Data processing method, system and apparatus, and storage medium
By storing only the key on the client and generating search tokens on the server for querying, the problem of large overhead of storing and query request generation in the DSSE solution is solved, and a data processing method with low storage cost and high data security performance is realized.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/CN2023/107232
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-05-24
- Filing Date
- 2023-07-13
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-28
AI Technical Summary
The existing dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) schemes have a high overhead in the storage and query request generation of smart clients, resulting in increased client storage costs.
By creating key sets and encrypted index sets, only the key is stored on the client and a search token is generated on the server side for querying, reducing the storage overhead of the client and improving data security performance.
Data query operations with low storage costs and high data security performance are realized, reducing client storage costs and improving data security performance.
Smart Images

Figure CN2023107232_28112024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Data processing method, system, device and storage medium Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a data processing method, system, device and storage medium. Background Art
[0002] Outsourcing data to remote cloud storage is becoming increasingly popular among organizations and individuals. The complexity of the structure and cryptographic primitives in Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE) schemes leads to high storage and query request overhead on smart device clients (SDCs). Furthermore, the increasing number of keywords increases client storage costs.
[0003] Summary of the Invention
[0004] The purpose of the present invention is to at least to some extent solve one of the technical problems in the prior art described above, namely, the high overhead of query and request generation and the increase in client storage costs.
[0005] To this end, an object of the present invention is to provide a data processing method, system, device and storage medium with low storage cost.
[0006] In order to achieve the above technical objectives, the technical solutions adopted by the embodiments of the present invention include:
[0007] In one aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing method, comprising the following steps:
[0008] A data processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention includes: creating a key set; the key set includes an encryption key and a decryption key; creating an index set and writing the encrypted index set into an encrypted database; the index set includes a first index, the first index being used to represent the correlation between a first keyword and a first document identifier; the encrypted database being located on a server; generating a first search token based on the first keyword; receiving a first identifier sent back by the server after a search based on the first search token; the first identifier being used to represent the encrypted first document identifier; and decrypting the first identifier based on the decryption key to obtain the first document identifier. In the embodiment of the present invention, the client only stores the key and performs a search query using the received first keyword to implement data query. Since only the key is stored, storage overhead is greatly reduced. At the same time, the document identifier is returned, improving data security. Therefore, the embodiment of the present invention can implement data query operations, which is beneficial for reducing client storage costs and improving data security.
[0009] In addition, the data processing method according to the above embodiment of the present invention may also have the following additional technical features:
[0010] Furthermore, the data processing method of the embodiment of the present invention further includes:
[0011] The client initializes the first mapping and the second mapping, and sends the first mapping and the second mapping to the encryption database; the first mapping and the second mapping are hash table structures; the first mapping is used to store the encrypted index set;
[0012] The client generates a first constant; after completing the update operation of the encrypted database, the first constant is updated.
[0013] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method includes:
[0014] Extracting a second keyword from a second index; the second index is in the index set;
[0015] Processing the second keyword with an encryption key to generate a first result;
[0016] After combining the first result with the first constant and performing hashing, a second search token is generated;
[0017] generating a second result based on the second search token;
[0018] generating a target keyword according to the second result and the first random number;
[0019] A mask value corresponding to the target keyword is generated according to the second result and the encrypted entry; the mask value is used to represent the second document identifier; and the second keyword is correlated with the second document identifier.
[0020] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, the following steps are also included:
[0021] Updating the first random number, looping and iterating the second result, and returning to the step of generating a target keyword based on the second result and the first random number; and generating a mask value corresponding to the target keyword based on the second result and the encrypted entry;
[0022] Until all target keywords and corresponding mask values are updated, the current first random number is set to a null value.
[0023] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, it further comprises:
[0024] The client generates a trap door according to the first keyword, and sends the trap door to the server;
[0025] The server performs a search operation on the encrypted database based on the trapdoor to obtain a first identifier, and sends the first identifier to the client;
[0026] The client extracts the first key, performs a decryption operation on the first identifier to obtain a first document identifier, and sends the first document identifier to the second mapping; the first key is a one-time decryption key.
[0027] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, it further comprises:
[0028] The server performs hash processing on the trapdoor several times and performs a search operation in the encrypted database according to the processing results;
[0029] Get the current value of the first constant as the first value;
[0030] If the first value is the same as the first constant, stop searching and determine the first identifier; the first constant is used to represent the last constant stored in the current second mapping;
[0031] Alternatively, a first constant between a previous update operation and a previous search operation is obtained, and the first identifier is calculated based on the first constant.
[0032] Furthermore, in one embodiment of the present invention, it further comprises:
[0033] Constructing a leakage function, wherein the leakage function is used to represent the control of the amount of information disclosed by the server;
[0034] Constructing a list function, wherein the list function is used to represent a document set added to a database; the database is located on the client;
[0035] Based on the list function, construct a first function; the leakage function includes the first function, and the first function is used to represent the leakage function with forward privacy;
[0036] Constructing a time function, wherein the time function is used to represent the timestamps and document identifiers that have not been deleted in the database;
[0037] Based on the time function, constructing a second function; the leakage function includes the second function, and the second function is used to characterize the leakage function with backward privacy;
[0038] Based on the first function and the second function, the security performance of the encrypted database is analyzed.
[0039] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing system, including:
[0040] The first module is configured to create a key set, wherein the key set includes an encryption key and a decryption key;
[0041] The second module is configured to create an index set and write the encrypted index set into an encrypted database; the index set includes a first index, the first index being used to represent the correlation between the first keyword and the first document identifier; the encrypted database is located in the server;
[0042] A third module is configured to generate a first search token based on the first keyword;
[0043] A fourth module is configured to receive, based on the first search token, a first identifier sent back by the server after the search; the first identifier is used to represent the encrypted first document identifier;
[0044] The fifth module is configured to decrypt the first identifier according to the decryption key to obtain a first document identifier.
[0045] In another aspect, an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing device, including:
[0046] at least one processor;
[0047] at least one memory for storing at least one program;
[0048] When the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor, the at least one processor implements the above-mentioned data processing method.
[0049] On the other hand, an embodiment of the present invention provides a storage medium storing a program executable by a processor. When the program is executed by the processor, it is used to implement the above-mentioned data processing method.
[0050] In this embodiment of the present invention, the client only stores the key and performs a search query using the received first keyword to implement data query. Since only the key is stored, storage overhead is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the document identifier is returned, improving data security. Therefore, this embodiment of the present invention enables data query operations, helping to reduce client storage costs and improve data security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0051] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following introduction is made to the drawings of the embodiments of the present invention or the related technical solutions in the prior art. It should be understood that the drawings introduced below are only for the convenience of clearly describing some embodiments of the technical solutions of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without any creative work.
[0052] FIG1 is a flow chart of an embodiment of a data processing method provided by the present invention;
[0053] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of an update process of encrypted data according to an embodiment of the present invention;
[0054] FIG3 is a schematic diagram showing the effect of client storage cost in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0055] FIG4 is a schematic diagram showing the effect of client query time cost in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0056] FIG5 is a schematic diagram showing the effect of client search performance in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0057] FIG6 is a schematic diagram showing the effect of client decryption cost in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0058] FIG7 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a data processing system provided by the present invention;
[0059] FIG8 is a schematic structural diagram of an embodiment of a data processing device provided by the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0060] The embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below, examples of which are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals throughout represent the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present invention and are not to be construed as limiting the present invention. The step numbers in the following embodiments are provided for ease of explanation only and do not limit the order of the steps. The order of execution of the steps in the embodiments can be adaptively adjusted according to the understanding of those skilled in the art.
[0061] Outsourcing data to remote cloud providers is becoming increasingly popular among organizations and individuals. Semi-trusted servers use searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) when searching encrypted databases to improve the security of information searches and mitigate the risk of information leakage. Dynamic SSE (DSSE) schemes enable the addition and deletion of documents through update and query operations. Each time a record is added or deleted, relevant information is typically leaked to the server. The complexity of the structure and cryptographic primitives in most existing DSSE schemes results in high overhead for storage and query requests on smart device clients (SDCs), resulting in wasteful data transfer. Therefore, DSSE schemes must address two important privacy concepts: forward privacy and backward privacy. As the number of keywords increases, the client's storage cost also increases linearly. Therefore, this paper proposes an innovative, secure, and lightweight DSSE scheme that provides Type II forward and backward privacy without incurring the ever-increasing storage costs of the SDC. This embodiment of the present invention is based on an inverted index structure that combines hash tables with linked nodes. This structure links all encrypted keywords w in the hash table together. Since the SDC side does not store a keyword counter, the storage overhead of the embodiment provided by the present invention is O(1). In addition, a new key is generated during each update process, further improving security. At the same time, the embodiment proposed by the present invention has been verified to have a low-cost query on the SDC side of 6460 nanoseconds, achieving compatibility with limited resource devices. In addition, compared with the existing solution, the embodiment of the present invention reduces the search cost on the server side. The existing solution takes 692 milliseconds to search in the relevant email database, and the result is 100,000.
[0062] Understandably, in modern times, with the advent of big data and its applications, cloud computing has become increasingly important and popular for SDCs. Because sensitive information can be easily hacked, it's encrypted on the SDC side and then outsourced to cloud servers. Due to data outsourcing and rising consumer awareness of data privacy, processing encrypted data stored on remote cloud servers and untrusted servers is becoming increasingly important. A semi-trusted (honest but curious) server should have minimal access to and knowledge of the SDC's data and query processes during processing. In this application scenario, an untrusted cloud server stores a document collection, which is managed by the client using searchable symmetric encryption (SSE). The SSE protocol enables the SDC to query the server and retrieve all records matching its search, while providing the host server with privacy guarantees regarding client data and query security. Understandably, with a static database, consumers upload their documents to the semi-trusted server, issue a search token to the server without exposing sensitive data, and then perform search operations to retrieve the desired data or documents. However, static SSE does not support creating, updating, or deleting records.
[0063] Therefore, embodiments of the present invention are based on a dynamic SSE (DSSE) scheme. Forward privacy is used to prevent new updates from being associated with previous operations (until a keyword matching the existing operation is found). If an adversary knows the contents of the added document, the security of many DSSE schemes is significantly compromised. Therefore, forward privacy is crucial to mitigate the risk of document injection attacks. Furthermore, the concept of backward privacy is important: if a search for keyword w is performed after a document containing w has been deleted, no information about the deleted document will be revealed.
[0064] See Table 1 for a comparison of several schemes, all of which have forward privacy and backward privacy. BP means backward privacy, and the number of (keyword, identifier) mappings is represented by N. The number m is the number of different keywords. The add operation on w is represented by a_w, d_w represents how many delete operations have been performed on w, and o_w represents the number of updates on w (i.e., o_w = a_w + d_w). As of the last search, the number of updates is {o^\prime}_w\, and n_w refers to the number of documents currently shared with w. \hat{O}\ represents the log\logN\ component. As of the last search, the constant LCon represents the total number of calculations that can be performed on the hash function. Therefore, the present application proposes a data processing method. In an embodiment of the present application, the owner can fully control the data, based on an inverted index structure with management capabilities, which is presented in the form of (key, value) pairs. The required encrypted value can be retrieved without the SDC-side keyword counter, so as to improve the security, efficiency and less computational load of the SDC side. To retrieve the desired value from the encrypted inverted index for a specific keyword, the client generates a token based on the keyword and its private key and sends the token to the cloud server. When the keyword is used as a link between encrypted values of the same keyword in the index, a random value is generated, eliminating the need for an SDC-side keyword counter. The first value for the keyword is extracted from the encrypted index using a token provided by the SDC to the server. This random value allows access to the next encrypted value, and so on. As can be understood, with forward privacy, a one-time key is used to generate new search tokens. The server can no longer infer whether a previously searched keyword appears in newly added documents by linking previous search tokens with subsequent update tokens. With Type II backward privacy, the server cannot see update operations (deletions or additions) during the completion of update queries. SDC-side optimization is performed on deleted documents. Results from previous searches are stored in plaintext on the server. In this case, re-encrypting these results does not provide any security benefits, as they have already been exposed to the server. Another benefit is the ability to continuously read plaintext results, thereby enhancing locality. To prevent an adversary server from establishing connections between subsequently added and deleted keywords, the result is returned to the client as an encrypted value (backward privacy). Therefore, the present embodiment enables efficient storage, a fixed SDC storage cost, low query generation cost, and forward and backward security.
[0065] Table 1 Comparison of several (DSSE) structures
[0066] The data processing method and system proposed in the embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. First, the data processing method proposed in the embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0067] 1 , a data processing method is provided in an embodiment of the present invention. The data processing method in the embodiment of the present invention can be applied to a terminal, a server, or software running in a terminal or a server. The terminal can be a tablet computer, a laptop computer, a desktop computer, etc., but is not limited thereto. The server can be an independent physical server, or a server cluster or distributed system composed of multiple physical servers, or a cloud server that provides basic cloud computing services such as cloud services, cloud databases, cloud computing, cloud functions, cloud storage, network services, cloud communications, middleware services, domain name services, security services, CDN, and big data and artificial intelligence platforms. The data processing method in the embodiment of the present invention mainly includes the following steps:
[0068] S100: Creating a key set; the key set includes an encryption key and a decryption key;
[0069] S200: Creating an index set and writing the encrypted index set into an encrypted database; the index set includes a first index, the first index being used to represent the correlation between a first keyword and a first document identifier; the encrypted database is located in a server;
[0070] S300: Generate a first search token based on the first keyword;
[0071] S: receiving, according to the first search token, a first identifier sent back by the server after the search; the first identifier is used to represent the first document identifier after encryption;
[0072] S500: Decrypt the first identifier according to the decryption key to obtain a first document identifier.
[0073] First, some characters and parameters involved in this application are explained, specifically:
[0074] The definitions of some parameters involved in this application are as follows: represents a uniform selection of x from a finite set X. |X| represents the cardinality of the set X. The concatenation operator is used to join two strings together, represented by the operator ||. The set {0,1} l represents all binary strings of length l, and the set {0,1} * Represents all binary strings of finite length. The method provided in the embodiment of the present application relies on the security parameter As input to all algorithms. During key generation, the λGet a uniform sample of the key in the range. In λ, only polynomial-time (probabilistic) algorithms and protocols are considered. A specific type of adversary is the probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm. The bitwise XOR operation between x and y is represented by the symbol This application relates to a database DB consisting of a set of pairs of document identifiers and keywords (ind, w) that appear in documents with identifier ind when keyword w is present. The negl(λ) function represents a negligible function negl in λ: In the case where all polynomials are positive polynomials p(.), if their λ is large enough, then negl(λ) < 1 / p(λ). Using this notation P(c; s) in the context of client-server systems, we denote that the protocol P is executed by the client and server on inputs c and s, respectively.
[0075] It is understandable that proofs are based on countermeasures. Reality-ideal world is a general method for proving the security of encryption schemes. The real world is used to prove the encryption construction, while the ideal world is constructed based on the leakage of the real world. Therefore, it can be said that as long as the adversary cannot distinguish between the two worlds, the leaked information will not provide any relevant information to the adversary, so the real world can be considered a secure solution. Suppose there are two countermeasures in the two worlds: G0 and G n , the goal is to ensure that they cannot be distinguished. However, this is usually difficult to prove directly. Instead, the embodiment of the application constructs the countermeasure as G1-G n-1 A mixture of such that each subsequent game will be slightly different from the previous one. Start with G0 and prove that it is indistinguishable from G1. Continue this process until you reach G n The opponent identifies G0 to G n The advantage in terms of identification is equal to (G0, G1), (G1, G2), ...., (G n-1 ,G n ) is the sum of the advantages of some of its opponents.
[0076] Dynamic Searchable Symmetric Encryption (DSSE): Classify a database DB into n documents doc = (ind, W id ), which is represented by the identifier Describes and contains a set of keywords The database DB is composed of Definition. Throughout Find a list of all keywords in is the set of documents containing keyword w.
[0077] It is understandable that the DSSE program The process is divided into three parts: Setup, Search, and Update. It requires the participation of two parties: the client and the server, and consists of three parts. These parts include two algorithms for Setup and Search, as well as an Update protocol. The client has a database (DB) and uploads the encrypted EDB to the server.
[0078] set up It is a setup algorithm. The client creates a state θ based on the security parameter λ and the database. The database is initialized by the server using EDB encryption.
[0079] Search (θ, w; EDB) → (θ′, res; EDB′): This is a search protocol. The client inputs the state θ and the keyword w, while the server inputs the encrypted database EDB. After executing this protocol, the client receives the updated state θ′ and the search result res. The server also updates the encrypted database EDB′.
[0080] Update (θ, in, op; EDB) → (θ′; EDB′): It is a protocol for updating data. The client obtains the state θ, in, which is an inverted index consisting of (w, ind) pairs, and op, which is (add or delete), as inputs to the update protocol. The client then obtains the newly modified state θ′ and the server obtains the updated encrypted database EDB′ as outputs of this protocol. For example, when the security parameter λ and the database DB are input, the client executes the algorithm “set” to obtain the key sk(K f ,K t ,K g ), after which it calls the update protocol N times to add N entries from DB to EDB.
[0081] Security: The main difference between all existing DSSE schemes is that they leak information at some point. To prevent the adversary from knowing too much about the database and queries (i.e., searches and updates), the present embodiment proposes almost all DSSE schemes with some explicit leaks. When the client calls the set, search, and update operations, the DSSE scheme usually defines a leak function This function is used to control the amount of information disclosed to the server. The formal definition of countermeasures is that there are two types: and If the two countermeasures are indistinguishable, then the adversary What is discovered is only the output of the leaked function in the scheme π. Specifically, The execution of the DSSE scheme is trustworthy. Similar to real-world scenarios, the adversary is given an EDB generated by the set (λ, DB; ⊥) protocol. When the adversary selects a keyword w, they receive a script generated by the search protocol (θ, w; EDB). Furthermore, the adversary can select an in set (w, ind) and an operation op to receive a copy generated by the update (θ, in, op; EDB) protocol. The adversary ultimately outputs a bit b∈{0,1}. The adversary receives a simulated script as a replacement for the real protocol script. Leaked functions with known outputs can be used; PPT simulators Generates a simulation script. The opponent receives When the adversary performs search and update operations, it receives the encrypted database generated by and Generated script. The adversary finally outputs the bit b∈0,1.
[0082] It is understandable that with leaky functions DSSE Program It is adaptively secure if and only if for each PPT adversary The number of queries q(λ) issued is polynomial, the simulator Satisfy the requirements of formula (1):
[0083] The internal state of the leakage function is determined by the query set Q, which includes the entries for each query. In Q, each entry represents a (t, w) pair. The search query uses the keyword w and a counter t, which starts at 0 and increases with each query. The query pattern sp(w) corresponds to each keyword w as shown in formula (2): sp(w) = {t|(t,w)∈Q} Formula (2)
[0084] This application also proposes HistDB(w) (list function) which consists of a list of documents containing keyword w that have been added to the database in the order of their insertion in history. Once a document is added, the document identifier will be included in the list regardless of whether it has been deleted. When HistDB(w) = {ind1, ind2}, it means that ind1 and ind2 have been added to the DB in history, but it is unknown whether they have been deleted. For keyword w, the time function TimeDB(w) is called using the timestamp / document identifier pair that has not been deleted from the database. The time function is shown in formula (3):
[0085] For all updates associated with w in Q, the timestamp is expressed as follows: Updates(w) = {t|(t,add,(w,ind))∈Q∨(t,del,(w,ind))∈Q} Formula (4)
[0086] Based on the above definition, this application can ensure that earlier search queries are irrelevant to current updates through forward privacy, so that this feature can be used to hide whether a specific keyword is associated with the most recent addition operation.
[0087] Specifically, forward privacy is a Adaptively secure DSSE scheme, forward privacy keyword supports update operation on a single keyword if and only if and Described as formula (5):
[0088] in this case, Represents a stateless function.
[0089] When a search query for keyword w is provided, where some entries of the search query have been deleted, backward privacy will minimize the amount of information that will be leaked to the server. When (w, ind) is added to the database and then deleted from it, the DSSE scheme is considered to be backward private. It can be seen that the search query only reveals ind after adding (w, ind) and before deleting (w, ind). Adaptive secure DSSE solution It has backward privacy if and only if Described as formula (6):
[0090] in this case, and Represents a stateless function.
[0091] Locality: SSE schemes can be classified based on the number of consecutive reads from the encrypted database EDB. Specifically, it is assumed that the search algorithm accesses the encrypted database only through an oracle. The oracle returns the word stored in the interval of EDB that corresponds to the query interval [a i ; b i By using the search algorithm, query the oracle for some intervals [a i ; b i ], using some tokens as a basis. Based on τ and the previous read interval, continue to calculate the next interval to be read from EDB. The interval is represented by ReadPat(EDB; τ).
[0092] Locality: A searchable encryption scheme r-local has locality if, for any w∈W, RdPat(w) contains at most r intervals. Note that locality is optimal when r=1.
[0093] Read efficiency: A single interval can read the entire database in the search algorithm, so there is no separate concept of locality. This read efficiency measures the amount of data read by the search operation. Given DB and w, let |DB(w)| denote the number of words contained in the encoding of DB(w).
[0094] Reading efficiency: The searchable encryption SE scheme has a reading efficiency of c, when for any w∈W, the total number of bits of RdPat(w) is at most c.|l.DB(w)| bits, where it should be noted that l is the number of bits required to operate a document identifier.
[0095] Overlapping reads: A searchable encryption SE scheme has α overlapping reads if the read pattern (of all keywords) overlaps by mostly α bits. In the case of α=0, the reads are disjoint.
[0096] Forward-Backward Privacy Scheme: A Type II definition develops a scheme that maintains a stable SDC storage cost, forward privacy, and backward privacy; this prevents subsequent searches from being associated with deleted documents. The proposed scheme adopts a two-party model, where the client is the owner of the data, and the server provides the client with large storage space and efficient computing power.
[0097] Specifically, the scheme includes an algorithm setup and two protocols for update and search. In the setup algorithm, the client initializes the specific parameters and structures used in other protocols to enable the DSSE system to operate correctly. The client encodes the keyword / document pairs for subsequent search in the update protocol. Based on the current global counter Con, an EDB is constructed for each keyword w in the update. Based on the keyword w and the global number of users, the search token KT is w Generated by the client and sent to the server. A search token can be used; the server generates all necessary addresses for keyword w and searches the EDB for documents stored under keyword w.
[0098] The key is generated by this process, GenPRP(1 λ ). Function F: {0,1} λ X{0,1} * →{0,1} λ is a pseudo-random function PRF, h∶{0,1} * →{0,1} λThe hash function is described in the form of a random oracle, G∶{0,1} λ X{0,1} λ →{0,1} λ is a pseudo-random permutation function PRP. An algorithm (setup algorithm) and two protocols (update and search protocols) are used to describe the solution of this application.
[0099] In summary, in this embodiment of the present invention, the client only stores the key and performs a search query using the received first keyword to implement data query. Since only the key is stored, storage overhead is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the document identifier is returned, improving data security. Therefore, this embodiment of the present invention enables data query operations, reducing client storage costs and improving data security.
[0100] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes:
[0101] The client initializes the first mapping and the second mapping, and sends the first mapping and the second mapping to the encryption database; the first mapping and the second mapping are hash table structures; the first mapping is used to store the encrypted index set;
[0102] The client generates a first constant; after completing the update operation of the encrypted database, the first constant is updated.
[0103] In some possible implementations, the present application embodiment proposes a setup algorithm. f ,K t and K g represents the key randomly generated by setting Algorithm 1 (see Algorithm 1 below); each key with a size determined by the security parameter λ is formally described. As a long-term key, K f Prevents the server from generating a valid search token in PRF F, PRP G uses K g Protect (ind,op), and K t Construct a tag for the keyword w. For the global counter Con, the client requires a fixed and minimum amount of storage (used together with the search token to generate the location Addr), and the client initializes two empty maps (S e ,S r ), they are sent to the server for storage. e In the update protocol, the encrypted entry is stored for each call, while in S r In , the plaintext entries are stored after the search operation is completed.
[0104] Send S e ,S rTo the server
[0105] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes:
[0106] Extracting a second keyword from a second index; the second index is in the index set;
[0107] Processing the second keyword with an encryption key to generate a first result;
[0108] After combining the first result with the first constant and performing hashing, a second search token is generated;
[0109] generating a second result based on the second search token;
[0110] generating a target keyword according to the second result and the first random number;
[0111] A mask value corresponding to the target keyword is generated according to the second result and the encrypted entry; the mask value is used to represent the second document identifier; and the second keyword is correlated with the second document identifier.
[0112] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes:
[0113] Updating the first random number, looping and iterating the second result, and returning to the step of generating a target keyword based on the second result and the first random number; and generating a mask value corresponding to the target keyword based on the second result and the encrypted entry;
[0114] Until all target keywords and corresponding mask values are updated, the current first random number is set to a null value.
[0115] In some possible implementations, the embodiment of the present application proposes an update protocol: As described in Algorithm 2, first, the embodiment of the present application is not applicable to a single keyword, but to a document or a group of documents. Therefore, the keyword index must be extracted from lines (1-4), which is self-evident in all effective solutions that directly process the index without solving its extraction problem. The client in the update protocol provides a document collection DocColl and an update operation op, such as adding or deleting documents. The local state θ contains information about the keyword w, three keys (K g ,K f ,K t ) and system constants Con. Add the document set Doc to the encrypted database S eThis involves adding a keyword / document (w, ind) to each document in the collection. First, the document is retrieved from the client (1-4). In this step, the keyword is extracted from each file in the collection index (keywords and the documents they contain). This step is essential in all systems. Before adding or removing keywords, the index is extracted. Therefore, the index is processed instead of the document directly. The extracted index is sent to the process program. The process program works as follows:
[0116] When executing PRF F, the client uses K for each keyword w in the index KTMap. f To calculate Search Token Key w The calculation includes: w The hash function is performed on the combination with the system constant Con; the value decreases with each update. It is necessary to ensure that it does not conflict with previous updates (i.e. forward privacy). w The encrypted value used to calculate the S e The position of the subsequent value in the hash table is calculated using a random value rn that is randomly generated for each pair (w, ind) except the last pair in the basic word index. The null value ⊥ will be introduced as the end tag of the index in the subsequent search process. Next, these (w, ind) are encrypted to prevent them from being explicitly revealed to the server (backward privacy). The mask value Val is obtained by masking the second result H (Key w ||0) and encrypted entry E id These steps are repeated for all keywords in the document. Each time an update request is made, a new key sk is calculated to achieve the highest level of privacy and security. During the update, this key is used to encrypt the value (ind||op) to hide it from the server and prevent it from being leaked.
[0117] When the process is completed, the system constant (Con-1) at the client will be updated and S′ e Add the encrypted index S to the server e In the process shown in FIG2 , the keyword w1 is updated for several file sets.
[0118] Algorithm 2 Update(θ,DocColl,op;S e )
[0119] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes:
[0120] The client generates a trap door according to the first keyword, and sends the trap door to the server;
[0121] The server performs a search operation on the encrypted database based on the trapdoor to obtain a first identifier, and sends the first identifier to the client;
[0122] The client extracts the first key, performs a decryption operation on the first identifier to obtain a first document identifier, and sends the first document identifier to the second mapping; the first key is a one-time decryption key.
[0123] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes:
[0124] The server performs hash processing on the trapdoor several times and performs a search operation in the encrypted database according to the processing results;
[0125] Get the current value of the first constant as the first value;
[0126] If the first value is the same as the first constant, stop searching and determine the first identifier; the first constant is used to represent the last constant stored in the current second mapping;
[0127] Alternatively, a first constant between a previous update operation and a previous search operation is obtained, and the first identifier is calculated based on the first constant.
[0128] In some possible implementations, the present application proposes a search protocol: Algorithm 3 formally describes the search protocol. Initially, the client provides a tag value t w , so that the server can return the document identifier and the last constant Lcon value (if any) for w based on the most recently completed search request. Explicit data will be leaked to the adversary based on access pattern leakage, so it is explicitly stored in the hash table S at the server after each search query. r [t w ] in the search token. Perform Con hashing, and the server calculates the location to search the encrypted database EDB S e Whenever the current Con is equal to S r [t w ], the search process terminates because no updates have occurred since the last search. Instead, a set of locations Addr of encrypted values in w is calculated using each value of Con between the last update and the last search. w LocationAddr wThe value of is calculated each time with the help of the random number rn stored in the encrypted value of the previous position until it contains the last value, as shown in Figure 2. These steps are repeated until the current constant Con number is equal to the last regular LCon number. The encrypted value ID2 is sent to the client, which decrypts it and filters it. After decryption, the plaintext data and the current Con are returned to the server to be stored in the hash table S r middle.
[0129] Algorithm 3: Search (θ, w, op; S e ,S r )
[0130] Optionally, in one embodiment of the present invention, the method further includes:
[0131] Constructing a leakage function, wherein the leakage function is used to represent the control of the amount of information disclosed by the server;
[0132] Constructing a list function, wherein the list function is used to represent a document set added to a database; the database is located on the client;
[0133] Based on the list function, construct a first function; the leakage function includes the first function, and the first function is used to represent the leakage function with forward privacy;
[0134] Constructing a time function, wherein the time function is used to represent the timestamps and document identifiers that have not been deleted in the database;
[0135] Based on the time function, constructing a second function; the leakage function includes the second function, and the second function is used to characterize the leakage function with backward privacy;
[0136] Based on the first function and the second function, the security performance of the encrypted database is analyzed.
[0137] In some possible implementations, the embodiments of the present application propose a security analysis: Type II backward privacy and forward privacy are achieved under the strategy of the present application, as shown in the following theorem.
[0138] Theorem 1: A DSSE scheme with forward privacy and backward privacy is a scheme where F is modeled as a secure PRF, G is modeled as a secure PRP, and h is a hash function. Its leakage is defined as follows:
[0139] Proof: This example demonstrates this using a hybrid approach involving a series of countermeasures. Countermeasures G0 and G4 are identical to the SSE countermeasures in the ideal world and the SSE countermeasures in the real world.
[0140] Countermeasure G0. Here is a countermeasure that simulates the SSE security in the real world, as shown in formula (8):
[0141] Game G1. Same as G0, but this hybrid method does not use the function F to generate KT and t w , but uses random numbers. In order to bind to the keyword w, KWT and TWT are two tables used to store any string linked to the keyword w. Specifically, when processing a new keyword w, the system selects a unique random string and stores it in two tables KWT and TWT so that it can be reused when querying w. If the adversary can distinguish G1 from G0, then it is possible to distinguish F from a true random function. This means that the embodiment of the present application can create an adversary that is as effective as formula (9)
[0142] Countermeasure G2. The output of function G is simulated using table GT in this hybrid method. If the output appears in at least one entry in GT, the hybrid fails. The probability of this happening is negligible. Again, to distinguish between G1 and G2, the adversary It should be possible to distinguish G from the randomly generated function, as shown in formula (10):
[0143] Countermeasure G3. In this hybrid method, in order to answer the random oracle query, the embodiment of the present application creates three tables HashT1, HashT2 and HashT3, each of which records the query results of H(KT w ||Con) and H(Key w ||0) and H(Key w || 1) response, assuming that only the addition process is considered when considering the leakage in the update function, the embodiment of the present application defines It will leak the total number of keyword / document pairs. Instead of calling the hash function H Con times, the process protocol uses a random string to generate a search token Key w As part of the token generation process, the hash function h1 = H(Key w ||0) and h2=H(Key w ||1) is replaced by a random string. Therefore, the random oracle H is programmed to be in the protocol for searching data, H(KT w||Con) = Key w , H(Key w ||0) = h1 and H(Key w ||1) = h2. Each time the hash function is called through tables HashT1, HashT2, and HashT3, the embodiments of the present application record the script. If the adversary can distinguish G3 from G2, then it may distinguish H from a truly random function. As a formal construction, the embodiments of the present application can create a valid adversary as shown in formula (11):
[0144] Countermeasure G4. Create a table Updates, which is indexed by keyword w and saved in this hybrid for generating search tokens. Search token Key w is generated by G3 by performing Con hashes instead of using the existing token. As an alternative to mapping, from the keyword to the value selected from EDB S e The embodiments of the present application use an immediate table Update that directly maps the keyword to the update counter. Thus, the following formula is obtained, formula (12): P[G3 = 1] - P[G4 = 1] = 0 formula (12)
[0145] Simulator. As a final step, the embodiments of the present application generate a simulator that utilizes the leakage function to generate an ideal countermeasure, which is similar to countermeasure G4. It knows nothing about w, which is the only difference. Instead, it relies on the leakage function. Thus, the following formula is obtained,: formula (13)
[0146] The following result is obtained by combining the results of all the above countermeasures, as shown in formula (14):
[0147] It can be seen that the simulator should use a random string instead of ind. Each time a new entry is updated in EDB, a new search token is required. In this way, the server cannot distinguish random entries from those observed during the update. In addition, the server does not know which operation it is performing. It only leaks the number of entries through its update protocol. To ensure backward privacy security, the server needs to know how many entries are related to the keyword w and when each update occurs. The server cannot learn more information from the search protocol. Therefore, the server cannot determine which deletion operations will delete which additions.
[0148] In summary, in this embodiment of the present invention, the client only stores the key and performs a search query using the received first keyword to implement data query. Since only the key is stored, storage overhead is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the document identifier is returned, improving data security. Therefore, this embodiment of the present invention enables data query operations, reducing client storage costs and improving data security.
[0149] The scheme proposed in this application was evaluated and compared with related schemes through experiments. The programming language used in all schemes is Java. The cryptographic hash function h is implemented using SHA-256 (160 bits long). PRF F is released with AES-128 / 256, while PRP G is released with AES-128 / 128. These experiments were conducted on a Huawei laptop running Windows 11 64-bit, x64-based operating system, with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-10210U CPU @ 1.60GHz, 8GB of RAM, and a 512GB SSD disk.
[0150] In these experiments, all document-keyword pairs in the A email dataset were extracted and stored in EDB. The size of the result constructed throughout the experiments varied, ranging from 10 to 10 5 . In order to simulate the performance impact of deletion on update operations, the embodiment of the present application simulates deletion with a probability p of 0.1. The time to process each entry is calculated by repeating the experiment 30 times and then taking the average of the results. The more entries processed, the less processing time each entry takes. The searchability of all keywords is retained, even those that are misspelled or typed incorrectly. In addition, document size does not affect the search cost; but it affects the insertion cost because larger documents typically contain more keywords.
[0151] Comparison of the proposed solution with the effective solution Mitra, SD d and CLOSE-FB. All comparison schemes use cryptographic symmetric primitives to ensure fair comparison. To simulate dynamic search and update queries for specific keywords, this embodiment of the application creates a sequence Seq containing 100,000 queries, which contain interleaved search and update queries. As part of constructing this sequence, a search parameter p is used to determine the probability of a search query appearing in the sequence, i.e., (1-p) is the probability of an update query occurring.
[0152] First, for client storage. One of the key elements for the success of smart devices is that local storage is fixed. This experiment compares the solution proposed in this application with some effective related solutions (such as Mitra solution) in terms of cost and client holding.w Calculate the number of updates required locally on the client for each keyword in the data set. Almost all effective solutions store keyword updates and search counters in one or more tables on the client, resulting in higher storage costs. Therefore, the cost of storage on the client increases linearly with the increase in database size. The embodiment of the present application does not require these tables because the client only needs the key, so the storage is fixed. Even if the database size grows, the storage at the client remains unchanged. The work proposed in the embodiment of the present application demonstrated high efficiency in this experiment. The storage cost of the client is shown in Figure 3. The client storage cost used in this application is shown in curve 310.
[0153] Second, regarding computational cost. Compare the solution proposed in this application with other solutions to see the computational cost of the client. The query generation for the search keyword is shown in FIG4 as a function of the number of documents matching this keyword, wherein the computational cost in the embodiment of this application is shown in curve 410. When keywords are required, the computational cost of the client is lower. When searching for keywords, the embodiment of this application only needs to calculate KT w Once (in each search, it is considered a new key), regardless of whether the number of documents containing the keyword increases. In other valid schemes SD d In both
[15] and Mitra, the computational cost of client-side queries increases linearly with the number of documents in the encrypted index associated with the keyword. Because they need to calculate all locations associated with the keyword w, the client's computational cost increases. This demonstrates that the solution of the present embodiment can be effectively used with smart devices.
[0154] Third, about the effect of dynamic operations. This experiment presents a simulation of the performance of search queries in a dynamic environment, and also uses traces to simulate to determine whether the improvement is significant. Three traces are generated, and in each trace, updates and searches for specific keywords are listed. The embodiment of the present application sets the trace length to 100,000. The probability of a search query is stored in each trace as parameter p. The probability that a query in a trace is a search query is p. In contrast, the probability of an update query is 1-ρ. Using the trace below, the embodiment of the present application records the time spent on the server side for each search query (from the time the search token is received to the time the result is received). During this experiment, the search time of serial queries is accumulated on the server side. The diagram of the search time for various values is shown in Figure 5. For each subgraph in Figure 5, the line segment with the smallest face is the effect curve corresponding to the solution of the present application. The embodiment of the present application stores plaintext instead of re-encrypting it and storing it again on the server. In contrast, the comparison solution will increase server storage and location. Therefore, searching for plaintext results that are like continuous blocks is more efficient.
[0155] Fourth, the decryption cost for the client. Due to the dynamic nature of the solution of the embodiment of the present application, it will simulate the behavior of the entire system, which runs dynamically, is constantly updated, and searches for specific keywords, just like what was done in the previous experiment. The embodiment of the present application designs a solution to achieve backward privacy properties. In order to prevent the search results from being explicitly viewed, the embodiment of the present application retrieves the results from the server in the form of encrypted values, which cannot be explicitly viewed during the search process to ensure backward privacy. Compared with other dynamic solutions such as Mitra, SD d Compared to CLOSE-FB, the dynamic solution of the embodiment of the present application provides the shortest decryption time for the results retrieved from the server during the search. According to these compared solutions, each search query will decrypt all retrieved results, even previously retrieved results, thereby increasing client processing time. Therefore, on the client alone, the solution of the embodiment of the present application requires less time to decrypt the encrypted values added after the last search. Figure 6 illustrates this situation. In each subgraph in Figure 6, the line segment with the smallest surface is the effect curve corresponding to the solution of the present application.
[0156] Therefore, security features such as forward and backward privacy are crucial in preventing serious attacks on SSE. Using symmetric encryption primitives, the embodiment of the present application proposes a dynamic SSE scheme that achieves forward and backward privacy at a fixed storage cost for the client. This article advocates the use of a two-party model to implement the solution, where the first party is the data owner and the second party acts as a server, providing users with a large amount of storage and efficient computing power. The embodiment of the present application proposes the use of encrypted indexes on the server to connect keywords with document identifiers that share keywords. This article proposes a DSSE framework with fixed storage costs for the client, which focuses on the practical application of DSSE. In order to evaluate the performance of the solution of the embodiment of the present application, the embodiment of the present application implements it together with the previous two solutions. Experimental results show that the performance of this solution is better than the best existing solution.
[0157] Next, a data processing system according to an embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to FIG. 7 .
[0158] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a data processing system according to an embodiment of the present invention, wherein the system specifically includes:
[0159] The first module 710 is configured to create a key set, wherein the key set includes an encryption key and a decryption key;
[0160] The second module 720 is configured to create an index set and write the encrypted index set into an encrypted database; the index set includes a first index, the first index being used to represent the correlation between the first keyword and the first document identifier; the encrypted database is located in the server;
[0161] A third module 730 is configured to generate a first search token based on the first keyword;
[0162] The fourth module 740 is configured to receive, according to the first search token, a first identifier sent back by the server after the search; the first identifier is used to represent the encrypted first document identifier;
[0163] The fifth module 750 is configured to decrypt the first identifier according to the decryption key to obtain a first document identifier.
[0164] It can be seen that the contents of the above method embodiments are all applicable to the present system embodiments. The functions specifically implemented by the present system embodiments are the same as those of the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above method embodiments.
[0165] 8 , an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing device, including:
[0166] at least one processor 810;
[0167] at least one memory 820, configured to store at least one program;
[0168] When the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor 810, the at least one processor 810 implements the data processing method.
[0169] Similarly, the contents of the above method embodiments are applicable to the present device embodiments. The functions specifically implemented by the present device embodiments are the same as those of the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above method embodiments.
[0170] An embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a program executable by a processor. The program executable by the processor is used to execute the above-mentioned data processing method when executed by the processor.
[0171] Similarly, the contents of the above method embodiments are applicable to the present storage medium embodiment. The functions specifically implemented by the present storage medium embodiment are the same as those of the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above method embodiments.
[0172] In some optional embodiments, the function / operation mentioned in the block diagram may not occur in the order mentioned in the operation diagram. For example, depending on the function / operation involved, the two boxes shown in succession can actually be executed substantially simultaneously or the boxes can sometimes be executed in reverse order. In addition, the embodiment presented and described in the flow chart of the present invention is provided in an exemplary manner for the purpose of providing a more comprehensive understanding of the technology. The disclosed method is not limited to the operation and logic flow presented herein. Optional embodiments are contemplated in which the order of the various operations is changed and the sub-operations described as a part of a larger operation are performed independently.
[0173] In addition, although the present invention is described in the context of functional modules, it should be understood that, unless otherwise stated, one or more of the functions and / or features may be integrated into a single physical device and / or software module, or one or more functions and / or features may be implemented in separate physical devices or software modules. It is also understood that a detailed discussion of the actual implementation of each module is not necessary for understanding the present invention. More specifically, given the properties, functions, and internal relationships of the various functional modules in the devices disclosed herein, the actual implementation of the module will be understood within the ordinary skill of an engineer. Therefore, a person skilled in the art will be able to implement the present invention set forth in the claims using ordinary skill without undue experimentation. It is also understood that the specific concepts disclosed are merely illustrative and are not intended to limit the scope of the present invention, which is determined by the full scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.
[0174] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several programs for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present invention. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.
[0175] The logic and / or steps represented in a flowchart or otherwise described herein, for example, may be considered as an ordered list of executable programs for implementing the logical functions, and may be embodied in any computer-readable medium for use by, or in conjunction with, a program execution system, apparatus, or device (e.g., a computer-based system, a system including a processor, or other system that can retrieve and execute a program from a program execution system, apparatus, or device). For purposes of this specification, a "computer-readable medium" may be any device that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use by, or in conjunction with, a program execution system, apparatus, or device.
[0176] More specific examples (a non-exhaustive list) of computer-readable media include the following: an electrical connection with one or more wires (electronic devices), a portable computer disk cartridge (magnetic devices), a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable and programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), a fiber optic device, and a portable compact disc read-only memory (CDROM). In addition, the computer-readable medium may even be paper or other suitable medium on which the program is printed, since the program may be obtained electronically, for example, by optically scanning the paper or other medium, followed by editing, deciphering, or processing in another suitable manner as necessary, and then stored in a computer memory.
[0177] It should be understood that various parts of the present invention can be implemented using hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above-described embodiments, multiple steps or methods can be implemented using software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable program execution system. For example, if implemented using hardware, as in another embodiment, any one of the following technologies known in the art or a combination thereof can be used: a discrete logic circuit having a logic gate circuit for implementing a logic function on a data signal, an application-specific integrated circuit having a suitable combination of logic gate circuits, a programmable gate array (PGA), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), etc.
[0178] In the above description of this specification, reference to the terms "one embodiment / example," "another embodiment / example," or "certain embodiments / examples" means that the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described in conjunction with the embodiment or example are included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the schematic representation of the above terms does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Moreover, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in any one or more embodiments or examples.
[0179] While embodiments of the present invention have been shown and described, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions, and variations may be made to the embodiments without departing from the principles and spirit of the invention, and that the scope of the invention is defined by the claims and their equivalents.
[0180] The above is a specific description of the preferred implementation of the present invention, but the present invention is not limited to the embodiments. Those skilled in the art can make various equivalent modifications or substitutions without violating the spirit of the present invention. These equivalent modifications or substitutions are all included in the scope defined by the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. A data processing method, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Create a key set; The key set includes an encryption key and a decryption key; Creating an index set, and writing the encrypted index set into an encrypted database; the index set includes a first index, the first index is used to characterize the correlation between the first keyword and the first document identifier; the encrypted database is located in a server; Based on the first keyword, generate a first search token; According to the first search token, receiving a first identifier sent back by the server after the search; The first identifier is used to represent the first document identifier after encryption; The first identifier is decrypted according to the decryption key to obtain a first document identifier.
2. The data processing method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The client performs initialization operations on the first mapping and the second mapping, and sends the first mapping and the second mapping to the encryption database; the first mapping is used to store the encrypted index set; The client generates a first constant; after completing the update operation of the encrypted database, the first constant is updated.
3. The data processing method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Extracting a second keyword from a second index; the second index is in the index set; Processing the second keyword through the encryption key to generate a first result; After combining the first result with the first constant, a second search token is generated through hash processing; generating a second result according to the second search token; generating a target keyword according to the second result and the first random number; A mask value corresponding to the target keyword is generated according to the second result and the encrypted entry; the mask value is used to represent the second document identifier; and the second keyword is correlated with the second document identifier.
4. The data processing method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The method further comprises the following steps: Update the first random number, loop and iterate the second result, and return to the step of generating a target keyword according to the second result and the first random number; and generate a mask value corresponding to the target keyword according to the second result and the encrypted entry; Until all target keywords and corresponding mask values are updated, the current first random number is set to a null value.
5. The data processing method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises the following steps: The client generates a trap door according to the first keyword, and sends the trap door to the server; The server performs a search operation in the encrypted database based on the trap door to obtain a first identifier, and sends the first identifier to the client; The client extracts the first key, performs a decryption operation on the first identifier to obtain a first document identifier, and The first document identifier is sent to the second mapping; the first key is a one-time decryption key.
6. The data processing method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The method further comprises: The server performs hash processing on the trap door for several times, and performs a search operation in the encrypted database according to the processing results; Get the current value of the first constant as the first value; If the first value is the same as the first constant, stop searching and determine the first identifier; the first constant is used to represent the last constant stored in the current second mapping; Alternatively, a first constant between a previous update operation and a previous search operation is obtained, and a first identifier is calculated based on the first constant.
7. The data processing method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further comprises: Constructing a leakage function, wherein the leakage function is used to characterize the control of the amount of information disclosed by the server; Building a list function, the list function is used to represent the document set added to the database; the database is located on the client; Based on the list function, construct a first function; the leakage function includes the first function, and the first function is used to characterize the leakage function with forward privacy; Constructing a time function, wherein the time function is used to characterize the timestamps and document identifiers that have not been deleted in the database; Based on the time function, construct a second function; the leakage function includes the second function, and the second function is used to characterize the leakage function with backward privacy; Based on the first function and the second function, the security performance of the encrypted database is analyzed.
8. A data processing system, characterized in that: include: The first module is used to create a key set; the key set includes an encryption key and a decryption key; The second module is used to create an index set and write the encrypted index set into an encrypted database; the index set includes a first index, and the first index is used to characterize the correlation between the first keyword and the first document identifier; the encrypted database is located in the server; A third module, configured to generate a first search token based on the first keyword; A fourth module is used to receive a first identifier sent back by the server after searching according to the first search token; The first identifier is used to represent the first document identifier after encryption; The fifth module is used to decrypt the first identifier according to the decryption key to obtain a first document identifier.
9. A data processing device, characterized in that: include: at least one processor; at least one memory for storing at least one program; When the at least one program is executed by the at least one processor, the at least one processor implements the data processing method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a program executable by a processor, characterized in that: The processor-executable program is used to implement the data processing method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 when executed by the processor.
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