Commercial vehicle traveling data recorder anti-cracking and operation traceability system and method

Abstract

The invention provides an anti-cracking and operation traceability system and method for a commercial vehicle traveling data recorder. The system comprises a physical interface protection and auditing module, a remote protocol deep analysis and traceability module and an anti-tampering traceability log management module. The method comprises the following sub-steps: S1, carrying out physical interface security protection and intrusion detection; s2, performing session binding, message analysis verification and terminal registration authentication protection on the JT / T 808 protocol; s3, generating and managing a tamper-proof traceability log; according to the method, through a USB bus white list mechanism, data transmission and drive loading of unauthorized equipment are blocked, attacks such as malicious equipment injection and HID simulation keyboard are completely eradicated, and the core loophole that a universal USB drive lacks strict identity control is solved; the state of the case and a three-level interrupt response mechanism are monitored by means of a safe GPIO pin, so that an attacker is prevented from tampering records by disassembling a shell and short-circuiting a circuit, and the defect that a physical shell is not protected is overcome.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of transportation supervision, and in particular to a system and method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of commercial vehicle driving recorders. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), commercial vehicle driving recorders, as core recording devices for vehicle operation status, are seeing their data gain increasing legal validity and social value. The national standard GB / T 19056-2021, "Automotive Driving Recorders," clearly specifies the data acquisition, storage, communication interfaces (USB, CAN, RS232), and data security of these recorders. JT / T 808, "Communication Protocol and Data Format for Satellite Positioning System Terminals of Road Transport Vehicles," serves as the mainstream communication standard in the industry, supporting key business interactions such as terminal registration, authentication, parameter setting, and location information reporting. However, in practical technology applications and operational scenarios, dashcams face the dual challenges of unauthorized physical access and malicious tampering with application layer protocols, resulting in the following main drawbacks: Significant physical interface security vulnerabilities exist: The USB interfaces mandated by the GB / T 19056-2021 standard are mostly based on the Linux kernel's general USB driver, lacking strict control over the identity of connected devices; attackers can insert malicious USB tools disguised as mass storage devices to execute scripts to tamper with data, use HID to simulate a keyboard to bypass the login interface, or disassemble the chassis to short-circuit GPIO pins / reset pins to force the terminal to restore factory settings or enter test mode to erase critical records; The remote protocol has weak security design: The JT / T 808 protocol design focuses on communication efficiency but lacks security design. Even though the 2019 version introduced the RSA encryption option, many terminals still use plaintext or simplified authentication codes for communication. On the one hand, attackers can forge platform instructions (such as 0x8103) to tamper with key parameters such as pulse coefficient and maximum speed threshold, causing the recorder to malfunction or data to be uploaded to illegal servers. On the other hand, the existing logs only record the operation type and lack the ability to deeply trace the source of the operation, making it impossible to distinguish between legitimate platform distribution, illegal IP attacks, or local USB modifications, which brings great difficulties to the determination of responsibility for the accident.

[0003] In summary, existing technologies lack a comprehensive defense mechanism that integrates underlying physical interface monitoring (USB / IO) with deep packet inspection of application layer protocols; there is an urgent need to develop a security system capable of real-time monitoring of both physical and network channels and possessing full-link traceability capabilities for operational behavior. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to address the shortcomings of existing technologies by proposing a system and method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of commercial vehicle driving recorders.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention adopts the following technical solution: A system for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder, comprising a physical interface protection and auditing module, a remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module, and an anti-tampering tracing log management module; The physical interface protection and auditing module includes a USB bus security protection unit and a chassis intrusion detection unit; the USB bus security protection unit is used to verify the identity of USB interface access devices, assign permissions, and record operation behavior; the chassis intrusion detection unit is used to prevent attacks that dismantle the recorder chassis. The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module is used to bind the JT / T 808 protocol session with the remote end network information, parse the protocol message and verify its integrity, and perform compliance checks on key parameters, etc. The anti-tampering traceability log management module is used to define the operation traceability log data structure, build an anti-tampering mechanism for logs through hash chain technology, and store logs independently on a secure medium.

[0006] This invention also proposes a method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of commercial vehicle driving recorders, including the following sub-steps: S1: Perform physical interface security protection and intrusion detection; Includes the following sub-steps: S11: Perform USB bus security protection; Establish a monitoring mechanism: In the Linux system, configure the udev rule file, which contains rules for capturing USB device insertion events and USB device removal events; the rules include event matching conditions, script triggering instructions, and parameter passing; When a USB device is inserted, the authentication script is triggered. The authentication script extracts the device hardware fingerprint from the parameters passed by the USB device insertion event capture rule. The device hardware fingerprint includes the device manufacturer ID, product ID, and the unique serial number of the external USB device connected to the commercial vehicle driving recorder's USB interface. The authentication script reads the whitelist database of devices stored in the security chip or encrypted partition. The whitelist database contains the hardware fingerprint hash values ​​of pre-set legitimate devices. The extracted device hardware fingerprint is hashed and compared with the hash values ​​in the whitelist database one by one. If it matches any hash value in the whitelist database, the device is deemed authorized and allowed to communicate normally and the access log is recorded. If it does not match any hash value in the whitelist database, the device is deemed unauthorized and the blocking operation is executed at the Linux kernel driver layer. S12: Perform chassis intrusion detection; S121: Establish a hardware detection loop; A normally closed microswitch or photoresistor is pre-installed at the junction of the PCB circuit board and the metal / plastic casing; when the casing is closed, the circuit is in the conducting state and outputs a low-level signal; when the casing is opened, the circuit is disconnected and outputs a high-level signal. Connect the signal line of the detection element to the dedicated security GPIO pin of the recorder processor; the dedicated security GPIO pin is configured to be "safe world visible" during the chip startup phase, meaning that the ordinary operating system cannot modify the register of this pin through memory mapping, nor can it block interrupt signals; S122: Perform interrupt signal processing; Signal debouncing: An RC filter circuit is connected in series in the hardware circuit or a delay judgment time is set in the software as the debouncing time. When the duration of the high level exceeds the debouncing time, it is judged as "real disassembly"; otherwise, it is judged as "false triggering". When the dedicated security GPIO pin detects a high level, the signal is debouncing and determined to be "real disassembly", triggering the first level response, that is, the security monitoring unit writes a random number to the area in the memory RAM where sensitive data is stored; The second-level response is triggered immediately after the first-level response is completed, which is to write a preset "chassis open" flag to the target storage medium; If the system is still powered when the second-level response is executed, triggering the third-level response, a dedicated alarm message will be constructed based on the JT / T 808 protocol; S2: Perform session binding, message parsing and verification, and terminal registration authentication protection for the JT / T 808 protocol; Includes the following sub-steps: S21: JT / T 808 Protocol Session Context Binding and Remote End Network Information Storage; When the dashcam of a commercial vehicle establishes a TCP connection with a remote terminal or receives protocol data packets, it initializes a session context of the JT / T 808 protocol, which is used to store relevant interactive data of the TCP connection. The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module calls the API interface to obtain the network information of the remote terminal, including the source IP address, source port number, etc.; and converts the source IP address and source port number into a standard format. By using assignment statements, the source IP address and source port number are stored into the corresponding fields of the session context, thereby binding the source IP address and source port number to the session context of the JT / T 808 protocol. Furthermore, all packets within the same TCP connection are associated with the same session context that stores the source IP address and source port number; the session context stores the corresponding operation source. S22: JT / T 808 protocol message parsing, verification and parameter binding; The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module receives JT / T 808 protocol messages, matches the corresponding session context based on the TCP connection currently carrying the message, and extracts the source IP address and source port number from the session context; The JT / T 808 protocol message includes a message header, a message body, and a tail XOR checksum; the message header includes a message ID, message length, etc.; the message body includes a parameter list, total number of parameters, etc. The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module extracts JT / T 808 protocol messages and extracts the message ID from the message header. The message ID corresponds one-to-one with the message instruction. Based on the message ID, the module matches the corresponding message instruction and extracts the XOR checksum from the message instruction. This XOR checksum is then compared with the corresponding checksum in the JT / T 808 protocol message. If they do not match, the message is determined to have been tampered with or corrupted, triggering exception handling. The exception handling includes refusing to parse subsequent fields and setting an exception code. If they match, the transmission is deemed error-free. Based on the message ID, the parameter item list of the message body of the JT / T 808 protocol message is traversed, and the corresponding parameter information is extracted from the parameter item list. The parameter information includes parameter ID, parameter name, data type, etc. The current effective value of the corresponding parameter ID is read from the non-volatile memory NVRAM as the original parameter value. The extracted parameter information is then checked for compliance by a preset monitoring rule, such as the pulse coefficient modification deviation not exceeding ±5% and the main server IP matching a valid network segment. If the compliance check fails, the parameter information is refused to be stored in the non-volatile memory NVRAM and a custom error code is set. If the compliance verification is successful, the parameter information that passed the compliance verification will be stored as the parameter modification value in the non-volatile memory NVRAM, overwriting the original parameter value in the non-volatile memory NVRAM; the source IP address, source port number will be bound to the message ID, parameter ID, original parameter value, and parameter modification value; S23: Perform terminal registration authentication and protection against abnormal attacks; After the commercial vehicle dashcam is activated, the terminal sends a terminal registration message to a pre-set legitimate remote management platform based on the JT / T 808 protocol. The terminal registration message contains identity information such as the terminal's mobile phone number and VIN code. The remote management platform receives and verifies the terminal registration message. After successful verification, it generates a registration response message and sends it to the terminal. The registration response message contains an authentication code. The terminal receives and parses the registration response message and extracts the authentication code as a cached valid authentication code. The remote protocol deep analysis and tracing module extracts the authentication code corresponding to the terminal authentication message contained in the JT / T 808 protocol, compares the valid authentication code with the authentication code, and if they are inconsistent for a total of 3 times, the current TCP connection is locked, and the corresponding source IP is marked as a "suspicious attack source" and recorded.

[0007] S3: Tamper-proof traceability log generation and management; Includes the following sub-steps: S31: Define the operation traceability log data structure; The anti-tampering traceability log management module defines an operation traceability log data structure, which includes a basic identifier, operation source, business association, data credential, and anti-tampering verification field. The basic identifier includes log serial number, timestamp, etc.; The operation source includes operation channel identifier, source IP address, etc.; wherein the operation channel identifier is assigned a value according to a preset mapping relationship, and the operation type corresponds one-to-one with the code. The business associations include message IDs and parameter IDs from the JT / T 808 protocol; The data credentials include the CRC32 hash of the parameter value before modification and the CRC32 hash of the parameter value after modification; The tamper-proof verification field is a hash chain verification value in SHA-256 format; S32: Implements the collection of operation traceability log fields, hash chain verification calculation, and independent storage; A binary random number is written into the secure storage area of ​​the vehicle's dashcam beforehand. When the system generates the first operation traceability log, the specific values ​​of each field in the operation traceability log data structure are extracted as the complete log content. The complete log content is concatenated with the binary random number and input into the SHA-256 encryption algorithm. The result is the anti-tampering verification field of the first operation traceability log, and the anti-tampering verification field is written into the corresponding field of the operation traceability log. When generating subsequent operation traceability logs, the anti-tampering verification field of the previous operation traceability log is obtained, the complete log content of the current operation traceability log is extracted and concatenated with the anti-tampering verification field, and the SHA-256 encryption algorithm is input. The result is the anti-tampering verification field of the current operation traceability log, and the anti-tampering verification field is written into the corresponding field of the operation traceability log. The anti-tampering traceability log management module writes the corresponding data of all operation traceability logs to an independent storage medium and performs integrity verification to ensure that all data is written completely. When exporting operation traceability logs, the auditing software recalculates all anti-tampering verification fields starting from the first operation traceability log. If an operation traceability log is tampered with or deleted, the hash values ​​of subsequent operation traceability logs will not be able to match.

[0008] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: This method uses a USB bus whitelist mechanism to verify the manufacturer ID, product ID, and serial number of the connected device, blocking data transmission and driver loading from unauthorized devices, preventing attacks such as malicious device injection and HID keyboard emulation, and solving the core vulnerability of the lack of strict identity control in general USB drivers; relying on secure GPIO pins to monitor the chassis status and a three-level interrupt response mechanism, it prevents attackers from tampering with records by disassembling the casing and short-circuiting circuits, thus compensating for the lack of protection of the physical casing; This method blocks malicious parameter tampering by combining semantic firewall with parameter compliance verification. It forcibly binds the JT / T 808 protocol session with the source IP address and port number of the operation, which can clearly distinguish between legitimate platform distribution, illegal IP attacks and local operations. It effectively solves the problems of traditional logs being unable to trace the source of operations and the difficulty in determining responsibility for incidents. By caching valid authentication codes and implementing locking strategies for connections that fail to authenticate consecutively, the system effectively resists attacks from fake base stations and brute-force attacks, making up for the security shortcomings of the JT / T 808 protocol, which uses plaintext or simplified authentication in many terminals, and improving the security of remote communication. Attached Figure Description

[0009] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of the method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0010] To provide a further understanding of the purpose, structure, features, and functions of the present invention, detailed descriptions are provided below with reference to specific embodiments.

[0011] A system for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder, comprising a physical interface protection and auditing module, a remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module, and an anti-tampering tracing log management module; The physical interface protection and auditing module includes a USB bus security protection unit and a chassis intrusion detection unit; the USB bus security protection unit is used to verify the identity of USB interface access devices, assign permissions, and record operation behavior; the chassis intrusion detection unit is used to prevent attacks that dismantle the recorder chassis. The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module is used to bind the JT / T 808 protocol session with the remote end network information, parse the protocol message and verify its integrity, and perform compliance checks on key parameters, etc. The anti-tampering traceability log management module is used to define the operation traceability log data structure, build an anti-tampering mechanism for logs through hash chain technology, and store logs independently on a secure medium.

[0012] like Figure 1 As shown, this invention also proposes a method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of commercial vehicle driving recorders, including the following sub-steps: S1: Perform physical interface security protection and intrusion detection; Includes the following sub-steps: S11: Perform USB bus security protection; Establish a monitoring mechanism: In the Linux system, configure the udev rule file, which contains rules for capturing USB device insertion events and USB device removal events; the rules include event matching conditions, script triggering instructions, and parameter passing; Specifically, the rules for capturing USB device insertion events are as follows: Event matching conditions: The triggered device event type is device addition, the subsystem is USB, and the device type is a kernel event of a USB physical device; Script trigger command: When all event matching conditions are met, execute the preset authentication script and identify the currently processed event as an inserted event through script parameters; Parameter passing: Parameters are synchronously passed to the authentication script by calling the device attribute variables in the Linux kernel. The parameters include device manufacturer ID, product ID, unique serial number of the external USB device connected to the USB interface of the commercial vehicle driving recorder, access bus number, device number, etc. The rules for capturing USB device unplug events are as follows: Event matching conditions: The triggered device event type is device removal, the subsystem is USB, and the device type is a kernel event of a USB physical device; Script trigger command: When all event matching conditions are met, execute the preset authentication script and identify the currently processed event as a pull-out event through script parameters; Parameter passing: The unique serial number of the external USB device connected to the commercial vehicle driving recorder's USB interface is synchronously passed to the authentication script by calling the device attribute variables in the Linux kernel; When a USB device is inserted, the authentication script is triggered. The authentication script extracts the device hardware fingerprint from the parameters passed by the USB device insertion event capture rule. The device hardware fingerprint includes the device manufacturer ID, product ID, and the unique serial number of the external USB device connected to the commercial vehicle driving recorder's USB interface. The authentication script reads the whitelist database of devices stored in the security chip or encrypted partition. The whitelist database contains the hardware fingerprint hash values ​​of pre-set legitimate devices. The extracted device hardware fingerprint is hashed and compared with the hash values ​​in the whitelist database one by one. If it matches any hash value in the whitelist database, the device is deemed authorized and allowed to communicate normally and the access log is recorded. If it does not match any hash value in the whitelist database, the device is deemed unauthorized and the blocking operation is executed at the Linux kernel driver layer. S12: Perform chassis intrusion detection; S121: Establish a hardware detection loop; A normally closed microswitch or photoresistor is pre-installed at the junction of the PCB circuit board and the metal / plastic casing; when the casing is closed, the circuit is in the conducting state and outputs a low-level signal; when the casing is opened, the circuit is disconnected and outputs a high-level signal. Connect the signal line of the detection element to the dedicated security GPIO pin of the recorder processor; the dedicated security GPIO pin is configured to be "safe world visible" during the chip startup phase, meaning that the ordinary operating system cannot modify the register of this pin through memory mapping, nor can it block interrupt signals; S122: Perform interrupt signal processing; Signal debouncing: An RC filter circuit is connected in series in the hardware circuit or a delay judgment time is set in the software as the debouncing time. When the duration of the high level exceeds the debouncing time, it is judged as "real disassembly"; otherwise, it is judged as "false triggering". When the dedicated security GPIO pin detects a high level, the signal is debouncing and determined to be "real disassembly", triggering the first level response, that is, the security monitoring unit writes a random number to the area in the memory RAM where sensitive data is stored; The second-level response is triggered immediately after the first-level response is completed, which means writing a preset "chassis open" flag to the target storage medium (such as a one-time programmable storage area OTP or a battery-powered RTC backup register); If the system is still powered when the second-level response is executed, triggering the third-level response, a dedicated alarm message is constructed based on the JT / T 808 protocol. Specifically, a 0x0200 location information reporting message is constructed based on the JT / T 808 protocol, and the extended position of the alarm flag bit in the 0x0200 location information reporting message is set to 1 to mark it as a terminal tamper alarm, and then sent to the preset platform.

[0013] S2: Perform session binding, message parsing and verification, and terminal registration authentication protection for the JT / T 808 protocol; Includes the following sub-steps: S21: JT / T 808 Protocol Session Context Binding and Remote End Network Information Storage; When the dashcam of a commercial vehicle establishes a TCP connection with a remote terminal or receives protocol data packets, it initializes a session context of the JT / T 808 protocol, which is used to store relevant interactive data of the TCP connection. The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module calls API interfaces such as getpeername to obtain the network information of the remote end, including the source IP address, source port number, etc.; and converts the source IP address and source port number into a standard format (such as converting the source IP address into a 32-bit unsigned integer and the source port number into a 16-bit unsigned integer). The source IP address is the real network IP address of the remote end, and the source port number is the network port number of the remote end that sends relevant protocol instructions; By using assignment statements, the source IP address and source port number are stored into the corresponding fields of the session context, thereby binding the source IP address and source port number to the session context of the JT / T 808 protocol. Furthermore, all packets within the same TCP connection are associated with the same session context that stores the source IP address and source port number; the session context stores the corresponding operation source. S22: JT / T 808 protocol message parsing, verification and parameter binding; The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module receives JT / T 808 protocol messages, matches the corresponding session context based on the TCP connection currently carrying the message, and extracts the source IP address and source port number from the session context; The JT / T 808 protocol message includes a message header, a message body, and a tail XOR checksum; the message header includes a message ID, message length, etc.; the message body includes a parameter list, total number of parameters, etc. The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module extracts JT / T 808 protocol messages and extracts the message ID from the message header. The message ID corresponds one-to-one with the message instruction. Based on the message ID, the module matches the corresponding message instruction and extracts the XOR checksum from the message instruction. This XOR checksum is then compared with the corresponding checksum in the JT / T 808 protocol message. If they do not match, the message is determined to have been tampered with or corrupted, triggering exception handling. The exception handling includes refusing to parse subsequent fields and setting an exception code. If they match, the transmission is deemed error-free. Based on the message ID, the parameter item list of the message body of the JT / T 808 protocol message is traversed, and the corresponding parameter information is extracted from the parameter item list. The parameter information includes parameter ID, parameter name, data type, etc. The current effective value of the corresponding parameter ID is read from the non-volatile memory NVRAM as the original parameter value. The extracted parameter information is then checked for compliance by a preset monitoring rule, such as the pulse coefficient modification deviation not exceeding ±5% and the main server IP matching a valid network segment. If the compliance check fails, the parameter information is refused to be stored in the non-volatile memory NVRAM and a custom error code is set. If the compliance verification is successful, the parameter information that passed the compliance verification will be stored as the parameter modification value in the non-volatile memory NVRAM, overwriting the original parameter value in the non-volatile memory NVRAM; the source IP address, source port number will be bound to the message ID, parameter ID, original parameter value, and parameter modification value; S23: Perform terminal registration authentication and protection against abnormal attacks; After the commercial vehicle dashcam is activated, the terminal sends a terminal registration message to a pre-set legitimate remote management platform based on the JT / T 808 protocol. The terminal registration message contains identity information such as the terminal's mobile phone number and VIN code. The remote management platform receives and verifies the terminal registration message. After successful verification, it generates a registration response message and sends it to the terminal. The registration response message contains an authentication code. The terminal receives and parses the registration response message and extracts the authentication code as a cached valid authentication code. The remote protocol deep analysis and tracing module extracts the authentication code corresponding to the terminal authentication message contained in the JT / T 808 protocol, compares the valid authentication code with the authentication code, and if they are inconsistent for a total of 3 times, the current TCP connection is locked, and the corresponding source IP is marked as a "suspicious attack source" and recorded.

[0014] S3: Tamper-proof traceability log generation and management; Includes the following sub-steps: S31: Define the operation traceability log data structure; The anti-tampering traceability log management module defines an operation traceability log data structure, which includes a basic identifier, operation source, business association, data credential, and anti-tampering verification field. The basic identifier includes log serial number, timestamp, etc.; The operation source includes operation channel identifier, source IP address, etc.; wherein the operation channel identifier is assigned a value according to a preset mapping relationship, and the operation type corresponds one-to-one with the code (e.g., 0x01 = remote platform, 0x02 = local USB, 0x03 = local IC card). The business associations include message IDs and parameter IDs from the JT / T 808 protocol; The data credentials include the CRC32 hash of the parameter value before modification and the CRC32 hash of the parameter value after modification; The tamper-proof verification field is a hash chain verification value in SHA-256 format; S32: Implements the collection of operation traceability log fields, hash chain verification calculation, and independent storage; A binary random number is written into the secure storage area of ​​the vehicle's dashcam beforehand. When the system generates the first operation traceability log, the specific values ​​of each field in the operation traceability log data structure are extracted as the complete log content. The complete log content is concatenated with the binary random number and input into the SHA-256 encryption algorithm. The result is the anti-tampering verification field of the first operation traceability log, and the anti-tampering verification field is written into the corresponding field of the operation traceability log. When generating subsequent operation traceability logs, the anti-tampering verification field of the previous operation traceability log is obtained, the complete log content of the current operation traceability log is extracted and concatenated with the anti-tampering verification field, and the SHA-256 encryption algorithm is input. The result is the anti-tampering verification field of the current operation traceability log, and the anti-tampering verification field is written into the corresponding field of the operation traceability log. Specifically, the system generates log serial numbers through a built-in counter and reads timestamps from the RTC real-time clock; during remote operation, it extracts the bound source IP address from the session context and assigns the operation channel identifier according to the mapping relationship; during local operation (USB / IC card), the operation channel identifier is assigned the corresponding code, and the source IP address field is filled with all 0s. Extract the message ID of the JT / T 808 protocol from the JT / T 808 protocol message header, and parse the parameter ID from the parameter item list; obtain the CRC32 hash of the parameter value before modification by performing a CRC32 hash calculation on the original parameter value of the non-volatile memory NVRAM in step S22. The CRC32 hash of the modified parameter value is obtained by performing a CRC32 hash calculation on the parameter modification value in step S22. The anti-tampering traceability log management module writes the corresponding data of all operation traceability logs to an independent storage medium (such as an independent log partition or a dedicated SPI interface Flash chip) and performs integrity verification to ensure that all data is written completely; it is physically isolated from business data to prevent malicious access or deletion.

[0015] When exporting operation traceability logs, the auditing software recalculates all anti-tampering verification fields starting from the first operation traceability log. If an operation traceability log is tampered with or deleted, the hash values ​​of subsequent operation traceability logs will not match, which can quickly locate the tampering point and ensure the legal validity of the logs.

[0016] This method generates a structured log containing device fingerprints (de-identified information such as manufacturer ID and product ID), operation results, and timestamps, which fully records all physical operations such as USB device connection / removal and chassis opening, solving the problems of lack of traceability for physical operations and difficulty in determining liability for accidents. This method not only defends against illegal commands at the application layer, but also defends against the access of malicious USB devices at the underlying driver level. Furthermore, it adds anti-tamper detection of the physical chassis, thus constructing a three-dimensional defense system of "physical-driver-application". By using underlying Socket information extraction technology, the shortcomings of the JT / T 808 protocol in identifying terminal identity based solely on "mobile phone number" are solved. It can accurately record the source IP and port of operation commands, effectively distinguishing between legitimate operation and maintenance and malicious attacks. By introducing hash chain technology to store operation logs, even attackers with root privileges cannot silently tamper with historical records without breaking the chain of evidence, greatly enhancing the forensic value of the data. The system's built-in parameter compliance verification logic ensures that key data such as vehicle speed records and mileage statistics during operation comply with national regulations, preventing operational fraud through technical means.

[0017] The present invention has been described in the above-described embodiments; however, these embodiments are merely examples for implementing the present invention. It must be noted that the disclosed embodiments do not limit the scope of the present invention. Conversely, any modifications and refinements made without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention are within the scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder, characterized in that: Includes the following steps: S1: Perform physical interface security protection and intrusion detection; S11: Perform USB bus security protection; Establish a monitoring mechanism: In the Linux system, configure the udev rule file, which contains rules for capturing USB device insertion events and rules for capturing USB device removal events; S12: Perform chassis intrusion detection; S121: Establish a hardware detection loop; S122: Perform interrupt signal processing; S2: Perform session binding, message parsing and verification, and terminal registration authentication protection for the JT / T 808 protocol; S21: JT / T 808 Protocol Session Context Binding and Remote End Network Information Storage; S22: JT / T 808 protocol message parsing, verification and parameter binding; S23: Perform terminal registration authentication and protection against abnormal attacks; S3: Anti-tampering traceability log generation and management; S31: Define the operation traceability log data structure; S32: Implements operation traceability log field collection, hash chain verification calculation, and independent storage.

2. The method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder as described in claim 1, characterized in that: In step S11, both the USB device insertion event capture rule and the USB device removal event capture rule include event matching conditions, script triggering instructions, and parameter passing; When a USB device is inserted, the authentication script is triggered. The authentication script extracts the device hardware fingerprint from the parameters passed by the USB device insertion event capture rule. The device hardware fingerprint includes the device manufacturer ID, product ID, and the unique serial number of the external USB device connected to the commercial vehicle driving recorder's USB interface. The authentication script reads the whitelist database of devices stored in the security chip or encrypted partition. The whitelist database contains the hardware fingerprint hash values ​​of pre-set legitimate devices. The extracted device hardware fingerprint is hashed and compared with the hash values ​​in the whitelist database one by one. If it matches any hash value in the whitelist database, the device is deemed authorized, allowing normal communication and recording. If the hash value does not match any of the hash values ​​in the whitelist database, the device is deemed unauthorized, and the blocking operation is executed at the Linux kernel driver layer.

3. The method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder as described in claim 1, characterized in that: The specific details of step S12 are as follows: S121: Establish a hardware detection loop; A normally closed microswitch or photoresistor is pre-installed at the junction of the PCB circuit board and the metal / plastic housing; when the housing is closed, the circuit is in the conducting state and outputs a low-level signal; when the housing is opened, the circuit is disconnected and outputs a high-level signal. Connect the signal line of the detection element to the dedicated safety GPIO pin of the recorder processor; S122: Perform interrupt signal processing; Signal debouncing: An RC filter circuit is connected in series in the hardware circuit or a delay judgment time is set in the software as the debouncing time. When the duration of the high level exceeds the debouncing time, it is judged as "real disassembly"; otherwise, it is judged as "false trigger". When the dedicated security GPIO pin detects a high level, the signal is debouncing and determined to be "real disassembly", triggering the first level response, that is, the security monitoring unit writes a random number to the area in the RAM where sensitive data is stored; The second-level response is triggered immediately after the first-level response is completed, which is to write a preset "chassis open" flag to the target storage medium; If the system is still powered when the second-level response is executed, triggering the third-level response, a dedicated alarm message will be constructed based on the JT / T 808 protocol and sent to the preset platform.

4. The method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder as described in claim 1, characterized in that: The specific details of step S2 are as follows: S21: JT / T 808 Protocol Session Context Binding and Remote End Network Information Storage; When the dashcam of a commercial vehicle establishes a TCP connection with the remote end or receives protocol data packets, it initializes a JT / T808 protocol session context. The remote protocol deep analysis and tracing module calls the API interface to obtain the network information of the remote terminal, including the source IP address and the source port number; The source IP address and source port number are stored in the corresponding fields of the session context using an assignment statement; All packets within the same TCP connection are associated with the same session context, which stores the source IP address and source port number; the session context stores the corresponding operation source. S22: JT / T 808 protocol message parsing, verification and parameter binding; The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module receives JT / T 808 protocol messages, matches the corresponding session context based on the TCP connection currently carrying the message, and extracts the source IP address and source port number from the session context; The remote protocol deep analysis and tracing module extracts JT / T 808 protocol messages and extracts the message ID from the message header. The message ID corresponds one-to-one with the message instruction. Based on the message ID, the corresponding message instruction is matched. The XOR checksum at the end of the message instruction is extracted and compared with the corresponding checksum in the JT / T 808 protocol message. If they do not match, it is determined that the message has been tampered with or damaged, and an exception is triggered. If they match, it is determined that the transmission is error-free. Based on the message ID, the parameter list of the message body of the JT / T 808 protocol message is traversed, and the corresponding parameter information is extracted from the parameter list. The current effective value of the corresponding parameter ID is read from the non-volatile memory NVRAM as the original parameter value. The extracted parameter information is checked for compliance according to the preset monitoring rules. If the compliance check fails, the parameter information is refused to be stored in the non-volatile memory NVRAM and a custom error code is set. If the compliance verification is successful, the parameter information that passes the compliance verification will be stored as the parameter modification value in the non-volatile memory NVRAM, overwriting the original parameter value in the non-volatile memory NVRAM. S23: Perform terminal registration authentication and protection against abnormal attacks; After the commercial vehicle dashcam is activated, the terminal sends a terminal registration message to the pre-set legitimate remote management platform based on the JT / T 808 protocol; The remote management platform receives and verifies the terminal registration message. After successful verification, it generates a registration response message and sends it to the terminal. The registration response message contains an authentication code. The terminal receives and parses the registration response message and extracts the authentication code as a cached valid authentication code. The remote protocol deep analysis and tracing module extracts the authentication code corresponding to the terminal authentication message contained in the JT / T 808 protocol, compares the valid authentication code with the authentication code, and if they do not match after a cumulative preset number of times, the current TCP connection is locked, and the corresponding source IP is marked as a "suspicious attack source" and recorded.

5. The method for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder as described in claim 1, characterized in that: The specific details of step S3 are as follows: S31: Define the operation traceability log data structure; The anti-tampering traceability log management module defines an operation traceability log data structure, which includes a basic identifier, operation source, business association, data credential, and anti-tampering verification field. S32: Implements the collection of operation traceability log fields, hash chain verification calculation, and independent storage; A binary random number is written into the secure storage area of ​​the vehicle's dashcam beforehand. When the system generates the first operation traceability log, the specific values ​​of each field in the operation traceability log data structure are extracted as the complete log content. The complete log content is concatenated with the binary random number and input into the SHA-256 encryption algorithm. The result is the anti-tampering verification field of the first operation traceability log, and the anti-tampering verification field is written into the corresponding field of the operation traceability log. When generating subsequent operation traceability logs, the anti-tampering verification field of the previous operation traceability log is obtained. The complete log content of the current operation traceability log is extracted and concatenated with the anti-tampering verification field. The SHA-256 encryption algorithm is then input, and the result is the anti-tampering verification field of the current operation traceability log. The anti-tampering verification field is then written into the corresponding field of the operation traceability log.

6. A system for preventing hacking and tracing the operation of a commercial vehicle driving recorder for implementing the method of any one of claims 1-5, characterized in that: The system includes a physical interface protection and auditing module, a remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module, and an anti-tampering tracing log management module. The physical interface protection and auditing module includes a USB bus security protection unit and a chassis intrusion detection unit; The remote protocol deep parsing and tracing module is used to bind the JT / T 808 protocol session with the remote end network information, parse the protocol messages and verify their integrity, and perform compliance checks on key parameters; The anti-tampering traceability log management module is used to define the operation traceability log data structure, construct a log anti-tampering mechanism through hash chain technology, and store the logs independently on a secure medium.

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