Industrial control instruction issuing method and system of DCS (Distributed Control System) based on trusted computing

Abstract

The invention discloses an industrial control instruction issuing method and system of a DCS (Distributed Control System) based on trusted computing. The method comprises the following steps: correspondingly configuring identity information and verification certificates in a first trusted platform module and a second trusted platform module corresponding to an upper computer and a lower computer; performing digital signature on the industrial control instruction of the upper computer by using the identity information of the first trusted platform module and the verification certificate; the second trusted platform module verifies the received industrial control instruction and digital signature; when the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification, the lower computer executes the industrial control instruction; according to the method, unauthorized industrial control instruction execution and man-in-the-middle attack are effectively prevented, and the security of the system is greatly improved; and the TPM is used as a hardware-level security chip, and the built-in functions of encryption, decryption, digital signature, signature verification and the like of the TPM are difficult to be cracked by attacks of a software level, so that a solid hardware foundation is provided for secure transmission and execution of industrial control instructions.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of data encryption transmission, and in particular to a method and system for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing. Background Art

[0002] In the operation of the DCS (Distributed Control System) system of thermal power generation, reliable communication between the host computer and the slave computer is the key to ensure the stable and efficient operation of the entire power generation process. The host computer, as the "brain" of the control system, is responsible for monitoring, analysis and decision-making, while the slave computer, as the execution unit, directly controls key parameters such as boiler combustion, turbine speed, and generator load. This control architecture that is highly dependent on network communication, while improving production efficiency and management level, also faces severe challenges in network security.

[0003] Since the upper computer and the lower computer are connected through a network, if an attack occurs in the network and the industrial control instructions forged from the upper computer are sent to the lower computer, it will harm the production process control performed by the lower computer, which may disrupt the production process and even cause personal and property damage. Attacks include industrial control instruction forgery attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and denial of service attacks.

[0004] Industrial control instruction forgery attack: attackers may intercept, tamper with or forge network communication data, send false information to the host computer or send unauthorized industrial control instructions to the subordinate computer, thereby interfering with or disrupting the normal production process; Man-in-the-middle attack: attackers may set up malicious nodes in the network to intercept and modify the communication data between the host computer and the subordinate computer, causing the industrial control instructions to be tampered with or delayed, thereby affecting production safety. Denial of service attack: by sending a large number of invalid requests to the system, consuming network resources, making it impossible for the host computer to send industrial control instructions to the subordinate computer in time, or making the subordinate computer unable to respond to the host computer's request, causing production interruption. Malware infection: if the security protection measures of the host computer or the subordinate computer are insufficient, it is vulnerable to attacks by malware such as viruses and Trojans, resulting in paralysis of the control system or malicious tampering of industrial control instructions.

[0005] In the event of an attack, erroneous industrial control instructions may lead to serious problems such as boiler overpressure, turbine overspeed, generator overload, etc., which in turn may cause production accidents, affect power generation efficiency and equipment life. In extreme cases, an out-of-control production process may cause catastrophic consequences such as explosions and fires, directly threatening the lives of operators and surrounding personnel. Production interruptions, equipment damage, and subsequent repair and compensation costs will bring huge economic losses to power generation companies. Summary of the invention

[0006] In view of the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention provides a method and system for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing, thereby ensuring the legitimacy of the industrial control instructions, ensuring a stable production process, and ensuring personal and property safety.

[0007] The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions: In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing, comprising the following steps: The identity certificate of the upper computer and the verification certificate of the lower computer are configured in the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, and the identity certificate of the lower computer and the verification certificate of the upper computer are configured in the second trusted platform module of the lower computer, wherein the identity certificate includes the serial number of the device, the MAC address of the device, the device ID and the identity authentication key AIK information of the trusted platform module on the device, the device is the upper computer or the lower computer, and the trusted platform module on the device is the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, or the second trusted platform module of the lower computer; Before the upper computer issues an industrial control instruction, the industrial control instruction is digitally signed, the industrial control instruction is digitally signed using the identity certificate of the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, the signature value of the industrial control instruction is obtained, and the industrial control instruction and its signature value are sent to the lower computer; When the lower computer receives the industrial control instruction and its signature value sent by the upper computer, it uses the upper computer's signature verification certificate configured in the second trusted module to verify the signature of the industrial control instruction; When the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification, the lower computer executes the industrial control instruction.

[0008] Optionally, after the first trusted platform module of the host computer and the second trusted platform module of the slave computer have configured the identity certificate and the verification certificate, the trusted platform module will automatically lock the identity certificate and the verification certificate configured thereto. In the locked state, the identity certificate and the verification certificate are prohibited from unauthorized access or tampering.

[0009] Optionally, after the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification, the correctness and duplication of the industrial control instruction are verified based on the time in the signature value. When a duplicate or erroneous industrial control instruction is found, the execution of the industrial control instruction is refused; when all the above verifications pass, the lower computer executes the industrial control instruction.

[0010] Optionally, after the lower computer executes or rejects the industrial control instruction, it sends the execution result of the industrial control instruction to the upper computer, uses the identity certificate of the lower computer configured in the second trusted module to digitally sign the execution result of the industrial control instruction to obtain a signature value, and sends the execution result of the industrial control instruction and the signature value to the upper computer.

[0011] Optionally, the signature algorithm used by the digital signature is an asymmetric encryption algorithm or an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.

[0012] Optionally, when the industrial control instruction fails to pass the signature verification, the lower computer outputs an alarm signal and discards the industrial control instruction or refuses to execute the industrial control instruction.

[0013] Optionally, the first trusted platform module and the second trusted platform module are connected to mainboards of the host computer and the slave computer respectively.

[0014] In a second aspect, the present invention provides an industrial control instruction issuing system for a DCS system based on trusted computing, comprising: A configuration module, configured to configure the identity certificate of the upper computer and the verification certificate of the lower computer in the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, and configure the identity certificate of the lower computer and the verification certificate of the upper computer in the second trusted platform module of the lower computer, wherein the identity certificate includes the serial number of the device, the MAC address of the device, the device ID, and the identity authentication key AIK information of the trusted platform module on the device, the device is the upper computer or the lower computer, and the trusted platform module on the device is the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, or the second trusted platform module of the lower computer; The signature module is used to digitally sign the industrial control instruction using the identity certificate of the first trusted platform module of the upper computer before the upper computer issues the industrial control instruction, obtain the signature value of the industrial control instruction, and send the industrial control instruction and its signature value to the lower computer; The signature verification module is used for the lower computer to verify the signature of the industrial control instruction using the signature verification certificate of the upper computer configured in the second trusted module when the lower computer receives the industrial control instruction and its signature value sent by the upper computer; The execution module is used for the lower computer to execute the industrial control instruction when the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification.

[0015] In a third aspect of the present invention, a computer device is provided, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method for issuing industrial control instructions for a DCS system based on trusted computing are implemented.

[0016] In a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method for issuing industrial control instructions for a DCS system based on trusted computing are implemented.

[0017] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects: The method for issuing industrial control instructions based on a DCS system with trusted computing provided in the present application configures the first trusted platform module and the second trusted platform module in the upper computer and the lower computer respectively, and uses the identity information and verification certificate built into the trusted platform module to digitally sign and verify the industrial control instructions, and uses the private key in the first trusted platform module to digitally sign the industrial control instructions to ensure that the industrial control instructions are not tampered with during transmission. The receiver (lower computer) verifies the validity of the signature value through the public key, thereby confirming the authenticity and integrity of the industrial control instructions, effectively preventing unauthorized execution of industrial control instructions and man-in-the-middle attacks, and greatly improving the security of the system; the trusted platform module (TPM) is a hardware-level security chip, and its built-in encryption, decryption, digital signature, verification and other functions are difficult to be cracked by software-level attacks, providing a solid hardware foundation for the secure transmission and execution of industrial control instructions.

[0018] Furthermore, identity information (such as serial number, MAC address, device ID) is used as an important basis for identity authentication, ensuring that only legitimate devices can participate in the communication process. This mechanism helps prevent counterfeit devices from accessing the system, further enhancing the protection capabilities of the control system.

[0019] Furthermore, mature signature algorithms such as RSA or ECDSA are used for digital signing and signature verification. These signature algorithms have high security and efficiency and can meet the real-time and security requirements of the DCS system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0020] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show certain embodiments of the present application and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0021] Figure 1 The present invention is a flow chart of a method for issuing industrial control instructions to a DCS system based on trusted computing.

[0022] Figure 2 The present invention is a structural block diagram of the industrial control instruction issuing system of the DCS system based on trusted computing.

[0023] Figure 3 It is a structural block diagram of the electronic device of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.

[0025] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the present application for which protection is sought, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0026] The present invention proposes a method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing. The method first configures a trusted platform module on a host computer and a slave computer. The trusted platform module has built-in identity certificates of the host computer and the slave computer, and has the functions of digital signature and signature verification of commercial passwords. At the same time, the host computer uses the trusted platform module to digitally sign the industrial control instruction before sending the industrial control instruction. After receiving the information, the slave computer verifies the signature value. Only the industrial control instructions that pass the signature verification are legal industrial control instructions and are processed. The industrial control instructions that fail the signature verification are considered illegal industrial control instructions and are not processed. In this way, the legality of the industrial control instructions is guaranteed, a stable production process is ensured, and personal and property safety is guaranteed.

[0027] See also Figure 1 , a method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing, comprising the following steps: Step 1: configure the identity certificate of the upper computer and the verification certificate of the lower computer in the first trusted platform module installed in the upper computer, and configure the identity certificate of the lower computer and the verification certificate of the upper computer in the second trusted platform module of the lower computer. The identity certificate information includes the serial number of the device, the media access control MAC address of the device, the device ID and the identity authentication key AIK information of the trusted platform module on the device. The device is a host computer or a lower computer, and the trusted platform module on the device is the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, or the second trusted platform module of the lower computer.

[0028] Configure identity information and verification certificate in the initial trusted platform module to obtain a trusted platform module; First, you need to prepare or select the appropriate Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware, which is usually a security chip embedded in the computer motherboard to provide security functions such as encryption, decryption, digital signature, and signature verification. Next, through a dedicated configuration tool or software interface, the unique identity information of the host and slave computers (such as serial number, MAC address (Media Access Control Address), device ID (Identifier), trusted platform module's identity authentication key AIK (Attestation Identity Key) information, etc.) and the corresponding verification certificate (issued by a trusted third-party certificate authority) are imported into the TPM. This information will serve as the key basis for the subsequent digital signature and verification process to ensure that only legitimate and authenticated devices can participate in the communication process.

[0029] Physically install the first trusted platform module and the second trusted platform module with configured identity information and verification certificates on the motherboards of the host and slave computers in the thermal power generation DCS system. This step needs to be carried out under the guidance of professional hardware engineers to ensure that the TPM chip is correctly connected to the corresponding slot or interface of the motherboard, and enable the TPM function through the BIOS (Basic Input / Output System) or UEFI (Unified Extensible Firmware Interface). After the installation is completed, the host and slave computers will have TPM-based security protection capabilities, providing hardware-level security for the subsequent digital signature and verification process of industrial control instructions.

[0030] Step 2: Before the host computer issues an industrial control instruction, the host computer uses the identity certificate of the first trusted platform module to digitally sign the industrial control instruction, obtain the signature value of the industrial control instruction, and send the industrial control instruction and its signature value to the slave computer.

[0031] When the upper computer of the thermal power generation DCS system issues an industrial control instruction, the identity certificate in the first trusted platform module is used to digitally sign the content of the industrial control instruction, and the industrial control instruction and the signature value are sent to the lower computer.

[0032] When the host computer needs to send an industrial control instruction to the lower computer, it will first call the digital signature function in the TPM through the software interface. The specific process is: the software of the host computer uses the industrial control instruction to be sent as input data, and references the identity certificate stored in the TPM as the private key, and uses the signature algorithm of commercial cryptography (such as RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, asymmetric encryption algorithm), ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, elliptic curve digital signature algorithm), etc.) to digitally sign the content of the industrial control instruction. The digital signature process will generate a unique signature value that is closely related to the content of the industrial control instruction. Then, the host computer packages the original industrial control instruction and the corresponding signature value into a data packet and sends it to the lower computer through the network. This step ensures that the issued industrial control instruction has the legitimacy and integrity of the signature that can be verified. Any tampering with the industrial control instruction will cause the signature value verification to fail.

[0033] Step 3: When the lower computer receives the industrial control instruction and its signature value sent by the upper computer, it uses the upper computer's signature verification certificate configured in the second trusted module to verify the signature of the industrial control instruction.

[0034] When the lower computer receives the industrial control instruction and signature value sent by the upper computer, the signature verification function in the TPM is immediately started. The lower computer software first parses the industrial control instruction content and signature value from the data packet, and then calls the TPM signature verification algorithm. During the signature verification process, the lower computer will use the public key corresponding to the upper computer identity certificate (usually stored in TPM or secure storage) to decrypt and compare the signature value to confirm whether the signature value is generated by a legitimate upper computer and that the content of the industrial control instruction has not been tampered with during transmission. If the signature verification passes, it means that the industrial control instruction is legitimate and can continue to be executed; if the signature verification fails, it means that the industrial control instruction may have been tampered with or forged, and should be directly discarded and trigger the corresponding security alarm.

[0035] Step 4: The lower computer executes the industrial control instructions that pass the signature verification; the lower computer directly discards the industrial control instructions that fail the signature verification.

[0036] Optionally, when the industrial control instruction fails to pass the signature verification, the lower computer outputs an alarm signal and discards the industrial control instruction or refuses to execute the industrial control instruction.

[0037] According to the above verification results, the lower-level machine will make corresponding processing decisions. If the signature value of the industrial control instruction passes the verification, it means that the industrial control instruction is legal and has not been tampered with, and then subsequent verification is performed.

[0038] Optionally, after the first trusted platform module of the host computer and the second trusted platform module of the slave computer are configured with identity certificates and verification certificates, the TPM will automatically lock this information to prevent unauthorized access or tampering, thereby generating a trusted platform module with high security.

[0039] Optionally, after the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification, the correctness of the industrial control instruction and whether it is repeated are verified according to the time in the signature value. When it is found that the time of the industrial control instruction has expired and the format of the industrial control instruction itself does not conform to the standard format, it means that the industrial control instruction may have security risks. The lower computer will directly discard the industrial control instruction and record relevant information for subsequent analysis. At the same time, in order to enhance the defense capability of the thermal power generation DCS system, the lower computer can also trigger a security alarm mechanism to notify the operator or security management system of potential attack behaviors so that timely countermeasures can be taken.

[0040] Optionally, after the above steps, the lower computer determines that the received industrial control instruction is correct, and then performs corresponding production process control operations according to the content of the industrial control instruction. These operations may include adjusting the boiler combustion state, changing the turbine speed, adjusting the generator load, etc., to ensure the stability and safety of the power generation process.

[0041] The industrial control command issuing method of the DCS system based on trusted computing has the following advantages: The advantages of this technical solution are mainly reflected in the following aspects: 1. Enhance the security of thermal power generation DCS system: By configuring the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in the upper and lower computers and using its built-in commercial cryptographic algorithm to digitally sign and verify the industrial control instructions, network security threats such as industrial control instruction forgery attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks are effectively prevented. Only industrial control instructions with legal digital signatures can be executed by the lower computer, thus ensuring the legitimacy and integrity of the industrial control instructions.

[0042] 2. Improve data protection capabilities: The hardware-level security features of TPM make it difficult for unauthorized access or tampering of identity information and verification certificates stored in it, enhancing data security. Even if the thermal power generation DCS system is infected by malware, it is difficult for attackers to obtain or tamper with this key information.

[0043] 3. Realize end-to-end secure communication: This technical solution not only digitally signs the industrial control instructions on the upper computer side, but also verifies the signature on the lower computer side, realizing full security control from industrial control instruction generation to execution. This end-to-end secure communication mechanism effectively prevents the risk of industrial control instructions being tampered with or forged during transmission.

[0044] 4. Improve system reliability and stability: By ensuring that only legal industrial control instructions can be executed, this technical solution avoids production accidents and equipment damage caused by erroneous industrial control instructions, thereby improving system reliability and stability. At the same time, it also helps to reduce economic losses caused by production interruptions and repair costs.

[0045] 5. Support rapid response and emergency handling: When an illegal industrial control instruction is found, the lower computer can immediately discard the industrial control instruction and trigger the security alarm mechanism to notify the operator or security management system. This rapid response and emergency handling capability helps to timely discover and respond to potential attacks and reduce the impact of security incidents on the system.

[0046] This technical solution is designed and implemented based on the existing trusted computing technology and DCS system architecture, so it has high compatibility and scalability. It can be easily integrated into the existing thermal power generation DCS system and upgraded and expanded as the system develops. This technical solution meets the system security requirements of these regulations and standards by adopting advanced trusted computing technology and commercial cryptographic algorithms.

[0047] See also Figure 2 , the present application also proposes an industrial control instruction issuing system for a DCS system based on trusted computing, comprising: A configuration module, configured to configure the identity certificate of the upper computer and the verification certificate of the lower computer in the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, and configure the identity certificate of the lower computer and the verification certificate of the upper computer in the second trusted platform module of the lower computer, wherein the identity certificate includes the serial number of the device, the MAC address of the device, the device ID, and the identity authentication key AIK information of the trusted platform module on the device, the device is the upper computer or the lower computer, and the trusted platform module on the device is the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, or the second trusted platform module of the lower computer; The signature module is used to digitally sign the industrial control instruction using the identity certificate of the first trusted platform module of the upper computer before the upper computer issues the industrial control instruction, obtain the signature value of the industrial control instruction, and send the industrial control instruction and its signature value to the lower computer; The signature verification module is used for the lower computer to verify the signature of the industrial control instruction using the signature verification certificate of the upper computer configured in the second trusted module when the lower computer receives the industrial control instruction and its signature value sent by the upper computer; The execution module is used for the lower computer to execute the industrial control instruction when the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification.

[0048] It should be noted that in the several embodiments provided in the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of each module is only a logical function division. There may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple modules can be combined or integrated into another device, or some features can be ignored or not executed. The module described as a separate component may or may not be physically separated. The component displayed as a module may be a physical unit or multiple physical units, that is, it may be located in one place, or it may be distributed in multiple different places. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the scheme of this embodiment.

[0049] In addition, each module in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into a processing unit, each module may exist physically separately, or two or more modules may be integrated into one unit. The above-mentioned integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.

[0050] See also Figure 3 , an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application includes a memory and a processor, a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method for issuing industrial control instructions of the DCS system based on trusted computing as described in any of the above embodiments are implemented; an input port connected to the processor is used to transmit multimodal data collected by an external acquisition device to the processor; and a display unit connected to the processor is used to display the processing results of the processor to the outside world; a communication module connected to the processor is used to realize communication between the electronic device and the outside world. The display unit can be a display panel, a laser scanning display, etc.; the communication mode adopted by the communication module includes but is not limited to mobile high-definition link technology, universal serial bus, high-definition multimedia interface, wireless connection (including wireless fidelity technology, Bluetooth communication technology, low-power Bluetooth communication technology, and communication technology based on IEEE802.11s), IEEE 802.11s is a standard formulated by IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) for wireless local area networks, specifically used to support the construction and management of wireless networks.

[0051] An embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, in which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method for issuing industrial control instructions to a DCS system based on trusted computing as described in any of the above embodiments are implemented.

[0052] The computer-readable storage medium involved in this application includes random access memory, internal memory, read-only memory (ROM), electrically programmable ROM, electrically erasable programmable ROM, registers, hard disks, removable disks, CD-ROMs (Compact Disc Read-Only Memory), or any other form of storage medium known in the technical field.

[0053] For the description of the relevant parts of the industrial control instruction issuing method for a DCS system based on trusted computing, the electronic device, and the computer-readable storage medium provided in the embodiment of the present application, please refer to the detailed description of the corresponding parts in the industrial control instruction issuing method for a DCS system based on trusted computing provided in the embodiment of the present application, which will not be repeated here. In addition, the parts of the above technical solutions provided in the embodiment of the present application that are consistent with the implementation principles of the corresponding technical solutions in the prior art are not described in detail to avoid excessive elaboration.

[0054] The above contents are only for explaining the technical idea of ​​the present invention and cannot be used to limit the protection scope of the present invention. Any changes made on the basis of the technical solution in accordance with the technical idea proposed by the present invention shall fall within the protection scope of the claims of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for issuing industrial control instructions for a DCS system based on trusted computing, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: The identity certificate of the upper computer and the verification certificate of the lower computer are configured in the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, and the identity certificate of the lower computer and the verification certificate of the upper computer are configured in the second trusted platform module of the lower computer, wherein the identity certificate includes the serial number of the device, the MAC address of the device, the device ID and the identity authentication key AIK information of the trusted platform module on the device, the device is the upper computer or the lower computer, and the trusted platform module on the device is the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, or the second trusted platform module of the lower computer; Before the upper computer issues an industrial control instruction, the upper computer uses the identity certificate of the first trusted platform module to digitally sign the industrial control instruction, obtains the signature value of the industrial control instruction, and sends the industrial control instruction and its signature value to the lower computer; When the lower computer receives the industrial control instruction and its signature value sent by the upper computer, it uses the upper computer's signature verification certificate configured in the second trusted module to verify the signature of the industrial control instruction; When the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification, the lower computer executes the industrial control instruction.

2. The method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing according to claim 1 is characterized in that: After the first trusted platform module of the host computer and the second trusted platform module of the slave computer have configured the identity certificate and the verification certificate, the trusted platform module will automatically lock the identity certificate and the verification certificate configured thereto. In the locked state, the identity certificate and the verification certificate are prohibited from unauthorized access or tampering.

3. The method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: When the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification, the correctness and duplication of the industrial control instruction are verified according to the time in the signature value. If a duplicate or wrong industrial control instruction is found, the execution of the industrial control instruction is rejected. When all the above verifications are passed, the lower computer executes the industrial control instruction.

4. The method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing according to claim 3 is characterized in that: After the lower computer executes or rejects the industrial control instruction, it sends the execution result of the industrial control instruction to the upper computer, uses the identity certificate of the lower computer configured in the second trusted module to digitally sign the execution result of the industrial control instruction to obtain a signature value, and sends the execution result of the industrial control instruction and the signature value to the upper computer.

5. The method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The signature algorithm used by the digital signature is an asymmetric encryption algorithm or an elliptic curve digital signature algorithm.

6. The method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing according to claim 1 is characterized in that: When the industrial control instruction fails to pass the signature verification, the lower computer outputs an alarm signal and abandons the industrial control instruction or refuses to execute the industrial control instruction.

7. The method for issuing industrial control instructions of a DCS system based on trusted computing according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The first trusted platform module and the second trusted platform module are connected to the mainboards of the host computer and the slave computer respectively.

8. An industrial control instruction issuing system for a DCS system based on trusted computing, characterized in that: include: A configuration module, configured to configure the identity certificate of the upper computer and the verification certificate of the lower computer in the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, and configure the identity certificate of the lower computer and the verification certificate of the upper computer in the second trusted platform module of the lower computer, wherein the identity certificate includes the serial number of the device, the MAC address of the device, the device ID, and the identity authentication key AIK information of the trusted platform module on the device, the device is the upper computer or the lower computer, and the trusted platform module on the device is the first trusted platform module of the upper computer, or the second trusted platform module of the lower computer; The signature module is used to digitally sign the industrial control instruction using the identity certificate of the first trusted platform module of the upper computer before the upper computer issues the industrial control instruction, obtain the signature value of the industrial control instruction, and send the industrial control instruction and its signature value to the lower computer; The signature verification module is used for the lower computer to verify the signature of the industrial control instruction using the signature verification certificate of the upper computer configured in the second trusted module when the lower computer receives the industrial control instruction and its signature value sent by the upper computer; The execution module is used for the lower computer to execute the industrial control instruction when the industrial control instruction passes the signature verification.

9. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method for issuing industrial control instructions to a DCS system based on trusted computing as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of a method for issuing industrial control instructions to a DCS system based on trusted computing as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.

Images