ID,AF ID,HNI).

[0548] In some embodiments, the first device may generate an A-TID. The A-TID may be based on the formula A-TID=f Ks (IDi) is determined. In some embodiments, the first device may generate an A-KID, which may be determined based on the formula A-KID=A-TID||RID||HNI. In some embodiments, the first device may generate an AKMA key, which may be determined based on the formula K AKMA =f Ks ("AKMA", "IDi") confirmed.

[0549] In some embodiments, the first device may generate a response parameter RES, which is calculated in the same manner as XRES.

[0550] The first device may send an authentication response to the authentication network element via the proxy node. The authentication response may include a response parameter RES. The authentication network element may compare RES with XRES to authenticate the first device. If RES and XRES are consistent, authentication of the first device succeeds; if RES and XRES are inconsistent, authentication of the first device fails. After successful authentication of the first device, the authentication network element may generate one or more of the following parameters: Ks, A-TID, A-KID, and AKMA key. The authentication network element generates these parameters in the same manner as the first device.

[0551] In step S2010, the authentication network element provides key material to the AAnF, where the key material may include an AKMA key and an A-KID.

[0552] In step S2012, AAnF generates an application key K based on the AKMA key. AF Application key K AF Based on the formula K AF =f KAKMA (AF ID, IDi, UE ID) is determined. Similarly, the first device generates the application key K based on the AKMA key AF .

[0553] In step S2014, the AAnF sends a response message to the AF. The response message may be a success response message. The response message includes the application key and / or the validity period of the application key. In some embodiments, the response message may also include a newly selected first key (or random number). The new first key can be used to update the hidden identity.

[0554] In step S2016, the AF sends a response message to the first device. The response message includes one or more of the following information: A-KID, validity period of the application key, newly selected first key, and message integrity check (MIC). The response message can be protected by a key, such as integrity protection and / or encryption protection. The key can include one or more of the following: K AF , Ku1, by K AF Derived subordinate key, subordinate key derived from Ku1.

[0555] The solution described below is applicable to all four examples above.

[0556] In some embodiments, to reduce the number of key derivations, the authentication network element may send Ks to the proxy node, so that the proxy node protects information transmitted over the air interface based on Ks. For example, the proxy node may generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key based on Ks, and the integrity protection key and / or encryption key are used for secure communication between the first device and the proxy node.

[0557] In some embodiments, in order to reduce the number of key derivations, the authentication network element can send Ks to AF, and AF and the first device can establish a secure connection (such as a transport layer security (TLS) connection) based on Ks to protect information transmitted in the air interface.

[0558] In some embodiments, for solutions involving proxy nodes, before triggering authentication and key negotiation between the first device and the network side, the first device can perform mutual authentication with the proxy node to avoid a malicious first device using the proxy node to launch a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack on the network, affecting network quality, or a malicious proxy node launching a man-in-the-middle attack to steal communication data between the first device and the network or third-party applications, or the authentication signaling of the first device is carried on a malicious proxy node, resulting in failure of successful authentication and key negotiation.

[0559] The authentication method between the first device and the proxy node may include one or more of the following: pairing, activation of the first device by the proxy node, physical unclonable function (PUF), and physical layer authentication.

[0560] After successful authentication, the proxy node can use its own security context to protect the authentication message of the first device. For example, after receiving the authentication request or response message from the first device, the proxy node can transmit the authentication container of the first device (such as Tag_authentication_container) using the NAS security context or AS security context of the first device to interact with the network side.

[0561] The information transmission between the AF and the authentication network element mentioned above can be implemented through a network exposure function (NEF). For example, the NEF can forward the transmission messages between the AF and the authentication network element.

[0562] The security credentials mentioned above may also be referred to as keys or root keys, etc.

[0563] The solution described above is based on the application of a key to protect the secure transmission between the first device and the proxy node. In some embodiments, in order to reduce the number of key derivations, the key Ks can be directly used to protect the secure transmission between the first device and the proxy node. In other words, the key Ks is equivalent to the key K AF For example, the authentication network element may send the key Ks to the proxy node, and the proxy node may generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key based on the key Ks. Similarly, the first device may also generate an integrity protection key and / or an encryption key based on the key Ks.

[0564] In some embodiments, the key Ks may be used to generate a NAS security context and / or an AS security context. For example, the authentication network element may generate Ks based on Ks. AMF and provide K to AMF AMF In this case, Ks is equivalent to K AUSF AMF can be based on K AMF Generate NAS security context. For example, the authentication network element can provide Ks to AMF. In this case, Ks is equivalent to K AMF The AMF may generate a NAS security context based on Ks. The NAS security context may include, for example, Knas-int and Knas-enc.

[0565] For another example, the authentication network element can generate Kgnb based on Ks and provide Kgnb to the base station. In this case, Ks is equivalent to K AUSF The base station can generate an AS security context based on Kgnb. For another example, the authentication network element can provide Ks to the base station. In this case, Ks is equivalent to the function of Kgnb. The base station can generate an AS security context based on Ks.

[0566] In some embodiments, the proxy node's relay mode can include L2 relay and L3 relay. That is, when the proxy node is used for relay communication, the protocol stack used by the relay can belong to the L2 layer or the L3 layer. For L2 relay, there is a separate context between the first device and the core network. There is a hop-by-hop and end-to-end secure connection between the first device and the network. For L3 relay, the first device only needs to establish a secure connection with the proxy node.

[0567] For an L3 relay, the security context may include the security context between the first device and the proxy node. For an L2 relay, the security context may include the security context between the first device and the proxy node, the NAS security context, and the AS security context.

[0568] The function f in the above formula can be any of the functions f1-f5 defined by 3GPP. Alternatively, the function f can be a KDF (such as HMAC-SHA256). Alternatively, the function f can be another lightweight function (such as ASCON).

[0569] The home domain network element or authentication network element mentioned above may include one or more of the following network elements: UDM, AUSF, KMS, ARPF. The service domain network element mentioned above may include one or more of the following: AMF, SMF, SEAF, and A-NF, a core network element specific to A-IoT services.

[0570] If the proxy node mentioned above is a terminal device, the identifier of the proxy node can be represented by UE ID.

[0571] The first key N1 mentioned above has three uses: first, it can be used to protect the identity of the first device; second, it can be used to calculate the authentication vector and the shared key Ks; third, it can be used for mobility management, that is, to generate Ku1.

[0572] It should be noted that the embodiment of the present application does not limit the generation of the key, which can be of any length. The key generation process may introduce values ​​such as the number FC and the parameter length, and the embodiment of the present application does not specifically limit the size of these values.

[0573] The method embodiment of the present application is described in detail above in conjunction with Figures 1 to 20. The device embodiment of the present application is described in detail below in conjunction with Figures 21 to 25. It should be understood that the description of the method embodiment corresponds to the description of the device embodiment. Therefore, for parts not described in detail, reference can be made to the above method embodiment.

[0574] Figure 21 is a schematic block diagram of a first device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The first device 2100 shown in Figure 21 can be any of the first devices described above. The first device 2100 may include a receiving unit 2110, a generating unit 2120, an authenticating unit 2130, and a sending unit 2140. These units are described in detail below.

[0575] The receiving unit 2110 is configured to receive a first authentication request from a proxy node, where the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code generated by an authentication network element.

[0576] The generating unit 2120 is configured to generate a second message authentication code based on the first key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

[0577] The authentication unit 2130 is configured to authenticate the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code.

[0578] The generating unit 2120 is further configured to, when the authentication network element succeeds in authentication, generate a response parameter by the first device.

[0579] The sending unit 2140 is configured to send a first authentication response to the proxy node, where the first authentication response includes the response parameters, and the response parameters are used to authenticate the first device.

[0580] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: generate the first response parameter based on the first key generation algorithm and the second parameter.

[0581] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: generate the first response parameter based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

[0582] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a second response parameter, the second response parameter is used for the service domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to generate the second response parameter based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

[0583] In some implementations, the response parameters include a third response parameter, and the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device. The generating unit is configured to generate the third response parameter based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

[0584] In some implementations, the generating unit is further used to: before receiving a first authentication request from the proxy node, perform an XOR operation on the identity identifier of the first device and the first key to generate a hidden identity identifier of the first device; the sending unit is further used to: send a second authentication request to the proxy node, wherein the second authentication request includes the hidden identity identifier.

[0585] In some implementations, the generating unit is further used to: before receiving a first authentication request from the proxy node, generate a hidden identity of the first device based on the identity of the first device, the first key and the third key generation algorithm, wherein the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm; the sending unit is further used to: send a second authentication request to the proxy node, wherein the second authentication request includes the hidden identity.

[0586] In some implementations, the first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, or the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node.

[0587] In some implementations, the generating unit is further configured to: generate a second key when the authentication network element is successfully authenticated; and generate an application layer authentication and key management key based on the second key and a fourth key generation algorithm.

[0588] In some implementations, the sending unit is further used to: send an application session establishment request message to the proxy node; the receiving unit is further used to: receive an application session establishment response message from the proxy node; the generating unit is further used to: in response to receiving the application session establishment response message, generate an application key based on the authentication and key management key of the application layer; and generate a third key based on the application key, a first key and a fifth key generation algorithm, wherein the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the fifth key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm; the device also includes a communication unit for securely communicating with the proxy node based on the third key.

[0589] Figure 22 is a schematic block diagram of a proxy node provided by an embodiment of the present application. The proxy node 2200 shown in Figure 22 can be any of the proxy nodes described above. The proxy node 2200 can include a sending unit 2210 and a receiving unit 2220. These units are described in detail below.

[0590] The sending unit 2210 is used to send a first authentication request to the first device, where the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code. The first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element. The first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element. The second message authentication code is generated by the first device. The first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter.

[0591] The receiving unit 2220 is configured to receive a first authentication response from the first device, where the first authentication response includes a response parameter, which is used to authenticate the first device and is generated when the authentication network element successfully authenticates the first device.

[0592] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

[0593] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

[0594] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a second response parameter, the second response parameter is used for the serving domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the second response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

[0595] In some implementations, the response parameters include a third response parameter, the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the third response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

[0596] In some implementations, the receiving unit is further used to: before sending the first authentication request to the first device, receive a second authentication request from the first device, wherein the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, and the hidden identity is generated by an exclusive OR operation of the identity of the first device and the first key.

[0597] In some implementations, the receiving unit is further used to: before sending the first authentication request to the first device, receive a second authentication request from the first device, the second authentication request including the hidden identity of the first device, the hidden identity generated by the hidden identity of the first device, the first key and a third key generation algorithm, and the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

[0598] In some implementations, the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the proxy node also includes a determination unit for determining the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity; the sending unit is also used to: send the second authentication request to the authentication network element, and the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the first key, the identity of the first device, and the identity of the proxy node.

[0599] In some implementations, the first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, and the sending unit is further used to: send the second authentication request to the authentication network element, and the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the hidden identity identifier and the identifier of the proxy node.

[0600] In some implementations, the receiving unit is also used to: receive an application key from an application function network element; the proxy node also includes: a generation unit, used to generate a third key based on the application key, the first key and the fifth key generation algorithm, wherein the first key is the physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the fifth key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm; a communication unit, used to communicate securely with the first device based on the third key.

[0601] Figure 23 is a schematic block diagram of an authentication network element provided in an embodiment of the present application. The authentication network element 2300 shown in Figure 23 can be any of the authentication network elements described above. The authentication network element 2300 can include a generating unit 2310 and a sending unit 2320. These units are described in detail below.

[0602] The generating unit 2310 is configured to generate a first message authentication code and an expected response, where the expected response is used to authenticate the first device, and the first message authentication code is generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter.

[0603] The sending unit 2320 is used to send a first authentication request to the proxy node, where the first authentication request includes the first message authentication code. The first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, and the second message authentication code is generated by the first device.

[0604] In some implementations, the expected response includes a first expected response, where the first expected response is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is configured to generate the first expected response based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

[0605] In some implementations, the expected response includes a first expected response, where the first expected response is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is configured to generate the first expected response based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

[0606] In some implementations, the expected response includes a second expected response, where the second expected response is used for the serving domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is configured to generate the second expected response based on the first expected response and a third parameter.

[0607] In some implementations, the expected response includes a third expected response, the third expected response is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to generate the third expected response based on the first expected response and a fourth parameter.

[0608] In some implementations, the authentication network element further includes: a receiving unit, configured to: receive a second authentication request from the proxy node before the authentication network element generates a first message authentication code and an expected response, wherein the second authentication request includes a hidden identity identifier of the first device; and a determination unit, configured to determine the identity identifier of the first device based on the hidden identity identifier and a first key.

[0609] In some implementations, the first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, or the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node.

[0610] In some implementations, the generating unit is configured to: generate a second key when the first device is successfully authenticated; and generate an application layer authentication and key management key based on the second key and a fourth key generation algorithm.

[0611] In some implementations, the first parameter includes a first random number, which is selected by the authentication network element or pre-shared by the authentication network element and the first device.

[0612] Figure 24 is a schematic block diagram of an access network device provided in an embodiment of the present application. The access network device 2400 shown in Figure 24 can be any of the access network devices described above. The access network device 2400 can include a sending unit 2410 and a receiving unit 2420. These units are described in detail below.

[0613] The sending unit 2410 is used to send a first authentication request to the first device, where the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, and the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter.

[0614] The receiving unit 2420 is configured to receive a first authentication response from the first device, where the first authentication response includes a response parameter, which is used to authenticate the first device and is generated when the authentication network element successfully authenticates the first device.

[0615] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

[0616] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

[0617] In some implementations, the response parameter includes a second response parameter, the second response parameter is used for the serving domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the second response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

[0618] In some implementations, the response parameters include a third response parameter, the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the third response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

[0619] In some implementations, the receiving unit is further used to: receive a second authentication request from the first device before the access network device sends the first authentication request to the first device, wherein the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, and the hidden identity is generated by an exclusive OR operation of the identity of the first device and a first key.

[0620] In some implementations, the receiving unit is further used to: receive a second authentication request from the first device before the access network device sends a first authentication request to the first device, the second authentication request including a hidden identity of the first device, the hidden identity generated by the hidden identity of the first device, a first key, and a third key generation algorithm, and the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

[0621] In some implementations, the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the access network device, and the access network device also includes a determination unit for determining the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity; the sending unit is also used to: send the second authentication request to the authentication network element, and the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the first key and the identity of the first device.

[0622] In some implementations, the first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, and the sending unit is further used to: send the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes the hidden identity.

[0623] In some implementations, the first authentication response includes a third response parameter, and the receiving unit is further used to: receive a second authentication response from the authentication network element, wherein the second authentication response includes a third expected response; the access network device further includes: a comparison unit, used to compare the third response parameter and the third authentication response to authenticate the first device.

[0624] Figure 25 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present application. Dashed lines in Figure 25 indicate that the unit or module is optional. Apparatus 2500 may be used to implement the method described in the above method embodiment. Apparatus 2500 may be a chip, a first device, a proxy node, an authentication network element, an access network device, or an application function network element.

[0625] The device 2500 may include one or more processors 2510. The processor 2510 may support the device 2500 to implement the method described in the method embodiment above. The processor 2510 may be a general-purpose processor or a special-purpose processor. For example, the processor may be a central processing unit (CPU). Alternatively, the processor may be another general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, etc. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor, etc.

[0626] The apparatus 2500 may further include one or more memories 2520. The memories 2520 store programs that can be executed by the processor 2510, causing the processor 2510 to perform the methods described in the above method embodiments. The memories 2520 may be independent of the processor 2510 or integrated into the processor 2510.

[0627] The apparatus 2500 may further include a transceiver 2530. The processor 2510 may communicate with other devices or chips via the transceiver 2530. For example, the processor 2510 may transmit and receive data with other devices or chips via the transceiver 2530.

[0628] The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a program. The computer-readable storage medium can be applied to the first device, proxy node, authentication network element, access network device, or application function network element provided in the embodiments of the present application, and the program causes a computer to execute the method performed by the first device, proxy node, authentication network element, access network device, or application function network element in each embodiment of the present application.

[0629] The embodiments of the present application also provide a computer program product. The computer program product includes a program. The computer program product can be applied to the first device, proxy node, authentication network element, access network device, or application function network element provided in the embodiments of the present application, and the program causes a computer to execute the method performed by the first device, proxy node, authentication network element, access network device, or application function network element in each embodiment of the present application.

[0630] The embodiments of the present application also provide a computer program. The computer program can be applied to the first device, proxy node, authentication network element, access network device, or application function network element provided in the embodiments of the present application, and the computer program causes a computer to execute the method performed by the first device, proxy node, authentication network element, access network device, or application function network element in each embodiment of the present application.

[0631] It should be understood that the terms used in this application are only used to explain the specific embodiments of this application and are not intended to limit this application. The terms "first," "second," "third," and "fourth," etc. in the specification and claims of this application and the accompanying drawings are used to distinguish different objects and are not used to describe a specific order.

[0632] In the embodiments of this application, the term "include" can refer to direct inclusion or indirect inclusion. Alternatively, the term "include" in the embodiments of this application can be replaced with "indicates" or "is used to determine." For example, "A includes B" can be replaced with "A indicates B" or "A is used to determine B."

[0633] In the embodiments of the present application, the term "corresponding" may indicate a direct or indirect correspondence between the two, or an association relationship between the two, or a relationship between indication and indication, configuration and configuration, etc.

[0634] In the embodiments of this application, the term "and / or" is simply a description of the association relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, the character " / " in this document generally indicates that the related objects are in an "or" relationship.

[0635] In various embodiments of the present application, the size of the serial numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0636] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included in the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. An authentication method, It is characterized in that include: The first device receives a first authentication request from a proxy node, where the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element; The first device generates a second message authentication code based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; The first device authenticates the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code; In the case where the authentication network element succeeds in authentication, the first device generates a response parameter; The first device sends a first authentication response to the proxy node, where the first authentication response includes the response parameter, and the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device.

2. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a first response parameter, and the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device. The first device generates the response parameter, including: The first device generates the first response parameter based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

3. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a first response parameter, and the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device. The first device generates the response parameter, including: The first device generates the first response parameter based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

4. The method according to claim 2 or 3, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a second response parameter, where the second response parameter is used for the service domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first device generates the response parameter, including: The first device generates the second response parameter based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

5. The method according to any one of claims 2 to 4, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a third response parameter, and the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device. The first device generates the response parameter, including: The first device generates the third response parameter based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, It is characterized in that Before the first device receives the first authentication request from the proxy node, the method further includes: The first device performs an XOR operation on the identity of the first device and a first key to generate a hidden identity of the first device; The first device sends a second authentication request to the proxy node, where the second authentication request includes the hidden identity.

7. The method according to claim 1, It is characterized in that Before the first device receives the first authentication request from the proxy node, the method further includes: The first device generates a hidden identity of the first device based on the identity of the first device, the first key, and a third key generation algorithm, where the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm; The first device sends a second authentication request to the proxy node, where the second authentication request includes the hidden identity.

8. The method according to claim 6 or 7, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, or the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: When the authentication network element succeeds in authentication, the first device generates a second key; The first device generates an application layer authentication and key management key based on the second key and a fourth key generation algorithm.

10. The method according to claim 9, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: The first device sends an application session establishment request message to the proxy node; The first device receives an application session establishment response message from the proxy node; In response to receiving the application session establishment response message, the first device generates an application key based on the authentication and key management key of the application layer; The first device generates a third key based on the application key, the first key and a fifth key generation algorithm, wherein the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the fifth key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm; The first device communicates securely with the proxy node based on the third key.

11. An authentication method, It is characterized in that include: The proxy node sends a first authentication request to the first device, where the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, and the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; The proxy node receives a first authentication response from the first device, where the first authentication response includes a response parameter, where the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and where the response parameter is generated when the authentication network element succeeds in authentication.

12. The method according to claim 11, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used for a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

13. The method according to claim 11, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

14. The method according to claim 12 or 13, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a second response parameter, where the second response parameter is used by a service domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the second response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

15. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 14, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a third response parameter, where the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the third response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

16. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 15, It is characterized in that Before the proxy node sends the first authentication request to the first device, the method further includes: The proxy node receives a second authentication request from the first device, where the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, and the hidden identity is generated by an exclusive OR operation of an identity of the first device and a first key.

17. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 15, It is characterized in that Before the proxy node sends the first authentication request to the first device, the method further includes: The proxy node receives a second authentication request from the first device, wherein the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, wherein the hidden identity is generated by the hidden identity of the first device, a first key, and a third key generation algorithm, wherein the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

18. The method according to claim 16 or 17, It is characterized in that The first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the method further includes: The proxy node determines the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity; The proxy node sends the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the first key, the identity of the first device, and the identity of the proxy node.

19. The method according to claim 16 or 17, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, and the method further includes: The proxy node sends the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the hidden identity identifier and an identifier of the proxy node.

20. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 19, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: The proxy node receives an application key from an application function network element; The proxy node generates a third key based on the application key, the first key and a fifth key generation algorithm, wherein the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the fifth key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm; The proxy node communicates securely with the first device based on the third key.

21. An authentication method, It is characterized in that include: The authentication network element generates a first message authentication code and an expected response, where the expected response is used to authenticate the first device, and the first message authentication code is generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; The authentication network element sends a first authentication request to the proxy node, the first authentication request includes the first message authentication code, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, and the second message authentication code is generated by the first device.

22. The method according to claim 21, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a first expected response, where the first expected response is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the authentication network element generates the expected response, including: The authentication network element generates the first expected response based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

23. The method according to claim 21, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a first expected response, where the first expected response is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the authentication network element generates the expected response, including: The authentication network element generates the first expected response based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

24. The method according to claim 22 or 23, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a second expected response, where the second expected response is used for a serving domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the method further includes: The authentication network element generates the second expected response based on the first expected response and a third parameter.

25. The method according to any one of claims 22 to 24, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a third expected response, and the third expected response is used for the access network device to authenticate the first device. The method further includes: The authentication network element generates the third expected response based on the first expected response and a fourth parameter.

26. The method according to any one of claims 21 to 25, It is characterized in that Before the authentication network element generates the first message authentication code and the expected response, the method further includes: The authentication network element receives a second authentication request from the proxy node, where the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, The authentication network element determines the identity of the first device based on the hidden identity and the first key.

27. The method according to claim 26, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, or the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node.

28. The method according to any one of claims 21 to 27, It is characterized in that The method further comprises: In case the first device is successfully authenticated, the authentication network element generates a second key; The authentication network element generates an application layer authentication and key management key based on the second key and a fourth key generation algorithm.

29. The method according to any one of claims 21 to 28, It is characterized in that The first parameter includes a first random number, which is selected by the authentication network element, or the first random number is pre-shared by the authentication network element and the first device.

30. An authentication method, It is characterized in that include: The access network device sends a first authentication request to the first device, where the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, and the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; The access network device receives a first authentication response from the first device, where the first authentication response includes a response parameter, where the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and where the response parameter is generated when the authentication network element succeeds in authentication.

31. The method according to claim 30, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used for a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

32. The method according to claim 30, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

33. The method according to claim 31 or 32, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a second response parameter, where the second response parameter is used by a service domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the second response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

34. The method according to any one of claims 31 to 33, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a third response parameter, where the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the third response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

35. The method according to any one of claims 30 to 34, It is characterized in that Before the access network device sends the first authentication request to the first device, the method further includes: The access network device receives a second authentication request from the first device, where the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, and the hidden identity is generated by an exclusive OR operation of an identity of the first device and a first key.

36. The method according to any one of claims 30 to 34, It is characterized in that Before the access network device sends the first authentication request to the first device, the method further includes: The access network device receives a second authentication request from the first device, wherein the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, wherein the hidden identity is generated by the hidden identity of the first device, a first key, and a third key generation algorithm, wherein the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

37. The method according to claim 35 or 36, It is characterized in that The first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the access network device, and the method further includes: The access network device determines the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity; The access network device sends the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the first key and an identity identifier of the first device.

38. The method according to claim 35 or 36, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, and the method further includes: The access network device sends the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes the hidden identity identifier.

39. The method according to any one of claims 30 to 38, It is characterized in that The first authentication response includes a third response parameter, and the method further includes: The access network device receives a second authentication response from the authentication network element, where the second authentication response includes a third expected response; The access network device compares the third response parameter with the third authentication response to authenticate the first device.

40. A device, It is characterized in that The device is a first device, and the first device includes: A receiving unit, configured to receive a first authentication request from a proxy node, wherein the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, and the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element; A generating unit, configured to generate a second message authentication code based on the first key generation algorithm and the first parameter; an authentication unit, configured to authenticate the authentication network element based on the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code; The generating unit is further configured to generate a response parameter by the first device when the authentication network element is successfully authenticated; A sending unit is used to send a first authentication response to the proxy node, where the first authentication response includes the response parameter, and the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device.

41. The apparatus according to claim 40, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: The first response parameter is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

42. The apparatus according to claim 40, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a first response parameter, the first response parameter is used for the home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: The first response parameter is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

43. Apparatus according to claim 41 or 42, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a second response parameter, where the second response parameter is used for the serving domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: The second response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and the third parameter.

44. The apparatus according to any one of claims 41 to 43, It is characterized in that The response parameter includes a third response parameter, and the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device. The generating unit is used to: The third response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and the fourth parameter.

45. The apparatus according to any one of claims 40 to 44, It is characterized in that The generating unit is further configured to: before receiving the first authentication request from the proxy node, perform an XOR operation on the identity of the first device and the first key to generate a hidden identity of the first device; The sending unit is further configured to send a second authentication request to the proxy node, wherein the second authentication request includes the hidden identity identifier.

46. ​​The apparatus according to claim 40, It is characterized in that The generating unit is further configured to: before receiving the first authentication request from the proxy node, generate a hidden identity of the first device based on the identity of the first device, the first key and a third key generating algorithm, wherein the third key generating algorithm is the first key generating algorithm or the second key generating algorithm; The sending unit is further configured to send a second authentication request to the proxy node, wherein the second authentication request includes the hidden identity identifier.

47. Apparatus according to claim 45 or 46, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, or the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node.

48. The apparatus according to any one of claims 40 to 47, It is characterized in that The generating unit is further configured to: If the authentication network element succeeds in authentication, generating a second key; Based on the second key and the fourth key generation algorithm, an authentication and key management key for the application layer is generated.

49. The apparatus according to claim 48, It is characterized in that The sending unit is further used to: send an application session establishment request message to the proxy node; The receiving unit is further used to: receive an application session establishment response message from the proxy node; The generating unit is further configured to: in response to receiving the application session establishment response message, generate an application key based on the authentication and key management key of the application layer; and generating a third key based on the application key, a first key and a fifth key generation algorithm, wherein the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the fifth key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm; The device further includes a communication unit configured to perform secure communication with the proxy node based on the third key.

50. A proxy node, It is characterized in that include: a sending unit, configured to send a first authentication request to a first device, wherein the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, and the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; A receiving unit is configured to receive a first authentication response from the first device, wherein the first authentication response includes a response parameter. The response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and the response parameter is generated when the authentication network element successfully authenticates.

51. The proxy node according to claim 50, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used for a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

52. The proxy node according to claim 50, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

53. A proxy node according to claim 51 or 52, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a second response parameter, where the second response parameter is used by a service domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the second response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

54. A proxy node according to any one of claims 51 to 53, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a third response parameter, where the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the third response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

55. A proxy node according to any one of claims 50 to 54, It is characterized in that The receiving unit is further used to: before sending the first authentication request to the first device, receive a second authentication request from the first device, the second authentication request including a hidden identity of the first device, the hidden identity being generated by an exclusive OR operation of the identity of the first device and a first key.

56. A proxy node according to any one of claims 50 to 54, It is characterized in that The receiving unit is also used to: before sending the first authentication request to the first device, receive a second authentication request from the first device, the second authentication request including the hidden identity of the first device, the hidden identity is generated by the hidden identity of the first device, the first key and a third key generation algorithm, and the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

57. A proxy node according to claim 55 or 56, It is characterized in that The first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the proxy node further includes a determination unit, configured to determine the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity; The sending unit is further used to: send the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the first key, the identity of the first device, and the identity of the proxy node.

58. A proxy node according to claim 55 or 56, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, The sending unit is further used for sending the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the hidden identity identifier and the identifier of the proxy node.

59. A proxy node according to any one of claims 50 to 58, It is characterized in that The receiving unit is further used to: receive an application key from an application function network element; The proxy node also includes: a generating unit, configured to generate a third key based on the application key, a first key, and a fifth key generating algorithm, wherein the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node, and the fifth key generating algorithm is the first key generating algorithm or the second key generating algorithm; A communication unit is configured to perform secure communication with the first device based on the third key.

60. An authentication network element, It is characterized in that include: a generating unit, configured to generate a first message authentication code and an expected response, wherein the expected response is used to authenticate the first device, and the first message authentication code is generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; A sending unit is used to send a first authentication request to the proxy node, wherein the first authentication request includes the first message authentication code, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, and the second message authentication code is generated by the first device.

61. The authentication network element according to claim 60, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a first expected response, where the first expected response is used for a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: The first expected response is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

62. The authentication network element according to claim 60, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a first expected response, where the first expected response is used for a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: The first expected response is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

63. The authentication network element according to claim 61 or 62, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a second expected response, where the second expected response is used for the serving domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: The second expected response is generated based on the first expected response and a third parameter.

64. An authentication network element according to any one of claims 61 to 63, It is characterized in that The expected response includes a third expected response, where the third expected response is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the generating unit is used to: The third expected response is generated based on the first expected response and a fourth parameter.

65. The authentication network element according to any one of claims 60 to 64, It is characterized in that The authentication network element also includes: a receiving unit, configured to: before the authentication network element generates a first message authentication code and an expected response, receive a second authentication request from the proxy node, wherein the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device; A determination unit is used to determine the identity of the first device based on the hidden identity and the first key.

66. The authentication network element according to claim 65, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, or the first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the proxy node.

67. An authentication network element according to any one of claims 60 to 66, It is characterized in that The generating unit is used for: If the first device is successfully authenticated, generating a second key; Based on the second key and the fourth key generation algorithm, an authentication and key management key for the application layer is generated.

68. The authentication network element according to any one of claims 60 to 67, It is characterized in that The first parameter includes a first random number, which is selected by the authentication network element, or the first random number is pre-shared by the authentication network element and the first device.

69. An access network device, It is characterized in that include: a sending unit, configured to send a first authentication request to a first device, wherein the first authentication request includes a first message authentication code, the first message authentication code is generated by an authentication network element, the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are used to authenticate the authentication network element, the second message authentication code is generated by the first device, and the first message authentication code and the second message authentication code are generated based on a first key generation algorithm and a first parameter; The receiving unit is used to receive a first authentication response from the first device, the first authentication response includes a response parameter, the response parameter is used to authenticate the first device, and the response parameter is generated when the authentication network element successfully authenticates.

70. The access network device according to claim 69, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used for a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on the first key generation algorithm and a second parameter.

71. The access network device according to claim 69, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a first response parameter, where the first response parameter is used by a home domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the first response parameter is generated based on a second key generation algorithm and the first parameter.

72. The access network device according to claim 70 or 71, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a second response parameter, where the second response parameter is used by a service domain network element to authenticate the first device, and the second response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a third parameter.

73. The access network device according to any one of claims 70 to 72, It is characterized in that The response parameters include a third response parameter, where the third response parameter is used by the access network device to authenticate the first device, and the third response parameter is generated based on the first response parameter and a fourth parameter.

74. The access network device according to any one of claims 69 to 73, It is characterized in that The receiving unit is also used for: Before the access network device sends a first authentication request to a first device, it receives a second authentication request from the first device, wherein the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, and the hidden identity is generated by an exclusive OR operation of the identity of the first device and a first key.

75. The access network device according to any one of claims 69 to 73, It is characterized in that The receiving unit is also used for: Before the access network device sends a first authentication request to the first device, it receives a second authentication request from the first device, where the second authentication request includes a hidden identity of the first device, where the hidden identity is generated by the hidden identity of the first device, a first key, and a third key generation algorithm, where the third key generation algorithm is the first key generation algorithm or the second key generation algorithm.

76. The access network device according to claim 74 or 75, It is characterized in that The first key is a physical layer key between the first device and the access network device, and the access network device further includes a determination unit, configured to determine the identity of the first device based on the first key and the hidden identity; The sending unit is further used to: send the second authentication request to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes one or more of the following information: the first key and the identity of the first device.

77. The access network device according to claim 74 or 75, It is characterized in that The first key is a shared key between the first device and the authentication network element, and the sending unit is further used for: The second authentication request is sent to the authentication network element, where the second authentication request includes the hidden identity identifier.

78. The access network device according to any one of claims 69 to 77, It is characterized in that The first authentication response includes a third response parameter, and the receiving unit is further used to: receive a second authentication response from the authentication network element, wherein the second authentication response includes a third expected response; The access network device further includes: a comparing unit, configured to compare the third response parameter with the third authentication response to authenticate the first device.

79. A device, It is characterized in that The device is a first device, which includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory so that the first device executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

80. A proxy node, It is characterized in that The method comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory so that the proxy node executes the method according to any one of claims 11 to 20.

81. An authentication network element, It is characterized in that It comprises a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory so that the authentication network element executes the method as described in any one of claims 21-29.

82. An access network device, It is characterized in that It comprises a memory and a processor, the memory is used to store a program, and the processor is used to call the program in the memory so that the access network device executes the method as described in any one of claims 30-39.

83. A device, It is characterized in that The invention comprises a processor, which is used to call a program from a memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 10.

84. A device, It is characterized in that The device comprises a processor, configured to call a program from a memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 11 to 20.

85. A device, It is characterized in that The device comprises a processor for calling a program from a memory to execute a method as claimed in any one of claims 21 to 29.

86. A device, It is characterized in that The device comprises a processor configured to call a program from a memory to execute a method as claimed in any one of claims 30 to 39.

87. A chip, It is characterized in that The device comprises a processor, which is used to call a program from a memory so that a device equipped with the chip executes a method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 10.

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