Apparatus and method for managing NAS security keys in multi-connectivity environment in wireless communication system
By independently managing NAS security keys for each access type using connection identifier information and a KDF, the solution addresses the limitations of conventional 5G systems, enhancing security management and reliability in multi-connection environments.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- PCT/KR2026/096393
- Authority / Receiving Office
- WO · WO
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2025-05-08
- Filing Date
- 2026-04-28
- Publication Date
- 2026-11-12
AI Technical Summary
Conventional 5G systems struggle with managing NAS security keys in multi-connection environments, as they lack the flexibility and scalability to distinguish and manage security contexts for each access type independently, leading to limitations in security management and verification reliability across different connection methods.
The proposed solution involves generating and managing NAS security keys independently for each access type or connection by using NAS connection identifier information, which is input to a Key Derivation Function (KDF), allowing for separate uplink and downlink NAS count management, and supporting both integrated and separate Security Anchor function scenarios.
This approach enhances the accuracy, flexibility, and scalability of NAS security procedures, improving security separation and reliability in multi-connection environments, and enables flexible adaptation to various network function deployment structures.
Smart Images

Figure KR2026096393_12112026_PF_FP_ABST
Abstract
Description
Device and method for managing NAS security keys in a multi-connection environment in a wireless communication system
[0001] The present disclosure relates to a wireless communication system. Specifically, the present disclosure relates to an apparatus and method for managing a Non Access Stratum (NAS) security key in a wireless communication system in which a multi-connection environment is established.
[0002] As mobile communication technology has gradually advanced, terminals have become able to access various networks depending on their location or connection environment through multiple connection methods. For example, terminals can connect to a core network not only through 3GPP access via standard mobile communication base stations, but also through other types of non-3GPP access or non-terrestrial network-based access such as satellite communication. In such a multi-connection environment, the core network must be able to operate without restrictions for each type of connection, and consistent control and security procedures must be supported even when different connection methods coexist.
[0003] Meanwhile, between the terminal and the core network, registration, authentication, mobility management, and various control messages are exchanged via the Non Access Stratum (NAS) protocol, and security technologies for integrity protection and encryption are mandatorily applied to these NAS messages. In particular, in 5G systems, NAS security is performed based on a security key generated after the registration process and primary authentication, and the NAS security context between the terminal and the network is operated through procedures such as the NAS Security Mode Command. Therefore, in an environment that supports multiple connections, security procedures related to NAS must also be able to operate appropriately for multiple connections or multiple access types.
[0004] However, in conventional 5G systems, NAS security has primarily been configured based on 3GPP and non-3GPP access. Even when a terminal connects to the 5GC in multiple ways, the NAS security context could not operate completely independently; instead, it was handled by sharing a single key across each access type while using only the uplink and downlink count values separately. While this structure can operate to some extent under the premise of a limited number of access technologies, it has limitations in precisely distinguishing NAS security processing corresponding to each connection or performing independent security management for each access type. Furthermore, if the number of access types to be supported increases in the future, it is difficult to ensure the flexibility and scalability of NAS security support using only the conventional structure.
[0005] Furthermore, in future mobile communication systems, the entity managing security keys may be configured differently from the past, and structures involving the introduction of a Security Anchor function separate from the AMF or the integration of various network functions may be considered. Accordingly, technology is required to distinguish NAS security contexts based on information identifying each NAS connection in a multi-connection environment, and to appropriately generate or manage keying materials, integrity protection keys, and encryption keys corresponding to each connection or access type. In other words, security key management technology is needed to enhance the accuracy, independence, and scalability of NAS security even in environments where multiple access types connect to the core network.
[0006] To solve the aforementioned problems, the present disclosure provides an apparatus and method for managing NAS security keys corresponding to each NAS connection or each access type more accurately and flexibly when a multi-connection environment is established in a wireless communication system.
[0007] The technical problems to be solved in this disclosure are not limited to those mentioned above, and other technical problems not mentioned will be clearly understood by those skilled in the art to which this disclosure belongs from the description below.
[0008] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a method performed by a first node comprises: receiving a NAS security mode command message from a second node in a multi-connection environment, the message including NAS security algorithm information and NAS connection identifier information; determining a NAS security key corresponding to a NAS connection identified in the multi-connection environment based on the NAS security algorithm information and the NAS connection identifier information; performing NAS security processing based on the NAS security key; and transmitting a NAS security mode complete message, in which the NAS security processing has been performed, to the second node.
[0009] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a method performed by a second node comprises: transmitting a NAS security mode command message to a first node in a multi-connection environment, the message including NAS security algorithm information and NAS connection identifier information; receiving a NAS security mode complete message from the first node; determining a NAS security key corresponding to a NAS connection identified in the multi-connection environment based on the NAS security algorithm information and the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode complete message; and transmitting a subsequent NAS message to the first node to which at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption is applied based on the NAS security key.
[0010] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a first node is provided, comprising: a transceiver; at least one processor; and at least one memory operably connected to the at least one processor and storing instructions for performing operations when executed by the at least one processor, wherein the operations include all steps of a method performed by the first node according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0011] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a second node is provided, comprising: a transceiver; at least one processor; and at least one memory operably connected to the at least one processor and storing instructions for performing operations when executed by the at least one processor, wherein the operations include all steps of a method performed by the second node according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0012] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a control device for controlling a first node in a wireless communication system comprises at least one processor and at least one memory operably connected to said at least one processor, said at least one memory stores instructions for performing operations based on execution by said at least one processor, said operations include all steps of a method performed by the first node according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0013] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a control device for controlling a second node in a wireless communication system comprises at least one processor and at least one memory operably connected to said at least one processor, said at least one memory stores instructions for performing operations based on execution by said at least one processor, said operations include all steps of a method performed by the second node according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0014] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, one or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing one or more instructions, wherein the one or more instructions perform operations based on execution by one or more processors, and said operations include all steps of a method performed by a first node according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0015] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, one or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing one or more instructions, wherein the one or more instructions perform operations based on execution by one or more processors, and said operations include all steps of a method performed by a second node according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0016] To solve the aforementioned problems, according to various embodiments of the present disclosure, NAS security contexts and NAS security keys corresponding to each access type or each NAS connection can be generated and managed independently of each other in a multi-connection environment. Accordingly, the accuracy, flexibility, and scalability of NAS security procedures can be improved even in an environment where multiple access types coexist.
[0017] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, by using NAS connection identifier information as input to a KDF or NAS security context selection information, different NAS security keys can be derived for each access type or NAS connection. Accordingly, the possibility of security information corresponding to a specific access type or a specific NAS connection being directly mixed with other access types or other NAS connections can be reduced, and consequently, the level of security separation in a multi-connection environment can be improved.
[0018] In addition, according to various embodiments of the present disclosure, uplink NAS counts and downlink NAS counts can be maintained and managed independently by access type or NAS connection. Accordingly, the impact of the NAS message processing status in a specific access type on the NAS message verification procedure in another access type can be reduced, and the reliability of NAS message verification can be improved even in an environment where multiple NAS connections coexist.
[0019] Furthermore, according to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a NAS security key management structure applicable to both cases where the security anchor function is implemented integrated within the AMF and cases where the security anchor function is implemented separately from the AMF can be provided. Accordingly, it is possible to flexibly respond to various network function deployment structures or future architectural changes of mobile communication systems.
[0020] The drawings attached below are intended to aid in understanding the present disclosure and may provide embodiments of the present disclosure together with the detailed description. However, the technical features of the present disclosure are not limited to specific drawings, and the features disclosed in each drawing may be combined with one another to form new embodiments. Reference numerals in each drawing may denote structural elements.
[0021] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of physical channels used in a system applicable to the present disclosure and a general signal transmission method using them.
[0022] FIG. 2 is a drawing illustrating an example of a wireless frame structure used in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0023] FIG. 3 is a drawing illustrating an example of a slot structure used in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0024] FIG. 4 is a drawing illustrating an example of a slot structure of a wireless frame used in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0025] Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 23.501 Figure 3.1.2. Non-Roaming 5G System Architecture in reference point representation.
[0026] Figure 6 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.2-1: Initiation of authentication procedure and selection of authentication method.
[0027] Figure 7 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.3.1-1: Authentication procedure for EAP-AKA'.
[0028] Figure 8 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.3.2-1: Authentication procedure for 5G AKA.
[0029] Figure 9 is a diagram illustrating the 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.5.2-1 Home Network triggered primary authentication procedure.
[0030] Figure 10 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.2.1-1: Key hierarchy generation in 5GS.
[0031] Figure 11 is a diagram illustrating the 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.7.2-1: NAS Security Mode Command procedure.
[0032] FIG. 12 is a drawing illustrating an example of an architecture with a security anchoring function in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0033] FIG. 13 shows K using two parameters in a system applicable to the present disclosure. NAS KDF for K NAS This is a drawing illustrating an example of (with 2 parameters).
[0034] FIG. 14 shows K using three parameters in a system applicable to the present disclosure. NAS KDF for K NAS This is a drawing illustrating an example of (with 3 parameters).
[0035] FIG. 15 is a diagram illustrating an example of a NAS Security Mode procedure for case that Security Anchor deployed in AMF in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0036] FIG. 16 is a drawing illustrating an example of a NAS security mode procedure for case that Security Anchor and AMF are deployed separately in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0037] FIG. 17 is a diagram illustrating an example of the operation process of a first node in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0038] FIG. 18 is a diagram illustrating an example of the operation process of a second node in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0039] FIG. 19 is a drawing illustrating an example of the structure of a first node and a second node in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0040] In various embodiments of the present disclosure, "A or B" may mean "only A," "only B," or "both A and B." Alternatively, in various embodiments of the present disclosure, "A or B" may be interpreted as "A and / or B." For example, in various embodiments of the present disclosure, "A, B or C" may mean "only A," "only B," "only C," or "any combination of A, B and C."
[0041] In various embodiments of the present disclosure, a slash ( / ) or a comma used may mean "and / or." For example, "A / B" may mean "A and / or B." Accordingly, "A / B" may mean "only A," "only B," or "both A and B." For example, "A, B, C" may mean "A, B or C."
[0042] In various embodiments of the present disclosure, "at least one of A and B" may mean "only A," "only B," or "both A and B." Additionally, in various embodiments of the present disclosure, the expressions "at least one of A or B" or "at least one of A and / or B" may be interpreted as synonymous with "at least one of A and B."
[0043] Additionally, in various embodiments of the present disclosure, “at least one of A, B and C” may mean “only A,” “only B,” “only C,” or “any combination of A, B and C.” Also, “at least one of A, B or C” or “at least one of A, B and / or C” may mean “at least one of A, B and C.”
[0044] Additionally, parentheses used in various embodiments of the present disclosure may mean "for example." Specifically, when indicated as "control information (PDCCH)," "PDCCH" may be proposed as an example of "control information." In other words, the "control information" of various embodiments of the present disclosure is not limited to "PDCCH," and "PDDCH" may be proposed as an example of "control information." Furthermore, even when indicated as "control information (i.e., PDCCH)," "PDCCH" may be proposed as an example of "control information."
[0045] Technical features described individually within one drawing in various embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented individually or simultaneously.
[0046]
[0047] Common signal transmission methods in 3GPP
[0048] Physical channels and general signal transmission
[0049] FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of physical channels used in a system applicable to the present disclosure and a general signal transmission method using them. Specifically, FIG. 1 illustrates physical channels used in a 3GPP system and a general signal transmission.
[0050] Figure 1 illustrates physical channels used in a 3GPP system and general signal transmission. In a wireless communication system, a terminal receives information from a base station via a downlink (DL) and transmits information to the base station via an uplink (UL). The information transmitted and received by the base station and the terminal includes data and various control information, and various physical channels exist depending on the type and purpose of the information they transmit and receive.
[0051] When the power is turned on again after being off, or when a terminal newly enters a cell, it performs an initial cell search operation, such as synchronizing with the base station (S11). To do this, the terminal receives PSCH (Primary Synchronization Channel) and SSCH (Secondary Synchronization Channel) from the base station to synchronize with the base station and obtain information such as cell ID (cell identity). In addition, the terminal can obtain cell broadcast information by receiving PBCH (Physical Broadcast Channel) from the base station. Furthermore, during the initial cell search phase, the terminal can check the downlink channel status by receiving DL RS (Downlink Reference Signal).
[0052] After completing the initial cell search, the terminal can obtain more specific system information by receiving the PDCCH (Physical Downlink Control Channel) and the corresponding PDSCH (Physical Downlink Control Channel) (S12).
[0053] Subsequently, the terminal may perform a Random Access Procedure to complete the connection to the base station (S13~S16). Specifically, the terminal transmits a preamble through a Physical Random Access Channel (PRACH) (S13) and receives a Random Access Response (RAR) for the preamble through a PDCCH and a corresponding PDSCH (S14). Subsequently, the terminal transmits a Physical Uplink Shared Channel (PUSCH) using scheduling information within the RAR (S15) and may perform a Conflict Resolution Procedure such as a PDCCH and a corresponding PDSCH (S16).
[0054] A terminal that has performed the procedure described above may subsequently perform PDCCH / PDSCH reception (S17) and PUSCH / PUCCH (Physical Uplink Control Channel) transmission (S18) as a general uplink / downlink signal transmission procedure. The control information transmitted by the terminal to the base station is referred to as UCI (Uplink Control Information). UCI includes HARQ ACK / NACK (Hybrid Automatic Repeat and reQuest Acknowledgement / Negative-ACK), SR (Scheduling Request), CSI (Channel State Information), etc. CSI includes CQI (Channel Quality Indicator), PMI (Precoding Matrix Indicator), RI (Rank Indication), etc. UCI is generally transmitted via PUCCH, but it may be transmitted via PUSCH if control information and data need to be transmitted simultaneously. Additionally, the terminal may transmit UCI non-periodically via PUSCH in response to requests / instructions from the network.
[0055]
[0056] OFDM (Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing) Numerology
[0057] The new RAT system uses the OFDM transmission method or a similar transmission method. The new RAT system may follow OFDM parameters different from those of LTE. Alternatively, the new RAT system may follow the existing LTE / LTE-A numerology but have a larger system bandwidth (e.g., 100 MHz). Or, a single cell may support multiple numerologies. That is, UEs operating with different numerologies can coexist within a single cell.
[0058]
[0059] radio frame structure
[0060] FIG. 2 is a drawing illustrating an example of the structure of a wireless frame used in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0061] In NR, uplink and downlink transmissions consist of frames. A radio frame has a length of 10 ms and is defined as two 5 ms half-frames (HF). A half-frame is defined as five 1 ms subframes (SF). A subframe is divided into one or more slots, and the number of slots within a subframe depends on the subcarrier spacing (SCS). Each slot contains 12 or 14 OFDM(A) symbols depending on the cyclic prefix (CP). When a standard CP is used, each slot contains 14 symbols. When an extended CP is used, each slot contains 12 symbols. Here, the symbols may include OFDM symbols (or CP-OFDM symbols) or SC-FDMA symbols (or DFT-s-OFDM symbols).
[0062] Table 1 illustrates how the number of symbols per slot, the number of slots per frame, and the number of slots per subframe vary depending on the SCS when a standard CP is used.
[0063] SCS (15*2^u)N slot symb N frame,u slot N subframe,u slot 15KHz (u=0)1410130KHz (u=1)1420260KHz (u=2)14404120KHz (u=3)14808240KHz (u=4)1416016
[0064] N slot symb is the number of symbols in the slot. N frame,uslot is the number of slots within the frame. N subframe,u slot is the number of slots within the subframe.
[0065]
[0066] Table 2 illustrates how, when extended CP is used, the number of symbols per slot, the number of slots per frame, and the number of slots per subframe vary depending on the SCS.
[0067] SCS (15*2^u)N slot symb N frame,u slot N subframe,u slot 60KHz (u=2)12404
[0068] NR supports multiple numerologies (or subcarrier spacing (SCS)) to support various 5G services. For example, when the SCS is 15 kHz, it supports a wide area in traditional cellular bands; when the SCS is 30 kHz / 60 kHz, it supports dense-urban, lower latency, and wider carrier bandwidth; and when the SCS is 60 kHz or higher, it supports a bandwidth greater than 24.25 GHz to overcome phase noise.
[0069] The NR frequency band can be defined by two types of frequency ranges (FR1, FR2). The numerical values of the frequency ranges may change; for example, the two types of frequency ranges (FR1, FR2) may be as shown in Table 3 below. For convenience of explanation, among the frequency ranges used in the NR system, FR1 may mean "sub 6GHz range" and FR2 may mean "above 6GHz range" and may be referred to as millimeter wave (mmW).
[0070] Frequency Range designationCorresponding frequency rangeSubcarrier SpacingFR1450MHz - 6000MHz15, 30, 60kHzFR224250MHz - 52600MHz60, 120, 240kHz
[0071] As described above, the numerical value of the frequency range of the NR system may change. For example, FR1 may include a band of 410 MHz to 7125 MHz as shown in Table 4 below. That is, FR1 may include a frequency band of 6 GHz (or 5850, 5900, 5925 MHz, etc.) or higher. For example, the frequency band of 6 GHz (or 5850, 5900, 5925 MHz, etc.) or higher included within FR1 may include an unlicensed band. The unlicensed band may be used for various purposes, for example, for communication for vehicles (e.g., autonomous driving).
[0072] Frequency Range designationCorresponding frequency rangeSubcarrier SpacingFR1410MHz - 7125MHz15, 30, 60kHzFR224250MHz - 52600MHz60, 120, 240kHz
[0073] In an NR system, the OFDM(A) numerology (e.g., SCS, CP length, etc.) can be configured differently among multiple cells that are merged into a single terminal. Accordingly, the (absolute time) interval of a time resource (e.g., SF, slot, or TTI) (collectively referred to as TU (Time Unit) for convenience) composed of the same number of symbols can be configured differently among the merged cells.
[0074]
[0075] FIG. 3 is a drawing illustrating an example of a slot structure used in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0076] A slot contains multiple symbols in the time domain. For example, in the case of a standard CP, one slot contains 7 symbols, whereas in the case of an extended CP, one slot contains 6 symbols. A carrier contains multiple subcarriers in the frequency domain. A Resource Block (RB) is defined as multiple (e.g., 12) consecutive subcarriers in the frequency domain. A Bandwidth Part (BWP) is defined as multiple consecutive (P)RBs in the frequency domain and can correspond to a single numerology (e.g., SCS, CP length, etc.). A carrier can contain up to N (e.g., 5) BWPs. Data communication is performed through the active BWPs, and only one BWP can be active for a single terminal. In the resource grid, each element is referred to as a Resource Element (RE) and can be mapped to a single complex symbol.
[0077]
[0078] FIG. 4 is a drawing illustrating an example of a slot structure of a wireless frame used in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0079] Figure 4 illustrates the slot structure of a frame of an NR system as an exemplary system.
[0080] The frame structure of NR is characterized by a self-contained structure in which a DL control channel, DL or UL data, and a UL control channel can all be included within a single slot unit, as shown in the example of FIG. 4. In this case, DL data scheduling information and UL data scheduling information can be transmitted in the DL control channel, while ACK / NACK information for DL data, CSI information (modulation and coding scheme information, MIMO transmission-related information, etc.), and scheduling requests can be transmitted in the UL control channel. In FIG. 4, a time gap for DL-to-UL or UL-to-DL switching may exist between the control area and the data area. Additionally, some of the DL control, DL data, UL data, and UL control channels may not be configured within a single slot. Alternatively, the order of channels constituting a single slot may vary (for example, DL control, DL data, UL control, UL data, or UL control, UL data, DL control, DL data, etc.).
[0081]
[0082] Introduction to the present disclosure
[0083] The present disclosure relates to an apparatus and method for managing Non-Access Stratum (NAS) security keys in a multi-connectivity environment.
[0084] With the advancement of mobile communication technology, it has become possible to provide communication services regardless of the terminal's location through multiple connection technologies. The aforementioned multiple connections may include not only connections through general mobile communication base stations (3GPP), but also connections through heterogeneous (non-3GPP) connection technologies and connections through satellite communication.
[0085] To support such a multi-connection environment, relevant technologies must be in place to ensure that the core network operates without restrictions according to each connection type. Furthermore, the application of security technologies is essential, and in particular, security technologies at the Non-Access Stratum (NAS) layer—the protocol between the terminal and the core network—must function properly.
[0086] Furthermore, with the development of 6G mobile communication technology, the entity managing security keys may differ from existing mobile communication systems, and special management measures for security keys may be required to support multiple access technologies. Accordingly, the present disclosure provides a method for operating NAS-related security procedures in cases where management of NAS security keys is required in a multiple connection environment.
[0087] Regarding the background technology, terms, abbreviations, etc. used in this disclosure, reference may be made to relevant standard documents published prior to this specification. Examples of referenced documents and abbreviations are as follows.
[0088] [1] 3GPP TS 23.501: “System Architecture for the 5G System”.
[0089] [2] 3GPP TS 33.501: “Security architecture and procedures for 5G system”.
[0090] [3] 3GPP TS 23.502: “Procedures for the 5G System (5GS)”.
[0091]
[0092] 5GC 5G Core Network
[0093] NAS Non Access Stratum
[0094] AS Access Stratum
[0095] AMF Access and Mobility Management Function
[0096] DN Data Network
[0097] SMF Session Management Function
[0098] UDM Unified Data Management
[0099] UPF User Plane Function
[0100] EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
[0101] AKA Authentication and Key Agreement
[0102] SIDF Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function
[0103] NAI Network Access Identifier
[0104] SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier
[0105] SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier
[0106] 5G-GUTI 5G - Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity
[0107] KDF Key Derivation Function
[0108] NH Next Hop parameter
[0109] NCC Next Hop Chaining Counter parameters
[0110] gNB NR Node B
[0111] NG Next Generation
[0112] ng-eNB Next Generation Evolved Node-B
[0113] TN Terrestrial Network
[0114] NTN Non-Terrestrial Network
[0115] SEAF Security Anchor Function
[0116] ngKSI 5G Key Set Identifier
[0117]
[0118] Explanation of background technology
[0119] 3GPP TS 23.501
[0120] According to TS 23.501 [1], the 5G System architecture is defined to support data connectivity and services enabling deployments to use techniques such as Network Function Virtualization and Software Defined Networking.
[0121] The 5G system architecture shall leverage service-based interactions between Control Plane (CP) Network Functions where identified.
[0122] The main principles and concepts are as follows.
[0123] - Separate the User Plane (UP) functions from the Control Plane (CP) functions, allowing independent scalability, evolution, and flexible deployments, e.g., centralized or distributed (remote) locations.
[0124] - Modularize the function design to enable flexible and efficient network slicing.
[0125] Where applicable, define procedures (i.e., the set of interactions between network functions) as services to enable reuse.
[0126] Enable each Network Function and its Network Function Services to interact with other NFs and their Network Function Services directly or indirectly via a Service Communication Proxy if required. This architecture does not exclude the use of another intermediate function (e.g., a DRA) to support the routing of Control Plane messages.
[0127] - Minimize dependencies between the Access Network (AN) and the Core Network (CN). This architecture is defined as a converged core network with a common AN-CN interface that integrates different access types, such as 3GPP access and non-3GPP access.
[0128] - Supports a unified authentication framework.
[0129] - Supports "stateless" NFs, where the "compute" resource is decoupled from the "storage" resource.
[0130] - Supports capability exposure.
[0131] - Supports concurrent access to local and centralized services. To support low-latency services and access to local data networks, UP functions can be deployed close to the access network.
[0132] - Supports roaming with both home-routed traffic and local breakout traffic in the visited PLMN.
[0133]
[0134] Figure 5 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 23.501 Figure 3.1.2. Non-Roaming 5G System Architecture in reference point representation.
[0135] Figure 3.1.2-1 depicts the 5G system architecture in the non-roaming case, using the reference point representation showing how various network functions interact with each other.
[0136] Figure 3.1.2. Non-Roaming 5G System Architecture in reference point representation
[0137] The 5G system architecture consists of the following network functions (NF).
[0138] - Authentication Server Function (AUSF)
[0139] - Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF)
[0140] - Data Network (DN), eg operator services, Internet access or 3rd party services
[0141] - Unstructured Data Storage Function (UDSF)
[0142] - Network Exposure Function (NEF)
[0143] - Intermediate NEF (I-NEF)
[0144] - Network Repository Function (NRF)
[0145] - Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF)
[0146] - Policy Control Function (PCF)
[0147] - Session Management Function (SMF)
[0148] - Unified Data Management (UDM)
[0149] - Unified Data Repository (UDR)
[0150] - User Plane Function (UPF)
[0151] - UE radio Capability Management Function (UCMF)
[0152] - Application Function (AF)
[0153] - User Equipment (UE)
[0154] - (Radio) Access Network ((R)AN)
[0155] - 5G-Equipment Identity Register (5G-EIR)
[0156] - Network Data Analytics Function (NWDAF)
[0157] - CHarging Function (CHF)
[0158]
[0159] 5G 시스템 아키텍처는 다음과 같은 참조점(reference point)들을 포함한다. (The 5G System Architecture contains the following reference points:)
[0160] N1: Reference point between the UE and the AMF.
[0161] N2: Reference point between the (R)AN and the AMF.
[0162] N3: Reference point between the (R)AN and the UPF.
[0163] N4: Reference point between the SMF and the UPF.
[0164] N6: Reference point between the UPF and a Data Network.
[0165] Note 1: The traffic forwarding details of N6 between a UPF acting as an uplink classifier and a local data network are not specified in this Release of the specification.
[0166] N9: Reference point between two UPFs.
[0167] The following reference points represent the interactions that exist between the NF services within the NFs. These reference points are implemented through corresponding NF service-based interfaces and by specifying the identified consumer and producer NF services as well as their interactions to realize a particular system procedure.
[0168] N5: Reference point between the PCF and an AF.
[0169] N7: Reference point between the SMF and the PCF.
[0170] N8: Reference point between the UDM and the AMF.
[0171] N10: Reference point between the UDM and the SMF.
[0172] N11: Reference point between the AMF and the SMF.
[0173] N12: Reference point between AMF and AUSF.
[0174] N13: Reference point between the UDM and Authentication Server function the AUSF.
[0175] N14: Reference point between two AMFs.
[0176] N15: Reference point between the PCF and the AMF in the case of non-roaming scenario, PCF in the visited network and AMF in the case of roaming scenario.
[0177] N16: Reference point between two SMFs, (in roaming case between SMF in the visited network and the SMF in the home network).
[0178] N16a: Reference point between SMF and I-SMF.
[0179] N17: Reference point between AMF and 5G-EIR.
[0180] N18: Reference point between any NF and UDSF.
[0181] N19: Reference point between two PSA UPFs for 5G LAN-type service.
[0182] N22: Reference point between AMF and NSSF.
[0183] N23: Reference point between PCF and NWDAF.
[0184] N24: Reference point between the PCF in the visited network and the PCF in the home network.
[0185] N27: Reference point between NRF in the visited network and the NRF in the home network.
[0186] N28: Reference point between PCF and CHF.
[0187] N29: Reference point between NEF and SMF.
[0188] N29i: Reference point between I-NEF and SMF in the VPLMN.
[0189] N30: Reference point between PCF and NEF.
[0190] Note 2: The functionality of N28, N29, and N30 reference points is defined in TS 23.503
[0045] .
[0191] N31: Reference point between the NSSF in the visited network and the NSSF in the home network.
[0192] Note 3: In some cases, a couple of NFs may need to be associated with each other to serve a UE.
[0193] In addition to the reference points above, there are interfaces / reference point(s) between SMF and the CHF. The reference point(s) are not depicted in the architecture illustrations of this specification.
[0194] Note 4: The functionality of these interface / reference points is defined in TS 32.240
[0041] .
[0195] N32: Reference point between SEPP in the visited network and the SEPP in the home network.
[0196] Note 5: The functionality of an N32 reference point is defined in TS 33.501
[0029] .
[0197] N33: Reference point between NEF and AF.
[0198] N34: Reference point between NSSF and NWDAF.
[0199] N35: Reference point between UDM and UDR.
[0200] N36: Reference point between PCF and UDR.
[0201] N37: Reference point between NEF and UDR.
[0202] N38: Reference point between I-SMFs.
[0203] N40: Reference point between SMF and the CHF.
[0204] Note 6: The reference points from N40 up to and including N49 are reserved for allocation and definition in TS 23.503
[0045] .
[0205] N50: Reference point between AMF and the CBCF.
[0206] N51: Reference point between AMF and NEF.
[0207] N51i: Reference point between I-NEF and the AMF in the VPLMN.
[0208] N52: Reference point between NEF and UDM.
[0209] N53: Reference point between the I-NEF and the NEF.
[0210] N55: Reference point between AMF and the UCMF.
[0211] N56: Reference point between NEF and the UCMF.
[0212] N57: Reference point between AF and the UCMF.
[0213]
[0214] 3GPP TS 33.501
[0215] 6 UE와 5G 네트워크 기능 간의 보안 절차 (6 Security procedures between UE and 5G network functions)
[0216] 6.0 일반 (6.0 General)
[0217] If a UE is connected to both the 5GC and the EPC and is connected to an ng-eNB connected to both the EPC and the 5GC, the UE has the ability to select the core network to connect to as described in Section 4.8.4 of TS24.501
[0035] . If the UE selects the EPC, the UE must use the security procedures in accordance with TS33.401
[0010] . Otherwise, if the UE selects the 5GC, the UE must use the security procedures in accordance with this document. (When the UE is capable of connecting to 5GC and EPC and connected to an ng-eNB which is connected to both EPC and 5GC, the UE has the ability to select which core network to connect to as described in clause 4.8.4 in TS24.501
[0035] . If the UE selects the EPC, the UE shall use security procedure as in TS33.401
[0010] . Otherwise, if the UE selects 5GC, the UE shall use the security procedures as per this document.)
[0218] For an ng-eNB capable of connecting to both EPC and 5GC, the ng-eNB shall select the corresponding security procedures based on the core network type selected by the UE. That is, if EPC is selected, the ng-eNB shall use the security procedures described in TS33.401
[0010] , and if 5GC is selected, the ng-eNB shall use the security procedures described in this document.
[0219] 6.1 Primary authentication and key agreement
[0220] 6.1.1 Authentication framework
[0221] 6.1.1.1 General
[0222] The purpose of the primary authentication and key consensus procedure is to enable mutual authentication between the UE and the network and to provide keying material that can be used between the UE and the serving network in subsequent security procedures. The keying material generated by the primary authentication and key consensus procedure is the K provided by the AUSF of the home network to the SEAF of the serving network.SEAF Create an anchor key called (The purpose of the primary authentication and key agreement procedures is to enable mutual authentication between the UE and the network and provide keying material that can be used between the UE and the serving network in subsequent security procedures. The keying material generated by the primary authentication and key agreement procedure results in an anchor key called the K SEAF provided by the AUSF of the home network to the SEAF of the serving network.)
[0223] K SEAF Keys for two or more security contexts can be derived from the K SEAFwithout the need of a new authentication run. A concrete example of this is that an authentication run over a 3GPP access network can also provide keys to establish security between the UE and a N3IWF used in untrusted non-3GPP access.)
[0224] Anchor Key K SEAF is K AUSF It is derived from the intermediate key called K AUSF It is established between the UE and HN as a result of the first authentication process. K AUSF Depending on the home operator's policy, it may be securely stored in the AUSF, for example, a control plane solution for Steering of Roaming (see Section 6.14), UE parameter update procedures (see Section 6.15), or if AKMA is supported by the HPLMN. (The anchor key K SEAF is derived from an intermediate key called the K AUSF The K AUSF is established between the UE and HN resulting from the primary authentication procedure. The K AUSF may be securely stored in the AUSF based on the home operator's policy on using such key eg if the control plane solution for Steering of Roaming (see clause 6.14) or UE Parameter Update procedures (see clause 6.15) or AKMA are supported by the HPLMN.)
[0225] Note A: For standalone non-public networks when an authentication method other than 5G AKA or EAP-AKA is used, Annex I.2 applies.
[0226] Note 1: This feature is an optimization that might be useful, for example, when a UE registers to different serving networks for 3GPP-defined access and untrusted non-3GPP access (this is possible according to TS 23.501 [2]). The details of this feature are operator-specific and not in scope of this document.
[0227] Note 2: K stored in AUSF AUSF Subsequent authentication based on the K provides somewhat weaker assurance than authentication directly involving ARPF and USIM. This is comparable to the fast re-authentication of EAP-AKA. (NOTE 2: A subsequent authentication based on the K AUSFstored in the AUSF gives somewhat weaker guarantees than an authentication directly involving the ARPF and the USIM. It is rather comparable to fast re-authentication in EAP-AKA'.)
[0228] Note 2a: Deleted. (NOTE 2a: Void.)
[0229] The UE and the serving network shall support EAP-AKA and 5G AKA authentication methods.
[0230] Note 2b: The home operator's decision is determined by which authentication method is selected.
[0231] The USIM must be mounted on a UICC. The UICC may be removable or non-removable.
[0232] Note 3: For non-3GPP access networks, USIM applies to terminals with 3GPP access capabilities.
[0233] If the terminal supports 3GPP access capabilities, the credentials used with EAP-AKA and 5G AKA for non-3GPP access networks shall reside on the UICC.
[0234] Note 4: Since EAP-AKA and 5G AKA are the only authentication methods supported in the UE and serving network, they are described only in sub-clause 6.1.3 of this document. For a private network using the 5G system as specified in [7], an example of how additional authentication methods can be used with the EAP framework is provided in the informative Annex B.
[0235] Note 5: For non-public network (NPN) security, details are provided in Annex I of the present document.
[0236] Upon successful completion of the 5G AKA primary authentication, the AMF shall initiate the NAS security mode command procedure (see clause 6.7.2) with the UE.
[0237] Note 6: The reason the NAS SMC procedure is mandatory after primary authentication is that the newly derived K until the UE receives the NAS SMC message AUSF This is because it does not store the new partially native NAS security context. A new partial native NAS security context is applied. Whether AS key re-keying is performed is specified in Section 6.9.4.4. (NOTE 6: The reason to mandatory run the NAS SMC procedure after primary authentication is because the UE does not store the new derived K AUSF until receiving the NAS SMC message. The new partial native NAS security context is taken into use. It is specified in clause 6.9.4.4 whether AS key re-keying is performed.)
[0238] 6.1.1.2 EAP Framework
[0239] The EAP framework is specified in RFC 3748
[0027] and defines the roles of the peer, pass-through authenticator, and back-end authentication server. The back-end authentication server acts as the EAP server and terminates the EAP authentication method with the peer. In the 5G system, the EAP framework is supported as follows:
[0240] The UE performs the role of the peer.
[0241] The SEAF performs the role of a pass-through authenticator.
[0242] The AUSF performs the role of the backend authentication server.
[0243]
[0244] 6.1.1.3 Granularity of anchor key binding to serving network
[0245] The first authentication and key agreement procedure is K SEAF The primary authentication and key agreement procedures shall bind the K to the serving network. Binding to the serving network prevents one serving network from impersonating another, thereby providing implicit serving network authentication for the UE. SEAF to the serving network. The binding to the serving network prevents one serving network from claiming to be a different serving network, and thus provides implicit serving network authentication to the UE.)
[0246] This implicit serving network authentication shall be provided to the UE irrespective of the access network technology, so it applies to both 3GPP and non-3GPP access networks.
[0247] In addition, the anchor key provided to the serving network must be specific to the authentication performed between the UE and the 5G core network. That is, K SEAF It must be cryptographically separated from the KASME key transmitted from the home network to the serving network in previous mobile communication generations. (Furthermore, the anchor key provided to the serving network shall also be specific to the authentication having taken place between the UE and a 5G core network, i.e., the K SEAF shall be cryptographically separate from the key KASME delivered from the home network to the serving network in earlier mobile network generations.)
[0248] The anchor key binding shall be achieved by including a parameter called "serving network name" into the chain of key derivations that leads from the long-term subscriber key to the anchor key.
[0249] The value of serving network name is defined in sub-clause 6.1.1.4 of the present document.
[0250] The chain of key derivations that leads from the long-term subscriber key to the anchor key is specified in sub-clause 6.1.3 of the present document for each (class) of authentication methods. The key derivation rules are specified in Annex A.
[0251] Note: Since 5G core procedures are designed to be access network agnostic, parameters such as 'access network type' are not used for anchor key binding.
[0252] 6.1.1.4 Construction of the serving network name
[0253] 6.1.1.4.1 Serving network name
[0254] The serving network name is used in the derivation of the anchor key and serves a dual purpose.
[0255] It binds the anchor key to the serving network by including the serving network identifier (SN Id).
[0256] - By setting the service code to "5G", the anchor key is specified for authentication between the 5G core network and the UE.
[0257]
[0258] In 5G AKA, the serving network name serves a similar purpose of binding the RES* and XRES* to the serving network.
[0259] The serving network name is the concatenation of a service code and the SN Id with a separation character ":", such that the service code prepends the SN Id.
[0260] Note: Since the serving network name relates to a 5G core procedure that is access network agnostic, parameters such as 'access network type' are not used for the serving network name.
[0261] The SN Id identifies the serving PLMN and, except for standalone non-public networks, is defined as SNN-network-identifier in TS 24.501
[0035] .
[0262] Note 1: For standalone non-public networks, the definition of SN Id is provided in Annex I.3.
[0263] 6.1.1.4.2 Construction of the serving network name by the UE
[0264] The UE shall construct the serving network name as follows:
[0265]
[0266] - The service code must be set to "5G".
[0267] The network identifier must be set to the SN Id of the network being authenticated.
[0268] - The service code and SN ID must be concatenated with the separation character ":".
[0269]
[0270] 6.1.1.4.3 Construction of the serving network name by the SEAF
[0271] The SEAF shall construct the serving network name as follows:
[0272] - The service code must be set to "5G".
[0273] - The network identifier shall be set to the SN Id of the serving network to which the AUSF sends the authentication data.
[0274] The service code and SN ID must be concatenated with the separation character ":".
[0275] Note: AUSF receives the serving network name from the SEAF. Before using the serving network name, AUSF checks that the SEAF is authorized to use it, as specified in clause 6.1.2.
[0276]
[0277] 6.1.2 Initiation of authentication and selection of authentication method
[0278] Figure 6 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.2-1: Initiation of authentication procedure and selection of authentication method.
[0279] The initiation of the primary authentication is shown in Figure 6.1.2-1.
[0280] Figure 6.1.2-1: Initiation of authentication procedure and selection of authentication method
[0281]
[0282] The SEAF may initiate authentication with the UE during any procedure establishing a signaling connection with the UE, according to the SEAF's policy. The UE shall use SUCI or 5G-GUTI in the Registration Request.
[0283] The SEAF shall invoke the Nausf_UEAuthentication service by sending a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message to the AUSF whenever the SEAF wishes to initiate an authentication.
[0284] The Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message shall contain one of the following:
[0285] - SUCI as defined in this standard, or (- SUCI, as defined in the current specification, or)
[0286] - SUPI as defined in TS 23.501[2].
[0287] If the SEAF possesses a valid 5G-GUTI and re-authenticates the UE, it must include the SUPI in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message. Otherwise, it must include the SUCI in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request. The SUPI / SUCI structure is part of the stage 3 protocol design.
[0288] The Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request shall furthermore contain the following:
[0289] - the serving network name, as defined in sub-clause 6.1.1.4 of the present document.
[0290] Note 2: The local policy for the selection of the authentication method does not need to be applied per UE and can be applied equally to all UEs.
[0291] The Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request may further include the following:
[0292] - Disaster Roaming service indication, as specified in TS 23.502[8] clause 4.2.2.2.
[0293] When the AUSF receives a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message, it must compare the serving network name in the request with the expected serving network name to determine whether the SEAF of the serving network is authorized to use that serving network name. The AUSF must temporarily store the received serving network name. If the serving network is not authorized to use that serving network name, the AUSF must respond with "serving network not authorized" in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response. (Upon receiving the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message, the AUSF shall check that the requesting SEAF in the serving network is entitled to use the serving network name in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request by comparing the serving network name with the expected serving network name. The AUSF shall store the received serving network name temporarily. If the serving network is not authorized to use the serving network name, the AUSF shall respond with "serving network not authorized" in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response.)
[0294] Note 2: The AUSF and the UDM may be configured with a Disaster Condition via OAM based on operator policy and the request of government agencies.
[0295] For disaster roaming, the AUSF shall check the local configuration and, if allowed, send a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request to the UDM.
[0296] The Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request sent from AUSF to UDM includes the following information:
[0297] - SUCI or SUPI; (- SUCI or SUPI;)
[0298] - the serving network name; (- the serving network name;)
[0299] - If received from SEAF, Disaster Roaming service indication.
[0300] Upon receiving the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, the UDM shall invoke SIDF if a SUCI is received. SIDF shall deconceal the SUCI to gain SUPI before the UDM can process the request.
[0301] The UDM / ARPF must select the authentication method based on SUPI.
[0302] Note 3: The Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message in reply to the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request and the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message in reply to the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request are described as part of the authentication procedures in clause 6.1.3.
[0303] For disaster roaming, the UDM shall check the local configuration and, if allowed, proceed with the procedure using the selected authentication method.
[0304]
[0305] 6.1.3 Authentication procedures
[0306] 6.1.3.1 Authentication procedure for EAP-AKA'
[0307] 'EAP-AKA' is specified in RFC 5448
[0012] . The 3GPP 5G profile for 'EAP-AKA' is specified in the normative Annex F.
[0308] The selection of using EAP-AKA' is described in sub-clause 6.1.2 of the present document.
[0309] Figure 7 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.3.1-1: Authentication procedure for EAP-AKA'.
[0310] Figure 6.1.3.1-1: Authentication procedure for EAP-AKA'
[0311] The authentication procedure for EAP-AKA operates as follows, refer to Figure 6.1.3.1-1.
[0312] 1. The UDM / ARPF shall first generate an authentication vector with the Authentication Management Field (AMF) separation bit set to 1 as defined in TS 33.102 [9]. The UDM / ARPF shall then compute CK' and IK' as per the normative Annex A and replace CK' and IK' with CK' and IK'.
[0313] 2. The UDM shall subsequently send this transformed authentication vector AV'(RAND, AUTN, XRES, CK', IK') to the AUSF from which it received the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, along with an indication that the AV' is to be used for EAP-AKA' using a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message.
[0314] Note: The exchange of Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request and Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response messages between AUSF and UDM / ARPF described in the previous paragraph is the input parameter for key derivation<network name> Except for the value, it is the same as the case for trusted access using EAP-AKA' described in Step 10 of Section 6.2 of TS 33.402
[0011] . "network name" is a concept from RFC 5448
[0012] and is passed in the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute of EAP-AKA'.<network name> The value of the parameter is defined in 3GPP specifications, not RFC 5448
[0012] . For EPS, it is defined as "access network identity" in TS 24.302
[0071] , and for 5G, it is defined as "serving network name" in Section 6.1.1.4 of this document. (NOTE: The exchange of a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message and an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message between the AUSF and the UDM / ARPF described in the preceding paragraph is the same as for trusted access using EAP-AKA' described in TS 33.402
[0011] , sub-clause 6.2, step 10, except for the input parameter to the key derivation, which is the value of<network name> . The "network name" is a concept from RFC 5448
[0012] ; it is carried in the AT_KDF_INPUT attribute in EAP-AKA'.The value of<network name> parameter is not defined in RFC 5448
[0012] , but rather in 3GPP specifications. For EPS, it is defined as “access network identity” in TS 24.302
[0071] , and for 5G, it is defined as “serving network name” in sub-clause 6.1.1.4 of the present document.).
[0315] If SUCI was included in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, the UDM must include SUPI in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response.
[0316] If a subscriber has an AKMA subscription, the UDM shall include the AKMA indication and routing indicator in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response.
[0317] 3. The AUSF shall send the EAP-Request / AKA'-Challenge message to the SEAF in a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message.
[0318] 4. SEAF shall transparently transmit EAP-Request / AKA'-Challenge messages to the UE via the Authentication Request message, which is a NAS message. ME shall transmit the RAND and AUTN received from the EAP-Request / AKA'-Challenge message to the USIM. This message shall include ngKSI and ABBA parameters. In practice, SEAF shall include ngKSI and ABBA parameters in all EAP authentication request messages. ngKSI is used by the UE and AMF to identify the partial native security context generated upon successful authentication. SEAF shall set the ABBA parameter as defined in Annex A.7.1. The values of the ngKSI and ABBA parameters transmitted by SEAF to the UE shall not be changed during the EAP authentication process. (4. The SEAF shall transparently forward the EAP-Request / AKA'-Challenge message to the UE in a NAS message Authentication Request message. The ME shall forward the RAND and AUTN received in EAP-Request / AKA'-Challenge message to the USIM. This message shall include the ngKSI and ABBA parameters. In fact, SEAF shall include the ngKSI and ABBA parameters in all EAP-Authentication request message. The ngKSI will be used by the UE and AMF to identify the partial native security context that is created if the authentication is successful.The SEAF shall set the ABBA parameter as defined in Annex A.7.1. During an EAP authentication, the value of the ngKSI and the ABBA parameter sent by the SEAF to the UE shall not be changed.).
[0319] Note 1: The SEAF needs to recognize that an EAP method is being used by evaluating the type of authentication method based on the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message.
[0320] 5. Upon receiving RAND and AUTN, the USIM shall verify the freshness of AV' by determining whether the AUTN is acceptable as described in TS 33.102[9]. If verification is successful, the USIM shall calculate the response value RES. The USIM shall return RES, CK, and IK to the ME. If the USIM calculates Kc (i.e., GPRS Kc) from CK and IK using the conversion function c3 described in TS 33.102[9] and transmits it to the ME, the ME shall ignore the GPRS Kc and shall not store the GPRS Kc in the USIM or the ME. The ME shall derive CK' and IK' in accordance with Annex A.3. If the AUTN verification fails in the USIM, the USIM and ME shall proceed as described in Section 6.1.3.3. (5. At receipt of the RAND and AUTN, the USIM shall verify the freshness of the AV' by checking whether AUTN can be accepted as described in TS 33.102 [9]. If so, the USIM computes a response RES. The USIM shall return RES, CK, IK to the ME. If the USIM computes a Kc (ie GPRS Kc) from CK and IK using conversion function c3 as described in TS 33.102 [9], and sends it to the ME, then the ME shall ignore such GPRS Kc and not store the GPRS Kc on USIM or in ME. The ME shall derive CK' and IK' according to Annex A.3.If the verification of the AUTN fails on the USIM, then the USIM and ME shall proceed as described in sub-clause 6.1.3.3.).
[0321] 6. The UE shall send the EAP-Response / AKA'-Challenge message to the SEAF in a NAS message, the Auth-Resp message.
[0322] 7. The SEAF shall transparently forward the EAP-Response / AKA'-Challenge message to the AUSF in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message.
[0323] 8. The AUSF shall verify the message by comparing the XRES and RES, and if the AUSF has successfully verified this message, it shall continue as follows; otherwise, it shall return an error to the SEAF. The AUSF shall inform the UDM about the authentication result (see sub-clause 6.1.4 of the present document for details on linking authentication confirmation).
[0324] 9. The AUSF and the UE may exchange EAP-Request / AKA'-Notification and EAP-Response / AKA'-Notification messages via the SEAF. The SEAF shall transparently forward these messages.
[0325] Note 2: EAP Notifications as described in RFC 3748
[0027] and EAP-AKA Notifications as described in RFC 4187
[0021] can be used at any time in the EAP-AKA exchange. These notifications can be used, for example, for protected result indications or when the EAP server detects an error in the received EAP-AKA response.
[0326] 10. AUSF shall derive EMSK from CK' and IK' as described in RFC 5448
[0012] and Annex F. AUSF shall derive K from the most significant 256 bits of EMSK. AUSF Use as, and as described in Section A.6 K AUSF From K SEAF must be calculated. The AUSF must include an EAP Success message within the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response and send it to the SEAF, and the SEAF must transparently forward this to the UE. The Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message contains K SEAF...is included. If the AUSF receives a SUCI from the SEAF at the start of authentication (see Section 6.1.2 of this document), the AUSF must also include a SUPI in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message. The AUSF, in accordance with the home network operator's policy pursuant to Section 6.1.1.1, K AUSF Save it. (10. The AUSF derives EMSK from CK' and IK' as described in RFC 5448
[0012] and Annex F. The AUSF uses the most significant 256 bits of EMSK as the K AUSF and then calculates K SEAF from K AUSF as described in clause A.6. The AUSF shall send an EAP Success message to the SEAF inside Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response, which shall forward it transparently to the UE. Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message contains the K SEAF . If the AUSF received a SUCI from the SEAF when the authentication was initiated (see sub-clause 6.1.2 of the present document), then the AUSF shall also include the SUPI in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message. The AUSF stores the K AUSFbased on the home network operator's policy according to clause 6.1.1.1.)
[0327] Note 3: For lawful interception, it is necessary but not sufficient for the AUSF to transmit SUPI to the SEAF. K SEAF From K AMF By including SUPI as an input parameter for the key derivation that derives K, the serving network can obtain additional assurance regarding the accuracy of SUPI from both the home network and the UE. (NOTE 3: For lawful interception, the AUSF sending SUPI to SEAF is necessary but not sufficient. By including the SUPI as input parameter to the key derivation of K AMF from K SEAF , additional assurance on the correctness of SUPI is achieved by the serving network from both, home network and UE side.)
[0328] 11. The SEAF shall send the EAP Success message to the UE in the N1 message. This message shall also include the ngKSI and ABBA parameters. The SEAF shall set the ABBA parameter as defined in Annex A.7.1.
[0329] Note 4: Step 11 could be a NAS Security Mode Command or Authentication Result.
[0330] Note 5: The ABBA parameter is included to enable the bidding-down protection of security features that may be introduced later.
[0331] The key received in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message is an anchor key in the sense of the key hierarchy defined in Section 6.2 of this document, i.e., K SEAF ...becomes. SEAF subsequently K according to Annex A.7 SEAF , K from ABBA parameters and SUPI AMF It must derive and transmit to the AMF. Upon receiving the EAP-Success message, the UE must derive the EMSK from CK' and IK' as described in RFC 5448 and Annex F. The ME uses the most significant 256 bits of the EMSK as K AUSF Use as, and K in the same way as AUSF SEAF ...must be calculated. UE K in accordance with Annex A.7 SEAF , K from ABBA parameters and SUPI AMF must be derived. (The key received in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message shall become the anchor key, KSEAF in the sense of the key hierarchy in sub-clause 6.2 of the present document. The SEAF shall then derive the K AMF from the K SEAF , the ABBA parameter and the SUPI according to Annex A.7 and send it to the AMF. On receiving the EAP-Success message, the UE derives EMSK from CK' and IK' as described in RFC 5448 and Annex F. The ME uses the most significant 256 bits of the EMSK as the K AUSF and then calculates K SEAF in the same way as the AUSF. The UE shall derive the K AMF from the K SEAF , the ABBA parameter and the SUPI according to Annex A.7.)
[0332] Note 6: As an implementation option, the UE creates the temporary security context as described in step 11 after receiving the EAP message that allows EMSK to be calculated. The UE converts this temporary security context into a partial security context when it receives EAP Success. The UE removes the temporary security context if the EAP authentication fails.
[0333] The further steps taken by the AUSF upon receiving a successfully verified EAP-Response / AKA'-Challenge message are described in sub-clause 6.1.4 of the present document.
[0334] If the EAP-Response / AKA'-Challenge message is not successfully verified, the subsequent AUSF behavior is determined according to the home network's policy.
[0335] If AUSF and SEAF determine that certification is successful, SEAF submits ngKSI and K to AMF. AMF must be provided. (If AUSF and SEAF determine that the authentication was successful, then the SEAF provides the ngKSI and the K AMF to the AMF.)
[0336]
[0337] 6.1.3.2 Authentication procedure for 5G AKA
[0338] 6.1.3.2.0 5G AKA (6.1.3.2.0 5G AKA)
[0339] 5G AKA enhances EPS AKA
[0010] by providing the home network with proof of successful authentication of the UE from the visited network. The proof is sent by the visited network in an Authentication Confirmation message.
[0340] The selection of using 5G AKA is described in sub-clause 6.1.2 of the present document.
[0341] Note 1: 5G AKA does not support requesting multiple 5G AVs, nor the SEAF pre-fetching 5G AVs from the home network for future use.
[0342] Figure 8 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.3.2-1: Authentication procedure for 5G AKA.
[0343] Figure 6.1.3.2-1: Authentication procedure for 5G AKA
[0344] The authentication procedure for 5G AKA operates as follows, refer to Figure 6.1.3.2-1.
[0345] 1. For each Nudm_Authenticate_Get Request, the UDM / ARPF must generate a 5G HE AV. The UDM / ARPF does this by generating an AV with the Authentication Management Field (AMF) separation bit set to "1", as defined in TS 33.102[9]. The UDM / ARPF then K AUSF must be derived (in accordance with Annex A.2) and XRES* calculated (in accordance with Annex A.4). Finally, UDM / ARPF consists of RAND, AUTN, XRES*, and K AUSF 5G HE AV must be generated from . (1. For each Nudm_Authenticate_Get Request, the UDM / ARPF shall create a 5G HE AV. The UDM / ARPF does this by generating an AV with the Authentication Management Field (AMF) separation bit set to "1" as defined in TS 33.102 [9]. The UDM / ARPF shall then derive K AUSF (as per Annex A.2) and calculate XRES* (as per Annex A.4). Finally, the UDM / ARPF shall create a 5G HE AV from RAND, AUTN, XRES*, and K AUSF .)
[0346] 2. The UDM shall then return the 5G HE AV to the AUSF via a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response, along with an indication that the 5G HE AV is to be used for 5G AKA. If SUCI was included in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request, the UDM shall include the SUPI in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response after deconcement of SUCI by SIDF.
[0347] If a subscriber has an AKMA subscription, the UDM shall include the AKMA indication and routing indicator in the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response.
[0348] 3. The AUSF shall temporarily store the XRES* together with the received SUCI or SUPI.
[0349] 4. The AUSF then calculates HXRES* from XRES* from the 5G HE AV received from the UDM / ARPF (in accordance with Annex A.5) and K AUSF from K SEAF Calculate (according to Annex A.6), convert the XRES* of 5G HE AV to HXRES*, K AUSF ul K SEAF The 5G AV must be generated by replacing it with. (4. The AUSF shall then generate the 5G AV from the 5G HE AV received from the UDM / ARPF by computing the HXRES* from XRES* (according to Annex A.5) and K SEAF from K AUSF (according to Annex A.6), and replacing the XRES* with the HXRES* and K AUSF with K SEAF in the 5G HE AV.)
[0350] 5. AUSF is K thereafter SEAF The AUSF shall then remove the K and return the 5G SE AV(RAND, AUTN, HXRES*) to the SEAF via the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response. (5. The AUSF shall then remove the K SEAF and return the 5G SE AV (RAND, AUTN, HXRES*) to the SEAF in a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response.)
[0351] 6. SEAF must send RAND and AUTN to the UE via the Authentication Request, which is a NAS message. This message contains the K generated if authentication is successful. AMF and it shall also include the ngKSI used by the UE and AMF to identify the partial native security context. This message shall also include the ABBA parameter. The SEAF shall set the ABBA parameter as defined in Annex A.7.1. The ME shall transmit the RAND and AUTN received in the NAS message Authentication Request to the USIM. (6. The SEAF shall send RAND, AUTN to the UE in a NAS message Authentication Request. This message shall also include the ngKSI that will be used by the UE and AMF to identify the K AMF and the partial native security context that is created if the authentication is successful. This message shall also include the ABBA parameters. The SEAF shall set the ABBA parameter as defined in Annex A.7.1. The ME shall forward the RAND and AUTN received in NAS message Authentication Request to the USIM.)
[0352] Note 2: The ABBA parameter is included to enable the prevention of downgrade attacks on security features.
[0353] 7. Upon receiving RAND and AUTN, the USIM shall verify the freshness of the received values by checking the acceptability of the AUTN as described in TS 33.102[9]. If verification is successful, the USIM shall calculate the response value RES. The USIM shall return RES, CK, and IK to the ME. If the USIM calculates Kc (i.e., GPRS Kc) from CK and IK using the conversion function c3 described in TS 33.102[9] and transmits it to the ME, the ME shall ignore the GPRS Kc and shall not store the GPRS Kc in the USIM or the ME. The ME shall subsequently calculate RES* from RES in accordance with Annex A.4. The ME shall calculate K from CK||IK in accordance with Section A.2 AUSF ... must be calculated. ME is K according to Section A.6 AUSF From K SEAF를 계산하여야 한다. 5G에 접속하는 ME는 인증 중에 AUTN의 AMF 필드에 있는 "분리 비트"가 1로 설정되어 있는지 확인하여야 한다. "분리 비트"는 AUTN의 AMF 필드의 비트 0이다. (7. At receipt of the RAND and AUTN, the USIM shall verify the freshness of the received values by checking whether AUTN can be accepted as described in TS 33.102[9]. If so, the USIM computes a response RES. The USIM shall return RES, CK, IK to the ME. If the USIM computes a Kc (i.e. GPRS Kc) from CK and IK using conversion function c3 as described in TS 33.102 [9], and sends it to the ME, then the ME shall ignore such GPRS Kc and not store the GPRS Kc on USIM or in ME. The ME then shall compute RES* from RES according to Annex A.4. The ME shall calculate K AUSF from CK||IK according to clause A.2. The ME shall calculate K SEAF from K AUSF according to clause A.6. An ME accessing 5G shall check during authentication that the "separation bit" in the AMF field of AUTN is set to 1. The "separation bit" is bit 0 of the AMF field of AUTN.)
[0354] Note 3: This separation bit in the AMF field of AUTN cannot be used anymore for operator-specific purposes as described by TS 33.102 [9], Annex F.
[0355] 8. The UE shall return RES* to the SEAF in a NAS message Authentication Response.
[0356] 9. The SEAF shall compute HRES* from RES* in accordance with Annex A.5, and compare HRES* with HXRES*. If the two values match, the SEAF shall consider the authentication successful from the serving network point of view. If they do not match, the SEAF shall proceed as described in sub-clause 6.1.3.2.2. If the UE is not reached and the RES* is never received by the SEAF, the SEAF shall consider the authentication as failed and notify the AUSF of the failure.
[0357] 10. The SEAF shall send the RES* received from the UE to the AUSF via a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message.
[0358] 11. When the AUSF receives a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message containing RES* as an authentication check, it may check whether the 5G AV has expired. If the 5G AV has expired, the AUSF may consider the authentication to have failed from the perspective of the home network. If the authentication is successful, the AUSF may, in accordance with the home network operator's policy pursuant to Section 6.1.1.1, K AUSF It must store the received RES*. The AUSF must compare the received RES* with the stored XRES*. If the RES* and XRES* are identical, the AUSF must consider the authentication successful from the home network perspective. The AUSF must notify the UDM of the authentication result (for details regarding the authentication confirmation association, refer to Section 6.1.4 of this document). (11. When the AUSF receives as authentication confirmation the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message including a RES* it may verify whether the 5G AV has expired. If the 5G AV has expired, the AUSF may consider the authentication as unsuccessful from the home network point of view. Upon successful authentication, the AUSF stores the K AUSFbased on the home network operator's policy according to clause 6.1.1.1. AUSF shall compare the received RES* with the stored XRES*. If the RES* and XRES* are equal, the AUSF shall consider the authentication as successful from the home network point of view. AUSF shall inform UDM about the authentication result (see sub-clause 6.1.4 of the present document for linking with the authentication confirmation).)
[0359] Note 4: K received in Step 2 AUSF Temporarily storing the K in AUSF until the RES* verification is successfully completed (i.e., up to step 11) is left to the implementation. (NOTE 4: It is left to implementation to temporarily store the K AUSF received in step 2 in AUSF until the RES* verification is done successfully (ie, at step 11).)
[0360] 12. AUSF shall notify SEAF of the success or failure of authentication from the home network perspective via the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response. If authentication is successful, K SEAFThis must be sent to the SEAF via the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response. Upon an authentication request (see Section 6.1.2 of this document), if the AUSF receives a SUCI from the SEAF and authentication is successful, the AUSF must also include a SUPI in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message. (12. The AUSF shall indicate to the SEAF in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response whether the authentication was successful or not from the home network point of view. If the authentication was successful, the K SEAF shall be sent to the SEAF in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response. In case the AUSF received a SUCI from the SEAF in the authentication request (see sub-clause 6.1.2 of the present document), and if the authentication was successful, then the AUSF shall also include the SUPI in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message.)
[0361] If authentication is successful, the key K received in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message SEAF becomes the anchor key in the sense of the key hierarchy specified in Section 6.2 of this document. Subsequently, SEAF is K according to Annex A.7 SEAF , K from ABBA parameters and SUPIAMF ...must be derived. SEAF is AMF with ngKSI and K AMF It must provide. If the AUSF indicates that authentication was successful from the home network perspective, the AMF must initiate a NAS Security Mode command procedure with the UE (see Section 6.7.2) to apply the newly created partial native 5G NAS security context. The UE must consider the performed primary authentication to be successful upon receiving a valid NAS Security Mode Command message from the AMF. (If the authentication was successful, the key K SEAF received in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message shall become the anchor key in the sense of the key hierarchy as specified in sub-clause 6.2 of the present document. Then the SEAF shall derive the K AMF from the K SEAF , the ABBA parameter and the SUPI according to Annex A.7. The SEAF shall provide the ngKSI and the K AMFto the AMF. If the AUSF indicates that the authentication was successful from the home network point of view, then the AMF shall initiate NAS security mode command procedure (see clause 6.7.2) with the UE, to take the newly generated partial native 5G NAS security context into use. Upon receiving the valid NAS Security Mode Command message from the AMF, the UE shall consider the performed primary authentication as successful.)
[0362] If SUCI is used in this certification, SEAF is K SEAF ngKSI and K in AMF only after receiving a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message containing SUPI. AMF It must provide, and communication services are not provided to the UE until the SUPI is known to the serving network. (If a SUCI was used for this authentication, then the SEAF shall only provide ngKSI and K AMF to the AMF after it has received the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message containing K SEAF and SUPI; no communication services will be provided to the UE until the SUPI is known to the serving network.)
[0363] The further steps taken by the AUSF after the authentication procedure are described in sub-clause 6.1.4 of the present document.
[0364] 6.1.3.2.1 Deleted (6.1.3.2.1 Void)
[0365] 6.1.3.2.2 RES* verification failure in SEAF or AUSF or both
[0366] This clause describes how RES* verification failure in the SEAF or in the AUSF shall be handled.
[0367] In step 9 of Figure 6.1.3.2-1, the SEAF shall compute HRES* from RES* according to Annex A.5, and the SEAF shall compare HRES* and HXRES*. If the two values do not coincide, the SEAF shall consider the authentication as unsuccessful.
[0368] The SEAF shall proceed with step 10 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1 and, after receiving the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message from the AUSF in step 12 in Figure 6.1.3.2-1, proceed as described below.
[0369] - If the AUSF has indicated in the Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message to the SEAF that the verification of the RES* was not successful in the AUSF, or
[0370] - If the verification of the RES* was not successful in the SEAF,
[0371] The SEAF shall either reject authentication by sending an Authentication Reject to the UE if the SUCI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message, or the SEAF / AMF shall initiate an identification procedure with the UE if the 5G-GUTI was used by the UE in the initial NAS message to retrieve the SUCI and initiate an additional authentication attempt.
[0372] Additionally, if the SEAF does not receive any Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response message from the AUSF as expected, the SEAF shall either reject the authentication to the UE or initiate an identification procedure with the UE.
[0373] 6.1.3.3 Synchronization failure or MAC failure
[0374] 6.1.3.3.1 Synchronization failure or MAC failure in USIM
[0375] This clause describes synchronization failure or MAC failure in USIM.
[0376] In step 7 of Figure 6.1.3.2-1 when 5G AKA is used, or in step 5 of Figure 6.1.3.1-1 when EAP-AKA is used, at the receipt of the RAND and AUTN, if the verification of the AUTN fails, the USIM informs the ME of the reason for the failure and, in the case of a synchronization failure, passes the AUTS parameter (see TS 33.102 [9]) to the ME.
[0377] If 5G AKA is used: The ME shall respond with a NAS message Authentication Failure containing a CAUSE value indicating the reason for failure. In the case of a synchronization failure of AUTN (as described in TS 33.102 [9]), the UE must also include AUTS provided by the USIM. Upon receipt of an authentication failure message, the AMF / SEAF may initiate new authentication for the UE (see TS 24.501
[0035] ).
[0378] If EAP-AKA' is used: The ME shall proceed as described in RFC 4187
[0021] and RFC 5448
[0012] for EAP-AKA'.
[0379] 6.1.3.3.2 Synchronization failure recovery in Home Network
[0380] Upon receiving an authentication failure message containing a synchronization failure (AUTS) from the UE, the SEAF sends a Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronization failure indication" to the AUSF, and the AUSF sends a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message to the UDM / ARPF, together with the following parameters.
[0381] - RAND sent to the UE in the previous Authentication Request, and
[0382] - AUTS received by the SEAF in the response from the UE to that request, as described in subsection 6.1.3.2.0 and 6.1.3.3.1.
[0383] An SEAF will not react to unsolicited "synchronization failure indication" messages from the UE.
[0384] The SEAF does not send new authentication requests to the UE before having received the response from the AUSF to its Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message with a "synchronization failure indication" (or before it is timed out).
[0385] When UDM / ARPF receives a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message containing "indication of synchronization failure," it operates as described in Section 6.3.5 of TS 33.102[9], which maps ARPF to HE / AuC. UDM / ARPF sends a Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message to AUSF containing a new authentication vector for either EAP-AKA or 5G-AKA, depending on the authentication method applicable to the user. AUSF performs a new authentication procedure with the UE in accordance with Section 6.1.3.1 or 6.1.3.2, depending on the authentication method applicable to the user. (When the UDM / ARPF receives an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Request message with a "synchronisation failure indication" it acts as described in TS 33.102 [9], clause 6.3.5 where ARPF is mapped to HE / AuC. The UDM / ARPF sends an Nudm_UEAuthentication_Get Response message with a new authentication vector for either EAP-AKA' or 5G-AKA depending on the authentication method applicable for the user to the AUSF. The AUSF runs a new authentication procedure with the UE according to clauses 6.1.3.1 or 6.1.3.2 depending on the authentication method applicable for the user.)
[0386] 6.1.5 Home network triggered primary authentication procedure
[0387] 6.1.5.1 General
[0388] Support for Home Network triggered authentication is optional for the HN and the SN. If both networks (HN and SN) support Home Network triggered primary authentication, the following clauses apply.
[0389] 6.1.5.2 Security mechanisms
[0390] The UDM may initiate primary authentication based on procedures initiated by the UE (e.g., UE registration in 5GC) or towards the UE (e.g., SoR / UPU) or events from other NFs, considering the local policy.
[0391] Figure 9 is a diagram illustrating the 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.1.5.2-1 Home Network triggered primary authentication procedure.
[0392] Figure 6.1.5.2-1 Home Network triggered primary authentication procedure
[0393] Steps 0a and 0b are prerequisites for the entire procedure.
[0394] 0a. The UDM may be pre-configured with an operator authentication policy in order to determine when to trigger a primary authentication procedure.
[0395] 0b. The UE registers with the network. As part of the registration, the serving AMF registers the UE with the UDM via Nudm_UECM_Registration in accordance with Section 4.2.2.2.2 of TS 23.502[8]. The AMF must provide a callback URI within the AMF registration to create an implicit subscription of the UDM to subsequently notify the AMF of potential home network-triggered re-authentication using the Nudm_UECM_Re-AuthenticationNotification service operation as in step 2. (0b. The UE registers to the network. As part of the registration, the serving AMF registers the UE with the UDM via the Nudm_UECM_Registration as per TS 23.502 [8], clause 4.2.2.2.2. The AMF shall provide a callback URI within the AMF registration for the UDM to create an implicit subscription to later notify the AMF for potential home network triggered re-authentication using the Nudm_UECM_Re-AuthenticationNotification service operation as in step 2.)
[0396] 1a-c. The UDM determines on its own, based on an event (e.g., an NF request such as an AAnF request defined in TS 33.535
[0091] ) or an authentication policy, to perform the home network trigger primary authentication described in the following steps. An NF such as an AAnF determines whether to send a Nudm_UECM_AuthTrigger request to the UDM for primary authentication using the UDM service described in Section 14.2.6, based on the operator's local authentication policy described in TS 33.535
[0091] . The NF may send a Nudm_UECM_AuthTrigger Request message to the UDM containing the target UE's SUPI. The UDM may acknowledge the request to the NF with a Nudm_UECM_AuthTrigger Response. (1a-c. The UDM decides itself based on events (eg, SoR / UPU or NF requests such as AAnF requests as defined in TS 33.535
[0091] ) or authentication policy and performs home network triggered primary authentication as described in the following steps. The NF such as the AAnF considers based on operator's local authentication policy described in TS 33.535
[0091] to send Nudm_UECM_AuthTrigger request to the UDM for primary authentication using the UDM services as described in clause 14.2.6. The NF may send a Nudm_UECM_AuthTrigger Request message to the UDM with the SUPI of the target UE.The UDM may acknowledge the request with an Nudm_UECM_AuthTrigger Response to the NF.).
[0397] Note A: For NF (e.g., AAnF) request events, the UDM may not proceed with the first authentication trigger based on the UDM's local authentication policy. When AAnF is NF, the AAnF sets the AF key expiration based on the carrier's local authentication policy, so frequent AF key expirations do not occur and there is no risk of signaling overload. Based on the received event and the local carrier authentication policy, if there is no first authentication in progress for the UE and the UDM decides to trigger first authentication, the UDM determines the serving AMF / SEAF for the target UE. (NOTE A: For the NF (eg, AAnF) request event, the UDM can decide not to proceed with triggering the primary authentication based on the UDM's local authentication policy. In case of AAnF being the NF, as AAnF sets the AF key expiry based on operator's local authentication policy, no frequent AF key expiry can happen and there is no risk of signaling overload. Based on a received event and the local operator authentication policy, if there is no ongoing primary authentication for the UE, and if the UDM determines to trigger the primary authentication, the UDM determines the serving AMF / SEAF of the target UE.)
[0398] If multiple AMFs are registered in the UDM for different access types, the UDM must select a single AMF to perform re-authentication. The criteria for selecting the AMF are determined by the local UDM authentication policy.
[0399] Note 1: There may be various reasons why a UDM determines that authentication of a UE is required. For example, a UDM may decide to initiate primary authentication based on a request from an AAnF, if an AMF registers a UE during the enrollment process for mobility from an EPC, if the SoR / UPU counter is close to an overflow, if required by an authentication policy. UDM behavior is determined by operator policies that consider whether specific features are supported in the PLMN. For example, if an HPLMN does not support the SoR / UPU function, a SoR / UPU counter overflow does not occur, so primary authentication is not required in this case. (NOTE 1: The reasons for the UDM determining that the UE needs to be authenticated can be different. For example, the UDM can determine to initiate a primary authentication when the AMF registers the UE upon the Registration procedure during the mobility from EPC or when SoR / UPU counters are about to wrap around, or when required based on authentication policy, or based on the request from AAnF. The UDM behavior is determined by operator policy which takes into account the support of certain features in the PLMN.For example, if the HPLMN does not support the SoR / UPU feature, then SoR / UPU counter wrap around will not happen, and primary authentication will not be required for this case.).
[0400] 2. UDM은 UE의 SUPI를 포함한 Nudm_UECM_Re-AuthenticationNotification 메시지를 AMF / SEAF에 전송한다. (2. The UDM sends a Nudm_UECM_Re-AuthenticationNotification message to the AMF / SEAF with the UE's SUPI.)
[0401] 3. Upon receiving the Nudm_UECM_Re-AuthenticationNotification message from the UDM, the AMF / SEAF must determine whether to execute the primary authentication procedure based on its own local authentication policy and the UE status (e.g., whether the UE is in a handover or is already authenticated by an AMF prior to receiving the authentication notification from the UDM). If the AMF / SEAF determines that it cannot execute the primary authentication described in Step 4 (e.g., due to a local policy), the AMF / SEAF sends an authentication response message to the UDM containing the cause of the failure; otherwise, it acknowledges the request. If the AMF / SEAF acknowledges the request but cannot initiate primary authentication for the UE (e.g., because the UE is unreachable), the AMF / SEAF must set the authentication pending flag. Upon receiving a failure from the AMF, the UDM may check if another AMF is available via other access. If available, the UDM may select another AMF and retry Step 2. (3. After receiving the Nudm_UECM_Re-AuthenticationNotification message from the UDM, the AMF / SEAF shall decide whether to run the primary authentication procedure based on its own local authentication policy, and the UE state (eg, if the UE is under handover, or if the UE is already under authentication by the AMF before receiving the authentication notification from the UDM).If the AMF / SEAF determines that it cannot run a primary authentication as described in step 4 (eg, due to local policy), the AMF / SEAF sends the authentication response message to the UDM with a failure cause else it acknowledges the request. If the AMF / SEAF acknowledged the request but the AMF / SEAF is not able to initiate the primary authentication towards the UE (eg if UE is not reachable), the AMF / SEAF shall set the authentication pending flag. Upon receiving a failure from the AMF, the UDM may check if another AMF is available over the other access. If available, the UDM may select another AMF and retry Step 2.).
[0402] When a UE reattaches to the same AMF or becomes reachable, the AMF checks the authentication pending flag and performs reauthentication if necessary. Once UE reauthentication is complete, the AMF resets the authentication pending flag.
[0403] Note B: In the case that the UE attaches to a new AMF, the new AMF will register to the UDM using the Nudm_UECM_Registration message. In this case, the UDM can determine again whether to trigger the primary authentication as described in 1b.
[0404] 4. The AMF / SEAF starts the primary authentication procedure as defined in clause 6.2.1 of the present document.
[0405] The UDM may execute other procedures (e.g., SoR / UPU) depending on the reason that motivated the UDM triggered (re-)authentication procedure in step 1.
[0406] 6.2 Key hierarchy, key derivation, and distribution scheme
[0407] 6.2.1 Key hierarchy
[0408] 5GC and NG-RAN requirements related to keys are described in Section 5.1.3. The following describes the keys for key hierarchy generation in a 5GS in detail.
[0409] Figure 10 is a diagram illustrating 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.2.1-1: Key hierarchy generation in 5GS.
[0410] Figure 6.2.1-1: Key hierarchy generation in 5GS
[0411] The keys related to authentication (see Figure 6.2.1-1) include the following keys: K, CK / IK. In the case of EAP-AKA', the keys CK' and IK' are derived from CK, IK as specified in clause 6.1.3.1.
[0412] The key hierarchy (see Figure 6.2.1-1) includes the following keys: K AUSF , K SEAF , K AMF , K NASint , K NASenc , K N3IWF, K gNB , K RRCint , K RRCenc , K UPint and K UPenc . (The key hierarchy (see Figure 6.2.1-1) includes the following keys: K AUSF , K SEAF , K AMF , K NASint , K NASenc , K N3IWF , K gNB , K RRCint , K RRCenc , K UPint and K UPenc .)
[0413] Keys for AUSF in home network:
[0414] - K AUSF is a key derived from the following. (- K AUSF is a key derived)
[0415] - In the case of EAP-AKA', it is derived from CK' and IK' by ME and AUSF, and AUSF receives CK' and IK' as part of the transformed AV from ARPF. Or, (- by ME and AUSF from CK', IK' in case of EAP-AKA', CK' and IK' is received by AUSF as a part of transformed AV from ARPF; or,)
[0416] - In the case of 5G AKA, it is derived from CK and IK by ME and ARPF, and AUSF is K as part of 5G HE AV from ARPF. AUSF Receives. (- by ME and ARPF from CK, IK in case of 5G AKA, K AUSF is received by AUSF as a part of the 5G HE AV from ARPF.)
[0417] - K SEAF is K by ME and AUSF AUSF It is an anchor key derived from. K SEAF is provided to the SEAF of the serving network by AUSF. (- K SEAF is an anchor key derived by ME and AUSF from K AUSF . K SEAF is provided by AUSF to the SEAF in the serving network.)
[0418] Key for AMF in serving network:
[0419] - K AMF is K by ME and SEAF SEAF It is a key derived from. K AMF is additionally derived by ME and source AMF when performing horizontal key derivation. (- K AMF is a key derived by ME and SEAF from K SEAF . K AMF is further derived by ME and source AMF when performing horizontal key derivation.)
[0420] Keys for NAS signaling:
[0421] - K NASint is K by ME and AMF AMF A key derived from, which must be used only for protecting NAS signaling using a specific integrity algorithm. (- K NASint is a key derived by ME and AMF from K AMF, which shall only be used for the protection of NAS signaling with a particular integrity algorithm.)
[0422] - K NASenc is K by ME and AMF AMF A key derived from, which must be used only for protecting NAS signaling using a specific encryption algorithm. (- K NASenc is a key derived by ME and AMF from K AMF , which shall only be used for the protection of NAS signaling with a particular encryption algorithm.)
[0423] Key for NG-RAN:
[0424] - K gNB is K by ME and AMF AMF It is a key derived from. K gNB is additionally derived by ME and source gNB when performing horizontal or vertical key derivation. K gNB is used as KeNB between ME and ng-eNB. (- K gNB is a key derived by ME and AMF from K AMF . K gNB is further derived by ME and source gNB when performing horizontal or vertical key derivation. The K gNB is used as KeNB between ME and ng-eNB.)
[0425] Keys for UP traffic:
[0426] - K UPenc is K by ME and gNBgNB A key derived from, which must be used only for protecting UP traffic using a specific encryption algorithm. (- K UPenc is a key derived by ME and gNB from K gNB , which shall only be used for the protection of UP traffic with a particular encryption algorithm.)
[0427] - K UPint is K by ME and gNB gNB A key derived from, which must be used only for protecting UP traffic between ME and gNB using a specific integrity algorithm. (- K UPint is a key derived by ME and gNB from K gNB , which shall only be used for the protection of UP traffic between ME and gNB with a particular integrity algorithm.)
[0428] Keys for RRC signalling:
[0429] - K RRCint is K by ME and gNB gNB A key derived from, which must be used only for protecting RRC signaling using a specific integrity algorithm. (- K RRCint is a key derived by ME and gNB from K gNB , which shall only be used for the protection of RRC signaling with a particular integrity algorithm.)
[0430] - K RRCenc is K by ME and gNB gNBA key derived from, which must be used only for protecting RRC signaling using a specific encryption algorithm. (- K RRCenc is a key derived by ME and gNB from K gNB , which shall only be used for the protection of RRC signaling with a particular encryption algorithm.)
[0431] Intermediate keys:
[0432] - NH is a key derived by ME and AMF to provide forward security as described in Clause A.10.
[0433] - K NG-RAN * is a key derived by ME and NG-RAN (i.e., gNB or ng-eNB) when performing horizontal or vertical key derivation as specified in Section 6.9.2.1.1 using the KDF specified in Sections A.11 / A.12. (- K NG-RAN * is a key derived by ME and NG-RAN (ie, gNB or ng-eNB) when performing a horizontal or vertical key derivation as specified in Clause 6.9.2.1.1 using a KDF as specified in Clause A.11 / A.12.)
[0434] - K AMF ' is a key that can be derived by the ME and AMF when a UE moves from one AMF to another during inter-AMF mobility as specified in Section 6.9.3, using the KDF specified in Annex A.13. (- KAMF ' is a key that can be derived by ME and AMF when the UE moves from one AMF to another during inter-AMF mobility as specified in Clause 6.9.3 using a KDF as specified in Annex A.13.)
[0435] Key for the non-3GPP access:
[0436] - K N3IWF is K by ME and AMF for non-3GPP access AMF It is a key derived from. K N3IWF is not transmitted between N3IWFs. (- K N3IWF is a key derived by ME and AMF from K AMF for the non-3GPP access. K N3IWF is not forwarded between N3IWFs.)
[0437] Note 1: The key hierarchy for standalone non-public networks when an authentication method other than 5G AKA or EAP-AKA is used is provided in Annex I.2.3.
[0438]
[0439] 3GPP TS 33.501
[0440] Security algorithm selection, key establishment and security mode command procedure
[0441] 6.7.2 NAS security mode command procedure
[0442] The NAS SMC shown in Figure 6.7.2-1 shall be used to establish NAS security context between the UE and the AMF. This procedure consists of a round trip of messages between the AMF and the UE. The AMF sends the NAS Security Mode Command message to the UE, and the UE responds with the NAS Security Mode Complete message.
[0443] Note 1: The NAS SMC procedure is designed to protect the Registration Request from a man-in-the-middle attack where an attacker modifies the IEs containing the UE's security capabilities in the Registration Request. It works as follows: If the procedure completes successfully, the UE connects to the network knowing that no downgrade attack has occurred. If a downgrade attack is attempted, the NAS SMC verification fails, and the UE responds with a reject message and does not connect to the network.
[0444] Figure 11 is a diagram illustrating the 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6.7.2-1: NAS Security Mode Command procedure.
[0445] Figure 6.7.2-1: NAS Security Mode Command procedure
[0446] 1a. The AMF activates the NAS integrity protection before sending the NAS Security Mode Command message.
[0447] 1b. The AMF transmits a NAS Security Mode Command message to the UE. The NAS Security Mode Command message must include the following: the retransmitted UE security function, the selected NAS algorithm, and K AMF ngKSI for identifying. NAS Security Mode Command messages may include the following: new K AMF K_AMF_change_flag indicating that is calculated (included in IE as an additional 5G security parameter specified in TS 24.501
[0035] ), a flag requesting a complete initial NAS message (see Section 6.4.6), and an Anti-Bidding down Between Architectures (ABBA) parameter. K during mobility registration updates or during multiple registrations within the same PLMN. AMF의 수평 도출의 경우, 6.9.3절에 기술된 바와 같이 NAS Security Mode Command 메시지에 K_AMF_change_flag가 포함되어야 한다. (1b. The AMF sends the NAS Security Mode Command message to the UE. The NAS Security Mode Command message shall contain: the replayed UE security capabilities, the selected NAS algorithms, and the ngKSI for identifying the K AMF . The NAS Security Mode Command message may contain: K_AMF_change_flag (carried in the additional 5G security parameters IE specified in TS 24.501
[0035] ) to indicate a new K AMF is calculated, a flag requesting the complete initial NAS message (see subclause 6.4.6), Anti-Bidding down Between Architectures (ABBA) parameter. In the case of horizontal derivation of K AMF during mobility registration update or during multiple registration in same PLMN, K_AMF_change_flag shall be included in the NAS Security Mode Command message as described in clause 6.9.3.)
[0448] 본 메시지는 NAS Security Mode Command 메시지의 ngKSI가 나타내는 K AMFThis message shall be integrity protected (but not ciphered) with a NAS integrity key based on the K AMF indicated by the ngKSI in the NAS Security Mode Command message (see Figure 6.7.2-1).)
[0449] Note 2: Deleted. (NOTE 2: Void.)
[0450] If the network supports interworking using the N26 interface between the MME and AMF, the AMF shall also include the selected EPS NAS algorithms (defined in Annex B of TS 33.401
[0010] ) to be used after mobility to EPS in the NAS Security Mode Command message (see clause 8.5.2). The UE shall store the algorithms for use after mobility to EPS using the N26 interface between the MME and AMF. The AMF shall store the selected EPS NAS algorithms in the UE security context.
[0451] Note 2a: When an AMF change occurs due to N2 handover or idle mode mobility, the selected EPS NAS algorithms are always included in the 5G UE security context and provided to the target AMF as part of the 5G UE security context.
[0452] 1c. The AMF activates NAS uplink deciphering after sending the NAS Security Mode Command message.
[0453] 2a. The UE shall validate the NAS Security Mode Command message. This is to verify that the UE security function transmitted by the AMF matches what is stored in the UE, thereby ensuring that it has not been tampered with by an attacker, and to verify the specified NAS integrity algorithm and the K represented by ngKSI. AMFThis includes verifying integrity protection using the NAS integrity key based on the AMF. (2a. The UE shall verify the NAS Security Mode Command message. This includes checking that the UE security capabilities sent by the AMF match the ones stored in the UE to ensure that these were not modified by an attacker and verifying the integrity protection using the indicated NAS integrity algorithm and the NAS integrity key based on the K AMF indicated by the ngKSI.)
[0454] If the NAS Security Mode Command message contains K_AMF_change_flag, the UE shall have a new K as described in Annex A.13 AMF You must derive and set the NAS COUNT to 0. (In case the NAS Security Mode Command message includes a K_AMF_change_flag, the UE shall derive a new K AMF as described in Annex A.13 and set the NAS COUNTs to zero.)
[0455] If the integrity verification of the NAS Security Mode Command message is successful, the UE shall start NAS integrity protection and ciphering / deciphering with the security context indicated by the ngKSI.
[0456] 2b. The UE transmits the NAS Security Mode Complete message to the AMF, encrypted and integrity protected. The NAS Security Mode Complete message must include PEI if requested by the AMF in the NAS Security Mode Command message. K AMF If horizontal derivation of K is performed, the AMF shall set the NAS COUNT to 0. The UE may include a complete initial NAS message (see Section 6.4.6 for details). (2b. The UE sends the NAS Security Mode Complete message to the AMF ciphered and integrity protected. The NAS Security Mode Complete message shall include PEI in case AMF requested it in the NAS Security Mode Command message. The AMF shall set the NAS COUNTs to zero if horizontal derivation of K AMFis performed. The UE may include the complete initial NAS message (see subclause 6.4.6 for details).)
[0457] If the validation of a NAS Security Mode Command message by the UE is unsuccessful, the UE must respond with a NAS Security Mode Reject message (see TS 24.501
[0035] ). The NAS Security Mode Reject message and all subsequent NAS messages must be protected by the previous 5G NAS security context (if any), that is, the 5G NAS security context used prior to the failed NAS Security Mode Command message. If no 5G NAS security context existed prior to the NAS Security Mode Command message, the NAS Security Mode Reject message must remain unprotected. (If the verification of the NAS Security Mode Command message is not successful in the UE, it shall reply with a NAS Security Mode Reject message (see TS 24.501
[0035] ). The NAS Security Mode Reject message and all subsequent NAS messages shall be protected with the previous, if any, 5G NAS security context, ie, the 5G NAS security context used prior to the failed NAS Security Mode Command message. If no 5G NAS security context existed prior to the NAS Security Mode Command message, the NAS Security Mode Reject message shall remain unprotected.)
[0458] Note 2b: Deleted. (NOTE 2b: Void.)
[0459] The AMF shall decrypt and verify the integrity protection of the NAS Security Mode Complete message using the key and algorithm specified in the NAS Security Mode Command message. NAS downlink ciphering at the AMF with this security context shall begin after receiving the NAS Security Mode Complete message.
[0460] 1d. The AMF activates NAS downlink ciphering.
[0461] Note 3: If the uplink NAS COUNT overflows due to the sending of the NAS Security Mode Reject message, the UE releases the NAS connection instead of sending the NAS Security Mode Reject message.
[0462] Note 4: If the AMF successfully validated the NAS SMC Complete message, the AMF has successfully confirmed that the SUPI received from the home network matches the SUPI used by the UE (as required in clause 5.5.3). However, a failure of the NAS SMC Complete message integrity check at the AMF could be caused by factors other than a SUPI mismatch.
[0463]
[0464] 3GPP TS 33.501
[0465] 6.4.2 Security for multiple NAS connections
[0466] 6.4.2.1 Multiple active NAS connections with different PLMNs
[0467] TS 23.501[2] describes a scenario in which a UE is registered to a VPLMN serving network via 3GPP access, while simultaneously being registered to a serving network of another VPLMN or HPLMN via non-3GPP access. If a UE is registered to one PLMN serving network via a specific access type (e.g., 3GPP) and to another PLMN serving network via a different access type (e.g., non-3GPP), the UE has two active NAS connections with different AMFs of different PLMNs. As described in Section 6.3.2.1, the UE must independently maintain and use two different 5G security contexts, one for each PLMN serving network. The 5G security context maintained by the UE must contain the full set of 5G parameters, including NAS context parameters for the 3GPP and non-3GPP access types per PLMN. When connected to two different PLMNs, a complete 5G NAS security context must be maintained independently for each PLMN, and each must include all relevant parameters (e.g., two pairs of NAS COUNT, one for 3GPP access and one for non-3GPP access). (TS 23.501 [2] has a scenario when the UE is registered to a VPLMN's serving network via 3GPP access and to another VPLMN's or HPLMN's serving network via non-3GPP access at the same time. When the UE is registered in one PLMN's serving network over a certain type of access (e.g., 3GPP) and is registered to another PLMN's serving network over another type of access (e.g., 3GPP).non-3GPP), then the UE has two active NAS connections with different AMF's in different PLMNs. As described in clause 6.3.2.1, the UE shall independently maintain and use two different 5G security contexts, one per PLMN serving network. The 5G security context maintained by the UE shall contain the full set of 5G parameters, including NAS context parameters for 3GPP and non-3GPP access types per PLMN. In case of connection to two different PLMNs, it is necessary to maintain a complete 5G NAS security context for each PLMN independently, each with all associated parameters (such as two pairs of NAS COUNTs, i.e. one pair for 3GPP access and one pair for non-3GPP access).).
[0468] 각 보안 컨텍스트는 홈 PLMN과의 성공적인 1차 인증 절차를 통해 별도로 수립되어야 한다. (Each security context shall be established separately via a successful primary authentication procedure with the Home PLMN.)
[0469] All the NAS and AS security mechanisms defined for single registration mode are applicable independently on each access using the corresponding 5G security context.
[0470] Note: The UE belongs to a single HPLMN.
[0471] 6.4.2.2 Multiple active NAS connections in the same PLMN's serving network
[0472] When the UE is registered in a serving network over two types of access (e.g., 3GPP and non-3GPP), the UE has two active NAS connections with the same AMF. A common 5G NAS security context is created during the registration procedure over the first access type.
[0473] To realize cryptographic separation and replay protection, the common NAS security context must have parameters specific to each NAS connection. The connection-specific parameters include a pair of NAS counts for uplink and downlink and a unique NAS connection identifier. The value of the unique NAS connection identifier must be set to "0x01" for 3GPP access and "0x02" for non-3GPP access. All other parameters, such as algorithm identifiers in the common NAS security context, apply commonly to multiple NAS connections.
[0474] In non-mobility cases, when the UE is simultaneously registered over both types of accesses, and if NAS key re-keying as described in clause 6.9.4.2 or NAS key refresh as described in clause 6.9.4.3 takes place over one of the accesses (say access A):
[0475] 1) If the other access (access B) is in the CM-CONNECTED state, then the new NAS security context shall only be activated over that access (access A). The UE and the AMF shall not change the NAS security context in use on the other access (access B). To activate the new NAS security context on the other access (access B), the AMF must trigger a NAS SMC execution through that access in the current ongoing procedure or a subsequent NAS procedure. During the second NAS SMC execution (at access B), the AMF must include the same ngKSI associated with the new NAS security context and the same algorithm selection as the first access. After the second NAS SMC procedure through the other access (access B) is successfully completed, both the UE and the AMF must delete the previous NAS security context. In order to activate the new NAS security context over the other access (access B), the AMF shall trigger a NAS SMC run over that access either in the current running procedure or a subsequent NAS procedure.During the second NAS SMC run (on access B), the AMF shall include the same ngKSI associated with the new NAS security context and the same algorithm choices as for the first access. After a successful second NAS SMC procedure over the other access (access B), both the UE and the AMF shall delete the old NAS security context.).
[0476] 2) Whenever the AMF sends a NAS SMC over access (access A) and the AMF considers the UE to not be in the CM-CONNECTED state on the other access (access B), the AMF shall additionally activate the security context that is active on the other access (if not already in use on that access). Likewise, if the UE receives a NAS SMC over access (access A) and is not in the CM-CONNECTED state on the other access (access B), the UE shall also additionally activate the security context that is active on the other access (if not already in use on that access). Similarly, whenever the UE receives a NAS SMC over the access (access A) and UE is not in CM-CONNECTED state on the other access (access B), the UE additionally activates (if not already in use on the other access) the security context on the other access.)
[0477] In the case of 3GPP access mobility or interworking with EPS, the following procedures apply.
[0478] 1) If the UE is in the CM-CONNECTED state on the non-3GPP access: (1) If the UE is in the CM-CONNECTED state on the non-3GPP access, then:)
[0479] a) If the AMF does not hold the security context that the UE is using in non-3GPP access (e.g., K in 3GPP access when changing the AMF AMF (Change), the AMF must execute the NAS SMC procedure in non-3GPP access to enable the same NAS security context being used in 3GPP access. Or (a) if the AMF does not have the security context the UE is using on the non-3GPP access (e.g., K AMF change on 3GPP access when the AMF changes), then in order to activate the same NAS security context that is in use over the 3GPP access the AMF shall run a NAS SMC procedure on the non-3GPP access; or)
[0480] b) In the case of handover from EPS, a mapped context is used on the 3GPP access, and a different security context is active on the non-3GPP access. To align the security contexts in use across both accesses, the AMF shall execute a NAS SMC procedure over one access to apply the security context in use on the other access. If a native security context is in use on the non-3GPP access, the NAS SMC procedure must be performed on the 3GPP access to apply that native security context. In the case that a native security context is in use on the non-3GPP access, then the NAS SMC procedure shall be on the 3GPP access to take the native security context into use.)
[0481] 2) Whenever the AMF sends a Registration Accept over the 3GPP access and the AMF considers the UE to not be in the CM-CONNECTED state on the non-3GPP access, the AMF shall activate (if not already in use on the non-3GPP access) the security context that is in use on the 3GPP access on the non-3GPP access. If the security context in use on the 3GPP access is a mapped security context, the AMF shall retain the native security context that was in use on the non-3GPP access. To apply this native security context, the AMF shall execute the NAS SMC procedure. The AMF shall keep a native security context that was in use on non-3GPP access if the security context in use on the 3GPP access is a mapped security context. In order to take this native security context into use, the AMF shall run a NAS SMC procedure.)
[0482] Similarly, whenever the UE receives a Registration Accept over the 3GPP access and the UE is not in the CM-CONNECTED state on the non-3GPP access, the UE activates (if not already in use on the non-3GPP access) the security context that is in use on the 3GPP access on the non-3GPP access. The UE shall keep a native security context that was in use on the non-3GPP access if the security context in use on the 3GPP access is a mapped security context.
[0483] To recover from a failure to align the NAS security contexts due to a state mismatch between the AMF and the UE, the AMF can align the security contexts in use on the 3GPP and non-3GPP access using the NAS SMC procedure during a subsequent registration procedure (that was either initiated by the UE or sent in response to a Service Reject if the UE sends a Service Request).
[0484]
[0485] Composition and Method of the Invention
[0486] In current 5G mobile communication systems, communication between a terminal and a network is carried out by exchanging messages through the NAS (Non-Access Stratum) protocol. Integrity protection and encryption of NAS messages can be performed based on a security key generated after the terminal's 5G core network registration procedure and primary authentication procedure.
[0487] In conventional 5G mobile communication systems, when a terminal connects to (or registers with) the 5G Core Network (5GC) via 3GPP access and non-3GPP access, the NAS Security Context was configured as if there were two, and this was utilized for the security of NAS messages. However, specifically, the NAS Security Context had a structure in which a single key was shared for each access, and only the NAS COUNT values for the uplink and downlink were operated separately for each access. Furthermore, the aforementioned conventional technology was structured to support only two access types, 3GPP access and non-3GPP access, which had the limitation that it would be difficult to support NAS security for more access types in the future.
[0488] The present disclosure aims to solve the problems of the prior art described above by providing a method that supports completely independent NAS security by creating an independent NAS security context for each access type when connecting to (or registering) a core network through multiple access types, and provides flexibility for multiple terminal access and the resulting security.
[0489] FIG. 12 is a drawing illustrating an example of an architecture with a security anchoring function in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0490] This disclosure describes a method for allocating NAS security contexts differently according to access types managed by the core network (e.g., 3gpp access, TN non-3gpp access, etc.).
[0491] FIG. 12 illustrates the structure of a mobile communication system proposed in this specification. FIG. 12 illustrates an example in which a terminal is registered in a core network through three access types. A TN (Terrestrial Network) refers to a network located on the ground, and two types of base stations that the terminal directly connects to are shown as examples: a Non-3GPP AP (Access Point) and a gNB (gNodeB). A NTN (Non-Terrestrial Network) refers to a satellite network equipped with base stations and core network equipment, and the terminal can also connect to the core network through this.
[0492] The present disclosure is based on the assumption that security key management of a terminal can be performed by a Network Function (NF) called a Security Anchor. The Security Anchor NF may be implemented separately from the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) or integrated within the AMF. (1) and (2) in FIG. 12 are distinguished based on whether the Security Anchor NF is implemented outside or inside the AMF. In the case where the Security Anchor NF is integrated within the AMF ((2) in FIG. 12), the AMF directly possesses the terminal's NAS security context, so when performing a NAS Security Mode Command procedure, the procedure can proceed by immediately referencing the NAS security context of the corresponding access type without a separate external inquiry. On the other hand, if the Security Anchor NF is implemented separately from the AMF ((1) in FIG. 12), the first network control node (e.g., AMF) must request the NAS security context of the terminal from the second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) or another network control node (e.g., another AMF) based on the terminal's identifier (ID) before initiating the NAS Security Mode Command procedure. In this case, if the second network control node has a NAS security context that matches the terminal's identifier, it transmits it to the first network control node that made the request, and the first network control node performs the subsequent NAS Security Mode Command procedure based on the received NAS security context. In both implementation methods, the NAS security context is distinguished and managed by access type by the NAS connection identifier, and an independent NAS security key corresponding to each access type is applied.
[0493] An NF performing the role of a Security Anchor can perform the role of supporting the authentication process of a terminal identifier (ID) by handling the authentication procedure for the serving network, similar to the Security Anchor Function (SEAF) of a 5G core network, and can also perform the role of managing multiple security keys of the terminal. In a multiple access scenario where a terminal connects through multiple access types, the NAS-related security key management operation in the case where a single Security Anchor manages multiple security keys is described below.
[0494] In the method proposed in this specification, when a terminal is registered with a core network through multiple access types, a completely independent NAS security context is created and managed for each access type. This is fundamentally different from the conventional 5G system method of sharing a single common key among multiple accesses and separating only the NAS COUNT value by access. In this method, the integrity protection key (K) included in the NAS security context NASint ) and encryption key (K NASenc Since each access type is derived independently, complete cryptographic separation is realized in which a security breach in one access does not affect the security of another access.
[0495] A NAS Connection Identifier is used to distinguish NAS security contexts for each access type. The NAS Connection Identifier is assigned by a first network control node (e.g., AMF) or a second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) at the time the terminal registers with the core network via the corresponding access type. As an example of the assignment method, identifier values may be assigned sequentially according to the order of registration with the core network for each access type. Based on the NAS Connection Identifier, the first and second network control nodes distinguish and manage multiple NAS security contexts and selectively apply the security context corresponding to the access type when transmitting or receiving NAS messages with the terminal. The terminal also identifies the corresponding NAS security context based on the received NAS Connection Identifier and utilizes it for NAS security processing.
[0496] To manage NAS security keys, a NAS security context is created and managed for each terminal. The NAS security context may include information such as a NAS Connection Identifier / Index, UL NAS COUNT, DL NAS COUNT, Selected algorithm for integrity protection, Selected algorithm for encryption, Key for integrity protection, and Key for encryption.
[0497] The NAS Connection Identifier / Index is an identifier or index used by the AMF or Security Anchor to manage the security context for each NAS connection. Identifiers may be assigned based on the order of registration with the AMF for each access type.
[0498] - UL / DL NAS COUNT is used for the verification of NAS messages and is managed independently for each NAS connection. The Uplink NAS COUNT (UL NAS COUNT) and Downlink NAS COUNT (DL NAS COUNT) function as sequence numbers to prevent replay attacks and verify the integrity of NAS messages. In this method, the UL NAS COUNT and DL NAS COUNT are maintained completely independently for each NAS connection corresponding to each access type. That is, even if the COUNT value is updated in a NAS connection of a specific access type, it does not affect the COUNT value of NAS connections of other access types. This ensures independent replay protection between multiple NAS connections and secures the reliability of verification for NAS traffic by access type. When a NAS security context is newly established or updated, the UL NAS COUNT and DL NAS COUNT of the corresponding access type may be initialized to 0.
[0499] - The Selected algorithm for integrity protection / encryption supports setting a different algorithm for each NAS connection.
[0500] - Keys for integrity protection and encryption are generated differently for each NAS connection, supporting encryption and integrity protection for each access type.
[0501] Keys for integrity protection and encryption can be generated in the following two ways for each access type. The first method utilizes two input parameters, and the second method utilizes three input parameters. In the method using two input parameters, the value of the existing algorithm identity is extended and utilized. In the method using three input parameters, a new input parameter is additionally utilized.
[0502] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, NAS connection identifier information may be used as information for a terminal or network node to identify a NAS security context corresponding to a specific NAS connection among a plurality of NAS connections. For example, a first node or a second node may select a NAS security context corresponding to a specific NAS connection among a plurality of NAS security contexts based on NAS connection identifier information included in a NAS security mode command message or a NAS security mode completion message.
[0503] The selected NAS security context may include or indicate an uplink NAS count, a downlink NAS count, integrity protection algorithm information, encryption algorithm information, and a higher-level keying material. Here, the higher-level keying material may be, for example, KAMF, but is not limited thereto. Additionally, the KDF may derive at least one of an integrity protection key (KNASint) and an encryption key (KNASenc) corresponding to a specific NAS connection by taking at least some of the higher-level keying material, NAS security algorithm related information, and NAS connection identifier information as inputs. Accordingly, in the present disclosure, the selection of the NAS security context and the derivation of the NAS security key through the KDF can be performed in conjunction.
[0504] The Key Derivation Function (KDF) for NAS security key generation is described below. Depending on whether the number of input parameters is two or three, the explanation is divided into the following two methods. NAS Security Key (K NASint , K NASenc ) is the upper keying material K AMF It is derived using the Key Derivation Function (KDF) with as the input string. K AMF is K after the first certification process SEAF As a key derived from, it forms the basis of the security layer between the terminal and the AMF. In this approach, to independently derive the NAS security key for each access type, the NAS Connection Identifier value is included in the input parameters of the KDF. Since the NAS Connection Identifier has different values for each access type, the same K AMFEven if the above keying material is used, the NAS security keys corresponding to each access type are derived as different values. This makes it possible to generate multiple independent NAS security keys from a single above keying material, and cryptographic separation by access type is guaranteed from the key derivation stage. The specific method of including the NAS connection identifier in the input of the KDF is divided into the following two types depending on the number of input parameters.
[0505] (1) A method utilizing two input parameters
[0506] FIG. 13 is a diagram illustrating an example of a KDF for KNAS with 2 parameters using 2 parameters in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0507] Figure 13 shows a KDF for generating a KNAS using two parameters. Referring to Figure 13, in the method for deriving a KNAS using two input parameters, the input string is the higher-level security key K AMF It is used, and 0x69 is used as the FC value. An Algorithm Type Distinguisher is used in P0, and the length value of P0 is used in L0. P1 can use an 8-bit (1 octet) value, of which the value of the integrity protection or encryption algorithm identifier is used in the lowest 4 bits, and the value of the NAS Connection Identifier assigned by the AMF or Security Anchor is used in the highest 4 bits. That is, a total 8-bit value combining the NAS Connection Identifier (4 bits) and the algorithm identifier (4 bits) is applied to P1. The length value of P1 is used in L1. The output of the above KDF yields the NAS key for integrity protection (KNAS int) and the NAS key for encryption (KNAS enc).
[0508] The input string is the higher security key K AMF is used, and 0x69 is used as the FC value. An Algorithm Type Distinguisher is used in P0, and the length value of P0 is used in L0. The Algorithm Type Distinguishers used are as shown in [Table 5]. [Table 5] shows the Algorithm Type Distinguishers.
[0509] Algorithm distinguisherValueN-NAS-enc-alg0x01N-NAS-int-alg0x02
[0510] P1 can use an 8-bit (1 octet) value, of which the lowest 4 bits use a value selected from the algorithms shown in [Table 6] and [Table 7]. L1 uses the length value of P1. The highest 4 bits use the value of the NAS Connection Identifier assigned by the AMF or Security Anchor. That is, a total of 8 bits, combining the NAS Connection Identifier (4 bits) and the algorithm identifier (4 bits), are applied to P1.
[0511] [Table 6] shows the ciphering algorithm identifier values.
[0512] bitsAbbreviationFull name0000NEA0Null ciphering algorithm0001128-NEA1128-bit SNOW 3G based algorithm0010128-NEA2128-bit AES based algorithm0011128-NEA3128-bit ZUC based algorithm
[0513] [Table 7] shows integrity algorithm identifier values.
[0514] bitsAbbreviationFull name0000NIA0Null ciphering algorithm0001128-NIA1128-bit SNOW 3G based algorithm0010128-NIA2128-bit AES based algorithm0011128-NIA3128-bit ZUC based algorithm
[0515] (2) A method utilizing three input parameters
[0516] FIG. 14 is a diagram illustrating an example of a KDF for KNAS with 3 parameters using 3 parameters in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0517] Figure 14 shows a KDF for generating KNAS using three parameters.
[0518] Referring to Fig. 14, in the KNAS derivation method utilizing three input parameters, the input string is the upper security key K AMF ...is used, and 0x69 is used as the FC value. An Algorithm Type Distinguisher is used in P0, and the length value of P0 is used in L0. The value of the integrity protection or encryption algorithm identifier is used in P1, and the length value of P1 is used in L1. Unlike the method utilizing two input parameters, this method separates the NAS Connection Identifier into a separate independent parameter and applies it to P2, and the length value of P2 is used in L2. The output of the above KDF yields the NAS key for integrity protection (KNAS int) and the NAS key for encryption (KNAS enc).
[0519] The input string is the higher security key KAMF It is used, and 0x69 is used as the FC value. An Algorithm Type Distinguisher is used for P0, and the length value of P0 is used for L0. The Algorithm Type Distinguisher used is as shown in [Table 5]. P1 can use an 8-bit (1 octet) value, of which the lowest 4 bits use a value selected from the algorithms shown in [Table 6] and [Table 7]. The length value of P1 is used for L1. The value of the NAS Connection Identifier assigned by the AMF or Security Anchor is used for P2, and the length value of P2 is used for L2.
[0520] The following describes the procedure for the NAS Security Mode Command (SMC) for applying NAS security. The above procedure may vary as shown in FIG. 15 or FIG. 16 depending on the network structure shown in FIG. 12.
[0521] FIG. 15 is a diagram illustrating an example of a NAS Security Mode procedure for case that Security Anchor deployed in AMF in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0522] The NAS SMC procedure of Fig. 15 is the procedure for the case where a terminal is registered via a Non-3GPP AP or gNB#1 in the structure corresponding to (2) of Fig. 12. Since the Security Anchor function is implemented within the AMF, a separate process of querying the NAS security context is unnecessary. The detailed procedure is as follows.
[0523] 1. AMF enables NAS Integrity Protection before sending NAS Security Mode Command messages to the terminal.
[0524] 2. The AMF transmits a NAS Security Mode Command message to the terminal. The message includes the selected NAS algorithm, K AMF It includes an ngKSI and a NAS Connection Identifier indicating. The message is protected for integrity but is not encrypted.
[0525] 3. (a) After transmitting the NAS Security Mode Command message, the AMF enables NAS uplink decryption to prepare for processing subsequent received NAS messages. (b) The terminal receives K from the received NAS Security Mode Command message. AMF It checks for the NAS message and performs integrity verification by generating a NAS key for integrity protection through a selected NAS algorithm to verify whether the NAS message has been tampered with in transit. If the verification is successfully completed, the terminal enables NAS integrity protection and encryption / decryption of the NAS message.
[0526] 4. The terminal transmits a NAS Security Mode Complete message to the AMF, which is protected by encryption and integrity. The NAS Security Mode Complete message transmitted by the terminal may include NAS Connection Identifier information. This is to enable the first network control node (e.g., AMF) to clearly identify which access type of NAS connection the message corresponds to when it receives the NAS Security Mode Complete message. Specifically, in a multi-connection environment, the terminal may be registered with the core network simultaneously or sequentially through multiple access types, and accordingly, multiple NAS security contexts may be maintained in parallel or independently. In this case, if the second node fails to clearly distinguish which NAS connection the message corresponds to when it receives the NAS Security Mode Complete message, there is a possibility that an incorrect NAS security context may be activated or an incorrect NAS security key may be applied in subsequent procedures. Therefore, according to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS Security Mode Complete message may include NAS Connection Identifier information. The second node can use the NAS connection identifier information to accurately correspond the security procedure initiated by the NAS security mode command message with the NAS security mode completion message. Additionally, the second node can improve the accuracy and reliability of the NAS security procedure in a multi-connection environment by activating a NAS security context corresponding to the NAS connection identifier information, or by applying a subsequent NAS security key and NAS COUNT corresponding to the NAS connection identifier information.In a multi-connection scenario where terminals are simultaneously registered with the core network via multiple access types, multiple NAS security mode command procedures may proceed in parallel or sequentially; therefore, it is necessary to accurately correspond each procedure using the NAS connection identifier within the NAS Security Mode Complete message. The first network control node verifies the NAS connection identifier included in the received NAS Security Mode Complete message, activates the NAS security context for the corresponding access type, and initiates subsequent NAS downlink encryption.
[0527] 5. AMF enables NAS downlink encryption.
[0528]
[0529] FIG. 16 is a drawing illustrating an example of a NAS security mode procedure for case that Security Anchor and AMF are deployed separately in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0530] 0. To execute the NAS Security Mode Command procedure, the AMF requests a security context from a Security Anchor or another AMF that holds the terminal's security context, based on the terminal's identifier (ID). If a matching security context exists, that context is passed to the requesting AMF.
[0531] 1. AMF enables NAS Integrity Protection before sending NAS Security Mode Command messages to the terminal.
[0532] 2. The AMF transmits a NAS Security Mode Command message to the terminal. The message includes the selected NAS algorithm, K AMF It includes an ngKSI and a NAS Connection Identifier indicating. The message is protected for integrity but is not encrypted.
[0533] 3. (a) After transmitting the NAS Security Mode Command message, the AMF enables NAS uplink decryption to prepare for processing subsequent received NAS messages. (b) The terminal receives K from the received NAS Security Mode Command message. AMF It checks for the NAS message and performs integrity verification by generating a NAS key for integrity protection through a selected NAS algorithm to verify whether the NAS message has been tampered with in transit. If the verification is successfully completed, the terminal enables NAS integrity protection and encryption / decryption of the NAS message.
[0534] 4. The terminal transmits a NAS Security Mode Complete message to the AMF with encryption and integrity protection applied. The NAS Security Mode Complete message transmitted by the terminal may include NAS Connection Identifier information. The reason why the NAS Connection Identifier is included in the NAS Security Mode Complete message transmitted by the terminal and the processing method of the first network control node are the same as described in Step 4 of FIG. 15. However, in this scenario, there is a difference in that the first network control node (e.g., AMF) verifies the NAS Connection Identifier based on the NAS security context received from the second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) or another network control node in Step 0, activates the NAS security context of the corresponding access type, and initiates subsequent NAS downlink encryption.
[0535] 5. AMF enables NAS downlink encryption.
[0536]
[0537] Characteristic configurations of various embodiments of the present disclosure
[0538] 1. When a terminal connects through multiple access types, a first network control node (e.g., AMF) or a second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) creates and manages a NAS security context for each access type.
[0539] 2. The above NAS security context includes a NAS Connection Identifier.
[0540] A. The NAS connection identifier is assigned by the first network control node (e.g., AMF or Security Anchor) when the terminal registers with the core network through each access type.
[0541] 3. The above NAS security context is an integrity protection key (K NASint ) and encryption key (K NASenc Includes ).
[0542] 4. K NASint and K NASenc When performing the Key Derivation Function to generate, the input parameters are applied as follows.
[0543] A. When two input parameters are used, the value of the NAS connection identifier assigned by the first network control node (e.g., AMF) or the second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) is applied to the top 4 bits of P1, and the value of the algorithm identifier is applied to the bottom 4 bits. A total of 8 bits of the combined value of the NAS connection identifier (4 bits) and the algorithm identifier (4 bits) is applied to P1.
[0544] B. When three input parameters are used, the value of the NAS connection identifier assigned by the first network control node (e.g., AMF) or the second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) is applied to P2. A value corresponding to the length of P2 is applied to L2.
[0545] 5. When the NAS Security Mode Command procedure is executed, it operates as follows.
[0546] A. A first network control node (e.g., AMF) may request a security context from a second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) or another network control node (e.g., another AMF) that holds the terminal's security context, based on the terminal's identifier (ID).
[0547] B. If a second network control node (e.g., Security Anchor) or another network control node has a security context that matches the terminal's identifier, it transmits the corresponding NAS security context to the requesting first network control node (e.g., AMF).
[0548]
[0549] [Explanation regarding the 1st Node (UE) claim]
[0550] The embodiments described above will be explained in detail below with reference to FIG. 17 regarding the operation of the first node. The methods described below are distinguished only for convenience of explanation, and it is obvious that, as long as they are not mutually excluded, a part of one method may be substituted with a part of another method or combined with one another and applied.
[0551] FIG. 17 is a diagram illustrating an example of the operation process of a first node in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0552] In the embodiment of FIG. 17, the first node may correspond to a UE, and the second node may correspond to an AMF.
[0553] In various embodiments of the present disclosure, a first node may receive a NAS security mode command message from a second node in a multi-connection environment, the message including information related to a NAS security algorithm and NAS connection identifier information. The first node may use the NAS connection identifier information to identify which of the plurality of NAS connections a security procedure is performed on.
[0554] Specifically, the first node may select a NAS security context corresponding to the NAS connection identifier information or identify a higher-level keying material corresponding to the NAS connection identifier information. Subsequently, the first node may determine at least one of an integrity protection key (KNASint) and an encryption key (KNASenc) by performing KDF based on the NAS security algorithm-related information and the NAS connection identifier information. The first node may generate a NAS security mode completion message that performs NAS security processing using the determined NAS security key and transmit the NAS security mode completion message to the second node.
[0555] The second node may be, for example, a network node including an AMF or security anchor function. In a multi-connection environment, the second node may transmit a NAS security mode command message to the first node that includes information related to the NAS security algorithm and NAS connection identifier information. The second node may instruct a security procedure for a specific NAS connection among multiple access types or multiple NAS connections through the NAS connection identifier information.
[0556] Subsequently, the second node may receive a NAS security mode completion message from the first node. The second node may identify which NAS connection the NAS security mode completion message corresponds to by using the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message. Additionally, the second node may determine a NAS security key corresponding to the identified NAS connection based on the NAS security algorithm-related information and the NAS connection identifier information, and may transmit a subsequent NAS message to the first node to which at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption is applied using the NAS security key.
[0557] Strictly speaking, the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) is defined as a Network Function (NF); however, for the convenience of explanation in this disclosure, entities that transmit and receive NAS messages to and from terminals are collectively referred to as nodes. That is, in this disclosure, the second node refers to a network-side entity that performs NAS security mode command procedures, and is used to encompass all cases where the AMF is implemented independently, where the Security Anchor function is integrated within the AMF, or where the AMF and Security Anchor are implemented separately and interact. Therefore, the designation of the second node as an AMF in this disclosure should be understood as indicating that the AMF is the network-side entity performing NAS security-related procedures.
[0558] In step S1710, the first node receives a NAS security mode command (Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command) message from the second node in a multi-connection environment, which includes information related to the NAS security algorithm and NAS connection identifier information.
[0559] In step S1720, the first node determines a NAS security key corresponding to a NAS connection identified in the multi-connection environment based on the information related to the NAS security algorithm and the NAS connection identifier information.
[0560] In step S1730, the first node performs NAS security processing based on the NAS security key.
[0561] In step S1740, the first node transmits a NAS Security Mode Complete message, indicating that the NAS security processing has been performed, to the second node.
[0562] According to one embodiment of the present disclosure, the operation of determining the NAS security key in step S1720 may be performed as follows. The first node derives the NAS security key corresponding to the corresponding NAS connection by utilizing the NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information as an input parameter of the Key Derivation Function (KDF). Specifically, if there are two input parameters of the KDF, a total of 8 bits, combining the NAS connection identifier value (4 bits) and the algorithm identifier value (4 bits), is applied as P1. If there are three input parameters of the KDF, the NAS connection identifier value is separated and applied as a separate parameter P2. As the NAS connection identifier is included in the input of the KDF in this manner, K, which is the same upper-level keying material AMF Different NAS security keys can be independently derived for each access type. Additionally, if the NAS security mode completion message transmitted by the first node in step S1740 includes NAS connection identifier information, the second node can identify which of the multiple NAS connections the security mode completion response is for through the identifier and activate the corresponding NAS security context.
[0563] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security mode completion message may include the NAS connection identifier information.
[0564] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS connection identifier information may include a NAS connection identifier value for identifying a NAS connection corresponding to any one of a plurality of access types.
[0565] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security key may include a key value derived based on information related to the NAS security algorithm and information related to the NAS connection identifier being provided as inputs to a Key Derivation Function (KDF). When the Key Derivation Function uses two input parameters, an algorithm type identifier may be applied to the first input parameter, the NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information may be applied to the top 4 bits of the second input parameter, and the algorithm identifier value may be applied to the bottom 4 bits. When the Key Derivation Function uses three input parameters, an algorithm type identifier may be applied to the first input parameter, the algorithm identifier value may be applied to the second input parameter, and the NAS connection identifier value may be applied independently to the third input parameter.
[0566] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security key may include a key value derived based on a NAS security context corresponding to a NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information.
[0567] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security key may include a key value derived based on a higher keying material corresponding to a NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information.
[0568] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security algorithm information may include at least one of a first value indicating an integrity protection algorithm and a second value indicating an encryption algorithm. The NAS security key is an integrity protection key (K NASint ) and encryption key (K NASencIt may include at least one of ). The NAS security processing may include at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption.
[0569] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a first node is provided in a wireless communication system. The first node includes a transceiver and at least one processor, and the at least one processor may be configured to perform a method of operation of the first node according to FIG. 17.
[0570] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, an apparatus for controlling a first node in a wireless communication system is provided. The apparatus comprises at least one processor and at least one memory operably connected to the at least one processor. The at least one memory may be configured to store instructions for performing a method of operation of the first node according to FIG. 17 based on execution by the at least one processor.
[0571] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, one or more non-transitory computer-readable media (CRMs) storing one or more instructions are provided. The one or more instructions perform operations based on execution by one or more processors, and the operations may include a method of operation of a first node according to FIG. 17.
[0572]
[0573] [Explanation regarding the 2nd Node (AMF) claim]
[0574] The embodiments described above will be explained in detail below with reference to FIG. 18 regarding the operation of the second node. The methods described below are distinguished only for the convenience of explanation, and it is obvious that as long as they are not mutually excluded, a part of one method may be substituted with a part of another method or combined with one another and applied.
[0575] FIG. 18 is a diagram illustrating an example of the operation process of a second node in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0576] In the embodiment of FIG. 18, the first node may correspond to a UE, and the second node may correspond to an AMF.
[0577] In various embodiments of the present disclosure, a first node may receive a NAS security mode command message from a second node in a multi-connection environment, the message including information related to a NAS security algorithm and NAS connection identifier information. The first node may use the NAS connection identifier information to identify which of the plurality of NAS connections a security procedure is performed on.
[0578] Specifically, the first node may select a NAS security context corresponding to the NAS connection identifier information or identify a higher-level keying material corresponding to the NAS connection identifier information. Subsequently, the first node may determine at least one of an integrity protection key (KNASint) and an encryption key (KNASenc) by performing KDF based on the NAS security algorithm-related information and the NAS connection identifier information. The first node may generate a NAS security mode completion message that performs NAS security processing using the determined NAS security key and transmit the NAS security mode completion message to the second node.
[0579] The second node may be, for example, a network node including an AMF or security anchor function. In a multi-connection environment, the second node may transmit a NAS security mode command message to the first node that includes information related to the NAS security algorithm and NAS connection identifier information. The second node may instruct a security procedure for a specific NAS connection among multiple access types or multiple NAS connections through the NAS connection identifier information.
[0580] Subsequently, the second node may receive a NAS security mode completion message from the first node. The second node may identify which NAS connection the NAS security mode completion message corresponds to by using the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message. Additionally, the second node may determine a NAS security key corresponding to the identified NAS connection based on the NAS security algorithm-related information and the NAS connection identifier information, and may transmit a subsequent NAS message to the first node to which at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption is applied using the NAS security key.
[0581] Strictly speaking, the Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF) is defined as a Network Function (NF); however, for the convenience of explanation in this disclosure, entities that transmit and receive NAS messages to and from terminals are collectively referred to as nodes. That is, in this disclosure, the second node refers to a network-side entity that performs NAS security mode command procedures, and is used to encompass all cases where the AMF is implemented independently, where the Security Anchor function is integrated within the AMF, or where the AMF and Security Anchor are implemented separately and interact. Therefore, the designation of the second node as an AMF in this disclosure should be understood as indicating that the AMF is the network-side entity performing NAS security-related procedures.
[0582] In step S1810, the second node transmits a NAS security mode command (Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command) message to the first node in a multi-connection environment, the message including NAS security algorithm-related information and NAS connection identifier information.
[0583] In step S1820, the second node receives a NAS Security Mode Complete message from the first node.
[0584] In step S1830, the second node determines a NAS security key corresponding to the NAS connection identified in the multi-connection environment based on the information related to the NAS security algorithm and the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message.
[0585] In step S1840, the second node transmits a subsequent NAS message to the first node to which at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption is applied based on the NAS security key.
[0586] According to one embodiment of the present disclosure, the operation of determining the NAS security key in step S1830 may be performed as follows. The second node verifies the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message to identify the NAS security context corresponding to the corresponding NAS connection identifier value. Subsequently, the second node derives the NAS security key corresponding to the corresponding NAS connection by utilizing the NAS connection identifier value as an input parameter of the Key Derivation Function (KDF). Specifically, if there are two input parameters of the KDF, a total of 8 bits, combining the NAS connection identifier value (4 bits) and the algorithm identifier value (4 bits), is applied as P1. If there are three input parameters of the KDF, the NAS connection identifier value is separated and applied as a separate parameter P2. By including the NAS connection identifier in the input of the KDF in this manner, K, which is the same upper-level keying material AMF Different NAS security keys can be independently derived from each access type, and the second node applies integrity protection, encryption, or decryption to subsequent NAS messages for NAS connections of the corresponding access type based on the derived NAS security keys.
[0587] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security mode completion message may include the NAS connection identifier information.
[0588] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS connection identifier information may include a NAS connection identifier value for identifying a NAS connection corresponding to any one of a plurality of access types.
[0589] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security key may include a key value derived based on information related to the NAS security algorithm and information related to the NAS connection identifier being provided as inputs to a Key Derivation Function (KDF). When the Key Derivation Function uses two input parameters, an algorithm type identifier may be applied to the first input parameter, the NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information may be applied to the top 4 bits of the second input parameter, and the algorithm identifier value may be applied to the bottom 4 bits. When the Key Derivation Function uses three input parameters, an algorithm type identifier may be applied to the first input parameter, the algorithm identifier value may be applied to the second input parameter, and the NAS connection identifier value may be applied independently to the third input parameter.
[0590] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security key may include a key value derived based on a NAS security context corresponding to a NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information.
[0591] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security key may include a key value derived based on a higher keying material corresponding to a NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information.
[0592] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the NAS security algorithm information may include at least one of a first value indicating an integrity protection algorithm and a second value indicating an encryption algorithm. The NAS security key is an integrity protection key (K NASint ) and encryption key (K NASenc It may include at least one of ).
[0593] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a second node is provided in a wireless communication system. The second node includes a transceiver and at least one processor, and the at least one processor may be configured to perform the operation method of the second node according to FIG. 18.
[0594] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, an apparatus for controlling a second node in a wireless communication system is provided. The apparatus comprises at least one processor and at least one memory operably connected to the at least one processor. The at least one memory may be configured to store instructions for performing a method of operating the second node according to FIG. 18 based on execution by the at least one processor.
[0595] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, one or more non-transitory computer readable media (CRMs) storing one or more instructions are provided. The one or more instructions perform operations based on execution by one or more processors, and the operations may include a method of operation of a second node according to FIG. 18.
[0596] Wireless devices applicable to the present disclosure
[0597] Hereinafter, examples of wireless devices to which various embodiments of the present disclosure are applied will be described.
[0598] FIG. 19 is a drawing illustrating an example of the structure of a first node and a second node in a system applicable to the present disclosure.
[0599] The first node (1600) may include a processor (1610), an antenna unit (1620), a transceiver (1630), and a memory (1640).
[0600] The processor (1610) performs baseband-related signal processing and may include an upper layer processing unit (1611) and a physical layer processing unit (1615). The upper layer processing unit (1611) may process operations of the MAC layer, RRC layer, or higher upper layers. The physical layer processing unit (1615) may process operations of the PHY layer. The physical layer processing unit (1615) may perform uplink signal processing, downlink signal processing, etc., depending on the role of the first node (1600). In addition to performing baseband-related signal processing, the processor (1610) may also control the overall operation of the first node (1600).
[0601] The antenna section (1620) may include one or more physical antennas, and if it includes multiple antennas, it may support MIMO transmission and reception. The transceiver (1630) may include an RF (Radio Frequency) transmitter and an RF receiver. The memory (1640) may store information processed by the processor (1610) and software, operating systems, applications, etc. related to the operation of the first node (1600), and may include components such as a buffer.
[0602] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a processor (1610) of a first node (1600) may be controlled to receive a NAS security mode command (Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command) message from a second node in a multi-connection environment, the message including NAS security algorithm-related information and NAS connection identifier information. Additionally, the processor (1610) may be controlled to determine a NAS security key corresponding to a NAS connection identified in the multi-connection environment based on the NAS security algorithm-related information and the NAS connection identifier information.
[0603] Additionally, the processor (1610) may be controlled to identify a NAS security context corresponding to a specific NAS connection among a plurality of NAS connections based on the NAS connection identifier information, or to identify a higher keying material corresponding to a NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information. Additionally, the processor (1610) may be controlled to determine at least one of an integrity protection key (KNASint) and an encryption key (KNASenc) by performing KDF based on at least some of the NAS security algorithm related information, the NAS connection identifier information, the NAS security context, and the higher keying material.
[0604] Additionally, the processor (1610) may be controlled to generate a NAS Security Mode Complete message in which at least one NAS security process, such as integrity protection, encryption, or decryption, is performed using the determined NAS security key. The transceiver (1630) may support the transmission and reception of the NAS security mode command message and the NAS security mode complete message.
[0605] The second node (1700) may include a processor (1710), an antenna unit (1720), a transceiver (1730), and a memory (1740). The processor (1710) may perform baseband-related signal processing and control the overall operation of the second node (1700). The antenna unit (1720) may include one or more physical antennas, and the transceiver (1730) may include an RF transmitter and an RF receiver. The memory (1740) may store information processed by the processor (1710), as well as software, operating systems, applications, etc., related to the operation of the second node (1700), and may include components such as a buffer.
[0606] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, the processor (1710) of the second node (1700) may be controlled to transmit a NAS security mode command message to the first node in a multi-connection environment, the message including NAS security algorithm-related information and NAS connection identifier information. Additionally, the processor (1710) may be controlled to receive a NAS security mode completion message from the first node and to identify a NAS connection identified in the multi-connection environment based on the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message.
[0607] Additionally, the processor (1710) may be controlled to determine a NAS security key corresponding to the identified NAS connection based on the NAS security algorithm related information and the NAS connection identifier information. For example, the processor (1710) may identify a specific NAS security context among a plurality of NAS security contexts based on the NAS connection identifier information, or identify a higher keying material corresponding to the NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information. Additionally, the processor (1710) may be controlled to determine at least one of an integrity protection key (KNASint) and an encryption key (KNASenc) by performing KDF based on at least some of the NAS security algorithm related information, the NAS connection identifier information, the NAS security context, and the higher keying material.
[0608] Additionally, the processor (1710) can generate a subsequent NAS message to which at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption is applied using the determined NAS security key, and control the transmission of the subsequent NAS message to the first node through the transceiver (1730).
[0609] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, instructions stored in the processors and memory of the first node (1600) and the second node (1700) may be configured to perform the operations of FIG. 17 and FIG. 18 described herein, respectively. Accordingly, the structure of the first node and the second node of FIG. 19 may be understood as an example of a device structure for implementing a NAS security key management method according to various embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0610] According to various embodiments of the present disclosure, a processor (1610) of a first node (1600) may be controlled to receive a NAS security mode command message from a second node in a multi-connection environment, the message including NAS security algorithm-related information and NAS connection identifier information. Additionally, the processor (1610) may be controlled to determine a NAS security key corresponding to a specific NAS connection based on the NAS security algorithm-related information and the NAS connection identifier information, and to generate a NAS security mode completion message in which NAS security processing has been performed using the NAS security key. A transceiver (1630) may support the transmission and reception of the NAS security mode command message and the NAS security mode completion message.
[0611] Additionally, the second node may also include a structure similar to that of the first node. For example, the second node may include a processor, an antenna unit, a transceiver, and memory. The processor may control the transmission of a NAS security mode command message containing information related to a NAS security algorithm and NAS connection identifier information to the first node in a multi-connection environment, and the reception of a NAS security mode completion message from the first node. Furthermore, the processor may control the identification of a specific NAS connection based on the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message, the determination of a NAS security key corresponding to the identified NAS connection, and the performance of at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption for a subsequent NAS message.
[0612] The processor (1610) of the first node (1600) may be configured to implement the operation of the first node in the embodiments described in the present disclosure. In particular, according to the embodiments of the present disclosure, the processor (1610) of the first node (1600) may be configured to identify NAS connection identifier information included in a NAS security mode command message received from the second node in a multi-connection environment, and to perform an operation to derive a NAS security key (KNASint, KNASenc) corresponding to the access type by utilizing the NAS connection identifier value as an input parameter of a key derivation function (KDF). The memory (1640) may be configured to store and manage a plurality of NAS security contexts generated for each access type by associating them with the NAS connection identifier. The transceiver (1630) may be configured to transmit a NAS security mode completion message, to which integrity protection and encryption are applied based on the derived NAS security key, to the second node.
[0613] The second node (1650) may include a processor (1660), an antenna section (1670), a transceiver (1680), and a memory (1690).
[0614] The processor (1660) performs baseband-related signal processing and may include an upper layer processing unit (1661) and a physical layer processing unit (1665). The upper layer processing unit (1661) may process operations of the MAC layer, RRC layer, or higher upper layers. The physical layer processing unit (1665) may process operations of the PHY layer. The physical layer processing unit (1665) may perform downlink signal processing, uplink signal processing, etc., depending on the role of the second node (1650). In addition to performing baseband-related signal processing, the processor (1660) may also control the overall operation of the second node (1660).
[0615] The antenna section (1670) may include one or more physical antennas, and if it includes multiple antennas, it may support MIMO transmission and reception. The transceiver (1680) may include an RF transmitter and an RF receiver. The memory (1690) may store information processed by the processor (1660) and software, operating systems, applications, etc. related to the operation of the second node (1650), and may include components such as a buffer.
[0616] The processor (1660) of the second node (1650) may be configured to implement the operation of the second node in the embodiments described in the present disclosure. In particular, according to the embodiments of the present disclosure, the processor (1660) of the second node (1650) may be configured to perform the operation of assigning a NAS connection identifier corresponding to each access type when a terminal registers to a core network through a plurality of access types, and generating and transmitting a NAS security mode command message containing the corresponding NAS connection identifier information. Additionally, the processor (1660) may be configured to identify the corresponding NAS security context by verifying the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message received from the first node, and to perform an operation to derive the NAS security key of the corresponding access type by utilizing the NAS connection identifier value as an input parameter of the KDF. The memory (1690) may be configured to store a plurality of NAS security contexts independently generated for each access type by associating them with the NAS connection identifier, and to independently manage the UL NAS COUNT and DL NAS COUNT for each context.
[0617] In the operation of the first node (1600) and the second node (1650), the details described for the first node and the second node in the embodiments of the present disclosure may be applied in the same way, and redundant descriptions are omitted.
[0618] Here, the wireless communication technology implemented in the device (1600, 1650) of the present disclosure may include LTE, NR and 6G as well as various other wireless communication technologies.
[0619]
[0620] The claims described in various embodiments of the present disclosure may be combined in various ways. For example, the technical features of the method claims of various embodiments of the present disclosure may be combined to be implemented as a device, and the technical features of the device claims of various embodiments of the present disclosure may be combined to be implemented as a method. Furthermore, the technical features of the method claims and the technical features of the device claims of various embodiments of the present disclosure may be combined to be implemented as a device, and the technical features of the method claims and the technical features of the device claims of various embodiments of the present disclosure may be combined to be implemented as a method.
Claims
1. In a method performed by the first node, A step of receiving a NAS security mode command (Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command) message from a second node in a multi-connection environment, the message including NAS security algorithm-related information and NAS connection identifier information; A step of determining a NAS security key corresponding to a NAS connection identified in a multi-connection environment based on the information related to the NAS security algorithm and the NAS connection identifier information; A step of performing NAS security processing based on the above NAS security key; and A step comprising transmitting a NAS Security Mode Complete message, in which the above NAS security processing has been performed, to the second node. method.
2. In Paragraph 1, The above NAS security mode completion message includes the above NAS connection identifier information, method.
3. In Paragraph 1, The above NAS connection identifier information includes a NAS connection identifier value for identifying a NAS connection corresponding to any one of a plurality of access types, method.
4. In Paragraph 1, The above NAS security key includes a key value derived based on the provision of information related to the NAS security algorithm and the NAS connection identifier information as inputs to a Key Derivation Function (KDF), and When the above key derivation function uses two input parameters, an algorithm type identifier is applied to the first input parameter (P0), the NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information is applied to the top 4 bits of the second input parameter (P1), and the algorithm identifier value is applied to the bottom 4 bits. When the above key derivation function uses three input parameters, an algorithm type identifier is applied to the first input parameter (P0), an algorithm identifier value is applied to the second input parameter (P1), and the NAS connection identifier value is independently applied to the third input parameter (P2). method.
5. In Paragraph 4, The above NAS security key includes a key value derived based on a NAS security context corresponding to a NAS connection identifier value included in the above NAS connection identifier information, method.
6. In Paragraph 4, The above NAS security key includes a key value derived based on a higher keying material corresponding to the NAS connection identifier value included in the above NAS connection identifier information, method.
7. In Paragraph 1, The above NAS security algorithm-related information includes at least one of a first value indicating an integrity protection algorithm and a second value indicating an encryption algorithm, and The above NAS security key is an integrity protection key (K NASint ) and encryption key (K NASenc Includes at least one of ), The above NAS security processing includes at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption. method.
8. In a method performed by the second node, A step of transmitting a NAS security mode command (Non Access Stratum Security Mode Command) message containing NAS security algorithm-related information and NAS connection identifier information to a first node in a multi-connection environment; A step of receiving a NAS Security Mode Complete message from the first node; A step of determining a NAS security key corresponding to a NAS connection identified in a multi-connection environment based on the NAS security algorithm-related information and the NAS connection identifier information included in the NAS security mode completion message; and A method comprising the step of transmitting a subsequent NAS message to the first node to which at least one of integrity protection, encryption, or decryption is applied based on the above NAS security key. method.
9. In Paragraph 8, The above NAS security mode completion message includes the above NAS connection identifier information, method.
10. In Paragraph 8, The above NAS connection identifier information includes a NAS connection identifier value for identifying a NAS connection corresponding to any one of a plurality of access types, method.
11. In Paragraph 8, The above NAS security key includes a key value derived based on the provision of information related to the NAS security algorithm and the NAS connection identifier information as inputs to a Key Derivation Function (KDF), and When the above key derivation function uses two input parameters, an algorithm type identifier is applied to the first input parameter (P0), the NAS connection identifier value included in the NAS connection identifier information is applied to the top 4 bits of the second input parameter (P1), and the algorithm identifier value is applied to the bottom 4 bits. When the above key derivation function uses three input parameters, an algorithm type identifier is applied to the first input parameter (P0), an algorithm identifier value is applied to the second input parameter (P1), and the NAS connection identifier value is independently applied to the third input parameter (P2). method.
12. In Paragraph 11, The above NAS security key includes a key value derived based on a NAS security context corresponding to a NAS connection identifier value included in the above NAS connection identifier information, method.
13. In Paragraph 11, The above NAS security key includes a key value derived based on a higher keying material corresponding to the NAS connection identifier value included in the above NAS connection identifier information, method.
14. In Paragraph 8, The above NAS security algorithm-related information includes at least one of a first value indicating an integrity protection algorithm and a second value indicating an encryption algorithm, and The above NAS security key is an integrity protection key (K NASint ) and encryption key (K NASenc including at least one of ), method.
15. In a device that performs the function of a first node, Transmitter / Receiver; At least one processor; and It includes at least one memory that is operablely connectable to the at least one processor and stores instructions for performing operations when executed by the at least one processor. The above operations are, Comprising all steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, Node 1.
16. In a device that performs the function of a second node, Transmitter / Receiver; At least one processor; and It includes at least one memory that is operablely connectable to the at least one processor and stores instructions for performing operations when executed by the at least one processor. The above operations are, Comprising all steps of the method according to any one of claims 8 through 14, Node 2.
17. In a control device for controlling a first node, At least one processor; and It includes at least one memory operably connected to the above at least one processor, and The above at least one memory stores instructions for performing operations based on execution by the above at least one processor, and The above operations are, Comprising all steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, controller.
18. In a control device for controlling a second node, At least one processor; and It includes at least one memory operably connected to the above at least one processor, and The above at least one memory stores instructions for performing operations based on execution by the above at least one processor, and The above operations are, Comprising all steps of the method according to any one of claims 8 through 14, controller.
19. In one or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing one or more instructions, The above one or more instructions perform operations based on being executed by one or more processors, and The above operations are, Comprising all steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7, Computer-readable media.
20. In one or more non-transitory computer-readable media storing one or more instructions, The above one or more instructions perform operations based on being executed by one or more processors, and The above operations are, Comprising all steps of the method according to any one of claims 8 through 14, Computer-readable media.
