Unmanned aerial vehicle physical layer secret key secret communication method based on orthogonal time-frequency space

Through the UAV physical layer key confidential communication method based on orthogonal time-frequency space, the channel eigenvalues ​​are generated by delay-Doppler domain channel modeling and three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, which solves the key generation problem of UAV communication system in high-speed mobile environment and improves the stability and security of the communication system.

CN120768548AActive Publication Date: 2025-10-10NORTHWESTERN POLYTECHNICAL UNIV

Patent Information

Application Number
CN202511275879.5
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-09-08
Publication Date
2025-10-10
Estimated Expiration
2045-09-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In the high-speed mobile environment of drone communication systems, traditional upper-layer encryption technology has a heavy computational burden, and online key distribution and management are difficult. In addition, channel changes make it difficult for both parties in legitimate communication to generate consistent keys, reducing security.

Method used

A UAV physical layer key confidentiality communication method based on orthogonal time-frequency space is adopted. Through delay-Doppler domain channel modeling and three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, channel eigenvalues ​​are generated and adaptively weighted. Combined with dynamic grouping Winnow key negotiation and hash function SHA-2 confidentiality enhancement, it ensures that legitimate users generate consistent physical layer keys.

Benefits of technology

It effectively responds to channel changes, improves the stability and security of the communication system, reduces the key inconsistency rate, enhances the bit error rate against illegal users, and ensures the confidentiality of information transmission.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention relates to an unmanned aerial vehicle physical layer secret key secret communication method based on an orthogonal time-frequency space. Comprising the following steps: establishing an unmanned aerial vehicle air-ground communication system consisting of a multi-antenna unmanned aerial vehicle base station, ground single-antenna legal users and ground passive eavesdropping illegal users; obtaining channel estimation vectors of all dominant paths by adopting a three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm; the method comprises the steps of obtaining a channel characteristic value of a communication channel through a path gain self-adaptive weighted moving average coding method, carrying out double-bit uniform quantization, carrying out Winnow key negotiation based on dynamic grouping and carrying out SHA-2 hash function confidentiality enhancement, and thus obtaining a physical layer key. According to the method, the channel dimension is converted through the orthogonal time-frequency space technology, the influence of Doppler frequency shift is effectively resisted, the channel reciprocity is improved, the key inconsistency rate is reduced, and the safety and stability of a communication system can be remarkably improved.
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Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of communication technology, in particular to a physical layer key secret communication method for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) based on orthogonal time-frequency space in air-ground communication scenario. BACKGROUND

[0002] Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication has the characteristics of high link gain, strong mobility and flexible networking, and is widely used in military and civilian fields. In the field of military, a large number of UAVs form a wide-area distributed rapid response communication network, which can complete various tasks in complex situations. In the field of civilian communication, the UAV communication system can efficiently contact with the ground network, and can provide temporary network service in a small range in emergency situations such as disaster relief, field exploration, public security, etc. where fixed communication infrastructure is unavailable, thereby providing protection for people's production and life. It is not difficult to see that in the current era of rapid development of high technology, UAV communication has become an indispensable important communication form in global national defense security.

[0003] However, this technology product also exposes some vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored. Due to the broadcast characteristics and direct link characteristics of UAV wireless transmission, the transmitted information is easy to be eavesdropped, and the information transmission security is seriously damaged, which is an incalculable loss. In the combat environment, the enemy can use this vulnerability to interfere with the attack or steal the battlefield environment perception information, data and picture information transmitted by our side, which will quickly change the battlefield situation. In matching verification communication, the account, authentication, personal information and other information transmitted by the base station are disturbed and stolen, which may cause damage to the property of citizens. From the above analysis, we can see that whether the UAV communication is reliable or not directly determines the winning position of the future intelligent unmanned battlefield and the safety of multi-field livelihood. Therefore, it is of great significance to ensure the reliable and safe communication of UAV.

[0004] Due to the characteristics of multi-UAV communication system itself, the traditional upper layer encryption technology is difficult to be applied alone, the main reasons are: (1) The computing power of UAV communication system itself is limited, and the computing time overhead and communication overhead of authentication key agreement protocol will cause a large burden to UAV network; (2) The UAV communication mechanism is complex, the information interaction is frequent, and the networking scale and structure are easy to change, which makes it difficult to distribute, share and manage the key online; (3) The standardization protection in UAV communication network is not safe enough, and is very easy to be attacked, and the security is reduced.

[0005] Unlike upper-layer encryption technologies, physical layer security focuses on leveraging the characteristics of physical media and communication devices to achieve secure information transmission. Its goal is to prevent information leakage and unauthorized access at the physical level without relying on traditional encryption algorithms. Physical layer key generation techniques based on wireless channel reciprocity have been widely researched both domestically and internationally due to their lightweight and flexible nature.

[0006] However, unlike traditional ground wireless communication systems, drone air-to-ground communication systems have the characteristics of high relative movement speed between communication terminals and drone base stations, which will produce serious Doppler frequency shift. The traditional time-frequency domain channel estimation results have large deviations, making it difficult for both parties in legitimate communication to generate consistent keys, seriously affecting the key generation performance. Summary of the Invention

[0007] The purpose of the present invention is to avoid the shortcomings of the existing technology and provide a physical layer key confidential communication method for drones based on orthogonal time-frequency space. By converting the rapidly changing time-frequency domain channel into a slowly changing delay-Doppler domain channel, and then extracting the channel eigenvalues ​​to generate the physical layer key, the method can effectively cope with the challenges brought by channel changes in the high-speed movement environment of drones and ensure the stability and security of communication.

[0008] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention adopts the following technical solution: a method for physical layer key confidential communication of unmanned aerial vehicles based on orthogonal time-frequency space, comprising the following steps: Step 1: Establish a UAV air-to-ground communication system consisting of a multi-antenna UAV base station, a single-antenna legitimate user authorized to receive information on the ground, and an illegal user passively eavesdropping on the ground. Then, perform delay-Doppler angle-dimensional channel modeling on the UAV air-to-ground communication system channel to obtain the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix. Step 2: Using a three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, based on the communication channel between a multi-antenna UAV base station and a single-antenna legitimate user, we obtain the index set of the dominant path of the communication channel in the delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and angle dimension. Then, we determine the channel estimation vectors of all dominant paths using the least squares method. Step 3: Adaptively weight the path gain strength of the channel estimation vector of the dominant path to obtain the channel eigenvalue of the communication channel. This is used to improve the reciprocity of the communication channel between the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user, ensuring that both communicating parties can generate consistent physical layer keys. Step 4: performing double-bit uniform quantization on the channel characteristic value of the communication channel to generate a channel characteristic value sequence, and then encoding the channel characteristic value sequence to obtain an initialized bit sequence; Step 5: Winnow key negotiation based on dynamic grouping is performed on the initialized bit sequence, that is, a consistent physical layer key for encrypting the transmitted information is obtained between the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user. Encryption through the physical layer key improves the bit error rate of illegal users, making it impossible for illegal users to eavesdrop, and realizing confidential communication of the physical layer key.

[0009] Furthermore, the step 1 specifically includes the following steps: Step 11: First, the channel of the UAV air-to-ground communication system is modeled. The channel estimation method for each single-antenna legitimate user is the same, so only channel estimation is performed on any single-antenna legitimate user. The specific steps are: Definition and multi-antenna UAV base station time-domain time-varying channels with correlated antennas for: , Where, is the index of time domain discretization, is the symbol period, is the subcarrier spacing; is the sampling interval, is the number of sampling points in the symbol period, is the discretization index of the delay domain; The number of main paths of the time-varying channel in the time domain , each main path contains subpath, the The Doppler shift of the subpath is , is the flight speed of the multi-antenna UAV base station, is the carrier frequency, is the speed of light; the channel gain is expressed as , No. The delay of all sub-paths under the main path is , the number of antennas indexed , is the total number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; No. Antenna departure angle of each subpath for , considering a linear uniform antenna array, with The relevant spatial angle is , is the distance between antennas, is the wavelength of the subcarrier; is the pulse shaping filter response; then the first the time delay-Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix of the mthantenna is: , where the variable , is the Doppler shift of the nthsub-path, is the number of time delay domain discrete symbols, is the symbol index of the Doppler domain, is the symbol index of the time delay discrete domain is the modulo operation, is the time delay of all sub-paths under the mthmain path, is the antenna spatial angle of the nthsub-path, which is a function of the variable is: , where is the number of symbols of the Doppler domain, , where is the number of symbols of the Doppler domain, is the summation index variable; Step 12, in order to perform sparse representation on the channel of the UAV air-ground communication system, the inverse discrete Fourier transform is performed on the time delay-Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix to obtain the time delay-Doppler angle dimension channel : , where is the angle index, is the total number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; Step 13, after modeling the time delay-Doppler angle dimension channel , the received signal of the single-antenna legitimate user and the time delay-Doppler domain channel matrix are respectively represented as: , , where is the pilot matrix transmitted by the UAV base station, is the identity matrix of , is the number of antennas of the UAV base station, is a sparse basis matrix, is additive white Gaussian noise, denotes the Kronecker product.

[0010] ​​Furthermore, the step 2 specifically includes the following steps: Step 21: Set the loop index of the three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm , the dominant path index set of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix , the channel estimation vector of the initial delay-Doppler domain channel matrix , initial residual for: , Where, is the received signal of a single-antenna legitimate user, is the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix; Step 22: Based on the three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, iterate according to the number of paths to be estimated, and then calculate the correlation vector of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix for: , Where, is the conjugate transpose of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix, For the The residual of the iteration; And, the related vector Rearranged into a three-dimensional tensor of delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and antenna dimension for: , Where, is the guard interval length in the delay dimension, is the guard interval length in the Doppler dimension, is the number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; Step 23: Calculate the three-dimensional tensor Expand along the delay dimension to obtain the expanded matrix for: , Compute the row vector of the expanded matrix Norm, get the delay dimension related vector , select The delayed dimension index corresponding to the maximum value ,Then As the first The support set of the delay dimension in the iteration; Step 24: Fixed Delay Dimension Index , the first slice matrix of the unfolded matrix is: , Then calculate the row vector of the first slice matrix along the Doppler dimension norm, and obtain the Doppler correlation vector , select the maximum value in the Doppler dimension correlation vector, determine the non-zero block on the Doppler dimension, and then get the The support set of the iteration in the Doppler dimension ; Step 25: Based on the first slice matrix and the support set in the Doppler dimension , the second slice matrix is ​​obtained as: , Calculate the column vector of the second slice matrix along the angle dimension Norm, get the angle dimension related vector ; Then, using the lifting transformation method, the angle dimension related vector Transform and process to determine the The support set of the iteration in the angle dimension ; Step 26: Update the delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and angle dimension support sets determined in steps 23 to 25 to obtain an index set. for: , Thus, through the least squares method, the channel estimation vector is obtained for: , Then, update the residual to , used to eliminate the influence of the estimated dominant path on the residual, repeat steps 23 to 26 until all dominant paths are detected and estimated, and finally output the channel estimation vector of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix for: , Where, is the number of dominant paths.

[0011] Furthermore, the step three specifically includes the following steps: Step 31: The channel estimation vector is recorded as: , Where, is the number of dominant paths; Step 32: Then, according to the magnitude of the dominant path gain strength, the dominant path gain strength is sorted from small to large to obtain: ; Where, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the smallest gain intensity after sorting, After sorting The gain strength estimate of the dominant path, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the largest gain intensity after sorting; Step 33: Adaptively weight the ranked dominant path gain strength from 0 to 1, that is: , Where, For the A weight is used to adaptively weight the gain strength of the sorted dominant path, and the value range is 0~1, where Corresponding to the path with the smallest gain, The path with the largest gain corresponds to the intermediate weight Increase in a linear manner; Step 34: Restore to the original order and perform sliding windowing to obtain the channel characteristic value of the communication channel. : , Where, is the window size, is the number of channel eigenvalues, is the overlap size of two adjacent windows, For the The weight of the adaptive weighting, Indicates the The dominant path gain strength estimate after adaptive weighting.

[0012] Furthermore, the step 4 specifically includes the following steps: Step 41: The channel characteristic value sequence of the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user is and , the sample size is ; Then, the multi-antenna UAV base station calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; A single-antenna legitimate user calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; According to the number of quantization bits , calculate the number of quantized regions , then divide the sample interval into equal intervals: , , Where, and are the classification intervals for multi-antenna UAV base stations and single-antenna legitimate users, respectively; Step 42: Multi-antenna UAV base stations and single-antenna legitimate users pass through classification intervals and Calculate the quantization threshold and treat the quantized sequence according to the quantization threshold and in The samples are classified separately; Step 43: The multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user encode the classified samples using Gray code to obtain an initialized bit sequence. and .

[0013] Furthermore, the step five specifically includes the following steps: Step 51: The multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user initialize the bit sequence and Randomly permutate according to the same rules and calculate the initialized bit sequence and Bit inconsistency rate , and set the bit inconsistency rate threshold ; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to Length grouping, A bit sequence indicating initialization length; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to Length grouping, calculating the parity bit of each group and exchanging them on a common channel; Step 52: Compare the parity bits of the packets exchanged between the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user. If the parity bits of any of the packets are different, perform error correction only on the packets with different parity bits, discard the first bit of the packet, and the remaining bits form a Hamming code group. and Perform local error correction; Step 53: Calculate the Hamming code group and Accompanied , They are: , , Where, is the check matrix, is the conjugate transposed matrix of the check matrix; Step 54: The multi-antenna UAV base station transmits the accompanying Sent to a single-antenna legitimate user, the single-antenna legitimate user calculates the bit-by-bit XOR ,in XOR calculation symbols are used to obtain the error bit position, thus achieving a round of dynamic negotiation and error correction; Step 55: Repeat steps 51 to 54 until the initial keys of the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user are completely consistent, and the physical layer key is obtained. .

[0014] Furthermore, in order to improve the randomness and security of the physical layer key, the method further includes performing a step of performing SHA-2 hash function security enhancement on the negotiated physical layer key.

[0015] Furthermore, the step of performing SHA-2 hash function security enhancement on the negotiated physical layer key is specifically as follows: Step 61: Based on the SHA-2 algorithm, the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user will use the same initial physical layer key after key negotiation. Fill in and then set an initial hash value, which consists of 8 32-bit fixed constants; Step 62: The multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user split the message into message blocks, and then expand and iterate each message block. Each round uses logical functions and bit operations to gradually integrate the message block information into the intermediate hash value. Step 63: After all message blocks are processed, the initial hash value and the intermediate results in the processing process are added as 32-bit words to generate a 256-bit final hash value, that is, the physical layer key after the hash function SHA-2 privacy enhancement is obtained. .

[0016] The beneficial effects of the present invention are: the present invention proposes a drone physical layer key confidential communication method based on orthogonal time-frequency space, adopts a three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm to estimate the communication channel between a multi-antenna drone base station and a single-antenna legitimate user, and then obtains the physical layer key for encryption through the proposed moving average coding algorithm based on path gain adaptive weighting, double-bit uniform quantization, Winnow key negotiation based on dynamic grouping and hash function confidentiality enhancement.

[0017] Simulation results show that the physical layer key confidentiality communication scheme proposed in this invention can effectively combat the Doppler frequency shift problem, reduce the impact of channel changes on communication performance, improve the reciprocity of legal channels, reduce the key inconsistency rate, and ensure the security and stability of the communication system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] Figure 1 This is a framework diagram of the UAV air-to-ground communication system of the present invention; Figure 2 2. It is a schematic diagram of the delay Doppler angle dimension channel of the UAV air-to-ground communication system of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a graph showing the channel reciprocity results of the preprocessing algorithm proposed in the simulation experiment of the present invention under different signal-to-noise ratios; Figure 4 This is a graph showing the key inconsistency rate results of the preprocessing algorithm proposed in the simulation experiment of the present invention under different signal-to-noise ratios; Figure 5 This is a bit error rate diagram of different physical layer security schemes under different signal-to-noise ratios in the simulation experiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0019] The principles and features of the present invention are described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The examples given are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the scope of the present invention.

[0020] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention provides the following specific implementation methods: Example 1: Figure 1 、 Figure 2 As shown, a method for physical layer key confidentiality communication of a UAV based on orthogonal time-frequency space includes the following steps: S01、 Figure 1 As shown, a multi-antenna UAV base station is established. The UAV air-to-ground communication system consists of a single-antenna legitimate user authorized to receive information on the ground and an illegal user passively eavesdropping on the ground, so as to model the delay-Doppler angle channel of the UAV air-to-ground communication system.

[0021] S02, due to the downlink channel The channel estimation method for each single-antenna legitimate user is the same, so only channel estimation is performed on any single-antenna legitimate user: Definition and multi-antenna UAV base station time-domain time-varying channels with correlated antennas for: , Where, is the index of time domain discretization, is the symbol period, is the subcarrier spacing; is the sampling interval, is the number of sampling points in the symbol period, is the discretization index of the delay domain; The number of main paths of the time-varying channel in the time domain , each main path contains subpath, the The Doppler shift of the subpath is , is the flight speed of the multi-antenna UAV base station, is the carrier frequency, is the speed of light; the channel gain is expressed as , No. The delay of all sub-paths under the main path is , the number of antennas indexed , is the total number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; No. Antenna departure angle of each subpath for , considering a linear uniform antenna array, with The relevant spatial angle is , is the distance between antennas, is the wavelength of the subcarrier; is the pulse shaping filter response; then we get Delay-Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix for a single antenna for: , In the formula, the variable , For the The Doppler shift of the subpath is is the number of discrete symbols in the delay domain, is the symbol index in the Doppler domain, is the discrete domain symbol index of the delay right Modulus, For the The delay of all sub-paths under the main path, For the The antenna spatial angle of the subpath, about the variable Function for: , Where, is the number of symbols in the Doppler domain, Summation index variable.

[0022] S03, in order to the channel of unmanned aerial vehicle air-ground communication system sparse representation, along the space domain delay Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix Discrete inverse Fourier transform, that is, the delay Doppler angle dimension channel , In the formula, Angle index, The total number of antennas of multi-antenna unmanned aerial base station.

[0023] S04, after the delay Doppler angle dimension channel Modeling, that is, the received signal of single antenna legitimate user And delay Doppler domain channel matrix , respectively, as follows: , , In the formula, Pilot matrix transmitted by unmanned aerial base station, Identity matrix of , the number of antennas of unmanned aerial base station, Sparse basis matrix, Additive white Gaussian noise, Indicates the Kronecker product. S05, using three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, based on the communication channel between multi-antenna unmanned aerial base station and single antenna legitimate user, set the cycle number index of three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm

[0024] , the dominant path index set of delay Doppler domain channel matrix , the initial channel estimation vector of initial delay Doppler domain channel matrix , the initial residual As follows: , In the formula, The received signal of single antenna legitimate user, Delay Doppler domain channel matrix.

[0025] S06, according to the number of paths to be estimated, the related vector of delay Doppler domain channel matrix is calculated by iterative cycle As follows: , In the formula, ​​is the conjugate transpose of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix, For the The residual of the iteration; And, the related vector Rearranged into a three-dimensional tensor of delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and antenna dimension for: , Where, is the guard interval length in the delay dimension, is the guard interval length in the Doppler dimension, is the number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station.

[0026] S07. Calculate three-dimensional tensor Expand along the delay dimension to obtain the expanded matrix for: , Compute the row vector of the expanded matrix Norm, get the delay dimension related vector , select The delayed dimension index corresponding to the maximum value ,Then As the first The support set of the delay dimension in the iteration.

[0027] S08, Fixed Delay Dimension Index , the first slice matrix of the unfolded matrix is: , Then calculate the row vector of the first slice matrix along the Doppler dimension norm, and obtain the Doppler correlation vector , select the maximum value in the Doppler dimension correlation vector, determine the non-zero block on the Doppler dimension, and then get the The support set of the iteration in the Doppler dimension .

[0028] S09, based on the first slice matrix and the support set in the Doppler dimension , the second slice matrix is ​​obtained as: , Calculate the column vector of the second slice matrix along the angle dimension Norm, get the angle dimension related vector ; Then, using the lifting transformation method, the angle dimension related vector Transform and process to determine the The support set of the iteration in the angle dimension .

[0029] S10: Update the delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and angle dimension support sets determined in S07 to S09 to obtain an index set. for: , Thus, through the least squares method, the channel estimation vector is obtained for: , Then, update the residual to , used to eliminate the influence of the estimated dominant path on the residual, repeat steps 23 to 26 until all dominant paths are detected and estimated, and finally output the channel estimation vector of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix for: , Where, is the number of dominant paths.

[0030] S11, the channel estimation vector is recorded as: , Where, is the number of dominant paths; S12. Then, according to the magnitude of the dominant path gain strength, the dominant path gain strength is sorted from small to large to obtain: ; Where, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the smallest gain intensity after sorting, After sorting The gain strength estimate of the dominant path, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the largest gain intensity after sorting; S13. Adaptively weight the gain strength of the sorted dominant path from 0 to 1, that is: , Where, For the A weight is used to adaptively weight the gain strength of the sorted dominant path, and the value range is 0~1, where Corresponding to the path with the smallest gain, The path with the largest gain corresponds to the intermediate weight Increase in a linear manner; S14, restore to the original order, perform sliding window processing, and obtain the channel characteristic value of the communication channel : , Where, is the window size, is the number of channel eigenvalues, is the overlap size of two adjacent windows, For the The weight of the adaptive weighting, Indicates the The dominant path gain strength estimate after adaptive weighting.

[0031] S15. Perform double-bit uniform quantization on the channel eigenvalues ​​of the communication channel. The channel eigenvalue sequences of the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user are: and , the sample size is ; Then, the multi-antenna UAV base station calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; A single-antenna legitimate user calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; According to the number of quantization bits , calculate the number of quantized regions , then divide the sample interval into equal intervals: , , Where, and are the classification intervals for multi-antenna UAV base stations and single-antenna legitimate users, respectively.

[0032] S16, multi-antenna drone base station and single-antenna legitimate users pass through classification interval and Calculate the quantization threshold and treat the quantized sequence according to the quantization threshold and in The samples are classified separately.

[0033] S17, the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user encode the classified samples using Gray code to obtain the initialized bit sequence and .

[0034] S18, multi-antenna UAV base station and single-antenna legal user will initialize the bit sequence and Randomly permutate according to the same rules and calculate the initialized bit sequence and Bit inconsistency rate , and set the bit inconsistency rate threshold ; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to Length grouping, A bit sequence indicating initialization length; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to The length of the packets is divided into groups, and the parity bit of each group is calculated and exchanged on a common channel.

[0035] S19. Compare the parity bits of the packets exchanged between the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user. If any of the parity bits are different, error correction is performed only on the packets with different parity bits, and the first bit of the packet is discarded. The remaining bits form a Hamming code group. and proceed Local error correction.

[0036] S20, calculate Hamming code group and Accompanied , They are: , , Where, is the check matrix, is the conjugate transposed matrix of the check matrix.

[0037] S21, multi-antenna UAV base station will be accompanied by the open channel Sent to a single-antenna legitimate user, the single-antenna legitimate user calculates the bit-by-bit XOR ,in The symbols are XORed to obtain the error bit position, thus achieving a round of dynamic negotiation and error correction.

[0038] S22, repeat S18 to S21 until the initial keys of the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user are completely consistent, and the physical layer key is obtained .

[0039] Embodiment 2: same as embodiment 1, except that: in order to improve the randomness and security of the physical layer key, a step of performing SHA-2 hash function security enhancement on the negotiated physical layer key is further included, specifically: S23, based on the SHA-2 algorithm, the multi-antenna unmanned aerial base station and the single-antenna legal user consistent with the initial physical layer key after key negotiation are filled, and then an initial hash value is set, the initial hash value being composed of 8 32-bit fixed constants.

[0040] S24, the multi-antenna unmanned aerial base station and the single-antenna legal user further divide the message to obtain a message block, and then perform extension and round iteration operations on each message block, using a logic function and bit operation in each round to gradually integrate the message block information into the intermediate hash value.

[0041] S25, after processing all the message blocks, the initial hash value and the intermediate results in the processing process are added in 32-bit words to generate a 256-bit final hash value, i.e. the physical layer key after SHA-2 hash function security enhancement .

[0042] As Figures 1 to 5 shown, in order to further illustrate the technical solutions and technical effects of the present application, the following specific examples are provided: Specific example 1: as Figure 1 , Figure 2 shown, a physical layer key secure communication method for unmanned aerial vehicles based on orthogonal time-frequency space, comprising the following steps: S01, as Figure 1 shown, an unmanned aerial ground communication system composed of a multi-antenna unmanned aerial base station equipped with 32 uniform antennas, four single-antenna legal users authorized to receive information on the ground, and an illegal user on the ground who passively eavesdrops is established, thereby modeling the channel of the unmanned aerial ground communication system in time delay Doppler angle dimension.

[0043] S02, since the channel estimation methods for the four single-antenna legal users in the downlink channel are the same, only the channel estimation for an arbitrary single-antenna legal user is performed: the correlation time-domain time-varying channel between the th antenna of the multi-antenna unmanned aerial base station and the single-antenna legal user is defined as: , wherein is the index of time-domain discretization, the symbol period , the subcarrier spacing ; the sampling interval , is the number of sampling points in the symbol period, is the discretization index of the delay domain; The number of main paths of the time-varying channel in the time domain , each main path contains subpath, the The Doppler shift of the subpath is , is the flight speed of the multi-antenna UAV base station, is the carrier frequency, is the speed of light; the channel gain is expressed as , No. The delay of all sub-paths under the main path is , , the number of antennas indexed , is the total number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; No. Antenna departure angle of each subpath for , , considering a linear uniform antenna array, with The relevant spatial angle is , is the distance between antennas, is the wavelength of the subcarrier, ; is the pulse shaping filter response; Then we get Delay-Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix for a single antenna for: , In the formula, the variable , For the The Doppler shift of the subpath is is the number of discrete symbols in the delay domain, is the symbol index in the Doppler domain, is the discrete domain symbol index of the delay right Modulus, For the The delay of all sub-paths under the main path, For the The antenna spatial angle of the subpath, about the variable Function for: , Where, is the number of symbols in the Doppler domain, Index variable for summation.

[0044] S03. In order to sparsely represent the channel of the UAV air-ground communication system, the delay-Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix is ​​calculated along the spatial domain. Perform inverse discrete Fourier transform to obtain the delay-Doppler angle domain channel : , Where, is the angle index, is the total number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station. Figure 2 As shown, only when 、 and hour, There will be non-zero elements.

[0045] S04, in the delay Doppler angle dimension channel After modeling, the received signal of the legitimate user with a single antenna is obtained and the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix , respectively expressed as: , , Where, is the pilot matrix transmitted by the UAV base station, for The identity matrix, is the number of drone base station antennas, is a sparse basis matrix, is additive white Gaussian noise, represents the Kronecker product.

[0046] S05. Using a three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, based on the communication channel between a multi-antenna UAV base station and a single-antenna legitimate user, set the cycle index of the three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm. , the dominant path index set of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix , the channel estimation vector of the initial delay-Doppler domain channel matrix , initial residual for: , Where, is the received signal of a single-antenna legitimate user, is the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix.

[0047] S06, iterate according to the number of paths to be estimated, and then calculate the correlation vector of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix for: , Where, is the conjugate transpose of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix, For the The residual of the iteration; And, the related vector Rearranged into a three-dimensional tensor of delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and antenna dimension for: , Where, is the guard interval length in the delay dimension, is the guard interval length in the Doppler dimension, is the number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station.

[0048] S07. Calculate three-dimensional tensor Expand along the delay dimension to obtain the expanded matrix for: , Compute the row vector of the expanded matrix Norm, get the delay dimension related vector , select The delayed dimension index corresponding to the maximum value ,Then As the first The support set of the delay dimension in the iteration.

[0049] S08, Fixed Delay Dimension Index , the first slice matrix of the unfolded matrix is: , Then calculate the row vector of the first slice matrix along the Doppler dimension norm, and obtain the Doppler correlation vector , select the maximum value in the Doppler dimension correlation vector, determine the non-zero block on the Doppler dimension, and then get the The support set of the iteration in the Doppler dimension .

[0050] S09, based on the first slice matrix and the support set in the Doppler dimension , the second slice matrix is ​​obtained as: , Calculate the column vector of the second slice matrix along the angle dimension Norm, get the angle dimension related vector ; Then, using the lifting transformation method, the angle dimension related vector Transform and process to determine the The support set of the iteration in the angle dimension .

[0051] S10: Update the delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and angle dimension support sets determined in S07 to S09 to obtain an index set. for: , Thus, through the least squares method, the channel estimation vector is obtained for: , Then, update the residual to , used to eliminate the influence of the estimated dominant path on the residual, repeat steps 23 to 26 until all dominant paths are detected and estimated, and finally output the channel estimation vector of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix for: , Where, is the number of dominant paths.

[0052] S11, the channel estimation vector is recorded as: , Where, is the number of dominant paths.

[0053] S12. Then, according to the magnitude of the dominant path gain strength, the dominant path gain strength is sorted from small to large to obtain:

[0054] Where, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the smallest gain intensity after sorting, After sorting The gain strength estimate of the dominant path, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the largest gain strength after sorting.

[0055] S13. Adaptively weight the dominant path gain strength from 0 to 1 using an adaptive weighting method, i.e.: , Where, For the A weight is used to adaptively weight the gain strength of the sorted dominant path, and the value range is 0~1, where Corresponding to the path with the smallest gain, The path with the largest gain corresponds to the intermediate weight Increase linearly.

[0056] S14, then restore to the original order, perform sliding window processing, and obtain the channel characteristic value of the communication channel for: , Where, is the number of channel eigenvalues, window size , the overlap size of two adjacent windows , For the The weight of the adaptive weighting, Indicates the The dominant path gain strength estimate after adaptive weighting.

[0057] S15. Perform double-bit uniform quantization on the channel eigenvalues ​​of the communication channel. The channel eigenvalue sequences of the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user are: and , the sample size is ; Then, the multi-antenna UAV base station calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; A single-antenna legitimate user calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; According to the number of quantization bits , calculate the number of quantized regions , then divide the sample interval into equal intervals: , , Where, and are the classification intervals for multi-antenna UAV base stations and single-antenna legitimate users, respectively.

[0058] S16, multi-antenna drone base station and single-antenna legitimate users pass through classification interval and Calculate the quantization threshold and treat the quantized sequence according to the quantization threshold and in The samples are classified separately.

[0059] S17, the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user encode the classified samples using Gray code to obtain the initialized bit sequence and .

[0060] S18, step 51: the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user initialize the bit sequence and Randomly permutate according to the same rules and calculate the initialized bit sequence and Bit inconsistency rate , and set the bit inconsistency rate threshold ; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to Length grouping, A bit sequence indicating initialization length; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to The length of the packets is divided into groups, and the parity bit of each group is calculated and exchanged on a common channel.

[0061] S19. Compare the parity bits of the packets exchanged between the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user. If any of the parity bits are different, perform error correction only on the different packets: discard the first bit of the packet, and the remaining bits form a Hamming code group. and Perform local error correction.

[0062] S20, calculate Hamming code group and Accompanied , They are: , , Where, is the check matrix, is the conjugate transposed matrix of the check matrix.

[0063] S21, multi-antenna UAV base station will be accompanied by the open channel Sent to a single-antenna legitimate user, the single-antenna legitimate user calculates the bit-by-bit XOR ,in The symbols are XORed to obtain the error bit position, thus achieving a round of dynamic negotiation and error correction.

[0064] S22, repeat S18 to S21 until the initial keys of the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user are completely consistent, and the physical layer key is obtained .

[0065] Specific embodiment 2: Figures 3 to 5 As shown, the method is the same as that of specific embodiment 1, except that: in order to improve the randomness and security of the physical layer key, the step of performing hash function SHA-2 confidentiality enhancement on the negotiated physical layer key is also included, specifically: S23, based on the SHA-2 algorithm, after key negotiation, the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user will use the same initial physical layer key. Fill in the data and then set an initial hash value, which consists of 8 32-bit fixed constants.

[0066] S24, the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user then split the message into message blocks, and then expand and iterate each message block. Each round uses logical functions and bit operations to gradually integrate the message block information into the intermediate hash value.

[0067] S25. After all message blocks are processed, the initial hash value and the intermediate results in the processing process are added as 32-bit words to generate a 256-bit final hash value, that is, the physical layer key after the hash function SHA-2 confidentiality enhancement is obtained. .

[0068] Figure 3 The improvement performance of different preprocessing algorithms on channel reciprocity is presented, and channel correlation is evaluated using the Pearson correlation coefficient. A larger Pearson correlation coefficient indicates better key consistency. As the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) increases, the channel eigenvalue correlation coefficient gradually increases. The correlation coefficient of the channel eigenvalues ​​for the Moving Average Coding (MAC) algorithm is lower than that for the Adaptive Weighted Path Gain Moving Average Coding (AWPMAC) algorithm. This is because smaller channel responses are more susceptible to noise in the delay-Doppler domain. By ranking the channel response strengths and adaptively weighting them, the impact of noise is further reduced, thereby improving legitimate channel reciprocity and making it easier for multi-antenna drone base stations and single-antenna legitimate users to generate consistent keys.

[0069] Figure 4The key inconsistency rates for different preprocessing algorithms are presented. The key inconsistency rate is the ratio of the number of different bits in the key of the two legitimate communicating parties after quantization to the key length. The smaller this value, the more conducive it is to the subsequent generation of consistent keys. As the signal-to-noise ratio gradually increases, the key inconsistency rate gradually decreases. The key inconsistency rate of the MAC algorithm is lower than that of the unprocessed one, and significantly higher than that of the AWPMAC algorithm. This is because the AWPMAC algorithm improves channel reciprocity. Through a more sophisticated channel feature extraction and processing mechanism, the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user can more accurately map channel information into a binary bit sequence, reducing the quantization error caused by channel differences.

[0070] Figure 5 The communication bit error rates of the key generation scheme and the artificial noise scheme were compared. In the key generation scheme, the bit error rate in legitimate communications is lower. This is because the illegal user passively eavesdropping on the ground does not possess the same physical layer key as the sender and cannot obtain the correct transmitted symbols, thus maintaining the bit error rate at 0.45. In the artificial noise security scheme, while the bit error rate of the illegal user passively eavesdropping on the ground remains high, increasing the noise power to address this issue results in excessive noise injection, reducing the transmission rate and communication efficiency. Therefore, the key generation scheme designed by the present invention is more secure than the artificial noise scheme.

[0071] Table 1

[0072] Finally, the randomness of the physical layer key is evaluated using the NIST standard. When , it is considered that the generated key has passed the randomness test. According to the NIST randomness test in Table 1, the key finally generated by the present invention has passed the NIST randomness test.

[0073] The above description is only a preferred specific example of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for secure communication of physical layer keys of unmanned aerial vehicles based on orthogonal time-frequency space, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: Step 1: Establish a UAV air-to-ground communication system consisting of a multi-antenna UAV base station, a single-antenna legitimate user authorized to receive information on the ground, and an illegal user passively eavesdropping on the ground. Then, perform delay-Doppler angle-dimensional channel modeling on the UAV air-to-ground communication system channel to obtain the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix. Step 2: Using a three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, based on the communication channel between a multi-antenna UAV base station and a single-antenna legitimate user, we obtain the index set of the dominant path of the communication channel in the delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and angle dimension. Then, we determine the channel estimation vectors of all dominant paths using the least squares method. Step 3: Adaptively weight the path gain strength of the channel estimation vector of the dominant path to obtain the channel eigenvalue of the communication channel. This is used to improve the reciprocity of the communication channel between the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user, ensuring that both communicating parties can generate consistent physical layer keys. Step 4: performing double-bit uniform quantization on the channel characteristic value of the communication channel to generate a channel characteristic value sequence, and then encoding the channel characteristic value sequence to obtain an initialized bit sequence; Step 5: Winnow key negotiation based on dynamic grouping is performed on the initialized bit sequence, that is, a consistent physical layer key for encrypting the transmitted information is obtained between the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user, which improves the bit error rate of illegal users, makes it impossible for illegal users to eavesdrop, and realizes confidential communication of the physical layer key.

2. The method for secure communication of a UAV physical layer key based on orthogonal time-frequency space according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 1 specifically includes the following steps: Step 11: First, the channel of the UAV air-to-ground communication system is modeled. The channel estimation method for each single-antenna legitimate user is the same, so only channel estimation is performed on any single-antenna legitimate user. The specific steps are: Definition and multi-antenna UAV base station time-domain time-varying channels with correlated antennas for: , Where, is the index of time domain discretization, is the symbol period, is the subcarrier spacing; is the sampling interval, is the number of sampling points in the symbol period, is the discretization index of the delay domain; The number of main paths of the time-varying channel in the time domain , each main path contains subpath, the The Doppler shift of the subpath is , is the flight speed of the multi-antenna UAV base station, is the carrier frequency, is the speed of light; the channel gain is expressed as , No. The delay of all sub-paths under the main path is , the number of antennas indexed , is the total number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; No. Antenna departure angle of each subpath for , considering a linear uniform antenna array, with The relevant spatial angle is , is the distance between antennas, is the wavelength of the subcarrier; is the pulse shaping filter response; Then we get Delay-Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix for a single antenna for: , In the formula, the variable , For the The Doppler shift of the subpath is is the number of discrete symbols in the delay domain, is the symbol index in the Doppler domain, is the discrete domain symbol index of the delay right Modulus, For the The delay of all sub-paths under the main path, For the The antenna spatial angle of the subpath, about the variable Function for: , Where, is the number of symbols in the Doppler domain, Index variables for summation; Step 12: In order to sparsely represent the channel of the UAV air-to-ground communication system, the delay-Doppler domain equivalent channel response matrix is ​​calculated along the spatial domain. Perform inverse discrete Fourier transform to obtain the delay-Doppler angle domain channel : , Where, is the angle index, is the total number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; Step 13: Delay Doppler angle channel After modeling, the received signal of a single-antenna legitimate user is and the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix Respectively expressed as: , , Where, is the pilot matrix transmitted by the UAV base station, for The identity matrix, is the number of drone base station antennas, is a sparse basis matrix, is additive white Gaussian noise, represents the Kronecker product.

3. The method for secure communication of a UAV physical layer key based on orthogonal time-frequency space according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 2 specifically includes the following steps: Step 21: Set the loop index of the three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm , the dominant path index set of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix , the channel estimation vector of the initial delay-Doppler domain channel matrix , initial residual for: , Where, is the received signal of a single-antenna legitimate user, is the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix; Step 22: Based on the three-dimensional structured orthogonal matching pursuit algorithm, iterate according to the number of paths to be estimated, and then calculate the correlation vector of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix for: , Where, is the conjugate transpose of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix, For the The residual of the iteration; And, the related vector Rearranged into a three-dimensional tensor of delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and antenna dimension for: , Where, is the guard interval length in the delay dimension, is the guard interval length in the Doppler dimension, is the number of antennas of the multi-antenna UAV base station; Step 23: Calculate the three-dimensional tensor Expand along the delay dimension to obtain the expanded matrix for: , Compute the row vector of the expanded matrix Norm, get the delay dimension related vector , select The delayed dimension index corresponding to the maximum value ,Then As the first The support set of the delay dimension in the iteration; Step 24: Fixed Delay Dimension Index , the first slice matrix of the unfolded matrix is: , Then calculate the row vector of the first slice matrix along the Doppler dimension norm, and obtain the Doppler correlation vector , select the maximum value in the Doppler dimension correlation vector, determine the non-zero block on the Doppler dimension, and then get the The support set of the iteration in the Doppler dimension ; Step 25: Based on the first slice matrix and the support set in the Doppler dimension , the second slice matrix is ​​obtained as: , Calculate the column vector of the second slice matrix along the angle dimension Norm, get the angle dimension related vector ; Then, using the lifting transformation method, the angle dimension related vector Transform and process to determine the The support set of the iteration in the angle dimension ; Step 26: Update the delay dimension, Doppler dimension, and angle dimension support sets determined in steps 23 to 25 to obtain an index set. for: , Thus, through the least squares method, the channel estimation vector is obtained for: , Then, update the residual to , used to eliminate the influence of the estimated dominant path on the residual, repeat steps 23 to 26 until all dominant paths are detected and estimated, and finally output the channel estimation vector of the delay-Doppler domain channel matrix for: , Where, is the number of dominant paths.

4. The method for secure communication of a UAV physical layer key based on orthogonal time-frequency space according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step three specifically includes the following steps: Step 31: The channel estimation vector is recorded as: , Where, is the number of dominant paths; Step 32: Then, according to the magnitude of the dominant path gain strength, the dominant path gain strength is sorted from small to large to obtain: ; Where, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the smallest gain intensity after sorting, After sorting The gain strength estimate of the dominant path, is the estimated value of the dominant path with the largest gain intensity after sorting; Step 33: Adaptively weight the ranked dominant path gain strength from 0 to 1, that is: , Where, For the A weight is used to adaptively weight the gain strength of the sorted dominant path, and the value range is 0~1, where Corresponding to the path with the smallest gain, The path with the largest gain corresponds to the intermediate weight Increase in a linear manner; Step 34: Restore to the original order and perform sliding windowing to obtain the channel characteristic value of the communication channel. : , Where, is the window size, is the number of channel eigenvalues, is the overlap size of two adjacent windows, For the The weight of the adaptive weighting, Indicates the The dominant path gain strength estimate after adaptive weighting.

5. The method for secure communication of a UAV physical layer key based on orthogonal time-frequency space according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 4 specifically includes the following steps: Step 41: The channel characteristic value sequence of the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user is and , the sample size is ; Then, the multi-antenna UAV base station calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; A single-antenna legitimate user calculates the sequence to be quantized based on its own channel eigenvalue sequence The sample interval is ; According to the number of quantization bits , calculate the number of quantized regions , then divide the sample interval into equal intervals: , , Where, and are the classification intervals for multi-antenna UAV base stations and single-antenna legitimate users, respectively; Step 42: Multi-antenna UAV base stations and single-antenna legitimate users pass through classification intervals and Calculate the quantization threshold and treat the quantized sequence according to the quantization threshold and in The samples are classified separately; Step 43: The multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legal user encode the classified samples using Gray code to obtain an initialized bit sequence. and .

6. The method for secure communication of a UAV physical layer key based on orthogonal time-frequency space according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step five specifically includes the following steps: Step 51: The multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user initialize the bit sequence and Randomly permutate according to the same rules and calculate the initialized bit sequence and Bit inconsistency rate , and set the bit inconsistency rate threshold ; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to Length grouping, A bit sequence indicating initialization length; like , then the initialized bit sequence after random permutation and according to Length grouping, calculating the parity bit of each group and exchanging them on a common channel; Step 52: Compare the parity bits of the packets exchanged between the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user. If the parity bits of any of the packets are different, perform error correction only on the packets with different parity bits, discard the first bit of the packet, and the remaining bits form a Hamming code group. and Perform local error correction; Step 53: Calculate the Hamming code group and Accompanied , They are: , , Where, is the check matrix, is the conjugate transposed matrix of the check matrix; Step 54: The multi-antenna UAV base station transmits the accompanying Sent to a single-antenna legitimate user, the single-antenna legitimate user calculates the bit-by-bit XOR ,in XOR calculation symbols are used to obtain the error bit position, thus achieving a round of dynamic negotiation and error correction; Step 55: Repeat steps 51 to 54 until the initial keys of the multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user are completely consistent, and the physical layer key is obtained. .

7. The method for secure communication of a UAV physical layer key based on orthogonal time-frequency space according to any one of claims 1 to 6, characterized in that: In order to improve the randomness and security of the physical layer key, the method further includes performing a step of performing SHA-2 confidentiality enhancement on the negotiated physical layer key.

8. The method for secure communication of physical layer keys of unmanned aerial vehicles based on orthogonal time-frequency space according to claim 7, characterized in that: The steps of performing SHA-2 hash function security enhancement on the negotiated physical layer key are specifically as follows: Step 61: Based on the SHA-2 algorithm, the multi-antenna drone base station and the single-antenna legitimate user will use the same initial physical layer key after key negotiation. Fill in and then set an initial hash value, which consists of 8 32-bit fixed constants; Step 62: The multi-antenna UAV base station and the single-antenna legitimate user split the message into message blocks, and then expand and iterate each message block. Each round uses logical functions and bit operations to gradually integrate the message block information into the intermediate hash value. Step 63: After all message blocks are processed, the initial hash value and the intermediate results in the processing process are added in 32-bit words to generate a 256-bit final hash value, which is the physical layer key after the hash function SHA-2 privacy enhancement. .

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