Anti-disassembly circuit, control method, and interphone

Abstract

Disclosed in the present application are an anti-disassembly circuit, a control method, and an interphone. The anti-disassembly circuit comprises a volatile storage component, a path switch and a power source component, wherein the volatile storage component is electrically connected to the path switch; the path switch is electrically connected to the power source component; the power source component comprises a host battery and a standby battery, and when the host battery is taken out of an electronic device, the standby battery supplies power to the volatile storage component; the volatile storage component is used for storing a sensitive factor, which is used for performing security verification on the electronic device, to which the anti-disassembly circuit is applied; and when a housing of the electronic device, to which the anti-disassembly circuit is applied, is disassembled, the path switch is disconnected, so as to disconnect the power supply to the volatile storage component. In the embodiments of the present application, after an electronic device is disassembled, the power used by a volatile memory that stores a sensitive factor is disconnected, such that the sensitive factor is immediately lost, and thus anti-disassembly protection is performed on the electronic device, thereby improving the security of the electronic device.

Description

Anti-tampering circuit, control method and intercom

[0001] This application claims priority to Chinese patent application No. 202311417954.8 filed on October 26, 2023, entitled “Anti-dismantling circuit, control method and intercom”, the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference into this application. Technical Field

[0002] The present application relates to the field of electronic security technology, and in particular to an anti-tampering circuit, a control method, and an intercom. Background Art

[0003] At present, for application fields with high safety requirements for electronic equipment, electronic equipment is generally required to be equipped with an anti-tampering device (abbreviated as anti-tampering), that is, a self-destruct function when the cover is removed, to protect the internal information security of the electronic equipment.

[0004] Generally, the anti-tampering protection of electronic devices includes protection when the electronic device is turned on and protection when the electronic device is turned off. However, both protection modes require the electronic device to be in a powered-on state so that the electronic device can perform the disassembly self-destruction operation. If the electronic device is in an unpowered state, the self-destruction operation cannot be performed. That is, sensitive information will not be deleted until the electronic device is powered on again. This information is easy to be stolen, which reduces security. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In response to the above problems, the present application provides an anti-dismantling circuit, an intercom and a control method, which achieve the immediate loss of sensitive information after the electronic device is disassembled, thereby improving the security of the information.

[0006] In order to achieve the above objectives, this application provides the following technical solutions:

[0007] An anti-tamper circuit, comprising:

[0008] A volatile storage component, a path switch, and a power supply component, wherein the volatile storage component is electrically connected to the path switch, and the path switch is electrically connected to the power supply component. The power supply component includes a host battery and a backup battery. When the host battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component. The volatile storage component is used to store a sensitive factor, and the sensitive factor is used to perform security verification on the electronic device using the anti-tamper circuit.

[0009] When the housing of the electronic device to which the anti-tampering circuit is applied is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected to cut off the power supply to the volatile storage component.

[0010] Optionally, one end of the path switch is electrically connected to the volatile storage component, and the other end is electrically connected to the power supply component. The path switch is in a closed state when the shell of the electronic device where the anti-disassembly circuit is located is in an installed state; when the shell of the electronic device is disassembled, the path switch is in an open state.

[0011] Optionally, the housing of the electronic device is in contact connection with the access switch.

[0012] Optionally, the volatile storage component is a volatile storage module in a microprocessor.

[0013] A control method is applied to an electronic device having an anti-tamper circuit, the anti-tamper circuit comprising: a volatile storage component, an access switch, and a power supply component; wherein the volatile storage component is electrically connected to the access switch, which is electrically connected to the power supply component, the power supply component comprising a main battery and a backup battery; when the main battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component; when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is opened to disconnect the power supply to the volatile storage component; the control method comprises:

[0014] In response to an instruction to start the anti-tampering function, obtaining a sensitive factor and storing it in the volatile storage component;

[0015] When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device is attacked.

[0016] Optionally, when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost, and when security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device has been attacked, including:

[0017] Sensitive information of the electronic device is encrypted based on the sensitive factor to obtain encrypted information. When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost, so that when the encrypted information needs to be decrypted based on the sensitive factor, it cannot be correctly decrypted.

[0018] Optionally, when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost, and when security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device has been attacked, including:

[0019] Based on the sensitive factor, generating and storing a target confirmation code;

[0020] When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitivity factor is lost;

[0021] In response to the electronic device being powered on, a current confirmation code is obtained based on the current sensitivity factor in the volatile storage component. If the current confirmation code is inconsistent with the stored target confirmation code, it is confirmed that the electronic device is under attack.

[0022] Optionally, the control method further includes:

[0023] If the electronic device is attacked, a target control instruction is generated, wherein the target control instruction is used to control the generation of prompt information that the electronic device is attacked, and / or to control the deletion of sensitive information in the electronic device.

[0024] Optionally, in response to enabling the anti-tampering function, obtaining the sensitive factor and storing it in the volatile storage component includes:

[0025] In response to the anti-tampering function being enabled, generating a sensitivity factor and storing the sensitivity factor in the volatile storage component;

[0026] The sensitive factor is a random sequence generated by a main processor of the electronic device, or a random sequence generated by a microprocessor where the volatile storage component is located.

[0027] Optionally, the control method further includes:

[0028] In response to turning off the anti-tamper function, the electronic device stops performing security verification based on the sensitive factor.

[0029] Optionally, the electronic device stopping security verification based on the sensitive factor includes:

[0030] The encrypted sensitive information in the electronic device is decrypted based on the sensitive factor.

[0031] A walkie-talkie, comprising: the anti-tamper circuit, main processor and memory as described in any one of the above;

[0032] The intercom executes any one of the control methods described above.

[0033] Compared to the prior art, the embodiments of the present application provide an anti-tampering circuit, a control method, and an intercom. The anti-tampering circuit includes a volatile storage component, a path switch, and a power supply component. The volatile storage component is electrically connected to the path switch, which is electrically connected to the power supply component. The power supply component includes a host battery and a backup battery. When the host battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery powers the volatile storage component. The volatile storage component is used to store sensitive factors, which are used to verify the security of the electronic device using the anti-tampering circuit. When the housing of the electronic device using the anti-tampering circuit is disassembled, the path switch is disconnected to disconnect the power supply to the volatile storage component. In the embodiments of the present application, when the electronic device is disassembled, the sensitive factors are immediately lost by disconnecting the power supply to the volatile memory storing the sensitive factors, thereby providing anti-tampering protection for the electronic device and improving the safety of the electronic device. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0034] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are merely embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on the provided drawings without any creative work.

[0035] FIG1 is a schematic structural diagram of a general electronic equipment anti-tampering system;

[0036] FIG2 is a schematic diagram of another general electronic equipment anti-tampering system;

[0037] FIG3 is a schematic structural diagram of an anti-tampering circuit provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0038] FIG4 is a flow chart of a control method provided in an embodiment of the present application;

[0039] FIG5 is a schematic structural diagram of a walkie-talkie provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0040] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of this application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of this application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0041] The terms "first," "second," and so on in the specification, claims, and drawings of this application are used to distinguish between different items, not to describe a specific order. Furthermore, the terms "including," "having," and any variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusions. For example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus comprising a series of steps or elements is not limited to the listed steps or elements and may include steps or elements that are not listed.

[0042] In an embodiment of the present application, an anti-dismantling circuit is provided, which is improved on the basis of the general components and circuits of existing private network communication electronic equipment. It does not require the addition of a dedicated encryption chip, has low cost, and realizes the disassembly and self-destruction function of the electronic equipment through a corresponding control method. The corresponding anti-dismantling circuit can be used in a variety of electronic equipment that needs to protect sensitive information, such as walkie-talkie equipment.

[0043] Figures 1 and 2 illustrate a commonly used terminal anti-tamper circuit. As shown in Figure 1, the terminal host detects whether it has been tampered by detecting the voltage on the ADC (analog-to-digital converter) interface or GPIO (general-purpose input / output) port. Tampering can cause R1 (made of a flexible printed circuit board (FPC) or printed circuit board (PCB)) to tear and break. After the host is powered on, it detects a change in the ADC or GPIO port voltage, declaring unauthorized tampering and deleting sensitive information from the host's memory. With this current approach, sensitive information is not immediately self-destructed when the electronic device is disassembled. It requires a power cycle to delete the sensitive information. Before this happens, the sensitive information is vulnerable to theft (for example, by soldering the memory and reading it with specialized read / write equipment). Furthermore, after repairing the device, the FPC must be replaced, which is cumbersome and increases costs.

[0044] The anti-dismantling circuit of the electronic device provided in the embodiment of the present application adopts existing common equipment on electronic devices, which is low in cost and occupies little space. For example, the anti-dismantling circuit is laid out on the mainboard PCB, which is easily compatible with encrypted models and non-encrypted models.

[0045] Specifically, referring to FIG3 , which is a schematic diagram of an anti-tampering circuit provided in an embodiment of the present application, the anti-tampering circuit includes a volatile storage component 101, a path switch 102, and a power supply component 103. The volatile storage component 101 is electrically connected to the path switch 102, which is electrically connected to the power supply component 103. The power supply component 103 includes a host battery and a backup battery. When the host battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component. The volatile storage component 101 is used to store a sensitive factor, which is used to perform security verification on the electronic device to which the anti-tampering circuit is applied. When the housing of the electronic device to which the anti-tampering circuit is applied is disassembled, the path switch 102 is disconnected to disconnect the power supply to the volatile storage component 101.

[0046] In one embodiment of the present application, one end of the access switch is electrically connected to the volatile storage component, and the other end is electrically connected to the power supply component. The access switch is in a closed state when the housing of the electronic device containing the anti-tamper circuit is installed; when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is in an open state. When the housing of the electronic device is in a normal installation state, the access switch and the volatile storage component are connected; when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch and the volatile storage component are disconnected.

[0047] Specifically, one end of the access switch is electrically connected to the volatile storage component, and the other end is electrically connected to the power supply component. The access switch is in a closed state when the housing of the electronic device containing the anti-tamper circuit is installed; when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is in an open state. Furthermore, the housing of the electronic device and the access switch are in contact connection.

[0048] Specifically, in the embodiment of the present application, the access switch can be a press-fit switch or a contact switch. Taking the access switch as a press-fit switch as an example, one end of the press-fit switch is connected to the volatile storage component, and the other end is connected to the power supply component. The elastic component of the press-fit switch is pressed by the housing of the device where the anti-disassembly circuit is located and is in a closed state; when the housing of the device is disassembled, the elastic component of the press-fit switch pops up and is in an open state. Specifically, the access switch in the anti-disassembly circuit is an anti-disassembly switch, which can be a press-fit anti-disassembly switch (also called a press-fit switch). When the device is normal, the switch is pressed by the housing of the device and is in a closed state. Disassembly causes the switch to pop up and be in an open state. However, the switch will not be destroyed when the device is disassembled, but will only be disconnected. The elastic component of the press-fit switch can be a spring, a shrapnel or other elastic material.

[0049] To reduce the power consumption of electronic devices, the power consumption of the volatile storage component in the embodiments of the present application can be less than a first power consumption threshold. The first power consumption threshold is a relatively low power consumption threshold, i.e., the volatile storage component is a low-power device. This can reduce the power consumption of the storage component and save power in the electronic device. The host battery in the power supply component can be a power module capable of charging and discharging power, such as a general-purpose lithium-ion battery. The backup battery can be a small battery suitable for electronic devices, such as a button cell battery or a rechargeable integrated battery.

[0050] In one embodiment of the present application, the volatile storage component in the anti-tamper circuit may be a volatile storage module in a microprocessor. For example, the volatile storage module may be a register or random access memory (RAM) in a controller. This type of volatile storage component requires power, and the stored content is lost when the power is disconnected. In this embodiment, the host battery generally powers the volatile storage component, and a backup battery powers the volatile storage component when the host battery is removed.

[0051] An embodiment of the present application provides an anti-tampering circuit, comprising a volatile storage component, a path switch, and a power supply component. The volatile storage component is electrically connected to the path switch, which is electrically connected to the power supply component. The power supply component includes a host battery and a backup battery. When the host battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component. The volatile storage component is used to store sensitive factors, which are used to verify the security of the electronic device to which the anti-tampering circuit is applied. When the housing of the electronic device to which the anti-tampering circuit is applied is disassembled, the path switch is disconnected to disconnect power to the volatile storage component. In this embodiment of the present application, when the electronic device is disassembled, the sensitive factors are immediately lost by disconnecting power to the volatile memory storing the sensitive factors, thereby providing anti-tampering protection for the electronic device and improving its security.

[0052] An embodiment of the present application also provides a control method for an electronic device having an anti-tamper circuit. The anti-tamper circuit includes: a volatile storage component, an access switch, and a power supply component. The volatile storage component is electrically connected to the access switch, which is electrically connected to the power supply component. The power supply component includes a main battery and a backup battery. When the main battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component. When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is opened to disconnect the power supply to the volatile storage component. Referring to Figure 4, the control method may include the following steps:

[0053] S101 : In response to the anti-tampering function being enabled, a sensitive factor is obtained and stored in a volatile storage component.

[0054] S102. When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device is under attack.

[0055] When the electronic device is in a normal state and the anti-tamper feature is enabled, the acquired sensitive factors can be stored in a volatile storage component. These sensitive factors are used for security verification of the electronic device. The volatile storage component is constantly powered by the power supply component. Specifically, the power pins of the volatile storage component can be powered by both the main battery of the power supply component and the backup battery. Furthermore, when the main battery is removed, power is supplied by the backup battery. When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch (also known as the anti-tamper switch) is disconnected, disconnecting power to the volatile storage component. Specifically, the backup battery can be a rechargeable battery. When the main battery is installed and has sufficient charge, the main battery charges the backup battery. Furthermore, as long as the main battery is in normal use, power is consumed by the main battery, not the backup battery. Power is supplied by the backup battery only when the main battery is removed, fails, or is low. If the access switch is disconnected, or both the main battery and the backup battery fail, power to the volatile storage component is lost, and the sensitive factors stored in the volatile storage component are lost.

[0056] In one implementation of the embodiment of the present application, when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When performing security verification based on the sensitive factor, confirming that the electronic device has been attacked includes:

[0057] Sensitive information of an electronic device is encrypted based on a sensitive factor to obtain encrypted information. When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is disconnected from power supply, and the sensitive factor is lost, so that when the encrypted information needs to be decrypted based on the sensitive factor, it cannot be correctly decrypted.

[0058] In an embodiment of the present application, sensitive information can be encrypted based on the sensitive factors stored in the volatile storage component to achieve data protection of sensitive information. Sensitive information can be information that the electronic device needs to protect. If the information is leaked, the sensitive information will affect the security of the electronic device or expose personal information of the user of the electronic device. Specifically, sensitive information can be some attribute information of the electronic device itself, or it can be information that the user of the electronic device selects to be protected. Sensitive information can be encrypted using the sensitive factors to obtain encrypted information. Furthermore, the encrypted information can also be decrypted using the decryption method corresponding to the sensitive factors. Specifically, when decrypting the encrypted information, it is also necessary to obtain the sensitive factors through the volatile storage component and then perform decryption based on the sensitive factors. However, when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the volatile storage component is disconnected from power supply due to the disconnection of the access switch, and the sensitive factors are lost. The corresponding sensitive factors cannot be obtained for decryption, thereby protecting the encrypted information from being decrypted after the electronic device is disassembled, thereby improving the security of the data.

[0059] Correspondingly, in one implementation of the embodiment of the present application, when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When performing security verification based on the sensitive factor, confirming that the electronic device has been attacked includes:

[0060] Based on the sensitive factors, generate and store the target confirmation code;

[0061] When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is disconnected from power supply, and the sensitive factor is lost;

[0062] In response to the electronic device being powered on, a current confirmation code is obtained based on the current sensitivity factor in the volatile storage component. If the current confirmation code is inconsistent with the stored target confirmation code, it is confirmed that the electronic device has been attacked.

[0063] In the embodiment of the present application, the sensitive factors stored in the volatile storage component can be used to encrypt or decrypt relevant information, or to generate a corresponding confirmation code. These two functions can be used separately or together. Among them, the confirmation code is a summary calculated based on the sensitive factor. After the confirmation code is generated based on the sensitive factor, the confirmation code can be stored in the memory of the electronic device. The function of the confirmation code can be to verify whether the electronic device is in a state of being powered on again after being disassembled. Verifying whether an electronic device has been attacked by using a confirmation code is mainly used in scenarios where electronic devices are prevented from being disassembled. For example, it can solve the security risks that exist when the electronic device has been disassembled without the user's knowledge. In this embodiment, the target confirmation code is a confirmation code generated based on the sensitive factor before the electronic device is disassembled. The current confirmation code is a confirmation code generated based on the sensitive factor in the current volatile storage component.

[0064] After the electronic device is disassembled, the volatile storage component loses power, and the original sensitive factors stored before the electronic device was disassembled are lost. When the electronic device is reassembled and turned on, the newly generated sensitive factors will be inconsistent with the original sensitive factors. Therefore, the confirmation code generated based on the new sensitive factors will also be inconsistent with the confirmation code originally stored before the electronic device was disassembled. This is because after the volatile storage component loses power, its stored content will be lost. After power is restored, the storage area where the sensitive factors were originally stored becomes invalid data, and the main processor will obtain invalid data. Even if the sensitive factors are regenerated, they will be different from the original sensitive factors. Therefore, when the processor of the electronic device tries to obtain the sensitive factors again, it will also obtain invalid data or sensitive factors that are different from the original ones. Therefore, it is possible to determine whether the electronic device has been attacked by using the confirmation code generated based on the sensitive factors, thereby ensuring the security of the electronic device.

[0065] Each time an electronic device is powered on, it can use a confirmation code to determine whether it has been attacked by disassembly or software data tampering. Of course, the confirmation code can also be triggered to verify during the operation of the electronic device. If the confirmation code in the memory is inconsistent with the confirmation code generated based on the sensitive factors in the volatile storage component, it can also be confirmed that the electronic device has been attacked.

[0066] Use sensitive factors to encrypt sensitive data. As long as the machine is disassembled, the sensitive information cannot be decrypted, and it does not matter whether the sensitive information has been erased. Specifically, when the sensitive factor is used to generate a confirmation code, if the electronic device has been tampered with, then when the electronic device is powered on again, it can detect that the confirmation code is incorrect, which can trigger various operations, such as erasing some sensitive information. Correspondingly, use the sensitive factor as a key, or use the sensitive factor to generate an encryption key to encrypt some sensitive information. In this way, after the machine is disassembled, the sensitive factor is lost. Even if the sensitive information on the machine is still there, it cannot be decrypted due to the lack of the sensitive factor. This is mainly to prevent the flash from being read from the electronic device after the machine is disassembled, and the information is also safe.

[0067] Furthermore, the control method in the embodiment of the present application further includes:

[0068] If the electronic device is attacked, a target control instruction is generated, wherein the target control instruction is used to control the generation of prompt information that the electronic device has been attacked, and / or to control the deletion of sensitive information in the electronic device.

[0069] If an electronic device is identified as under attack, a notification message can be generated to alert the user of the attack, or sensitive information stored in the device can be directly deleted. Depending on the specific application scenario, one or the other can be selected as the response method after the electronic device is attacked, or both control instructions can be executed simultaneously to ensure that sensitive information in the electronic device is not leaked.

[0070] In one embodiment, in response to enabling the anti-tampering function, obtaining the sensitive factor and storing it in the volatile storage component includes:

[0071] In response to turning on the anti-tampering function, a sensitive factor is generated and stored in a volatile storage component; the sensitive factor is a random sequence generated by a main processor of the electronic device, or a random sequence generated by a microprocessor where the volatile storage component is located.

[0072] It should be noted that a sensitive factor can be a string of random numbers or a key. Accordingly, the sensitive factor can be a random sequence generated by the electronic device's main processor (such as a central processing unit) or by the microprocessor (such as an MCU) housing the volatile storage component. The sensitive factor is used as a key, a portion of a key, a key derived from the sensitive factor, or a random number in an encryption algorithm to encrypt sensitive information, thereby protecting it. When the device is attacked (such as by disassembly), the sensitive factor is lost, making it impossible to decrypt the sensitive information, thus providing real-time protection for the sensitive information. Different important information in the memory can use the same or different encryption keys; the random encryption keys generated by the sensitive factors can be a single or multiple sets. Furthermore, the sensitive factors stored in the volatile storage component can be a single or multiple sets, but any sensitive factor can be deleted after the electronic device is disassembled.

[0073] In an embodiment of the present application, the control method further includes:

[0074] In response to turning off the anti-tamper function, the electronic device stops performing security verification based on the sensitive factor.

[0075] Furthermore, the electronic device stopping security verification based on the sensitive factor includes: decrypting encrypted sensitive information in the electronic device based on the sensitive factor.

[0076] In the embodiment of the present application, the anti-dismantling function can also be turned off. For example, in the application scenario of disassembling an electronic device for inspection, the anti-dismantling function can be turned off first, and the security verification of the electronic device is no longer performed based on the sensitive factors. Instead, only the functional detection of the relevant hardware after the electronic device is disassembled is performed. This can avoid the loss of the original stored data in the electronic device. Furthermore, after turning off the anti-dismantling function, the sensitive information encrypted in the electronic device can also be decrypted based on the sensitive factors. It should be noted that when turning off the anti-dismantling function, it is necessary to confirm whether the electronic device is in a safe environment. Furthermore, only users with relevant permissions can choose to turn off the anti-dismantling function for the electronic device to ensure the application security of the electronic device.

[0077] In an embodiment of the present application, a control method is provided. This control method is applied to an electronic device with an anti-tampering circuit. In response to the activation of the anti-tampering function, a sensitive factor is obtained and stored in the volatile storage component. When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device has been attacked. This embodiment implements security verification of the electronic device after disassembly based on the sensitive factor to detect whether the electronic device has been attacked. If an attack has been carried out, the relevant information in the electronic device can be further protected to prevent leakage, thereby improving the security of the data after the electronic device is disassembled.

[0078] An embodiment of the present application further provides a walkie-talkie, comprising:

[0079] The anti-tamper circuit, main processor and memory as described in any one of the above items.

[0080] The anti-dismantling circuit includes: a volatile storage component, a path switch and a power supply component; the volatile storage component is electrically connected to the path switch, the path switch is electrically connected to the power supply component, the power supply component includes a host battery and a backup battery, when the host battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component, the volatile storage component is used to store sensitive factors, and the sensitive factors are used to perform security verification on the electronic device applying the anti-dismantling circuit; when the shell of the electronic device applying the anti-dismantling circuit is disassembled, the path switch is disconnected to disconnect the power supply to the volatile storage component.

[0081] Optionally, one end of the access switch is electrically connected to the volatile storage component, and the other end is electrically connected to the power supply component. The access switch is in a closed state when the housing of the electronic device containing the anti-tamper circuit is installed; when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is in an open state. Optionally, the housing of the electronic device and the access switch are in contact connection. Optionally, the volatile storage component is a volatile storage module in a microprocessor.

[0082] In this embodiment, the main processor is at least used to obtain the sensitivity factor of the time-sensitive storage component in the anti-tampering circuit, and to perform encryption and decryption processing on the sensitive information of the intercom based on the sensitivity factor;

[0083] The memory is used to store at least a confirmation code corresponding to the intercom and information encrypted based on the sensitive factor.

[0084] Correspondingly, when a two-way radio using the anti-tampering circuit is dismantled, the sensitive factors used for encryption and decryption are immediately lost, thereby improving the security of the data stored therein.

[0085] Specifically, the intercom can execute any of the control methods described above. Please refer to the above structural description of the anti-tampering circuit and the method flow description of the control method, which will not be described in detail here.

[0086] The following describes the embodiments of the present application using actual application scenarios. Taking a walkie-talkie as an example of an electronic device to which the anti-dismantling circuit is applied, see Figure 5, which is a structural diagram of a walkie-talkie provided by an embodiment of the present application. The walkie-talkie includes an anti-dismantling circuit as described in any of the above items. In Figure 5, the volatile storage component is represented by a low-power device, that is, the sensitive factor is stored in the backup memory of the low-power device, and the switch S1 is used to represent the path switch. The low-power device can be powered by a main battery or a button battery. It should be noted that Figure 5 is only an example representation of the walkie-talkie provided by the present application, in which the relevant components can be replaced by other structural components with the same functions.

[0087] Furthermore, the intercom also includes:

[0088] a main processor electrically connected to the volatile storage component, the main processor being at least configured to obtain a sensitivity factor of the volatile storage component;

[0089] A host memory electrically connected to the main processor, the host memory being used to store a confirmation code corresponding to the sensitive factor and to store information encrypted based on the sensitive factor.

[0090] Specifically, after the walkie-talkie is assembled on the production line, when the terminal serial number is injected during the packaging process (or after the user purchases the walkie-talkie, configures the walkie-talkie, and prepares to use the terminal), a command is sent to turn on the anti-tampering function. When the walkie-talkie receives the command to turn on the anti-tampering function, it randomly generates a string of random numbers (such as 64 bits) and sends the string of random numbers to the low-power storage volatile device of the terminal (such as the backup register of the MCU's RTC). At the same time, the summary of the random number calculation (such as using a hash algorithm) is stored in the memory of the terminal host. The summary is the confirmation code.

[0091] When the user needs to store sensitive information (such as various communication keys, certificates, authorization files, etc.) in the memory of the intercom host, the random number participates in the encryption operation, and the sensitive information is encrypted and stored. When in use, the random number is used to participate in the decryption operation, and the sensitive information is decrypted and used.

[0092] When the intercom is disassembled, the anti-tamper switch is disconnected, the power supply to the backup power supply pin is disconnected, and the random number in the backup register is lost. Due to the loss of the random number, the encrypted sensitive information cannot be decrypted normally due to the lack of the correct random number, thereby protecting the sensitive information.

[0093] Each time the radio is turned on, it reads the random number from the backup register of the RTC (real-time clock) and calculates the digest of the random number. When the calculated digest is the same as the digest in the terminal host memory, it means that the terminal has not been disassembled. When the digest is different, it means that the random number has been destroyed, that is, the terminal has been disassembled. In this case, it can trigger the deletion of all important information and restore the factory settings.

[0094] Based on the foregoing embodiments, an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores one or more programs, and the one or more programs can be executed by one or more processors to implement a control method for an anti-dismantling circuit of an electronic device as described in any of the above items.

[0095] An embodiment of the present application also provides an electronic device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements a method for controlling an anti-disassembly circuit of the electronic device when executing the program.

[0096] It should be noted that the processor or CPU may be at least one of an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a digital signal processor (DSP), a digital signal processing device (DSPD), a programmable logic device (PLD), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a central processing unit (CPU), a controller, a microcontroller, and a microprocessor. It is understood that the electronic device that implements the functions of the processor may also be other electronic devices, which are not specifically limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0097] It should be noted that the above-mentioned computer storage medium / memory can be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), a magnetic random access memory (FRAM), a flash memory (Flash Memory), a magnetic surface memory, an optical disc, or a compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM); it can also be various terminals including one or any combination of the above-mentioned memories, such as mobile phones, computers, tablet devices, personal digital assistants, etc.

[0098] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. The device embodiments described above are merely schematic. For example, the division of the units is merely a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as: multiple units or components can be combined, or can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling, direct coupling, or communication connection between the components shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of the devices or units can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0099] The units described above as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed on multiple network units; some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

[0100] In addition, the functional units in the embodiments of the present application can all be integrated into one processing module, or each unit can be a separate unit, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit; the above-mentioned integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional units. It can be understood by ordinary technicians in this field that all or part of the steps of the above-mentioned method embodiments can be completed by hardware related to program instructions, and the above-mentioned program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed, it executes the steps of the above-mentioned method embodiments; and the above-mentioned storage medium includes: mobile storage devices, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), disks or optical disks, etc. Various media that can store program codes.

[0101] The methods disclosed in the several method embodiments provided in this application can be arbitrarily combined without conflict to obtain new method embodiments.

[0102] The features disclosed in the several product embodiments provided in this application can be arbitrarily combined without conflict to obtain new product embodiments.

[0103] The features disclosed in the several method or device embodiments provided in this application can be arbitrarily combined without conflict to obtain new method embodiments or device embodiments.

[0104] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on the differences from other embodiments. Reference can be made to the common and similar parts between the various embodiments. For the devices disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the method description.

[0105] The above description of the disclosed embodiments is intended to enable one skilled in the art to implement or use the present application. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to one skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of the present application. Therefore, the present application is not limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is intended to conform to the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A tamper-proof circuit, characterized in that: include: A volatile storage component, a path switch and a power supply component; wherein the volatile storage component is electrically connected to the path switch, the path switch is electrically connected to the power supply component, the power supply component includes a host battery and a backup battery, when the host battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component, the volatile storage component is used to store a sensitive factor, and the sensitive factor is used to perform security verification on the electronic device to which the anti-tampering circuit is applied; When the housing of the electronic device to which the anti-tampering circuit is applied is disassembled, the passage switch is disconnected to cut off the power supply to the volatile storage component.

2. The anti-tampering circuit according to claim 1, characterized in that: One end of the access switch is electrically connected to the volatile storage component, and the other end is electrically connected to the power supply component. When the housing of the electronic device where the anti-disassembly circuit is located is in an installed state, the access switch is in a closed state; when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is in an open state.

3. The anti-tampering circuit according to claim 1, characterized in that: The housing of the electronic device is in contact connection with the passage switch.

4. The anti-tampering circuit according to claim 1, characterized in that: The volatile storage component is a volatile storage module in a microprocessor.

5. A control method, characterized in that: Applicable to an electronic device with an anti-disassembly circuit, the anti-disassembly circuit comprising: a volatile storage component, a path switch and a power supply component; wherein the volatile storage component is electrically connected to the path switch, the path switch is electrically connected to the power supply component, the power supply component comprises a host battery and a backup battery, when the host battery is removed from the electronic device, the backup battery supplies power to the volatile storage component; when the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the path switch is disconnected to disconnect the power supply to the volatile storage component; the control method comprises: In response to the anti-tampering function being turned on, obtaining a sensitive factor and storing it in the volatile storage component; When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device is attacked.

6. The control method according to claim 5, characterized in that: When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device is attacked, including: Sensitive information of the electronic device is encrypted based on the sensitive factor to obtain encrypted information. When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost, so that when the encrypted information needs to be decrypted based on the sensitive factor, it cannot be correctly decrypted.

7. The control method according to claim 5, characterized in that: When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost. When security verification is performed based on the sensitive factor, it is confirmed that the electronic device is attacked, including: Based on the sensitive factor, generate and store a target confirmation code; When the housing of the electronic device is disassembled, the access switch is disconnected, the volatile storage component is powered off, and the sensitive factor is lost; In response to the electronic device being powered on, a current confirmation code is obtained based on the current sensitive factor in the volatile storage component, and if the current confirmation code is inconsistent with the stored target confirmation code, it is confirmed that the electronic device is attacked.

8. The control method according to claim 7, characterized in that: The control method further comprises: If the electronic device is attacked, a target control instruction is generated, wherein the target control instruction is used to control the generation of prompt information that the electronic device is attacked, and / or to control the deletion of sensitive information in the electronic device.

9. The control method according to claim 5, characterized in that: In response to the anti-tampering function being turned on, obtaining the sensitive factor and storing it in the volatile storage component comprises: In response to the anti-tampering function being turned on, generating a sensitive factor and storing it in the volatile storage component; The sensitive factor is a random sequence generated by a main processor of the electronic device, or a random sequence generated by a microprocessor where the volatile storage component is located.

10. The control method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The control method further comprises: In response to turning off the anti-tampering function, the electronic device stops performing security verification based on the sensitive factor.

11. The control method according to claim 10, characterized in that: The electronic device stopping security verification based on the sensitive factor includes: The encrypted sensitive information in the electronic device is decrypted based on the sensitive factor.

12. A walkie-talkie, characterized in that: include: The anti-tamper circuit, main processor and memory as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 4; The intercom executes the control method according to any one of claims 5 to 11.

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