Flight phase perception based adaptive adjustment method for network dynamic security policy of airborne network

CN123035459APending Publication Date: 2026-11-03SHENYANG HANGSHENG TECH CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202611478514.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-09-22
Publication Date
2026-11-03

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing airborne cybersecurity strategies employ static configuration methods, which cannot adapt to changes in security requirements at different flight phases, resulting in wasted resources during low-threat phases and insufficient protection during high-threat phases.

Method used

This paper presents a method for adaptive adjustment of airborne network dynamic security policies based on flight phase awareness. By predefined security policy profiles and real-time identification of flight phases by the flight management system, the method utilizes an SDN controller and a policy management engine to achieve dynamic adjustment of security policies, including security policy parameter generation, consistency checks, simulation verification, and security policy updates using a two-phase commit protocol.

Benefits of technology

It achieves an optimal balance between security and real-time performance of airborne networks at different stages of flight, avoiding resource waste and insufficient protection, and ensuring the continuity and security of network communication.

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Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of avionics network communication security, and provides a flight phase-aware airborne network dynamic security policy adaptive adjustment method.The method comprises the following steps: predefining security policy images of different flight phases; identifying the current flight phase; when switching the current flight phase, generating security policy parameters according to the new security policy image, and then performing consistency checking and simulation verification on the security policy parameters; issuing security policy update instructions under a two-phase commit protocol, and issuing the security policy update instructions according to the issuing priority; performing continuity guarantee processing on the security policy update instructions; when the key update period changes, triggering key update by reusing the two-phase commit protocol; performing emergency strategy adjustment when a threat event alarm is received; recording all strategy switching event logs, and generating a security policy execution report.The present application realizes the optimal balance between security and real-time performance of the airborne network under different flight phases.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the technical field of avionics network communication security, and more specifically, to a method for adaptive adjustment of dynamic security strategies for airborne networks based on flight phase awareness. Background Technology

[0002] Airborne networks face significantly different security threats during different flight phases, including ground parking, taxiing, takeoff, climb, cruise, maneuvering, approach, and landing. During ground parking and taxiing, the network faces internal threats such as maintenance personnel misoperation and access from ground equipment. During takeoff and landing, the network carries critical flight control commands, requiring extremely high real-time performance, and security strategies cannot introduce excessive overhead. During cruise, network resources are relatively abundant, allowing for the implementation of stricter security strategies. During combat maneuvering, the network may face electronic warfare threats, requiring the highest level of security protection.

[0003] However, existing airborne network security strategies employ static configuration—security parameters such as authentication frequency, encryption strength, and detection sensitivity remain unchanged regardless of the flight phase. The IEEE 802.1DP-2025 standard also explicitly stipulates that airborne TSN networks should use a fully centralized offline file configuration, prohibiting dynamic configuration at runtime. This static strategy presents two problems: during low-threat phases such as cruising, security overhead wastes valuable airborne computing resources; during high-threat phases such as combat, security protection is insufficient.

[0004] Furthermore, the airborne network contains both FC-AE-ASM and TSN domains, and the security requirements and capabilities of the two types of networks are different, requiring differentiated and dynamic security strategies for management.

[0005] The closest prior art to this invention is application number CN121887737A, "A method and system for dynamic traffic scheduling of airborne TSN network", and the IEEE 802.1DP-2025 standard, "Time-Sensitive Networking for AerospaceOnboard Ethernet Communications".

[0006] Patent application CN121887737A uses federated learning to achieve dynamic scheduling of TSN traffic. It can generate scheduling configurations based on service intent and network status, but its scheduling objects are limited to traffic scheduling and do not involve dynamic adjustment of security policies. At the same time, federated learning has a large computational overhead and is not suitable for real-time adjustment of security policies.

[0007] The IEEE 802.1DP-2025 standard defines the configuration method for airborne TSN networks. However, this standard explicitly stipulates that airborne TSN networks should adopt a fully centralized, offline, static configuration, prohibiting dynamic configuration during runtime and not supporting dynamic adjustments to security policies. This approach cannot adapt to changing security requirements at different flight phases, resulting in resource waste during low-threat phases and insufficient protection during high-threat phases.

[0008] In summary, existing technologies lack a mechanism for dynamically adjusting safety strategies based on flight phases, and therefore cannot achieve an optimal balance between safety and real-time performance at different flight phases. Summary of the Invention

[0009] This invention aims to solve the problem that static configuration of airborne network security strategies cannot adapt to the security requirements of different flight phases.

[0010] Therefore, in view of the shortcomings of the existing technology, the purpose of this invention is to provide an adaptive adjustment method for dynamic security strategy of airborne network based on flight phase awareness.

[0011] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides a flight-phase-aware adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security policies. This flight-phase-aware adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security policies includes: Step S01: Predefining security policy profiles for the airborne network in different flight phases; wherein, the security policy profile is a set of security parameters adapted to the airborne network in the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain; Step S02: Real-time identification of the current flight phase by the flight management system, and then determining whether a switch has occurred based on the identification result; if the determination result is yes, proceed to Step S03; Step S03: When it is determined that a switch has occurred in the current flight phase, the policy management engine generates security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain based on the security policy profile of the current flight phase after the switch, and then performs consistency checks and simulation verification on the security policy parameters, and issues the security policy parameters when both the consistency check and simulation verification pass; Step S04: The policy management engine instructs the SDN controller to use a two-phase commit protocol to send the security policy parameters to the FC switch in the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN switch in the TSN domain. The system issues a security policy update instruction upon switching aircraft, and distributes the instruction to each communication channel according to the priority order. The priority order is based on the security level of the communication channel. The security policy update instruction includes the security policy parameters and an effective timestamp. Step S05: The old policy is used to process currently transmitted ASM messages and TSN streams, while the new policy is applied to newly initiated ASM messages and TSN streams according to the security policy update instruction, ensuring continuity of the security policy update instruction execution. Step S06: When the key update cycle in the security policy profile changes, the two-phase commit protocol is reused to trigger a key update. Step S07: When a security event alarm is received, an emergency policy adjustment, unconstrained by the current flight phase, is executed through the policy management engine. Step S08: The complete log of all policy switching events is recorded through the policy management engine, and a security policy execution report is generated after the flight ends. The security policy execution report is used to optimize the security policy profile.

[0012] Preferably, in step S01, the set of security parameters for the security strategy profile includes any one or more of the following: ASM message authentication mode, encryption algorithm type, encryption key length, intrusion detection sensitivity level, key update cycle, TSN gPTP security detection strength, and FRER authentication mode; the flight phases include: ground parking phase, taxiing phase, takeoff phase, landing phase, cruise phase, and combat maneuver phase.

[0013] Preferably, step S02 specifically includes: step S21: acquiring current flight phase information in real time through the flight management system; wherein, the current flight phase information includes: current flight phase identifier, flight altitude, flight speed, flight attitude, and flight mission mode; step S22: identifying the current flight phase in real time based on the current flight phase information; step S23: confirming whether the current flight phase has switched based on the identification result and using a dual confirmation mechanism and an anti-shake mechanism; wherein, the dual confirmation mechanism is to use the current flight phase identifier output by the flight management system as the primary criterion, and the flight altitude, flight speed, flight attitude, and flight mission mode as auxiliary criterions, and to determine whether the current flight phase has switched based on the primary criterion and the auxiliary criterion respectively, and to initially confirm that the current flight phase has switched when the judgment results of the primary criterion and the auxiliary criterion are consistent; the anti-shake mechanism is to finally confirm that the current flight phase has switched only when the duration of the initially confirmed switch of the current flight phase is greater than a first preset time.

[0014] Preferably, step S03 specifically includes: Step S31: When it is determined that a switch has occurred in the current flight phase, the policy management engine generates security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain based on the security policy profile of the current flight phase after the switch; wherein, the security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain include: ASM message authentication mode, key ID, and detection threshold; the security policy parameters for the TSN domain include: gPTP detection mode, FRER authentication mode, and TAS monitoring strength; the detection threshold includes: authentication failure count threshold and traffic anomaly detection threshold per unit time; Step S32: Determine whether the security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain are compatible with the current network state, so as to perform a consistency check on the security policy parameters; when the determination result is yes, it indicates that the consistency check has passed, and step S33 is executed; Step S33: Simulate the execution effect of the security policy parameters in the digital twin model, so as to perform simulation verification of the security policy parameters; when the simulated execution effect does not affect the real-time constraints of airborne network communication, step S34 is executed; Step S34: Issue the security policy parameters.

[0015] Preferably, in step S04, a two-phase commit protocol is used to issue the security policy update instruction, specifically including: in the first phase, the security policy parameters are issued to each communication channel, but the security policy parameters are not enabled, and each node of each communication channel is waited for a reply confirming receipt of the security policy parameters; in the second phase, the security policy update instruction is enabled to ensure that each node of each communication channel enables the security policy update instruction synchronously according to the same effective timestamp.

[0016] Preferably, step S05 further includes: when the ASM message authentication mode is switched, a second preset transition period is set, during which messages processed by the old and new strategies are accepted simultaneously; when the encryption algorithm type is switched, the receiving end selects the corresponding decryption algorithm according to the algorithm identifier bit carried in the message frame encrypted by the new algorithm, so as to achieve seamless switching.

[0017] Preferably, in step S06, the two-phase commit protocol is reused to trigger the key update, specifically including: in the first phase, a new key period is issued to each communication channel, but the new key period is not activated, and each node of each communication channel is waited for a reply confirming receipt of the new key period; in the second phase, the new key period is activated to ensure that each node of each communication channel synchronously activates the new key period to trigger the key update; wherein, the key update adopts a derivation method, and a new session key K_session is derived from the master key MK combined with the current flight phase identifier phase_id and timestamp, so as to achieve the elimination of the complete key negotiation process and control the key update delay within 10 milliseconds; after the new key is activated, the old key is retained for a 30-second transition period before being destroyed.

[0018] Preferably, in step S07, the emergency strategy adjustment specifically includes: upgrading the security level of the affected communication channel; the execution priority of the emergency strategy adjustment is higher than the execution priority when the current flight phase is switched; and after a third preset time after the security event alarm is cleared, reverting to the security strategy profile of the current flight phase.

[0019] Preferably, the adaptive adjustment method for onboard network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness further includes:

[0020] Step S09: Dynamically update the security policy profile based on the security policy execution report; Step S10: Store the updated security policy profile in the security policy profile database in real time.

[0021] The beneficial technical effects of this invention are as follows:

[0022] The adaptive adjustment method for dynamic security policies of airborne networks with flight phase awareness provided by this invention predefines security policy profiles for each flight phase, then obtains flight phase information in real time through the flight management system, dynamically adjusts security policy parameters (authentication frequency, encryption strength, detection sensitivity, key update cycle, etc.) of the FC-AE-ASM domain and TSN domain, and then relies on the SDN controller to realize centralized management and millisecond-level distribution of security policies, achieving the optimal balance between security and real-time performance of airborne networks under different flight phases.

[0023] Additional aspects and advantages of the invention will become apparent from the description which follows, or may be learned by practice of the invention. Attached Figure Description

[0024] The accompanying drawings, which form part of this invention, are used to provide a further understanding of the invention. The illustrative embodiments of the invention and their descriptions are used to explain the invention and do not constitute an improper limitation of the invention.

[0025] Figure 1 A diagram illustrating the overall architecture of a flight-phase-aware adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategies according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown.

[0026] Figure 2 This diagram illustrates the definition of safety strategy profiles for each flight phase according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0027] Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating flight phase identification and safety policy parameter mapping according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown;

[0028] Figure 4 A timing diagram of two-stage policy delivery and switching based on SDN, according to an embodiment of the present invention, is shown.

[0029] Figure 5 A flowchart illustrating an emergency strategy adjustment decision triggered by a security event, according to an embodiment of the present invention, is shown. Detailed Implementation

[0030] To better understand the above-mentioned objects, features, and advantages of the present invention, such as Figures 1 to 5 As shown in the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments, the present invention will be further described in detail below. It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in these embodiments can be combined with each other.

[0031] Many specific details are set forth in the following description in order to provide a full understanding of the invention. However, the invention may also be practiced in other ways different from those described herein, and therefore the scope of protection of the invention is not limited to the specific embodiments disclosed below.

[0032] The following specific embodiment will demonstrate the adaptive adjustment method for dynamic airborne network security strategies based on flight phase awareness of the present invention. For example... Figure 1 As shown in the figure, the adaptive adjustment method for onboard network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness in this specific embodiment is implemented through the following steps:

[0033] (1) Step S01: Predefine the security policy profile of the airborne network in different flight phases through the security policy profile database; wherein, the security policy profile is a set of security parameters adapted to the airborne network in the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain.

[0034] In step S01, the security policy profile includes any one or more of the following: ASM message authentication mode, encryption algorithm type, encryption key length, intrusion detection sensitivity level, key update cycle, TSN gPTP security detection strength, and FRER authentication mode.

[0035] The ASM message authentication modes include: bypass authentication, lightweight authentication, strong authentication, and full-featured authentication; the encryption algorithm types include: AES-128, AES-256, and no encryption; the intrusion detection sensitivity levels include: high, medium, and low sensitivity levels; the key update cycle includes: hourly, frame-by-frame, and fixed update granularities; the TSNgPTP security detection strength includes: full detection, sampling detection, and closed detection modes; the FRER authentication modes include: mandatory authentication, optional authentication, and closed authentication modes.

[0036] Each flight phase includes: ground parking phase, taxiing phase, takeoff phase, landing phase, cruise phase, and combat maneuver phase.

[0037] Furthermore, such as Figure 2 As shown, the predefined security strategy profiles for each flight phase are as follows: Ground parking and taxiing phases use a "maintenance security profile," meaning ASM message authentication mode is bypass authentication, encryption algorithm type is unencrypted, TSNgPTP security detection strength is set to full detection, key update cycle is 1 hour, and FRER authentication mode is optional. Takeoff and landing phases use a "critical security profile," meaning ASM message authentication mode is lightweight authentication, encryption algorithm type is AES-128, detection sensitivity level is medium, key update cycle is at the flight level, and FRER authentication mode is optional. Cruise phases use a "standard security profile," meaning ASM message authentication mode is strong authentication, encryption algorithm type is AES-256, detection sensitivity level is high, key update cycle is 24 hours, and FRER authentication mode is optional. Combat maneuver phases use a "highest security profile," meaning ASM message authentication mode is full-function authentication, encryption algorithm type is AES-256 encryption, detection sensitivity level is high, key update cycle is 1 hour, and FRER authentication mode is mandatory.

[0038] Furthermore, the security policy profile is stored in the security policy profile database, and the profile parameters can be dynamically updated based on flight mission type and threat intelligence.

[0039] (2) Step S02: Real-time identification of flight phase; Specifically, the current flight phase is identified in real time through the flight management system (FMS), and then it is determined whether the current flight phase has switched based on the identification result; When the determination result is yes, step S03 is executed.

[0040] Step S02 specifically includes:

[0041] Step S21: Obtain the current flight phase information in real time through the Flight Management System (FMS); wherein, the current flight phase information includes: current flight phase identifier, flight altitude, flight speed, flight attitude and flight mission mode; wherein, the current flight phase identifier includes one of the following: ground parking phase, taxiing phase, takeoff phase, landing phase, cruise phase, and combat maneuver phase.

[0042] Step S22: Based on the current flight phase information, identify the current flight phase in real time;

[0043] Step S23: Based on the identification results, and using a dual confirmation mechanism and an anti-shake mechanism, confirm whether a switch has occurred in the current flight phase;

[0044] The dual confirmation mechanism uses the current flight phase identifier output by the flight management system as the primary criterion and flight altitude, flight speed, flight attitude, and flight mission mode as secondary criterions. It then determines whether the current flight phase has switched based on the primary and secondary criterions. When the results of the primary and secondary criterions are consistent, it preliminarily confirms that the current flight phase has switched, thus preventing incorrect FMS output from causing incorrect strategy switching.

[0045] The anti-shake mechanism works as follows: the current flight phase is only confirmed to have switched if the duration of the initially confirmed switch is greater than a first preset time, thus avoiding frequent strategy switching caused by transient states. Specifically, the phase switch detection has an anti-shake mechanism—the switch is only confirmed if the new phase lasts for more than 3 seconds.

[0046] (3) Step S3: Safety policy parameter mapping and generation; Specifically, when it is determined that the current flight phase has been switched, the policy management engine generates safety policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain and TSN domain according to the safety policy profile of the current flight phase after the switch. Then, the safety policy parameters are checked for consistency and simulated for verification. When the consistency check and simulation verification are both passed, the safety policy parameters are issued.

[0047] Step S03 specifically includes:

[0048] Step S31: When it is determined that a switchover has occurred in the current flight phase, the policy management engine generates security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain based on the security policy profile of the current flight phase after the switchover. The security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain include: ASM message authentication mode, key ID, and detection threshold (the detection threshold includes: authentication failure count threshold and traffic anomaly detection threshold per unit time). The security policy parameters for the TSN domain include: gPTP detection mode, FRER authentication mode, and TAS monitoring strength.

[0049] Step S32: Determine whether the security policy parameters of the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain are compatible with the current network state, so as to perform a consistency check on the security policy parameters; when the determination result is yes, it means that the consistency check has passed, and proceed to step S33;

[0050] Step S33: Simulate the execution effect of the security policy parameters in the digital twin model to realize the simulation verification of the security policy parameters; if the simulated execution effect does not affect the real-time constraints of airborne network communication, proceed to step S34.

[0051] Step S34: Issue the security policy parameters.

[0052] Specifically, in step S32, a consistency check is performed when the security policy parameters are generated—ensuring that the security policy parameters are compatible with the current network state. For example, if the security policy parameters require a strong authentication mode, it is necessary to confirm that the keys of all nodes are ready; otherwise, the switch is delayed until the conditions are met.

[0053] In steps S02 and S03, as follows Figure 3 As shown, firstly, the FMS acquires flight phase information, including phase identifier, altitude, and speed data. Then, it performs dual verification of the flight phase, simultaneously verifying the phase based on the phase identifier output by the FMS and the flight parameters. After dual verification, it enters the flight phase switching judgment stage to determine if a flight phase switch has occurred. If no flight phase switch is determined, it continues monitoring, maintaining the existing security policy without performing a policy switching operation. If a flight phase switch is determined, it performs anti-jitter verification processing, confirming the new phase state for 3 seconds to filter out false triggers caused by transient disturbances. After successful anti-jitter verification, it searches for a security policy profile matching the target flight phase. Based on this security policy profile, it generates a policy parameter set and performs consistency checks and simulation verification on the generated policy parameter set to verify the legality and executability of the policy parameters. After verification, the policy parameter set is sent to the SDN controller, which performs the security policy switch, completing the adaptive update of the airborne network security policy.

[0054] (4) Step S04: The policy management engine instructs the SDN controller to issue security policy update instructions to the FC switches in the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN switches in the TSN domain using a two-phase commit protocol, and issues the security policy update instructions to each communication channel according to the order of issuance priority; wherein, the issuance priority is ordered according to the security level of the communication channel, and the channel / flow with the higher security level is switched first to ensure that the security policy of critical communication takes effect first; the security policy update instructions include: the security policy parameters and the effective timestamp.

[0055] Step S04 includes: policy execution in the FC-AE-ASM domain and policy execution in the TSN domain.

[0056] In step S04, Figure 4 This diagram illustrates the interaction sequence of phased policy distribution and timestamp-based synchronous activation of the new security policy in this specific embodiment. Figure 4 As shown, the entities involved in the interaction include the SDN controller, FC switches, TSN switches, and each end node. The entire policy switching process is divided into two execution steps: Phase 1 and Phase 2. In Phase 1: Policy parameters are issued. The SDN controller issues updated security policy parameters to the FC switches, TSN switches, and each end node. After receiving the policy parameters, the FC switches, TSN switches, and each end node complete the preloading of local parameter configurations, and each node returns a ready confirmation message to the SDN controller. After receiving the ready confirmation messages from all nodes, the SDN controller executes Phase 2: Issuing an activation command. The SDN controller sends a policy activation command carrying a unified timestamp to the FC switches, TSN switches, and each end node. After receiving the activation command, the FC switches, TSN switches, and end nodes do not immediately take effect with the new policy, but wait until the same timestamp specified in the command. At that same timestamp, all nodes synchronously activate the new security policy, completing the seamless switching of the security policies between the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain. This timing scheme separates parameter pre-configuration and policy activation to avoid inconsistent policy activation times across network nodes and prevent communication anomalies caused by mixing old and new policies in the airborne network.

[0057] A two-phase commit protocol is used to issue security policy update instructions, specifically including: in the first phase, the security policy parameters are sent to each communication channel, but the security policy parameters are not enabled, and the system waits for each node in each communication channel to reply and confirm receipt of the security policy parameters; in the second phase, the security policy update instructions are enabled to ensure that each node in each communication channel enables the security policy update instructions synchronously according to the same effective timestamp, thus ensuring the network-wide synchronization of policy switching.

[0058] (5) Step S05 ( Figure 1(Not shown in the text): For ASM messages and TSN streams that are currently being transmitted, the old policy is used for processing. For newly initiated ASM messages and TSN streams, the new policy is used for processing according to the security policy update instruction, so as to realize the continuity guarantee processing of the security policy update instruction.

[0059] Step S05 further includes: when the ASM message authentication mode is switched, a second preset transition period is set, during which messages processed by both the old and new strategies are accepted simultaneously; for example, when the authentication mode is switched (such as from bypass to strong authentication), a transition period (default 5 seconds) is set, during which messages processed by both the old and new strategies are accepted simultaneously to avoid normal messages being discarded due to differences in switching timing; when the encryption algorithm type is switched, the receiving end selects the corresponding decryption algorithm according to the algorithm identifier bit carried in the message frame encrypted by the new algorithm to achieve seamless switching.

[0060] (6) Step S06 ( Figure 1 (Not shown in the image): When the key update cycle in the security policy profile changes, the two-phase commit protocol is reused to trigger a key update.

[0061] In step S06, the two-phase commit protocol is reused to trigger key updates. Specifically, this includes: in the first phase, a new key period is sent to each communication channel, but the new key period is not activated, and each node in each communication channel is waited for a reply confirming receipt of the new key period; in the second phase, the new key period is activated to ensure that each node in each communication channel synchronously activates the new key period to trigger key updates. The key update adopts a derivation method, which derives a new session key K_session from the master key MK combined with the current flight phase identifier phase_id and timestamp, so as to achieve the elimination of the need for a complete key negotiation process and control the key update delay within 10 milliseconds; after the new key is activated, the old key is retained for a 30-second transition period before being destroyed.

[0062] In step S06, specifically, when the security policy profile requires a change in the key update cycle (e.g., switching from the frame level to the hour level), a key update is triggered simultaneously with the phase switch, and the update process reuses the two-phase commit protocol of step S04; furthermore, the key update adopts a derivation method—deriving a new session key K_session = KDF(MK, phase_id, timestamp) from the master key MK, with the update delay controlled within 10 milliseconds; furthermore, the old key is retained for a transition period (default 30 seconds) after the new key is enabled, to handle old key encrypted messages that may arrive during the switch delay, and the old key is securely destroyed after the transition period.

[0063] (7) Step S07: Emergency policy adjustment triggered by a safety incident. Specifically, when a safety incident alarm is received, an emergency policy adjustment that is not constrained by the current flight phase is executed through the policy management engine.

[0064] The emergency strategy adjustment specifically includes: upgrading the security level of the affected communication channel; prioritizing the emergency strategy adjustment over the current flight phase transition; and reverting to the current flight phase's security strategy profile after a third preset time has elapsed since the security event alarm was cleared.

[0065] Specifically, in step S07, as Figure 5 As shown, when an IDS alarm or authentication failure occurs, triggering a security event, the system first determines the security event level to see if it is a high-level event. If the event is not determined to be high-level, an event logging operation is performed to save the security event information, maintain the existing security policy, and continue network monitoring. If the event is determined to be high-level, an emergency security policy is generated, raising the protection level to the highest level. The emergency security policy is preemptively deployed, interrupting the ongoing normal policy switching process, enabling the emergency policy to take effect and activating mandatory authentication, encryption, and full-scale detection protection measures. After the emergency security policy takes effect, continuous monitoring is performed to determine if the threat has been eliminated. If the threat has not been eliminated, the emergency security policy continues to run, maintaining continuous monitoring; if the threat has been eliminated, the security policy profile corresponding to the current flight phase is gradually restored, completing the emergency response process.

[0066] (8) Step S08: Policy execution audit and post-event analysis. Specifically, the policy management engine records a complete log of all policy switching events and generates a security policy execution report after the flight ends; the security policy execution report is used to optimize the security policy profile.

[0067] In step S08, the policy management engine records a complete log of all policy switching events, including the switching time, source stage, target stage, switching reason (stage switching / security event trigger / manual trigger), policy parameter change details, and switching execution result. Furthermore, the log also records comparative data of security indicators before and after the policy switching—authentication success rate, number of detection alarms, changes in communication latency, etc.—to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy switching. Furthermore, after the flight ends, the policy management engine generates a safety policy execution report to support post-event analysis of policy rationality and provide data support for optimizing the safety policy profile.

[0068] (9) Step S09: Dynamically update the security policy profile based on the security policy execution report. Specifically, it supports dynamically updating the profile parameters based on task type and threat intelligence.

[0069] (10) Step S10: Store the updated security policy profile to the security policy profile database in real time.

[0070] In this specific embodiment, the flight phase-aware airborne network dynamic security policy adaptive adjustment method predefines security policy profiles for each flight phase; the flight management system collects flight phase information in real time and dynamically adjusts the security policy parameters (including authentication frequency, encryption strength, detection sensitivity, key update cycle, etc.) of the FC-AE-ASM domain and TSN domain; the SDN controller centrally manages the security policy and completes millisecond-level policy distribution, enabling the airborne network to achieve the optimal balance between security and real-time performance in various flight phases.

[0071] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for adaptive adjustment of airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness, characterized in that, include: Step S01: Predefine the security policy profile of the airborne network in different flight phases; wherein, the security policy profile is a set of security parameters adapted to the airborne network in the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain; Step S02: The flight management system identifies the current flight phase in real time, and then determines whether the current flight phase has changed based on the identification result; if the determination result is yes, proceed to step S03; Step S03: When it is determined that the current flight phase has been switched, the policy management engine generates safety policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain and TSN domain according to the safety policy profile of the current flight phase after the switch. Then, the safety policy parameters are checked for consistency and simulated for verification. When the consistency check and simulation verification are both passed, the safety policy parameters are issued. Step S04: The policy management engine instructs the SDN controller to issue security policy update instructions to the FC switches in the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN switches in the TSN domain using a two-phase commit protocol, and issues the security policy update instructions to each communication channel according to the order of issuance priority; wherein, the issuance priority is ordered according to the security level of the communication channel; the security policy update instructions include: the security policy parameters and the effective timestamp; Step S05: The old policy is used to process the ASM messages and TSN streams that are being transmitted. The new policy is used to process the newly initiated ASM messages and TSN streams according to the security policy update instruction, so as to realize the continuity guarantee processing of the security policy update instruction. Step S06: When the key update cycle in the security policy profile changes, the two-phase commit protocol is reused to trigger a key update; Step S07: When a safety event alarm is received, an emergency policy adjustment that is not constrained by the current flight phase is executed through the policy management engine; Step S08: Record a complete log of all policy switching events through the policy management engine, and generate a safety policy execution report after the flight ends; the safety policy execution report is used to optimize the safety policy profile.

2. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S01, the set of security parameters for the security policy profile includes any one or more of the following: ASM message authentication mode, encryption algorithm type, encryption key length, intrusion detection sensitivity level, key update cycle, TSN gPTP security detection strength, and FRER authentication mode. The flight phases include: ground parking phase, taxiing phase, takeoff phase, landing phase, cruise phase, and combat maneuver phase.

3. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S02 specifically includes: Step S21: Obtain the current flight phase information in real time through the flight management system; wherein, the current flight phase information includes: current flight phase identifier, flight altitude, flight speed, flight attitude, and flight mission mode; Step S22: Based on the current flight phase information, identify the current flight phase in real time; Step S23: Based on the identification results, and using a dual confirmation mechanism and an anti-shake mechanism, confirm whether a switch has occurred in the current flight phase; The dual confirmation mechanism uses the current flight phase identifier output by the flight management system as the primary criterion and flight altitude, flight speed, flight attitude, and flight mission mode as secondary criterions. It then determines whether the current flight phase has switched based on the primary and secondary criterions. When the results of the primary and secondary criterions are consistent, it is preliminarily confirmed that the current flight phase has switched. The anti-shake mechanism is as follows: the current flight phase is only confirmed to have switched if the duration of the initially confirmed switch is greater than a first preset time.

4. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S03 specifically includes: Step S31: When it is determined that a switchover has occurred in the current flight phase, the policy management engine generates security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain based on the security policy profile of the current flight phase after the switchover. The security policy parameters for the FC-AE-ASM domain include: ASM message authentication mode, key ID, and detection threshold. The security policy parameters for the TSN domain include: gPTP detection mode, FRER authentication mode, and TAS monitoring strength. The detection threshold includes: a threshold for the number of authentication failures per unit time and a threshold for detecting abnormal traffic. Step S32: Determine whether the security policy parameters of the FC-AE-ASM domain and the TSN domain are compatible with the current network state, so as to perform a consistency check on the security policy parameters; when the determination result is yes, it means that the consistency check has passed, and proceed to step S33; Step S33: Simulate the execution effect of the security policy parameters in the digital twin model to realize the simulation verification of the security policy parameters; if the simulated execution effect does not affect the real-time constraints of airborne network communication, proceed to step S34. Step S34: Issue the security policy parameters.

5. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S04, a two-phase commit protocol is used to issue a security policy update instruction, which specifically includes: in the first phase, the security policy parameters are issued to each communication channel, but the security policy parameters are not enabled, and each node of each communication channel is waited for a reply confirming receipt of the security policy parameters; in the second phase, the security policy update instruction is enabled to ensure that each node of each communication channel enables the security policy update instruction synchronously according to the same effective timestamp.

6. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step S05 also includes: When the ASM message authentication mode is switched, a second preset transition period is set, during which messages processed by both the old and new strategies are accepted simultaneously. When the encryption algorithm type is switched, the receiving end selects the corresponding decryption algorithm based on the algorithm identifier bit carried in the message frame encrypted with the new algorithm, so as to achieve seamless switching.

7. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S06, the two-phase commit protocol is reused to trigger key updates, specifically including: in the first phase, a new key period is sent to each communication channel, but the new key period is not activated, and each node of each communication channel is waited for a reply confirming receipt of the new key period; in the second phase, the new key period is activated to ensure that each node of each communication channel synchronously activates the new key period to trigger key updates. The key update adopts a derivation method, which derives a new session key K_session from the master key MK in combination with the current flight phase identifier phase_id and timestamp, so as to achieve the elimination of the complete key negotiation process and control the key update delay within 10 milliseconds; After the old key is enabled, it will be retained for a 30-second transition period before being destroyed.

8. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step S07, the emergency strategy adjustment specifically includes: Upgrade the security level of the affected communication channels; The execution priority of emergency strategy adjustments is higher than the execution priority when the current flight phase changes; After the third preset time for the safety incident alarm to be cleared, the safety strategy profile will revert to the current flight phase.

9. The adaptive adjustment method for airborne network dynamic security strategy based on flight phase awareness according to any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that, Also includes: Step S09: Dynamically update the security policy profile based on the security policy execution report; Step S10: Store the updated security policy profile to the security policy profile database in real time.

Citation Information

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