Anti-quantum-attack password authentication key exchange and authentication method based on block chain

Abstract

The invention discloses an anti-quantum-attack password authentication key exchange and authentication method based on a block chain. The method comprises the following steps: inputting a preset parameter, a trap door, a matrix, a noise vector, a password and a public key into a computer system; executing a parameter generation algorithm to generate common parameters; executing a Hash key generation algorithm to generate a Hash key, and executing a projection Hash key generation algorithm to generate a projection Hash key; generating a label according to the identifications of the two communication parties and the projection hash key, encrypting the label to obtain a ciphertext, and transmitting and receiving the projection hash key and the ciphertext of the opposite communication party; after the projection hash key of the communication opposite side is verified to be valid, a session key is generated in combination with related parameters; the computer system processor executes a computer program and outputs a session key. According to the method, the lattice-based smooth projection hash function with the trap door and the block chain structure are fused, the quantum attack resistance and universal combinable security characteristics are achieved, only one round of communication is needed, and the method is suitable for a block chain large-scale node scene.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the technical fields of cryptography, information security, privacy protection, blockchain, industrial internet, and Internet of Things, and specifically relates to a quantum attack-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method. Background Technology

[0002] In blockchain, transaction information is typically public, which can lead to the leakage of users' privacy information. To address this issue, general-purpose composable secure protocols are used to design and implement privacy protection mechanisms. Among them, the general-purpose composable secure password-authenticated key exchange protocol has attracted attention due to its suitability for blockchain scenarios. It can ensure transaction privacy and prevent the leakage of sensitive information. During the process of establishing a shared key between communicating parties, this protocol can perform authentication: users use their passwords as authentication credentials, and generate session keys using the messages exchanged by the protocol. The Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocol itself combines the convenience of password authentication with the security of key exchange protocols, and can support users in generating high-entropy session keys that ensure the security of subsequent communications.

[0003] However, existing PAKE protocols are mostly built on traditional hard problems, which have obvious security shortcomings. With the development of quantum computing technology, cryptographic systems based on traditional hard problems are facing serious threats. This puts blockchain privacy protection mechanisms that rely on such PAKE protocols at risk, that is, traditional PAKE cannot resist quantum attacks. Therefore, we need to construct lattice-based PAKE to ensure data security.

[0004] Currently, password-based key authentication protocols have been widely studied for secure data access in IoT devices. Improvements to existing technologies focus on reducing the number of communication rounds and computational overhead in the protocol to optimize operational efficiency. However, such improvements only optimize protocol complexity and are difficult to adapt to the complex internet operating environment.

[0005] Given the shortcomings of the existing technologies, in order to better ensure data security and the rational use of equipment resources in blockchain scenarios, it is urgent to design a password-based key exchange protocol with quantum-resistant security characteristics to meet the security requirements of blockchain and achieve the goal of general composable security. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The main objective of this invention is to provide a quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method to address the following two inherent limitations of existing password authentication key exchange and authentication schemes: (1) weak resistance to quantum attacks, making it difficult to cope with security threats in a quantum computing environment; (2) insufficient security of key exchange between blockchain nodes, low authentication efficiency, and easy leakage of privacy data.

[0007] Based on the first main aspect of the present invention, a quantum-attack-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method is provided, comprising the following steps performed by a computer system:

[0008] Input preset parameters, trapdoors, matrices, noise vectors, passwords, and public keys into the computer system;

[0009] The preset parameters, trapdoor, and matrix execution parameter generation algorithm generate common parameters;

[0010] A hash key is generated by performing a hash key generation algorithm on the preset parameters, and a projected hash key generation algorithm is performed on the public parameters and the hash key to generate a projected hash key.

[0011] A tag is generated based on the identifiers of both communicating parties and the projection hash key, and the tag is encrypted to obtain ciphertext. The projection hash key and the ciphertext are transmitted to the other party, and the projection hash key and ciphertext transmitted by the other party are received simultaneously.

[0012] After verifying the validity of the projection hash key transmitted by the receiving communication partner, a session key is generated by combining the hash key, the received projection hash key, the ciphertext of both parties, and the password.

[0013] The computer system processor executes a computer program and outputs the session key.

[0014] As a further preferred embodiment, in the aforementioned method, when executing the parameter generation algorithm, a combination matrix is ​​generated by combining a specific matrix with a zero matrix, and then the common parameters are generated by combining the combination matrix with the noise vector; the common parameters include the calculation result, the adaptation matrix, and a preset association value;

[0015] The noise vector satisfies Where U is the combination matrix, x is the noise vector, and q is the operation modulus;

[0016] The adaptation matrix is ​​obtained by combining the matrix with the trapdoor through lattice linear operations.

[0017] As a further preferred embodiment, in the aforementioned method, the hash key generation algorithm includes: inputting the preset parameters, generating a vector through a preset linear generation rule on the lattice, and using the vector as the hash key.

[0018] As a further preferred embodiment, in the aforementioned method, the step of generating a projected hash key by applying a projection hash key generation algorithm to the public parameters and the hash key includes:

[0019] First, a first projection key part is generated using the projection hash key generation algorithm. Then, the second projection key part is calculated by combining the preset matrix corresponding to the preset association value in the public parameters, the hash key, and the calculation result.

[0020] The projection hash key includes the first projection key portion and the second projection key portion.

[0021] As a further preferred embodiment, in the aforementioned method, the step of generating a label based on the identifiers of both communicating parties and the projected hash key specifically includes:

[0022] The identifiers of the two communicating parties include a client identifier and a server identifier; when generating the tag, the tag is obtained by concatenating the client identifier, server identifier and projected hash key in the order of client identifier-server identifier-projected hash key, and the tag, the public key and the password are input and the tag is encrypted using an encryption algorithm to generate the ciphertext.

[0023] As a further preferred embodiment, in the aforementioned method, verifying the projection hash key transmitted by the receiving communication counterpart includes:

[0024] Extract the projection hash key transmitted by the other party and the adaptation matrix in the public parameters, and perform operations on the first projection key part and the second projection key part of the projection hash key transmitted by the other party with the adaptation matrix respectively;

[0025] If the calculation results are equal, the projected hash key transmitted by the other party is deemed valid; otherwise, the process is terminated.

[0026] As a further preferred embodiment, in the aforementioned method, generating the session key specifically includes:

[0027] A projection hash value is generated by combining the received projection hash key, the self-generated ciphertext, and the password; and a hash value is generated by combining the hash key, the received ciphertext, and the password.

[0028] The vector dot product operation is performed between the projected hash value and the hash value, and the result is used as the session key.

[0029] As a further preferred embodiment, the aforementioned method further includes executing a trapdoor hash key generation algorithm, which uses the trapdoor, projected hash key, public parameters, ciphertext, and plaintext to call a preset reversal algorithm to deduce the hash key;

[0030] The trapdoor hash key generation algorithm is as follows: ,

[0031] Where k is the hash key and Inver is the reversal algorithm. The second projection key portion of the projection hash key. This is a trapdoor, and u is a preset associated value in the common parameters.

[0032] As a further preferred embodiment, in the aforementioned method, the execution of the trapdoor hash key generation algorithm further includes generating a hash value, specifically including:

[0033]

[0034] in, c is the hash value, and c is the ciphertext. This represents the encoding operation on data m. Let s and e be the incidence matrix, and s and e be vectors. This is a scaling adjustment factor related to the operation modulus q and the matrix dimension.

[0035] Based on a second key aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed, implements the aforementioned quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method.

[0036] Compared with existing technologies, this invention focuses on the core security requirements of metadata access. Addressing the technical limitations of existing PAKE protocols in meeting security requirements while also considering communication overhead, this invention innovatively optimizes existing lattice-based smooth projection hash function schemes by introducing a trapdoor mechanism and adding Verhp and Thash algorithms. This successfully constructs a lattice-based smooth projection hash function with a trapdoor, thereby realizing a single-round quantum-resistant PAKE protocol. This effectively fills the gap in quantum-resistant security of traditional key authentication methods and provides reliable security for metadata access in a quantum-resistant environment.

[0037] Secondly, based on the trapdoor smooth projection hash function constructed above, this invention addresses the current challenge of implementing a lattice-based one-round PAKE protocol with universal composable (UC) security. It designs a lattice-based one-round PAKE protocol that can achieve universal composable security, significantly breaking through the dual bottlenecks of existing key authentication technologies in terms of universal composable security and simplified protocol rounds. The protocol achieves a high level of security while further simplifying the interaction process and improving the practicality of security authentication.

[0038] Finally, this invention demonstrates significant advantages in communication and computation efficiency. Compared to existing key authentication methods, it requires only one communication round, greatly reducing interaction latency. Furthermore, both computational and communication overhead increase linearly with the increase in security parameters. Even though the rate of increase slightly accelerates when the security parameter exceeds 256, its overall computational and communication overhead is still superior to existing technologies, effectively balancing security performance and efficiency requirements. Attached Figure Description

[0039] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, obtaining other drawings based on these drawings without creative effort still falls within the scope of the present invention.

[0040] Figure 1 The following is a flowchart illustrating the execution of a quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to one embodiment of the present invention.

[0041] Figure 2 A model diagram of a lattice-based smooth projection hash function with trapdoors is shown in one embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 3 A key exchange model based on password authentication is shown in one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0043] The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below to provide a clearer understanding of the purpose, features, and advantages of the invention. It should be understood that the following embodiments are not intended to limit the scope of the invention, but are merely illustrative of the essential spirit of the technical solution of the invention.

[0044] In the following description, certain specific details are set forth for the purpose of illustrating various disclosed embodiments in order to provide a thorough understanding of the various disclosed embodiments. However, those skilled in the art will recognize that embodiments may be practiced without one or more of these specific details. In other instances, well-known techniques associated with the invention may not have been shown or described in detail to avoid unnecessarily obscuring the description of the embodiments.

[0045] Throughout this specification, references to "an embodiment" or "an embodiment" indicate that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment. Therefore, the appearance of "in an embodiment" or "an embodiment" in various places throughout the specification does not necessarily refer to the same embodiment. Furthermore, a particular feature, structure, or characteristic may be combined in any manner in one or more embodiments.

[0046] The specific meanings of the technical terms, English abbreviations, and letters that may be involved in this invention are explained below.

[0047] TSPHF: Smooth Projective Hash Function with Trapdoor;

[0048] PAKE: Password authentication key exchange;

[0049] UC: General composable security;

[0050] MP: Smooth projection hash function;

[0051] Params: Preset parameters;

[0052] Trapping door;

[0053] P: Lattice public key matrix;

[0054] X: Noise vector;

[0055] pw: Password;

[0056] pk: Public key;

[0057] crs: Common parameters;

[0058] m, n: Dimension parameters;

[0059] u: Preset associated value;

[0060] : Independence matrix;

[0061] hk: Hash key;

[0062] hp: Projected hash key;

[0063] l: tag;

[0064] c: Ciphertext;

[0065] Y: Adaptation matrix;

[0066] U: Combination matrix;

[0067] sk: Session key.

[0068] like Figure 1As shown, in one embodiment of the present invention, a quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method includes the following steps S110-S160:

[0069] S110, input preset parameters, trapdoor, matrix, noise vector, password and public key into the computer system;

[0070] S120, Generate common parameters for the preset parameters, trapdoor, and matrix execution parameter generation algorithm;

[0071] S130, execute a hash key generation algorithm on the preset parameters to generate a hash key, and execute a projection hash key generation algorithm on the public parameters and the hash key to generate a projection hash key;

[0072] S140: Generate a tag according to the identifiers of both communicating parties and the projection hash key, encrypt the tag to obtain ciphertext, transmit the projection hash key and the ciphertext to the other party, and simultaneously receive the projection hash key and ciphertext transmitted by the other party.

[0073] S150, after verifying the validity of the projection hash key transmitted by the receiving communication partner, a session key is generated by combining the hash key, the received projection hash key, the ciphertext of both parties, and the password.

[0074] S160, the computer system processor executes a computer program and outputs the session key.

[0075] In one embodiment, the present invention constructs a lattice-based method for constructing a smooth projection hash function with trapdoors, combined with... Figure 2 As shown, it consists of the following seven algorithms: Thash trapdoor generation algorithm, Pgen parameter generation algorithm, HashKeg hash key generation algorithm, ProjKG projection key generation algorithm, Hash hash generation algorithm, ProjHash projection hash generation algorithm, and Verhp projection key verification algorithm.

[0076] First, a smooth projective hash function with a trapdoor based on the lattice hardness assumption is constructed, and a trapdoor is designed to verify the projected key. To this end, in this embodiment, the trapdoor in existing public-key encryption schemes is processed and used in the scheme, and a reversal algorithm is used for verifying the projected key. In other words, in the smooth projective hash function scheme with a trapdoor, the algorithm of the smooth projective hash function remains unchanged; a trapdoor and a reversal algorithm are introduced for the generation and verification of the projected key.

[0077] This embodiment details how to generate the trapdoor of TSPHF in the following possible implementations. and common parameters ;

[0078] Trapdoor generation algorithms in public-key encryption schemes generate matrices. and trapdoor In this embodiment, matrix T is concatenated with a zero matrix to obtain... ,calculate , where the noise vector Make .

[0079] There exists a projection mapping : There is a cut matrix ,in Let be the identity matrix, such that Known ,so Then there is We have ,matrix Zero space ,set up The dimension is Then a basis of the null space of matrix P. ,calculate ,matrix Zero space ,set up The dimension is ,but It is a set of bases that satisfy .

[0080] Existence matrix , .therefore . .

[0081] In this embodiment, the complete TSPHF scheme based on lattice is composed of the parameter generation algorithm PGene. Hash key generation algorithm HashKeg ( ), Projected hash key generation algorithm ProjKG ( Hash generation algorithm () Projected hash generation algorithm ProjHash ( Verhp (Verification algorithm) ), Trapdoor hash generation algorithm THash ( The components are as follows:

[0082] (1)PGen ( ):

[0083] Select a noise vector Algorithm generation ;

[0084] From the matrix calculate ; ;

[0085] Algorithm output common parameters Together, these three provide unified parameters for the subsequent ProjKG and Verhp algorithms, ensuring the compatibility of each algorithm.

[0086] (2) HashKeg ( ):

[0087] Generate vectors using known algorithms ;

[0088] Algorithm outputs hash key As the core key for hash operations, it is used for subsequent hash value generation operations.

[0089] (3) ProjKG ( ):

[0090] Generate the first projection key part using a known algorithm , It is the public verification part of the projection key, which does not contain trapdoor information and is only used for verification in association with the second projection key part;

[0091] Generating the second projection key part This achieves the binding of the projection key with the trapdoor information, making the second projection key part... It contains both hash keys and noise randomness;

[0092] The algorithm outputs a projection hash key that includes a first projection key portion and a second projection key portion. .

[0093] (4) Hash( ):

[0094] The algorithm outputs a hash value. .

[0095] (5) ProjHash( ):

[0096] The algorithm outputs the projected hash value. .

[0097] (6) Verhp( ):

[0098] Verify the projected hash key, if If the parameters are equal, the algorithm outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0. If they are equal, it means that the projected hash key was generated based on valid parameters; otherwise, it is a malicious parameter, and the process is terminated.

[0099] (7) THash ):

[0100] Calculate using projected hash key The logic of the inversion algorithm is based on trapdoors. The short basis property. Solving linear equations. ,because It can efficiently solve linear equations on lattice surfaces, therefore it can be used to... By deducing k, the traceability and verification of the hash key can be achieved;

[0101] Calculate hash value : ;

[0102] The algorithm outputs a hash value. It is used to verify the correspondence between ciphertext and plaintext;

[0103] If they hold the same k and The hash value calculated for the same ciphertext and plaintext will always be the same, which can be used to detect whether the ciphertext has been tampered with, and enhance the anti-forgery property of the hash function.

[0104] Based on the aforementioned TSPHF construction, this invention presents a one-round password-based key exchange protocol with general composable security. First, public parameters and a password `pw` are set before the protocol, where `crs` contains the public parameters from TSPHF and the public key from the MP encryption scheme. These parameters, published before the protocol, will be used by the participants in the protocol.

[0105] In the protocol of this invention, after one round of communication, both parties generate a private key to ensure the security of subsequent sessions. This round of information exchange includes a projected hash key and ciphertext for encrypting pw. Both parties first generate (hk, hp) and ciphertext c, then retain hk and send hp and c to the other party. Upon receiving the other party's transmitted (hk, hp ... , After that, the inspection The validity of the data is checked; if it is invalid, the protocol is terminated; otherwise, it can be determined based on the received data. Generate a session key with hk.

[0106] In one embodiment, the protocol interaction between the client and the server is as follows:

[0107] First, the client and server side Generate separately and Then the generated information is transmitted to the other party respectively:

[0108] Both parties called respectively Calculate their respective hash keys and ;

[0109] Call again Calculate the projection key separately and ;

[0110] Secondly, tags are set up to bind "participant identity + projection key" to prevent identity forgery:

[0111] Both parties set labels respectively and setting tags ;

[0112] Both parties called respectively Calculate ciphertext and ;

[0113] After both parties receive the communication information, they verify the validity of the projected hash key and calculate the session key sk.

[0114] Client verify ;

[0115] Server side verify ;

[0116] Client settings tags Server-side tag settings ;

[0117] if If invalid, terminate the process; otherwise, the client performs the calculation. ;

[0118] if If invalid, the process is terminated; otherwise, the server performs the calculation. .

[0119] In one possible implementation, combining Figure 3 As shown, the following embodiments illustrate key exchange based on password authentication:

[0120] This embodiment mainly involves four stages: the request interaction stage, the parameter preparation stage, the communication stage, and the response stage. The request interaction stage involves the user requesting interaction and then sending their password to the blockchain node; the parameter preparation stage involves generating relevant parameters based on the user's password and storing them in the node for subsequent communication; the communication stage involves the user generating communication information and then interacting with the node; the response stage involves the node responding after the information exchange and generating a session key for both users. The specific process is as follows:

[0121] (1) Request interaction phase:

[0122] The user initiates an interaction request to the blockchain node and provides their password. ;

[0123] Users only need to send their password to the node. No additional calculations are required; this step is the foundation for all subsequent stages. (2) Parameter preparation stage:

[0124] The node uses the password provided by the user. It generates public parameters for subsequent communication and saves the user's "parameter-password" association information to ensure that the user's identity can be verified later.

[0125] Step 1: Node Utilization Algorithm Select a noise vector ;

[0126] Algorithm generation ; by matrix calculate ; ;

[0127] Algorithm output common parameters ;

[0128] Step 2: Node saving .

[0129] (3) Communication phase:

[0130] The user generates encrypted information, and the node verifies and calculates the key.

[0131] Step 1: Both users agree to... Generate separately and .

[0132] First, calculate using an algorithm. and ; and ;

[0133] Then set the label. and The tag is used to uniquely identify the current communication;

[0134] Both parties calculate separately and ;

[0135] Step 2: Both users base their communication information on the generated communication information. and It is transmitted to the other party through the node;

[0136] This step is a "secure relay station." It does not directly decrypt information but is responsible for forwarding the communication information between the two parties to each other, thus avoiding the potential eavesdropping risks of direct point-to-point transmission between users.

[0137] Step 3: After receiving the communication information, both nodes verify the information. and ;

[0138] And set labels and setting tags ;if and If invalid, the process is terminated to prevent unauthorized access; otherwise, node computation continues. .

[0139] (4) Response phase: The user receives the generated session key sk and completes the process.

[0140] The node sends the calculated session key to each user, and both users end up with the same session key sk. Both users receive the session key sk and can use the session key for point-to-point encrypted communication thereafter.

[0141] Because the session key is held only by the two parties and its generation process involves multiple verifications and encryption, the confidentiality and integrity of the communication can be ensured.

[0142] In this embodiment, the entire process involves two users and a blockchain node. The core objective is to enable the two users to calculate the same session key through the "parameter generation-information verification" mediation role of the node without exposing sensitive information.

[0143] The security of this process relies on three core elements. First, the user password (pw) serves as the core credential for identity binding. Second, a series of cryptographic algorithms ensure that parameters are immutable and information is transmitted in encrypted form. Finally, the node verification process filters out illegal requests to prevent malicious users from accessing the network. Through symmetric hashing and encryption calculations, both parties obtain the same session key, meeting the security requirements for subsequent communication.

[0144] The technical terms, principles, or means related to the technical solutions of the present invention mentioned in the above embodiments, which are not described in detail above, are all well-known technologies or common practices that are known to those skilled in the art.

[0145] The foregoing has shown and described the basic principles, main features, and advantages of the present invention. Those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. The embodiments and descriptions in the specification are merely illustrative of the principles of the invention. Various changes and modifications can be made to the invention without departing from its spirit and scope, and all such changes and modifications fall within the scope of the present invention as claimed. The scope of protection of this invention is defined by the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A quantum-attack-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method, characterized in that, This includes the following steps performed by the computer system: Input preset parameters, trapdoors, matrices, noise vectors, passwords, and public keys into the computer system; The preset parameters, trapdoor, and matrix execution parameter generation algorithm generate common parameters; A hash key is generated by performing a hash key generation algorithm on the preset parameters, and a projected hash key generation algorithm is performed on the public parameters and the hash key to generate a projected hash key. A tag is generated based on the identifiers of both communicating parties and the projection hash key, and the tag is encrypted to obtain ciphertext. The projection hash key and the ciphertext are transmitted to the other party, and the projection hash key and ciphertext transmitted by the other party are received simultaneously. After verifying the validity of the projection hash key transmitted by the receiving communication partner, a session key is generated by combining the hash key, the received projection hash key, the ciphertext of both parties, and the password. The computer system processor executes a computer program and outputs the session key.

2. The quantum-attack-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, When executing the parameter generation algorithm, a combination matrix is ​​generated by combining a specific matrix with a zero matrix, and then the common parameters are generated by combining the combination matrix with the noise vector. The common parameters include the calculation result, the adaptation matrix, and a preset association value. The noise vector satisfies Where U is the combination matrix, x is the noise vector, and q is the operation modulus; The adaptation matrix is ​​obtained by combining the matrix with the trapdoor through lattice linear operations.

3. The quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The hash key generation algorithm includes: inputting the preset parameters, generating a vector through a preset linear generation rule on the lattice, and using the vector as the hash key.

4. The quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The method of generating a projected hash key by projecting the public parameters and the hash key includes: First, a first projection key part is generated using the projection hash key generation algorithm. Then, the second projection key part is calculated by combining the preset matrix corresponding to the preset association value in the public parameters, the hash key, and the calculation result. The projection hash key includes the first projection key portion and the second projection key portion.

5. The quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of generating a label based on the identifiers of both communicating parties and the projected hash key specifically includes: The identifiers of the two communicating parties include a client identifier and a server identifier; when generating the tag, the tag is obtained by concatenating the client identifier, server identifier and projected hash key in the order of client identifier-server identifier-projected hash key, and the tag, the public key and the password are input and the tag is encrypted using an encryption algorithm to generate the ciphertext.

6. The quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The verification of the projection hash key transmitted by the receiving communication counterpart includes: Extract the projection hash key transmitted by the other party and the adaptation matrix in the public parameters, and perform operations on the first projection key part and the second projection key part of the projection hash key transmitted by the other party with the adaptation matrix respectively; If the calculation results are equal, the projected hash key transmitted by the other party is deemed valid; otherwise, the process is terminated.

7. The quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of the session key specifically includes: A projection hash value is generated by combining the received projection hash key, the self-generated ciphertext, and the password; and a hash value is generated by combining the hash key, the received ciphertext, and the password. The vector dot product operation is performed between the projected hash value and the hash value, and the result is used as the session key.

8. The quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, It also includes executing a trapdoor hash key generation algorithm, which uses the trapdoor, projected hash key, public parameters, ciphertext, and plaintext to call a preset reversal algorithm to deduce the hash key; The trapdoor hash key generation algorithm is as follows: , Where k is the hash key and Inver is the reversal algorithm. The second projection key portion of the projection hash key. This is a trapdoor, and u is a preset associated value in the common parameters.

9. The quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The execution of the trapdoor hash key generation algorithm also includes generating hash values, specifically including: ； in, c is the hash value, and c is the ciphertext. This represents the encoding operation on data m. Let s and e be the incidence matrix, and s and e be vectors. This is a scaling adjustment factor related to the operation modulus q and the matrix dimension.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When executed, the program implements the quantum-resistant blockchain-based password authentication key exchange and authentication method as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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