Vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification method and related device

Abstract

The embodiment of the invention discloses a vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification method and related device, and the method comprises the steps: firstly carrying out verification based on the freshness of a timestamp, and guaranteeing the freshness of the timestamp from the source; verifying the validity of the single signatures one by one, and rejecting the received invalid signatures; and finally, aggregated signature verification is carried out, the overall validity of all signatures can be verified through one-time bilinear pairing operation, and compared with a traditional method in which verification is carried out one by one and multiple times of bilinear pairing operation needs to be carried out, the calculation complexity can be reduced. In a high-concurrency scene, the processing delay is shortened from a second level to a hundreds of milliseconds level, the problem of low dynamic message authentication efficiency of the Internet of Things, especially the Internet of Vehicles, can be effectively solved, and the real-time requirement is met. In addition, the intelligent contract of the block chain and the distributed digital identity verification technology are introduced, hostile attacks of Internet of Things viruses or nodes can be prevented, and it is particularly important to improve privacy protection and prevent privacy disclosure.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle network security communication technology, and in particular to a vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification method and related devices. Background Art

[0002] With the development of the Internet of Things (IoT), and particularly the rapid adoption of intelligent connected vehicle (ICV) technology, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) has become a core pillar of intelligent transportation systems. Through real-time interaction between vehicles, vehicles and roadside units (ROSs), vehicles and pedestrians, and vehicles and the cloud, V2X enables traffic information sharing, collaborative decision-making, and safety warnings. However, the open, dynamic, and real-time nature of V2X communications presents significant security challenges. Vehicle nodes must rapidly exchange critical information such as location, speed, and braking status at high speeds. Any tampering, forgery, or delay of these messages could potentially trigger a chain reaction of traffic accidents (such as pileups and running red lights). Furthermore, the anonymity and mobility of vehicle nodes require that communications balance privacy protection with identity traceability to prevent illegal tracking of user trajectories or the persistent misuse of malicious nodes by impersonating legitimate nodes.

[0003] V2X involves multiple vehicles, each of which broadcasts its signature to the roadside unit (RSU). Traditional signature verification methods rely on the RSU to verify vehicle signatures one by one. For n signatures, this requires n bilinear pairing operations, resulting in low efficiency. Therefore, improving signature verification efficiency to meet the real-time requirements of the Internet of Things (IoT), especially vehicle-to-vehicle networks, prevent malicious attacks from IoT viruses, and enhance privacy protection and prevent privacy leaks is crucial. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The embodiments of the present application provide a method and related devices for efficient aggregation and anonymous verification of a vehicle ad hoc network, which are conducive to improving verification efficiency.

[0005] A first aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a method for efficient aggregation and anonymous verification of a vehicle ad hoc network, which is applied to a roadside unit. The method includes: receiving a signature tuple, a pseudonym, and a timestamp broadcast by a vehicle node, wherein the signature tuple includes a plurality of signatures, each signature including a pair of a temporary public key and a signature component; When the timestamp is confirmed to be valid, for each signature, calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, calculating a first element based on the signature component and the generator, and calculating a second element based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component, and the generator; When the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, confirming that the signature is valid and obtaining a valid signature set; Accumulating the temporary public keys in the valid signature set according to point addition under the module to obtain an aggregate temporary public key, and summing the signature components in the valid signature set according to scalar addition under the module to obtain an aggregate signature component, the aggregate temporary public key and the aggregate signature component forming an aggregate signature; The overall validity of the aggregate signature is verified according to a verification equation, the aggregate signature, and the aggregate identifier of the aggregate signature.

[0006] It can be seen that the efficient aggregated anonymous verification method for vehicle self-organizing networks provided by the embodiment of the present application first performs verification based on the freshness of the timestamp, ensuring the freshness of the timestamp from the source, and only when the timestamp is confirmed to be valid, the validity of each individual signature is further verified one by one; in the single signature validity verification, a new second hash value is calculated based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed and the roadside unit public key, and the first element is calculated based on the signature component and the generator, and the second element is calculated based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component and the generator. When the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, the signature is confirmed to be valid, so that the invalid signature received can be eliminated, preparing for the next step of aggregate signature verification; in the aggregate signature verification stage, by aggregating the valid signatures and then using the verification equation for verification, the overall validity of all signatures can be verified through one bilinear pairing operation. Compared with the one-by-one verification in the traditional method, multiple bilinear pairing operations are required, which can reduce the computational complexity. In high-concurrency scenarios, processing delays are shortened from seconds to hundreds of milliseconds, effectively solving the problem of low efficiency in authentication of dynamic messages in the Internet of Vehicles and meeting real-time requirements.

[0007] Optionally, each signature further includes a globally unique incremental serial number. Before calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, the method further includes: Determining the latest received ascending sequence number corresponding to the currently received ascending sequence number according to the pseudonym corresponding to the currently received ascending sequence number; If the currently received incrementing sequence number is less than or equal to the latest received incrementing sequence number, the signature is determined to be a replay attack, the signature is rejected, and a warning is sent to the vehicle node corresponding to the signature; If the currently received incrementing sequence number is greater than the latest received incrementing sequence number, the currently received incrementing sequence number is updated to the latest received incrementing sequence number, and the step of calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key is executed.

[0008] As can be seen, in this embodiment of the application, before validating each signature, a uniqueness check is first performed based on the serial number corresponding to each signature to prevent replay attacks. Furthermore, screening is performed before aggregate signature verification, which helps reduce computational complexity and thus improves verification efficiency. This also prevents chain reactions caused by forged critical messages such as braking and steering, significantly improving the security of vehicle-to-vehicle communications.

[0009] Optionally, the method further includes: If the overall validity of the aggregate signature is invalid, extracting the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature; Locally aggregating the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature to locate abnormal signatures; If the number of abnormal signatures is less than or equal to a preset threshold, requesting the vehicle node corresponding to the abnormal signature to regenerate and send a new signature; If the number of abnormal signatures is greater than a preset threshold, all signatures in the aggregate signature will be marked as an abnormal aggregation group and stored in the local cache. At the same time, the hash value, failure timestamp and associated pseudonym set of the abnormal aggregation group will be uploaded to the chain for evidence through the smart contract interface of the blockchain node, and binary positioning attack detection will be triggered.

[0010] It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present application, when the overall validity of the aggregate signature is invalid, the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature are extracted for local aggregation to locate the abnormal signature, and then classified and processed according to the number of abnormal signatures. If it is less than the threshold, the vehicle node corresponding to the abnormal signature is requested to regenerate and send a new signature, which can eliminate the misjudgment of aggregate signature failure caused by network delay or temporary calculation error; if it is greater than the threshold, all signatures in the aggregate signature are marked as abnormal aggregation groups and stored in the local cache. At the same time, the hash value, failure timestamp and associated pseudonym set of the abnormal aggregation group are uploaded to the chain for evidence through the smart contract interface of the blockchain node, and binary positioning attack detection is triggered; this classification processing mechanism can optimize the signature verification process, thereby improving verification efficiency.

[0011] Optionally, triggering binary positioning attack detection includes: Obtain at least one normal historical aggregate signature from the blockchain node; Calculating a temporary public key difference and a signature component difference between the abnormal aggregated group and at least one normal historical aggregated signature; If the temporary public key difference and the signature component difference do not satisfy the linear relationship of the elliptic curve, it is determined that an abnormal temporary public key and / or an abnormal signature component exists in the abnormal aggregation group; Determine, based on a dichotomy method, an abnormal signature corresponding to the abnormal temporary public key and / or the abnormal signature component; The malicious vehicle node is located according to the abnormal signature, and the pseudonym and abnormal signature features of the malicious vehicle node are recorded.

[0012] It can be seen that the embodiment of the present application provides a method for binary positioning attack detection, which determines whether there are abnormal temporary public keys and / or abnormal signature components by judging whether the temporary public key differences and signature component differences between the abnormal aggregation group and the normal historical aggregation signature satisfy the linear relationship of the elliptic curve, and then locates the malicious vehicle nodes layer by layer through the binary method, which is conducive to solving the problem that traditional solutions cannot locate the specific attack source or mistakenly reject normal nodes, and improves the accuracy of malicious node handling.

[0013] Optionally, the method further includes: Querying the registration information of the malicious vehicle node based on the stored evidence of the blockchain node and the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node; Verify, based on the registration information, whether the binding relationship between the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node and the identity information of the vehicle-mounted terminal hardware of the malicious vehicle node has been tampered with; If the binding relationship is tampered with, the abnormal signature is determined to be a pseudonym forgery attack; If the binding relationship has not been tampered with, it is determined that the malicious vehicle node is a real malicious node.

[0014] It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present application, the registration information of the malicious vehicle node is queried in the evidence of the blockchain node using the pseudonym as the index, and then it is further determined whether the binding relationship between the malicious vehicle node and the identity information of the vehicle terminal hardware has been tampered with to locate the specific cause of the failure.

[0015] Optionally, the method further includes: triggering an identity revocation operation of the blockchain node through the smart contract interface, so that the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node is written into the tamper-proof log of the blockchain node; A revocation notification message is broadcast to all vehicle nodes in the area, where the revocation notification message carries the pseudonym and revocation timestamp of the malicious vehicle node, so that after receiving the revocation notification message, all vehicle nodes in the area update the local trusted vehicle node list according to the pseudonym and revocation timestamp of the malicious vehicle node and refuse to communicate with the malicious vehicle node.

[0016] It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present application, if the malicious vehicle node is a real malicious node, it will not only be written into the blockchain node to prevent tampering, but also broadcast to other vehicle nodes, so that other vehicle nodes update their own local trusted vehicle node lists, thereby forming a global blacklist, realizing cross-regional identity tracing and immediate revocation of malicious nodes, thereby preventing malicious nodes from disguising themselves as normal nodes to do evil for a long time, making up for the defect of regional isolation failure of traditional solutions, and enhancing the reliability of identity management of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0017] Optionally, the second hash value is calculated according to a second hash function, and the second hash function is used to bind the message to be signed, the roadside unit public key and the temporary public key; The fourth hash value is calculated based on a fourth hash function, the fourth hash function is used to bind a system master public key, the temporary public key, and the second hash value, the system master public key is generated based on the master key fragments of the key generation center and the generators; The fifth hash value is calculated according to a fifth hash function, and the fifth hash function is used to bind the temporary private key corresponding to the temporary public key, the certificate parameters issued by the key generation center, the message to be signed, the first hash value, and the second hash value; The first hash value is calculated according to a first hash function, and the first hash function is used to generate the dynamic pseudonym; The partial private key is generated based on the vehicle random number, the master key fragment of the key generation center and the first hash value, and the vehicle random number is generated by the vehicle node based on a random number generator.

[0018] A second aspect of the present application provides a vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification device, which is applied to a roadside unit. The device includes: a communication unit, configured to receive a signature tuple, a pseudonym, and a timestamp broadcast by a vehicle node, wherein the signature tuple includes a plurality of signatures, each signature including a pair of a temporary public key and a signature component; a processing unit, configured to, when confirming that the timestamp is valid, calculate, for each signature, a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, calculate a first element based on the signature component and a generator, and calculate a second element based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component, and the generator; The processing unit is further configured to, when the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, confirm that the signature is valid and obtain a valid signature set; The processing unit is further configured to accumulate the temporary public keys in the valid signature set according to point addition under the module to obtain an aggregate temporary public key, and sum the signature components in the valid signature set according to scalar addition under the module to obtain an aggregate signature component, wherein the aggregate temporary public key and the aggregate signature component constitute an aggregate signature; The processing unit is further configured to verify the overall validity of the aggregate signature according to a verification equation, the aggregate signature, and the aggregate identifier of the aggregate signature.

[0019] A third aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides an electronic device, including: a processor and a memory; The processor is connected to the memory, wherein the memory is used to store the computer program, and the processor is used to call the computer program to execute the method in the first aspect of the embodiment of the present application.

[0020] A fourth aspect of an embodiment of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, which stores a computer program. The computer program includes program instructions. When the program instructions are executed by a processor, the method in the first aspect of the embodiment of the present application is executed.

[0021] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiments of the present application provide a vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification device, electronic device and computer-readable storage medium. The beneficial effects thereof can be found in the above method embodiments and will not be repeated here. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present application or the technical solutions in the prior art, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying any creative work.

[0023] Figure 1 A system block diagram of a vehicle networking system provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown; Figure 2 A schematic diagram showing a process flow of a method for efficient aggregation and anonymous verification of a vehicle ad hoc network provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification device provided by one embodiment of the present application is shown; Figure 4 A schematic structural diagram of a computer device provided in one embodiment of the present application is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0024] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of this application to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of this application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0025] Please refer to Figure 1 , which shows a system block diagram of a connected vehicle system provided by an embodiment of the present application. The system may include: a vehicle node group 10, a roadside unit (RSU) group 20, a blockchain node group 30, and a key generation center (KGC) 40. Each node group or unit group includes at least one node. Among them: The vehicle node group 10, as the main body for generating and transmitting dynamic messages, generates corresponding parameters through the on-board security chip and broadcasts them to the neighboring RSU through the V2X communication module; at the same time, it locally maintains an incremental serial number and synchronizes the network time base between blockchain nodes to ensure that the timestamp error does not exceed ±100ms, thereby ensuring the freshness and uniqueness of the signature.

[0026] RSU group 20 is the core node of the aggregation verification, responsible for collecting the signature tuples of the vehicle node group 10 in the area within the preset time window, verifying the uniqueness of the message content through the hash table cache, removing duplicate signatures, and checking the timestamp. Whether it is within the current time window, the timed-out signature is directly discarded.

[0027] The blockchain node group 30 serves as a trusted evidence storage and identity management hub, storing the binding hash value of the vehicle pseudonym and the vehicle terminal MAC address, the abnormal aggregation group hash value, and the malicious node revocation log; when the RSU confirms the malicious node ID, it triggers the "identity revocation" operation through the smart contract, marks the ID as "malicious" and writes it into the tamper-proof blockchain log; at the same time, the blockchain node synchronizes the revocation logs of each RSU to form a global malicious node blacklist to ensure the consistency of node information across regions.

[0028] KGC40 is responsible for generating the parameters of the Internet of Vehicles system. First, select the security parameters , used to define the security strength of the system, in this application For example, other values ​​see The situation when , not one by one example; then define the elliptic curve group G, select the elliptic curve that meets the international standard, the order of the elliptic curve is a prime number q, the generator P is a base point in the group G, satisfying P's order is q; at the same time predefine the hash function family { },in, : Used for dynamic pseudonym generation, the input is four elliptic curve group elements, and the output is a 128-bit hash value; : They are used for message, public key, temporary key binding, identity, public key, temporary key binding, and signature component binding respectively. The input is a variable-length message and two group elements, and the output is an integer modulo q. They are multi-parameter composite hashes used for signature binding. : , the input contains two group elements, an integer modulo q and two group elements, which are used for on-chain verification of the aggregate signature; : , the input is a group element, and the output is a 256-bit hash value. All hash functions meet the collision resistance and anti-image attack properties, which conform to the random oracle model assumption.

[0029] KGC40 generates a master key , and calculate the system public key , where · represents the elliptic curve point multiplication operation; in order to avoid the risk of single-point leakage of the master key, the Shamir threshold secret sharing scheme is adopted (the threshold is set to , n is the total number of blockchain nodes), decompose the master key s into n secret fragments s'_1,s'_2,…,s'_n. S can be recovered only when at least t fragments are aggregated. The fragments are distributed to the n nodes of the blockchain through a secure channel for storage; KGC40 collects system parameters The parameters are packaged into structured data and written into the Genesis Block of the blockchain node. The blockchain network adopts the Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) consensus mechanism, which requires that at least 2 / 3 of the nodes must pass the signature verification of the new block before the parameter block can be confirmed as a valid block. This ensures that the system parameters stored in all nodes are completely consistent, avoiding subsequent signature verification failures due to parameter differences.

[0030] The deployment of blockchain node group 30 includes the Identity Authentication Contract (IAC) and the Aggregate Signature Verification Contract (ASVC). IAC is used to define pseudonym update rules, malicious node judgment criteria, and penalty measures; ASVC is used to implement efficient verification logic for multi-signature aggregation, supporting RSU to aggregate the signatures of multiple vehicles into a single signature and quickly verify its validity.

[0031] KGC40 generates the initial encryption factor seed , a random number with a length of 256 bits, is transmitted through the Oracle of the blockchain node Injected into the local storage of vehicle node group 10; encryption factor is periodic Dynamic update, the update formula is ,in is the current timestamp, For the 128-bit hash function defined above, the output is truncated to 256 bits as the new encryption factor, and the updated Transmitted to the vehicle node group 10 via a secure channel and overwrites the old value; illustratively, seconds, ensuring that it is less than half the security parameter to resist replay attacks.

[0032] When the vehicle node group 10 starts, it obtains the system parameter pp through the blockchain application programming interface API and calculates , for the elliptic curve base point P Hash operation; the parameter verification value stored locally on the node is ,like , the parameters are determined to be inconsistent, a local alarm is triggered and access to the Internet of Vehicles communication network is denied. At the same time, the abnormal information is reported to the supervision node through the blockchain transaction.

[0033] The registration process for new vehicle nodes is as follows: The newly connected vehicle node submits a registration request to KGC40, including the real identity , hardware identifier VIN code and device public key KGC40 first verifies the legitimacy of the VIN code and then verifies the device public key. The new vehicle node needs to check the validity of the signature. The KGC40 uses the pre-assigned device private key to verify the signature and generates the initial private key component for the vehicle after verification. , through the hash value of the KGC40 master key s and the vehicle VIN code XOR generation, that is , ensure that the private key is bound to the vehicle identity and calculate the corresponding public key .

[0034] Newly connected vehicle nodes will be pseudonymous , public key , registration timestamp and VIN code are packaged as a registration transaction, and the signature field of the transaction is the private key pair of the vehicle using the device and Signature ; The transaction is broadcast to blockchain nodes 30 through the P2P network, and the signature validity is verified by at least 2 / 3 of the blockchain nodes using the device public key verify After the parameters are consistent, it is packaged into a new block and uploaded to the chain; the blockchain returns the hash value of the transaction , as the only identity certificate of the vehicle node on the blockchain, subsequent signature generation and verification must reference this As an associated person.

[0035] Please refer to Figure 2 , which shows a flow chart of a method for efficient aggregation and anonymous verification of a vehicle ad hoc network provided by an embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to Figure 1 The roadside unit 10 shown. The method may include the following steps: Step 201: Receive a signature tuple, a pseudonym, and a timestamp broadcast by a vehicle node, wherein the signature tuple includes multiple signatures, and each signature includes a pair of a temporary public key and a signature component.

[0036] Among them, the temporary public key It is the generator P and temporary private key of the vehicle node based on the elliptic curve group G It is calculated by elliptic curve point multiplication operation, and the calculation formula is: , temporary private key The vehicle node is generated by a random number generator from the residual group modulo q The random number generator selected can be a true random number generator or a pseudo random number generator, which is not limited here. For example, it can be a true random number generator that complies with the NIST SP 800-90A standard. The random number generator must pass the FIPS 140-2 security certification to ensure the output Uniformly distributed within the group, that is, the probability error of each element does not exceed 2−128, to avoid predictable signatures or cracking by quantum computing attacks due to random number deviations.

[0037] Temporary public key The specific generation operation is: Convert to binary number, perform scalar multiplication and modular addition and doubling operation on the x coordinate of P, and finally get The coordinates (x, y) satisfy the elliptic curve equation (where a and b are elliptic curve parameters). It should be noted that the temporary public key Only valid in this round of signatures, its randomness is determined by The uniform distribution of is used to bind the timeliness and anti-replay attack capability of the current signature.

[0038] Furthermore, the method also includes ensuring the legitimacy of the temporary key pair through double verification. Specifically: first check ,Right now and Is it true? If so, verify Is it a valid point of group G? Substitute (x, y) into the elliptic curve equation. If the elliptic curve equation is true, then determine Valid; if verification fails (e.g. x or y exceeds the modulo q range, or the equation is not satisfied), regenerate And repeat the calculation until a legal temporary key pair is obtained .

[0039] Among them, the signature component The vehicle node uses a temporary private key , the fifth hash value , part of the private key , the fourth hash value and the vehicle's long-term private key component The specific calculation formula is:

[0040] in, ,and , is the real identity of the vehicle node, s′ is the key fragment pre-assigned by KGC, for Multiplicative inverse modulo q.

[0041] Among them, the fourth hash value According to the fourth hash function The fourth hash function is calculated Used to bind the system master public key , the temporary public key and the second hash value , the specific calculation formula is: , is the public key of the roadside unit, and "||" represents string concatenation. It is generated based on the master key fragment s and the generator P of the key generation center. The specific calculation formula is: .

[0042] Wherein, the second hash value According to the second hash function The second hash function is calculated Used to bind the message to be signed , the roadside unit public key and the temporary public key , the specific calculation formula is: .

[0043] Among them, the fifth hash value According to the fifth hash function The fifth hash function is calculated Used to bind the temporary public key The corresponding temporary private key , the certificate parameters issued by the key generation center , the message to be signed , first hash value and the second hash value , the specific calculation formula is: .

[0044] Among them, the first hash value According to the first hash function The first hash function is calculated The pseudonym used to generate dynamic .

[0045] Among them, the part of the private key Based on the vehicle random number , the master key fragment s of the key generation center and the first hash value Generated, the vehicle random number It is generated by the vehicle node according to the random number generator.

[0046] Among them, the timestamp The vehicle node is signing Then generated by the local clock of the vehicle node; pseudonym Based on the latest encryption factor , vehicle random number , timestamp , the vehicle's long-term private key Corresponding public key and the real identity of the vehicle node And the first hash function The specific calculation formula is: ,in Represents the hash output (128 bits) with The bitwise XOR operation of the x-coordinate (256 bits) (the first 128 bits are taken after truncating the hash value to 256 bits), the public key According to the vehicle's long-term private key weight And generator P, the specific calculation formula is: .

[0047] At the same time, the encryption factor The update cycle is , based on the encryption factor of the previous round and the current timestamp And the first hash function is updated, the specific calculation formula is: Furthermore, if abnormal communication is detected during the cycle, the recalculation to reduce the safety risks caused by long-term use of the same factor.

[0048] It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present application, due to and Dynamic nature, each round of pseudonym The uniqueness probability is as high as 1 / 2128, which can effectively resist identity tracking attacks.

[0049] Step 202: When the timestamp is confirmed to be valid, for each signature, a new second hash value is calculated based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed and the roadside unit public key, the first element is calculated based on the signature component and the generator, and the second element is calculated based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component and the generator.

[0050] Specifically, the confirmation that the timestamp is valid may include: the roadside unit obtains its own local time , then and Compare and determine whether the difference is less than or equal to the preset time difference ,Right now If yes, confirm the timestamp Valid. For example, The default setting can be 5 seconds, 10 seconds, 20 seconds, 30 seconds, etc. If not, confirm the timestamp Invalid, the corresponding message to be signed is determined to be a replay of a historical message, verification is rejected, and a warning is triggered.

[0051] At the same time, the RSU can also maintain a timestamp cache based on a hash table, where the key is the hash value of the message content and the value is the timestamp of the most recent message received. If the timestamp of the same message is repeated (i.e., the same message exists in the cache), And the timestamp difference is less than or equal to ), it is considered a replay attack and is rejected.

[0052] Step 203: When the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, confirm that the signature is valid and obtain a valid signature set.

[0053] Exemplarily, the calculation formula of the second hash value is: The new second hash value is calculated by the roadside unit based on the received signature. The original second hash value is calculated by the roadside unit using the parameters obtained from the blockchain node. By comparing whether the two are equal, it can be determined whether the relevant parameters have changed, thereby determining the validity of the signature.

[0054] Exemplarily, according to the signature component And the generator P calculates the first element, the calculation formula is ; According to the temporary public key , the fourth hash value , the fifth hash value , part of the private key , the vehicle's long-term private key The second element is calculated with the generator P, and the calculation formula is: ; By comparing whether the first element and the second element are equal, it is determined whether they satisfy the elliptic curve equation, thereby determining the validity of the signature.

[0055] In the embodiment of the present application, by confirming the signatures one by one, all valid signatures can be determined, and then a valid signature set can be obtained. .

[0056] Step 204: Accumulate the temporary public keys in the valid signature set according to point addition under the module to obtain an aggregate temporary public key, and sum the signature components in the valid signature set according to scalar addition under the module to obtain an aggregate signature component. The aggregate temporary public key and the aggregate signature component constitute an aggregate signature.

[0057] Exemplary, aggregated temporary public key , aggregate signature component , the complete aggregate signature is .

[0058] Furthermore, the aggregate signature can be hashed using the sixth hash function to generate a unique aggregate identifier. , used for unique identification and quick verification of the aggregate signature in the subsequent verification phase.

[0059] Step 205: Verify the overall validity of the aggregate signature according to a verification equation, the aggregate signature, and the aggregate identifier of the aggregate signature.

[0060] For example, the verification equation is:

[0061] Furthermore, it is also possible to target multiple hash values ​​involved in the aggregation process (such as , , ), using Merkle tree structure for compression. RSU will compress each signature As a leaf node, build the Merkle tree and calculate the root hash , only With aggregate signature Synchronous storage. Only verification is required during verification The association with the aggregate signature can significantly reduce storage and transmission overhead.

[0062] It can be seen that the efficient aggregated anonymous verification method for vehicle self-organizing networks provided by the embodiment of the present application first performs verification based on the freshness of the timestamp, ensuring the freshness of the timestamp from the source, and only when the timestamp is confirmed to be valid, the validity of each individual signature is further verified one by one; in the single signature validity verification, a new second hash value is calculated based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed and the roadside unit public key, and the first element is calculated based on the signature component and the generator, and the second element is calculated based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component and the generator. When the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, the signature is confirmed to be valid, so that the invalid signature received can be eliminated, preparing for the next step of aggregate signature verification; in the aggregate signature verification stage, by aggregating the valid signatures and then using the verification equation for verification, the overall validity of all signatures can be verified through one bilinear pairing operation. Compared with the one-by-one verification in the traditional method, multiple bilinear pairing operations are required, which can reduce the computational complexity. In high-concurrency scenarios, processing delays are shortened from seconds to hundreds of milliseconds, effectively solving the problem of low efficiency in authentication of dynamic messages in the Internet of Vehicles and meeting real-time requirements.

[0063] In one embodiment provided by this application, each signature also includes a globally unique incremental serial number Before calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, the method further includes: According to the currently received incrementing sequence number Corresponding pseudonym Determine the currently received incremented sequence number The corresponding latest received incrementing sequence number ; If the currently received incrementing sequence number Less than or equal to the latest received incremented sequence number (Right now ), the signature is determined to be a replay attack, the signature is rejected and a warning is sent to the vehicle node corresponding to the signature; If the currently received incrementing sequence number Greater than the latest received incremented sequence number (Right now ), then the currently received incremented sequence number Updated to the latest received incremented sequence number , and execute the step of calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed and the roadside unit public key.

[0064] As can be seen, in this embodiment of the application, before validating each signature, a uniqueness check is first performed based on the serial number corresponding to each signature to prevent replay attacks. Furthermore, screening is performed before aggregate signature verification, which helps reduce computational complexity and thus improves verification efficiency. This also prevents chain reactions caused by forged critical messages such as braking and steering, significantly improving the security of vehicle-to-vehicle communications.

[0065] In one embodiment provided in this application, the method further includes: If the overall validity of the aggregate signature is invalid, extracting the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature; Locally aggregating the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature to locate abnormal signatures; If the number of abnormal signatures is less than or equal to a preset threshold, requesting the vehicle node corresponding to the abnormal signature to regenerate and send a new signature; If the number of abnormal signatures is greater than a preset threshold, all signatures in the aggregate signature will be marked as an abnormal aggregation group and stored in the local cache. At the same time, the hash value, failure timestamp and associated pseudonym set of the abnormal aggregation group will be uploaded to the chain for evidence through the smart contract interface of the blockchain node, and binary positioning attack detection will be triggered.

[0066] Among them, the preset threshold can be, for example, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20% of the valid signatures, and the cache time can be set to 1 time window, 2 time windows, 3 time windows, and each time window can be 10 seconds, 20 seconds, 30 seconds, etc., which are not limited here.

[0067] It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present application, when the overall validity of the aggregate signature is invalid, the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature are extracted for local aggregation to locate the abnormal signature, and then classified and processed according to the number of abnormal signatures. If it is less than the threshold, the vehicle node corresponding to the abnormal signature is requested to regenerate and send a new signature, which can eliminate the misjudgment of aggregate signature failure caused by network delay or temporary calculation error; if it is greater than the threshold, all signatures in the aggregate signature are marked as abnormal aggregation groups and stored in the local cache. At the same time, the hash value, failure timestamp and associated pseudonym set of the abnormal aggregation group are uploaded to the chain for evidence through the smart contract interface of the blockchain node, and binary positioning attack detection is triggered; this classification processing mechanism can optimize the signature verification process, thereby improving verification efficiency.

[0068] In one embodiment provided in the present application, triggering binary positioning attack detection includes: Obtain at least one normal historical aggregate signature from the blockchain node; Calculating a temporary public key difference and a signature component difference between the abnormal aggregated group and at least one normal historical aggregated signature; If the temporary public key difference and the signature component difference do not satisfy the linear relationship of the elliptic curve, it is determined that an abnormal temporary public key and / or an abnormal signature component exists in the abnormal aggregation group; Determine, based on a dichotomy method, an abnormal signature corresponding to the abnormal temporary public key and / or the abnormal signature component; The malicious vehicle node is located according to the abnormal signature, and the pseudonym and abnormal signature features of the malicious vehicle node are recorded.

[0069] For example, the majority method can be used to obtain the normal historical aggregate signature. Can be an odd number (i.e. k is an odd number) to calculate abnormal aggregation groups With each normal history aggregation signature The difference between the temporary public key and signature component differences When more than half of the differences do not satisfy the linear relationship of the elliptic curve, it is determined that there are abnormal temporary public keys and / or abnormal signature components in the abnormal aggregation group. The linear relationship of the elliptic curve is:

[0070] Exemplarily, the abnormal temporary public key and / or the abnormal signature corresponding to the abnormal signature component are determined based on the binary method, that is, based on the difference analysis result, the RSU divides the abnormal aggregation group S (initially all nodes in the current batch) into two groups after sorting them by the pseudonym hash value. and , respectively extract and The signature component recalculates the local aggregate signature and .like Verification failed and Success, the malicious node In; otherwise Repeat this binary process (maximum times, n is the number of suspicious nodes), and finally locate the specific malicious node i and record its pseudonym With exception signature features (such as exception Hash value ).

[0071] It can be seen that the embodiment of the present application provides a method for binary positioning attack detection, which determines whether there are abnormal temporary public keys and / or abnormal signature components by judging whether the temporary public key differences and signature component differences between the abnormal aggregation group and the normal historical aggregation signature satisfy the linear relationship of the elliptic curve, and then locates the malicious vehicle nodes layer by layer through the binary method, which is conducive to solving the problem that traditional solutions cannot locate the specific attack source or mistakenly reject normal nodes, and improves the accuracy of malicious node handling.

[0072] In one embodiment provided in this application, the method further includes: Querying the registration information of the malicious vehicle node based on the stored evidence of the blockchain node and the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node; Verify, based on the registration information, whether the binding relationship between the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node and the identity information of the vehicle-mounted terminal hardware of the malicious vehicle node has been tampered with; If the binding relationship is tampered with, the abnormal signature is determined to be a pseudonym forgery attack; If the binding relationship has not been tampered with, it is determined that the malicious vehicle node is a real malicious node.

[0073] For example, the binding relationship is: .

[0074] It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present application, the registration information of the malicious vehicle node is queried in the evidence of the blockchain node using the pseudonym as the index, and then it is further determined whether the binding relationship between the malicious vehicle node and the identity information of the vehicle terminal hardware has been tampered with to locate the specific cause of the failure.

[0075] In one embodiment provided in this application, the method further includes: triggering an identity revocation operation of the blockchain node through the smart contract interface, so that the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node is written into the tamper-proof log of the blockchain node; A revocation notification message is broadcast to all vehicle nodes in the area, where the revocation notification message carries the pseudonym and revocation timestamp of the malicious vehicle node, so that after receiving the revocation notification message, all vehicle nodes in the area update the local trusted vehicle node list according to the pseudonym and revocation timestamp of the malicious vehicle node and refuse to communicate with the malicious vehicle node.

[0076] It can be seen that in the embodiment of the present application, if the malicious vehicle node is a real malicious node, it will not only be written into the blockchain node to prevent tampering, but also broadcast to other vehicle nodes, so that other vehicle nodes update their own local trusted vehicle node lists, thereby forming a global blacklist, realizing cross-regional identity tracing and immediate revocation of malicious nodes, thereby preventing malicious nodes from disguising themselves as normal nodes to do evil for a long time, making up for the defect of regional isolation failure of traditional solutions, and enhancing the reliability of identity management of the Internet of Vehicles.

[0077] Figure 3 The following is a schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification device provided by one embodiment of the present application. Applied to a roadside unit, the device includes: The communication unit 301 is configured to receive a signature tuple, a pseudonym, and a timestamp broadcast by a vehicle node, wherein the signature tuple includes multiple signatures, each signature including a pair of a temporary public key and a signature component; The processing unit 302 is configured to, when confirming that the timestamp is valid, calculate, for each signature, a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, calculate a first element based on the signature component and a generator, and calculate a second element based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component, and the generator; The processing unit 302 is further configured to, when the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, confirm that the signature is valid and obtain a valid signature set; The processing unit 302 is further configured to accumulate the temporary public keys in the valid signature set according to point addition under the module to obtain an aggregate temporary public key, and to sum the signature components in the valid signature set according to scalar addition under the module to obtain an aggregate signature component, wherein the aggregate temporary public key and the aggregate signature component constitute an aggregate signature; The processing unit 302 is further configured to verify the overall validity of the aggregate signature according to a verification equation, the aggregate signature, and the aggregate identifier of the aggregate signature.

[0078] Figure 4 A structural schematic diagram of a computer device provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown, including a memory and a processor, the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the functions of a computer system of the vehicle self-organizing network efficient aggregation anonymous verification method in any of the above-mentioned embodiments.

[0079] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the computer program is executed by a computer, the computer performs the functions of the computer system of the vehicle self-organizing network efficient aggregation anonymous verification method in any of the above embodiments.

[0080] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product comprising instructions, which, when executed by a computer, enables the computer to perform the functions of the computer system of the vehicle ad hoc network efficient aggregation anonymous verification method in any of the above embodiments.

[0081] It should be understood that the specific examples in this application are only intended to help those skilled in the art better understand the embodiments of this application, rather than to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0082] It can be understood that in the various implementation methods of this application, the size of the serial number of each process does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the implementation method of this application.

[0083] It can be understood that the various embodiments described in this application can be implemented individually or in combination, and the embodiments of this application are not limited to this.

[0084] Unless otherwise indicated, all technical and scientific terms used in the embodiments of the present application have the same meaning as those commonly understood by those skilled in the art in the technical field of the present application. The terms used in this application are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. The term "and / or" used in this application includes any and all combinations of one or more related listed items. The singular forms "a", "above", and "the" used in the embodiments of the present application and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.

[0085] It is understood that the processor in the embodiments of the present application can be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. During implementation, each step of the above-mentioned method embodiment can be completed by hardware integrated logic circuits in the processor or software instructions. The above-mentioned processor can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. The various methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented or executed. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be directly implemented and executed by a hardware decoding processor, or by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module can be located in a storage medium mature in the art, such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, etc. The storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and, in conjunction with its hardware, completes the steps of the above-mentioned method.

[0086] It will be understood that the memory in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (programmable ROM, PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (erasable PROM, EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM) or flash memory. The volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM). It should be noted that the memory of the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.

[0087] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0088] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the above-described systems, devices and units can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method implementation methods and will not be repeated here.

[0089] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For example, the division of units is merely a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0090] Units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0091] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

[0092] If the function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the various implementation methods of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

[0093] The above are only specific embodiments of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included in the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for efficient aggregation and anonymous verification of vehicle ad hoc networks, characterized in that: Applied to a roadside unit, the method includes: receiving a signature tuple, a pseudonym, and a timestamp broadcast by a vehicle node, wherein the signature tuple includes a plurality of signatures, each signature including a pair of a temporary public key and a signature component; When the timestamp is confirmed to be valid, for each signature, calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, calculating a first element based on the signature component and the generator, and calculating a second element based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component, and the generator; When the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, confirming that the signature is valid and obtaining a valid signature set; Accumulating the temporary public keys in the valid signature set according to point addition under the module to obtain an aggregate temporary public key, and summing the signature components in the valid signature set according to scalar addition under the module to obtain an aggregate signature component, the aggregate temporary public key and the aggregate signature component forming an aggregate signature; The overall validity of the aggregate signature is verified according to a verification equation, the aggregate signature, and the aggregate identifier of the aggregate signature.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that Each signature also includes a globally unique incremental serial number. Before calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, the method further includes: Determining the latest received ascending sequence number corresponding to the currently received ascending sequence number according to the pseudonym corresponding to the currently received ascending sequence number; If the currently received incrementing sequence number is less than or equal to the latest received incrementing sequence number, the signature is determined to be a replay attack, the signature is rejected, and a warning is sent to the vehicle node corresponding to the signature; If the currently received incrementing sequence number is greater than the latest received incrementing sequence number, the currently received incrementing sequence number is updated to the latest received incrementing sequence number, and the step of calculating a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key is executed.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: If the overall validity of the aggregate signature is invalid, extracting the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature; Locally aggregating the temporary public key and signature component of each signature in the aggregate signature to locate abnormal signatures; If the number of abnormal signatures is less than or equal to a preset threshold, requesting the vehicle node corresponding to the abnormal signature to regenerate and send a new signature; If the number of abnormal signatures is greater than a preset threshold, all signatures in the aggregate signature will be marked as an abnormal aggregation group and stored in the local cache. At the same time, the hash value, failure timestamp and associated pseudonym set of the abnormal aggregation group will be uploaded to the chain for evidence through the smart contract interface of the blockchain node, and binary positioning attack detection will be triggered.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that The triggering of binary positioning attack detection includes: Obtain at least one normal historical aggregate signature from the blockchain node; Calculating a temporary public key difference and a signature component difference between the abnormal aggregated group and at least one normal historical aggregated signature; If the temporary public key difference and the signature component difference do not satisfy the linear relationship of the elliptic curve, it is determined that an abnormal temporary public key and / or an abnormal signature component exists in the abnormal aggregation group; Determine, based on a dichotomy method, an abnormal signature corresponding to the abnormal temporary public key and / or the abnormal signature component; The malicious vehicle node is located according to the abnormal signature, and the pseudonym and abnormal signature features of the malicious vehicle node are recorded.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The method further comprises: Querying the registration information of the malicious vehicle node based on the stored evidence of the blockchain node and the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node; Verify, based on the registration information, whether the binding relationship between the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node and the identity information of the vehicle-mounted terminal hardware of the malicious vehicle node has been tampered with; If the binding relationship is tampered with, the abnormal signature is determined to be a pseudonym forgery attack; If the binding relationship has not been tampered with, it is determined that the malicious vehicle node is a real malicious node.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The method further comprises: triggering an identity revocation operation of the blockchain node through the smart contract interface, so that the pseudonym of the malicious vehicle node is written into the tamper-proof log of the blockchain node; A revocation notification message is broadcast to all vehicle nodes in the area, where the revocation notification message carries the pseudonym and revocation timestamp of the malicious vehicle node, so that after receiving the revocation notification message, all vehicle nodes in the area update the local trusted vehicle node list according to the pseudonym and revocation timestamp of the malicious vehicle node and refuse to communicate with the malicious vehicle node.

7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that The second hash value is calculated according to a second hash function, and the second hash function is used to bind the message to be signed, the roadside unit public key and the temporary public key; The fourth hash value is calculated based on a fourth hash function, the fourth hash function is used to bind a system master public key, the temporary public key, and the second hash value, the system master public key is generated based on the master key fragments of the key generation center and the generators; The fifth hash value is calculated according to a fifth hash function, and the fifth hash function is used to bind the temporary private key corresponding to the temporary public key, the certificate parameters issued by the key generation center, the message to be signed, the first hash value, and the second hash value; The first hash value is calculated according to a first hash function, and the first hash function is used to generate the dynamic pseudonym; The partial private key is generated based on the vehicle random number, the master key fragment of the key generation center and the first hash value, and the vehicle random number is generated by the vehicle node based on a random number generator.

8. A highly efficient aggregation anonymous verification device for a vehicle ad hoc network, characterized in that: Applied to a roadside unit, the device comprises: a communication unit, configured to receive a signature tuple, a pseudonym, and a timestamp broadcast by a vehicle node, wherein the signature tuple includes a plurality of signatures, each signature including a pair of a temporary public key and a signature component; a processing unit, configured to, when confirming that the timestamp is valid, calculate, for each signature, a new second hash value based on the temporary public key, the message to be signed, and the roadside unit public key, calculate a first element based on the signature component and a generator, and calculate a second element based on the temporary public key, the fourth hash value, the fifth hash value, the partial private key, the vehicle long-term private key component, and the generator; The processing unit is further configured to, when the new second hash value is equal to the original second hash value and the first element is equal to the second element, confirm that the signature is valid and obtain a valid signature set; The processing unit is further configured to accumulate the temporary public keys in the valid signature set according to point addition under the module to obtain an aggregate temporary public key, and sum the signature components in the valid signature set according to scalar addition under the module to obtain an aggregate signature component, wherein the aggregate temporary public key and the aggregate signature component constitute an aggregate signature; The processing unit is further configured to verify the overall validity of the aggregate signature according to a verification equation, the aggregate signature, and the aggregate identifier of the aggregate signature.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: include: processor and memory; The processor is connected to a memory, wherein the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call the computer program to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, wherein the computer program includes program instructions. When the program instructions are executed by a processor, the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 is executed.

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