Device information protection method and related apparatus

Abstract

Disclosed in embodiments of the present application are a device information protection method and a related apparatus, used for improving the security of hardware device information in the entire device, and applied to a baseboard management controller (BMC), the BMC comprising a security kernel isolated from external environment access. The method comprises: calling a security kernel, signing a firmware hash value on the basis of a trusted certificate, and generating a firmware identity certificate, wherein the firmware hash value is obtained by performing hash value calculation on firmware information of a BMC; acquiring reference device information, wherein the reference device information is device information of an initial hardware device; and calling the security kernel, signing the reference device information on the basis of the firmware identity certificate, and generating a device identity certificate, wherein the device identity certificate is used for extracting the reference device information when a target hash value does not match a reference hash value, the target hash value is obtained by performing hash value calculation on target device information, the target device information is device information of a target hardware device, and the reference hash value is obtained by performing hash value calculation on the reference device information.

Description

A device information protection method and related apparatus

[0001] The present application claims priority from the Chinese patent application No. 202411053130.1 filed on July 31, 2024, and entitled "A device information protection method and related apparatus", the content of which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. TECHNICAL FIELD

[0002] Embodiments of the present application relate to the technical field of data transmission, and in particular to a device information protection method and related apparatus. BACKGROUND

[0003] With the progress of computing technology and the development of computing devices, the means of security attacks on the whole machine of computing devices are also increasing. The traditional whole machine security strategy mainly focuses on security protection at the firmware level and vulnerability patching of the software system, and the security management of the core hardware devices of the computer (such as processor, memory, storage device, etc.) is more focused on the optimization and management of functions, ignoring the security protection ability at the physical layer. In the face of using non-authentic spare parts, unauthorized modification, there is a lack of technical means to ensure the security of the hardware devices. SUMMARY

[0004] Embodiments of the present application provide a device information protection method and related apparatus, which can verify the hardware device information in the whole machine, thereby improving the security of the hardware device information in the whole machine.

[0005] A first aspect of the present application provides a device information protection method applied to a baseboard management controller (BMC), the BMC comprising a secure core isolated from access of an external environment;

[0006] The method comprises:

[0007] The secure core is called, the firmware hash value is signed based on the trusted certificate, the firmware identity certificate is generated, and the firmware hash value is obtained by calculating the hash value of the firmware information of the BMC. Since the firmware identity certificate is generated based on the trusted certificate, it is ensured that the firmware hash value carried by the firmware identity certificate is trusted. In the device production, maintenance and firmware upgrade stage, the trusted certificate and the hash value can be confirmed by the device administrator, and the firmware hash value is set as the reference firmware hash value. In the subsequent running stage of the existing network device, the BMC system can calculate the hash value of the current firmware after starting, and compare the current firmware hash value with the reference firmware hash value to ensure that the firmware information (function code) of the BMC is not tampered. The firmware identity certificate can be stored in the secure storage area of the BMC, and the secure storage area can be the memory of the BMC. The private key of the trusted certificate is stored in the secure core and cannot flow out of the secure core.

[0008] The reference device information is obtained, and the reference device information is the device information of the initial hardware device. The hardware devices of the whole machine device include CPU, memory, GPU, PCIe board card and the like. In the production and equipment stage of the whole machine device, the obtained device information of the hardware devices is taken as the reference device information, that is, the device information of the factory. The device information can be compared with the device information obtained in the existing network stage in the future, so as to determine the changed hardware device.

[0009] The secure core is called, the firmware hash value is signed based on the trusted certificate, the firmware identity certificate is generated, and the firmware hash value is obtained by calculating the hash value of the firmware information of the BMC. Since the firmware identity certificate is generated based on the trusted certificate, it is ensured that the firmware hash value carried by the firmware identity certificate is trusted. In the device production, maintenance and firmware upgrade stage, the trusted certificate and the hash value can be confirmed by the device administrator, and the firmware hash value is set as the reference firmware hash value. In the subsequent running stage of the existing network device, the BMC system can calculate the hash value of the current firmware after starting, and compare the current firmware hash value with the reference firmware hash value to ensure that the firmware information (function code) of the BMC is not tampered. The firmware identity certificate can be stored in the secure storage area of the BMC, and the secure storage area can be the memory of the BMC. The private key of the trusted certificate is stored in the secure core and cannot flow out of the secure core. In the subsequent existing network stage, the BMC system starts, and then verifies whether the target hash value matches the reference hash value. When the comparison result indicates that the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, the secure core can be called to verify the device identity certificate, and the reference device information is extracted. The reference device information reflects the original device information of the whole machine device in the production and equipment stage, so the reference device information and the target device information can be compared, the changed hardware device is determined from the target device information, and the accurate monitoring and identification of the key asset are realized.

[0010] In a possible implementation method, before the secure core is called, the firmware hash value is signed based on the trusted certificate, and the firmware identity certificate is generated, the method further includes:

[0011] Performing secure boot by the security core;

[0012] Obtaining firmware information;

[0013] Calculating a hash value of the firmware information to obtain a firmware hash value.

[0014] In this embodiment, when the BMC system starts, the security core can be used to perform a secure boot strategy to ensure the security and integrity of the BMC firmware information. In the production and equipment stage of the whole machine device, the BMC system can obtain the firmware information of the BMC after performing the secure boot and verification, and calculate the hash value of the firmware information. The firmware information can include the firmware type, version number, identification code, code segment data, and specific configuration parameters of the firmware. The firmware information can be extracted from the firmware storage area, registry or other trusted sources of the BMC.

[0015] In a possible implementation method, the device information includes first information obtained by the BMC and second information obtained by a basic input output system (BIOS);

[0016] Obtaining reference device information, including:

[0017] Obtaining the first information and the second information;

[0018] Summarizing the first information and the second information to obtain the reference device information.

[0019] In this embodiment, in the hardware device, part of the device information can be obtained directly through the corresponding output system of the hardware device without being reported by the business system. Another part of the device information cannot be obtained directly by the BMC, and can be obtained through the basic input output system (BIOS). For the whole machine device, the first information and the second information of the key hardware devices such as the motherboard, CPU, memory, SSD and GPU are summarized to obtain the hardware device identity information of the whole machine device. In the production and equipment stage of the whole machine device, the summarized information is the reference device information.

[0020] In a possible implementation method, the initial hardware device includes a first device;

[0021] After calling the security core, signing the reference device information based on the firmware identity certificate to generate the device identity certificate, the method further includes:

[0022] Obtaining the changed device information including the signature, the changed device information being the device information of the changed first device;

[0023] Performing a signature verification operation on the changed device information;

[0024] If the signature verification passes, the reference device information corresponding to the first device is changed to the changed device information.

[0025] The secure kernel is invoked, and the device identity certificate is updated based on the changed device information.

[0026] In this embodiment, the device information of the hardware device will be changed in the case of factory repair or spare part replacement of the whole machine device, and such change is made by the manufacturer to ensure the normal and effective operation of the whole machine device. The hardware device that has the above change is the first device, and the changed device information is the changed device information. In order to ensure the legality and authorization of the change of the first device, prevent unauthorized modification and potential malicious behavior, the changed device information needs to be signed to obtain the corresponding digital certificate. The changed device information is verified based on the signature, and if the verification passes, it means that the change of the first device is legal and authorized, so that the changed information can be trusted, and the reference device information of the hardware device is updated accordingly.

[0027] In a possible implementation method, after the reference device information corresponding to the first device is changed to the changed device information if the signature verification passes, the method further includes:

[0028] The reference hash value is updated based on the changed device information.

[0029] In this embodiment, when the reference device information is changed, the consistency between the whole machine device in the present network stage and the changed whole machine device needs to be verified, and the reference hash value can also be updated based on the changed device information.

[0030] In a possible implementation method, the device information includes a device identification code, and further includes a device type and / or a slot number.

[0031] In a possible implementation method, after the secure kernel is invoked, the reference device information is signed based on the firmware identity certificate to generate the device identity certificate, the method further includes:

[0032] After the BMC is restarted, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained;

[0033] If the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, the secure kernel is invoked to extract the reference device information from the device identity certificate;

[0034] The reference device information is compared with the target device information to determine the abnormal hardware device that is inconsistent with the initial hardware device in the target hardware device.

[0035] In this embodiment, if the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, it indicates that the hardware device information may have changed, that is, it may have been tampered with or replaced without authorization. After detecting that the hash values do not match, the security core is called to extract the reference device information in the device identity certificate and compare it in detail with the current target device information. The comparison may include the model, serial number, hardware configuration, and other key information of the device. Through the comparison, it can be determined which device information has changed, thereby realizing the identification of abnormal hardware devices.

[0036] In a possible implementation method, after the BMC is restarted, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained, including:

[0037] After the BMC is restarted, the security core is called to perform validity verification on the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate.

[0038] If the validity verification of the device identity certificate passes, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained.

[0039] In this embodiment, after the BMC is restarted, in order to ensure system security and the validity of device identity, a series of security verification processes can be performed, which usually include steps such as loading a security module, verifying the identity of firmware and devices, and checking the pre-stored device identity certificate to ensure the reliability of the certificate.

[0040] In a possible implementation method, after the BMC is restarted, the security core is called to perform validity verification on the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate, including:

[0041] After the BMC is restarted, the security core is called to perform validity verification on the firmware identity certificate based on the trusted certificate.

[0042] If the validity verification of the firmware identity certificate passes, the security core is called to perform validity verification on the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate.

[0043] In this embodiment, the security verification process performed after the BMC is restarted can also include validity verification of the firmware identity certificate. Since the firmware identity certificate is generated based on the trusted certificate, the private key of the trusted certificate is stored in the security core, and therefore the security core needs to be called to perform validity verification on the firmware identity certificate. This verification process mainly verifies whether the signature of the firmware identity certificate is issued based on the trusted certificate. If the validity verification of the firmware identity certificate passes, it can be considered that the source of the firmware hash value is trusted and has not been tampered with, which is a prerequisite for subsequent verification steps.

[0044] In a possible implementation method, after comparing the reference device information with the target device information, determining the abnormal hardware device inconsistent with the initial hardware device in the target hardware device, the method further includes:

[0045] generating and outputting an abnormal alarm, the abnormal alarm indicating the abnormal hardware device.

[0046] In this embodiment, once the abnormal hardware device is identified, the BMC can take corresponding processing measures, such as issuing an alarm, recording an event, isolating the device, or requesting manual intervention, and based on these processing measures, an abnormal alarm can be generated to indicate the abnormal hardware device, so as to prompt the user to perform subsequent processing.

[0047] The second aspect of the present application provides a device information protection apparatus, including a secure core isolated from access of an external environment, and further including:

[0048] a firmware certificate management module configured to invoke the secure core, sign a firmware hash value based on a trusted certificate, and generate a firmware identity certificate, the firmware hash value being obtained by performing a hash value calculation on firmware information of the BMC;

[0049] a device information acquisition module configured to acquire reference device information, the reference device information being device information of an initial hardware device;

[0050] a device certificate management module configured to invoke the secure core, sign the reference device information based on the firmware identity certificate, and generate a device identity certificate, the device identity certificate being used to extract the reference device information when a target hash value does not match a reference hash value, wherein the target hash value is obtained by performing a hash value calculation on target device information, the target device information being device information of a target hardware device, and the reference hash value is obtained by performing a hash value calculation on the reference device information.

[0051] In a possible implementation method, the apparatus further includes:

[0052] a firmware digest generation module configured to, after performing a secure start on the BMC through the secure core, acquire firmware information of the BMC and perform a hash calculation on the firmware information to obtain a firmware hash value;

[0053] In a possible implementation method, the device information includes first information acquired by the BMC and second information acquired by a basic input output system (BIOS);

[0054] The apparatus further includes:

[0055] a hardware scanning module configured to acquire the first information that can be directly acquired through the BMC;

[0056] a data reporting module configured to acquire the second information that needs to be reported through the BIOS;

[0057] The device information acquisition module is configured to acquire reference device information, the reference device information being device information of an initial hardware device, and specifically comprising summarizing hardware device information collected by the hardware scanning module and the data reporting module.

[0058] In a possible implementation method, the apparatus further comprises:

[0059] The hardware signature verification module is configured to perform a signature verification operation on the hardware device information after acquiring the hardware device information comprising the signature.

[0060] In a possible implementation method, the initial hardware device comprises a first device.

[0061] The apparatus further comprises:

[0062] The changing module is configured to acquire changed device information comprising a signature, the changed device information being device information of the changed first device; perform an operation; change the reference device information corresponding to the first device to the changed device information after performing a signature verification on the changed device information and passing the signature verification; and call the security core to update the device identity certificate based on the changed device information.

[0063] In a possible implementation method, the changing module is further configured to update the reference hash value based on the changed device information.

[0064] In a possible implementation method, the apparatus further comprises:

[0065] The device difference detection module is configured to acquire target device information and a target hash value after the BMC is restarted; call the security core to extract the reference device information from the device identity certificate if the target hash value does not match the reference hash value; and compare the reference device information with the target device information to determine an abnormal hardware device inconsistent with the initial hardware device in the target hardware device.

[0066] In a possible implementation method, the apparatus further comprises:

[0067] The certificate verification module is configured to call the security core to perform an effectiveness verification on the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate after the BMC is restarted. If the effectiveness verification on the device identity certificate passes, the target device information and the target hash value are acquired by the device information acquisition module 7041.

[0068] In a possible implementation method, the certificate verification module is specifically configured to call the security core to perform an effectiveness verification on the firmware identity certificate based on the trusted certificate after the BMC is restarted; and call the security core to perform an effectiveness verification on the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate if the effectiveness verification on the firmware identity certificate passes.

[0069] In a possible implementation manner, the method further includes:

[0070] The device exception alarm module is configured to generate and output an exception alarm, where the exception alarm indicates the abnormal hardware device.

[0071] The third aspect of the present application further provides a computing device, including a processor;

[0072] The processor is configured to execute a computer program or computer instructions in the memory to perform the method of the first aspect.

[0073] The fourth aspect of the present application further provides a computer program product including instructions, when the instructions are executed by a computing device, the computing device performs the method of the first aspect.

[0074] The fifth aspect of the present application further provides a computer readable storage medium including computer program instructions, when the computer program instructions are executed by a computing device, the computing device performs the method of the first aspect.

[0075] The sixth aspect of the present application further provides a chip device including a processor, configured to be connected with a memory, and call a program stored in the memory to make the processor execute the method of the first aspect.

[0076] The technical solutions provided by the second to sixth aspects have the beneficial effects of the technical solutions of the first aspect, which will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0077] FIG. 1 is a whole flowchart of a data protection method in the related art;

[0078] FIG. 2 is a data generation signaling diagram of an information protection method in the related art;

[0079] FIG. 3 is a data checking signaling diagram of an information protection method in the related art;

[0080] FIG. 4 is a method flowchart of an equipment information protection method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0081] FIG. 5 is a supplementary method flowchart of an equipment information protection method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0082] FIG. 6 is a supplementary method flowchart of an equipment information protection method provided by an embodiment of the present application;

[0083] FIG. 7 is a structural schematic diagram of an equipment information protection device provided by the present application;

[0084] FIG. 8 is a structural schematic diagram of a computing device provided by an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0085] Embodiments of the present application provide a device information protection method and related apparatus, which obtains a device identity certificate by signing original device information in stages through a security core of a baseboard management controller (BMC), the security core is isolated from external environment access, thus ensuring the security of the original device information in the signing process. When it is detected that the current device information has changed, the security core is called to extract the original device information from the identity certificate, which can be compared with the current device information to determine the hardware device with differences. The device information protection method provided by the embodiments of the present application protects the hardware device information in the form of signing in stages, improves the security of the hardware device information, and can identify abnormal hardware, thereby achieving accurate asset management and control.

[0086] In order to make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the present application clearer, the embodiments of the present application are described below in conjunction with the drawings, obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of the present application, not all the embodiments. Those skilled in the art can know that, with the emergence of new application scenarios, the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application are also applicable to similar technical problems.

[0087] The terms "first", "second", "third", etc. in the specification and claims of this application and in the above drawings are used to distinguish between similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a particular sequential or chronological order. It is to be understood that the use of such terms as "first", "second", etc. in the description of the embodiments herein can be interchanged, where appropriate, so that the embodiments described herein can be carried out in other than the order shown or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprise" and "have", and any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, for example, a process, method, system, product or apparatus that comprises a list of steps or modules as a process, method, system, product or apparatus not necessarily limited to those steps or modules that are expressly listed, but can include other not expressly listed steps or modules. The naming or numbering of the steps in the present application does not mean that the steps in the method flow must be executed in the order / time sequence indicated by the naming or numbering. The execution order of the steps that have been named or numbered can be changed according to the technical purpose to be achieved, as long as the same or similar technical effects can be achieved. The division of units in the present application is a logical division, and in actual application, other division methods can be used, for example, multiple units can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be omitted or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the units shown or discussed can be through an interface, and the indirect coupling or communication connection between the units can be electrical or other similar forms, which are not limited in the present application. In addition, the units or sub-units described as separate components can or can not be physically separate, and can or can not be physical units, or can be distributed in multiple circuit units. According to actual needs, part or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of the present application.

[0088] BMC is an embedded system management chip, which is usually integrated on the motherboard of a server, workstation, large storage device or other high-end computer device. BMC is responsible for monitoring hardware status, managing hardware events, performing system recovery operations, and communicating with external management entities (such as remote management consoles) through specific communication protocols (such as intelligent platform management interface-IPMI).

[0089] With the progress of computing technology and the development of computing devices, the means of attacking the whole machine security of computing devices also increases. The traditional whole machine security strategy mainly focuses on the security protection of the firmware level and the patching of software system vulnerabilities, and the security management of computer core hardware devices (such as processors, memories, storage devices, etc.) is more focused on the optimization and management of functions, ignoring the security protection ability of itself in the physical layer. When facing the use of non-authentic spare parts and unauthorized modification, there is a lack of technical means to ensure the security of hardware devices.

[0090] In the related art, information protection of a hardware device can be implemented based on system locking. After system locking, the software and hardware configuration of a customer cannot be modified. The hardware configuration is constrained in a list, and a check value is uniformly formed. After the hardware configuration is modified, the BMC collects the check value, compares it with the historical locked check value, and notifies the user after finding the change. For details, refer to FIG. 1, which is a whole flowchart of a data protection method in the related art, FIG. 2 is a data generation signaling diagram of an information protection method in the related art, and FIG. 3 is a data inspection signaling diagram of an information protection method in the related art. Next, the information protection method in the related art will be described in combination with FIG. 1, FIG. 2, and FIG. 3.

[0091] In the production process of the whole machine device, an external object (for example, a device production manager) initiates a configuration locking instruction for the BMC system configuration. The BMC detects the running state of the hardware device of the current system to ensure that the device is normally running, and device information can be obtained. The BMC obtains device information through system hardware and integrates it with software configuration to uniformly calculate a hash value to generate an original device hash value. The device hash value is saved in the secure storage area of the whole machine device.

[0092] In the transportation process of the whole machine device, it may be subjected to malicious attacks by external objects, such as tampering with device information of the hardware device, including replacing high-value assets and adding counterfeit devices.

[0093] When the whole machine system is powered on during on-site installation and deployment, the BMC obtains device information of the current hardware device again and uniformly calculates a hash value in combination with software configuration to generate a current device hash value. The current device hash value is compared with the original device hash value in the secure storage area. If they are inconsistent, it indicates that the device or configuration has changed, that is, an alarm is generated and the user is prompted.

[0094] It can be understood that the above method can detect the existence of hardware differences by directly collecting and calculating the hash value of the hardware device information and the configuration information. However, it cannot identify the specific change of the hardware, and the storage device (such as a solid state disk) itself may also be replaced, so the security of the original device hash value is difficult to guarantee. In the face of using non-authentic spare parts and unauthorized modification, there is a lack of technical means to authenticate the security of the hardware device. This leads to weak asset management capability of the cluster customer, a lack of reliable detection means for hardware replacement, counterfeiting, and tampering attacks during the transportation and use stages, and a lack of effective information updating means for hardware management under subsequent updates and maintenance.

[0095] To solve the above problems, the present application provides a device information protection method. To help those skilled in the art better understand the technical solutions of the present application, some concepts involved in the embodiments of the present application are introduced first.

[0096] The production equipment stage refers to the stage in which the single board of the whole machine device is in the production or program burning stage. The single board can refer to a circuit board on which components are welded. In the embodiments of the present application, the single board can be a circuit board integrated with a central processing unit (CPU), a baseboard management controller (BMC), a flash, a bus or other components.

[0097] The present network stage, i.e. the present network device running stage, corresponds to the production equipment stage. In the embodiments of the present application, the present network stage can refer to the stage in which the single board of the whole machine device has been packaged into a corresponding device and can be used by users.

[0098] The business core refers to the core of a processor for performing tasks related to business, including tasks such as storing logs, communication, upgrading, etc.

[0099] The security core refers to the core of a processor for performing tasks such as secure boot and trusted measurement. The security level of the security core is higher than that of the business core, and the security core is independent of the business core, i.e. to ensure the security of the system, the security core has independent security memory which is not allowed to be accessed by the business core and external devices, but communication between the security core and the business core can be achieved through the security channel inside the security core chip.

[0100] The device information protection method provided in the embodiments of the present application is applied to the BMC of the whole machine device. The BMC is a control unit deployed on the single board of the whole machine device with independent power supply and independent I / O interface. It does not depend on the processor, BIOS or operating system of the electronic device to work, and is a separate agentless management subsystem running in the whole machine device. When the BMC is a heterogeneous multi-core processor, the cores in the processor can be divided into security cores and business cores. The security cores are used to perform tasks related to the security of the BMC, such as secure boot and security verification. The business cores are used to perform tasks related to business in the BMC.

[0101] Firmware refers to a program written into an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM) or an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM). The firmware in the service core can be referred to as service core firmware, and the firmware in the security core can be referred to as security core firmware.

[0102] Next, the technical solutions involved in the present application will be introduced.

[0103] Please refer to FIG. 4, which is a method flowchart of the device information protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application. The method is applied to a BMC, the BMC includes a security core isolated from an external environment, and the method includes the following steps:

[0104] 401. Call the security core, sign the firmware hash value based on a trusted certificate, generate a firmware identity certificate, and the firmware hash value is obtained by hashing the firmware information of the BMC.

[0105] It can be understood that the security core is the core of the secure boot task of the BMC, and is used to provide a secure environment and encryption services. The trusted certificate refers to a digital certificate obtained from a trusted certificate authority (CA). The trusted certificate can be generated by the security core. For example, the security core can store a unique device secret (UDS), which is a secret information of the device and is a random number. Once initialized, the UDS cannot be changed in the life cycle of the device. Based on the UDS, the security core generates a bottom-layer trusted certificate.

[0106] The firmware hash value is obtained by hashing the firmware information of the BMC. The firmware information can be a collection of various key information (such as firmware type, version number, firmware identification code, etc.) of the BMC firmware.

[0107] After the firmware hash value is transmitted into the secure core, the secure core can issue a certificate public-private key pair of this level based on the trusted certificate, configure the firmware hash value to the certificate configuration, and sign the firmware hash value using the private key of the trusted certificate to obtain a firmware identity certificate. Since the firmware identity certificate is generated based on the trusted certificate, it is ensured that the firmware hash value carried by the firmware identity certificate is trusted. In the device production, maintenance, and firmware upgrade stage, the device administrator can confirm the trusted certificate and the hash value, and set the firmware hash value as the reference firmware hash value. In the subsequent live network device running stage, the BMC system can calculate the hash value of the current firmware after startup, and compare the hash value of the current firmware with the reference firmware hash value to ensure that the firmware information (function code) of the BMC is not tampered with.

[0108] It can be understood that the firmware identity certificate can be stored in the secure storage area of the BMC after being generated, and the secure storage area can be the memory of the BMC. The private key of the trusted certificate is stored in the secure core and does not flow out of the secure core.

[0109] In a possible implementation method, the step of generating the firmware identity certificate can be performed after the BMC system is securely started, that is, before step 401, and further includes:

[0110] 4001. performing secure startup on the BMC by the secure core;

[0111] 4002. obtaining firmware information;

[0112] 4003. performing hash value calculation on the firmware information to obtain a firmware hash value.

[0113] It can be understood that when the BMC system is started, the security and integrity of the BMC firmware information can be ensured by performing a secure startup strategy by the secure core. In the production and equipment stage of the whole machine device, after the BMC system performs secure startup and verification by the secure core, the firmware information of the BMC can be obtained, and the hash value of the firmware information can be calculated. The firmware information can include the firmware type, version number, identification code, code segment data, and specific configuration parameters of the firmware. The firmware information can be extracted from the firmware storage area, the registry, or other trusted sources of the BMC.

[0114] Performing secure startup on the BMC can include two ways: one is to perform integrity verification on the firmware information based on the certificate chain of the trusted certificate during the BMC startup process, and to stop the startup if the verification fails; the other is to audit the integrity state of the device by a local or external entity after the BMC is started, for example, to compare the consistency between the current firmware hash value and the reference firmware hash value in the local control center or the remote proof center.

[0115] 402. Obtain reference device information, the reference device information being device information of an initial hardware device.

[0116] It can be understood that the hardware devices of the whole machine device include a CPU, a memory, a GPU, a PCIe board card, and the like. In the production and equipment stage of the whole machine device, the device information of these hardware devices obtained is taken as the reference device information, that is, the factory device information. These device information can be compared with the device information obtained in the live network stage, so as to determine the hardware devices that have been changed.

[0117] In a possible implementation method, the device information includes first information obtained by a BMC and second information obtained by a basic input output system (BIOS), and step 402 specifically includes:

[0118] 4021. Obtain reference device information, including:

[0119] 4022. Obtain the first information and the second information.

[0120] 4023. Aggregate the first information and the second information to obtain the reference device information.

[0121] It can be understood that in the hardware device, part of the device information can not be reported by the business system, but is directly obtained through the corresponding output system of the hardware device. For example, the model of the server, the manufacturer, the production date, the production and technical information of each component (such as a CPU, a memory, a hard disk, and the like), case information, mainboard information, and the like. This kind of information is the first information. Another part of the device information cannot be directly obtained by the BMC, and can be obtained through the basic input output system (basic input output system, BIOS). For example, the configuration information of each device (such as a CPU, a memory, a graphics card, a hard disk, and the like) in the computer, such as the model, the capacity, the speed, and the like. This kind of information is the second information, which is reported to the BMC through the BIOS based on the system management BIOS (System Management BIOS, SMBIOS) information after the BIOS is started.

[0122] For the whole machine device, the first information and the second information of the key hardware devices such as the mainboard, the CPU, the memory, the SSD, and the GPU are aggregated to obtain the hardware device identity information of the whole machine device. Specifically, the device information can include a device type, a slot number, a device identification code (such as a device serial number, a chip ID), and the like. In the production and equipment stage of the whole machine device, the aggregated information is the reference device information.

[0123] Further, for each type of hardware device, if the number is multiple, the format can be divided according to the order, which is conducive to subsequent implementation of precise change detection at the slot level.

[0124] 403. Call the secure core, sign the reference device information based on the firmware identity certificate, generate a device identity certificate, and the device identity certificate is used to extract the reference device information when the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, wherein the target hash value is obtained by hashing the target device information, and the target device information is the device information of the target hardware device, and the reference hash value is obtained by hashing the reference device information.

[0125] It can be understood that after obtaining the reference device information, the reference device information can be specifically transmitted into the secure core, and the secure core is called to sign the reference device information through the firmware identity certificate to obtain the device identity certificate. This process is similar to the process of generating the firmware identity certificate. After generating the firmware identity certificate, the public and private key pair of the firmware identity certificate can be generated through the secure core, the reference device information is expanded into the certificate, the reference device information is signed based on the private key of the firmware identity certificate, and the device identity certificate is obtained.

[0126] It can be understood that the device identity certificate can be stored in the secure storage area of the BMC after being generated. The secure storage area can be the memory of the BMC. The private key of the firmware identity certificate is stored in the secure core and does not flow out of the secure core.

[0127] In the subsequent live network stage, after the BMC system is started, it is verified whether the target hash value matches the reference hash value first. This process is similar to the related art described in FIGS. 1 to 3. The target hash value refers to the device hash value calculated based on the device information of the current hardware device, and the reference hash value refers to the original device hash value.

[0128] In the embodiment of the application, unlike the above related art, when the comparison result indicates that the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, the secure core can be called to verify the device identity certificate and extract the reference device information. The reference device information reflects the original device information of the whole machine device when it is produced and equipped, so the reference device information and the target device information can be compared to determine the hardware device that has been changed from the target device information, thereby realizing accurate monitoring and identification of key assets.

[0129] The device information protection method provided in the embodiments of the present application generates a firmware identity certificate of the BMC based on a trusted certificate by calling the secure core of the BMC which is isolated from external environment access in the production equipment stage of the whole machine device, then generates a device identity certificate of the reference device information of the whole machine device based on the firmware identity certificate, forms a certificate chain and ensures the transmission of the certificate chain, so that the firmware identity certificate and the device identity certificate can be verified, thereby ensuring the validity and reliability of the two. At the same time, the plaintext information of the reference device information is recorded in the device identity certificate. In the live network stage, when the target hash value is inconsistent with the reference hash value, it indicates that there is a difference between the current device and the original device. The reference device information plaintext is extracted from the device identity certificate by calling the secure core, which can be compared with the current target device information, so as to determine the hardware device with differences, thereby achieving accurate monitoring and identification of key assets. Therefore, the device information protection method provided in the embodiments of the present application protects the hardware device information in the form of step-by-step signature, improves the security of the hardware device information, and can identify abnormal hardware, thereby achieving accurate asset management and control.

[0130] It can be understood that, in the above embodiments, steps 401 to 403 are executed in the production process of the whole machine device. In a possible implementation method, the device information of the hardware device in the whole machine device will change in the case of returning to the factory for repair or replacement of spare parts. However, such change is carried out by the manufacturer to ensure the normal and effective operation of the functions of the whole machine device. Therefore, the embodiments of the present application further provide a method for updating the reference device information, which allows the hardware manufacturer to replace the hardware reasonably.

[0131] Specifically, referring to FIG. 5, which is a supplementary method flowchart of the device information protection method provided in the embodiments of the present application. The method is executed after step 403 of the corresponding embodiment of FIG. 4, wherein the initial hardware device includes a first device, and the method comprises the following steps:

[0132] 504. Obtain the changed device information including the signature, wherein the changed device information is the device information of the changed first device.

[0133] The scenario to which the embodiments of the present application are applied is that when a certain function of the whole machine device needs to be repaired, upgraded, etc., and the solution is to replace the hardware or change the hardware configuration, the hardware device that has the above change is the first device, and the device information after the change is the changed device information.

[0134] In order to ensure the legality and authorization of the change of the first device and prevent unauthorized modification and potential malicious behavior, the changed device information needs to be signed to obtain the corresponding digital certificate.

[0135] Specifically, the first device can carry a component self-description record (CSR) containing the identification information, configuration information, performance parameters, and other key information of the component, which is used for self-identification and configuration of the device. The CSR can be signed based on an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) signature. ECC is a public key cryptography algorithm that uses points on an elliptic curve for encryption and decryption operations. In the field of digital signatures, ECC signature uses a private key to encrypt the hash value of data to generate a digital signature. This signature can be used by entities holding the corresponding public key to verify the validity of the signature and the integrity of the data.

[0136] 505. Perform a signature verification operation on the changed device information.

[0137] It can be understood that when the first device carries the signature, upon receiving the CSR and the corresponding ECC signature, the following operations can be performed: first, the self-description information is hashed using the same hash algorithm as the signature to obtain a new hash value; then, the signature is decrypted using the public key provided by the hardware device manufacturer to obtain the original hash value; finally, the decrypted hash value is compared with the hash value calculated in step one. If they are the same, it indicates that the self-description information has not been tampered with during transmission, and it is indeed signed by the component manufacturer holding the private key.

[0138] 506. If the signature verification is passed, the baseline device information corresponding to the first device is changed to the changed device information.

[0139] It can be understood that if the signature verification is passed, it means that the change of the first device (including component replacement, upgrade, configuration modification, etc.) is legal and authorized, because the digital signature is generated by an entity holding a private key (usually the manufacturer of the hardware device or an authorized maintenance agency), which verifies the integrity of the hardware device self-description information and the authenticity of the source. Once the signature verification is passed, the system or BMC can trust these changed information, and update the baseline device information of the hardware device accordingly.

[0140] In a possible implementation method, after the change device information is verified, a step of human review and confirmation can be further included. This step is usually performed by a system administrator or a device administrator, and the rationality of the device change is evaluated. When the technical verification (verification) and the human review (authorization authentication) are passed, the reference device information corresponding to the first device is changed to the change device information. By combining the technical verification (digital signature and verification) and the human review (authorization authentication), the security and reliability of the change of the device information can be ensured, unauthorized changes and potential security risks can be effectively prevented, and the security and stability of the whole machine device can be protected.

[0141] 507. Call the security core, and update the device identity certificate based on the change device information.

[0142] It can be understood that after the reference device information is changed, the device identity certificate can also be updated accordingly. Similarly, the process is implemented by calling the security core, that is, the updated device identity certificate is also obtained by signing the changed device information based on the firmware identity certificate.

[0143] In a possible implementation method, after the verification is passed, the following steps are further included:

[0144] 508. Update the reference hash value based on the change device information.

[0145] It can be understood that when the reference device information is changed, to verify the consistency between the whole machine device in the present network stage and the whole machine device after the change, the reference hash value can also be updated based on the change device information.

[0146] The method provided in the embodiments of the present application can identify the change device including the signature, and accordingly expand and change the reference device information, and the hardware device of the whole machine device can also be protected in the case of maintenance and spare part replacement.

[0147] The methods provided in the embodiments of the above-mentioned FIG. 4 and FIG. 5 correspond to the application scenarios in the non-present network stage. Next, the embodiments of the present application further provide a method for verifying device information in the present network stage. Please refer to FIG. 6, which is a supplementary method flowchart of the device information protection method provided in the embodiments of the present application. The method is executed after step 403 of the embodiment corresponding to FIG. 4, or after step 507 or 508 of the embodiment corresponding to FIG. 5. The method includes the following steps:

[0148] 601. After the BMC is restarted, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained.

[0149] It can be understood that, in the live network stage, after the BMC is restarted, the device information verification process is started. First, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained. The target device information is obtained in a manner similar to step 402 in the embodiment of FIG. 4, and is the device information of the hardware device of the current whole machine device. Similarly, the device information can also include the first information obtained by the BMC and the second information obtained by the basic input / output system (BIOS). The target device information is obtained by summarizing the first information and the second information in the live network stage. The target hash value is obtained by performing hash calculation on the target device information.

[0150] In a possible implementation method, step 601 specifically includes:

[0151] 6011. After the BMC is restarted, the security core is called, and the validity of the device identity certificate is verified based on the firmware identity certificate.

[0152] 6012. If the validity verification of the device identity certificate passes, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained.

[0153] It can be understood that, after the BMC is restarted, in order to ensure system security and the validity of the device identity, a series of security verification processes can be performed, which usually include steps such as loading a security module, verifying the identity of the firmware and the device, and verifying the pre-stored device identity certificate to ensure the reliability of the certificate.

[0154] After the BMC is restarted, the security core built in the BMC is first loaded and called. Since the private key of the firmware identity certificate is stored in the security core, the security core needs to be called to perform the device identity certificate verification operation. If the validity verification of the device identity certificate passes, it indicates that the reference device information carried by the device identity certificate is legal and has not been tampered with.

[0155] In a possible implementation method, step 6011 specifically includes:

[0156] 60111. After the BMC is restarted, the security core is called, and the validity of the firmware identity certificate is verified based on the trusted certificate.

[0157] 60112. If the validity verification of the firmware identity certificate passes, the security core is called, and the validity of the device identity certificate is verified based on the firmware identity certificate.

[0158] It can be understood that the security verification process performed after the BMC restarts can also include validity verification of the firmware identity certificate. Since the firmware identity certificate is generated based on the trusted certificate, the private key of the trusted certificate is stored in the secure core, and therefore the secure core needs to be called to verify the validity of the firmware identity certificate. This verification process mainly verifies whether the signature of the firmware identity certificate is issued based on the trusted certificate. If the validity verification of the firmware identity certificate passes, it can be considered that the source of the firmware hash value is trusted and has not been tampered with, which is a prerequisite for subsequent verification steps.

[0159] 602. If the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, the secure core is called to extract reference device information from the device identity certificate;

[0160] 603. Compare the reference device information with the target device information to determine the abnormal hardware device inconsistent with the initial hardware device in the target hardware device.

[0161] It can be understood that the reference hash value is generated after the device is shipped or the hardware device is legally changed. If the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, it means that the hardware device information may have changed, that is, it may have been tampered with or replaced without authorization.

[0162] After detecting that the hash values do not match, the secure core is called to extract the reference device information in the device identity certificate and compare it in detail with the current target device information. The comparison content can include the model, serial number, hardware configuration and other key information of the device. Through the comparison, it can be determined which device information has changed, thereby realizing the identification of the abnormal hardware device, which includes tampering, replacement, damage or unauthorized modification of the hardware.

[0163] In one possible implementation method, after step 603, the following is further included:

[0164] 604. Generate and output an abnormal alarm, and the abnormal alarm indicates the abnormal hardware device.

[0165] It can be understood that once the abnormal hardware device is identified, the BMC can take corresponding processing measures, such as issuing an alarm, recording an event, isolating the device or requesting manual intervention, and based on these processing measures, an abnormal alarm can be generated to indicate the abnormal hardware device, so as to prompt the user to perform subsequent processing.

[0166] The method provided by the embodiments of the present application can achieve authentication and verification of the firmware identity certificate and the device identity certificate through the certificate chain of the secure core, achieve the anti-fraud feature, and can accurately identify the abnormal hardware device by extracting the reference device information from the device identity certificate, and achieve the effect of accurate asset management and control.

[0167] The application further provides a device information protection apparatus. Please refer to FIG. 7, which is a structural schematic diagram of a device information protection apparatus 700 provided by the application.

[0168] The device information protection apparatus can be a BMC, which includes a secure core 701 isolated from external environment access, and the secure core 701 specifically includes a certificate chain generation module 7011, a certificate signature module 7012, a UDS 7013 and a certificate extension module 7014.

[0169] In addition, for the convenience of understanding, the functions of the BMC are divided as follows: hardware management 702, firmware management 703 and identity management 704, wherein:

[0170] The hardware management 702 includes a hardware scanning module 7021, a data reporting module 7022 and a hardware signature verification module 7023, wherein:

[0171] The hardware scanning module 7021 is configured to acquire hardware device information that can be directly acquired by the BMC, such as information of hardware devices such as CPU and memory in the whole machine device.

[0172] The data reporting module 7022 is configured to acquire hardware device information that needs to be reported through the BIOS, such as information of hardware devices such as GPU and board card in the whole machine device.

[0173] The hardware signature verification module 7023 is configured to perform signature verification on the hardware device information after the hardware device information including the signature is acquired, such as performing signature verification based on the ECC signature when a certain GPU or board card carries the CSR and the corresponding ECC signature.

[0174] The firmware management 703 includes a firmware digest generation module 7031 and a firmware certificate management module 7032, wherein:

[0175] The firmware digest generation module 7031 is configured to acquire firmware information of the BMC and perform hash calculation on the firmware information to obtain a firmware hash value after the BMC performs secure boot through the secure core.

[0176] The firmware certificate management module 7032 is configured to input the firmware hash value into the secure core and call the certificate signature module 7012 of the secure core 701 to sign the firmware hash value based on a trusted certificate to generate a firmware identity certificate. The trusted certificate is generated by the certificate chain generation module 7011 based on the UDS 7013 in the secure core 701; and the firmware hash value is configured to the firmware identity certificate by the certificate extension module 7014.

[0177] The identity management 704 includes a device information acquisition module 7041, a device certificate management module 7042, a device difference detection module 7043, and a device exception alarm module 7044, wherein:

[0178] The device information acquisition module 7041 is configured to acquire reference device information, the reference device information being device information of an initial hardware device, and specifically including summarizing hardware device information collected by the hardware scanning module 7021 and the data reporting module 7022. The device information can include a device type, a slot number, a device identification code, and the like.

[0179] The device certificate management module 7042 is configured to call a certificate signing module 7012 of the security core 701, sign the reference device information based on a firmware identity certificate, generate a device identity certificate, and use the device identity certificate to extract the reference device information when a target hash value does not match a reference hash value. The target hash value is obtained by performing a hash value calculation on target device information, and the target device information is device information of a target hardware device. The reference hash value is obtained by performing a hash value calculation on the reference device information. The reference device information is configured to the device identity certificate by the certificate extension module 7014.

[0180] The device difference detection module 7043 is configured to acquire target device information and a target hash value after the BMC is restarted. If the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, the security core is called to extract the reference device information from the device identity certificate. The reference device information is compared with the target device information to determine an abnormal hardware device that is inconsistent with the initial hardware device in the target hardware device.

[0181] The device exception alarm module 7044 is configured to generate and output an exception alarm, and the exception alarm indicates an abnormal hardware device.

[0182] In a possible implementation method, the method further includes:

[0183] The changing module is configured to acquire signed changed device information, the changed device information being device information of a changed first device; perform operations; change the reference device information corresponding to the first device to the changed device information after verifying the changed device information and passing the verification; and call the security core to update the device identity certificate based on the changed device information.

[0184] In a possible implementation method, the changing module is further configured to update the reference hash value based on the changed device information.

[0185] In a possible implementation method, the method further includes:

[0186] The certificate verification module is configured to, after the BMC is restarted, call the secure kernel, and verify the validity of the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate. If the validity verification of the device identity certificate passes, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained by the device information obtaining module 7041.

[0187] In a possible implementation method, the certificate verification module is specifically configured to, after the BMC is restarted, call the secure kernel, and verify the validity of the firmware identity certificate based on the trusted certificate. If the validity verification of the firmware identity certificate passes, the secure kernel is called to verify the validity of the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate.

[0188] The application further provides a computing device, please refer to Fig. 8, which is a structural schematic diagram of the computing device provided by the embodiment of the application. The computing device can be used to execute the computer program or computer instruction in the memory to execute the method in the embodiment shown in Figs. 4-6. Please refer to the related description in the above method embodiment.

[0189] The computing device includes a processor 801. Optionally, the communication device further includes a memory 802 and a transceiver 803.

[0190] The embodiment of the application further provides a computer program product including instructions, which, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the communication method of the embodiment shown in Figs. 4-6.

[0191] The embodiment of the application further provides a computer readable storage medium including computer instructions, which, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of the embodiment shown in Figs. 4-6.

[0192] The embodiment of the application further provides a chip device including a processor, which is configured to be connected to a memory, and call the program stored in the memory to make the processor execute the method of the embodiment shown in Figs. 4-6.

[0193] Any processor mentioned above can be a general central processing unit, a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits for controlling the execution of the program of the method of the embodiment shown in Fig. 6. Any memory mentioned above can be a read-only memory (ROM) or other type of static storage device that can store static information and instructions, a random access memory (RAM), etc.

[0194] Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0195] In several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic, for example, the division of units is only a logical function division, and actual implementation can have another division manner, for example, a plurality of units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the units shown or discussed can be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0196] The units described as separate components can or can not be physically separate, and the components shown as units can or can not be physical units, that is, they can be located in one place, or can be distributed on a plurality of network units. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the embodiment scheme.

[0197] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application can be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit can be physically present separately, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.

[0198] If the integrated unit is realized in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solutions of the present application essentially or the part of the prior art that makes a contribution or the whole or part of the technical solutions can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes a plurality of instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the embodiments of the method of the present application. The foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and various program code storage media.

Claims

1. A device information protection method characterized by comprising: A baseboard management controller (BMC) includes a secure core isolated from external environment access; The method comprises: calling the secure core, signing a firmware hash value based on a trusted certificate to generate a firmware identity certificate, the firmware hash value being obtained by hashing firmware information of the BMC; obtaining reference device information, the reference device information being device information of an initial hardware device; calling the secure core, signing the reference device information based on the firmware identity certificate to generate a device identity certificate, the device identity certificate being used to extract the reference device information when a target hash value does not match a reference hash value, wherein the target hash value is obtained by hashing target device information, the target device information being the device information of a target hardware device, and the reference hash value is obtained by hashing the reference device information.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, Before the calling the secure core, signing a firmware hash value based on a trusted certificate to generate a firmware identity certificate, the method further comprises: performing a secure boot on the BMC through the secure core; obtaining the firmware information; hashing the firmware information to obtain the firmware hash value.

3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The device information comprises first information obtained by the BMC and second information obtained by a basic input / output system (BIOS); The obtaining reference device information comprises: obtaining the first information and the second information; summarizing the first information and the second information to obtain the reference device information.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, The initial hardware device comprises a first device; After the calling the secure core, signing the reference device information based on the firmware identity certificate to generate a device identity certificate, the method further comprises: obtaining signed changed device information, the changed device information being device information of a changed first device; performing a signature verification operation on the changed device information; if the signature verification is passed, changing reference device information corresponding to the first device to the changed device information; calling the secure core, updating the device identity certificate based on the changed device information.

5. The method of claim 4, wherein, After the if the signature verification is passed, changing reference device information corresponding to the first device to the changed device information, the method further comprises: updating the reference hash value based on the changed device information.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that, The device information comprises a device identification code, and further comprises a device type and / or a slot number.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that, After the calling the secure core, signing the reference device information based on the firmware identity certificate to generate a device identity certificate, the method further comprises: after the BMC is restarted, obtaining the target device information and the target hash value; if the target hash value does not match the reference hash value, calling the secure core to extract the reference device information from the device identity certificate; comparing the reference device information with the target device information to determine an abnormal hardware device inconsistent with the initial hardware device in the target hardware device.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein, The after the BMC is restarted, obtaining the target device information and the target hash value, comprises: After the BMC is restarted, the secure core is invoked to verify the validity of the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate; If the validity verification of the device identity certificate passes, the target device information and the target hash value are obtained.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein, The step of verifying the validity of the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate after the BMC is restarted includes: After the BMC is restarted, the secure core is invoked to verify the validity of the firmware identity certificate based on the trusted certificate; If the validity verification of the firmware identity certificate passes, the secure core is invoked to verify the validity of the device identity certificate based on the firmware identity certificate.

10. The method according to any one of claims 7 to 9, characterized in that, After the reference device information is compared with the target device information, and the abnormal hardware device inconsistent with the initial hardware device is determined in the target hardware device, the method further includes: An abnormal alarm is generated and output, and the abnormal alarm indicates the abnormal hardware device.

11. An apparatus information protection device, characterized by comprising: The secure core isolated from external environment access further includes: A firmware certificate management module is configured to invoke the secure core to sign a firmware hash value based on a trusted certificate to generate a firmware identity certificate, wherein the firmware hash value is obtained by performing a hash value calculation on firmware information of the BMC. A device information acquisition module is configured to acquire reference device information, wherein the reference device information is device information of an initial hardware device. A device certificate management module is configured to invoke the secure core to sign the reference device information based on the firmware identity certificate to generate a device identity certificate, wherein the device identity certificate is used to extract the reference device information when a target hash value does not match a reference hash value, the target hash value is obtained by performing a hash value calculation on target device information, the target device information is the device information of a target hardware device, and the reference hash value is obtained by performing a hash value calculation on the reference device information.

12. A computing device, comprising: The processor is configured to execute a computer program or computer instructions in the memory to perform the method in any one of claims 1 to 10. The instructions, when executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to perform the method in any one of claims 1 to 10.

13. A computer program product comprising instructions, characterized in that, The computer program instructions, when executed by a computing device, cause the computing device to perform the method in any one of claims 1 to 10.

14. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The processor is configured to be connected to the memory and invoke a program stored in the memory to cause the processor to perform the method in any one of claims 1 to 10.

15. A chip device, characterized by ​

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