Key updating method, communication apparatus, and readable storage medium
By generating a first key after re-authentication on the first network and sending a key update request to the second network, the problem of insecure keys after authentication on 5G and IMS networks is solved, thereby improving the security of data transmission.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/CN2026/094623
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2025-05-06
- Filing Date
- 2026-04-30
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-12
AI Technical Summary
After authentication with 5G and IMS networks, the key used by the UE to communicate with the IMS network is no longer secure, resulting in reduced data transmission security. How can we implement key updates for another network to ensure data transmission security?
After the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, it generates a first key and sends a key update request message to the second network, instructing the second network to update the key so that the second network can establish a secure communication connection with the terminal device.
It effectively ensures the security of data communication between the second network and terminal devices, and improves the security of data transmission through key updates.
Smart Images

Figure CN2026094623_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
A key update method, communication device and readable storage medium
[0001] This application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 202510577936.9, filed on May 6, 2025, entitled "A Key Update Method, Communication Device and Readable Storage Medium", the entire contents of which are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field
[0002] This application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a key update method, a communication device, and a readable storage medium. Background Technology
[0003] User Equipment (UE) can register with the operator's network through the access network to use operator services. During the registration process, the operator's network needs to authenticate the UE to confirm whether the UE is a legitimate user authorized to access the core network. For example, in one application scenario, when a user uses voice services on the Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, the UE needs to first undergo 5G network authentication and then IMS network authentication. The key used by the IMS network can be derived from the key generated during 5G network authentication. However, during 5G network re-authentication, the 5G network updates the key. At this time, the key derived from the 5G network used by the UE to communicate with the IMS network will no longer be secure, thus reducing the security of data transmission.
[0004] Therefore, after the 5G network and IMS network have completed authentication with the UE in sequence, how to update the key of the other network and the UE communicating with the other network to ensure the security of data transmission after re-authentication on one network has become an urgent technical problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention
[0005] This application provides a key update method, communication device, and readable storage medium to solve the technical problem of how to update the key of another network and the UE communicating with the other network after re-authentication on one network in order to ensure data transmission security.
[0006] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a key update method, comprising: a first network function in a first network receiving a first message, the first message being used to request the first network to re-authenticate a terminal device; if the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, based on a preset first indication, the first network function generates a first key for the terminal device and sends a first key update request message to a second network function in a second network; wherein the first key update request message is used to instruct the second network function to update the key, the first key update request message includes the first key, and the first key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal device and the second network.
[0007] In this technical solution, after the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, based on a preset first instruction, the first network function generates a first key and sends a first key update request message, including the first key, to the second network function of the second network to instruct the second network function to update the key, so that the second network and the terminal device can establish a secure communication connection based on the first key. This ensures that the second network can also update its key after the first network re-authenticates, thereby effectively guaranteeing the security of data communication between the second network and the terminal device.
[0008] In one implementation, the first network function stores a second key, which is generated when the first network successfully authenticates the terminal device once. The implementation further includes: the first network function determining a third key and updating the stored second key to the third key; wherein the third key is a key between the terminal device and the first network function generated when the first network re-authenticates the terminal device.
[0009] In one implementation, the first network and the terminal device establish a secure communication connection based on the key derived from the third key.
[0010] In one implementation, based on a preset first instruction, the first network function generates a first key for the terminal device according to the third key.
[0011] In one implementation, before the first network function in the first network receives the first message, it further includes:
[0012] The first network function receives a second message, which is used to request authentication of the terminal device;
[0013] If the terminal device is successfully authenticated, the first network function generates a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier;
[0014] The first network function sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the terminal device;
[0015] The first network function generates a fourth key and a first indication, wherein the fourth key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal device and the second network;
[0016] The first network function sends the fourth key to the second network function.
[0017] In one implementation, the first key update request message includes: the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, and the fourth key.
[0018] In one implementation, the first key update request message further includes: a second temporary identifier and a second key identifier; wherein the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier are generated by the first network function when the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device.
[0019] In one implementation, before the first network function in the first network receives the first message, the method further includes:
[0020] The first network function generates a third temporary identifier;
[0021] The first network function sends the third temporary identifier to the second network function.
[0022] In one implementation, the first key update request message further includes a fourth temporary identifier; wherein, if the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, the first network function generates the fourth temporary identifier and updates the third temporary identifier to the fourth temporary identifier.
[0023] In one implementation, the first key update request message further includes the first indication.
[0024] In one implementation, the first network is a cellular communication network, and the function of the first network is authentication service; the second network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, and the function of the second network is service call session control; or, the first network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, and the function of the first network is service call session control; the second network is a cellular communication network, and the function of the second network is authentication service.
[0025] In one implementation, the Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network includes a Multimodal Communication System (MCS) network or a next-generation IMS network.
[0026] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a key update method, comprising: a second network function in a second network receiving a first key update request message from a first network function in a first network, the first key update request message being used to instruct the second network function to update a key; the second network function updating the key according to the first key update request message to obtain a first key of a terminal device; the second network function sending a second key update request message to the terminal device; wherein the second key update request message being used to instruct the terminal device to update the key to obtain the first key; and establishing a secure communication connection between the second network and the terminal device based on the first key.
[0027] In this technical solution, after receiving the first key update request message, the second network function updates the key and establishes a secure communication connection with the terminal device based on the updated first key. This effectively improves the security of data communication.
[0028] In one implementation, before the second network function in the second network receives the first key update request message from the first network function in the first network, the method further includes:
[0029] The second network function receives a third message, which is used to request authentication of the terminal device; wherein, the third message includes a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier, which are generated by the first network function when the first network successfully authenticates the terminal device once;
[0030] The second network function receives a fourth message, which includes a fourth key and a third temporary identifier; wherein the fourth key is used to protect the communication security between the terminal device and the second network;
[0031] The second network function generates a third key identifier;
[0032] The second network function stores the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, the third temporary identifier, the third key identifier, and the fourth key.
[0033] In one implementation, the first key update request message includes the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, and the first key; the second network function determines the fourth key based on the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier; the second network function updates the fourth key to the first key based on the first key update request message and the first policy.
[0034] In one implementation, the second network function determines the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier based on the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier; the second network function sends a second key update request message to the terminal device; wherein the second key update request message includes the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier.
[0035] In one implementation, the first key update request message includes a first instruction and further includes: the second network function updates the key according to the first instruction and the first policy.
[0036] In one implementation, the first strategy includes: updating the key during second network re-authentication; or updating the key upon receiving a key update instruction; or updating the key when the terminal device is determined to be in an idle state; or updating the key immediately.
[0037] In one implementation, the first key update request message includes a second temporary identifier and a second key identifier, wherein the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier are generated by the first network function when the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device. The implementation further includes: the second network function sending the second key update request message to the terminal device, wherein the second key update request message includes the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier.
[0038] Thirdly, embodiments of this application provide a key update method. The execution subject of this method can be a terminal device or a module (such as a chip) in the terminal device. The method includes: sending a first message to a first network function in a first network, the first message being used to request the first network to re-authenticate the terminal device; if the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, receiving a second key update request message from a second network function in a second network; updating the key according to the second key update request message to obtain a first key of the terminal device; and establishing a secure communication connection between the terminal device and the second network based on the first key.
[0039] In this technical solution, the key is updated based on the received second key update request message, and a secure communication connection with the second network is established based on the updated first key, which effectively improves the security of data communication.
[0040] In one implementation, the terminal device stores a second key, which is generated when the first network successfully authenticates the terminal device once; the method further includes: determining a third key and updating the stored second key to the third key; wherein the third key is a key between the terminal device and the first network function generated when the first network re-authenticates the terminal device.
[0041] In one implementation, the second key update request message includes a third temporary identifier and a third key identifier, wherein the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier are stored by the second network function when the second network successfully authenticates the terminal device once; the method further includes: determining the third key based on the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier; and determining the first key based on the third key.
[0042] In one implementation, the first key of the terminal device is obtained by updating the key according to the second key update request message and the second policy.
[0043] In one implementation, the second key update request message includes a first instruction; the key is updated according to the first instruction and a second strategy to obtain the first key of the terminal device.
[0044] Fourthly, embodiments of this application provide a key update method, the execution subject of which can be a terminal device or a module (such as a chip) in the terminal device, the method comprising:
[0045] A first message is sent to a first network function in a first network, the first message being used to request the first network to re-authenticate the terminal device; if the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, a first key is generated based on a preset first instruction, and a third key update request message is sent to a second network function in a second network, wherein the third key update request message is used to instruct the second network function to update the key to obtain the first key; based on the first key, a secure communication connection is established between the terminal device and the second network.
[0046] In this technical solution, a first key is generated based on a preset first instruction, and a third key update request message is sent to the second network function to instruct the second network function to update the key. Based on the first key, a secure communication connection is established between the terminal device and the second network, thereby effectively improving the security of data communication.
[0047] In one implementation, a fifth message is received from a first network function in a first network, the fifth message indicating that the first network has successfully re-authenticated the terminal device; wherein the fifth message includes a second temporary identifier and a second key identifier; the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier are generated by the first network function when the re-authentication between the first network and the terminal device is successful.
[0048] In one implementation, before sending the first message to the first network function in the first network, the method further includes: receiving a sixth message from the second network function in the second network, wherein the sixth message includes a third temporary identifier, which is received by the second network function from the first network function when the second network successfully authenticates the terminal device once.
[0049] In one implementation, the third key update request message includes the second temporary identifier, the second key identifier, and the third temporary identifier.
[0050] In one implementation, after receiving the fifth message from the first network function in the first network, the method further includes: determining a third key based on the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier; and deriving the first key based on the third key according to the first indication; wherein the third key is generated when the terminal device is successfully re-authenticated by the first network.
[0051] In one implementation, after receiving the fifth message from the first network function in the first network, the method further includes: determining a second key based on the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier; updating the second key to the third key; wherein the second key is generated when the first network successfully authenticates the terminal device once.
[0052] Fifthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device. The communication device includes at least one processor that executes instructions stored in a memory to cause the communication device to perform the operations described in the first aspect.
[0053] Sixthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device. The communication device includes at least one processor that executes instructions stored in a memory to cause the communication device to perform the operations described in the second aspect above.
[0054] In a seventh aspect, embodiments of this application provide a communication device. The communication device includes at least one processor that executes instructions stored in a memory to cause the communication device to perform the operations described in the third aspect above.
[0055] Eighthly, embodiments of this application provide a communication device. The communication device includes at least one processor that executes instructions stored in a memory to cause the communication device to perform the operations described in the fourth aspect above.
[0056] In one possible design, the communication device may further include the memory. The memory may be integrated with the processor or it may be disposed separately.
[0057] A ninth aspect provides a computer-readable storage medium comprising: a computer program or instructions; which, when executed on a computer, causes the computer to perform the authentication method described in any of the possible implementations above.
[0058] In a tenth aspect, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program or instructions that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the authentication method described in any of the possible implementations above. Attached Figure Description
[0059] Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the network architecture of a communication system;
[0060] Figure 2 is a flowchart illustrating a key update method provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0061] Figure 3 is a flowchart illustrating another key update method provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0062] Figure 4 is a flowchart illustrating another key update method provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0063] Figure 5 is a flowchart illustrating another key update method provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0064] Figure 6 is a flowchart illustrating another key update method provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0065] Figure 7 is a flowchart illustrating another key update method provided in an embodiment of this application;
[0066] Figure 8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation
[0067] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. The terms "first," "second," and corresponding designations in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such terms are interchangeable where appropriate; this is merely a way of distinguishing objects with the same attributes in the embodiments of this application. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of units is not necessarily limited to those units, but may include other units not explicitly listed or inherent to those processes, methods, products, or apparatuses. Additionally, words such as "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate example, illustration, or description. Any embodiment or design described as "exemplary" or "for example" in this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or designs. Specifically, the use of words such as "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.
[0068] The technical solution provided in this application can be applied to various communication systems, such as: 5th generation (5G) communication systems (or new radio (NR) systems), 4th generation (4G) communication systems (or long term evolution (LTE) systems), LTE frequency division duplex (FDD) systems, and LTE time division duplex (TDD) systems. The technical solution provided in this application can also be applied to future communication systems, such as 6th generation (6G) mobile communication systems.
[0069] In various communication systems, the portion operated by the operator can be referred to as the operator network. The operator network, also known as the public land mobile network (PLMN), is a network established and operated by the government or government-approved operators for the purpose of providing terrestrial mobile communication services to the public. It is primarily a public network where mobile network operators (MNOs) provide mobile broadband access services to users. The operator network or PLMN network described in this application embodiment can be a network conforming to the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard requirements, abbreviated as 3GPP network. Typically, 3GPP networks are operated by operators and include, but are not limited to, 5th-generation (5G) networks, 4th-generation (4G) networks, or 3rd-generation (3G) networks. It also includes future communication systems such as 6G networks.
[0070] To better understand the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of this application, the technical terms involved in the embodiments of this application will be introduced.
[0071] The following example, with reference to Figure 1, illustrates a communication system applicable to an embodiment of this application. It should be understood that the communication system described in this application is merely an example and should not be construed as limiting the scope of this application.
[0072] Figure 1 illustrates a network architecture diagram of a communication system applicable to the method provided in the embodiments of this application. As shown in Figure 1, the communication system may include: a user equipment (UE), a radio access network (RAN), a 5G core network (5GC), and an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) core network.
[0073] User equipment (UE), also known as terminal equipment, is a device with wireless transceiver capabilities as described in this application embodiment. It can communicate with one or more core networks via access network devices in a wireless access network. UE can also be referred to as an access terminal, terminal, user unit, user station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, remote terminal, mobile device, user terminal, wireless network equipment, user agent, or user device, etc. UE can be deployed on land, including indoors or outdoors, handheld or vehicle-mounted; it can also be deployed on water (such as on ships); and it can be deployed in the air (e.g., on airplanes, balloons, and satellites). The UE can be a cellular phone, cordless phone, session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, smartphone, mobile phone, wireless local loop (WLL) station, personal digital assistant (PDA), handheld device with wireless communication capabilities, computing device or other device connected to a wireless modem, in-vehicle device, wearable device, drone device or Internet of Things (IoT) or terminal in vehicle network, terminal in any form in 5G mobile communication network and future network, relay user equipment or terminal in future evolved public land mobile network (PLMN), etc. Among them, relay user equipment can be, for example, a 5G residential gateway (RG). For example, the UE can be a virtual reality (VR) terminal, an augmented reality (AR) terminal, a wireless terminal in industrial control, a wireless terminal in self-driving, a wireless terminal in remote medical care, a wireless terminal in a smart grid, a wireless terminal in transportation safety, a wireless terminal in a smart city, a wireless terminal in a smart home, etc. This application does not limit this.
[0074] Radio Access Network (RAN): To access an operator's network, a UE can connect to the operator's network service nodes through the Radio Access Network (RAN). The RAN device in this embodiment is a device that provides wireless communication functions for the UE; it can also be called a network device. RAN devices include, but are not limited to: next-generation node base stations (gNBs) in 5G systems, evolved node Bs (eNBs) in Long Term Evolution (LTE), radio network controllers (RNCs), node Bs (NBs), base station controllers (BSCs), base transceiver stations (BTSs), home base stations (e.g., home evolved node Bs or home node Bs (HNBs)), base band units (BBUs), transmitting and receiving points (TRPs), transmitting points (TPs), small cell equipment (picos), mobile switching centers, or network devices in future networks. It can also be a wireless controller in a cloud radio access network (CRAN) scenario, or the wireless access network device can be a relay station, access point, vehicle-mounted equipment, drone, wearable device, or network equipment in a 5G network or an evolved PLMN, etc. In systems employing different wireless access technologies, the names of devices with access network device functions may differ. For ease of description, in all embodiments of this application, the aforementioned devices providing wireless communication functions for the UE are collectively referred to as access network devices or simply RAN or AN. It should be understood that this document does not limit the specific type of access network device.
[0075] Core network: This can be a 5G core network, an evolved packet core (EPC), or a network used in future communication systems, such as 6th generation (6G) mobile communication systems. The IMS core network is built on top of the 5G core network and provides converged access to voice, video, messaging, data, and web-based technologies for wireless and wired users. Figure 1 uses 5GC and IMS core networks as examples, and they are referred to as the 5G network and IMS network, respectively.
[0076] 5G networks may include, but are not limited to, the following network functions:
[0077] Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF, also known as AMF network element, AMF network function, or AMF network function entity) is a control plane network function provided by the operator's network. It is responsible for the access control and mobility management of the UE accessing the operator's network, including functions such as mobility state management, assigning temporary user identities, authenticating and authorizing users, etc.
[0078] The Security Anchor Function (SEAF, also known as SEAF network element, SEAF network function, or SEAF network function entity) is mainly responsible for functions related to network security anchors. This SEAF network element can be an independent network element in the system architecture, or it can be a network element co-located with existing functional entities, such as on the AMF network element, or it can be placed on other network elements.
[0079] The Session Management Function (SMF, also known as an SMF network element, SMF network function, or SMF network function entity) is a control plane network function provided by the operator's network, responsible for managing the UE's Protocol Data Unit (PDU) sessions. A PDU session is a channel used to transmit PDUs; terminal devices need to exchange PDUs with the data network (DN) through PDU sessions. The SMF network function is responsible for establishing, maintaining, and deleting PDU sessions. The SMF network function includes session management (such as session establishment, modification, and release, including tunnel maintenance between the User Plane Function (UPF) and the RAN), selection and control of UPF network functions, service and session continuity (SSC) mode selection, roaming, and other session-related functions.
[0080] The Unified Data Management (UDM) network element (also known as UDM network element, UDM network function, or UDM network function entity) is a control plane function provided by the operator. It is responsible for storing information such as the subscriber permanent identifier (SUPI), the generic public subscription identifier (GPSI), and the credential for subscribed users within the operator's network. The SUPI is encrypted during transmission; the encrypted SUPI is called the subscription concealed identifier (SUCI). This information stored in the UDM can be used for UE authentication and authorization when accessing the operator's network. Specifically, the subscribed user in the operator's network can be a user using services provided by the operator's network, such as a user using a China Telecom SIM card or a China Mobile SIM card. The credential for the subscribed user can be a small file containing a long-term key stored on the SIM card or information related to the SIM card's encryption, used for authentication and / or authorization. It should be noted that the permanent identifier, credential, security context, authentication data (cookie), and token are equivalent to information related to verification / authentication and authorization.
[0081] The Authentication Service Function (AUSF) is a control plane function provided by the operator, typically used for primary authentication, i.e., authentication between terminal device 110 (the subscribed user) and the operator's network. After receiving an authentication request from the subscribed user, the AUSF can authenticate and / or authorize the subscribed user using the authentication and / or authorization information stored in the UDM network function, or generate the subscribed user's authentication and / or authorization information using the UDM network function. The AUSF network function can then send the authentication and / or authorization information back to the subscribed user.
[0082] IMS network: Internet Protocol (IP) Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, used to manage IP packets, distinguish between the signaling portion and the multimedia data portion of IP packets, authenticate the UE by processing the signaling portion, and provide audio and video services to the UE by processing the multimedia data portion. In the future, the IMS network may also be called a Multimodal Communication System (MCS) network, a next-generation IMS network, etc. This invention does not limit the name; any network built on the core network that provides converged access to voice, video, messaging, data, and web-based technologies for wireless and wired users can be an IMS network.
[0083] An IMS network may include, but is not limited to, the following network functions:
[0084] P-CSCF: Proxy Call Session Control Function (P-CSCF), the unified entry point for IMS visiting the network. Its main functions include forwarding SIP registration requests initiated by user equipment to I-CSCF and forwarding SIP messages sent by UE to S-CSCF.
[0085] I-CSCF: Interrogating CSCF (I-CSCF), the entry point to the IMS network. Its main functions include: During registration, the I-CSCF assigns a Service-Specific CSCF (S-CSCF) to the user based on information obtained from the UDM and forwards the registration request to that S-CSCF. During the session, the I-CSCF queries the UDM to obtain the S-CSCF address and, based on that address, forwards SIP requests or responses to the S-CSCF.
[0086] S-CSCF (Serving CSCF) plays a central role in IMS network session control. Its main functions include: during registration, receiving registration requests forwarded by P-CSCF, interacting with the UDM to authenticate users, and updating user registration status information on the UDM. After successful registration and authentication, it downloads user-related information from the UDM, provides service-related information to terminal devices, and controls the terminal device's session. It also obtains the I-CSCF address and forwards SIP requests or responses to the I-CSCF.
[0087] In addition, the following terms used in the embodiments of this application are explained:
[0088] IMPI: Internet Protocol Multimedia Private Identity (IMPI), used for user registration, authentication, and billing when accessing the IMS network. It is a user identity identifier defined by the network operator and is globally unique. One private identifier corresponds to one physical terminal.
[0089] IMPU: Internet Protocol multimedia public identity (IMPU), used for routing Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) messages. An IMS user can assign one or more IMPUs.
[0090] In Figure 1, Nausf, Nudm, Namf, Nsmf, N1, and N2 are interface sequence numbers. The meanings of these interface sequence numbers can be found in the 3GPP standard protocols, and will not be elaborated upon here. It should be noted that Figure 1 uses the User Equipment (UE) as an example only, and the interface names between the various network functions in Figure 1 are merely examples. In specific implementations, the interface names in this system architecture may be other names, which are not specifically limited.
[0091] For ease of explanation, this application uses the Mobility Management Network Function (AMF) as an example in its embodiments. It can also be other network functions with the aforementioned AMF in future communication systems. Alternatively, the Mobility Management Network Function in this application can also be the Mobility Management Entity (MME) in LTE, etc. The AMF network function is abbreviated as AMF or AMF element, and the user equipment is referred to as UE. In the embodiments of this application, AMF can be replaced with the Mobility Management Network Function, and UE can be replaced with the user equipment; the user equipment can also include, but is not limited to, terminal equipment, smart terminals, smart devices, etc.
[0092] This application uses the authentication service function AUSF as an example for illustration. The authentication service function can also be other network functions with the aforementioned AUSF function in future communication systems. Furthermore, AUSF will be abbreviated as AUSF or AUSF network element, and the AUSF described below in this application embodiment can be replaced with authentication service function, authentication function entity, or authentication service function entity, etc.
[0093] This application uses Unified Data Management (UDM) as an example for illustration. Unified Data Management can also be other network functions with the aforementioned UDM functionality in future communication systems.
[0094] It is understood that the above naming is defined solely for the purpose of distinguishing different functions and should not constitute any limitation on this application. This application does not preclude the possibility of using other naming conventions in 5G networks and other future networks. For example, in 6G networks, some or all of the above-mentioned network elements may use the terminology from 5G, or they may use other names. The network architecture and service scenarios described in this application are for the purpose of more clearly illustrating the technical solutions of this application and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions provided in this application. As those skilled in the art will understand, with the evolution of network architecture and the emergence of new service scenarios, the various network functions involved in this application may change, and the technical solutions provided in this application are equally applicable to similar technical problems.
[0095] Currently, to ensure network security, an authentication process is required for user equipment accessing the network, namely, identity authentication and authorization of the user equipment. User equipment can only access the network after successful authentication. Furthermore, changes in security policies, such as key leakage, loss of trust in the network or UE, invalidation of the security context, or periodic registration, will trigger a network re-authentication process to update the keys.
[0096] This invention provides a key update method. This key update method is applied in a scenario where a first network re-authenticates and updates the key for a terminal device (UE). After the first network re-authenticates the terminal device, the first network function updates the key and sends a first key update request to a second network function in a second network. Then, the second network function updates the key based on the first key update request and sends a second key update request message to the terminal device, which then updates the key based on the second key update request.
[0097] The specific implementation process, as shown in Figure 2, includes the following steps:
[0098] S210. A first message is sent to a first network function in the first network, the first message being used to request the first network to re-authenticate the terminal device; correspondingly, the first network function in the first network receives the first message.
[0099] The first message is an authentication request message. Based on this authentication request message, the first network executes a re-authentication process for the terminal device.
[0100] In one possible implementation, the first network may be a cellular communication network, for example, a 5G network, and the first network function is an Authentication Service Function (AUSF); the second network is an IMS network, and the second network function is a Service Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF).
[0101] In one possible implementation, the first network may also be an IMS network, and the function of the first network is Service Call Session Control Function (S-CSCF); the second network may be a cellular communication network, for example, a 5G network, and the function of the second network is Authentication Service Function (AUSF).
[0102] It is understood that in the embodiments of this application, if the first network is a 5G network and its function is AUSF, then the second network is an IMS network and its function is S-CSCF. Conversely, if the first network is an IMS network and its function is S-CSCF, then the second network is a 5G network and its function is AUSF. Further details will not be elaborated upon in the specific implementations that follow in this application.
[0103] Before step S210, there is also a step S200 where the first network performs an initial authentication on the terminal device, which specifically includes the following steps:
[0104] Step 1: The first network function receives a second message, which is used to request authentication of the terminal device.
[0105] The second message can be a registration request message sent by the terminal device, used to request authentication of the terminal device when accessing the first network.
[0106] Step 2: If the terminal device is successfully authenticated, the first network function generates a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier.
[0107] During the authentication process of the terminal device, the first network function can also generate a second key and save the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier and the second key locally. The second key is the key between the terminal device and the first network function.
[0108] In one possible implementation, when the first network is a 5G network and its function is AUSF, the second key is K. AUSF The first temporary identifier is UEID#2, and the first key identifier is KID#2.
[0109] In one possible implementation, the first network is an IMS network, and when the first network function is S-CSCF, the second key is K. IMS The first temporary identifier is UEID#3, and the first key identifier is KID#3.
[0110] Step 3: The first network function sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the terminal device.
[0111] After successful authentication of the terminal device, the first network function sends an authentication response message to the terminal device, which includes a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier; the terminal device saves the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, and the second key locally.
[0112] Step 4: The terminal device sends a third message to the second network function in the second network, the third message including the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier.
[0113] The third message can be a registration request message, used to request access to the second network; the registration request message includes a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier.
[0114] Step 5: The second network function sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the first network function.
[0115] The second network function sends a key request message to the first network function, which includes a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier.
[0116] Step 6: The first network function determines the second key based on the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier, and deduces the fourth key based on the second key.
[0117] After deriving the fourth key, the first network function can further generate a first indication and a third temporary identifier, and save the first temporary identifier, first key identifier, third temporary identifier, second key, fourth key, and first indication locally. For example, the first indication is generated and set to true. It can be understood that when the first indication is true, it indicates that the first network and the second network have successfully authenticated the terminal device, and the terminal device needs to access the second network.
[0118] In one possible implementation, when the first network is a 5G network and its function is AUSF, the fourth key is K. IMS The third temporary identifier is UEID#3, and the first indication is IMS association indication.
[0119] In one possible implementation, when the first network is an IMS network and its function is S-CSCF, the fourth key is K. AUSF The third temporary identifier is UEID#2, and the first indication is the 5GC association indication.
[0120] Step 7: The first network function sends a fourth message to the second network function, the fourth message including the fourth key and the third temporary identifier.
[0121] The fourth message can be a key response message. For example, in response to a key request message sent by a second network function, a first network function sends a key response message to the second network function, which includes the fourth key and the third temporary identifier.
[0122] The second network function can also generate a third key identifier, and the second network function saves the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, the third temporary identifier, the third key identifier and the fourth key.
[0123] In one possible implementation, when the second network is an IMS network and its function is S-CSCF, the third key identifier can be represented as KID#3. It can be understood that the S-CSCF locally stores the first temporary identifier UEID#2, the first key identifier KID#2, the third temporary identifier UEID#3, the third key identifier KID#3, and the fourth key K. IMS .
[0124] In one possible implementation, when the second network is a 5G network and its function is AUSF, the third key identifier can be represented as KID#2. It can be understood that AUSF locally stores the first temporary identifier UEID#3, the first key identifier KID#3, the third temporary identifier UEID#2, the third key identifier KID#2, and the fourth key K. AUSF .
[0125] Based on the fourth key, the second network establishes a secure communication connection with the terminal device to protect the communication security between the second network and the terminal device.
[0126] Step 8: The second network function sends a sixth message to the terminal device. The sixth message includes the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier. Then, the terminal device saves the third temporary identifier, the third key identifier, and the fourth key locally. For example, after authentication in step S200, the terminal device locally stores UEID#2, KID#2, UEID#3, KID#3, and K... AUSF and K IMS .
[0127] In one possible implementation, the first network function stores a second key; the first network function determines a third key and updates the stored second key with the third key. For example, during the re-authentication process of the terminal device, the first network function generates a third key, indexes the locally stored second key based on a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier, and then updates the second key with the third key. The second key was generated when the first network successfully authenticated the terminal device previously.
[0128] S220. If the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, the first network function generates the first key of the terminal device based on a preset first instruction.
[0129] Specifically, based on a preset first instruction, the first network function generates the first key of the terminal device according to the third key.
[0130] In one possible implementation, when the first network is a 5G network and its function is AUSF, the third key is K. AUSF _re, the first key is K IMS _re. For example, if the IMS association indication is true, then AUSF indexes to the local storage K based on UEID#2 and KID#2. AUSF _re, and according to K AUSF _re deduction yields K IMS _re.
[0131] In one possible implementation, the first network is an IMS network, and when the first network function is S-CSCF, the third key is K. IMS _re, the first key is K AUSF _re. For example, if the 5GC association indication is true, then the S-CSCF indexes to the local storage K based on UEID#3 and KID#3. IMS _re, and according to K IMS _re deduction yields K AUSF _re.
[0132] Optionally, if the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, the first network function generates the fourth temporary identifier and updates the third temporary identifier to the fourth temporary identifier. For example, when the first network is a 5G network and the first network function is AUSF, the fourth temporary identifier is UEID#3_re; AUSF generates UEID#3_re and updates the locally stored UEID#3 to UEID#3_re.
[0133] For another example, when the first network is an IMS network and the first network function is S-CSCF, the fourth temporary identifier is UEID#2_re; S-CSCF generates UEID#2_re and updates the locally stored UEID#2 to UEID#2_re.
[0134] Optionally, the first network function may also generate the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier. For example, when the first network function is AUSF, AUSF generates UEID#2_re and KID#2_re. When the first network function is S-CSCF, S-CSCF generates UEID#3_re and KID#3_re.
[0135] S230, the first network function sends a first key update request message to the second network function in the second network. Correspondingly, the second network function receives the first key update request message, which includes the first key. The first key update request message instructs the second network function to update the key.
[0136] In one possible implementation, the first key update request message further includes the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier.
[0137] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S220, if the first network function generates a second temporary identifier and a second key identifier, the first key update request message may further include the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier.
[0138] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S220, if the first network function generates a fourth temporary identifier, the first key update request message may further include the fourth temporary identifier.
[0139] Optionally, the first key update request message may also include the first indication.
[0140] S240. The second network function updates the key according to the first key update request message to obtain the first key.
[0141] Specifically, the second network function updates the fourth key to the first key based on the first key request message and the first policy. For example, the second network function determines the fourth key based on the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier included in the first key request message, and updates the fourth key to the first key based on the first key request message and the first policy.
[0142] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S230, if the first key update request message includes a first indication, the second network function updates the fourth key to the first key according to the first indication and the first policy.
[0143] S250, the second network function sends a second key update request message to the terminal device, and the terminal device receives the second key update request message accordingly.
[0144] The second key update request message includes a third temporary identifier and a third key identifier. For example, the second network function determines the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier based on the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier in the first key update request message; the second network function sends the second key update request message to the terminal device, the second key update request message including the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier.
[0145] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S230, if the first key update request message includes the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier, the second key update request message may further include the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier.
[0146] Optionally, the second key update request message may also include the first indication.
[0147] S260. The terminal device updates the key according to the second key update request message to obtain the first key.
[0148] The terminal device determines the third key based on the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier, and determines the first key based on the third key.
[0149] In one possible implementation, the first key of the terminal device is obtained by updating the key according to the second key update request message and the second policy.
[0150] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S250, if the second key update request message includes the first indication, then the key is updated according to the first indication and the second strategy to obtain the first key of the terminal device.
[0151] S270. Based on the first key, the terminal device establishes a secure communication connection with the obtained second network.
[0152] Based on the established secure communication connection, the communication security between the terminal device and the second network is protected.
[0153] In an alternative implementation, in step 6 of step S200, if the first network function does not generate a third temporary identifier, the first temporary identifier can still serve the same function as the third temporary identifier; similarly, in step 7 of step S200, if the second network function does not generate a third key identifier, the first key identifier can still serve the same function as the third key identifier. It is understood that the third temporary identifier and / or third key identifier appearing in steps 7 and 8, and steps S250 and S260 of step S200 can be replaced with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier to achieve the same function of the key that needs to be updated for the same index. Furthermore, since the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device locally store the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier, it is not necessary to replace the third temporary identifier and / or the third key identifier stored locally by the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier.
[0154] This invention provides another key update method. This key update method is applied in a scenario where a first network re-authenticates and updates the key for a terminal device (UE). After the first network re-authenticates the terminal device, the terminal device sends a third key update request to a second network function in a second network based on a preset first instruction key. The second network function sends a key request message to a first network function in the first network. After updating the key, the first network function sends the updated key to the second network function, and the second network function updates the key based on the received key.
[0155] The specific implementation process, as shown in Figure 3, includes the following steps:
[0156] S310. Send a first message to the first network function in the first network, the first message being used to request the first network to re-authenticate the terminal device; correspondingly, the first network function in the first network receives the first message.
[0157] For the specific implementation process, please refer to step S210 above, which will not be repeated here.
[0158] S320, Receive a fifth message from the first network function in the first network.
[0159] After the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, the first network function sends a fifth message to the terminal device, which is used to indicate that the re-authentication was successful.
[0160] In one possible implementation, the fifth message includes the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier. For example, after successful re-authentication between the first network and the terminal device, the first network function generates the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier, and then sends the fifth message to the terminal device, the fifth message including the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier.
[0161] In one possible implementation, the fifth message can be an authentication response message.
[0162] S330. If the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, a first key is generated based on a preset first instruction.
[0163] Specifically, the first key is derived from the third key based on a preset first indication. For example, if the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, the third key is determined based on the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier, and the first key is derived from the third key based on the preset first indication.
[0164] S340. A third key update request message is sent to the second network function in the second network, and correspondingly, the second network function in the second network receives the third key update request message. The third key update request message is used to instruct the second network function to update the key.
[0165] The third key update request message includes the second temporary identifier, the second key identifier, and the third temporary identifier.
[0166] S350. Based on the key update request message, the second network function sends a key request message to the first network function, and correspondingly, the first network function receives the key request message.
[0167] In one possible implementation, the second network function determines the first network function based on the third temporary identifier, and the second network function sends a key request message to the first network function, the key request message including the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier.
[0168] S360, The first network function updates the key based on the key request message.
[0169] Specifically, the first network function determines the third key based on the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier, and then derives the first key based on the third key.
[0170] S370, the first network function sends a key response message to the second network function, and correspondingly, the second network function receives the key response message; the key response message includes the first key.
[0171] S380. Based on the first key, the second network establishes a secure communication connection with the terminal device.
[0172] Based on the established secure communication connection, the communication security between the terminal device and the second network is protected.
[0173] In an alternative implementation, similar to the aforementioned embodiment, in step 6 of step S300, if the first network function does not generate a third temporary identifier, the first temporary identifier can still function as the third temporary identifier; similarly, in step 7 of step S300, if the second network function does not generate a third key identifier, the first key identifier can still function as the third key identifier. It is understood that the third temporary identifier and / or third key identifier appearing in steps 7 and 8, and steps S340 and S350 of step S300 can be replaced with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier to achieve the same function of the key that needs to be updated for the same index. Furthermore, since the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device locally store the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier, it is not necessary to replace the third temporary identifier and / or the third key identifier stored locally by the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier.
[0174] The descriptions of the keys and identifiers in the embodiments of this application are explained here in a unified manner:
[0175] The key and identifier used during the last authentication:
[0176] K AUSF : Key between UE and AUSF; K IMS The key between the UE and the S-CSCF;
[0177] UEID#2: Temporary identifier used by the UE in the 5G network; KID#2: Key identifier for the UE and AUSF;
[0178] UEID#3: Temporary identifier used by the UE in the IMS network; KID#3: Key identifier between the UE and the S-CSCF;
[0179] The key and identifier used during re-authentication:
[0180] K AUSF _re: The key between the UE and AUSF; K IMS_re: The key between the UE and the S-CSCF;
[0181] UEID#2_re: Temporary identifier used by the UE in the 5G network; KID#2_re: Key identifier for the UE and AUSF;
[0182] UEID#3_re: Temporary identifier used by the UE in the IMS network; KID#3_re: Key identifier for the UE and S-CSCF.
[0183] It should be noted that if the UE is re-authenticated by a 5G network, then the first network is a 5G network, the first network function is AUSF, and therefore, the first temporary identifier is UEID#2, the second temporary identifier is UEID#2_re, the third temporary identifier is UEID#3, and the fourth temporary identifier is UEID#3_re; the first key is K. IMS _re, the second key is K AUSF The third key is K AUSF _re, the fourth key is K IMS The first indication is the IMS association indication.
[0184] Additionally, if the UE is re-authenticated by the IMS network, then the first network is the IMS network, and its function is S-CSCF. Therefore, the first temporary identifier is UEID#3, the second temporary identifier is UEID#3_re, the third temporary identifier is UEID#2, and the fourth temporary identifier is UEID#2_re; the first key is K. AUSF _re, the second key is K IMS The third key is K IMS _re, the fourth key is K AUSF The first indication is the 5G-related indication.
[0185] In subsequent corresponding embodiments, they will not be described separately.
[0186] This invention provides yet another method for updating a key. This method is applied to a scenario where a 5G network re-authenticates and updates the key for a UE (User Equipment). In this scenario, after the 5G network performs primary authentication on the UE, the UE requests authentication from the IMS network using a registration request message. Subsequently, the key is updated during the 5G network's re-authentication of the UE.
[0187] The specific implementation process, as shown in Figure 4, includes the following steps:
[0188] The S400 and 5G networks perform primary authentication for the UE. During this authentication process, the authentication element AUSF in the 5G network generates a second key K. AUSFThe AUSF sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the UE. The AUSF can also send the second key K... AUSF The first temporary identifier and the first key identifier are saved locally.
[0189] S410. During the authentication process between the UE and the IMS network, the UE sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the authentication network element in the IMS network. In this embodiment, the authentication network element in the IMS network is taken as S-CSCF.
[0190] The S-CSCF sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the AUSF, and receives the fourth key K returned by the AUSF. IMS The third temporary identifier UEID#3 is generated by the AUSF and saved locally; wherein, the third temporary identifier UEID#3 is generated by the AUSF and the fourth key K IMS The AUSF is based on the second key K AUSF This is deduced. After receiving the fourth key and the third temporary identifier, the S-CSCF can also generate a third key identifier KID#3 and save it locally. It can be understood that what the S-CSCF saves locally includes the aforementioned first temporary identifier, first key identifier, third temporary identifier, third key identifier, and fourth key KID#3. IMS .
[0191] Correspondingly, AUSF can also derive the fourth key K through deduction. IMS Then, an IMS association instruction is generated and saved locally. It can be understood that AUSF saves the following locally: the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, the third temporary identifier, and the second key K. AUSF Fourth key K IMS Indicators related to IMS.
[0192] Correspondingly, during the primary authentication process of the UE by the 5G network, the UE will also generate a second key K in the same way as the 5G network. AUSF And according to the second key K AUSF The fourth key K was obtained through deduction. IMS The UE also receives the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier sent from the S-CSCF. It is understood that the UE stores locally the aforementioned first temporary identifier, first key identifier, third temporary identifier, third key identifier, and second key K. AUSF and the fourth key K IMS .
[0193] Optionally, after receiving the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier from the S-CSCF, the UE can also generate an IMS association indication and save it locally.
[0194] Optionally, after generating the third key identifier, the S-CSCF can also generate an IMS association indicator and save it locally.
[0195] In one possible implementation, local data storage can be achieved using arrays, linked lists, or databases. Taking a multidimensional array as an example, one or a pair of identifiers can be used to index other parameters stored in the same array. For instance, the UE locally stores K... AUSF UEID#2, KID#2, K IMS UEID#3, KID#3; where the UE can index the associated stored KID#3 through UEID#2 and KID#2. AUSF and / or K IMS Alternatively, you can index the associated storage's K ID using UEID#3 and KID#3. AUSF and / or K IMS Similarly, other situations will not be described in detail here.
[0196] It is understandable that in the specific implementation of generating the IMS association indication, if the 5G network successfully authenticates the UE, the generated IMS association indication will be set to TRUE; if it fails, the generated IMS association indication will be set to FALSE.
[0197] In this implementation, the IMS association indicator can be represented as an IMS association indicator, used to instruct the 5G network to synchronize the key to the IMS network after re-authentication. Optionally, the IMS association indicator can also be represented as an association indicator; or a unified authentication indicator; or a key update indicator; or a synchronization indicator; etc., and the specific form is not limited.
[0198] When security policies change, or other events or conditions trigger UE re-authentication, network elements in the 5G network will receive a request message to trigger re-authentication.
[0199] After receiving the request message to trigger re-authentication, S420 and SEAF initiate re-authentication of the UE, and AUSF determines the third key K. AUSF _re.
[0200] SEAF can initiate re-authentication of the UE based on a request from the UDM or the UE.
[0201] Specifically, after receiving the request message to trigger re-authentication, SEAF determines to initiate re-authentication of the UE and sends a UE authentication request message to AUSF. Then, AUSF sends a UE authentication acquisition request message to UDM to request an authentication vector; UDM receives the UE authentication acquisition request message, selects an authentication method based on SUPI and user subscription information, and then executes the re-authentication process.
[0202] In practice, during UE re-authentication, AUSF determines the third key K. AUSF _re, and generate the second temporary identifier UEID#2_re and the second key identifier KID#2_re.
[0203] For example, during UE re-authentication, AUSF receives or generates K AUSF _re, index K based on UEID#2 and KID#2 AUSF And updated to K AUSF _re, and generate UEID#2_re and KID#2_re, and combine UEID#2, KID#2, K AUSF Save _re, UEID#2_re, and KID#2_re locally.
[0204] Correspondingly, during UE re-authentication, the UE can also determine K. AUSF _re, and receive UEID#2_re and KID#2_re from AUSF.
[0205] For example, during UE re-authentication, the UE generates K. AUSF _re, will K AUSF Updated to K AUSF The UE then updates its locally stored UEID#2 and KID#2 based on the received UEID#2_re and KID#2_re. In other words, the UE locally stores UEID#2_re, KID#2_re, and KID#2_re. AUSF _re and UEID#3, KID#3.
[0206] Some implementation details of the above re-authentication process can be found in the authentication process described in sections 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 of 3GPP TS 33.501, which will not be elaborated here.
[0207] S430, after successful re-authentication, based on the IMS association instruction, AUSF uses the third key K. AUSF _re deduces the first key K IMS _re.
[0208] In a specific implementation, when AUSF detects that the locally stored IMS association indicator is true, AUSF can then determine the association based on K. AUSF_re deduction K IMS _re. For example, AUSF indexes the locally stored IMS association indication based on SUPI. If the index to the locally stored IMS association indication is true, then AUSF indexes according to K. AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0209] Optionally, after successful re-authentication, AUSF can also index the locally stored KID based on UEID#2 and KID#2. IMS Then K IMS Updated to K IMS _re.
[0210] Optionally, AUSF is based on K AUSF _re deduction K IMS After _re, a fourth temporary identifier UEID#3_re can be generated, and the locally stored key UEID#3 can be indexed based on UEID#2 and KID#2. Then, UEID#3 is updated to UEID#3_re.
[0211] S440 and AUSF send a first key update request message to S-CSCF. The first key update request message includes K. IMS _re, UEID#2 and KID#2.
[0212] In specific implementation, when the AUSF detects that the locally stored IMS association indication is true, it obtains the address of the S-CSCF and sends a first key update request message to the S-CSCF. The first key update request message includes K. IMS _re, UEID#2, and KID#2; then, AUSF can delete the locally saved UEID#2 and KID#2.
[0213] Optionally, the first key update request message may also include UEID#2_re and KID#2_re.
[0214] Optionally, if UEID#3 is updated to UEID#3_re in the aforementioned step S430, the first key update request message may also include UEID#3_re.
[0215] Optionally, the first key update request message may also include an IMS association indication. It is understood that if the S-CSCF does not locally store an IMS association indication, the first key update request message sent by the AUSF to the S-CSCF may carry the IMS association indication.
[0216] Optionally, AUSF obtains the address of the S-CSCF, including: AUSF obtaining the IP address of the locally stored S-CSCF; or, AUSF requesting the IP address of the S-CSCF from the UDM.
[0217] S450 and S-CSCF receive the first key update request and determine the key K based on the first key update request message. IMS Based on the first key update request message and the predetermined policy, UEID#3 and KID#3, S-CSCF will transfer K... IMS Updated to K included in the first key update request message. IMS _re.
[0218] In a specific implementation, the first key update request message may include a key update indication, which instructs the S-CSCF to update the key. For example, based on this key update indication and a predetermined policy, the S-CSCF updates the key... IMS Updated to K included in the first key update request message. IMS _re.
[0219] In one possible implementation, S-CSCF can first determine the key K. IMS Based on the first key update request message and the predetermined strategy, K is then... IMS Updated to K IMS _re. Specifically, the S-CSCF can index the locally stored KID#2 and KID#2 in the first key update request message. IMS And according to the key update instruction and the predetermined strategy, K IMS Updated to K IMS _re.
[0220] In an alternative implementation, the first key update request message itself can be used to instruct the S-CSCF to update the key. Specifically, the first key update request message can be represented as KeyUpdateRequest, the message name itself indicating that the S-CSCF is updating the key.
[0221] In an alternative implementation, the S-CSCF updates the key based on the IMS association indication and a predefined policy. Specifically, based on the received IMS association indication and the predefined policy, the S-CSCF updates the key... IMS Updated to K included in the first key update request message. IMS _re. For example, in the aforementioned step S440, the first key update request message includes an IMS association indication. When the S-CSCF detects that the received IMS association indication is true, it then, based on a predetermined strategy, updates the locally stored key... IMSUpdated to K included in the first key update request message. IMS _re.
[0222] In another alternative implementation, the S-CSCF updates the key based on locally stored IMS association indicators and a predetermined policy. For example, in step S420 above, if the S-CSCF locally stores the IMS association indicators, then when the S-CSCF detects that the locally stored IMS association indicators are true, it updates the locally stored key based on the predetermined policy. IMS Updated to K included in the first key update request message. IMS _re.
[0223] In specific implementations, the predefined strategies may include one or more of the following:
[0224] 1. When the IMS network re-authenticates the UE, it updates the key.
[0225] For example, the conditions that trigger the IMS network to re-authenticate the UE may include one or more of the following:
[0226] (1) The UE's current registration has expired;
[0227] (2) When one or more error conditions exist in S-CSCF;
[0228] (3) S-CSCF does not trust UE;
[0229] (4) The S-CSCF receives an update requesting re-authentication, such as an access update caused by a change in the UE’s access network type or a change in the UE’s IP address.
[0230] 2. When a key update instruction is received from the UE, update the key.
[0231] For example, the S-CSCF sends a NOTIFY request to the UE to confirm whether the session can be terminated. If the UE returns a message that the key can be updated, the S-CSCF updates the key; if it returns a message that the key cannot be updated, the key is not updated.
[0232] 3. When the UE is determined to be in an idle state, update the key.
[0233] For example, (1) the S-CSCF interacts with the IMS Access Media Gateway (IMS-AGW) through the P-CSCF to determine whether the UE is in a call or video state, or the S-CSCF interacts with the Media Function (MF) through the P-CSCF to determine whether the UE is in a call state. If the UE is not in a call, video, or avatar call state, the S-CSCF updates the key; if the UE is in a call, video, or avatar call state, the S-CSCF waits for the above state to end before determining whether to update the key; (2) the S-CSCF interacts with the P-CSCF to determine whether the UE is participating in other registration processes. If not, the key is updated; if so, the S-CSCF waits until the registration process ends before determining whether to update the key.
[0234] 4. Update the key immediately.
[0235] S460 and S-CSCF send a second key update request message to the UE, which includes UEID#3 and KID#3.
[0236] In specific implementation, the second key update request message is sent by the S-CSCF to K IMS Updated to K IMS The _re message is then sent to the UE, and this second key update request message is used to instruct the UE to update the key.
[0237] Optionally, the second key update request message may also include an IMS association indication. It is understood that if the UE does not locally store the IMS association indication in step S420, the second key update request message sent by the S-CSCF to the UE may also include the IMS association indication.
[0238] Optionally, if the first key update request message includes UEID#2_re and KID#2_re in step S440 above, the second key update request message may also include UEID#2_re and KID#2_re.
[0239] Optionally, if the first key update request message includes UEID#3_re in step S440 above, then after the S-CSCF sends the second key update request message to the UE, the locally stored UEID#3 is updated to UEID#3_re.
[0240] It can be understood that in steps S450 and S460 above, after receiving the first key update request, the S-CSCF determines the key K based on the first key update request message. IMSUEID#3 and KID#3, K IMS Update to K in the first key update request. IMS _re, and send the UEID#3 and KID#3 to the UE via a second key update request message.
[0241] S470, The UE determines the key K based on the second key update request message. AUSF After _re, based on the second key update request message and the predetermined strategy, according to K AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0242] In a specific implementation, the second key update request message may include a key update indication, which instructs the UE to update the key. For example, based on this key update indication and a predetermined policy, the UE updates the key according to K... AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0243] In one possible implementation, the UE can first index the locally stored KID#3 and KID#3 in the second key update request message. AUSF _re, and then based on the key update instruction and the pre-defined policy, according to K AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0244] In an alternative implementation, the second key update request message itself can be used to instruct the UE to update the key. Specifically, the second key update request message can also be represented as KeyUpdateRequest, the message name itself indicating that the UE needs to update the key.
[0245] In an alternative implementation, the UE updates the key based on the IMS association indication and a predetermined policy. Specifically, based on the received IMS association indication and predetermined policy, the UE updates the key according to K. AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re. For example, in the aforementioned step S460, the second key update request message includes the IMS association indication. When the UE detects that the received IMS association indication is true, it then, based on a predetermined strategy, determines the key update according to the locally stored K. AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0246] In another alternative implementation, the UE updates the key based on a locally stored IMS association indication and a predetermined policy. For example, in step S420 above, the UE locally stores the IMS association indication. Then, when the UE detects that the locally stored IMS association indication is true, it updates the key based on the predetermined policy and the locally stored key.AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0247] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S460, if the second key update request message includes UEID#2_re and KID#2_re, the UE can also index the locally stored KID#2_re based on the UEID#2_re and KID#2_re. AUSF _re. It can be understood that the UE locally stores UEID#2_re and KID#2_re, UEID#3 and KID#3, as well as the key K. AUSF _re, key K IMS At this time, the UE can index the locally stored key K based on the UEID#3 and KID#3, and / or the UEID#2_re and KID#2_re. AUSF _re and / or key K IMS .
[0248] In specific implementations, the predefined strategies may include one or more of the following:
[0249] (1) Update the key immediately;
[0250] (2) Check if there is an ongoing session on the UE (including video, voice calls, Avatar calls, etc.). If it exists, wait; if it does not exist, update the key.
[0251] (3) Check if the UE is participating in other registration processes. If not, update the key; otherwise, wait.
[0252] S480, UE sends a second key update response message to S-CSCF.
[0253] Specifically, after the UE obtains the key kims_re, it sends a second key update response message.
[0254] S490 and S-CSCF receive the second key update response message, according to K IMS The first encryption key CK_re and the first integrity key IK_re are derived from _re; based on CK_re and IK_re, a secure communication connection is established between the IMS network and the UE.
[0255] Accordingly, after sending the second key update response message, the UE obtains CK_re and IK_re based on the same deduction method as the IMS network side.
[0256] In specific implementation, the S-CSCF sends CK_re and IK_re to the P-CSCF. Based on CK_re and IK_re, the P-CSCF establishes a secure communication connection with the UE. For example, the P-CSCF and UE establish a secure communication connection by negotiating secure connection parameters. Specifically, after receiving CK_re and IK_re, the P-CSCF sends a response message to the UE. This response message carries the P-CSCF's own encryption algorithm and integrity verification algorithm. After the UE determines that it supports the received algorithms, it performs integrity protection based on its own derived CK_re and IK_re and the aforementioned algorithms, and then sends a registration request message to the P-CSCF. Upon receiving the registration request message, the P-CSCF performs integrity verification based on the derived CK_re and IK_re and the corresponding algorithm. If the verification is successful, it returns a response message to the UE, completing the establishment of the secure communication connection.
[0257] For another example, the P-CSCF and UE establish a secure communication connection using a pre-shared key. Specifically, before re-authenticating the UE, the UE sends a third message to the second network function carrying an encryption algorithm and an integrity algorithm. In this step, after obtaining the CK_re and IK_re, the P-CSCF determines that it supports the received algorithms, performs integrity protection based on the CK_re, IK_re, and the algorithms, and then sends a response message to the UE. Upon receiving the response message, the UE performs integrity verification based on its own derived CK_re, IK_re, and the corresponding algorithms. If the verification is successful, the establishment of the secure communication connection is completed.
[0258] In one possible implementation, in response to the first key update request message from the AUSF, the S-CSCF may also send a first key update response message to the AUSF to instruct the IMS network to complete the key update.
[0259] Optionally, after obtaining CK_re and IK_re, S-CSCF can also generate a fourth key identifier KID#3_re.
[0260] In one possible implementation, after the UE establishes a secure communication connection with the IMS network, the S-CSCF can also send an identifier update synchronization message to the UE. This message is used to synchronize the updated temporary identifier and key to the UE. For example, in step S460, if the S-CSCF updates the locally stored UEID#3 to UEID#3_re, and in step S490, the S-CSCF generates KID#3_re, then the identifier update synchronization message can also include UEID#3_re and KID#3_re.
[0261] In an alternative implementation, similar to the aforementioned embodiment, in step S410, if the AUSF does not generate a third temporary identifier UEID#3 and the S-CSCF does not generate a third key identifier KID#3, then the first temporary identifier UEID#2 can still function as the third temporary identifier UEID#3, and the first key identifier KID#2 can also function as the third key identifier KID#3. It is understood that in step S450, it is not necessary to determine UEID#3 and KID#3, and UEID#3 and / or KID#3 in steps S460 and S470 can be replaced with UEID#2 and / or KID#2. Furthermore, since the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device locally store the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier, it is not necessary to replace the third temporary identifier and / or the third key identifier stored locally by the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier.
[0262] In this implementation of the present invention, after 5G network re-authentication, the AUSF updates the key and sends a key update request message to the S-CSCF based on the IMS association indication. The S-CSCF then updates the key and sends a key update request message to the UE. Based on this, after 5G network re-authentication, the key is synchronized to the IMS network and the UE based on the IMS association indication, improving the security of data communication between the UE and the IMS network.
[0263] Unlike the above implementation, in another implementation of the present invention after 5G network re-authentication, after the UE updates the key according to the IMS association indication, it actively sends a third key update request message to the S-CSCF. Then, the S-CSCF updates the key based on the third key update request. As shown in Figure 5, Figure 5 provides a flowchart of another key update method 500, which includes the following steps.
[0264] S500 and 5G networks perform master authentication for UEs.
[0265] Similar to step S400 mentioned above, it will not be repeated here.
[0266] The process of S510 and UE initiating authentication with the IMS network.
[0267] Similar to step S410 mentioned above, it will not be repeated here.
[0268] After receiving the request message to trigger re-authentication, S520 and SEAF initiate re-authentication of the UE, and AUSF determines the third key K. AUSF _re.
[0269] In the specific implementation, when the re-authentication is successful, the UE receives an authentication response message from the AUSF, which includes UEID#2_re and KID#2_re.
[0270] Optionally, the authentication response message may also include an IMS association indication.
[0271] After S530 re-authentication is successful, the UE, based on the IMS association indication, according to K AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0272] In specific implementation, the UE can first obtain the IMS association indication, and then, based on the IMS association indication, according to K AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0273] In one possible implementation, the UE can first obtain the IMS association indication, and then, based on the IMS association indication and a predetermined policy, according to K... AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0274] In one possible implementation, in step S520 above, if the authentication response message includes the IMS association indication, the method by which the UE obtains the IMS association indication may include: the UE obtaining the IMS association indication from the received authentication response message. For example, when the IMS association indication received by the UE is true, based on a predetermined strategy, according to K... AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0275] In one possible implementation, the method by which the UE obtains the IMS association indication may include: the UE obtaining the locally stored IMS association indication. For example, when the UE detects that the locally stored IMS association indication is true, it determines, based on a predetermined strategy, according to K... AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0276] In specific implementation, after receiving the authentication response message, the UE indexes the associated stored KID based on the UEID#2_re and KID#2_re included in the authentication response message. AUSF _re, then obtain the IMS association indication, and based on the IMS association indication and the predetermined strategy, according to K AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0277] Optionally, the UE can also index the locally stored key K based on UEID#2_re and KID#2_re. IMSThen K IMS Updated to K IMS _re.
[0278] In specific implementations, the predefined strategies may include one or more of the following:
[0279] (1) Update the key immediately;
[0280] (2) Check if there is an ongoing session on the UE (including video, voice calls, Avatar calls, etc.). If it exists, wait; if it does not exist, update the key.
[0281] (3) Check if the UE is participating in other registration processes. If not, update the key; otherwise, wait.
[0282] S540, the UE sends a third key update request message to the S-CSCF, which includes UEID#2_re, KID#2_re and UEID#3.
[0283] Optionally, the third key update request message may also include KID#3 and the IMS association indication.
[0284] In specific implementation, the third key update request message is sent by the UE based on the IMS association indication, according to the K AUSF _re determines K IMS After _re, it is sent to the S-CSCF, and the third key update request message is used to instruct the S-CSCF to update the key.
[0285] It can be understood that in steps S530 and S540 above, after the UE receives the authentication response message, it indexes K based on the UEID#2_re and KID#2_re included in the authentication response message. AUSF _re and UEID#3, based on IMS association indication, according to the K AUSF _re deduction yields K IMS After _re, UEID#2_re, KID#2_re and UEID#3 are sent to S-CSCF through the third key update request message.
[0286] S550 and S-CSCF send a key request message to AUSF based on the third key update request message. The key request message includes UEID#2_re and KID#2_re.
[0287] In one possible implementation, the S-CSCF receiving the third key update request message from the UE may include a key update indication, which instructs the S-CSCF to update the key. For example, the S-CSCF receives the third key update request message, obtains the key update indication, and based on this indication, the S-CSCF obtains the address of the AUSF according to UEID#3 in the third key update request message, and sends a key request message to the AUSF.
[0288] In one possible implementation, based on the IMS association indication, the S-CSCF sends a key request message to the AUSF according to the third key update request message. For example, the S-CSCF obtains the IMS association indication; if the IMS association indication is true, it obtains the AUSF's address based on UEID#3 in the third key update request message and sends a key request message to the AUSF.
[0289] Optionally, in step S540 above, if the third key update request message includes the IMS association indication, then the S-CSCF obtaining the IMS association indication may include: the S-CSCF obtaining the IMS association indication from the third key update request message. For example, when the IMS association indication received by the S-CSCF is true, the S-CSCF obtains the AUSF address based on the UEID#3 in the third key update request message and sends a key request message to the AUSF.
[0290] Optionally, the S-CSCF may obtain the IMS association indication by obtaining the locally stored IMS association indication. For example, when the S-CSCF detects that the locally stored IMS association indication is true, it obtains the AUSF address based on the UEID#3 and sends a key request message to the AUSF.
[0291] In one possible implementation, the S-CSCF can index the IP address of the locally stored AUSF based on UEID#3.
[0292] In one possible implementation, the S-CSCF can request the AUSF's IP address from the UDM based on UEID#3.
[0293] S560 and AUSF determine K based on the key request message. AUSF _re, and according to K AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0294] In its specific implementation, AUSF indexes the locally stored KID#2_re and KID#2_re in the key request message. AUSF _re, then according to K AUSF _re deduction K IMS _re.
[0295] Optionally, the AUSF can also generate a fourth temporary identifier UEID#3_re and update the locally stored UEID#3 with the UEID#3_re. For example, the AUSF can first index the locally stored UEID#3 based on the UEID#2_re and KID#2_re, and then update the UEID#3 with the UEID#3_re.
[0296] S570. In response to the key request message from the S-CSCF, the AUSF sends a key response message to the S-CSCF, the key update response message including the K... IMS _re.
[0297] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S560, if the AUSF generates UEID#3_re, the key response message may also include the UEID#3_re.
[0298] S580 and S-CSCF receive the key response message, according to the K IMS The first encryption key CK_re and the first integrity key IK_re are derived from _re; based on CK_re and IK_re, a secure communication connection is established between the IMS network and the UE.
[0299] Accordingly, after sending the third key update request message, the UE obtains CK_re and IK_re based on the same deduction method.
[0300] The specific process of establishing a secure communication connection between the IMS network and the UE can be found in the description of step S490 in the aforementioned embodiment, and will not be repeated here.
[0301] Optionally, after obtaining CK_re and IK_re through S-CSCF derivation, a fourth key identifier KID#3_re can also be generated.
[0302] S590. In response to the third key update request message sent by the UE, the S-CSCF sends a third key update response message to the UE to instruct the IMS network to complete the key update.
[0303] In one possible implementation, the S-CSCF sends the third key update response message to the UE via the P-CSCF. This third key update response message is used to instruct the UE to complete the key update. For example, in the aforementioned step S480, if the S-CSCF receives the UEID#3_re and generates the KID#3_re, the third key update response message may further include UEID#3_re and KID#3_re.
[0304] In an alternative implementation, similar to the aforementioned embodiment, in step S510, if the AUSF does not generate a third temporary identifier UEID#3 and the S-CSCF does not generate a third key identifier KID#3, then the first temporary identifier UEID#2 can still function as the same as the third temporary identifier UEID#3, and the first key identifier KID#2 can also function as the same as the third key identifier KID#3. It is understood that UEID#3 and / or KID#3 in steps S540 and S550 can be replaced with UEID#2 and / or KID#2. Furthermore, since the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device locally store the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier, it is not necessary to replace the third temporary identifier and / or the third key identifier stored locally by the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier.
[0305] In this implementation of the present invention, after 5G network re-authentication, the UE updates the key based on the IMS association indication and sends a third key update request message to the S-CSCF. The S-CSCF then updates the key according to the third key update request message. Based on this, after 5G network re-authentication, the key is synchronized to the IMS network and the UE based on the IMS association indication, improving the security of data communication between the UE and the IMS network.
[0306] After IMS network re-authentication, in one implementation of the present invention, the S-CSCF, based on the 5GC association indication, finds the AUSF of the 5G network and sends the first key update request message. Then, the AUSF updates the key based on the first key update request message and sends a second key update request message to the UE. The UE updates the key based on the first key update request message. As shown in Figure 6, Figure 6 provides a flowchart of another key update method 600, which includes the following steps.
[0307] The S600 and IMS networks perform authentication for the UE. During this authentication process, the authentication network element S-CSCF in the IMS network generates a second key K. IMS The system generates a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier, and sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the UE.
[0308] S610, During the process of the UE initiating authentication with the 5G network, the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier are sent to the authentication network element in the 5G network. In this embodiment, the authentication network element in the 5G network is AUSF as an example.
[0309] After authentication, AUSF saves the following locally: the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, the third temporary identifier, the third key identifier, and the fourth key K. AUSF The S-CSCF stores locally the aforementioned first temporary identifier, first key identifier, third temporary identifier, and second key K. IMS Fourth key K AUSF The UE is associated with 5GC. The UE locally stores the fourth key K. AUSF First temporary identifier, first key identifier, second key K IMS The third temporary identifier and the third key identifier are generated by the S-CSCF and the AUSF, respectively.
[0310] It is understood that in the embodiments of this application, if the first network is an IMS network, then the first temporary identifier is represented as UEID#3, the first key identifier is represented as KID#3, the third temporary identifier is represented as UEID#2, and the third key identifier is represented as KID#2.
[0311] Understandably, if the IMS network successfully authenticates the UE, the generated 5GC association indicator will be set to TRUE; if it fails, the generated 5GC association indicator will be set to FALSE.
[0312] In this implementation, the 5GC association indicator can be represented as a 5GC association indicator, used to instruct the key to be synchronized to the 5G network after IMS re-authentication. Optionally, the 5GC association indicator can also be represented as an association indicator; or a unified authentication indicator; or a key update indicator; or a synchronization indicator, etc., and the specific form is not limited.
[0313] When security policies change, or other events or conditions trigger UE re-authentication, network elements in the IMS network will receive a request message to trigger re-authentication.
[0314] After receiving the request message to trigger re-authentication, S620 and S-CSCF initiate re-authentication of the UE, and S-CSCF determines the third key K. IMS _re.
[0315] In the specific implementation, after the Policy Control Function (PCF) sends a request message to trigger re-authentication through the Cx interface, the S-CSCF determines to initiate re-authentication of the UE and sends an authentication vector request message to the UDM. Then, the UDM begins to execute the re-authentication process for the UE.
[0316] In specific implementation, during UE re-authentication, S-CSCF generates K. IMS _re, and generate the second temporary identifier UEID#3_re and the second key identifier KID#3_re.
[0317] For example, during UE re-authentication, the S-CSCF generates K. IMS _re, index K based on UEID#3 and KID#3 IMS And updated to K IMS _re, and generate UEID#3_re and KID#3_re, and combine UEID#3, KID#3, K IMS Save _re, UEID#3_re, and KID#3_re locally.
[0318] Correspondingly, during UE re-authentication, the UE generates a K IMS _re, and receive UEID#3_re and KID#3_re from S-CSCF.
[0319] For example, during UE re-authentication, the UE generates K. IMS _re, will K IMS Updated to K IMS The UE then updates its locally stored UEID#3 and KID#3 with the received UEID#3_re and KID#3_re. In other words, the UE locally stores UEID#3_re, KID#3_re, and KID#3_re. IMS _re and UEID#3, KID#3.
[0320] In its specific implementation, S-CSCF can deduce CK and IK from the long-term key K, and then deduce K from CK and IK. IMS _re.
[0321] For some implementation details of the above re-authentication process, please refer to the authentication process in section 6.1.1 of 3GPP TS 33.203, which will not be elaborated here.
[0322] S630, after successful re-authentication, based on the 5GC association indication, S-CSCF uses the third key K. IMS _re deduces the first key K AUSF _re.
[0323] The specific implementation is similar to the aforementioned step S430, and will not be repeated here.
[0324] S640 and S-CSCF send a first key update request message to AUSF. This first key update request message includes K. AUSF _re, UEID#3 and KID#3.
[0325] The specific implementation is similar to the aforementioned step S440, and will not be repeated here.
[0326] S650 and AUSF receive the first key update request and determine K based on the first key update request message. AUSF Based on the first key update request message and the predetermined strategy, K AUSF Updated to K included in the first key update request message. AUSF_ re.
[0327] In a specific implementation, the first key update request message may include a key update indication, which instructs AUSF to update the key. For example, AUSF, based on this key update indication and a predetermined policy, updates the key... AUSF Updated to K included in the first key update request message. AUSF _re.
[0328] Optionally, AUSF obtains a 5GC association indication, and based on the 5GC association indication and a predetermined strategy, AUSF will... AUSF Updated to K AUSF_ For example, if the first key update request message in the aforementioned steps includes the first key update request message, then AUSF can obtain the 5GC association indication in the first key update request message. As another example, AUSF can also obtain the locally stored 5GC association indication.
[0329] In specific implementation, the predetermined strategy includes: (1) AUSF sends a key update request message to UDM and AMF, and UDM and AMF determine whether to update the key; (2) AUSF sends a UE status request to AMF, and AUSF determines whether to update the key based on the UE status.
[0330] The update key is determined when the UE state meets one or more of the following conditions:
[0331] (1) The UE is in a handover state;
[0332] (2) The UE is in the authentication / NAS SMC state;
[0333] (3) The UE is in the RM-DEREGISTERED state;
[0334] (4) The UE is in the CM-DISCONNECTED state.
[0335] In one possible implementation, AUSF, based on the first key update request message and a predetermined policy, will... AUSF Updated to K AUSF_ re may also include the following steps.
[0336] Step 1: AUSF sends the first key update request message to UDM. The first key update request message includes UEID#2.
[0337] Step 2: After receiving the first key update request message, UDM determines whether to update the key based on its local policy; wherein, the local policy of UDM includes updating the key after the key expires or updating the key immediately.
[0338] If the UDM determines that the key needs to be updated, it sends the first key update request message to the AMF, which includes UEID#2.
[0339] Step 3: Based on the first key update request message, the AMF determines whether to update the key according to the UE's status; or, if the AMF determines to update the key immediately, the AMF sends a key update response message to the AUSF through the UDM, carrying a key update indication to indicate whether to perform a key update.
[0340] Step 4: The AUSF receives a key update instruction and determines whether a key update is needed. If so, it sets the key... AUSF Updated to K AUSF_ re.
[0341] In one possible implementation, AUSF, based on the first key update request message and a predetermined policy, will... AUSF Updated to K AUSF_ re may also include the following steps.
[0342] Step 1: After receiving the first key update request message, AUSF sends the UE status request message to UDM.
[0343] Step 2: After receiving the UE status request message, UDM immediately forwards it to AMF.
[0344] Step 3: Based on the UE status request message, the AMF sends a UE status response to the AMF via the UDM, carrying the UE status.
[0345] Step 4: The AUSF receives the UE status and determines whether the key needs to be updated based on the UE status. If so, it updates the key. AUSF Updated to K AUSF_ re.
[0346] S660 and AUSF send a second key update request message to the UE, which includes UEID#2 and KID#2.
[0347] In a specific implementation, the AUSF sends the second key update request message to the AMF, and then the AMF sends the second key update request message to the UE.
[0348] Other implementation details for this step can be found in step S460 above, and will not be repeated here.
[0349] S670, UE determines K based on key update request message. IMS After _re, based on the second key update request message and the predetermined strategy, according to K IMS _re deduction K AUSF _re.
[0350] In specific implementation, the UE updates the key when the predetermined policy meets one or more of the following conditions:
[0351] (1) Update the key immediately;
[0352] (2) The UE is in a handover state;
[0353] (3) The UE is in the authentication / NAS SMC state;
[0354] (4) The UE is in the RM-DEREGISTERED state;
[0355] (5) The UE is in the CM-DISCONNECTED state.
[0356] Other implementation details for this step can be found in step S470 above, and will not be repeated here.
[0357] S680. In response to the second key update request message from the AUSF, the UE sends a second key update response message to the AUSF.
[0358] S690 and AUSF receive the second key update response message, according to K AUSF _re deduction yields K AMF _re, based on the K AMF_re, establish a secure communication connection between the 5G network and the UE.
[0359] In its specific implementation, AUSF is based on K AUSF _re deduction yields K SEAF _re and send it to SEAF, SEAF according to K SEAF _re deduction yields K AMF _re and send to AMF.
[0360] Accordingly, after sending the second key update response message, the UE obtains K based on the same deduction method as the 5G network. AMF _re.
[0361] Based on the K AMF _re, the AMF establishes a secure communication connection with the UE. For specific implementation details, please refer to the NAS SMC procedure in Section 6.7.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501.
[0362] In one possible implementation, in response to the first key update request message from the S-CSCF, the AUSF can also send a first key update response message to the S-CSCF to instruct the 5G network to complete the key update.
[0363] Optionally, AUSF obtains the K. SEAF After _re, a fourth key identifier KID#2_re can also be generated.
[0364] In one possible implementation, after the UE establishes a secure communication connection with the 5G network, the AUSF can also send an identifier update synchronization message to the UE. This message is used to instruct the 5G network to complete the key update. Optionally, in step S660, if the AUSF updates the locally stored UEID#2 to UEID#2_re, and in step S690, the AUSF generates KID#2_re, then the identifier update synchronization message can also include UEID#2_re and KID#2_re.
[0365] In an alternative implementation, similar to the aforementioned embodiment, in step S610, if the S-CSCF does not generate a third temporary identifier UEID#2 and the AUSF does not generate a third key identifier KID#2, then the first temporary identifier UEID#3 can still function as the third temporary identifier UEID#2, and the first key identifier KID#3 can also function as the third key identifier KID#2. It is understood that UEID#2 and / or KID#2 in steps S650, S660, and S670 can be replaced with UEID#3 and / or KID#3. Furthermore, since the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device locally store the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier, it is not necessary to replace the third temporary identifier and / or the third key identifier stored locally by the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier.
[0366] Unlike the above implementation, in another implementation of this invention after IMS network re-authentication, after the UE updates the key according to the 5GC association indication, it actively sends a third key update request message to the AUSF. Then, the AUSF updates the key based on the third key update request. As shown in Figure 7, Figure 7 provides a flowchart of another key update method 700, which includes the following steps.
[0367] The S700 and IMS networks perform authentication for the UE.
[0368] Similar to step S600 above, it will not be repeated here.
[0369] The S710 and UE initiate authentication to the 5G network.
[0370] Similar to step S610 above, it will not be repeated here.
[0371] After receiving the request message to trigger re-authentication, S720 and S-CSCF initiate re-authentication of the UE, and S-CSCF determines the third key K. IMS _re.
[0372] Similar to step S620 above, it will not be repeated here.
[0373] S730, after successful re-authentication, the UE, based on the 5GC association indication, according to K IMS _re deduction K AUSF _re.
[0374] In specific implementation, the UE can first obtain the 5GC association indication, and then, based on the 5GC association indication, according to K IMS _re deduction K AUSF _re.
[0375] In one possible implementation, the UE can first obtain the 5GC association indication, and then, based on the 5GC association indication and a predetermined strategy, according to K... IMS _re deduction K AUSF _re.
[0376] In specific implementation, the UE updates the key when the predetermined policy meets one or more of the following conditions:
[0377] (1) Update the key immediately;
[0378] (2) The UE is in a handover state;
[0379] (3) The UE is in the authentication / NAS SMC state;
[0380] (4) The UE is in the RM-DEREGISTERED state;
[0381] (5) The UE is in the CM-DISCONNECTED state.
[0382] Other implementation details can be found in step S530 above, and will not be elaborated here.
[0383] S740, the UE sends a third key update request message to the AUSF, which includes UEID#3_re, KID#3_re and UEID#2.
[0384] Similarly, the specific implementation can be referred to step S540 above.
[0385] S750 and AUSF send a key request message to S-CSCF based on the third key update request message. The key request message includes UEID#3_re and KID#3_re.
[0386] Similarly, the specific implementation can be referred to step S550 above.
[0387] S760 and S-CSCF determine K based on the key request message. IMS _re, and according to K IMS _re deduction K AUSF _re.
[0388] Similarly, the specific implementation can be referred to step S560 above.
[0389] S770. In response to the key request message from the AUSF, the S-CSCF sends a key response message to the AUSF, the key response message including the K... AUSF _re.
[0390] Optionally, in the aforementioned step S660, if the S-CSCF generates UEID#2_re, the key response message may also include the UEID#2_re.
[0391] S780 and AUSF receive the key update response message, according to K AUSF _re deduction yields K AMF _re, based on the K AMF _re, establish a secure communication connection between the 5G network and the UE.
[0392] In its specific implementation, AUSF is based on K AUSF _re deduction yields K SEAF _re and send to SEAF, SEAF according to K SEAF _re deduction yields K AMF _re and send to AMF.
[0393] Accordingly, after sending the third key update request message, the UE obtains K based on the same deduction method as the 5G network. AMF _re.
[0394] Based on the K AMF _re, the AMF establishes a secure communication connection with the UE. For specific implementation details, please refer to the NAS SMC procedure in Section 6.7.2 of 3GPP TS 33.501.
[0395] Optionally, AUSF obtains the K. SEAF After _re, a fourth key identifier KID#2_re can also be generated.
[0396] S790. In response to the third key update request message sent by the UE, the AUSF sends a third key update response message to the UE, which is used to instruct the 5G network to complete the key update.
[0397] Optionally, in step S760 above, if the AUSF updates the locally stored UEID#2 to UEID#2_re, and in step S780 above, the AUSF generates KID#2_re, then the third key update response message may also include UEID#2_re and KID#2_re.
[0398] In an alternative implementation, similar to the aforementioned embodiment, in step S710, if the S-CSCF does not generate a third temporary identifier UEID#2 and the AUSF does not generate a third key identifier KID#2, then the first temporary identifier UEID#3 can still function as the third temporary identifier UEID#2, and the first key identifier KID#3 can also function as the third key identifier KID#2. It is understood that UEID#2 in steps S740 and S750 can be replaced with UEID#3. Furthermore, since the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device locally store the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier, it is not necessary to replace the third temporary identifier and / or the third key identifier stored locally by the first network function, the second network function, and the terminal device with the first temporary identifier and / or the first key identifier.
[0399] In the embodiments of this application, after IMS network re-authentication, the S-CSCF sends a key update request message to the AUSF; or, the UE sends a key update request message to the AUSF, and the AUSF updates the key based on the 5GC association instruction. Therefore, after IMS network re-authentication, the security of data communication between the UE and the 5G network is improved.
[0400] It is understood that in other possible implementations of this application, if the first network is a 5G network, other network elements of the 5G network, such as AMF and SEAF, can also be used to deduce the keys used and updated by the IMS network. In other communication networks, other network function entities with the same functionality can also be used to implement the authentication function, and the names are not limited to AUSF, AMF, or SEAF.
[0401] In another possible implementation, in the embodiment of process 400, after the 5G network completes the UE re-authentication, AUSF is based on K. AUSF _re deduction yields K SEAF _re and send to SEAF, the SEAF network element based on the IMS association instruction, according to K SEAF _re deduction yields K IMS _re, and send the first key update request message to the S-CSCF. The other steps are similar.
[0402] In another possible implementation, in the embodiment of process 500, the SEAF network element receives a key request message from the S-CSCF and, based on the 5GC association indication, determines according to K... SEAF _re deduction yields K IMS _re, and send a key response message to the S-CSCF. The other steps are similar.
[0403] Similarly, in an embodiment of process 600, the SEAF receives a first key update request message, which includes K. SEAF _re, SEAF based on K SEAF _re updates the key; or in the embodiment of process 700, the SEAF receives a third key update request message and sends a key request message to the S-CSCF, which then updates the key according to the K. IMS K derived from _re SEAF _re, and then send it to SEAF. The other steps are similar.
[0404] Another possible implementation, if using the AMF network element, is similar to the aforementioned SEAF network element implementation, where the SEAF network element is based on K. SEAF _re deduction yields K AMF _re and send to the AMF network element; the AMF network element, based on the association indication, according to K AMF _re deduction yields K IMS _re, or S-CSCF network elements based on K IMS _re deduction yields K AMF _re, which will not be elaborated on here.
[0405] In another possible implementation, in the embodiment of process 400, after the 5G network completes the UE re-authentication, AUSF determines the UE based on K. AUSF _re deduction yields K SEAF _re and send to SEAF, the SEAF network element based on the IMS association instruction, according to K SEAF _re deduction yields K IMS _re, and send a first key update request message to AUSF, which carries K IMS Then AUSF sends the first key update request message to S-CSCF. The other steps are similar.
[0406] In another possible implementation, in the embodiment of process 400, after the 5G network completes the UE re-authentication, AUSF determines the UE based on K. AUSF _re deduction yields K SEAF _re and send to SEAF, SEAF network element according to K SEAF _re deduction yields K AMF _re and send to the AMF network element. The AMF network element, based on the IMS association instruction, according to K AMF _re deduction yields K IMS _re, and send a first key update request message to AUSF, which carries K IMS Then AUSF sends the first key update request message to S-CSCF. The other steps are similar.
[0407] In another possible implementation, in the embodiment of process 500, after the AUSF receives the third key update request message from the S-CSCF and forwards it to the SEAF, the SEAF network element, based on the IMS association indication, according to K... SEAF _re deduction yields K IMS _re, and send a third key update response message to AUSF, which carries K IMS _re, and then AUSF sends the third key update response message to S-CSCF. The other steps are similar.
[0408] In another possible implementation, in the embodiment of process 500, after the AFS receives the third key update request message from the S-CSCF and forwards it to the AMF, the AMF network element, based on the IMS association indication, according to K... AMF _re deduction yields K IMS The system then sends a third key update response message to the AUSF, which in turn sends the message to the S-CSCF. The remaining steps are similar.
[0409] Similarly, in an embodiment of process 600, the AUSF receives the first key update request message and forwards it to the SEAF. This first key update request message includes K. SEAF _re, SEAF based on K SEAF _re updates the key; or in the embodiment of process 700, the AUSF receives the third key update request message and forwards it to the SEAF, then sends a key request message to the S-CSCF, which then updates the key according to the K. IMS K derived from _re SEAF _re, and then send it to SEAF. The other steps are similar.
[0410] In other similar embodiments, such as in process 600, the AUSF receives the first key update request message and forwards it to the AMF. This first key update request message includes K. AMF _re, AMF is based on K AMF _re updates the key; or in the embodiment of process 700, the AUSF receives the third key update request message and forwards it to the AMF, then sends a key request message to the S-CSCF, which then updates the key according to the K. IMS K derived from _re SEAF The process involves sending the data (_re) to AUSF, which then forwards it to AMF. Other steps are similar.
[0411] For example, FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device provided in an embodiment of this application. The communication device may be a communication device or a network device. As shown in FIG8, the communication device 800 may include a processor 801. Optionally, the communication device 800 may further include a memory 802 and / or a transceiver 803. The processor 801 is coupled to the memory 802 and the transceiver 803, for example, they may be connected via a communication bus.
[0412] The following section, with reference to Figure 8, provides a detailed description of each component of the communication device 800:
[0413] The processor 801 is the control center of the communication device 800. It can be a single processor or a collective term for multiple processing elements. For example, the processor 801 can be one or more central processing units (CPUs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of this application, such as one or more digital signal processors (DSPs), or one or more field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs).
[0414] Optionally, the processor 801 can perform various functions of the communication device 800 by running or executing software programs stored in the memory 802 and by calling data stored in the memory 802.
[0415] In a specific implementation, as one example, processor 801 may include one or more CPUs, such as CPU0 and CPU1 shown in FIG8.
[0416] In a specific implementation, as one embodiment, the communication device 800 may also include multiple processors, such as processors 801 and 804 shown in FIG. 8. Each of these processors may be a single-core processor (single-CPU) or a multi-core processor (multi-CPU). Here, a processor may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and / or processing cores for processing data (e.g., computer program instructions).
[0417] The memory 802 is used to store the software program that executes the solution of this application, and is controlled by the processor 801 to execute it. The specific implementation method can be referred to the above method embodiment, and will not be repeated here.
[0418] Optionally, the memory 802 may be a read-only memory (ROM) or other type of static storage device capable of storing static information and instructions, random access memory (RAM) or other type of dynamic storage device capable of storing information and instructions, or electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disc storage, optical disc storage (including compressed optical discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital universal optical discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), magnetic disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium capable of carrying or storing desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and accessible by a computer, but not limited thereto. The memory 802 may be integrated with the processor 801 or may exist independently and be coupled to the processor 801 through the interface circuit of the communication device 800 (not shown in FIG. 8). This application embodiment does not specifically limit this.
[0419] Transceiver 803 is used for communication with other communication devices. For example, if communication device 800 is a terminal device, transceiver 803 can be used to communicate with a network device or with another terminal device. As another example, if communication device 800 is a network device, transceiver 803 can be used to communicate with a terminal device or with another network device.
[0420] Optionally, transceiver 803 may include a receiver and a transmitter (not shown separately in Figure 8). The receiver is used to implement the receiving function, and the transmitter is used to implement the transmitting function.
[0421] Optionally, the transceiver 803 can be integrated with the processor 801 or exist independently and be coupled to the processor 801 through the interface circuit of the communication device 800 (not shown in FIG8). This application embodiment does not specifically limit this.
[0422] It should be noted that the structure of the communication device 800 shown in Figure 8 does not constitute a limitation on the communication device. The actual communication device may include more or fewer components than shown, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.
[0423] Furthermore, the technical effects of the communication device 800 can be referred to the technical effects of the communication method described in the above method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.
[0424] It should be understood that the processor in the embodiments of this application can be a central processing unit (CPU), or it can be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.
[0425] It should also be understood that the memory in the embodiments of this application can be volatile memory or non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory. The non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or flash memory. The volatile memory can be random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example, but not limitation, many forms of random access memory (RAM) are available, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous DRAM (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous DRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous linked DRAM (SLDRAM), and direct rambus RAM (DR RAM).
[0426] The above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, by software, hardware (such as circuits), firmware, or any other combination thereof. When implemented using software, the above embodiments can be implemented, in whole or in part, in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions or computer programs. When the computer instructions or computer programs are loaded or executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more sets of available media. The available medium can be a magnetic medium (e.g., floppy disk, hard disk, magnetic tape), an optical medium (e.g., DVD), or a semiconductor medium. A semiconductor medium can be a solid-state drive.
[0427] It should be understood that the term "and / or" in this article is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, or B existing alone. A and B can be singular or plural. Additionally, the character " / " in this article generally indicates an "or" relationship between the preceding and following related objects, but it can also represent an "and / or" relationship. Please refer to the context for a more accurate understanding.
[0428] In this application, "at least one" means one or more, and "more than one" means two or more. "At least one of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or multiple items. For example, at least one of a, b, or c can mean: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, or abc, where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.
[0429] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of this application, the order of the above-mentioned processes does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.
[0430] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
[0431] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.
[0432] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, apparatuses, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.
[0433] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.
[0434] In addition, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit.
[0435] If the aforementioned functions are implemented as software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or a portion of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.
[0436] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.
Claims
A key update method characterized by comprising: The method comprises: A first network function in a first network receives a first message, the first message being used for requesting the first network to re-authenticate a terminal device; In a case where the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, the first network function generates a first key of the terminal device based on a preset first indication, and sends a first key update request message to a second network function in a second network; The first key update request message is used for instructing the second network function to update a key, the first key update request message comprises the first key, and the first key is used for protecting communication security between the terminal device and the second network. The method of claim 1, wherein The first network function stores a second key, the second key being generated in a case where the first network successfully authenticates the terminal device for the last time, and the method further comprises: The first network function determines a third key, and updates the stored second key to the third key; the third key is a key between the terminal device and the first network function generated when the first network re-authenticates the terminal device. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The method further comprises: The first network function generates the first key of the terminal device according to the third key. The method of claim 1, wherein Before the first network function in the first network receives the first message, the method further comprises: The first network function receives a second message, the second message being used for requesting to authenticate the terminal device; In a case where the terminal device is successfully authenticated, the first network function generates a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier; The first network function sends the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier to the terminal device; The first network function generates a fourth key and the first indication, the fourth key being used for protecting communication security between the terminal device and the second network; The first network function sends the fourth key to the second network function. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The first key update request message comprises the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The first key update request message further comprises a second temporary identifier and a second key identifier; the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier are generated by the first network function in a case where the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that Before the first network function in the first network receives the first message, the method further comprises The first network function generates a third temporary identifier; The first network function sends the third temporary identifier to the second network function. The method of claim 7, wherein The first key update request message further comprises a fourth temporary identifier; in a case where the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, the first network function generate the fourth temporary identifier, and updates the third temporary identifier to the fourth temporary identifier. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that The first key update request message further comprises the first indication. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 9, characterized in that The first network is a cellular communication network, and the first network function is an authentication service function; or the first network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, and the first network function is a serving call session control function; or the first network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, and the first network function is a serving call session control function; or the first network is a cellular communication network, and the first network function is an authentication service function. A key update method characterized by comprising: The method comprises: The second network function in the second network receives a first key update request message from the first network function in the first network, the first key update request message being used to instruct the second network function to update a key; The second network function updates a key according to the first key update request message to obtain a first key of a terminal device; The second network function sends a second key update request message to the terminal device; wherein the second key update request message is used to instruct the terminal device to update a key to obtain the first key; Based on the first key, a secure communication connection between the second network and the terminal device is established. The method of claim 11, wherein Before the second network function in the second network receives the first key update request message from the first network function in the first network, the method further comprises: The second network function receives a third message, the third message being used to request authentication of the terminal device; wherein the third message comprises a first temporary identifier and a first key identifier, the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier being generated by the first network function in the case that the terminal device is successfully authenticated for the last time in the first network; The second network function receives a fourth message, the fourth message comprising a fourth key and a third temporary identifier; wherein the fourth key is used to protect the security of communication between the terminal device and the second network; The second network function generates a third key identifier; The second network function saves the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, the third temporary identifier, the third key identifier, and the fourth key. The method of claim 12, wherein The first key update request message comprises the first temporary identifier, the first key identifier, and the first key; the method further comprises: The second network function determines the fourth key according to the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier; The second network function updates the fourth key to the first key according to the first key update request message and a first policy. The method of claim 13, wherein The method further comprises: The second network function determines the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier according to the first temporary identifier and the first key identifier; The second network function sends the second key update request message to the terminal device; wherein the second key update request message comprises the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier. The method of claim 11, wherein The first key update request message comprises a first indication; the method further comprises: The second network function updates a key according to the first indication and a first policy. The method according to any one of claims 11-15, characterized in that The first key update request message includes a second temporary identifier and a second key identifier, the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier are generated by the first network function in the case that the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, and the method further includes: The second network function sends the second key update request message to the terminal device, and the second key update request message includes the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier. The method according to any one of claims 11-16, characterized in that The first network is a cellular communication network, the first network function is an authentication service function, the second network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, and the second network function is a serving call session control function; or, the first network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, the first network function is a serving call session control function, the second network is a cellular communication network, and the second network function is an authentication service function. A key update method characterized by comprising: The method includes: In the case that the first network successfully re-authenticates the terminal device, receiving a second key update request message from a second network function in a second network; Updating a key according to the second key update request message to obtain a first key of the terminal device; Based on the first key, establishing a secure communication connection between the terminal device and the second network. The method of claim 18, wherein The terminal device stores a second key, the second key is generated in the case that the first network successfully authenticates the terminal device once, and the method further includes: Determining the third key and updating the stored second key to the third key; wherein the third key is a key between the terminal device and the first network function generated when the first network re-authenticates the terminal device. The method of claim 19, wherein The second key update request message includes a third temporary identifier and a third key identifier, wherein the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier are stored by the second network function in the case that the second network successfully authenticates the terminal device once; and the method further includes: Determining the third key according to the third temporary identifier and the third key identifier; Determining the first key according to the third key. The method according to any one of claims 18-20, characterized in that The method further includes: Updating the first key of the terminal device according to the second key update request message and a second policy. The method according to any one of claims 18-21, characterized in that The second key update request message includes a first indication; and the method further includes: Updating the first key of the terminal device according to the first indication and a second policy. The method according to any one of claims 18-22, characterized in that The first network is a cellular communication network, the first network function is an authentication service function, the second network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, and the second network function is a serving call session control function; or, the first network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, the first network function is a serving call session control function, the second network is a cellular communication network, and the second network function is an authentication service function. A key update method characterized by comprising: In a case that the first network re-authenticates the terminal device successfully, a first key is generated based on a preset first indication, and a third key update request message is sent to a second network function in the second network, where the third key update request message is used to instruct the second network function to update a key to obtain the first key; A secure communication connection between the terminal device and the second network is established based on the first key. The method of claim 24, wherein The method further includes: receiving a fifth message from a first network function in the first network, where the fifth message is used to indicate that the first network re-authenticates the terminal device successfully; wherein the fifth message includes a second temporary identifier and a second key identifier; the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier are generated by the first network function in a case that the first network re-authenticates the terminal device successfully. The method of claim 24, wherein Before the first message is sent to the first network function in the first network, the method further includes: receiving a sixth message from the second network function in the second network, where the sixth message includes a third temporary identifier, and the third temporary identifier is received from the first network function by the second network function in a case that the second network authenticates the terminal device successfully. The method of claim 26, wherein The third key update request message includes the second temporary identifier, the second key identifier and the third temporary identifier. The method of claim 25, wherein After the fifth message is received from the first network function in the first network, the method further includes: determining a third key according to the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier; deriving the first key according to the third key based on the first indication; wherein the third key is generated in a case that the first network re-authenticates the terminal device successfully. The method of claim 28, wherein After the fifth message is received from the first network function in the first network, the method further includes: determining a second key according to the second temporary identifier and the second key identifier; updating the second key to the third key; wherein the second key is generated in a case that the first network authenticates the terminal device successfully. The method according to any one of claims 24-29, characterized in that The first network is a cellular communication network, the first network function is an authentication service function, the second network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, and the second network function is a serving call session control function; or the first network is an Internet Protocol Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) network, the first network function is a serving call session control function, the second network is a cellular communication network, and the second network function is an authentication service function. A communication device characterized by comprising: comprise: at least one processor that executes instructions stored in a memory for performing operations of the method of any of claims 1-10. A communication device characterized by comprising: comprise: at least one processor that executes instructions stored in a memory for performing operations of the method of any of claims 11-17. A communication device characterized by comprising: comprise: at least one processor that executes instructions stored in memory for performing operations of the method of any of claims 18-23. A communication device characterized by comprising: comprising: at least one processor that executes instructions stored in memory for performing operations of the method of any of claims 24-30. A computer readable storage medium comprising instructions which, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any of claims 1-10, any of claims 11-17, any of claims 18-23, or any of claims 24-30.
