Method and system for detection of rogue NMEA device

The active and passive NMEA device detection system addresses the challenge of identifying rogue devices in ship networks by using a combination of packet transmission, alarm devices, and CBS inventory comparisons, effectively preventing cyber attacks and ensuring compliance with IACS cybersecurity standards.

WO2024248516A1PCT designated stage expired Publication Date: 2024-12-05HANWHA OCEAN CO LTD (KR) +1
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Patent Information

Application Number
PCT/KR2024/007428
Authority / Receiving Office
WO · WO
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2023-06-05
Filing Date
2024-05-31
Publication Date
2024-12-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing ship network systems using the NMEA 2000 protocol face challenges in identifying rogue NMEA devices, which can lead to cyber attacks, as they lack effective methods to differentiate between authorized and unauthorized devices, failing to meet cybersecurity requirements such as those set by the International Classification Society (IACS) UR E26.

Method used

An active and passive NMEA device detection system that utilizes a ship network detector to transmit packets, an alarm device to set alarms, and a manager server to compare packets, along with a message processing unit to extract and compare PGN values and source addresses with a CBS inventory, to identify and flag rogue NMEA devices, thereby preventing unauthorized access.

Benefits of technology

Effectively minimizes the cyber attack surface by accurately identifying normal and abnormal NMEA devices within a ship network, ensuring compliance with IACS UR E26 cybersecurity requirements and preventing unauthorized access.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The present invention relates to a method and a system for the active or passive detection of a rogue NMEA device, whereby a normal / abnormal NMEA device can be identified on a ship network on which an NMEA gateway is installed, and a cyber attack caused by an unauthorized NMEA device on a ship can be prevented.
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Description

Method and system for detecting log NMEA devices

[0001] The present invention relates to a method and system for detecting rogue NMEA devices in an active and passive manner, which can identify normal / abnormal NMEA devices in a ship network in which an NMEA gateway is installed and prevent cyber attacks caused by unauthorized NMEA devices on board a ship.

[0002] All sensor equipment used onboard ships today utilizes the NMEA 2000 communications protocol for integrated operation and automation. The CAN-based NMEA 2000 protocol was officially announced in October 2001 by the US-based National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) and was recently adopted as the sensor network standard for e-Navigation, an integrated vessel monitoring solution.

[0003] As the demand for Ethernet, USB, Serial communication and wireless communication (Wifi, Bluetooth, etc.) increases on ship networks, NMEA gateways are being installed to enable intercommunication with NMEA 2000-based navigation and communication equipment.

[0004] The NMEA gateway has an interface that converts messages between the NMEA protocol and Ethernet, USB, and Wifi protocols in both directions.

[0005] The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) UR E26 Identify Cybersecurity Requirements requires the identification of an inventory list of computer-based systems (CBS) on board ships.

[0006] However, since the NMEA gateway is connected to n NMEA-based navigation and communication devices and converts CAN-based NMEA messages into a protocol and transmits and receives them through an interface such as Ethernet, there was a problem in that it was impossible to check whether it was included in the CBS inventory list according to the cybersecurity requirements of the International Classification Society and whether it was a rogue NMEA device installed by an unauthorized person.

[0007] Related prior literature includes Patent Document 1, Republic of Korea Patent No. 10-1321081 (October 23, 2013), Patent Document 2, Republic of Korea Patent No. 10-1528547 (June 12, 2015), and Patent Document 3, Republic of Korea Publication No. 10-2006-0057756 (May 29, 2006).

[0008] The purpose of the present invention is to identify normal / abnormal NMEA devices in a ship network where an NMEA gateway is installed, thereby minimizing the cyber attack surface caused by unidentified NMEA devices, preventing cyber attacks caused by unauthorized NMEA devices on board a ship, and ultimately providing a method and system for detecting rogue NMEA devices in an active and passive manner, which can implement the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) UR E26 Cybersecurity Requirements Identify.

[0009] According to one aspect of the present invention for achieving the above technical task, an active-mode rogue NMEA device detection system comprises: a ship network detector that transmits a packet to an NMEA network to detect an NMEA device in an internal Ethernet network of a ship; an alarm device that sets an alarm for the received NMEA device when any one of a plurality of NMEA devices receives the packet transmitted from the ship network detector; and a manager server that compares the packet received from the alarm device with the packet transmitted from the ship network detector; and if the packet matches the packet transmitted from the ship network detector, the manager server can determine that the ship Ethernet network is connected to the NMEA of the ship OT (Operational Technology) network, and if the packet does not match the packet transmitted from the ship network detector, the manager server can determine that the ship Ethernet network is connected to the NMEA of the ship OT (Operational Technology) network.

[0010] In addition, in an active mode log NMEA device detection system according to one aspect of the present invention, a data frame of an Ethernet packet received from the ship network detector includes a CAN packet, and a source address of the CAN packet can be set to an alarm device.

[0011] In addition, an active mode rogue NMEA device detection method according to another aspect of the present invention may include a packet transmission step of transmitting a packet from a ship network detector to an NMEA network to detect an NMEA device in an internal Ethernet network of a ship; an alarm device setting step of setting a packet received through the packet transmission step as an alarm device; a comparison step of comparing the packet received in the alarm device setting step with a packet sent from the ship network detector by an administrator server; and a determination step of determining that the ship Ethernet network is connected to the NMEA of a ship OT (Operational Technology) network if the packet matches the packet sent from the ship network detector through the comparison step, and determining that the packet is rogue NMEA if the packet does not match the packet sent from the ship network detector.

[0012] In addition, in an active mode log NMEA device detection method according to another aspect of the present invention, in the alarm device setting step, a data frame of an Ethernet packet received from the ship network detector includes a CAN packet, and the source address of the CAN packet can be set to an alarm device.

[0013] In addition, a passive rogue NMEA device detection method according to another aspect of the present invention may include an input step in which a signal of a protocol transmitted through an NMEA gateway to an Ethernet interface is input to a message processing unit; a data frame extraction step in which the message processing unit checks whether the signal input through the input step is in NMEA format, and if it is in NMEA format, extracts a data frame stored in a payload area of ​​the protocol; a PGN processing step in which a PGN processing unit extracts an NMEA-ID from the data frame extracted through the data frame extraction step, and extracts a PGN value and a source address from the extracted NMEA-ID; a judgment step in which a PGN identification unit compares the PGN value and source address extracted through the PGN processing step with a CBS inventory, and if the PGN judgment unit does not find the PGN value and source address in the CBS inventory, determines that the device is a rogue NMEA device; and an abnormality signal output step in which an abnormality signal output unit outputs an abnormality signal to notify the user when the device is determined to be a rogue NMEA device through the judgment step.

[0014] In addition, in a passive method for detecting a rogue NMEA device according to another aspect of the present invention, the abnormal signal output step can recognize and output a PGN value and source address identified in the source address and PGN identification section of the header of the payload as a rogue NMEA device.

[0015] In addition, a passive rogue NMEA device detection method according to another aspect of the present invention may further include an NMEA path tracking step, prior to the abnormal signal output step, of tracking an NMEA path and identifying an unconfirmed NMEA device as an abnormal NMEA device if the device is determined to be a rogue NMEA device.

[0016] In addition, a passive rogue NMEA device detection system according to another aspect of the present invention may include a message processing unit that inputs a signal of a protocol transmitted through an NMEA gateway to an Ethernet interface, checks whether the input signal is in NMEA format, and extracts a data frame stored in a payload area of ​​the protocol if the signal is in NMEA format; a PGN processing unit that extracts an NMEA-ID from the data frame extracted by the message processing unit, and extracts a PGN value and a source address from the extracted NMEA-ID; a PGN identification unit that compares the PGN value and the source address extracted by the PGN processing unit with a CBS inventory; a PGN determination unit that determines a rogue NMEA device if the device is not in the CBS inventory when compared by the PGN identification unit; and an abnormality signal output unit that outputs an abnormality signal to notify the user if the device is determined to be a rogue NMEA device through the PGN determination unit.

[0017] In addition, in a passive rogue NMEA device detection system according to another aspect of the present invention, the abnormal signal output unit can recognize and output a PGN value and source address identified in the source address and PGN identification unit of the header of the payload as a rogue NMEA device.

[0018] In addition, a passive rogue NMEA device detection system according to another aspect of the present invention may further include an NMEA path tracking unit that tracks an NMEA path and identifies an unconfirmed NMEA device as an abnormal NMEA device when the PGN determination unit determines that the device is a rogue NMEA device.

[0019] According to the present invention, it has the effect of identifying normal / abnormal NMEA devices in a ship network where an NMEA gateway is installed, thereby minimizing the cyber attack surface caused by unidentified NMEA devices, preventing cyber attacks caused by unauthorized NMEA devices on board a ship, and ultimately implementing the International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) UR E26 Cybersecurity Requirements Identification.

[0020] FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing the configuration of an active mode log NMEA device detection system in a log NMEA device detection system according to the present invention.

[0021] FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an active mode log NMEA device detection method in a log NMEA device detection method according to the present invention.

[0022] FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing the configuration of a passive log NMEA device detection system in a log NMEA device detection system according to the present invention.

[0023] FIG. 4 is a diagram showing a process of extracting a PGN and a source address of a passive log NMEA device detection system in a log NMEA device detection system according to the present invention.

[0024] FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing a passive log NMEA device detection method in a log NMEA device detection system according to the present invention.

[0025] The purpose and technical configuration of the present invention and the resulting operation and effects will be more clearly understood through a detailed description based on the drawings attached to the specification of the present invention.

[0026] The terminology used herein is merely used to describe specific embodiments and is not intended to limit the present invention. For example, terms such as "consist of" or "include" used herein should not necessarily be construed to include all of the various components or various steps described in the invention, but should be construed to mean that some of the components or some steps may not be included, or that additional components or steps may be included. Furthermore, the singular expression "a" or "an" as used herein includes the plural expression unless the context clearly dictates otherwise.

[0027] Hereinafter, the present invention will be described in detail by describing preferred embodiments thereof with reference to the attached drawings. The embodiments described below are provided to facilitate the technical concept of the present invention for those skilled in the art to understand, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention. It should be understood that the embodiments of the present invention will have various applications to those skilled in the art.

[0028] Referring to FIGS. 1 and 2, an active mode log NMEA device detection method and system according to the present invention will be examined.

[0029] FIG. 1 illustrates an active mode log NMEA device detection system according to the present invention, and may include a ship network detector (11) that transmits a packet to an NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) network (20) to detect an NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association) device (200) in an internal Ethernet network (10) of a ship, and an administrator server (300) that sets the received NMEA device as an alarm device (290) when any one of a plurality of NMEA devices (200) receives a packet transmitted from the ship network detector (11), and compares the packet received from the alarm device (290) with the packet transmitted from the ship network detector (11).

[0030] At this time, the active method means a method of detecting a log NMEA device by only transmitting packets from the ship's internal Ethernet network (10) to the NMEA network (20).

[0031] In addition, the management server (300) can determine that the ship Ethernet network (10) is connected to the NMEA of the ship OT (Operational Technology) network if it matches the packet sent from the ship network detector (11), and can determine that it is a rogue NMEA if it does not match the packet sent from the ship network detector (11).

[0032] Additionally, a data frame of an Ethernet packet received from a ship network detector (11) includes a CAN packet, and the source address of the CAN packet can be set to an alarm device (290).

[0033] In addition, the active mode rogue NMEA device detection method according to another aspect of the present invention, referring to FIG. 2, includes a packet transmission step (S10) of transmitting a packet from a ship network detector (11) to an NMEA network (20) to detect an NMEA device in a ship's internal Ethernet network (10), an alarm device setting step (S11) of setting a packet received through the packet transmission step (S10) as an alarm device (29), a comparison step (S12) of comparing the packet received through the alarm device setting step (S11) with a packet sent from the ship network detector, and a determination step (S13) of determining that the ship Ethernet network (10) is connected to the NMEA of the ship OT (Operational Technology) network if it matches the packet sent from the ship network detector (11) through the comparison step (S12), and determining that it is a rogue NMEA if it does not match the packet sent from the ship network detector (11). May include.

[0034] In addition, in the alarm device setting step (S11), the data frame of the Ethernet packet received from the ship network detector (11) includes a CAN packet, and the source address of the CAN packet can be set to the alarm device (29).

[0035] Therefore, according to the present invention, it is possible to detect unauthorized Ethernet and NMEA connections in a complex and large ship IT / OT network.

[0036] Also, referring to FIGS. 3 to 5, a passive log NMEA device detection method and system according to another aspect of the present invention will be examined.

[0037] FIG. 3 and FIG. 4 illustrate a passive log NMEA device detection system according to the present invention and a process for extracting a PGN and a source address. As illustrated in FIG. 3, the passive log NMEA device detection system includes a message processing unit (100), a PGN processing unit (110), a PGN identification unit (120), a PGN determination unit (130), an NMEA path tracking unit (140), and an abnormal signal output unit (150).

[0038] In the passive log NMEA device detection system of the present invention, the message processing unit (100) inputs a signal of a protocol transmitted to an Ethernet interface through an NMEA gateway, checks whether the input signal is in NMEA format, and if it is in NMEA format, extracts a data frame stored in the payload area of ​​the protocol.

[0039] Here, NMEA is defined by the National Marine Electronics Association (NMEA) of the United States, and is a standard for transmitting information such as time, location, and direction.

[0040] Additionally, the PGN processing unit (110) can extract NMEA-ID from the data frame extracted from the message processing unit (100) and extract PGN values ​​and source addresses from the extracted NMEA-ID.

[0041] Here, PGN (Parameter Group Number) is used to distinguish what data is contained in the data field of a CAN message and serves as a message ID for CAN communication.

[0042] In addition, the PGN identification unit (120) compares the PGN value and source address extracted from the PGN processing unit (110) with the CBS (Computer Based System) inventory, and the PGN determination unit (130) can determine that the device is a rogue NMEA device if it is not found in the CBS inventory when compared by the PGN identification unit (120).

[0043] In addition, the NMEA path tracking unit (140) can track the NMEA path and identify an unconfirmed NMEA device as an abnormal NMEA device when the PGN determination unit (130) determines that the device is a rogue NMEA device, and can identify a confirmed NMEA device as a normal device.

[0044] In addition, the abnormal signal output unit (150) can output an abnormal signal to notify when the PGN judgment unit determines that the device is a rogue NMEA device.

[0045] In addition, the abnormal signal output unit (150) can recognize and output the source address of the header of the payload and the PGN value and source address identified in the PGN identification unit as a rogue NMEA device, as shown in FIG. 4.

[0046] That is, when a signal is input to the message processing unit (100) through a protocol transmitted to an Ethernet interface via an NMEA gateway, the data frame stored in the payload area of ​​the protocol is extracted.

[0047] Next, NMEA-ID is extracted from the data frame extracted from the PGN processing unit (110), and PGN and source address are extracted from the extracted NMEA-ID.

[0048] Additionally, the PGN identification unit (120) compares the PGN value and source address with the CBS inventory, and if the PGN determination unit (130) does not find the device in the CBS inventory, it determines that the device is a rogue NMEA device.

[0049] Additionally, the source address of the header of the payload and the PGN value and source address identified in the PGN identification section are recognized as a rogue NMEA device and output in the abnormal signal output section (150).

[0050] FIG. 5 is a flow chart showing a passive log NMEA device detection method according to the present invention. As shown in FIG. 5, the flow chart includes an input step (S100) in which a signal is input to a message processing unit through a protocol transmitted to an Ethernet interface via an NMEA gateway, a message processing unit (100) confirms whether the signal input through the input step is in NMEA format (S110), and if it is in NMEA format, a data frame extraction step (S120) in which a data frame stored in a payload area in the protocol is extracted, a PGN processing step (S140) in which an NMEA-ID is extracted from the data frame extracted in the data frame extraction step in a PGN processing unit (120) (S130), and a PGN value and a source address are extracted from the extracted NMEA-ID, and the PGN value and source address extracted in the PGN processing step (S140) are compared with the CBS inventory in the PGN identification unit (S150). The method may include a step (S160) of determining a rogue NMEA device if it is not in the CBS inventory in the PGN determination unit; and a step (S180) of outputting an abnormal signal from the abnormal signal output unit (150) to notify the user if it is determined to be a rogue NMEA device through the determination step (S160).

[0051] In addition, in the passive method for detecting a rogue NMEA device according to one aspect of the present invention, the abnormal signal output step (S180) can recognize and output the PGN value and source address identified in the PGN identification section and the source address of the header of the payload as a rogue NMEA device.

[0052] In addition, a passive rogue NMEA device detection method according to one aspect of the present invention may include an NMEA path tracking step (S170) of tracking an NMEA path and identifying an unconfirmed NMEA device as an abnormal NMEA device if the device is determined to be a rogue NMEA device before the abnormal signal output step.

[0053] 10: Ethernet network

[0054] 11: Ship Network Detector

[0055] 20: NMEA network

[0056] 21, 22, 23, 24: NMEA devices

[0057] 29: Alarm device

[0058] 30: Admin Server

[0059] 100: Message Processing Unit

[0060] 110: PGN Processing Unit

[0061] 120: PGN identification section

[0062] 130: PGN Judgment Department

[0063] 140: NMEA path tracking unit

[0064] 150: Abnormal signal output section

Claims

1. A ship network detector that transmits packets to the NMEA network to detect NMEA devices on the ship's internal Ethernet network; An alarm device that sets an alarm on a received NMEA device when any one of a plurality of NMEA devices receives a packet transmitted from the ship network detector; and Includes an administrator server that compares packets received from the alarm device with packets sent from the ship network detector; The above management server is a rogue NMEA device detection system that determines that the ship Ethernet network is connected to the NMEA of the ship OT (Operational Technology) network if it matches the packet sent from the ship network detector, and determines that it is rogue NMEA if it does not match the packet sent from the ship network detector.

2. In claim 1, The data frame of the Ethernet packet received from the above ship network detector includes a CAN packet; A log NMEA device detection system in which the source address of the above CAN packet is set to an alarm device.

3. Packet transmission step of transmitting packets from the ship network detector to the NMEA network to detect NMEA devices on the ship's internal Ethernet network; An alarm device setting step in which a packet received through the above packet transmission step is set as an alarm device; The administrator server compares the packets received in the alarm device setting step with the packets sent from the ship network detector; and A method for detecting a rogue NMEA device, comprising a determination step of determining that the ship Ethernet network is connected to the NMEA of the ship OT (Operational Technology) network if the packet matches the packet sent from the ship network detector through the above comparison step, and determining that the packet is rogue NMEA if the packet does not match the packet sent from the ship network detector.

4. In claim 3, In the alarm device setup step, A method for detecting a log NMEA device, wherein a data frame of an Ethernet packet received from the above ship network detector includes a CAN packet, and the source address of the CAN packet is set to an alarm device.

5. Input stage where the signal of the protocol transmitted to the Ethernet interface through the NMEA gateway is input to the message processing unit; A data frame extraction step in which the message processing unit checks whether the signal input through the above input step is in NMEA format, and if it is in NMEA format, extracts the data frame stored in the payload area of ​​the protocol; A PGN processing step of extracting NMEA-ID from the data frame extracted in the above data frame extraction step in a PGN processing unit and extracting a PGN value and source address from the extracted NMEA-ID; A judgment step of comparing the PGN value and source address extracted in the above PGN processing step with the CBS inventory in the PGN identification unit, and judging it as a rogue NMEA device if it is not in the CBS inventory in the PGN judgment unit; and A method for detecting a rogue NMEA device, comprising an abnormal signal output step for outputting an abnormal signal from an abnormal signal output unit when the device is determined to be a rogue NMEA device through the above judgment step.

6. In claim 5, The above abnormal signal output step is: A method for detecting a rogue NMEA device, which recognizes the PGN value and source address identified in the source address and PGN identification section of the header of the above payload as a rogue NMEA device and outputs them.

7. In claim 5, Before the above abnormal signal output step, A method for detecting a rogue NMEA device, further comprising an NMEA path tracing step of tracing an NMEA path to identify an unconfirmed NMEA device as an abnormal NMEA device when the device is determined to be a rogue NMEA device.

8. A message processing unit that inputs a signal of a protocol transmitted to the Ethernet interface through the NMEA gateway, checks whether the input signal is in NMEA format, and if it is in NMEA format, extracts the data frame stored in the payload area of ​​the protocol; A PGN processing unit that extracts NMEA-ID from the data frame extracted from the above message processing unit and extracts PGN value and source address from the extracted NMEA-ID; A PGN identification unit that compares the PGN value and source address extracted from the above PGN processing unit with the CBS inventory; A PGN determination unit that determines a rogue NMEA device if it is not in the CBS inventory when compared to the above PGN identification unit; and A rogue NMEA device detection system, including an abnormal signal output unit that outputs an abnormal signal when the device is determined to be a rogue NMEA device through the above PGN judgment unit.

9. In claim 8, The above abnormal signal output unit is, A rogue NMEA device detection system that recognizes and outputs the PGN value and source address identified in the source address and PGN identification section of the header of the above payload as a rogue NMEA device.

10. In claim 8, A rogue NMEA device detection system further comprising an NMEA path tracking unit that tracks the NMEA path and identifies an unconfirmed NMEA device as an abnormal NMEA device when the PGN determination unit determines the device to be a rogue NMEA device.

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