Communication method, communication device, medium, and program product
Through blockchain technology, the secure registration and authorization of network functional devices is realized in the 5G service architecture, the security and efficiency problems in the 5G network are solved, the cross-operator authorization process is simplified, and the security and storage efficiency of network functional information are improved. .
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/CN2024/094754
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-05-22
- Filing Date
- 2024-05-22
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-28
AI Technical Summary
In a 5G service-oriented architecture, changes in communication modes between network elements make it difficult to balance security, privacy and performance requirements, and traditional authorization solutions are inefficient and complex, especially in cross-operator network function access and authorization scenarios.
Using blockchain technology, the network registration functional equipment and the smart contract of the symmetric key encryption and distributed management equipment is achieved through the network registration functional equipment and the network management equipment, the network functional equipment is implemented to realize the secure registration and authorization, reduce the complexity of the operator's trust relationship, and automatically execute it. Authorization and certification.
It improves the security and efficiency of network function access, realizes the secure storage and sharing of network function information across operators, simplifies the authorization process, and reduces the complexity of trust establishment among operators.
Smart Images

Figure CN2024094754_28112024_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Communication method, communication equipment, medium and program product
[0001] This application claims priority to the Chinese patent application filed with the State Intellectual Property Office of China on May 22, 2023, with application number 202310581318.2 and invention name “Communication Method, Communication Equipment, Medium and Program Product”, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field
[0002] The present application relates generally to the field of communications, and more particularly to a communication method, a communication device, a computer-readable storage medium, and a computer program product. Background Art
[0003] With technological advancements, the fifth-generation mobile communication system (5G) further expands performance, user experience, and flexibility. Achieving these goals requires not only profound improvements to new radio access but also significant changes to the 5G core network. The most profound change involves applying service-oriented architecture (SOA) principles to control plane signaling, as the foundation of the 5G service-based architecture (SBA). SOA defines architectural principles for implementing distributed systems based on service orchestration. The fundamental concepts of a service-oriented architecture include three components: service consumers, service providers, and a service registry. Service providers offer services that are invoked by service consumers. The service registry is a searchable repository of service contracts that defines the attributes and policies of the different services exposed by a specific service provider. Service consumers query the service registry to discover services based on the provided service contracts. 3GPP specifies a REST-based service architecture as the blueprint for SBA. In the 5G core network's service-based architecture, services are represented as network function services. A group of related network function services constitutes a network function (NF).
[0004] Adopting a service-oriented architecture improves efficiency and generally also improves security. However, in system design, openness and flexibility often conflict with security, privacy, and performance requirements. A balance must be struck between promoting technological innovation and ensuring security and stability. Such a large-scale architectural overhaul means that communication patterns between network elements will be radically different from before, necessitating new mechanisms to meet the security requirements of modern mobile networks.
[0005] Summary of the Invention
[0006] The embodiments of the present application provide a communication method, a communication device, and a computer-readable storage medium. Through the embodiments of the present application, distributed authentication and information sharing of network service functions are achieved, and the secure operation of network function registration, access, and authorization functions is guaranteed.
[0007] In a first aspect of the present application, a communication method is provided. The method comprises: receiving, at a network registration function device, a registration request from a network function device, the registration request including an identity of the network function device; obtaining an encrypted identity of the network function device based on the identity of the network function device; encrypting the registration request of the network function device using a symmetric key between the network registration function device and a trusted environment device; and sending a transaction request to a distributed management device, the transaction request including a certificate of the network registration function device, the encrypted registration request, the encrypted identity of the network function device, and a signature of the transaction request from the network registration function device. In this manner, the registration request of the network function device can be securely transmitted to the blockchain network.
[0008] In some embodiments, the registration request may further include at least one of the following: the type of the network function device; the identity of the network to which the network function device belongs; the address of the network function device; or the services supported by the network function device. Thus, the information of the network function device can be stored in the blockchain network and shared by different nodes.
[0009] In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include an identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device requests to be called, thereby enabling the distributed management device to call the registration contract based on the identifier.
[0010] In some embodiments, the method may further include: generating an identity credential for the network function device based on determining that the network function device is legitimate; and sending the identity credential to the network function device. Thus, the network function device has the authority to register in the blockchain network.
[0011] In some embodiments, the registration request received from the network function device may be a first registration request, and the method may further include: sending a second registration request to the authentication device, the second registration request including the identity of the network registration function device and a signature of the network registration function device; and receiving a certificate of the network registration function device from the authentication device. Thus, the network registration function device may be registered with the blockchain network.
[0012] In some embodiments, the method may further include: performing interactive authentication with the trusted environment device using the certificate; and generating a symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device. Thus, the network registration function device and the trusted environment device can use the symmetric key for encryption or decryption, thereby ensuring communication security.
[0013] In some embodiments, the method may further include: receiving a registration success message from the distributed management device; and sending the registration success message to the network function device. Thus, the network function device can confirm that the registration in the blockchain network is successful.
[0014] In a second aspect of the present application, a communication method is provided. The method includes: receiving, at a distributed management device, a first transaction request from a network registration function device, the first transaction request including a certificate of the network registration function device, an encrypted registration request of the network function device, an encrypted identity of the network function device, and a signature of the transaction request from the network registration function device; determining whether the signature is legitimate based on the certificate; and, based on determining that the signature is legitimate, sending a second transaction request to a trusted environment device, the second transaction request including the identity of the network registration function device, the encrypted registration request of the network function device, and the encrypted identity of the network function device. In this way, the distributed management device can verify the legitimacy of the transaction request and send the transaction request to the trusted environment for processing, thereby ensuring transaction security.
[0015] In some embodiments, the first transaction request and the second transaction request may further include an identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke, so that the distributed management device can invoke the registration contract according to the identifier.
[0016] In some embodiments, the method may further include: receiving a registration success message from the trusted environment device indicating that the network function device has completed registration; and sending the registration success message to the network registration function device. Thus, the distributed management device can call the registration contract according to the identifier.
[0017] In a third aspect of the present application, a communication method is provided. The method includes: receiving a transaction request from a distributed management device at a trusted environment device, the transaction request including an identity of a network registration function device, an encrypted registration request of the network function device, and the encrypted identity of the network function device; determining a symmetric key between the trusted environment device and the network registration function device based on the identity of the network registration function device; decrypting the encrypted registration request using the symmetric key; and, in response to determining that the transaction request is valid based on the encrypted identity, adding the network function device and the services supported by the network function device to a registration list. In this manner, the transaction request can be securely processed in a trusted environment, enabling secure registration of the network function device.
[0018] In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include an identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke and a signature of the transaction request by the network registration function device, thereby enabling the registration contract to be invoked based on the identifier.
[0019] In some embodiments, the registration request may include at least one of the following: the identity of the network function device; the type of the network function device; the identity of the network to which the network function device belongs; the address of the network function device; or the services supported by the network function device. Thus, the information of the network function device may be stored in the blockchain network and shared by different nodes.
[0020] In some embodiments, the encrypted identity of the network function device included in the transaction request may be a first encrypted identity, and the transaction request further includes: invoking a registration contract based on the identifier of the registration contract; obtaining a second encrypted identity of the network function device based on the identity of the network function device; and determining that the transaction request is valid based on determining that the first encrypted identity and the second encrypted identity are the same. Thus, the legitimacy of the transaction request can be confirmed, thereby ensuring security.
[0021] In some embodiments, the method may further include: sending a registration success message of the network function device to the distributed management device, thereby enabling the network function device to confirm successful registration in the blockchain network.
[0022] In a fourth aspect of the present application, a communication method is provided. The method comprises: at a second network function device, sending a service token request to a network registration function device, the service token request including the identity of the second network function device, the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, the type of service requested by the first network function device, and the identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs; and receiving a decrypted service token from the network registration function device. In this manner, the second network function device can request services provided by another network function device from a blockchain network, reducing the complexity of the interaction.
[0023] In some embodiments, the method may further include: using the public key of the trusted environment device to determine whether the decrypted service token is legitimate; based on determining that the service token is legitimate, sending a service request to the first network function device, the service request including the identity of the second network function device, the type of the second network function device, the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, the identity of the first network function device, the type of the first network function device, and the service token; and receiving a service response message from the first network function device. Thus, the service token request of the second network function device can be securely transmitted to the blockchain network.
[0024] In a fifth aspect of the present application, a communication method is provided. The method includes: receiving, at a network registration function device, a service token request from a second network function device, the service token request including the identity of the second network function device, the identity of the network in which the second network function device resides, the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, the type of service requested by the first network function device, and the identity of the network in which the first network function device resides; encrypting the service token request using a symmetric key between the network registration function device and a trusted environment device; and sending a transaction request to a distributed management device, the transaction request including the encrypted service token request, the certificate of the network registration function device, and the signature of the transaction request by the network registration function device. In this manner, the service token request from the network function device can be securely transmitted to the blockchain network.
[0025] In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include an identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke, thereby enabling the distributed management device to invoke the registration contract based on the identifier.
[0026] In some embodiments, the method may further include: receiving an encrypted service token from the distributed management device; decrypting the encrypted service token using a symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device; and sending the decrypted service token to the network function device. Thus, the service token can be securely transmitted to the network function device.
[0027] In a sixth aspect of the present application, a communication method is provided. The method comprises: receiving, at a distributed management device, a first transaction request from a network registration function device, the first transaction request including an encrypted service token request from the network function device, a certificate of the network registration function device, and a signature of the transaction request from the network registration function device; determining whether the signature is legitimate based on the certificate; and, upon determining that the signature is legitimate, sending a second transaction request to a trusted environment device, the second transaction request including the identity of the network registration function device and the encrypted service token request. In this manner, the distributed management device can verify the legitimacy of the transaction request and send the transaction request to the trusted environment for processing, thereby ensuring transaction security.
[0028] In some embodiments, the first transaction request and the second transaction request may further include an identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke, so that the distributed management device can invoke the registration contract according to the identifier.
[0029] In some embodiments, the method may further include: receiving an encrypted service token from the trusted environment device; and sending the encrypted service token to the network registration function device. Thus, the service token can be securely transmitted.
[0030] In a seventh aspect of the present application, a communication method is provided. The method includes: receiving a transaction request from a distributed management device at a trusted environment device, the transaction request including the identity of a network registration function device and an encrypted service token request from a second network function device; determining a symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device based on the identity of the network registration function device; decrypting the encrypted service token request based on the symmetric key; determining, based on the service token request, whether a first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device; and generating a service token for the second network function device based on determining that the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device. In this manner, transaction requests can be securely processed within a trusted environment, enabling secure authorization of network function devices.
[0031] In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include an identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to be invoked, so that the registration contract can be invoked according to the identifier.
[0032] In some embodiments, the service token request may include at least one of the following: the identity of the second network function device; the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs; the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device; the type of service requested by the second network function device from the first network function device; or the identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs. This allows the second network function device to request services provided by another network function device from the blockchain network, reducing the complexity of the interaction.
[0033] In some embodiments, the service token may include at least one of the following: the identity of the second network function device; the identity of the first network function device; the lifecycle of the service token; or the signature algorithm of the trusted environment device. Thus, the second network function device can request services provided by the first network function device using the service token.
[0034] In some embodiments, determining whether the first network function device provides a service requested by the second network function device may include: invoking an authorization contract based on an identifier of the authorization contract; obtaining an encrypted identity of the first network function device based on the identity of the first network function device; determining registration information of the first network function device based on the encrypted identity of the first network function device to obtain services supported by the first network function device; and determining whether the services supported by the first network function device include the type of service of the first network function device requested by the second network function device. Thus, the service requested by the second network function device may be compared with the services supported by the first network function device.
[0035] In some embodiments, the communication method further comprises: encrypting the service token using a symmetric key; and sending the encrypted service token to the distributed management device. Thus, the service token of the second network function device can be securely transmitted to the second network function device.
[0036] In an eighth aspect of the present application, a communication device is provided. The communication device includes a processor and a memory storing instructions. When the instructions are executed by the processor, the communication device performs any method according to any one of the first to seventh aspects and their implementations.
[0037] In a ninth aspect of the present application, a chip is provided, comprising a processing circuit configured to execute any method of any one of the first to seventh aspects and implementations thereof.
[0038] In a tenth aspect of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, which, when executed by an electronic device, causes the electronic device to execute any method of any one of the first to seventh aspects and their implementations.
[0039] In an eleventh aspect of the present application, a computer program product is provided, which includes instructions, and when the instructions are executed by an electronic device, the electronic device executes any method of any one of the first to seventh aspects and their implementations.
[0040] It should be understood that the contents described in the Summary of the Invention are not intended to define the key or important features of the present application, nor are they intended to limit the scope of the present application. Other features of the present application will become readily understood through the following description. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0041] FIG1A shows a schematic diagram of a network environment in which embodiments of the present application may be implemented.
[0042] Figure 1B shows a schematic diagram of a 5G core network reference point architecture related to an embodiment of the present application.
[0043] Figure 1C shows a schematic diagram of a 5G core network service-oriented architecture related to an embodiment of the present application.
[0044] FIG1D shows a schematic diagram of a system architecture in which embodiments of the present application may be implemented.
[0045] FIG2 illustrates an interactive signaling diagram of service authorization according to some embodiments of the present application.
[0046] FIG3 illustrates an example process of service authorization according to some embodiments of the present application.
[0047] FIG4 illustrates an example process of service authorization using a public chain structure.
[0048] FIG5 illustrates an example process of network function registration according to some embodiments of the present application.
[0049] FIG6 illustrates an example process of token request authorization and network function service access according to some embodiments of the present application.
[0050] FIG7 illustrates a schematic flowchart of a method implemented at a network registration function device according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0051] FIG8 shows a schematic flow chart of a method implemented at a distributed management device according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0052] FIG9 shows a schematic flow chart of a method implemented at a trusted environment device according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0053] FIG10 shows a schematic flowchart of a method implemented at a network function device according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0054] FIG11 illustrates a schematic flowchart of a method implemented at a network registration function device according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0055] FIG12 shows a schematic flow chart of a method implemented at a distributed management device according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0056] FIG13 shows a schematic flow chart of a method implemented at a trusted environment device according to an embodiment of the present application.
[0057] FIG14 shows a simplified block diagram of an example device of a possible implementation method of an embodiment of the present application.
[0058] FIG15 shows a simplified block diagram of an example device of a possible implementation method of an embodiment of the present application.
[0059] Throughout the drawings, the same or similar reference numerals are used to designate the same or similar components. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0060] The following describes embodiments of the present application in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. Although certain embodiments of the present application are shown in the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that the present application can be implemented in various forms and should not be construed as limited to the embodiments described herein. Instead, these embodiments are provided to provide a more thorough and complete understanding of the present application. It should be understood that the drawings and embodiments of the present application are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of the present application.
[0061] In the description of the embodiments of this application, the term "including" and similar terms should be understood as open inclusion, that is, "including but not limited to." The term "based on" should be understood as "based at least in part on." The term "one embodiment" or "the embodiment" should be understood as "at least one embodiment." The terms "first," "second," etc. can refer to different or the same objects. Other explicit and implicit definitions may also be included below.
[0062] The embodiments of the present application may be implemented according to any appropriate communication protocol, including but not limited to cellular communication protocols such as third generation (3G), fourth generation (4G), fifth generation (5G), and future communication protocols (e.g., sixth generation (6G)), wireless local area network communication protocols such as Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11, and / or any other protocol currently known or developed in the future.
[0063] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application are applied to communication systems that comply with any appropriate communication protocols, such as: General Packet Radio Service (GPRS), Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Enhanced Data rate for GSM Evolution (EDGE), Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS), Long Term Evolution (LTE) system, Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA), Code Division Multiple Access 2000 (CDMA2000), Time Division-Synchronization Code Division Multiple Access (TD-SCDMA), Frequency Division Duplex (FDD) system, Time Division Duplex (TDD), fifth generation (5G) system (e.g., New Radio (NR)) and future communication systems (e.g., sixth generation (6G) system), etc.
[0064] For the purpose of illustration, the embodiments of the present application are described below in the context of the 5G communication system in 3GPP. However, it should be understood that the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this communication system, but can be applied to any communication system with similar problems, such as a wireless local area network (WLAN), a wired communication system, or other communication systems developed in the future.
[0065] The term "terminal" or "terminal device" used in this application refers to any terminal device that can communicate with network devices or with each other by wire or wirelessly. Terminal devices may sometimes be referred to as user equipment or UE. Terminal devices may be any type of mobile terminal, fixed terminal or portable terminal. Terminal devices may be various wireless communication devices with wireless communication capabilities. With the rise of Internet of Things (IOT) technology, more and more devices that did not previously have communication capabilities, such as but not limited to household appliances, vehicles, tools and equipment, service equipment and service facilities, have begun to obtain wireless communication capabilities by configuring wireless communication units, so that they can access wireless communication networks and accept remote control. Such devices have wireless communication capabilities because they are configured with wireless communication units, and therefore also fall into the category of wireless communication devices. As an example, the terminal device may include a mobile cellular phone, a cordless phone, a mobile terminal (MT), a mobile station, a mobile device, a wireless terminal, a handheld device, a client, a subscription station, a portable subscription station, an Internet node, a communicator, a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a notebook computer, a tablet computer, a personal communication system device, a personal navigation device, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a wireless data card, a wireless modem (Modulator demodulator, Modem), a positioning device, a radio broadcast receiver, an e-book device, a gaming device, an IoT device, a vehicle-mounted device, an aircraft, a virtual reality (VR) device, an augmented reality (AR) device, a wearable device (for example, a smart watch, etc.), a terminal device in a 5G network or any terminal device in an evolved public land mobile network (PLMN), other devices that can be used for communication, or any combination of the above.
[0066] The term "network node" or "network device" used in this application refers to an entity or node that can be used to communicate with a terminal device, for example, an access network device. An access network device can be a device deployed in a wireless access network to provide wireless communication functions for a mobile terminal, for example, a radio access network (RAN) network device. Access network devices may include various types of base stations. Base stations are used to provide wireless access services to terminal devices. Specifically, each base station corresponds to a service coverage area, and terminal devices entering the area can communicate with the base station through wireless signals to receive wireless access services provided by the base station. There may be overlap between the service coverage areas of base stations. A terminal device in the overlapping area can receive wireless signals from multiple base stations, so that the terminal device can be served by multiple base stations at the same time. Depending on the size of the service coverage area provided, the access network device may include a macro base station providing macro cells, a micro base station for providing pico cells, a pico base station for providing micro cells, and a femto base station for providing femto cells. In addition, access network equipment may also include various forms of relay stations, access points, remote radio units (RRUs), radio heads (RHs), remote radio heads (RRHs), etc. In systems using different wireless access technologies, the names of access network equipment may vary. For example, in Long Term Evolution (LTE) networks, it is called evolved NodeB (eNB or eNodeB), in 3G networks, it is called NodeB (NB), in 5G networks, it may be called gNodeB (gNB) or NR NodeB (NR NB), etc.
[0067] Figure 1A shows a schematic diagram of a network environment 100 in which embodiments of the present application may be implemented. As shown in Figure 1A , the system may include a network function device 110, two network registration function devices 120 and 130, two distributed management devices 140 and 150, and two trusted environment devices 160 and 170. In some embodiments, network function device 110 may be implemented as a network function service consumer, network registration function devices 120 and 130 may be implemented as network function storage functions (NRFs), distributed management devices 140 and 150 may be implemented as distributed nodes (Peers) of a blockchain network, and trusted environment devices 160 and 170 may be implemented as trusted computing environments (TEEs) deployed on each peer node. In some embodiments, network registration function devices 120 and 130 may belong to different operators. A network function device belonging to the same operator as network registration function device 120 may request services provided by a network function device belonging to another operator. How to implement service authorization will be described in further detail below. It should be understood that the numbers shown in Figure 1A are for example purposes only. In implementation, any appropriate number of devices may be included according to the scale and architecture of the network, and this application does not impose any limitation on this.
[0068] It should be understood that the communication system 100A can be applicable to various scenarios. For example, the application scenarios of the communication system 100A include but are not limited to LTE systems, 5G systems or new wireless (New Radio, NR) and future communication systems, such as sixth-generation mobile communication systems. The embodiments of the present application are not limited to this, and it should be understood that the above-mentioned communications can follow any appropriate communication technology and corresponding communication standards. In addition, the device names involved in Figure 1A are only used as examples and are not intended to be limiting. In future communication architectures, they can be implemented as devices with the same functions.
[0069] Figure 1B shows a schematic diagram of a 5G core network reference point architecture 100B related to an embodiment of the present application. Logical entities with different interfaces and dependencies have been previously defined. All network elements are decomposed into separate network functions, each of which is interconnected through a point-to-point interface. This architectural design, which continues the legacy of previous generations of mobile networks, is called a reference point architecture. As shown in Figure 1B, the 5G core network reference point architecture 100B may include a UE, a (radio) access network (R)AN, a user plane function (UPF), a data network (DN), an access and mobility management function (AMF), a session management function (SMF), a policy control function (PCF), an application function (AF), a network slice selection function (NSSF), an authentication server function (AUSF), and a unified data management (UDM). Each network function can only communicate with a network function with a designated reference point. For example, the UE can only send Non-Access Stratum (NAS) messages to the AMF, or send data and radio signaling messages to the (R)AN.
[0070] The fifth-generation mobile communication system further expands performance, user experience, and flexibility. Achieving these goals requires not only profound improvements to new radio access but also significant changes to the 5G core network. The most profound change involves applying service-oriented architecture principles to control plane signaling as the foundation of 5G SBA. SOA defines architectural principles for implementing distributed systems based on service orchestration. The fundamental concepts of a service-oriented architecture include three components: service consumers, service providers, and a service registry. Service providers offer services that are invoked by service consumers. The service registry is a searchable repository of service contracts that defines the attributes and policies of the different services exposed by a specific service provider. Service consumers query the service registry to discover services based on the provided service contracts. 3GPP specifies a service architecture based on Representational State Transfer (REST) as the blueprint for SBA. In the service-based architecture of the 5G core network, services are represented as network function services. A group of related network function services constitutes a network function (NF).
[0071] The key benefits of adopting a service-oriented architecture are threefold. First, telecom providers can leverage existing mature services and rich tooling to facilitate the creation of new services and accelerate future innovation. Second, by integrating standardized, industry-proven technologies, they can avoid defining complete signaling protocols from scratch, which not only improves efficiency but also generally enhances security. Finally, core network elements are decoupled into separate network function services, deployed as stateless services, with service state stored in the core network's Unstructured Data Function (UDSF), which aligns with the goals of Network Function Virtualization (NFV). A service-oriented architecture should allow the network to adapt to changing loads while enabling operators to seamlessly manage and maintain increasingly diverse network function deployments. Overall, adopting a service-oriented architecture offers the following benefits: the ability to update production networks, scalability, modularity and reusability, and openness.
[0072] However, a key requirement put forward by mobile network operators for 5G is to introduce new services and functions in a more flexible way, minimize the impact on other entities in the network, and fully virtualize to achieve economical and efficient deployment. In the 5G service-based architecture (SBA), point-to-point interfaces are replaced by a common bus connecting all network functions, as shown in Figure 1C. Figure 1C shows a schematic diagram of the 5G core network service-based architecture related to an embodiment of the present application. Control plane functions such as AUSF, AMF, SMF, NSSF, NEF, NRF, PCF, UDM, or AF interact using service-based interfaces. For example, the service-oriented interface provided by AUSF is Nausf; the service-oriented interface provided by AMF is Namf; the service-oriented interface provided by SMF is Nsmf; the service-oriented interface provided by NSSF is Nnssf; the service-oriented interface provided by NEF is Nnef; the service-oriented interface provided by NRF is Nnrf; the service-oriented interface provided by PCF is Npcf; the service-oriented interface provided by UDM is Nudm; and the service-oriented interface provided by AF is Naf. All control plane network functions in the 5G core network use REST-based services to provide one or more functions that can be discovered, requested, or subscribed to by other network functions. To achieve these goals, the 5G service-oriented architecture further defines two new functional entities: NF registration function (NRF) and network exposure function (NEF). NRF provides network function service discovery, management, authorization, and other functions. NEF exposes network function services from within the network to authorized external applications to adjust network configuration, monitor machine type communication equipment, etc.
[0073] During the service registration and deregistration phase, NRF records the available network function instances and supported services, and enables network functions to discover each other and the services they provide in the network. As a service registry, NRF also provides and maintains service contracts in network function instances represented by configuration files. Network functions can be divided into service consumers who request services and service producers who provide services. The network function service itself is defined as a capability that enables the network function to be opened to another authorized network function through a service-based interface. Network function service authorization is performed by the service producer. The authorization of a service consumer is executed according to the policy negotiated by the network function, service operator, etc., and limits the type and source of network functions that can access the services provided by the service producer.
[0074] The service-based architecture further transforms the protocol stack beyond the basic IP connectivity between network functions. Unlike the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) and DIAMETER protocols used in previous mobile networks, control plane signaling in the 5G core network is built on top of the Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP / 2). In particular, HTTP / 2 plays a key role in network function services. Communication between network function services is achieved by invoking REST-based application programming interfaces (APIs) over HTTP / 2 routing, with HTTP / 2 over TCP serving as the API invocation protocol. Network elements in the access network, such as the RAN and UE, and user-plane network function communication continue to use designated reference points. In the service-based architecture, the point-to-point interfaces in the reference point architecture are mapped to service-based interfaces (SBIs). Each network function provides a corresponding service-based interface for network functions, acting as service consumers, to invoke services. To ensure consistency among network functions, OpenAPI 3.0 is used as the service contract definition language for all service-based interfaces. The OpenAPI specification can be expressed as a Java-based data description format (JSON) object and provides a standardized way to specify API endpoints and the application layer data contained in request and response messages.
[0075] However, it's important to note that in system design, openness and flexibility often conflict with security, privacy, and performance requirements. A balance must be struck between promoting technological innovation and ensuring security and stability. Such a large-scale architectural overhaul means that communication patterns between network elements will be radically different from before, necessitating new mechanisms to meet the security demands of modern mobile networks.
[0076] The 5G core network adopts a service-based architecture design, with all integrated network elements replaced by network functions. Conventional 5G network function access authorization uses an OAuth2.0-based authorization scheme. This presents multiple security and efficiency challenges when handling large-scale cross-operator network function access and authorization scenarios. First, 5G networks introduce Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) at each operator's boundary to clearly demarcate security domains. However, cross-domain network function access requires SEPPs across two network domains, and the SEPPs perform security operations and filtering, such as data encryption, signing, and internal and external address mapping. These operations undoubtedly reduce the efficiency of cross-domain network access. Second, Internetwork Packet Exchange (IPX) nodes may be introduced between SEPPs for transit transmission. IPX nodes can modify the content of transmitted messages, posing security threats to point-to-point secure transmission. Finally, traditional point-to-point cross-operator access authorization methods face serious efficiency challenges in large-scale cross-domain network function access and authorization scenarios. For example, n operators need to maintain n(n-1) / 2 point-to-point access control policies, which is on the order of O(n²). 5G supports the deployment of small and even micro-operators, which will greatly increase the base number of operators, thus facing a more complex point-to-point control policy.
[0077] In view of this, an embodiment of the present application provides a communication method that adopts blockchain technology and leverages the distributed, decentralized, and tamper-proof characteristics of blockchain to design a secure and efficient cross-operator network function access authorization scheme. In this method, a network registration function device receives a registration request from a network function device, including the network function device's identity. Based on the network function device's identity, the network registration function device obtains the encrypted identity of the network function device. The network registration function device encrypts the network function device's registration request using a symmetric key with a trusted environment device. The network registration function device then sends a transaction request to a distributed management device. The transaction request includes the network registration function device's certificate, the encrypted registration request, the encrypted identity of the network function device, and the network registration function device's signature on the transaction request. The network registration function device also receives a service token request from a second network function device. The service token request includes the identity of the second network function device, the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, the type of service requested by the second network function device from the first network function device, and the identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs. The network registration function device encrypts the service token request and then sends a transaction request to the distributed management device. The transaction request includes the encrypted service token request, the certificate of the network registration function device and the signature of the network registration function device on the transaction request.
[0078] In this way, a distributed trust relationship is established between multiple mutually distrustful operators, reducing the point-to-point operator trust relationship structure under the traditional core network structure and reducing the complexity of establishing trust between multiple operators. Functions such as the operator's network function registration and access authorization are deployed on the blockchain network, can be automatically executed, and the credibility of the functions is guaranteed. Secure storage and cross-domain sharing of the operator's network function information are achieved. In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of this application clearer, the application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The specific operating methods, functional descriptions, etc. in the method embodiments can also be applied to device embodiments or system embodiments.
[0079] Figure 1D illustrates a schematic diagram of a system architecture 100D in which embodiments of the present application may be implemented. System architecture 100D is a cross-operator network function authorization and authentication framework based on a consortium blockchain. This framework aims to leverage consortium blockchain technology to improve the security, privacy, and communication efficiency of cross-operator authorization, authentication, and access to network functions.
[0080] The network elements involved in the embodiments of this application primarily include network function providers (pNFs), network function consumers (cNFs), network function storage functions (vNRFs / hNRFs) within the access / registration network, and blockchain management nodes. Network function providers (pNFs) can provide network logic modules for specific network function services. Network function consumers (cNFs) can access or call network function modules for other network function services. Network function storage functions (vNRFs / hNRFs) within the access / registration network support registration, discovery, authentication, and access authorization for network function services, maintain information about network function modules, and provide NF instances or NF IP addresses or corresponding identifiers. One or more blockchain management nodes are deployed in each public land mobile network, responsible for building and maintaining the consortium blockchain. These include operations such as initializing the blockchain platform, registering and managing blockchain applications, executing the consensus mechanism, and generating blocks. Management nodes specifically include certification authority nodes, ordering service nodes (orderers), distributed peers, and trusted computing environments (TEEs). Certification authority nodes provide user management services such as node registration, identity authentication, and certificate issuance within the consortium blockchain network. Ordering service nodes are responsible for sorting all received transactions and packaging them into blocks. Distributed nodes are endorsing nodes. They process transaction proposals according to endorsement policies, invoke smart contracts to process transaction proposals, and sign and endorse the execution results. Each peer node maintains a blockchain ledger (Ledger), which stores all confirmed transactions in the form of a hash chain. Peers also maintain blockchain state information (State). A Trusted Computing Environment (TEE) is a hardware-based secure computing environment deployed on each peer node. It creates a secure and trusted execution environment within the peer node, enabling the deployment and execution of smart contracts and the secure processing of on-chain data.
[0081] This framework is applicable to cross-operator service scenarios involving two or more shared land mobile networks (PLMNs). As shown in Figure 1D, system architecture 100D may include a vPLMN (access network) 181 and a hPLMN (home network) 182. System architecture 100D may also include an NRF (network function) that supports network service registration, authentication, discovery, and access authorization, and maintains available NF instances and NF profiles. For simplicity, the embodiments of this application only describe a scenario involving two NRF entities: vNRF 183 in vPLMN 181 and hNRF 184 in hPLMN 182. The NFs maintained by the NRF include cNFs 185 and pNFs 186. The blockchain network in system architecture 100D includes multiple blockchain management nodes, such as peer1 187, peer2 188, and peer2 189. This blockchain network supports registration and management of network function nodes, cross-operator NF access control, authorization, automated generation of access tokens, and identity authentication. The blockchain network in system architecture 100D also includes a trusted computing environment (TEE), which is deployed on the blockchain management node to achieve secure storage of on-chain data and secure execution of smart contracts. The blockchain management node also includes an ordering service node 190.
[0082] In this system architecture, cNF 185 is registered with vNRF 183 in vPLMN 181, and pNF 186 is registered with hNRF 184 in hPLMN 182. The NRF maintains a list of NF instance profiles, which include, but are not limited to, the NF instance identity (ID), NF type (Type), home network identity (PLMN ID), NF fully qualified domain name (FQDN) or IP address, NF capability information (Capacity), NF priority information (Priority), and so on. cNF 185 in vPLMN 181 sends a service discovery request to its local NRF, vNRF 183, to query for network function instances in its local network or another network (e.g., hPLMN 184). To simplify the process, we assume that cNF 185 wishes to access network services provided by a pNF, a network function provider, in another operator's network, hPLMN 182. Because cNF 185 and pNF 186 are registered in different PLMNs and lack a trust relationship between them, cNF 185 must establish a trust relationship with pNF 186 through the authentication and authorization services of vNRF 183 and hNRF 184 to invoke network services provided by pNF 186. vNRF 183 and hNRF 184 authenticate and authorize cNF 185, issuing an access authorization token. cNF 185 presents the access authorization token to pNF 186, requesting access to its services. After verifying cNF 185's identity and the access authorization token, pNF 186 provides the corresponding network services to the network function consumer.
[0083] In this system architecture, two mobile operator networks are connected to a blockchain network, which is responsible for cross-domain discovery, identity authentication, and access authorization of network functions. Smart contracts (chaincode) deployed within the blockchain system automate access authentication and authorization, generating corresponding access tokens for network function service requesters. Furthermore, the blockchain system utilizes a consensus mechanism to generate blocks, record cross-domain access control information, and enable cross-domain sharing and synchronization of access authorization information. To ensure secure storage and confidential computation of network function information within the operator networks, this system deploys a trusted execution environment (TEE) on the management nodes (e.g., peer nodes) within the blockchain system and deploys relevant smart contract applications within the TEE. These smart contracts running within the TEE securely execute functions such as user registration and access authorization, and can encapsulate the results of these operations in encrypted form, generating blocks that are ultimately stored in the blockchain ledger.
[0084] Figure 2 illustrates a signaling diagram for service authorization interactions according to some embodiments of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 200 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A. In this implementation, network function device 110 is implemented as a second network function device 201, network registration function device 120 is implemented as a network registration function device 202, network registration function device 130 is implemented as a network registration function device 205, distributed management device 140 is implemented as a distributed management device 203, distributed management device 150 is implemented as a distributed management device 206, trusted environment device 160 is implemented as a trusted environment device 204, and trusted environment device 170 is implemented as a trusted environment device 207.
[0085] In process 200, a network registration function device 202 receives (211) a registration request from a first network function device, the registration request including an identity of the first network function device. For example, the network registration function device 202 may be a network function storage device hNRF in a home network hPLMN, and the first network function device may be a network function provider pNF. Based on the identity of the first network function device, the network registration function device 202 obtains (213) an encrypted identity of the first network function device. For example, the network registration function device 202 may perform a hash calculation on the identity (ID) of the first network function device to obtain the encrypted identity of the first network function device. The network registration function device 202 encrypts the registration request of the first network function device using (215) a symmetric key between the network registration function device 202 and the trusted environment device 204. The symmetric key refers to a session key negotiated between the network registration function device 202 and the trusted environment device 204. Subsequently, the network registration function device 202 sends (217) a transaction request 219 to the distributed management device 203. The transaction request 219 includes the network registration function device's certificate, the encrypted registration request, the encrypted identity of the first network function device, and the network registration function device 202's signature on the transaction request 219. The transaction request 219 is a transaction proposal for the registration request of the first network function device.
[0086] In some embodiments, the registration request may also include the type of the first network function device, the identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs, the address of the first network function device, the services supported by the first network function device, or a combination of one or more of the above. In some embodiments, the transaction request 219 also includes the identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device 202 requests to invoke. The registration contract can be a smart contract deployed in a trusted execution environment that can securely execute user registrations and encapsulate the execution results in encrypted form, generating blocks that are ultimately stored in the blockchain ledger.
[0087] In some embodiments, based on determining that the first network function device is legitimate, the network registration function device 202 may generate an identity credential for the first network function device and send the identity credential to the first network function device. That is, after receiving the registration request, the network registration function device 202 verifies the legitimacy of the first network function device, generates an identity credential or certificate for the legitimate first network function device, and sends the credential back to the first network function device via a secure channel. In some embodiments, the network registration function device 202 may send a second registration request to the authentication device. The second registration request includes the identity of the network registration function device 202 and a signature of the network registration function device 202. The authentication device may be a certification authority (CA) included in the consortium blockchain network. It is responsible for generating basic system parameters, managing node identities, and generating corresponding identity certificates (Credentials) for nodes. These certificates can be used for functions such as identity authentication and access authorization for nodes within the system. The CA verifies the identities of the operator and the network registration function device, generates a public-private key pair for them, and sends the public-private key pair to the network registration function device via a secure channel. After successful authentication, the network registration function device 202 receives its certificate from the authentication device. In some embodiments, the network registration function device 202 uses the certificate to perform interactive authentication with the trusted environment device 204 and generates a symmetric key between the network registration function device 202 and the trusted environment device 204. For example, the network registration function device 202 can authenticate the trusted environment device 204 on the alliance chain management node through remote authentication.
[0088] Continuing with reference to FIG2 , the distributed management device 203 receives ( 221 ) a transaction request 219 from the network registration function device 202 , the transaction request 219 including the certificate of the network registration function device 202 , the encrypted registration request of the first network function device, the encrypted identity of the first network function device, and the signature of the network registration function device 202 on the transaction request 219 .
[0089] The distributed management device 203 determines (223) whether the signature is legitimate based on the certificate. For example, the distributed management device 203 can obtain the public key of the network registration function device 202 based on the certificate of the network registration function device 202, and then use the public key to verify the legitimacy of the transaction request. Based on determining that the signature is legitimate, the distributed management device 203 sends (225) a transaction request 227 to the trusted environment device 204. The transaction request 227 includes the identity of the network registration function device 202, the encrypted registration request of the first network function device, and the encrypted identity of the first network function device. In some embodiments, the transaction request 219 and the transaction request 227 also include the identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device 202 requests to invoke.
[0090] Accordingly, the trusted environment device 204 receives (229) a transaction request 227 from the distributed management device 203. Based on the identity of the network registration function device 202, the trusted environment device 204 determines the symmetric key between the trusted environment device 204 and the network registration function device 202. The trusted environment device 204 uses (233) the symmetric key to decrypt the encrypted registration request. For example, the trusted environment device 204 can obtain the registration information of the network function device by decrypting the encrypted registration request using the symmetric key. The trusted environment device 204 obtains the identity of the network function device from the registration information of the network function device. After the trusted environment device 204 determines that the transaction request 227 is valid based on the encrypted identity, it adds the first network function device and the services supported by the first network function device to the registration list (251). For example, the trusted environment device 204 can search the local ledger based on the encrypted identity, create a new key-value entry if the encrypted identity entry of the network function device is not retrieved, and update the key-value if the encrypted identity entry is retrieved. If the creation or update is completed, the chain code running status is returned and the encrypted key-value entry is returned.
[0091] In some embodiments, the cryptographic identity of the first network function device included in the transaction request 227 may be a first cryptographic identity. The trusted environment device 204 may also invoke the registration contract based on the identifier of the registration contract. Based on the identity of the first network function device, the trusted environment device 204 obtains a second cryptographic identity of the first network function device. For example, the trusted environment device 204 may perform a hash calculation on the identity of the first network function device to obtain the second cryptographic identity of the first network function device. The trusted environment device 204 compares the second cryptographic identity with the first cryptographic identity included in the transaction request 227. If the first cryptographic identity and the second cryptographic identity are identical, the trusted environment device 204 determines that the transaction request 227 is valid.
[0092] In some embodiments, trusted environment device 204 may send a registration success message to distributed management device 203 regarding the first network function device. Alternatively, distributed management device 203 may receive the registration success message from trusted environment device 204 and send the message to network registration function device 202. Alternatively, network registration function device 202 may receive the registration success message from distributed management device 203 and then send the message to the first network function device. In some examples, distributed management device 203 generates a proposal response based on the results and output of the smart contract executed by trusted environment device 204 and returns it to network registration function device 202. Network registration function device 202, following an endorsement mechanism, submits the collected proposal responses to a sorting service node for global transaction sorting and ultimately broadcasts them to all distributed management devices for confirmation. If confirmation is successful, the distributed management device writes the transaction to its local ledger. This completes network function device registration and secure information storage.
[0093] Continuing with reference to FIG2 , the second network function device 201 sends (253) a service token request 255 to the network registration function device 205. The service token request 255 includes the identity of the second network function device 201, the identity of the network to which the second network function device 201 belongs, the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device 201, the type of service requested by the first network function device by the second network function device 201, and the identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs. The second network function device 201 may be a network function consumer CNF in a vPLMN of the access network, and the network registration function device 205 may be a network function storage device vNRF in the vPLMN of the access network. For example, a CNF discovers a network function service pNF provided by another network operator (e.g., hPLMN) through a service discovery function. When a CNF requests a service of a pNF in an hPLMN network for the first time, it should request an access token from the network where the pNF is located. The CNF first sends a token request message to the vNRF in the vPLMN of its network.
[0094] Accordingly, the network registration function device 205 receives (257) a service token request 255 from the second network function device 201. The network registration function device 205 encrypts (259) the service token request 255 using the symmetric key between the network registration function device 205 and the trusted environment device 207. Subsequently, the network registration function device 205 sends (263) a transaction request 261 to the distributed management device 206. The transaction request 261 includes the encrypted service token request, the certificate of the network registration function device 205, and the signature of the network registration function device 205 on the transaction request 261. Additionally, the transaction request 261 may also include the identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device 205 requests to invoke. For example, the network registration function device 205 packages the encrypted service token request, the identity of the network registration function device 205, the invoked smart contract, and the signature of the network registration function device 205 on the transaction proposal as payload into the transaction request 261. After the network registration function device 205 signs the transaction proposal, it sends the transaction proposal to the corresponding distributed management device 206 according to the endorsement mechanism and calls the smart contract.
[0095] The distributed management device 206 receives (265) a transaction request 261 from the network registration function device 205. The distributed management device 206 determines whether the signature is legitimate based on the certificate. If the signature is legitimate, the distributed management device 206 sends (269) a transaction request 271 to the trusted environment device 207. The transaction request 271 includes the identity of the network registration function device 205 and an encrypted service token request. Additionally, the transaction request 261 and the transaction request 271 also include the identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device 205 requests to invoke. In some examples, after receiving the transaction proposal, the distributed management device 206 obtains the public key of the network registration function device 205 based on the certificate of the network registration function device 205, and then uses the public key to verify the legitimacy of the transaction proposal. If the verification is successful, the distributed management device 206 sends the transaction proposal to the trusted environment device 207 to execute the authorization contract.
[0096] Accordingly, the trusted environment device 207 receives (273) the transaction request 271 from the distributed management device 206. Based on the identity of the network registration function device 205, the trusted environment device 207 determines (275) the symmetric key between the network registration function device 205 and the trusted environment device 207. After obtaining the symmetric key, the trusted environment device 207 decrypts (279) the encrypted service token request based on the symmetric key. Based on the service token request, the trusted environment device 207 determines (281) whether the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device 201. If the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device 201, the trusted environment device 207 generates (283) a service token for the second network function device 201.
[0097] In some embodiments, the service token may include the identity of the second network function device 201 , the identity of the first network function device, the lifecycle of the service token; or the signature algorithm of the trusted environment device 207 .
[0098] In some embodiments, to determine whether the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device 201, the trusted environment device 207 may invoke the authorization contract based on the identifier of the authorization contract. Based on the identity of the first network function device, the trusted environment device 207 may obtain the encrypted identity of the first network function device. Based on the encrypted identity of the first network function device, the trusted environment device 207 may determine the registration information of the first network function device to obtain the services supported by the first network function device. The trusted environment device 207 may determine whether the services supported by the first network function device include the type of service requested by the second network function device 201.
[0099] In some embodiments, after generating a service token, the trusted environment device 207 may encrypt the service token using a symmetric key and send the encrypted service token to the distributed management device 206. Alternatively, the token may be signed by the trusted environment device 207 using its private key and encrypted using a symmetric key before being sent to the distributed management device 206. Alternatively, the trusted environment device 207 may encrypt the network function device service access record and token generation record and return them to the distributed management device 206. Accordingly, the distributed management device 206 may receive the encrypted service token from the trusted environment device 207 and send it to the network registration function device 205. The network registration function device 205 receives the encrypted service token from the distributed management device and decrypts it using the symmetric key. Additionally, upon receiving the service token, the network registration function device 205 sends the collected transactions to the ordering service device for ordering according to the endorsement mechanism. The sorting service device broadcasts the block after sorting. After receiving the block, the distributed management device performs transaction verification. If the verification is successful, the block containing the access request and token generation record is written to the local ledger and the global state is updated.
[0100] Subsequently, network registration function device 205 sends the decrypted service token to second network function device 201. Correspondingly, the second network function device can receive the decrypted service token from network registration function device 205. Second network function device 201 uses the public key of trusted environment device 207 to determine whether the decrypted service token is valid. If the service token is valid, second network function device 201 sends a service request to the first network function device. The service request includes the identity of second network function device 201, its type, the identity of the network to which second network function device 201 belongs, the identity of the first network function device, its type, and the service token. Additionally, second network function device 201 can receive a service response message from the first network function device. For example, after receiving the service request message from the CNF, the pNF can verify the service token using the public key of the trusted environment device. If verification succeeds, the pNF verifies the CNF's service request parameters and returns a service response message to the CNF, providing the service. If verification fails, a failure message is returned.
[0101] This approach reduces the complexity of establishing trust between multiple operator networks. Functions such as network function registration and access authorization are deployed on the blockchain network, enabling automated execution and ensuring functional trustworthiness. Furthermore, contract technology enables rapid deployment and updates of system functions. Trusted environment devices enable secure storage and cross-domain sharing of operator network function information, providing confidentiality and integrity protection for smart contract execution.
[0102] Furthermore, for clarity of description, two specific implementations of service authorization will be described with reference to FIG3 and FIG4 .
[0103] FIG3 illustrates an example process for service authorization according to some embodiments of the present application, which can be considered a specific implementation of the service authorization of FIG2 . For clarity and without limitation, process 300 will be described in conjunction with FIG1A . In this implementation, network function device 110 is implemented as NF_k 301, network registration function device 120 is implemented as NRF_i 304, network registration function device 130 is implemented as NRF_m 303, distributed management devices 140 and 150 are implemented as Peer_j 305, and trusted environment devices 160 and 170 are implemented as TEE_j 306. It should be understood that Peer_j 305 can be two distributed management devices; for ease of description, only one distributed management device is shown in FIG3 . Similarly, TEE_j 306 can be two trusted environment devices; for ease of description, only one trusted environment device is shown in FIG3 .
[0104] Process 300 is a network function authorization framework implemented based on a consortium chain network and TEE. In process 300, after the blockchain system is started, TEE_j 306 is initialized (310), generates public and private keys, and obtains a certificate Cert(PK_tee_j, SK_tee_j) from a certification authority (CA). (PK_tee_j, SK_tee_j) is the public and private key pair generated by the CA for TEE_j 306. TEE_j 306 deploys a network function management smart contract jointly signed by the operator, which includes functions such as network function registration, update, and deletion. After this, an operator's network element begins to use the system for network element authorization management.
[0105] NRF_i 304 initiates (312) a registration request to CA 308, which provides the identity NRF_ID of NRF_i 304, the public key of NRF_i 304, and the signature. CA 308 generates (314) a certificate Cert_nrfi for NRF_i 304 and returns (316) the NRF_i certificate Cert_nrfi to NRF_i 304. After receiving the certificate, NRF_i 304 uses the certificate to interact with TEE_j 306 for authentication. After successful authentication, NRF_i 304 and TEE_j 306 generate (320) a symmetric key Kij.
[0106] A network function NF_i 302 of an operator initiates (322) a registration request to a network registration NF_i 304 of the operator. The registration request includes the operator's network ID (PLMN_ID), the identity ID_i of NF_i 302, the type NF_Type of NF_i 302, and a list of services provided by NF_i 302. NRF_i 304 performs (324) a hash operation on the received identity ID_i of NF_i 302 to generate PID_i, i.e., [PID]_([NF]_i) = Hash([ID]_([NF]_i)). NRF_i 304 encrypts (326) the registration request using a symmetric key Kij, i.e., CT_nfi = Enc(ID_i, PLMN_ID, NF_type, service list). NRF_i 304 sends (328) a registration request to the blockchain node Peer_j 305 by calling the smart contract. The registration request includes the certificate Cert_nrfi of NRF_i 304, the generated ciphertext CT_nfi, and the signature generated using the private key corresponding to Cert_nrfi.
[0107] After receiving the registration request from NRF_i 304, Peer_j 305 verifies the signature using Cert_nrfi (330). After verification, Peer_j 305 runs (332) the smart contract, where the contract parameters include NRF_ID of NRF_i 304 and the ciphertext CT_nfi. TEE_j 306 queries and obtains the symmetric key Kij based on NRF_ID of NRF_i 304 and decrypts (334) CT_nfi. TEE_j 306 adds NF_i 302 and its service list to the registration list (336). TEE_j 306 returns a registration success message (338) to NF_i 302 through Peer_j 305, NRF_i 304, and other entities.
[0108] A network function NF_k 301 from another operator sends (340) a service token request to the network registration function NRF_m 303 of the operator. The service token request includes the identity information of NF_k 301, specifically including the ID_k of NF_k 301, the type of NF_i 302, the PLMN_ID to which NF_k 301 and NF_i 302 belong respectively, and the requested service type.
[0109] Based on the request, NRF_m 303 generates a service request token, encrypts the token, and then sends (342) a token request to a blockchain node, such as Peer_j 305. The token request includes a signature provided by NRF_m 303. Blockchain node Peer_j 305 verifies (344) the signature of the request. Peer_j 305 calls (346) the smart contract deployed in TEE_j 306 and sends the received encrypted token request and NRF_ID of NRF_m 303 to TEE_j 306.
[0110] TEE_j 306 obtains the corresponding decryption key based on the NRF_ID of NRF_m 303 and decrypts the token request (348). TEE_j 306 executes (350) the smart contract and obtains the authorization token of NF_k 301. TEE_j 306 returns (352) the encrypted NF_k 301 access authorization token to NRF_m 303 through Peer_j 305. NRF_m 303 decrypts the token and sends (354) the decrypted token to the requesting party NF_k 301.
[0111] Process 300 uses a consortium chain as the blockchain platform to implement distributed registration and access authorization for network functions, supporting secure cross-domain access to network functions. A trusted execution environment (TEE) is employed to ensure the secure storage and processing of network function registration information, as well as the secure and trusted operation of user registration and access authorization, protecting data privacy and system reliability. Smart contracts are employed to automate user registration, access authentication, and authorization, reducing communication overhead for cross-domain operations between operator networks. This integration of a service-oriented architecture with a blockchain system, coupled with the use of a TEE to protect smart contracts with authorization functions, ensures the system's openness, transparency, and auditability.
[0112] Figure 4 illustrates an example process of service authorization using a public chain structure. Unlike process 3 which uses a consortium chain, process 400 uses a public chain structure. Therefore, it is necessary to deploy an open smart contract on the public chain. This smart contract will call the smart contract in the TEE deployed on the Worker or oracle to generate an authorization token. The open contract is deployed on the public chain (Ethereum). Anyone can call this open contract. It acts as a list that records the addresses of all workers and the privacy smart contracts deployed in the workers, and sends contract call requests. Workers are blockchain nodes and have a privacy contract in their TEE. Workers jointly build a distributed network. The joining of new workers requires mutual authentication and sharing of session keys. Worker_j 407
[0113] In process 400 , after the blockchain system is started, TEE_j 406 is initialized ( 410 ), generates public and private keys, and obtains a certificate Cert(PK_tee_j, SK_tee_j) from a certification authority CA, where (PK_tee_j, SK_tee_j) is the public and private key pair generated by the CA for TEE_j 406 .
[0114] NRF_i 404 initiates (412) a registration request to CA 408, which provides the identity NRF_ID of NRF_i 404, the public key of NRF_i 404, and the signature. CA 408 generates (414) a certificate Cert_nrfi for NRF_i 404 and returns (416) the NRF_i certificate Cert_nrfi to NRF_i 404. After receiving the certificate, NRF_i 404 uses the certificate to interact with TEE_j 407 for authentication. After successful authentication, NRF_i 404 and TEE_j 406 generate (420) a symmetric key Kij. The smart contract is deployed (422) on TEE_j 406.
[0115] A network function network element NF_i 402 of the operator initiates (424) a registration request to a network registration network element NRF_i 404 of the operator. The registration request includes the operator's network ID (PLMN_ID), the identity ID_i of NF_i 402, the type NF_Type of NF_i 402, and a list of services provided by NF_i 402. NRF_i 404 performs (426) a hash operation on the received identity ID_i of NF_i 402 to generate PID_i, i.e., [PID]_([NF]_i) = Hash([ID]_([NF]_i)). NRF_i 404 encrypts (428) the registration request using a symmetric key Kij, i.e., CT_nfi = Enc(ID_i, PLMN_ID, NF_type, service list). NRF_i 404 sends (430) a registration request to the open contract 405, the registration request including the certificate Cert_nrfi of NRF_i 404, the generated ciphertext CT_nfi, and the signature generated using the private key corresponding to Cert_nrfi.
[0116] After receiving the registration request from NRF_i 404, the open contract 405 verifies the above signature using Cert_nrfi (432). After the verification is passed, the open contract 405 calls (434) the smart contract, and the contract parameters include the NRF_ID of NRF_i 404 and the ciphertext CT_nfi. TEE_j 407 deployed on Worker_j 406 queries and obtains the symmetric key Kij based on the NRF_ID of NRF_i 404, and decrypts (436) CT_nfi. TEE_j 407 adds NF_i 402 and its service list to the registration list (438). TEE_j 407 returns (440) a registration success message to NF_i 402 through the open contract 405, NRF_i 404 and other entities.
[0117] The network function NF_k 401 from another operator sends (442) a service token request to the network registration function NRF_m 403 of the operator. The service token request includes the identity information of NF_k 401, specifically including the ID_k of NF_k 401, the type of NF_i 402, the PLMN_ID to which NF_k 401 and NF_i 402 belong respectively, and the requested service type.
[0118] Based on the request, NRF_m 403 generates a service request token, encrypts the token, and then sends (444) a token request to the open contract 405. The token request includes a signature provided by NRF_m 403. The open contract 405 verifies (446) the signature of the request. The open contract 405 calls (448) the smart contract and sends the received encrypted token request and the NRF_ID of NRF_m 403 to TEE_j 407.
[0119] TEE_j 407 obtains the corresponding decryption key based on the NRF_ID of NRF_m 403 and decrypts the token request (450). TEE_j 407 executes (452) the smart contract and obtains the authorization token of NF_k 401. TEE_j 407 NRF_m 403 returns (454) the encrypted access authorization token of NF_k 401. NRF_m 403 decrypts the token and sends (456) the decrypted token to the requesting party NF_k 401.
[0120] In this way, process 400 uses the public chain as a blockchain platform to implement distributed registration, access authorization and other functions of network functions, and supports cross-domain secure access to network functions.
[0121] Specifically, the service authorization process may include system initialization, trusted environment initialization, network function registration, service request authorization, and service access.
[0122] During system initialization, the two mobile operator networks—the visited PLMN and the home PLMN—jointly initialize a blockchain network. This blockchain network includes a certification authority (CA), which is responsible for generating basic system parameters, managing the identities of all system nodes, and generating corresponding credentials for each node. These credentials can be used for authentication and access authorization within the system. The network function storage nodes vNRF and hNRF in the core networks of the two operators are registered with the CA. The CA verifies the identities of vNRF and hNRF and generates public-private key pairs (PK_vNRF, SK_vNRF) and (PK_hNRF, SK_hNRF) for them, respectively. These key pairs are then transmitted to vNRF and hNRF via a secure channel. The blockchain network consists of two peer nodes, Peer_1 and Peer_2, an ordering service node, and a confidential channel. vNRF and hNRF are associated with the two peer nodes, respectively. The peer node is responsible for transaction endorsement, signing and executing smart contracts (chain codes); the sorting service node is responsible for packaging blocks and synchronizing ledgers; the two networks involved in the authorization process should belong to the same channel, that is, the peer node corresponding to vNRF and the peer node corresponding to hNRF execute the authorization process in the same channel.
[0123] During the trusted computing environment initialization process, Peer 1 and Peer 2 each locally initialize an enclave, TEE 1 and TEE 2, respectively, to deploy and securely run smart contracts. TEE i (i = 1, 2) generates a public-private key pair (PK_TEEi, SK_TEEi) according to a pre-defined secure boot procedure. The public key PK_TEEi is made public to other system nodes and serves as the unique identifier for this enclave. The operator's vPLMN and hPLMN jointly develop two smart contracts, the Network Function Registration Contract and the Network Service Request Authorization Contract, and deploy them within the enclave. These two smart contracts define the corresponding endorsement policies, as well as network function registration and access authorization (i.e., access token generation).
[0124] vNRF and hNRF authenticate the enclave TEE i of the peer node through remote authentication. If the authentication is successful, a symmetric key is negotiated with the TEE i as the session key skij.
[0125] During the network function registration process, a network function 〖NF〗_i in the operator's network sends a registration request NFRegister_Request to its network function storage function node 〖NRF〗_i. This request contains the network function 〖NF〗_i instance identity 〖ID〗_(〖NF〗_i〗), the type of network function 〖NF〗_i 〖Type〗_(〖NF〗_i〗), the identity of the home network 〖ID〗_PLMN〗, the address of 〖NF〗_i 〖Addr〗_(〖NF〗_i〗), and the list of network function services supported by 〖NF〗_i 〖List〗_(〖NSF〗_i〗={〖NFS〗_i^1,〖NFS〗_i^2,…,〖NFS〗_i^n}. The specific process is shown in Figure 8.
[0126] After receiving the registration request, the network storage function node NRF i verifies the legitimacy of NF i and generates an identity credential for the legitimate network function, namely the public-private key pair PK (NF i) / SK (NF i). It then sends this credential back to NF i via a secure channel. NF i stores the credential locally.
[0127] The network storage function node NRF i hashes the instance identity ID (NF i) of the network function NF i to generate a hidden identity, i.e., PID (NF i) = Hash (ID (NF i)). It then encrypts the user registration information using the session key sk ij, i.e., ct (PID (NF i)) = Enc (sk ij, [ID (NF i), Type (NF i), ID PLMN, Address (NF i), List (NSF i)]). Based on the endorsement mechanism, NRF i sends a transaction proposal to the endorsing peers in the consortium chain, executing the NF Registration Contract. The transaction proposal contains the network storage function node identity 〖NRF〗_i〗, the hidden identity of the network function 〖NF〗_i〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i〗), the called smart contract ID, the encrypted registration information 〖ct〗_(〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i〗), and the signature of 〖NRF〗_i on its transaction proposal.
[0128] According to the endorsement mechanism, Peer i, upon receiving a transaction proposal, first verifies the proposal's legitimacy using NRF i's public key. If verification is successful, Peer j sends the transaction proposal to its local TEE i via a dedicated TEE interface. Upon receiving the transaction proposal, TEE i decrypts the ciphertext ct(PID(NFi)) using its session key skij with NRF i to obtain NF i's registration information. TEE i then calls the network function to register the smart contract, hashes the obtained ID(NFi), and obtains the hidden identity PID(NFi). This is then compared with the hidden identity in the transaction proposal to determine the validity of the proposal. And search the local ledger according to 〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i). If 〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i) is not retrieved, a new key-value entry (Key-Value) is created, where the Key is 〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i) and the Value is 〖Seal〗_(〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i)), where 〖Seal〗_(〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i))=Enc(〖SealK〗_i,[〖ID〗_(〖NF〗_i),〖Type〗_(〖NF〗_i),〖ID〗_PLMN,FQDN,〖List〗_(〖NSF〗_i)]), where 〖SealK〗_i is the encapsulation key of the trusted computing environment 〖TEE〗_i; if the 〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i) entry is retrieved, the key value is updated. If the creation or update is completed, the chain code running status True is returned, and the encrypted key value entry is returned, that is,<Key,Value> =<〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i),〖Seal〗_(〖PID〗_(〖NF〗_i))>.
[0129] Based on the results and outputs of the TEE_i smart contract execution, the peer node generates a proposal response and returns it to NRF_i. Following the endorsement mechanism, NRF_i submits the collected proposal responses to the ordering service node, the Orderer, for global transaction sorting. This generates a block and broadcasts it to all peer nodes for confirmation. If confirmation is successful, the peer node writes the block to its local ledger. This completes the registration of NF_i and secure storage of its information.
[0130] Figure 5 illustrates the network function registration process, which can be considered as part of a specific implementation of the service authorization in Figure 2. For clarity and without limitation, process 500 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A. In this implementation, the network registration function device 120 is implemented as NRF_i 502, the distributed management device 140 is implemented as Peer 503, and the trusted environment device 160 is implemented as Enclave 504.
[0131] In process 500, NF_i 501 sends (510) a registration request to NRF_i 502. NRF_i 502 verifies (512) the legitimacy of NF_i 501 and generates a public-private key pair for NF_i 501. Based on the identity of NF_i 501, NRF_i 502 generates a hidden identity PID for NF_i 501. NRF_i 502 encrypts the registration information of NF_i 501 and sends (514) a transaction proposal to Peer 503, which includes the registration request of NF_i 501. Peer 503 verifies (516) the transaction proposal and, upon successful verification, calls (518) the smart contract in enclave 504. After receiving the transaction proposal, enclave 504 executes (520) the user registration smart contract. Enclave 504 returns (522) the registration result to NRF_i 502. After receiving the registration request, NRF_i 502 sends (524) the sorting request to the sorting service node 505. The sorting service node 505 then performs global sorting, generates a new block, and broadcasts (526) it to Peer 503. Peer 503 sends (528) a registration success message to NRF_i 502, and NRF_i 502 returns (530) a registration success message to NF_i 501.
[0132] During service request authorization, a network function consumer (cNF) in a vPLMN discovers a network function service (pNF) provided by another network operator (hPLMN) through service discovery. The first time a cNF requests a service from a network function provider (pNF) in another network operator's hPLMN, it must obtain an access token. The cNF first sends a token request message (AccessToken_Get_Request) to the vNRF in its vPLMN. This message contains the cNF's instance identity (ID)_cNF, the network ID (ID)_vPLMN where the cNF resides, the desired service provider (ID)_pNF, the type of the desired service provider (Type)_pNF, and the network ID (ID)_hPLMN where the pNF resides. The vNRF encrypts the token request message using the session key (sk)_ij corresponding to the TEE execution environment, generating a ciphertext message. The vNRF then packages this ciphertext message as the payload into a transaction proposal, which then invokes the request authorization contract (Request Authorization Contract) deployed in the TEE environment. After the vNRF signs the transaction proposal, it sends it to the corresponding peer node according to the endorsement mechanism, calling the smart contract (Request Authorization Contract). The transaction proposal contains the network storage function node identity [ID]_vNRF, the called smart contract ID, the encrypted token request information, and the vNRF's signature on the transaction proposal.
[0133] After receiving the transaction proposal, the peer node uses the vNRF public key to verify the legitimacy of the transaction proposal. If the verification is successful, the peer node sends the transaction proposal to the smart contract (Request Authorization Contract) in the enclave TEE for execution. The TEE first uses the session key 〖sk〗_ij to decrypt the token request message and obtain the instance identity information 〖ID〗_cNF of the cNF, the ID of the network where the cNF is located 〖ID〗_vPLMN, the expected service provider 〖ID〗_pNF, the type of the expected service NF 〖Type〗_pNF, and the network where the pNF is located 〖ID〗_hPLMN. Subsequently, the TEE calculates the hidden identity of the expected service provider, that is, 〖PID〗_pNF=Hash(〖ID〗_pNF), and retrieves the local ledger based on 〖PID〗_pNF to extract the registration information of the pNF.<Key,Value> = <〖PID〗_(p〖NF〗_i),〖Seal〗_(〖PID〗_pNF)>. The TEE decrypts 〖Seal〗_(〖PID〗_pNF), obtains the pNF's service support list, compares the cNF's service request information with the pNF's service support list, and determines whether the cNF consumer can access the services provided by the pNF provider. If satisfied, an access token is generated for the cNF. The access token defines attributes such as the signature algorithm, the service consumer cNF, the service producer pNF, and the token lifecycle. The token is first signed by the TEE using its private key 〖SK〗_TEE, encrypted using the session key 〖sk〗_ij, and then sent to the peer node. The TEE also encrypts the cNF service access record and token generation record and returns them to the peer node. Based on the TEE's output, the peer node generates a proposal response and returns it to the vNRF. After receiving the transaction response, the vNRF sends the collected transactions to the ordering service for sorting according to the endorsement mechanism. After sorting, the ordering service broadcasts the block. Upon receiving the block, the peer node performs transaction verification. If successful, it writes the block containing the access request and token generation record to the local ledger and updates the global state. Simultaneously, the peer node sends the received token to the vNRF. The vNRF decrypts the token using the session key [sk]_ij and sends the plaintext to the CNF via a secure channel. The CNF verifies the legitimacy of the token using the TEE's public key [PK]_TEE.
[0134] During service access, after receiving the access token, the consumer CNF sends an NF Service Request to the pNF based on the pNF's address. This request includes the CNF's identity (ID_cNF), the CNF's type (Type_cNF), the CNF's network ID (ID_vPLMN), the pNF's identity (ID_pNF), the pNF's type (Type_pNF), and the access token (AccessToken). Upon receiving the service request message from the CNF, the pNF verifies the access token using the TEE's public key (PK_TEE). If verification succeeds, the pNF verifies the CNF's service request parameters and returns a service response message to the CNF, providing the service. Otherwise, a failure message is returned.
[0135] Figure 6 illustrates the process of token request authorization and network function service access, which can be considered as part of a specific implementation of the service authorization in Figure 2. For clarity and without limitation, process 600 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A. In this implementation, network function device 110 is implemented as a CNF 601, network registration function device 130 is implemented as a vNRF 602, distributed management device 150 is implemented as a peer 603, and trusted environment device 170 is implemented as an enclave 604.
[0136] In process 600, cNF 601 sends (610) an access token request to vNRF 602. vNRF 602 encrypts (612) the token request message, generates a transaction proposal, and signs the transaction proposal. vNRF 602 then sends (614) a transaction proposal to Peer 603, which contains cNF 601's token request. Peer 603 verifies (616) the transaction proposal and, upon successful verification, calls (618) the smart contract in enclave 604. After receiving the transaction proposal, enclave 604 executes (620) the authorization request smart contract. Enclave 604 returns (622) the authorization result to vNRF 602. After receiving the authorization result, vNRF 602 sends (624) a sorting request to the sorting service node 605, which then performs a global sort, generates a new block, and broadcasts (66) it to Peer 603. Peer 603 sends (628) an access token reply to vNRF 602, and vNRF 602 returns (630) an access token reply to CNF 601. After CNF 601 obtains the access token and confirms that the access token is valid, it can send (632) a network function service request carrying the access token to pNF 606. pNF 606 verifies (634) the access token and, after confirming its validity, can provide the corresponding service to CNF 601. pNF 606 also provides (636) a service reply to CNF 601.
[0137] Figure 7 illustrates a schematic flow chart of a method 700 implemented at a network registration function device according to an embodiment of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 700 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A. In one possible implementation, method 700 may be implemented by network registration function device 130 in communication system 100A. In other possible implementations, method 700 may also be implemented by other communication devices independent of communication system 100A. As an example, the following description of method 700 will be based on the example of implementation by network registration function device 130 in communication system 100A.
[0138] At block 710, the network registration function 130 receives a registration request from a network function device, the registration request including the network function device's identity. At block 720, the network registration function 130 obtains an encrypted identity of the network function device based on the network function device's identity. At block 730, the network registration function 130 encrypts the network function device's registration request using a symmetric key between the network registration function 130 and the trusted environment device. At block 740, the network registration function 130 sends a transaction request to the distributed management device. The transaction request includes the network registration function 130's certificate, the encrypted registration request, the encrypted identity of the network function device, and the network registration function 130's signature on the transaction request.
[0139] In some embodiments, the registration request may further include the type of the network function device, the identity of the network to which the network function device belongs, the address of the network function device, the services supported by the network function device, or one or more of the above. In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include the identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device 130 requests to invoke.
[0140] In some embodiments, the network registration function device 130 may further generate an identity credential for the network function device based on determining that the network function device is legitimate, and send the identity credential to the network function device.
[0141] In some embodiments, the registration request received from the network function device may be a first registration request, and the network registration function device 130 may also send a second registration request to the authentication device, the second registration request including the identity of the network registration function device 130, and the signature of the network registration function device 130, and the certificate of the network registration function device 130 received from the authentication device.
[0142] In some embodiments, the network registration function device 130 may also use the certificate to perform interactive authentication with the trusted environment device, and generate a symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device.
[0143] In some embodiments, the network registration function device 130 may also receive a registration success message from the distributed management device, and send a registration success message to the network function device.
[0144] In this way, registration requests for network function devices can be securely transmitted to the blockchain network, enabling distributed authentication and information sharing of network service functions.
[0145] Figure 8 illustrates a schematic flow chart of a method 800 implemented at a distributed management device according to an embodiment of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 800 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A. In one possible implementation, method 800 can be implemented by distributed management device 150 in communication system 100A. In other possible implementations, method 800 can also be implemented by other communication devices independent of communication system 100A. As an example, the following description of method 800 will be based on the example of implementation by distributed management device 150 in communication system 100A.
[0146] At block 810, the distributed management device 150 receives a first transaction request from a network registration function device. The first transaction request includes the network registration function device's certificate, an encrypted registration request from the network function device, the encrypted identity of the network function device, and a signature of the transaction request from the network registration function device. At block 820, the distributed management device 150 determines whether the signature is valid based on the certificate. At block 830, based on determining that the signature is valid, the distributed management device 150 sends a second transaction request to the trusted environment device. The second transaction request includes the identity of the network registration function device, the encrypted registration request from the network function device, and the encrypted identity of the network function device.
[0147] In some embodiments, the distributed management device 150 may also receive a registration success message of the network function device from the trusted environment device, and send a registration success message to the network registration function device.
[0148] In this way, the distributed management device can verify the legitimacy of the transaction request and send the transaction request to the trusted environment for processing, thereby ensuring the security of the transaction.
[0149] FIG9 illustrates a schematic flow chart of a method 900 implemented at a trusted environment device according to an embodiment of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 900 will be described in conjunction with FIG1A . In one possible implementation, method 900 may be implemented by trusted environment device 170 in communication system 100A. In other possible implementations, method 900 may also be implemented by other communication devices independent of communication system 100A. As an example, method 900 will be described below using implementation by trusted environment device 170 in communication system 100A as an example.
[0150] At block 910, the trusted environment device 170 receives a transaction request from the distributed management device. The transaction request includes the identity of the network registration function device, an encrypted registration request of the network function device, and the encrypted identity of the network function device. At block 920, the trusted environment device 170 determines a symmetric key between the trusted environment device and the network registration function device based on the identity of the network registration function device. At block 930, the trusted environment device 170 decrypts the encrypted registration request using the symmetric key. At block 940, in response to determining that the transaction request is valid based on the encrypted identity, the trusted environment device 170 adds the network function device and the services supported by the network function device to the registration list.
[0151] In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include an identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke and a signature of the transaction request by the network registration function device.
[0152] In some embodiments, the registration request may include: the identity of the network function device, the type of the network function device, the identity of the network to which the network function device belongs, the address of the network function device, the services supported by the network function device, or one or more of the above.
[0153] In some embodiments, the encrypted identity of the network function device included in the transaction request may be a first encrypted identity. Trusted environment device 170 may also invoke the registration contract based on the identifier of the registration contract. Based on the identity of the network function device, trusted environment device 170 may obtain a second encrypted identity of the network function device. Upon determining that the first encrypted identity and the second encrypted identity are identical, trusted environment device 170 may determine that the transaction request is valid.
[0154] In some embodiments, the trusted environment device 170 may also send a registration success message of the network function device to the distributed management device.
[0155] In this way, a hardware-secured isolated environment is built on the blockchain, and in this secure environment, the secure operation of the network function registration function and the secure storage and sharing of network function data are achieved.
[0156] Figure 10 illustrates a schematic flow chart of a method 1000 implemented at a second network function device according to an embodiment of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 1000 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A. In one possible implementation, method 1000 may be implemented by network function device 120 in communication system 100A. In other possible implementations, method 1000 may also be implemented by other communication devices independent of communication system 100A. As an example, method 1000 will be described below using network function device 120 in communication system 100A as an example.
[0157] At block 1010, the second network function device 120 sends a service token request to the network registration function device. The service token request includes the identity of the second network function device, the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, the type of service requested by the second network function device from the first network function device, and the identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs. At block 1020, the second network function device 120 receives the decrypted service token from the network registration function device.
[0158] In some embodiments, the second network function device 120 may also use the public key of the trusted environment device to determine whether the decrypted service token is valid. Based on the determination that the service token is valid, the second network function device 120 may send a service request to the first network function device. The service request may include the identity of the second network function device, the type of the second network function device, the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, the identity of the first network function device, the type of the first network function device, and the service token. The second network function device 120 may receive a service response message from the first network function device.
[0159] In this way, the second network function device can request services provided by another network function device from the blockchain network, reducing the complexity of the interaction.
[0160] Figure 11 illustrates a schematic flow chart of a method 1100 implemented at a network registration function device 120 according to an embodiment of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 1100 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A . In one possible implementation, method 1100 may be implemented by network registration function device 120 in communication system 100A. In other possible implementations, method 1100 may also be implemented by other communication devices independent of communication system 100A. As an example, method 1100 will be described below using the example of being implemented by network registration function device 120 in communication system 100A.
[0161] At block 1110, the network registration function 120 receives a service token request from a second network function. The service token request includes the identity of the second network function, the identity of the network in which the second network function resides, the identity of the first network function requested by the second network function, the type of service requested by the second network function from the first network function, and the identity of the network in which the first network function resides. At block 1120, the network registration function 120 encrypts the service token request using a symmetric key shared between the network registration function 120 and the trusted environment device. At block 1130, the network registration function 120 sends a transaction request to the distributed management device. The transaction request includes the encrypted service token request, the certificate of the network registration function 120, and the signature of the network registration function 120 on the transaction request.
[0162] In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include an identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device 120 requests to invoke.
[0163] In some embodiments, the network registration function device 120 may also receive an encrypted service token from the distributed management device, decrypt the encrypted service token using the symmetric key, and then send the decrypted service token to the network function device.
[0164] In this way, a service token request from a network function device can be securely transmitted to the blockchain network.
[0165] Figure 12 illustrates a schematic flow chart of a method 1200 implemented at a distributed management device 140 according to an embodiment of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 1200 will be described in conjunction with Figure 1A . In one possible implementation, method 1200 can be implemented by distributed management device 140 in communication system 100A. In other possible implementations, method 1200 can also be implemented by other communication devices independent of communication system 100A. As an example, the following description of method 1200 will be based on the example of implementation by distributed management device 140 in communication system 100A.
[0166] At block 1210, the distributed management device 140 receives a first transaction request from a network registration function device. The first transaction request includes an encrypted service token request from the network function device, a certificate from the network registration function device, and a signature of the transaction request from the network registration function device. At block 1220, the distributed management device 140 determines whether the signature is valid based on the certificate. At block 1230, based on the determination that the signature is valid, the distributed management device 140 sends a second transaction request to the trusted environment device. The second transaction request includes the identity of the network registration function device and the encrypted service token request.
[0167] In some embodiments, the first transaction request and the second transaction request may further include an identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke.
[0168] In some embodiments, the distributed management device 140 may also receive an encrypted service token from the trusted environment device. The distributed management device 140 may then send the encrypted service token to the network registration function device.
[0169] In this way, transaction requests can be securely processed in a trusted environment, enabling secure authorization of network-enabled devices.
[0170] FIG13 illustrates a schematic flow chart of a method 1300 implemented at a trusted environment device 160 according to an embodiment of the present application. For clarity and without limitation, process 1300 will be described in conjunction with FIG1A . In one possible implementation, method 1300 may be implemented by a trusted environment device 160 in communication system 100A. In other possible implementations, method 1300 may also be implemented by other communication devices independent of communication system 100A. As an example, method 1300 will be described below using implementation by trusted environment device 160 in communication system 100A as an example.
[0171] At block 1310, the trusted environment device 160 receives a transaction request from the distributed management device. The transaction request includes the identity of the network registration function device and an encrypted service token request from the second network function device. At block 1320, the trusted environment device 160 determines a symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device 160 based on the identity of the network registration function device. At block 1330, the trusted environment device 160 decrypts the encrypted service token request based on the symmetric key. At block 1340, the trusted environment device 160 determines, based on the service token request, whether the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device. At block 1350, the trusted environment device 160 generates a service token for the second network function device based on the determination that the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device.
[0172] In some embodiments, the transaction request may further include an identifier of the authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to be invoked. In some embodiments, the service token request may include: the identity of the second network function device, the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, the type of service requested by the second network function device from the first network function device, the identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs, or one or more of the above.
[0173] In some embodiments, the service token may include: the identity of the second network function device, the identity of the first network function device, the lifecycle of the service token, the signature algorithm of the trusted environment device, or one or more of the above.
[0174] In some embodiments, to determine whether the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device, the trusted environment device 160 may invoke the authorization contract based on the identifier of the authorization contract. Based on the identity of the first network function device, the trusted environment device 160 may obtain the encrypted identity of the first network function device. The trusted environment device 160 may determine the registration information of the first network function device based on the encrypted identity of the first network function device to obtain services supported by the first network function device, and determine whether the services supported by the first network function device include the type of service requested by the second network function device.
[0175] In some embodiments, the trusted environment device 160 may further encrypt the service token using a symmetric key and send the encrypted service token to the distributed management device.
[0176] In this way, a hardware-secured isolated environment is built on the blockchain, and in this secure environment, the secure operation of network access authentication and authorization functions, as well as the secure storage and sharing of network function data, are achieved.
[0177] FIG14 is a schematic diagram of the structure of possible communication devices provided in an embodiment of the present application. These communication devices can implement the functions of the terminal device or network device in the above-mentioned method embodiment, and thus can also achieve the beneficial effects possessed by the above-mentioned method embodiment. In the embodiment of the present application, the communication device can be the network function device 110, network registration function device 120, network registration function device 130, distributed management device 140, distributed management device 150, trusted environment device 160 and trusted environment device 170 as shown in FIG1A, or can be a module (such as a chip) applied to the network function device 110, network registration function device 120, network registration function device 130, distributed management device 140, distributed management device 150, trusted environment device 160 and trusted environment device 170.
[0178] As shown in Figure 14, a communication device 1400 includes a processing unit 1410, a receiving unit 1420, and a sending unit 1430. The communication device can be used to implement the functions of a network function device, a network registration function device, a distributed management device, or a trusted environment device in the method embodiments shown in any of Figures 2 to 13 above. In some embodiments, the processing unit can be a processor, the sending unit can be a transmitter, and the receiving unit can be a receiver.
[0179] As shown in Figure 15, communication device 1500 includes a processor 1510 and an interface circuit 1520. Processor 1510 and interface circuit 1520 are coupled to each other. It is understood that interface circuit 1520 can be a transceiver or an input / output interface. Optionally, communication device 1500 may also include a memory 1530 for storing instructions executed by processor 1510, input data required by processor 1510 to execute instructions, or data generated by processor 1510 after executing instructions.
[0180] When the communication device 1500 is used to implement the method in the above method embodiment, the processor 1510 is used to execute the functions of the above processing unit 1410, and the interface circuit 1520 is used to execute the functions of the above receiving unit 1420 and the sending unit 1430.
[0181] When the communication device is a chip applied to the network function device 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160, and the trusted environment device 170, the device chip implements the functions of the network function device 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160, and the trusted environment device 170 in the above method embodiments. The device chip receives information from other modules (such as radio frequency modules or antennas) in the network function device 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160, and the trusted environment device 170. The information may be sent by other network function devices 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160, and the trusted environment device 170; Alternatively, the device chip sends information to other modules (such as radio frequency modules or antennas) of the network function device 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160 and the trusted environment device 170. The information is sent to other network function devices 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160 and the trusted environment device 170.
[0182] It is understood that the processor in the embodiments of the present application may be a central processing unit (CPU), or may be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC), field programmable gate arrays (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.
[0183] An embodiment of the present application provides a communication system. The communication system may include the communication apparatus involved in the embodiment shown in FIG14 above, such as the network function device 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160, and the trusted environment device 170. Optionally, the terminal device 110, the access and mobility management device 140, the session management device 150, the control management device 160, and the application node discovery device 170 in the communication system may execute any of the communication methods shown in FIG2 to FIG13.
[0184] The present application also provides a circuit that can be coupled to a memory and can be used to execute the processes related to the network function device 110, the network registration function device 120, the network registration function device 130, the distributed management device 140, the distributed management device 150, the trusted environment device 160, and the trusted environment device 170 in any of the above method embodiments. The chip system may include the chip and may also include other components such as a memory or a transceiver.
[0185] It should be understood that the processor mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may be a CPU, or may be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor, etc.
[0186] It should also be understood that the memory mentioned in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous link dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).
[0187] It should be noted that when the processor is a general-purpose processor, DSP, ASIC, FPGA or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware component, the memory (storage module) is integrated into the processor.
[0188] It should be noted that the memory described herein is intended to include, but not be limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
[0189] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of the present application, the size of the serial numbers of the above-mentioned processes does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.
[0190] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the modules and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
[0191] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and modules described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.
[0192] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed communication methods and devices can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely schematic. For example, the division of the modules is merely a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple modules or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or described can be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.
[0193] The modules described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as modules may or may not be physical modules, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network elements. Some or all of these elements may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.
[0194] In addition, each functional module in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing module, or each module may exist physically separately, or two or more modules may be integrated into one module.
[0195] If this function is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that makes the contribution, or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method of each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer. By way of example and not limitation, computer-readable media may include random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), universal serial bus flash disk, mobile hard disk, or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be accessed by a computer.
[0196] As used herein, the term "including" and similar terms should be understood as open inclusion, i.e., "including but not limited to". The term "based on" should be understood as "based at least in part on". The term "one embodiment" or "the embodiment" should be understood as "at least one embodiment". The terms "first", "second", etc. can refer to different or the same objects and are only used to distinguish the objects referred to, and do not imply a specific spatial order, temporal order, order of importance, etc. of the objects referred to. In some embodiments, values, processes, selected items, determined items, devices, means, components, assemblies, etc. are referred to as "best", "lowest", "highest", "minimum", "maximum", etc. It should be understood that such descriptions are intended to indicate that a selection can be made from a number of available functional options, and that such a selection need not be better, lower, higher, smaller, larger, or otherwise preferred than other options in other aspects or all aspects. As used herein, the term "determine" can encompass a variety of actions. For example, "determine" can include calculating, computing, processing, deriving, investigating, searching (e.g., searching in a table, database, or another data structure), ascertaining, etc. Furthermore, "determining" may include receiving (eg, receiving information), accessing (eg, accessing data in a memory), etc. Furthermore, "determining" may include resolving, selecting, choosing, establishing, etc.
[0197] The above is only a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the embodiments of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the embodiments of the present application, and all such changes or substitutions should be included in the scope of protection of the embodiments of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the embodiments of the present application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.
Claims
1. A communication method, comprising: receiving, at a network registration function device, a registration request from a network function device, the registration request including an identity of the network function device; Based on the identity of the network function device, obtaining an encrypted identity of the network function device; Encrypting a registration request for the network function device using a symmetric key between the network registration function device and a trusted environment device; as well as A transaction request is sent to a distributed management device, wherein the transaction request includes a certificate of the network registration function device, the encrypted registration request, the encrypted identity of the network function device, and a signature of the network registration function device on the transaction request.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the registration request further comprises at least one of the following: The type of the network function device; The identity of the network to which the network function device belongs; The address of the network function device; or The services supported by the network function device.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the transaction request further includes an identifier of a registration contract that the network registration function device requests to call.
4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, further comprising: Based on determining that the network function device is legitimate, generating an identity credential for the network function device; as well as Sending the identity credential to the network function device.
5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, wherein the registration request received from the network function device is a first registration request, the method further comprising: Sending a second registration request to the authentication device, the second registration request including the identity of the network registration function device and the signature of the network registration function device; as well as The certificate of the network registration function device is received from the authentication device.
6. The method according to claim 5, further comprising: Using the certificate to perform interactive authentication with the trusted environment device; as well as A symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device is generated.
7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, further comprising: Receive a registration success message from a distributed management device; as well as Send the registration success message to the network function device.
8. A communication method, comprising: receiving, at the distributed management device, a first transaction request from a network registration function device, the first transaction request comprising a certificate of the network registration function device, an encrypted registration request of the network function device, an encrypted identity of the network function device, and a signature of the transaction request by the network registration function device; determining whether the signature is legitimate based on the certificate; and Based on determining that the signature is legitimate, a second transaction request is sent to the trusted environment device, the second transaction request including the identity of the network registration function device, the encrypted registration request of the network function device, and the encrypted identity of the network function device. 9 . The method according to claim 8 , wherein the first transaction request and the second transaction request further include an identifier of a registration contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke.
10. The method according to claim 8 or 9, further comprising: Receiving a registration success message of the network function device from the trusted environment device; as well as Sending the registration success message to the network registration function device.
11. A communication method, comprising: receiving, at a trusted environment device, a transaction request from a distributed management device, the transaction request including an identity of the network registration function device, an encrypted registration request of the network function device, and an encrypted identity of the network function device; Determining a symmetric key between the trusted environment device and the network registration function device based on the identity of the network registration function device; decrypting the encrypted registration request using the symmetric key; as well as In response to determining that the transaction request is valid based on the encrypted identity, the network function device and the network function device supported by the network function device are The service is added to the registration list.
12. The method according to claim 11, wherein the transaction request further comprises an identifier of the registration contract that the network registration function device requests to call and a signature of the transaction request by the network registration function device.
13. The method of claim 11, wherein the registration request comprises at least one of the following: the identity of the network functional device; The type of the network function device; The identity of the network to which the network function device belongs; The address of the network function device; or The services supported by the network function device.
14. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 13, wherein the encrypted identity of the network function device included in the transaction request is a first encrypted identity, further comprising: Invoking a registration contract based on the identifier of the registration contract; Based on the identity of the network function device, obtaining a second encrypted identity of the network function device; as well as Based on determining that the first encrypted identity is the same as the second encrypted identity, the transaction request is determined to be valid.
15. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 14, further comprising: Send a registration success message of the network function device to the distributed management device.
16. A communication method, comprising: At the second network function device, sending a service token request to the network registration function device, the service token request including an identity of the second network function device, an identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, an identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, a type of service of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, and an identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs; as well as A decrypted service token is received from the network registration function device.
17. The method according to claim 16, further comprising: Using the public key of the trusted environment device to determine whether the decrypted service token is legitimate; Based on determining that the service token is legitimate, sending a service request to the first network function device, the service request including the identity of the second network function device, the type of the second network function device, the identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs, the identity of the first network function device, the type of the first network function device, and the service token; as well as A service response message is received from the first network function device.
18. A communication method, comprising: receiving, at the network registration function device, a service token request from a second network function device, the service token request including an identity of the second network function device, an identity of a network in which the second network function device is located, an identity of a first network function device requested by the second network function device, a type of service of the first network function device requested by the second network function device, and an identity of the network in which the first network function device is located; encrypting the service token request using a symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device; as well as A transaction request is sent to a distributed management device, wherein the transaction request includes the encrypted service token request, the certificate of the network registration function device, and a signature of the network registration function device on the transaction request.
19. The method according to claim 18, wherein the transaction request further comprises an identification of an authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke.
20. The method according to claim 18 or 19, further comprising: receiving an encrypted service token from a distributed management device; decrypting the encrypted service token using the symmetric key; as well as The decrypted service token is sent to the second network function device.
21. A communication method, comprising: receiving, at the distributed management device, a first transaction request from a network registration function device, the first transaction request comprising an encrypted service token request of the network function device, a certificate of the network registration function device, and a signature of the transaction request by the network registration function device; determining whether the signature is legitimate based on the certificate; as well as Based on determining that the signature is legitimate, a second transaction request is sent to the trusted environment device, where the second transaction request includes the identity of the network registration function device and the encrypted service token request.
22. The method according to claim 21, wherein the first transaction request and the second transaction request further include an identifier of an authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke.
23. The method according to claim 21 or 22, further comprising: receiving an encrypted service token from the trusted environment device; as well as The encrypted service token is sent to the network registration function device.
24. A communication method, comprising: receiving, at the trusted environment device, a transaction request from the distributed management device, the transaction request including an identity of the network registration function device, an encrypted service token request of the second network function device; Determining a symmetric key between the network registration function device and the trusted environment device based on the identity of the network registration function device; decrypting the encrypted service token request based on the symmetric key; determining, based on the service token request, whether the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device; as well as Based on determining that the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device, a service token is generated for the second network function device.
25. The method according to claim 24, wherein the transaction request further comprises an identification of an authorization contract that the network registration function device requests to invoke.
26. The method of claim 24, wherein the service token request comprises at least one of: the identity of the second network function device; The identity of the network to which the second network function device belongs; the identity of the first network function device requested by the second network function device; The type of service of the first network function device requested by the second network function device; or The identity of the network to which the first network function device belongs.
27. The method according to any one of claims 24 to 26, wherein the service token comprises at least one of the following: the identity of the second network function device; the identity of the first network function device; the lifecycle of the service token; or The signature algorithm of the trusted environment device.
28. The method according to any one of claims 24 to 27, wherein determining whether the first network function device provides the service requested by the second network function device comprises: Invoking an authorization contract based on the identifier of the authorization contract; Based on the identity of the first network function device, obtaining an encrypted identity of the first network function device; determining, based on the encrypted identity of the first network function device, registration information of the first network function device to obtain services supported by the first network function device; as well as Determining whether services supported by the first network function device include a type of service of the first network function device requested by the second network function device.
29. The method according to any one of claims 24 to 28, further comprising: encrypting the service token using the symmetric key; as well as The encrypted service token is sent to the distributed management device.
30. A communication device comprising: A processor, and a memory storing instructions, which, when executed by the processor, cause the communication device to perform a method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, any one of claims 8 to 10, any one of claims 11 to 15, any one of claims 16 or 17, any one of claims 18 to 20, any one of claims 21 to 23, or any one of claims 24 to 29.
31. A chip comprising a processing circuit configured to perform a method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, any one of claims 8 to 10, any one of claims 11 to 15, any one of claims 16 or 17, any one of claims 18 to 20, any one of claims 21 to 23, or any one of claims 24 to 29.
32. A computer-readable storage medium storing instructions which, when executed by a communication device, cause the communication device to perform a method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, any one of claims 8 to 10, any one of claims 11 to 15, any one of claims 16 or 17, any one of claims 18 to 20, any one of claims 21 to 23, or any one of claims 24 to 29.
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