Key generation management device and signature verification system

The key generation management device addresses privacy concerns in connected cars by using a group signature method to uniquely identify in-vehicle electronic devices, ensuring legitimate data transmission and handling signature validity issues effectively.

WO2024241525A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-11-28ASTEMO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/JP2023/019293
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-05-24
Publication Date
2024-11-28

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing digital signature methods for vehicle data in connected cars face privacy issues as they cannot accurately identify the in-vehicle electronic device generating the signature, leading to difficulties in verifying signature validity and compliance with laws regarding personal information handling.

Method used

A key generation management device generates and manages unique signature keys using a group signature method, allowing for signer verification while protecting privacy by identifying the in-vehicle electronic device corresponding to the signer through a signer verification process.

Benefits of technology

Enables the authentication of in-vehicle electronic devices without revealing identifying information, ensuring legitimate vehicle data transmission and handling abnormalities such as cyber attacks or communication errors effectively.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The purpose of the present invention is to enable identification of an in-vehicle electronic device, which is a signer, from a digital signature when the validity of the digital signature cannot be verified, while at the same time protecting privacy thereof. A key generation management device 11 generates and manages a signature key to be used for generating a signature that is added to vehicle data transmitted from an in-vehicle electronic device 21. The key generation management device 11 includes: a key generation unit 102 that generates a plurality of signature keys having mutually different values and verification keys corresponding to the plurality of signature keys by using a group signature scheme; a communication unit 101 that receives a signature generated by the in-vehicle electronic device 21 using a signature key and subjected to processing for verifying the validity of the signature using a verification key; and a signer verification processing unit 103 that performs signer verification processing for the signature received by the communication unit 101, the signer verification processing identifying the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to a signer who has generated the signature.
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Description

Key generation management device and signature verification system

[0001] The present invention relates to a key generation management device and a signature verification system.

[0002] Vehicles such as automobiles are equipped with multiple on-board electronic devices called ECUs (Electronic Control Units), which perform functions such as engine control, brake control, and safety control. These functions are realized by on-board software implemented in the ECUs. In recent years, in order to realize functions such as autonomous driving and driving assistance, on-board electronic devices that perform these functions have been interconnected and linked via an on-board network, and have also been connected to servers located outside the vehicle. Vehicles equipped with such network connectivity are called connected cars, and vehicle data such as vehicle location information, driving history, and behavior information is transmitted from the on-board electronic devices to an external server. The server that receives the vehicle data analyzes the vehicle data and transmits the analysis results to the on-board electronic devices as driving suggestions. It is expected that services such as autonomous driving and driving assistance via such networks will become more widespread in the future.

[0003] Since vehicles are also used as a means of transportation across regions or countries, it is desirable to be able to continue using the service even after crossing borders. To realize such network-based services, it is important to ensure that the vehicle data is legitimate data transmitted from a legitimate vehicle, i.e., that it has not been tampered with. To ensure the authenticity of the vehicle data, a digital signature is usually attached to the vehicle data before it is transmitted to a server of a service provider that provides and manages the service. The service provider verifies the digital signature attached to the vehicle data.

[0004] A technology for adding a digital signature to vehicle data and verifying the signature is known from Patent Document 1. Patent Document 1 describes a method for using the same signature key for adding the digital signature for all vehicles, and a method for using the same method in combination with a vehicle identifier.

[0005] Japanese Patent Application Laid-Open No. 2020-201807

[0006] A typical digital signature is uniquely linked to the signer, who generated the digital signature, so a service provider who verifies the signature can obtain information that can identify the signer. In other words, a typical digital signature poses a privacy problem in that the service provider can identify the individual who sent the vehicle data.

[0007] In the method of using the same signature key for all vehicles described in Patent Document 1, if the legitimacy of the digital signature cannot be verified, it is difficult to identify the in-vehicle electronic device from the digital signature. As a result, in the method of using the same signature key for all vehicles described in Patent Document 1, it is difficult to deal with abnormalities that make it impossible to verify the legitimacy of the digital signature. Furthermore, the method of using a vehicle identifier described in Patent Document 1 also has the above-mentioned privacy issues, and service providers are required to take additional measures to comply with laws and regulations regarding the handling of personal information.

[0008] The present invention has been made in consideration of the above, and aims to make it possible to identify the in-vehicle electronic device that signed the digital signature from the digital signature when the legitimacy of the digital signature cannot be verified, while protecting privacy.

[0009] In order to solve the above problem, the key generation management device of the present invention is a key generation management device that generates and manages signature keys used to generate signatures to be added to vehicle data transmitted from an on-board electronic device to an outside of the vehicle, and is characterized by comprising: a key generation unit that generates multiple signature keys having different values ​​and verification keys corresponding to the multiple signature keys using a group signature method; a communication unit that receives the signature generated by the on-board electronic device using the signature keys, and after signature verification processing that verifies the validity of the signature using the verification key; and a signer verification processing unit that performs signer verification processing on the signature received by the communication unit to identify the on-board electronic device corresponding to the signer who generated the signature.

[0010] According to the present invention, it is possible to protect privacy while making it possible to identify the on-board electronic device that signed the digital signature when the authenticity of the digital signature cannot be verified. Other problems, configurations, and advantages will become clear from the description of the following embodiments.

[0011] 5 is a diagram showing the configuration of a signature verification system of the present embodiment. FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the hardware configuration of each vehicle shown in FIG. 1. FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the hardware configuration of an on-board electronic device shown in FIG. 1. FIG. 2 is a diagram showing the hardware configurations of a key generation management device and a signature verification device shown in FIG. 1. A flowchart showing processing performed by the signature verification system shown in FIG. 1. A flowchart showing details of the key generation processing of S501 shown in FIG. 5. A flowchart showing details of the key distribution processing of S502 shown in FIG. 5. A flowchart showing details of the signature generation processing of S503 shown in FIG. 5. A flowchart showing details of the signature verification processing of S504 shown in FIG. 5. A flowchart showing details of the signer verification processing of S505 shown in FIG. 5. A diagram showing an example of a user screen displayed to a user by the key generation management device shown in FIG. 1. A diagram explaining vehicle information and key generation-related information stored in the key generation management device shown in FIG. 1. A diagram explaining a determination processing of the key generation management device based on the relationship between the result of the signature verification processing and the result of the signer verification processing.

[0012] Hereinafter, embodiments of the present invention will be described with reference to the drawings. Note that components or functions denoted by the same reference numerals in each embodiment have the same components or functions in each embodiment unless otherwise specified, and description thereof will be omitted.

[0013] FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the configuration of a signature verification system 1 according to this embodiment.

[0014] The signature verification system 1 includes a key generation management center 10 and a vehicle 20. 1 ~20 N , a signature verification center 30, and a network 40.

[0015] The key generation management center 10 includes a key generation management device 11, which is a computer that generates and distributes signature keys and verification keys and verifies signers.

[0016] Vehicle 20 1~20 N In this embodiment, the number of vehicles 20 1 ~20 N When there is no need to particularly distinguish between the vehicles 20 1 ~20 N The subscripts are omitted and the vehicle 20 1 ~20 N is also simply referred to as a vehicle 20. The vehicle 20 includes an on-board electronic device 21 that generates a digital signature (hereinafter also referred to as a "signature") and adds it to vehicle data.

[0017] The signature verification center 30 is part of a service provider that provides services such as automated driving or driving assistance to the vehicle 20 via the network 40. The signature verification center 30 includes a signature verification device 31, which is a computer that performs signature verification and signer verification requests.

[0018] The key generation management device 11 generates and manages signature keys used to generate signatures to be added to vehicle data transmitted from the in-vehicle electronic device 21 to the outside of the vehicle 20. The key generation management device 11 transmits each of the generated multiple signature keys to the in-vehicle electronic device 21, and also transmits the generated verification key to the signature verification device 31. The key generation management device 11 performs signer verification processing for the signature transmitted from the signature verification device 31, to identify the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer who generated the signature.

[0019] The key generation management device 11 includes a communication unit 101 that communicates with the network 40, a key generation unit 102 that generates a signature key and a verification key, a signer verification processing unit 103 that performs signer verification processing, and a notification unit 104 that notifies a user of the result of the signer verification processing. The key generation management device 11 also includes a parameter storage unit 105 that stores parameters used in the generation of the signature key and the verification key by the key generation unit 102, and a key storage unit 106 that stores the verification key generated by the key generation unit 102. The key generation management device 11 also includes a signature storage unit 107 that stores a signature transmitted from the signature verification device 31, and a vehicle information storage unit 108 that stores vehicle information including the signature key generated by the key generation unit 102 and identification information of the on-board electronic device 21 that indicates the destination of the signature key.

[0020] The key generation unit 102 generates a plurality of signature keys having mutually different values ​​and a verification key corresponding to the plurality of signature keys using a group signature scheme. The key generation unit 102 generates the plurality of signature keys using a plurality of mutually different parameters.

[0021] The communication unit 101 receives, from the signature verification device 31, a signature that has been generated by the on-board electronic device 21 using a signature key and that has undergone signature verification processing to verify the validity of the signature using a verification key. For example, the communication unit 101 receives, from the signature verification device 31, a signature whose validity could not be verified by the signature verification processing of the signature verification device 31.

[0022] The signer verification processing unit 103 performs a signer verification process for identifying the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer who generated the signature received by the communication unit 101. In the signer verification process, the signer verification processing unit 103 identifies the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer by identifying which of a plurality of parameters was used to generate the signature key used to generate the signature received by the communication unit 101.

[0023] If the signer verification processing unit 103 is unable to identify the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer through the signer verification processing, it determines that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and received by the communication unit 101 may have been tampered with by a cyber-attack. If the signer verification processing unit 103 is able to identify the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer through the signer verification processing, it determines that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and received by the communication unit 101 may contain a communication error.

[0024] The notification unit 104 displays the result of the signer verification process on a display to notify the user. Furthermore, if the notification unit 104 determines that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and received by the communication unit 101 may have been tampered with by a cyber-attack, the notification unit 104 notifies the determination result to an outside of the key generation management device 11. For example, the notification unit 104 notifies the determination result to the key generation management center 10 or a security management department of the service provider. Furthermore, if the notification unit 104 determines that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and received by the communication unit 101 may contain a communication error, the notification unit 104 notifies the determination result to an outside of the key generation management device 11. For example, the notification unit 104 notifies the determination result to a department of the service provider that manages the communication status of the vehicle 20, the vehicle 20, or the like.

[0025] The communication unit 101 may receive, from the signature verification device 31, a signature whose validity has been verified by the signature verification process of the signature verification device 31. In this case, the signer verification processing unit 103 can identify the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer by the signer verification process.

[0026] The on-board electronic device 21 generates a signature using the signature key transmitted from the key generation management device 11 and adds the signature to the vehicle data, and also transmits the signature added to the vehicle data to the signature verification device 31 .

[0027] The on-board electronic device 21 includes a communication unit 201 that communicates with the network 40, a signature unit 202 that generates a signature using a signature key stored in an on-board storage unit 204 and adds the signature to the vehicle data, and a vehicle data generation unit 203 that generates vehicle data. The on-board electronic device 21 further includes the on-board storage unit 204 that stores the signature key transmitted from the key generation management device 11, and a vehicle data storage unit 205 that stores the vehicle data generated by the vehicle data generation unit 203.

[0028] The signature verification device 31 is connected to the in-vehicle electronic device 21 and the key generation management device 11 via a network 40, and performs a signature verification process to verify the validity of a signature. Specifically, the signature verification device 31 performs the signature verification process on a signature transmitted from the in-vehicle electronic device 21 using a verification key transmitted from the key generation management device 11. The signature verification device 31 determines whether or not it is necessary to perform a signer verification process. The signature verification device 31 transmits a signature determined to require the execution of a signer verification process to the key generation management device 11, and requests the key generation management device 11 to verify the signer.

[0029] The signature verification device 31 includes a communication unit 301 that communicates with the network 40, a signature verification unit 302 that performs signature verification processing on the signature transmitted from the on-board electronic device 21, and a signer verification request unit 303 that requests signer verification from the key generation management device 11. Furthermore, the signature verification device 31 includes a verification key storage unit 304 that stores the verification key transmitted from the key generation management device 11, a signature storage unit 305 that stores the signature transmitted from the on-board electronic device 21, and a verification result storage unit 306 that stores the result of the signature verification processing.

[0030] FIG. 2 shows each vehicle 20 shown in FIG. 1 ~20 N FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating a hardware configuration of the

[0031] In the vehicle 20, one or more on-board electronic devices 21 1 ~21 M are connected to each other via an in-vehicle network 22. 1 ~21 M The number of the in-vehicle electronic devices 21 is arbitrary and is not particularly limited. 1 ~21 M Among them, the in-vehicle electronic device 21 other than itself 1 ~21 M the master device that controls the in-vehicle electronic device 21 other than itself. 1 ~21 M a slave device that receives an instruction from the in-vehicle electronic device 21, or two or more different in-vehicle electronic devices 21 other than itself 1 ~21 MIn this embodiment, a proxy device or a gateway device may be provided to mediate and convert the communication between the vehicle-mounted electronic device 21 and the vehicle-mounted electronic device 21. 1 ~21 M When there is no need to particularly distinguish between the in-vehicle electronic device 21 1 ~21 M The subscripts are omitted, and the in-vehicle electronic device 21 1 ~21 M are also simply referred to as the on-board electronic device 21. The on-board network 22 is, for example, but not limited to, a Control Area Network (CAN) or Ethernet. A plurality of on-board networks 22 may exist in the vehicle 20.

[0032] FIG. 3 is a diagram showing the hardware configuration of the in-vehicle electronic device 21 shown in FIG.

[0033] The on-board electronic device 21 includes a communication device 23, an input / output device 24, a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 25, a memory 26, a storage device 27, and a secure device 28, all interconnected by an internal signal line 29 such as a bus. The secure device 28 may have, for example, a storage area that cannot be physically rewritten, a storage area that can be rewritten only once, or a storage area with access control such as user or process authentication. The secure device 28 may be a device such as an HSM (Hardware Security Module) that stores keys for encryption or decryption, digital signatures for verifying software, electronic certificates, setting values, verification values, or identification information, and performs encryption / decryption, verification, or signature addition processing. The communication device 23 is connected to a network 40 and transmits and receives data.

[0034] FIG. 4 is a diagram showing the hardware configuration of each of the key generation management device 11 and the signature verification device 31 shown in FIG.

[0035] The hardware configuration of the key generation management device 11 and the hardware configuration of the signature verification device 31 may be the same. Each of the key generation management device 11 and the signature verification device 31 is configured by a communication device 12, an input / output device 13, a CPU 14, a memory 15, and a storage device 16, which are interconnected by internal signal lines 17. The input / output device 13 is, for example, a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, a numeric keypad, a scanner, a microphone, a sensor, a display, a printer, or a speaker. The communication device 12 is connected to a network 40 and transmits and receives data.

[0036] FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing the processing performed by the signature verification system 1 shown in FIG.

[0037] 5 is executed by loading programs stored in the storage devices 16 and 27 of the key generation management device 11, the signature verification device 31, and the on-board electronic device 21, respectively, into the memories 15 and 26 and executing them by the CPUs 14 and 25. The programs stored in the storage devices 16 and 27 may be introduced into the storage devices 16 and 27 at appropriate times via an external recording medium or a communication medium (a network or a transmission wave propagating through a network).

[0038] First, the key generation management device 11 performs a key generation process to generate a signature key and a verification key using the group signature scheme (S501). Next, the key generation management device 11, the in-vehicle electronic device 21, and the signature verification device 31 perform a key distribution process to distribute the generated signature key and verification key (S502). Next, the in-vehicle electronic device 21 and the signature verification device 31 perform a signature generation process to generate a signature to be added to vehicle data using the signature key (S503). Next, the key generation management device 11 and the signature verification device 31 perform a signature verification process to verify the validity of the signature using the verification key (S504). Next, the key generation management device 11 performs a signer verification process to identify the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer who generated the signature (S505).

[0039] FIG. 6 is a flowchart showing the details of the key generation process in S501 shown in FIG.

[0040] First, the key generation management device 11 starts the key generation process (S601). Next, the key generation management device 11 determines whether a key generation instruction has been received (S602). The key generation management device 11 may receive the key generation instruction input by a user operating the input / output device 13, such as a touchscreen display, a keyboard, or a mouse. An example of a user screen for a user to input the key generation instruction will be described later with reference to FIG. 11. As another example, the key generation management device 11 may receive the key generation instruction input via an external storage medium, such as a DVD (Digital Versatile Disc) or a USB (Universal Serial Bus) memory, or may receive the key generation instruction input via a network from another device or department in the key generation management center 10 (not shown).

[0041] If it is determined that a key generation instruction has not been received, the key generation management device 11 returns to the process of S602. On the other hand, if it is determined that a key generation instruction has been received, the key generation management device 11 acquires key generation-related information included in the key generation instruction (S603). The key generation information includes information about the destination of the verification key, the number of signature keys to be generated, and parameters used to generate the signature key and verification key. The information about the destination of the verification key is, for example, the name, address, and identifier of the destination of the verification key. The parameters are, for example, a random number, a seed, a fixed value, an algorithm name, a variable value, a public value, or a secret value. The key generation-related information is not limited to these and may also be a combination of these.

[0042] Next, the key generation management device 11 generates a signature key and a verification key (S604). The key generation management device 11 generates multiple signature keys having different values ​​and a verification key corresponding to the multiple signature keys using a group signature scheme. The group signature scheme is a type of public key cryptography in which the verification key and the signature key have different values. The group signature scheme is an encryption scheme based on a pairing operation that calculates a mapping from a set of two points on an elliptic curve to a finite field. The group signature scheme is an encryption scheme in which the relationship between the verification key and the signature key is 1:n. In this embodiment, in the process of S604, the key generation management device 11 generates multiple signature keys and one verification key using multiple parameters (the number of signature keys to be generated) acquired in the process of S603.

[0043] Next, the key generation management device 11 stores the parameters used to generate the signature key and verification key in the process of S604 in the parameter storage unit 105 (S605). In the process of S605, the key generation management device 11 may store key generation-related information other than the parameters in the parameter storage unit 105. Next, the key generation management device 11 stores the signature key generated in the process of S604 in the vehicle information storage unit 108 (S606). Next, the key generation management device 11 stores the verification key generated in the process of S604 in the key storage unit 106 (S607). Then, the key generation management device 11 ends the key generation process (S608). Note that the processes of S605, S606, and S607 may be performed in any order.

[0044] FIG. 7 is a flowchart showing the details of the key distribution process in S502 shown in FIG.

[0045] First, the key generation management device 11 starts the key distribution process (S701). The key generation management device 11 transmits the signature keys (A701 to A703) via the network 40 to the onboard electronic devices 21 to which the generated signature keys have been assigned, among the onboard electronic devices 21 that are the destinations of the signature keys and are indicated in the vehicle information stored in the vehicle information storage unit 108. Furthermore, the key generation management device 11 transmits the verification key (A704) stored in the key storage unit 106 via the network 40 to the destination of the verification key included in the key generation related information.

[0046] Here, the network 40 may be a wireless communication network such as LTE (Long Term Evolution), 4G, 5G, Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity), or Bluetooth, or may be a wired LAN (Local Area Network), etc. Furthermore, the network 40 may encrypt the communication path and perform one-way or mutual authentication using a communication protocol such as IPsec (Security Architecture for Internet Protocol), SSL (Secure Socket Layer), TLS (Transport Layer Security), or SSH (Secure Shell).

[0047] Next, vehicle 20 1 ~20 N Each of the on-board electronic devices 21 acquires a signature key (A701-A703) (S702-S704). The communication unit 201 of each on-board electronic device 21 receives the signature key (A701-A703) from the network 40. The on-board storage unit 204 of each on-board electronic device 21 stores the signature key (A701-A703) received by the communication unit 201 of each on-board electronic device 21. Next, the signature verification device 31 acquires a verification key (A704) (S705). The communication unit 301 of the signature verification device 31 receives the verification key (A704) from the network 40. The verification key storage unit 304 of the signature verification device 31 stores the verification key (A704) received by the communication unit 301. Then, the key generation management device 11, the on-board electronic device 21, and the signature verification device 31 end the key distribution process (S706). The processes of S702 to S705 may be performed in any order or may be performed simultaneously in parallel.

[0048] FIG. 8 is a flowchart showing the details of the signature generation process in S503 shown in FIG.

[0049] First, the on-board electronic device 21 starts the signature generation process (S801). The signature generation process may be started when vehicle data is generated, or when a predetermined number of vehicle data items have been generated. Alternatively, the signature generation process may be started when the available capacity of the vehicle data storage unit 205 falls below a predetermined value, or when a predetermined time has elapsed. Alternatively, the signature generation process may be started when the bandwidth of the network 40 becomes available, or when the vehicle 20 is stopped, or when the processing load of the on-board electronic device 21 falls below a predetermined value. The timing at which the signature generation process is started is not limited to these, and may also be a combination of these.

[0050] Next, the on-board electronic device 21 acquires the vehicle data to be signed from the vehicle data storage unit 205 (S802). Next, the on-board electronic device 21 acquires the signature key from the on-board storage unit 204 (S803). Next, the on-board electronic device 21 generates a signature using the signature key in the signature unit 202 and attaches the generated signature to the vehicle data (S804). Then, the on-board electronic device 21 transmits the signature (A801) attached to the vehicle data to the signature verification device 31 via the network 40.

[0051] Next, the signature verification device 31 stores the signature (A801) transmitted from the in-vehicle electronic device 21 in the signature storage unit 305 (S805). Next, the signature verification device 31 transmits a receipt notification (A802) notifying that the signature (A801) has been received to the in-vehicle electronic device 21 via the network 40.

[0052] Next, the in-vehicle electronic device 21 determines whether or not it has received a receipt notification (A802) (S806). If it determines that it has received the receipt notification (A802), the in-vehicle electronic device 21 terminates the signature generation process (S808). On the other hand, if it determines that it has not received the receipt notification (A802), the in-vehicle electronic device 21 determines whether or not a predetermined time has elapsed since the signature (A801) was transmitted (S807). If it determines that the predetermined time has elapsed, the in-vehicle electronic device 21 returns to the process of transmitting the signature (A801). On the other hand, if it determines that the predetermined time has not elapsed, the in-vehicle electronic device 21 returns to the process of S806. Note that the processes of S802 and S803 may be performed in any order.

[0053] FIG. 9 is a flowchart showing the details of the signature verification process in S504 shown in FIG.

[0054] First, the signature verification device 31 starts the signature verification process (S901). The signature verification process may be started when a predetermined time has elapsed, when a predetermined number of signatures have been stored in the signature storage unit 305, or when a signature is received from the vehicle 20. The timing at which the signature verification process is started is not limited to these, and may also be a combination of these.

[0055] Next, the signature verification device 31 acquires the signature from the signature storage unit 305 (S902). Next, the signature verification device 31 acquires the verification key from the verification key storage unit 304 (S903). Next, the signature verification device 31 verifies the validity of the signature using the verification key (S904). Next, the signature verification device 31 determines whether or not it is necessary to execute signer verification processing (S905).

[0056] An example of a case where the execution of the signer verification process is necessary is when the authenticity of the signature cannot be verified in the process of S904, such as when the signature verification result is a mismatch. In this case, the vehicle data to which the signature whose authenticity could not be verified is attached is used for notification and handling for security measures. Notification and handling for security measures include, for example, identifying the on-board electronic device 21 that is under cyber-attack, analyzing the tactics, techniques, or procedures being exploited in the attack, disseminating information including identifying other on-board electronic devices 21 that may be subject to the same attack, and planning specific measures.

[0057] Furthermore, if the authenticity of the signature cannot be verified in the process of S904, the vehicle data to which the signature whose authenticity cannot be verified is attached may contain a communication error. In this case, the vehicle data is used for notification and handling to check the communication status of the vehicle 20 and for notification and handling for security measures.

[0058] Another example of a case where the signer verification process needs to be executed is when the authenticity of the signature can be verified in the process of S904. In this case, the vehicle data to which the verified signature is attached is collected by the service provider's server after identifying the on-board electronic device 21 in order for the service provider to manage the status of the vehicle 20 necessary for providing the service. The collected vehicle data is stored in the server as a log of the vehicle 20 and is used to detect failures of each part of the vehicle 20, estimate the degree of wear or failure of each part, predict failures of each part, etc.

[0059] The signature verification device 31 may determine that it is necessary to execute the signer verification process regardless of the result of the signature verification process in order to use the vehicle data for at least one of the above-mentioned security measures, confirmation of the communication status of the vehicle 20, and status management of the vehicle 20. The cases in which it is necessary to execute the signer verification process are not limited to the above examples, and may be a combination of these.

[0060] If it is determined in the processing of S905 that execution of signer verification processing is necessary, the signature verification device 31 transmits the signature (A901) that was the target of the processing of S904 to the key generation management device 11. Next, the key generation management device 11 stores the signature received by the communication unit 101 in the signature memory unit 107 (S906). Next, the key generation management device 11 transmits a receipt notification (A902) notifying that the signature (A901) has been received to the signature verification device 31 via the network 40.

[0061] Next, the signature verification device 31 determines whether all signatures stored in the signature storage unit 305 have been verified (S907). Note that even if it is determined in the processing of S905 that execution of the signer verification processing is unnecessary, the signature verification device 31 proceeds to the processing of S907. As a method for performing the processing of S907, for example, a method is available in which a signature for which signature verification has been completed is deleted from the signature storage unit 305, and a method is available in which a determination is made as to whether the number of signatures stored in the signature storage unit 305 has become zero. As another method for performing the processing of S907, for example, a method is available in which a flag is added to a signature stored in the signature storage unit 305 when signature verification is completed, and a method is available in which a determination is made as to whether the number of signatures to which no flag is added has become zero. The method for performing the processing of S907 is not limited to these methods, and a combination of these methods may also be used.

[0062] If it is determined that all signatures have been verified, the signature verification device 31 ends the signature verification process (S908). On the other hand, if it is determined that all signatures have not been verified, the signature verification device 31 returns to the process of S902. Note that the processes of S902 and S903 may be performed in any order.

[0063] FIG. 10 is a flowchart showing the details of the signer verification process in S505 shown in FIG.

[0064] First, the key generation management device 11 starts the signer verification process (S1001). The signer verification process may be started when an instruction to start the signer verification process input by a user operation is received, or may be started after a predetermined time has elapsed, or may be started when a predetermined number of signatures are stored in the signature storage unit 107. The timing at which the signer verification process is started is not limited to these, and may also be a combination of these.

[0065] Next, the key generation management device 11 acquires a signature from the signature storage unit 107 (S1002). Next, the key generation management device 11 acquires parameters from the parameter storage unit 105 (S1003). Next, the key generation management device 11 calculates a verification value using the parameters (S1004). This verification value is a value for identifying the signature key included in the signature. Here, for example, the key generation related information acquired in the processing of S603 may include the number of verification keys to be generated so that multiple verification keys can be generated. In this case, the key generation management device 11 uses the parameters included in the key generation related information to calculate verification values ​​for the number of verification keys to be generated.

[0066] Next, the key generation management device 11 determines whether the signature acquired in the process of S1002 includes the verification value calculated in the process of S1004 (or any one of the verification values ​​if multiple verification values ​​were calculated) (S1005). If it is determined that the calculated verification value is included in the signature acquired in the process of S1002, the key generation management device 11 generates a signature key using the parameters acquired in the process of S1003 (S1006). The process of S1006 may be performed in the same manner as the process of S604, or only a part of the process of S604 that uses the verification value included in the signature may be performed. The process of S1006 is not limited to this.

[0067] Next, the key generation management device 11 searches the vehicle information storage unit 108 using the signature key generated in the processing of S1006 as a search key (S1007). Next, the key generation management device 11 identifies, from the search results, a signature key that matches the signature key generated in the processing of S1006. Then, the key generation management device 11 obtains identification information of the on-board electronic device 21 linked to the identified signature key (S1008). This allows the key generation management device 11 to identify the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer who generated the signature obtained in the processing of S1002.

[0068] Next, the key generation management device 11 notifies the identification information of the on-board electronic device 21 acquired in the process of S1008 via the notification unit 104 (S1009). The method of performing the process of S1009 may be, for example, a method of displaying the identification information of the on-board electronic device 21 on the display of the input / output device 13, but is not limited to this.

[0069] Furthermore, if it is determined in the process of S1005 that the calculated verification value is not included in the signature obtained in the process of S1002, the key generation management device 11 determines (S1010) whether or not the verification value has been calculated using all parameters stored in the parameter storage unit 105. The method of performing the process of S1010 includes, but is not limited to, a method of calculating the verification value using the parameters stored in the parameter storage unit 105 in the order in which they were stored, and determining whether or not the verification value has been calculated using the most recently stored parameter.

[0070] If it is determined that the verification value has not been calculated using all the parameters, the key generation management device 11 returns to the process of S1003. On the other hand, if it is determined that the verification value has been calculated using all the parameters, the key generation management device 11 proceeds to the process of S1009. In this case, the key generation management device 11 notifies the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer via the notification unit 104 (S1009). In this case, the notification content in the process of S1009 may be, for example, that the signature key included in the signature obtained in the process of S1002 was not generated by the key generation management device 11, or that the vehicle data to which the signature obtained in the process of S1002 was added may have been tampered with. The notification content in the process of S1009 in this case is not limited to these and may also be a combination of these.

[0071] Next, the key generation management device 11 determines whether the signers of all signatures have been verified (S1011). One method for performing the process of S1011 is, for example, to add a flag to a signature stored in the signature storage unit 107 when signer verification is complete, and to determine whether the number of signatures to which no flag has been added has reached zero. Another method for performing the process of S1011 is to set the status of a signature stored in the signature storage unit 107 to verified when signer verification is complete, and to determine whether the status of all signatures has been set to verified. The method for performing the process of S1011 is not limited to these methods, and may be a combination of these methods.

[0072] If it is determined that the signers of all the signatures have been verified, the key generation management device 11 ends the signer verification process (S1012). On the other hand, if it is determined that the signers of all the signatures have not been verified, the key generation management device 11 returns to the process of S1002.

[0073] FIG. 11 is a diagram showing an example of a user screen 1100 displayed to the user by the key generation management device 11 shown in FIG.

[0074] The user screen 1100 is made up of a key generation processing screen 1101 and a signer verification processing screen 1109 .

[0075] The key generation processing screen 1101 displays a verification key destination field 1102, a number of signature keys to be generated field 1103, a parameter field 1104, a status field 1105, a start key generation button 1106, a verification key transmission button 1107, and a signature key transmission button 1108.

[0076] The verification key destination field 1102 is used to input and display, for example, the name of the provider to which the verification key is to be sent, an address, an email address, or a telephone number. The input and display contents of the verification key destination field 1102 are not limited to these. The number of signature keys to be generated field 1103 is used to input and display the number of signature keys to be generated. The parameter field 1104 is used to input and display parameters used to generate the signature key and the verification key, such as a random number, a seed, a fixed value, an algorithm name, a variable value, a public value, or a secret value. The input and display contents of the parameter field 1104 are not limited to these and may be a combination of these. The status field 1105 displays the status of key generation. The status of key generation displayed in the status field 1105 is, for example, "new input in progress," "key generation in progress," "key generated," "signature key sent," or "verification key sent," but is not limited to these and may be a combination of these.

[0077] The key generation start button 1106 is a button for starting the key generation process when pressed by the user. The verification key send button 1107 is a button for sending the verification key to a verification key destination when pressed by the user. The signature key send button 1108 is a button for sending the signature key when pressed by the user.

[0078] The signer verification processing screen 1109 displays a user selection field 1110, a signature field 1111, a receipt date and time field 1112, a status field 1113, a verification result field 1114, a signer verification start button 1115, a verification result notification button 1116, and an update button 1117.

[0079] The user selection field 1110 has a verification field in which the user inputs a check mark to select a signature for which signer verification processing is to be performed, and a notification field in which the user inputs a check mark to select a signature for which the result of the signer verification processing is to be notified. The signature field 1111 displays the signature received from the signature verification device 31. The reception date and time field 1112 displays the date and time when the signature was received from the signature verification device 31. The display format of the reception date and time field 1112 is, for example, ISO 8601, but is not limited to this. The status field 1113 displays the status of signer verification. The signer verification status displayed in the status field 1113 may be, for example, new, verified, or notified, but is not limited to these and may be a combination of these. The verification result field 1114 displays the result of the signer verification processing. The results of the signer verification process displayed in the verification result field 1114 include, for example, the identification information of the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer, the fact that the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer was not found, the fact that the signature key was not generated by the key generation management device 11, the possibility that the vehicle data has been tampered with, etc. The results of the signer verification process displayed in the verification result field 1114 are not limited to these, and may also be a combination of these.

[0080] The signer verification start button 1115 is a button for starting the signer verification process for a signature for which a check mark has been entered in the verification field of the user selection field 1110, upon acceptance of a user's press operation. The verification result notification button 1116 is a button for notifying the outside of the key generation management device 11 of the results of the signer verification process for a signature for which a check mark has been entered in the notification field of the user selection field 1110, upon acceptance of a user's press operation. The update button 1117 is a button for updating each display on the signer verification process screen 1109, upon acceptance of a user's press operation. If a new signature for signer verification has been received from the signature verification device 31, pressing the update button 1117 adds each piece of information related to the newly received signature to the signer verification process screen 1109. Note that the updates to each display on the signer verification process screen 1109 may be performed when the update button 1117 is pressed, or may be performed automatically periodically, or may be performed in a combination of these ways.

[0081] Note that the display items on the user screen 1100 are not limited to those described above, and the arrangement of the display items is also not limited to those described above.

[0082] FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating vehicle information 1200 and key generation related information 1205 stored in the key generation management device 11 shown in FIG.

[0083] The vehicle information 1200 includes identification information 1201 of the vehicle 20 , identification information 1202 of the on-board electronic device 21 , a signature key 1203 , and a generation date and time 1204 .

[0084] The identification information 1201 of the vehicle 20 is, for example, but not limited to, a vehicle identifier such as a VIN (Vehicle Identification Number). The identification information 1202 of the on-board electronic device 21 is, for example, but not limited to, an on-board electronic device identifier such as an ECUID. The signature key 1203 is the value of a generated signature key. The creation date and time 1204 is the date and time when the signature key 1203 is created. The format of the creation date and time 1204 is, for example, ISO 8601, but is not limited to this.

[0085] The key generation related information 1205 includes a verification key transmission destination 1206 , a number of generated signature keys 1207 , parameters 1208 , and a generation date and time 1209 .

[0086] The verification key destination 1206 is, for example, but not limited to, the name of the provider to which the verification key is to be sent, an address, an email address, or a telephone number. The number of signature keys generated 1207 is the number of signature keys generated. The parameters 1208 are parameters used to generate the signature key and the verification key, such as a random number, a seed, a fixed value, an algorithm name, a variable value, a public value, or a secret value, but are not limited to these and may be a combination of these. The generation date and time 1209 is the date and time when the verification key was generated. The format of the generation date and time 1209 is, for example, ISO 8601, but is not limited to this.

[0087] FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating the determination process of the key generation management device 11 based on the relationship between the result of the signature verification process and the result of the signer verification process.

[0088] In Fig. 13, a result of the signature verification process that is OK indicates that the validity of the signature has been verified, and a result of the signature verification process that is NG indicates that the validity of the signature has not been verified. In Fig. 13, a result of the signer verification process that is OK indicates that the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer of the signature has been identified, and a result of the signer verification process that is NG indicates that the in-vehicle electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer of the signature has not been identified.

[0089] If the result of the signature verification process is OK and the result of the signer verification process is OK, the signature to be verified is a valid signature generated using the signature key of the key generation management device 11. In this case, the signer verification processing unit 103 of the key generation management device 11 determines that the vehicle data to which this signature is attached is reliable and valid vehicle data. The vehicle data to which this signature is attached is used for vehicle status management by the service provider, etc.

[0090] If the result of the signature verification process is NG and the result of the signer verification process is NG, the signature to be verified is an invalid signature generated using a signature key other than that of the key generation management device 11. In this case, the signer verification processing unit 103 determines that the vehicle data to which this signature is attached may have been tampered with by a cyber-attack. The notification unit 104 notifies the key generation management center 10 or the security management department of the service provider, etc., of the determination result. The vehicle data to which this signature is attached is used for notification and response as security measures.

[0091] If the result of the signature verification process is NG and the result of the signer verification process is OK, the signature to be verified was generated using the signature key of the key generation management device 11, but the authenticity of the signature could not be verified. In this case, the signer verification processing unit 103 determines that the vehicle data to which this signature is attached may contain a communication error. The notification unit 104 notifies the relevant vehicle 20 or the relevant vehicle 20 of the determination result. Furthermore, the signer verification processing unit 103 can also determine that the vehicle data to which this signature is attached may have been tampered with. The notification unit 104 notifies the key generation management center 10 or the security management unit of the service provider of the determination result. The vehicle data to which this signature is attached is used for notifications and actions to check the communication status of the vehicle 20 and for notifications and actions for security measures.

[0092] It is not possible for the result of the signature verification process to be OK, but the result of the signer verification process to be NG, because the same signature cannot be generated using multiple signing keys with different values, and this is guaranteed by the fundamental security of the group signature scheme.

[0093] As described above, the key generation management device 11 of this embodiment is a device that generates and manages signature keys used to generate signatures to be added to vehicle data transmitted from the on-board electronic device 21 to the outside of the vehicle 20. The key generation management device 11 includes: a key generation unit 102 that generates, by using a group signature scheme, multiple signature keys having mutually different values ​​and verification keys corresponding to the multiple signature keys; a communication unit 101 that receives a signature that has been generated by the on-board electronic device 21 using the signature key and that has undergone signature verification processing to verify the validity of the signature using the verification key; and a signer verification processing unit 103 that performs signer verification processing on the signature received by the communication unit 101 to identify the on-board electronic device 21 that corresponds to the signer who generated the signature.

[0094] As a result, the key generation management device 11 can allow a service provider performing signature verification to verify the legitimacy of a signature generated by the on-board electronic device 21 without providing information that can identify the on-board electronic device 21 that is the signer. Therefore, the key generation management device 11 can enable the service provider to confirm that the vehicle data is legitimate and has been transmitted from a legitimate vehicle 20 that can receive the service, while preventing the service provider from identifying an individual linked to the source of the vehicle data. On the other hand, if the legitimacy of the signature cannot be verified in signature verification, the key generation management device 11 can identify the on-board electronic device 21 that corresponds to the signer from the signature. Therefore, the key generation management device 11 can protect privacy while making it possible to identify the on-board electronic device 21 that is the signer from the digital signature when the legitimacy of the digital signature cannot be verified.

[0095] Furthermore, in the key generation management device 11 of this embodiment, the key generation unit 102 generates multiple signature keys using multiple parameters that are different from each other. In the signer verification process, the signer verification processing unit 103 identifies the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer by identifying which of the multiple parameters was used to generate the signature key received by the communication unit 101.

[0096] This allows the key generation management device 11 to reliably generate multiple signature keys having mutually different values ​​and to reliably identify which of the multiple signature keys was used to generate the signature. Therefore, the key generation management device 11 can reliably identify the on-board electronic device 21 that corresponds to the signer. Therefore, the key generation management device 11 can reliably identify the on-board electronic device 21 that is the signer from the digital signature when the authenticity of the digital signature cannot be verified, while protecting privacy.

[0097] Furthermore, in the key generation management device 11 of this embodiment, the communication unit 101 receives a signature whose legitimacy could not be verified by the signature verification process. If the signer verification process fails to identify the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer, the signer verification processing unit 103 determines that the vehicle data to which the signature received by the communication unit 101 is added may have been tampered with by a cyber attack.

[0098] As a result, if the reason why the validity of the signature cannot be verified is due to data tampering caused by a cyber attack, the key generation management device 11 can have the key generation management center 10 or the security management department of the service provider, etc., accurately deal with the abnormality where the validity of the signature cannot be verified. Thus, the key generation management device 11 can protect privacy while making it possible to identify the relevant signer when the validity of the digital signature cannot be verified, and can accurately deal with the abnormality where the validity cannot be verified.

[0099] Furthermore, the key generation management device 11 of this embodiment further includes a notification unit 104 that notifies the result of the signer verification process. The notification unit 104 notifies the outside of the key generation management device 11 of the determination result that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and which has been received by the communication unit 101 may have been tampered with by a cyber-attack.

[0100] As a result, if the reason why the validity of the signature cannot be verified is due to data tampering caused by a cyber attack, the key generation management device 11 can have the key generation management center 10 or the security management department of the service provider, etc., accurately and quickly deal with the abnormality where the validity of the signature cannot be verified. Thus, the key generation management device 11 can protect privacy while making it possible to identify the relevant signer when the validity of the digital signature cannot be verified, and can accurately and quickly deal with the abnormality where the validity cannot be verified.

[0101] Furthermore, in the key generation management device 11 of this embodiment, the communication unit 101 receives a signature whose validity could not be verified by the signature verification process. If the signer verification process identifies the on-board electronic device 21 corresponding to the signer, the signer verification processing unit 103 determines that the vehicle data to which the signature received by the communication unit 101 is added may contain a communication error.

[0102] As a result, if the reason why the validity of the signature cannot be verified is a communication error, the key generation management device 11 can have a department of the service provider that manages the communication status of the vehicle 20 accurately deal with the abnormality where the validity of the signature cannot be verified. Thus, the key generation management device 11 can protect privacy while making it possible to identify the relevant signer when the validity of the digital signature cannot be verified, and can accurately deal with the abnormality where the validity cannot be verified.

[0103] Furthermore, the key generation management device 11 of this embodiment further includes a notification unit 104 that notifies the result of the signer verification process. The notification unit 104 notifies the outside of the key generation management device 11 of the determination result that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and which has been received by the communication unit 101 may contain a communication error.

[0104] As a result, if the reason why the validity of the signature cannot be verified is a communication error, the key generation management device 11 can have a department of the service provider that manages the communication status of the vehicle 20 accurately and quickly deal with the abnormality where the validity of the signature cannot be verified. Thus, the key generation management device 11 can protect privacy while making it possible to identify the relevant signer when the validity of the digital signature cannot be verified, and can accurately and quickly deal with the abnormality where the validity cannot be verified.

[0105] Furthermore, the signature verification system 1 of this embodiment is a system including the above-described key generation management device 11 and a signature verification device 31 that is connected to the key generation management device 11 and the in-vehicle electronic device 21 via a network 40 and performs signature verification processing. The key generation management device 11 transmits each of a plurality of signature keys generated by the key generation unit 102 to the in-vehicle electronic device 21, and transmits the verification key generated by the key generation unit 102 to the signature verification device 31. The in-vehicle electronic device 21 generates a signature using the signature key transmitted from the key generation management device 11, adds it to vehicle data, and transmits the signature added to the vehicle data to the signature verification device 31. The signature verification device 31 performs signature verification processing on the signature transmitted from the in-vehicle electronic device 21 using the verification key transmitted from the key generation management device 11, determines whether or not signer verification processing is required, and transmits a signature determined to require signer verification processing to the key generation management device 11. The key generation management device 11 performs signer verification processing on the signature transmitted from the signature verification device 31 .

[0106] As a result, the signature verification system 1 can have the signature verification device 31 of the service provider that performs the signature verification verify the legitimacy of the signature generated by the on-board electronic device 21 without providing information that can identify the on-board electronic device 21 that is the signer. Therefore, the signature verification system 1 can confirm that the vehicle data is legitimate and has been transmitted from a legitimate vehicle 20 that can enjoy the service, while preventing the signature verification device 31 from identifying an individual linked to the source of the vehicle data. On the other hand, if the legitimacy of the signature cannot be verified in the signature verification, the signature verification system 1 can identify the on-board electronic device 21 that corresponds to the signer from the signature in the key generation management device 11. Therefore, the signature verification system 1 can protect privacy while making it possible to identify the on-board electronic device 21 that is the signer from the digital signature when the legitimacy of the digital signature cannot be verified.

[0107] In the signature verification system 1 of this embodiment, the key generation management device 11 may be configured by a plurality of computers connected via a network within the key generation management center 10. The signature verification device 31 may be configured by a plurality of computers connected via a network within the signature verification center 30. When a plurality of on-board electronic devices 21 have a hierarchical structure within the vehicle 20, the on-board electronic device 21 at the highest level may receive vehicle data and a signature key from an on-board electronic device 21 at a lower level, generate a signature, and transmit the signature to the signature verification device 31, or each on-board electronic device 21 may generate a signature, and the on-board electronic device 21 at the highest level may transmit the signature to the signature verification device 31.

[0108] Furthermore, the vehicle 20 and the signature verification device 31 may be connected via a wireless communication network or a wired communication network. When the signature verification device 31 and the key generation management device 11 receive multiple signatures, the signature verification device 31 and the key generation management device 11 may repeatedly perform multiple sets of the signature verification process (S504) and the signer verification process (S505). Alternatively, in this case, the signature verification device 31 and the key generation management device 11 may repeat each of steps S901 to S908 in the signature verification process (S504) and each of steps S1001 to S1012 in the signer verification process (S505) multiple times for each process. Alternatively, in this case, the signature verification device 31 and the key generation management device 11 may perform a combination of these processing methods.

[0109] The present invention is not limited to the above-described embodiments and includes various modifications. For example, the above-described embodiments have been described in detail to clearly explain the present invention, and the present invention is not necessarily limited to those including all of the described configurations. Furthermore, it is possible to replace part of the configuration of one embodiment with the configuration of another embodiment, and it is also possible to add the configuration of another embodiment to the configuration of one embodiment. Furthermore, it is possible to add, delete, or replace part of the configuration of each embodiment with other configurations.

[0110] Furthermore, the above-described configurations, functions, processing units, processing means, etc. may be partially or entirely realized by hardware, for example, by designing them as integrated circuits. Furthermore, the above-described configurations, functions, etc. may be realized by software, in which a processor interprets and executes a program that realizes each function. Information such as the program, table, and file that realizes each function can be stored in a memory, a recording device such as a hard disk or SSD (solid state drive), or a recording medium such as an IC card, SD card, or DVD.

[0111] In addition, the control lines and information lines shown are those that are considered necessary for the explanation, and do not necessarily show all the control lines and information lines in the product. In reality, it can be assumed that almost all components are interconnected.

[0112] 1... Signature verification system, 11... Key generation management device, 101... Communication unit, 102... Key generation unit, 103... Signer verification processing unit, 104... Notification unit, 20... Vehicle, 21... In-vehicle electronic device, 31... Signature verification device, 40... Network

Claims

1. A key generation management device that generates and manages signing keys used to generate signatures to be added to vehicle data transmitted from an on-board electronic device to an outside of the vehicle, comprising: a key generation unit that generates multiple signing keys having different values ​​and a verification key corresponding to the multiple signing keys using a group signature scheme; a communication unit that receives the signature generated by the on-board electronic device using the signing key, the signature having been subjected to a signature verification process that verifies the validity of the signature using the verification key; and a signer verification processing unit that performs a signer verification process on the signature received by the communication unit to identify the on-board electronic device that corresponds to the signer who generated the signature.

2. The key generation management device according to claim 1, characterized in that the key generation unit generates the multiple signature keys using multiple parameters that are different from each other, and the signer verification processing unit, in the signer verification process, identifies the in-vehicle electronic device corresponding to the signer by determining which of the multiple parameters was used to generate the signature key received by the communication unit.

3. The key generation management device of claim 2, characterized in that the communication unit receives the signature whose legitimacy cannot be verified by the signature verification process, and the signer verification processing unit determines that the vehicle data to which the signature received by the communication unit is attached may have been tampered with by a cyber attack if the signer verification process is unable to identify the in-vehicle electronic device corresponding to the signer.

4. The key generation management device as described in claim 3, further comprising a notification unit that notifies the result of the signer verification process, and the notification unit notifies an external device of the determination result that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and received by the communication unit may have been tampered with by a cyber attack.

5. The key generation management device of claim 2, characterized in that the communication unit receives a signature whose legitimacy cannot be verified by the signature verification process, and the signer verification processing unit determines that the vehicle data to which the signature received by the communication unit is attached may contain a communication error if the signer verification process can identify the in-vehicle electronic device corresponding to the signer.

6. The key generation management device according to claim 5, further comprising a notification unit that notifies the result of the signer verification process, and the notification unit notifies a determination result that the vehicle data to which the signature has been added and received by the communication unit may contain a communication error to a device outside the key generation management device.

7. A signature verification system comprising a key generation management device according to any one of claims 1 to 6, and a signature verification device connected to said key generation management device and said in-vehicle electronic device via a network and performing said signature verification processing, wherein said key generation management device transmits each of said multiple signature keys generated by said key generation unit to said in-vehicle electronic device, and transmits the verification key generated by said key generation unit to said signature verification device, said in-vehicle electronic device generates said signature using the signature key transmitted from said key generation management device and adds it to said vehicle data, and transmits said signature added to the vehicle data to said signature verification device, said signature verification device performs said signature verification processing on said signature transmitted from said in-vehicle electronic device using the verification key transmitted from said key generation management device, determines whether or not execution of said signer verification processing is necessary, and transmits to said key generation management device the signature for which it is determined that execution of said signer verification processing is necessary, and said key generation management device performs said signer verification processing on said signature transmitted from said signature verification device.

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