Safety protection method, equipment and system for train

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of railway safety, and provides a train safety protection method, device and system, and the method comprises the steps: obtaining train head wind pressure through an ATP system, obtaining train tail wind pressure through an IEOT device, and building the communication between the ATP and the IEOT through a train head radio station. When the train is departed, if the wind pressure at the head and the tail is consistent and communication and satellite positioning are normal, judging that the train is complete; if communication, wind pressure or positioning is abnormal during train operation, judging that the integrity is lost; and if the ATP and IEOT connection is not established, fails or cancelled, judging that the integrity is unknown, and taking corresponding protection measures according to the integrity state. The problem that an existing test system and an existing test method are not suitable for a heavy-load train group operation control system, and the safety protection requirement of the train cannot be guaranteed can be solved.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present disclosure belongs to the technical field of railway safety, and particularly relates to a safety protection method, device and system for trains. Background Art

[0002] The heavy-haul train group operation control system is a new type of train control system for the heavy-haul field. The train integrity inspection, monitoring and protection functions are important functions in the system and belong to safety-related functions, involving multiple aspects such as head-to-tail communication, satellite positioning, vehicle-to-ground communication, vehicle-to-vehicle communication, train and ground safety protection logics.

[0003] The invention patent with publication number CN110456776A relates to an ITCS train integrity indoor test system and test method. Since there are significant differences between the heavy-haul train group operation control system and the ITCS system in terms of system architecture, equipment composition and operation scenarios, and the functions and protection logics related to train integrity are different from system design to specific implementation logic.

[0004] The existing test systems and test methods are not applicable to the heavy-haul train group operation control system and cannot guarantee the safety protection requirements for train group operation. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To solve the above problems, the present disclosure provides a safety protection method, device and system for trains, which uses ATP and IEOT to obtain the air pressure and establish communication, matches the heavy-haul train system architecture and equipment composition, determines the train integrity by comprehensively considering the head and tail air pressures, communication and satellite positioning data, and takes different protection measures according to the integrity status and formation conditions, so as to adapt to the existing heavy-haul train group operation control system and ensure the safe operation of trains.

[0006] The following are the technical details of the present invention: A safety protection method for trains, characterized by comprising: Using the train automatic protection system ATP to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train, and using the end-of-train information wireless transmission device IEOT to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the end of the train; and establishing a communication connection between ATP and IEOT through the head radio. When the train departs, if the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal, then it is determined that the integrity status of the train is intact. During the train operation, if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal, then it is determined that the integrity status of the train is lost. If the ATP and IEOT do not establish a connection, or the connection establishment fails, or the ATP and IEOT are deregistered and disconnected, then the integrity status of the train is judged to be unknown; According to the integrity status of the train, corresponding train protection measures are implemented.

[0007] Furthermore, The implementation of corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train includes: Before train formation: If the integrity status of the train changes from complete to unknown, the train keeps the end-of-train position unchanged and calculates the protected car length; if it changes from complete to lost, the train brakes to a stop. If the integrity status of the train immediately preceding train A changes from complete to unknown, the end point of the movement authority of train A does not continue to extend with the operation of the immediately preceding train; if it changes from complete to lost, train A is controlled to stop.

[0008] Furthermore, The implementation of corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train includes: After train formation: If train A does not receive the integrity status of the train immediately preceding it, train A calculates the movement authority using the information of the train immediately preceding it received at the previous moment. If the integrity status of the train immediately preceding train A changes from complete to unknown, the end point of the movement authority of train A does not continue to extend with the operation of the preceding train; if it changes from complete to lost, train A is decoupled from the train immediately preceding it, and train A is controlled to brake to a stop.

[0009] Furthermore, The ATP sends the integrity status information to the Group Control Center (GCC) through vehicle-ground communication, and the GCC calculates the movement authority and sends it to the ATP.

[0010] Furthermore, The communication anomaly between the ATP and the IEOT includes: The ATP does not receive the end-of-train data information sent by the IEOT for consecutive n seconds, where n is the duration threshold.

[0011] Furthermore, The abnormal air pressure at the head and tail of the train includes: The air pressure at the head of the train on the ATP side is less than the threshold and the duration is greater than the threshold, or the air pressure at the end of the train obtained by the IEOT consecutively for multiple times is less than the threshold.

[0012] Furthermore, The abnormal satellite positioning data of the train includes: When both the head and tail satellites of the train are valid, if the difference between the train length calculated by ATP based on satellite positioning and the actual length is greater than the threshold for three consecutive times, or the difference between the train speed calculated by IEOT based on satellite positioning and the actual speed is greater than the threshold for three consecutive times.

[0013] A safety protection device for a train, which is used to execute the above method, and is characterized by including: The train automatic protection system ATP, which is used to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train; The end-of-train information wireless transmission device IEOT, which is used to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the end of the train; The head radio station, which is used to establish a communication connection between ATP and IEOT; The processing unit is used to, when the train departs, if the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal, then determine that the integrity status of the train is intact; During the running of the train, if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal, then determine that the integrity status of the train is lost; The processing unit is also used to, if the connection between ATP and IEOT is not established, or the connection establishment fails, or ATP and IEOT cancel the number and disconnect the connection, then determine that the integrity status of the train is unknown; The control unit is used to execute corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train.

[0014] Furthermore, The establishment of a communication connection between ATP and IEOT includes: ATP and the head radio station are connected through an Ethernet interface, and the head radio station is connected to the IEOT device interface through 400M communication to realize the communication connection between ATP and IEOT; ATP sends connection establishment and number cancellation information to IEOT; IEOT sends command responses, abnormal alarms, and satellite positioning data information to ATP.

[0015] A train message information transmission system, which is characterized by including: The data acquisition module is used to use the train automatic protection system ATP to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train, use the end-of-train information wireless transmission device IEOT to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the end of the train; and establish a communication connection between ATP and IEOT through the head radio station; The integrity status judgment module is used to, when the train departs, if the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal, then determine that the integrity status of the train is intact; During the train operation, if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressure at the head and tail of the train is abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal, then it is determined that the integrity status of the train is lost; If ATP and IEOT do not establish a connection, or the connection fails, or ATP is disconnected from IEOT, then it is determined that the integrity status of the train is unknown; A control module is used to execute corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the present disclosure has the following advantages: The present invention proposes a train safety protection method for a heavy-haul train group operation control system; it uses ATP and IEOT to obtain air pressure and establish communication, which matches the heavy-haul train system architecture and equipment composition, comprehensively determines the train integrity based on the air pressure at the head and tail, communication, and satellite positioning data, and takes different protection measures according to the integrity status and formation situation to ensure the safe operation of the train; Among them, the train operation is a complex process involving the collaborative work of multiple systems. By comprehensively evaluating the integrity based on the air pressure at the head and tail of the train, the communication status between ATP and IEOT, and the satellite positioning data, the actual state of the train can be fully reflected; the air pressure reflects the key state of the train braking system, the communication ensures the real-time interaction of information at the head and tail of the train, and the satellite positioning provides important operation data such as the train position and speed. The comprehensive judgment of multiple aspects of information avoids the one-sidedness caused by judging based on a single factor and more accurately grasps the overall situation of the train.

[0017] Other features and advantages of the present disclosure will be described in the subsequent specification, and part of them will become obvious from the specification, or will be understood by implementing the present disclosure. The objectives and other advantages of the present disclosure can be achieved and obtained through the structures pointed out in the specification, claims, and drawings. Brief Description of the Drawings

[0018] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present disclosure or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments or the prior art. Obviously, the following drawings are some embodiments of the present disclosure. For those of ordinary skill in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative efforts.

[0019] Figure 1 Shows a schematic diagram of the method of the present invention; Figure 2 Shows a schematic diagram of the integrity detection and monitoring function architecture of the train of the present invention; Figure 3 Shows a schematic diagram of the integrity check process of the present invention; Figure 4 Shows the schematic diagram of the integrity monitoring process of the present invention; Figure 5 Shows the schematic diagram of the integrity protection process of a single vehicle of the present invention; Figure 6 Shows the schematic diagram of the integrity protection process of multiple vehicles before formation of the present invention; Figure 7 Shows the schematic diagram of the integrity protection process of multiple vehicles after formation of the present invention. Detailed implementation manners

[0020] To make the objectives, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present disclosure clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present disclosure will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present disclosure. Apparently, the described embodiments are some but not all of the embodiments of the present disclosure. All other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art based on the embodiments of the present disclosure without creative efforts shall fall within the scope of protection of the present disclosure.

[0021] The system composition of the heavy-haul train group operation control system includes: ground equipment and on-vehicle equipment 1) Among them, the ground equipment includes: Central equipment: dispatching and command center (CTC), group control center (GCC), temporary speed limit server (TSRS), core network equipment; Station equipment: dispatching and command station machine (CTC), computer interlocking (CBI), vehicle-ground communication base station equipment; Trackside equipment: track occupancy inspection equipment, balise.

[0022] 2) Among them, the on-vehicle equipment includes: Train automatic protection equipment (ATP), train automatic driving equipment (ATO), balise transmission module (BTM), locomotive communication equipment, integrated communication platform (including vehicle-ground communication radio, vehicle-vehicle communication radio), leading train communication radio, integrated end-of-train equipment (IEOT), etc.

[0023] 3) System features: The above heavy-haul train group operation control system is applicable to single-track and double-track freight lines with a speed not exceeding 80 km / h.

[0024] Within the control range of the GCC, LTE communication is adopted, the movement authority is generated by the GCC, and the formation and decomposition of trains are controlled. Outside the control range of the GCC, 400M autonomous vehicle-vehicle communication is adopted between trains to ensure the normal operation of the group. An end-of-train device is mounted at the end of the train, and real-time communication between the head and the tail ensures the integrity of the train. The system supports flexible setting of temporary speed limits on the main line and at the station siding with a precision of meters.

[0025] The heavy-haul train group operation control system controls the train operation according to the moving block before train formation and controls the train operation in the virtual formation mode after train formation. Under both control modes, the integrity check, monitoring and protection functions of the train directly affect the safe operation of the system.

[0026] In the heavy-haul train group operation control system, the ATP and IEOT jointly complete the train integrity check and monitoring functions from the perspective of a single vehicle, and display them in real time on the DMI (Driver-Machine Interface) interface of the on-vehicle equipment, so as to facilitate the driver to know the integrity status of the current train.

[0027] At the same time, ATP and GCC will overall consider information such as the change of the integrity status of each train in the system, the running order of the trains, and the end point of the movement authority, and impose corresponding safety protection measures in the case of integrity function failures.

[0028] In order to solve the problem that the existing test systems and test methods are not applicable to the heavy-haul train group operation control system and cannot guarantee the safety protection requirements of the train, the present invention proposes a train safety protection method, device and system. The technical solutions are as follows: II. Train safety protection method: In the heavy-haul train group operation control system, there are two train tracking operation states: Before formation, the GCC calculates the movement authority information of each train. The movement authority of the leading train is calculated by the GCC according to the opening situation of the signal machine ahead and the occupied / idle situation of the track occupancy inspection equipment. The movement authority of the following trains is jointly calculated by the GCC according to the position, length and integrity status information of its immediate preceding train. After formation, the calculation method of the movement authority of the leading train remains unchanged, and the movement authority of the following trains is changed to be independently calculated by the ATP according to the position, length, integrity status and braking distance information of its immediate preceding train.

[0029] In the above two tracking operation states, the safe tracking operation of the train depends on the accuracy of the integrity status calculation of its immediate preceding train.

[0030] 1) The integrity detection and monitoring function architecture of the train, such as Figure 2 shown: In the heavy-haul train group operation control system, the ATP, IEOT, GCC, leading train radio, vehicle-to-vehicle communication, and vehicle-to-ground communication jointly complete the train integrity check and monitoring functions, involving the following interfaces: The ATP and the locomotive body interface collect the train pipe air pressure; ATP communicates with the leading radio station through an Ethernet interface, and then the leading radio station communicates with the IEOT device through 400M communication to achieve ATP-IEOT communication. ATP sends information such as link establishment and number cancellation to IEOT; IEOT sends information such as command response, exception alarm, and satellite positioning data to ATP. ATP receives satellite positioning information through a satellite receiving module. ATP sends information such as integrity status to GCC through vehicle-ground communication and receives information such as movement authority. ATP sends information such as integrity status to adjacent trains through train-to-train communication and receives train-to-train communication information from adjacent ATPs. IEOT interfaces with the train body air duct to collect the train pipe air pressure. IEOT receives satellite positioning information through a satellite receiving module.

[0031] Based on the integrity function architecture of the train, the safety protection technology proposed by the present invention is as Figure 1 shown below, specifically as follows: 1) Integrity check of the train: (a) Power on the on-vehicle ATP device and the end-of-train IEOT device. (b) ATP inputs train data and formation information. (c) ATP inputs the end-of-train ID. ATP establishes a connection with IEOT through the leading radio station, and the DMI displays the end-of-train air pressure value. (d) After confirming that the head and tail air pressures are consistent, confirm the train integrity, and the DMI displays that the train integrity changes from "unknown" to "complete".

[0032] (e) The train departs from the originating station and runs to the terminal station and stops. During the running process, the train integrity status is monitored in real time. (f) After the train stops, ATP selects to cancel the number, ATP disconnects from IEOT, and the DMI displays that the train integrity changes from "complete" to "unknown".

[0033] 2) Integrity monitoring of the train: (a) If ATP does not receive the end-of-train data information sent by IEOT for 180 s (configurable) continuously, the train integrity changes from "complete" to "lost".

[0034] (b) If the leading air pressure on the ATP side is less than 280 Kpa (configurable) and the duration is greater than 10 min (configurable), the train integrity changes from "complete" to "lost".

[0035] (c) If the end-of-train air pressure on the IEOT side is less than 280 Kpa (configurable) and occurs three times continuously, the train integrity changes from "complete" to "lost".

[0036] (d)When both the head and tail satellites are valid, if the difference between the train length calculated by ATP based on satellite positioning and the actual train length is greater than 100 m (configurable) and this occurs three times consecutively, the train integrity changes from "intact" to "lost".

[0037] (e)When both the head and tail satellites are valid, if the difference between the train speed calculated by IEOT based on satellite positioning and the actual train speed is greater than 10 km / h (configurable) and this occurs three times consecutively, the train integrity changes from "intact" to "lost".

[0038] 3) Train safety protection: (a)Before formation: The train integrity changes from "intact" to "unknown", the train keeps the end-of-train position unchanged, and the protected car length is calculated.

[0039] When the train integrity changes from "intact" to "lost", the train brakes to a stop.

[0040] When the integrity of the train immediately in front changes from "intact" to "unknown", the end point of the movement authority of the following train does not continue to extend as the train in front moves.

[0041] When the integrity of the train immediately in front changes from "intact" to "lost", GCC sends a special control message to the following train to control the train to stop.

[0042] (b)After formation: If the integrity status of the train immediately in front is not received, the following train calculates the movement authority using the information of the train immediately in front received at the previous moment.

[0043] When the integrity of the train immediately in front changes from "intact" to "unknown", the end point of the movement authority of the following train does not continue to extend as the train in front moves.

[0044] When the integrity of the train immediately in front changes from "intact" to "lost", the following train decouples from the train immediately in front and brakes to a stop.

[0045] Based on the method of the present invention, the embodiments of the present disclosure further provide a device for executing the above method, including: Automatic Train Protection System ATP, used to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train; End-of-train Information Wireless Transmission Equipment IEOT, used to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the end of the train; Head radio station, used to establish a communication connection between ATP and IEOT; The processing unit is used to, when the train departs, determine that the integrity status of the train is intact if the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal; during the train operation, determine that the integrity status of the train is lost if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal; the processing unit is also used to determine that the integrity status of the train is unknown if ATP and IEOT have not established a connection, or the connection establishment fails, or ATP is disconnected from IEOT; The control unit is used to perform corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train.

[0046] Based on the method of the present invention, the embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a system corresponding to the above method, including: The data acquisition module is used to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train by using the train automatic protection system ATP, and obtain the train pipe air pressure at the tail of the train by using the end-of-train information wireless transmission device IEOT; and establish a communication connection between ATP and IEOT through the head radio; The integrity status judgment module is used to, when the train departs, determine that the integrity status of the train is intact if the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal; during the train operation, determine that the integrity status of the train is lost if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal; determine that the integrity status of the train is unknown if ATP and IEOT have not established a connection, or the connection establishment fails, or ATP is disconnected from IEOT; The control module is used to perform corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train.

[0047] Embodiment: This embodiment is used to test the system formed based on the above train safety protection method, including: 1. Step 1, establish a scenario model Purpose: Describing the functional scenario in the form of a flowchart can more intuitively display the processing logic and state jumps inside and between products during system operation, effectively improving the design efficiency of test cases and shortening the test cycle.

[0048] Specific process: 1) Train integrity check process.

[0049] The integrity check process starts with the power-on of ATP and IEOT devices and the train integrity status being "unknown", and ends with the train running to the final station and selecting "cancellation" and the integrity status returning to "unknown". The process is as Figure 3 shown.

[0050] 2) Train integrity monitoring process.

[0051] The integrity monitoring process starts with the passing of the train integrity test and the train integrity status being "intact", and continuously monitors. When the integrity status changes, the integrity monitoring process exits as the end point. The process is as Figure 4 shown.

[0052] 3) Single - vehicle integrity protection process.

[0053] The single - vehicle integrity protection process starts with the train integrity status being "intact", continuously checks the integrity status. When the integrity status remains "intact" or becomes "unknown", it does not affect the train operation. When the integrity status becomes "lost", braking is applied to stop and protect. The process is as Figure 5 shown.

[0054] 4) Multi - vehicle integrity protection process.

[0055] The multi - vehicle integrity protection process is divided into two cases: before formation and after formation. Both start with the integrity status of the immediately preceding train being "intact", continuously check the integrity status of the immediately preceding train. When the integrity status of the immediately preceding train remains "intact" or becomes "unknown", the corresponding protection function is enabled but does not affect the train formation operation. When the integrity status of the immediately preceding train becomes "lost", the following train applies braking to stop and protect, and uncouples. The process is as Figure 6 and Figure 7 shown.

[0056] 2. Step 2. Design test cases Using the scenario model established in the above text, analyze each flowchart path one by one, and screen and form test cases based on the smallest executable path unit (after performing specified operations on the devices in the system, the test results can be observed by the observation terminal), which can effectively improve the test coverage. The specific test cases are as follows: 1) Integrity check scenario Case 1. Establishing a link between the head and the tail Operation steps: Select the end - of - train information by the DMI.

[0057] Input the end - of - train ID number and confirm.

[0058] Expected results: The DMI displays the end - of - train information input interface.

[0059] The ATP establishes a connection with the IEOT, and the DMI prompts the start of the integrity test.

[0060] Case 2. Failure to establish a link between the head and the tail Operation steps: After setting the failure of the end-of-train communication radio, the DMI selects the end-of-train information.

[0061] Enter the end-of-train ID number and confirm.

[0062] Expected result: The DMI displays the end-of-train information input interface.

[0063] After the ATP continuously calls the IEOT device for 180S, it prompts that the integrity test fails. The DMI integrity status interface shows "unknown".

[0064] Case 3. Integrity check passed Operation steps: After starting the integrity test, the head and tail air pressures are set to be the same by the end-of-train air pressure detection bench and the on-vehicle interface platform, and the DMI confirms that the head and tail air pressures are the same.

[0065] Expected result: The DMI prompts that the integrity test is successful, and the DMI integrity status interface shows "complete".

[0066] Case 4. Integrity check not passed Operation steps: Start the integrity test. The head and tail air pressures are set to be different by the end-of-train air pressure detection bench and the on-vehicle interface platform, and the DMI confirms that the head and tail air pressures are different.

[0067] Expected result: The DMI prompts that the integrity test fails, and the DMI integrity status interface shows "unknown".

[0068] Case 5. Train cancellation Operation steps: The DMI integrity status interface shows "complete". The DMI selects the end-of-train information.

[0069] Select "Cancellation" and confirm.

[0070] Expected result: The DMI displays the end-of-train information input interface.

[0071] The ATP disconnects from the IEOT, and the DMI integrity status interface shows "unknown".

[0072] 2) Integrity monitoring scenario Case 6. Head and tail communication timeout Operation steps: The train is running normally. The DMI integrity status interface shows "complete". Turn off the head radio.

[0073] Expected result: Within 180 seconds, the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete", and in the ATP recording unit, check that the train calculates the protected train length based on the position of the end of the train before the communication interruption. After 180 seconds, the DMI integrity status interface shows "Lost", and the train brakes to a stop.

[0074] Case 7. Continuous low air pressure at the head of the train Operation steps: When the train is running normally and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete", set the air pressure at the head of the train to be less than 280 Kpa through the on-vehicle interface platform.

[0075] Expected result: Within 10 minutes, the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete", and in the ATP recording unit, check that the train calculates the protected train length based on the position of the end of the train before the communication interruption. After 10 minutes, the DMI integrity status interface shows "Lost", and the train brakes to a stop.

[0076] Case 8. Low air pressure at the end of the train Operation steps: When the train is running normally and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete", set the air pressure at the end of the train to be less than 280 Kpa through the end-of-train air pressure detection bench.

[0077] Expected result: When the ATP continuously receives the air pressure at the end of the train less than 280 Kpa three times, the DMI integrity status interface shows "Lost", and the train brakes to a stop.

[0078] Case 9. Invalid satellite positioning at the head of the train Operation steps: When the train is running normally and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete", set the ATP satellite positioning to be invalid through satellite simulation.

[0079] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete" and does not affect the train operation.

[0080] Case 10. Invalid satellite positioning at the end of the train Operation steps: When the train is running normally and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete", set the satellite positioning at the end of the train to be invalid through satellite simulation.

[0081] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete" and does not affect the train operation.

[0082] Case 11. Different satellite speeds at the head and the end Operation steps: The train is running normally, and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete". Set the difference between the end-of-train satellite positioning speed and the ATP satellite positioning speed to be greater than 10 km / h through the train model.

[0083] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface shows "Lost", and the train brakes to a stop.

[0084] Case 12. The actual train length is inconsistent with the satellite positioning train length Operation steps: The train is running normally, and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete". Set the difference between the train length calculated from the end-of-train satellite positioning position and the ATP satellite positioning position through the train model and the train length input through the DMI to be greater than 100 m.

[0085] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface shows "Lost", and the train brakes to a stop.

[0086] 3) Single train integrity protection scenario Case 13. The train integrity changes to "Unknown" Operation steps: The train is running normally, and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete". After stopping, perform the "cancellation" operation.

[0087] Control the train to continue running.

[0088] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface shows "Unknown".

[0089] Check the protected train length calculated by the train based on the end-of-train position before communication interruption in the ATP recording unit.

[0090] Case 14. The train integrity changes to "Lost" Operation steps: The train is running normally, and the DMI integrity status interface shows "Complete". Set the low end-of-train air pressure through the end-of-train air pressure detection bench.

[0091] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface shows "Lost", and the train brakes to a stop.

[0092] 4) Multi-train integrity protection Case 15. Before formation, the communication between the immediately preceding train and the GCC is interrupted Operation steps: Two trains are running in succession (not formed). The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "Complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the trailing train shows "Complete". Set the communication failure between the leading train and the GCC.

[0093] Expected result: The following train maintains the previous train's communication interruption, the end point of the moving authority of the following train no longer changes, and the end point position of the moving authority of the following train is correct when viewed in the ATP recording unit.

[0094] Case 16. Before formation, the leading train in front is "complete" Operation steps: The two trains are running in a trailing manner (not formed). The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the following train shows "complete".

[0095] Expected result: The following train updates the moving authority in real time according to the running position of the leading train, and the end point position of the moving authority of the following train is correct when viewed in the ATP recording unit.

[0096] Case 17. Before formation, the leading train in front changes from "complete" to "unknown" Operation steps: The two trains are running in a trailing manner (not formed). The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the following train shows "complete". The leading train stops and performs the "cancellation" operation.

[0097] Expected result: The following train maintains the previous train's communication interruption, the end point of the moving authority of the following train no longer changes, and the end point position of the moving authority of the following train is correct when viewed in the ATP recording unit.

[0098] Case 18. Before formation, the leading train in front changes from "complete" to "lost" Operation steps: The two trains are running in a trailing manner (not formed). The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the following train shows "complete". Set the tail wind pressure of the leading train to be less than 280 Kpa through the tail wind pressure detection bench.

[0099] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "lost", outputs braking and stops. The following train brakes and stops, and deletes the moving authority after stopping.

[0100] Case 19. After formation, the communication between trains is interrupted Operation steps: The two trains are running in formation. The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the following train shows "complete". Set the train-to-train communication failure.

[0101] Expected result: The following train maintains the previous train's communication interruption, the end point of the moving authority of the following train no longer changes, and the end point position of the moving authority of the following train is correct when viewed in the ATP recording unit.

[0102] Case 20. After formation, the leading train in front is "complete" Operation steps: Two trains operate in formation. The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the trailing train shows "complete".

[0103] Expected result: The trailing train updates the movement authority in real time according to the running position of the leading train, and the correct end position of the trailing train's movement authority can be viewed in the ATP recording unit.

[0104] Case 21. After formation, the leading train in front changes from "complete" to "unknown" Operation steps: Two trains operate in formation. The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the trailing train shows "complete". The leading train stops and performs the "cancellation" operation.

[0105] Expected result: The trailing train maintains the end position of the movement authority before the communication interruption of the leading train without change, and the correct end position of the trailing train's movement authority can be viewed in the ATP recording unit.

[0106] Case 22. After formation, the leading train in front changes from "complete" to "lost" Operation steps: Two trains operate in formation. The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "complete", and the DMI integrity status interface of the trailing train shows "complete". Set the trailing air pressure of the leading train to less than 280 Kpa through the trailing air pressure detection bench.

[0107] Expected result: The DMI integrity status interface of the leading train shows "lost", and it outputs braking to stop. The leading and trailing trains are uncoupled, the trailing train brakes to stop, and the movement authority is deleted after stopping.

[0108] 3. Step Three. Build a test environment 1) Build a test environment According to the overall system architecture and integrity function architecture, a system test environment is built in a semi-physical simulation manner. For the devices directly affecting the test results, physical devices are introduced into the test environment, and for the remaining accompanying test devices, simulation devices are introduced into the test environment. This solution effectively reduces the test cost while ensuring the test reliability.

[0109] In terms of introducing trailing devices, the test environment realizes the switchable access of real trailing devices and simulation trailing devices. For scenario tests, real trailing devices can be used to ensure the test authenticity, and for accurate configuration parameter tests, simulation trailing devices can be used to ensure the test accuracy.

[0110] The specific composition of the test environment disclosed in this application is as follows: a. Physical equipment: The equipment components of the heavy-haul train group operation control system belong to the objects to be tested for the train integrity function. Therefore, physical equipment (running on a real hardware platform) is built. The equipment list is as follows:

[0111] b. Test equipment simulation: The equipment components of the heavy-haul train group operation control system belong to the accompanying test objects for the train integrity function. Therefore, simulation equipment (running on a PC, with the same functional logic as the real equipment) is built. The simulation equipment is as follows:

[0112] c. Test environment simulation Provide a human-machine interface and calculate the simulation operation data required by each device in the system operation in real time.

[0113]

[0114] d. Interface equipment The interface equipment that provides the data content calculated by the test environment simulation to the equipment components of the heavy-haul train group operation control system.

[0115]

[0116] e. Communication network construction: Build a communication network to achieve communication among physical equipment, test simulation equipment, test environment simulation, and interface simulation equipment.

[0117]

[0118] 2) Selection of test data To make the test environment closer to the real operation scenario, select on-site train control data and satellite data in a certain place to build the test environment and improve the test authenticity.

[0119] 4. Step 4. System testing System testing is black-box testing, which is divided into scenario testing and script testing. While ensuring test efficiency, it effectively improves the test accuracy.

[0120] For scenario testing, in the system test environment, sequentially execute the test cases designed in Step 3, use the ATP equipment (including the recording unit) as the final observation terminal, record the test results, and judge the passing situation of the test cases.

[0121] For the accurate configuration values of the ATP part, script testing is carried out. Using simulation IEOT, specified data is sent to ATP in accordance with the script method, and equivalence class and boundary value testing techniques are used to verify the correctness of the configuration values. The script testing content includes the following configuration parameters:

[0122] In summary, the present invention studies the system requirements and operation scenarios of the heavy-haul train group operation control system, constructs a flowchart model for train integrity inspection, monitoring and protection functions, extracts the key and necessary test conditions for the above functions from the perspective of system operation, and adopts test techniques such as graph model analysis, equivalence class analysis, boundary value analysis, black box scenario testing, and black box script testing to overall design specific test cases and test methods, effectively improving the test coverage rate.

[0123] At the same time, the present invention designs a test system according to the system architecture and integrity function architecture, effectively improving the authenticity of the test, enhancing the comprehensiveness and reliability of the test, and ensuring the high-quality completion of the test. This test plan has clear ideas, concise content, is easy to understand, and has strong operability.

[0124] Although the present disclosure has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that: they can still modify the technical solutions recorded in the foregoing embodiments, or perform equivalent replacements for some of the technical features; and these modifications or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present disclosure.

Claims

1. A safety protection method for a train, characterized in that, Including: Utilize the train automatic protection system ATP to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train, and utilize the end-of-train information wireless transmission device IEOT to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the end of the train; and establish a communication connection between ATP and IEOT through the head-of-train radio. When the train departs, if the air pressures at the head and the end of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal, then determine that the integrity status of the train is intact. During the train operation, if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressures at the head and the end of the train are abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal, then determine that the integrity status of the train is lost. If the connection between ATP and IEOT is not established, or the connection establishment fails, or ATP and IEOT are unnumbered and disconnected, then determine that the integrity status of the train is unknown. Execute corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train.

2. The safety protection method for a train according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of executing corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train includes: Before train formation: If the integrity status of the train changes from intact to unknown, the train keeps the end-of-train position unchanged and calculates the protected car length; if it changes from intact to lost, the train brakes to a stop. If the integrity status of the train immediately preceding train A changes from intact to unknown, the end point of the movement authority of train A does not continue to extend as the preceding train runs; if it changes from intact to lost, control train A to stop.

3. The safety protection method for a train according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of executing corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train includes: After train formation: If train A does not receive the integrity status of the immediately preceding train, train A calculates the movement authority using the information of the immediately preceding train received at the previous moment. If the integrity status of the train immediately preceding train A changes from intact to unknown, the end point of the movement authority of train A does not continue to extend as the preceding train runs; if it changes from intact to lost, train A is uncoupled from its immediately preceding train, and train A is controlled to brake to a stop.

4. The safety protection method for a train according to claim 3, characterized in that, The ATP sends the integrity status information to the group control center GCC through vehicle-ground communication, and the GCC calculates the movement authority and sends it to the ATP.

5. The safety protection method for a train according to claim 1, characterized in that, The abnormal communication between ATP and IEOT includes: ATP does not receive the end-of-train data information sent by IEOT for consecutive n seconds, where n is a time threshold.

6. The safety protection method for a train according to claim 1, characterized in that, The abnormal air pressures at the head and the end of the train include: The air pressure at the head of the train on the ATP side is less than the threshold and the duration is greater than the threshold, or the air pressure at the end of the train obtained by IEOT is less than the threshold for consecutive multiple times.

7. The safety protection method for a train according to claim 1, characterized in that, The abnormal satellite positioning data of the train includes: When the satellites at the head and the end of the train are both valid, if the difference between the train length calculated by ATP based on satellite positioning three consecutive times and the actual length is greater than the threshold, or the difference between the train speed calculated by IEOT based on satellite positioning three consecutive times and the actual speed is greater than the threshold.

8. A safety protection device for a train, used to execute the method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Including: Train automatic protection system ATP, used to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train; End-of-train information wireless transmission device IEOT, used to obtain the train pipe air pressure at the end of the train; Head-of-train radio, used to establish a communication connection between ATP and IEOT; Processing unit, used to determine that the integrity status of the train is intact when the air pressures at the head and the end of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal when the train departs. During the train operation, if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressure at the head and tail of the train is abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal, then it is determined that the integrity status of the train is lost; The processing unit is further configured to determine that the integrity status of the train is unknown if the connection between ATP and IEOT is not established, or the connection establishment fails, or ATP and IEOT cancel the number and disconnect the connection; The control unit is configured to perform corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train.

9. The safety protection equipment of the train according to claim 8, characterized in that, Establishing a communication connection between ATP and IEOT includes: ATP communicates with the head radio through an Ethernet interface, and the head radio communicates with the IEOT device interface through 400M communication to achieve a communication connection between ATP and IEOT; ATP sends link establishment and number cancellation information to IEOT; IEOT sends command responses, abnormal alarms, and satellite positioning data information to ATP.

10. A message information transmission system of a train, characterized in that, Including: The data acquisition module is configured to use the train automatic protection system ATP to acquire the train pipe air pressure at the head of the train, and use the end-of-train information wireless transmission device IEOT to acquire the train pipe air pressure at the tail of the train; and establish a communication connection between ATP and IEOT through the head radio; The integrity status judgment module is configured to determine that the integrity status of the train is complete if the air pressures at the head and tail of the train are consistent, the communication between ATP and IEOT is normal, and the satellite positioning data of the train is normal when the train departs; During the train operation, if the communication between ATP and IEOT is abnormal, or the air pressure at the head and tail of the train is abnormal, or the satellite positioning data of the train is abnormal, then it is determined that the integrity status of the train is lost; If the connection between ATP and IEOT is not established, or the connection establishment fails, or ATP and IEOT are disconnected, then it is determined that the integrity status of the train is unknown; The control module is configured to perform corresponding train protection measures according to the integrity status of the train.

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