Anti-quantum identity authentication method, anti-quantum identity authentication system and electronic equipment

Abstract

The invention relates to the technical field of communication security, in particular to an anti-quantum identity authentication method and device.On the basis of a traditional authentication scheme, a root of trust is introduced and used for signing a public key and identity information in a storage device, signing and issuing of the storage device are completed, and the security of the storage device is improved. The identity authentication end can confirm that the public key and the identity information in the storage equipment are effective by verifying the signature of the root of trust, so that the risk of identity counterfeiting is reduced; in addition, an anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm is introduced to the root of trust and the identity authentication end, signature and verification are carried out in a mode of mixing the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm and a national cryptographic algorithm, and higher-level security is provided.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of communication security technology, and in particular to a quantum-resistant identity authentication method, system and electronic equipment. Background Art

[0002] As information technology continues to merge with real life, network security has become an important factor in national security. Identity authentication technology, as the first line of defense in cyberspace security, has always been a hot research topic in this field. Identity authentication is the process of confirming the user's claimed identity through specific technical means. In recent years, UKey-based identity authentication technology has been widely used in various fields such as e-government, e-commerce, and online payment because of its convenience, security, and reliability.

[0003] In the traditional UKey-based identity authentication scenario, the client sends an identity authentication request to the server. After receiving the identity authentication request, the server generates a random number and sends it to the client. This random number is called the challenge value. After receiving the challenge value, the client transmits the challenge value to UKey through the USB interface. UKey uses the challenge value and the key in UKey to generate an HMAC value and sends the value to the server. This value is the response value. After receiving the response value, the server also uses the challenge value and the user key stored on the server to calculate the HMAC value. If the locally calculated HMAC value is consistent with the returned response value, the identity authentication is passed. However, this method requires UKey to share a key with the server, resulting in security risks in the key distribution process. Summary of the invention

[0004] The present invention provides a quantum-resistant identity authentication method, system and electronic device, which are used to solve the problem of potential security risks in the key distribution process caused by the UKey and the server sharing a key in the prior art.

[0005] The embodiment of this specification provides a quantum-resistant identity authentication method, including a root of trust, and the method includes:

[0006] Obtain a random number generated based on the identity authentication request, and sign the random number using a private key generated by the first national secret algorithm to obtain a random number signature;

[0007] Obtaining a signature result of a mixed signature of the identity information and the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using a private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and a private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root; wherein the identity information is an identity identifier of the storage device;

[0008] The random number signature, the signature result, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information are sent to the identity authentication end; the identity authentication end verifies the signature result using the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm, and after successful verification, verifies the random number signature using the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to achieve identity authentication.

[0009] Optionally, the storage device is UKey.

[0010] Optionally, obtaining a random number generated based on the identity authentication request includes:

[0011] The storage device sends an identity authentication request to the identity authentication end;

[0012] The identity authentication end controls a quantum random number generator preset in the identity authentication end to generate a quantum random number based on the identity authentication request, and sends the quantum random number to the storage device.

[0013] Optionally, the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm includes a Dilithium signature algorithm, and the second national secret algorithm includes an SM2 algorithm;

[0014] The obtaining of the signature result of a mixed signature of the identity information and the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using the private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root includes:

[0015] The storage device sends the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to the trusted root;

[0016] The trusted root uses the private key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to obtain the first sub-signature data;

[0017] The trusted root uses the private key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the first sub-signature data, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to obtain the second sub-signature data, wherein the first sub-signature data and the second sub-signature data constitute the signature result;

[0018] The root of trust sends the signature result to the storage device.

[0019] Optionally, the step of obtaining a signature result of a mixed signature of identity information and a public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using a private key generated by a second national secret algorithm and a private key generated by a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root includes:

[0020] The storage device sends the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to the trusted root;

[0021] The trusted root uses the private key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to obtain third sub-signature data;

[0022] The trusted root uses the private key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the third sub-signature data, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to obtain a fourth sub-signature data, wherein the third sub-signature data and the fourth sub-signature data constitute the signature result;

[0023] The root of trust sends the signature result to the storage device.

[0024] Optionally, the identity verification end verifies the signature result using a public key generated by a second national secret algorithm and a public key generated by a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm, including:

[0025] Performing signature verification on the first sub-signature data using the public key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to obtain a first verification result;

[0026] Verify the second sub-signature data using the public key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to obtain a second verification result;

[0027] When both the first verification result and the second verification result are successfully verified, the signature result verification is successful.

[0028] Optionally, the identity verification end verifies the signature result using a public key generated by a second national secret algorithm and a public key generated by a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm, including:

[0029] Verify the third sub-signature data using the public key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to obtain a third verification result;

[0030] Performing signature verification on the fourth sub-signature data using the public key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to obtain a fourth verification result;

[0031] When the third verification result and the fourth verification result are both successfully verified, the signature result verification is successful.

[0032] The embodiment of this specification also provides a quantum-resistant identity authentication system, including a storage device, a root of trust, and an identity authentication terminal, wherein the system includes:

[0033] The storage device sends an identity authentication request to the identity authentication end;

[0034] The identity authentication end controls a preset quantum random number generator in the identity authentication end to generate a quantum random number based on the identity authentication request, and sends the quantum random number to the storage device;

[0035] The storage device signs the random number using a private key generated by a first national secret algorithm to obtain a random number signature;

[0036] The trust root uses the private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to perform a mixed signature on the identity information and the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to obtain a signature result; wherein the identity information is an identity identifier of the storage device;

[0037] The trusted root sends the signature result to the storage device;

[0038] The storage device sends the random number signature, the signature result, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to the identity authentication end;

[0039] The identity authentication end uses the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to verify the signature result, and after successful verification, uses the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to verify the random number signature to achieve identity authentication.

[0040] An electronic device comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores computer instructions, and the processor is configured to run the computer instructions to execute the method described above.

[0041] A storage medium stores computer instructions, wherein the computer instructions are configured to execute the above method when executed.

[0042] Its beneficial effects are as follows: this application introduces a trust root based on the traditional authentication scheme, which is used to sign the public key and identity information in the storage device to complete the issuance of the storage device, and the identity authentication end can confirm that the public key and identity information in the storage device are valid by verifying the signature of the trust root, thereby reducing the risk of identity forgery; this application also introduces a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root and the identity authentication end, and uses a hybrid method of the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm and the national secret algorithm for signing and verification, providing a higher level of security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0043] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0044] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:

[0045] Figure 1 A flow chart of a quantum-resistant identity authentication method provided in an embodiment of this specification;

[0046] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of a quantum-resistant identity authentication system provided in an embodiment of this specification;

[0047] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this specification;

[0048] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a computer-readable medium provided for an embodiment of this specification. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present invention, but should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

[0050] The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present invention, but should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

[0051] It should be noted that the relative arrangement of components and steps, the numerical expressions and numerical values ​​set forth in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the present invention unless specifically stated otherwise.

[0052] The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is merely illustrative in nature and is in no way intended to limit the invention, its application, or uses.

[0053] Technologies, methods, and equipment known to ordinary technicians in the relevant art may not be discussed in detail, but where appropriate, the technologies, methods, and equipment should be considered as part of the specification.

[0054] In all examples shown and discussed herein, any specific values ​​should be interpreted as merely exemplary and not as limiting. Therefore, other examples of the exemplary embodiments may have different values.

[0055] It should be noted that like reference numerals and letters refer to similar items in the following figures, and therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it need not be further discussed in subsequent figures.

[0056] Reference Figure 2 A flow chart of a quantum-resistant identity authentication method provided for an embodiment of the present specification includes a root of trust, and the method includes: S101: obtaining a random number generated based on an identity authentication request, and signing the random number with a private key generated by a first national secret algorithm to obtain a random number signature; S102: obtaining a signature result of a mixed signature of identity information and a public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using a private key generated by a second national secret algorithm and a private key generated by an anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm in the root of trust; wherein the identity information is an identity identifier of a storage device; S103: sending the random number signature, the signature result, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to an identity authentication end; the identity authentication end verifies the signature result using the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm, and after successful verification, verifies the random number signature using the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to achieve identity authentication.

[0057] The obtaining of a random number generated based on an identity authentication request includes:

[0058] The storage device sends an identity authentication request to the identity authentication end;

[0059] The identity authentication end controls a quantum random number generator preset in the identity authentication end to generate a quantum random number based on the identity authentication request, and sends the quantum random number to the storage device.

[0060] In an optional embodiment, the storage device is UKey as an example. In order to complete the identity authentication of UKey, this application introduces a trust root, which includes a pair of keys K1 and K2 generated by the national secret algorithm, and a pair of keys S1 and S2 generated by the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm, where K1 is a public key, K2 is a private key, S1 is a public key, S2 is a private key, and the public keys K1 and S1 are in a public state. UKey contains a pair of keys M1 and M2 generated by the national secret algorithm, where M1 is a public key and M2 is a private key.

[0061] Then, UKey sends an authentication request to the authentication end through the USB interface. The authentication end controls the quantum random number generator to generate a quantum random number k based on the authentication request, and sends the quantum random number k to UKey. Subsequently, UKey uses the private key M2 to sign the random number k to obtain the random number signature SigUKey.

[0062] Afterwards, UKey obtains the signature result Sig Root of the mixed signature of the identity information ID info and the public key M1 using the private key K2 and the private key S2 in the trust root; and sends the random number signature Sig UKey, the signature result Sig Root, the public key M1 and the identity information ID info to the identity authentication end; the identity authentication end verifies the signature result Sig Root using the public key K1 and the public key S1, and after the verification is successful, verifies the random number signature Sig UKey using the public key M1. When the verification passes, it means that the UKey identity authentication passes. Among them, the identity information is the identity identifier of the storage device, and the storage device can also be other devices to be authenticated. This application introduces a trust root on the basis of the traditional authentication scheme, which is used to sign the public key and identity information in the storage device to complete the issuance of the storage device, and the identity authentication end can verify the signature of the trust root to confirm that the public key and identity information in the storage device are valid, thereby reducing the risk of identity forgery; this application also introduces anti-quantum cryptographic algorithms in the trust root and the identity authentication end, and uses a hybrid method of anti-quantum cryptographic algorithms and national secret algorithms for signing and verification, providing a higher level of security.

[0063] Optionally, the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm includes the Dilithium signature algorithm, and the second national secret algorithm includes the SM2 algorithm; the obtaining of the signature result of a mixed signature of identity information and a public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using the private key generated by the second national secret algorithm, the private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root includes: the storage device sends the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to the trust root; the trust root uses the private key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to obtain first sub-signature data; the trust root uses the private key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the first sub-signature data, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to obtain second sub-signature data, wherein the first sub-signature data and the second sub-signature data constitute the signature result; the trust root sends the signature result to the storage device.

[0064] Optionally, the identity authentication end uses a public key generated by a second national secret algorithm and a public key generated by a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to verify the signature result, including: using a public key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to perform signature verification on the first sub-signature data to obtain a first verification result; using a public key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to verify the second sub-signature data to obtain a second verification result; when the first verification result and the second verification result are both successful, the signature result verification is successful.

[0065] In an optional embodiment, the storage device sends the public key M1 and identity information IDinfo generated by the first national secret algorithm to the trusted root; the trusted root uses the private key S2 generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the public key M1 and the identity information ID info generated by the first national secret algorithm to obtain the first sub-signature data SigRoot0; the trusted root uses the private key K1 generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the first sub-signature data Sig Root0, the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information ID info to obtain the second sub-signature data SigRoot1, wherein the first sub-signature data Sig Root0 and the second sub-signature data Sig Root1 constitute the signature result Sig Root; the trusted root sends the signature result Sig Root to UKey. UKey sends the signature result Sig Root, identity information ID info, the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the random number signature Sig UKey to the identity authentication end.

[0066] The identity authentication end uses the public key S1 generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to perform signature verification on the first sub-signature data Sig Root0 to obtain a first verification result; uses the public key K1 generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to verify the second sub-signature data Sig Root1 to obtain a second verification result; when the first verification result and the second verification result are both successful, the signature result verification is successful, that is, the identity information IDinfo of UKey and the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm are valid. By using the Dilithium signature algorithm and the SM2 algorithm for hybrid signature and signature verification, the signature has the function of resisting quantum attacks. Even if the communication equipment is hacked in a classical computer environment, the security of the overall signature can be guaranteed, thereby improving communication security. It should be noted that the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm is not limited to the Dilithium signature algorithm, but can also be other algorithms in the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm, such as the Kyber algorithm, etc. The first national secret algorithm can be the SM2 algorithm.

[0067] Optionally, the step of obtaining the signature result of a mixed signature of identity information and a public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using a private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and a private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root includes: the storage device sends the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to the trust root; the trust root uses the private key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to obtain a third sub-signature data; the trust root uses the private key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the third sub-signature data, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to obtain a fourth sub-signature data, wherein the third sub-signature data and the fourth sub-signature data constitute the signature result; the trust root sends the signature result to the storage device. The identity authentication end uses the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to verify the signature result, including: using the public key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to verify the third sub-signature data to obtain a third verification result; using the public key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to perform signature verification on the fourth sub-signature data to obtain a fourth verification result; when the third verification result and the fourth verification result are both successfully verified, the signature result verification is successful.

[0068] In an optional embodiment, UKey sends the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information IDinfo to the trust root; the trust root uses the private key K2 generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information ID info to obtain the third sub-signature data Sig Root2; the trust root uses the private key S2 generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the third sub-signature data Sig Root2, the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information ID info to obtain the fourth sub-signature data Sig Root3, wherein the third sub-signature data Sig Root2 and the fourth sub-signature data SigRoot3 constitute the signature result Sig Root; the trust root sends the signature result Sig Root to UKey. UKey sends the signature result Sig Root, the identity information ID info, the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the random number signature SigUKey to the identity authentication end.

[0069] The identity authentication end uses the public key K1 generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to verify the third sub-signature data SigRoot2 to obtain the third verification result; uses the public key S1 generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to perform signature verification on the fourth sub-signature data Sig Root3 to obtain the fourth verification result; when the third verification result and the fourth verification result are both successful, the signature result Sig Root is successfully verified, that is, the identity information ID info of UKey and the public key M1 generated by the first national secret algorithm are valid. By using the Dilithium signature algorithm and the SM2 algorithm for hybrid signature and signature verification, the signature has the function of resisting quantum attacks. Even if the communication equipment is hacked in a classical computer environment, the security of the overall signature can be guaranteed, thereby improving communication security. It should be noted that the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm is not limited to the Dilithium signature algorithm, but can also be other algorithms in the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm, such as the Kyber algorithm, and the first national secret algorithm can be the SM2 algorithm.

[0070] In an optional embodiment, the first national secret algorithm and the second national secret algorithm are not limited to SM1, and may also be SM1, SM3 and other national secret algorithms, which are not limited here.

[0071] This application introduces a trust root based on the traditional authentication scheme, which is used to sign the public key and identity information in the storage device to complete the issuance of the storage device. The identity authentication end can confirm that the public key and identity information in the storage device are valid by verifying the signature of the trust root, thereby reducing the risk of identity forgery. This application also introduces a quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root and the identity authentication end, and uses a hybrid method of the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm and the national secret algorithm for signing and verification, providing a higher level of security.

[0072] Reference Figure 2The embodiment of this specification also provides a quantum-resistant identity authentication system, including a storage device, a trust root, and an identity authentication terminal. Specifically: the storage device sends an identity authentication request to the identity authentication terminal; the identity authentication terminal controls the quantum random number generator preset in the identity authentication terminal to generate a quantum random number based on the identity authentication request, and sends the quantum random number to the storage device; the storage device signs the random number using a private key generated by a first national secret algorithm to obtain a random number signature; the trust root uses a private key generated by a second national secret algorithm and a private key generated by an anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm to perform a mixed signature on identity information and a public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to obtain a signature result; wherein the identity information is The storage device's identity identifier; the trust root sends the signature result to the storage device; the storage device sends the random number signature, the signature result, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to the identity authentication end; the identity authentication end sends a request to obtain a key to the trust root, and the trust root responds to the request to obtain a key by sending a public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and a public key generated by the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm to the identity authentication end, and the identity authentication end verifies the signature result using the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm, and after successful verification, verifies the random number signature using the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to achieve identity authentication. This application introduces a trust root on the basis of the traditional authentication scheme, which is used to sign the public key and identity information in the storage device to complete the issuance of the storage device, and the identity authentication end can confirm that the public key and identity information in the storage device are valid by verifying the signature of the trust root, thereby reducing the risk of identity forgery; this application also introduces an anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm in the trust root and the identity authentication end, and uses a hybrid method of the anti-quantum cryptographic algorithm and the national secret algorithm for signing and verification, providing a higher level of security.

[0073] Based on the same inventive concept, an embodiment of this specification also provides an electronic device.

[0074] The following describes an electronic device embodiment of the present invention, which can be regarded as a specific physical implementation of the method and device embodiments of the present invention. The details described in the electronic device embodiment of the present invention should be regarded as a supplement to the above method or device embodiments; details not disclosed in the electronic device embodiment of the present invention can be implemented with reference to the above method or device embodiments.

[0075] Reference Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this specification. Figure 3 The electronic device 300 according to the embodiment of the present invention is described. Figure 3The electronic device 300 shown is only an example and should not bring any limitation to the functions and scope of use of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0076] like Figure 3 As shown, the electronic device 300 is in the form of a general computing device. The components of the electronic device 300 may include, but are not limited to: at least one processing unit 310, at least one storage unit 320, a bus 330 connecting different device components (including the storage unit 320 and the processing unit 310), a display unit 340, etc.

[0077] The storage unit stores program codes, which can be executed by the processing unit 310, so that the processing unit 310 performs the steps according to various exemplary embodiments of the present invention described in the above processing method section of this specification. For example, the processing unit 310 can perform the following steps: Figure 1 Steps shown.

[0078] The storage unit 320 may include a readable medium in the form of a volatile storage unit, such as a random access memory unit (RAM) 3201 and / or a cache memory unit 3202 , and may further include a read-only memory unit (ROM) 3203 .

[0079] The storage unit 320 may also include a program / utility 3204 having a set (at least one) of program modules 3205, such program modules 3205 including but not limited to: operating means, one or more application programs, other program modules and program data, each of which or some combination may include the implementation of a network environment.

[0080] Bus 330 may represent one or more of several types of bus structures, including a memory unit bus or memory unit controller, a peripheral bus, an accelerated graphics port, a processing unit, or a local bus using any of a variety of bus architectures.

[0081] The electronic device 300 may also communicate with one or more external devices 400 (e.g., keyboards, pointing devices, Bluetooth devices, etc.), one or more devices that enable a user to interact with the electronic device 300, and / or any device that enables the electronic device 300 to communicate with one or more other computing devices (e.g., routers, modems, etc.). Such communication may be performed through an input / output (I / O) interface 350. Furthermore, the electronic device 300 may also communicate with one or more networks (e.g., a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), and / or a public network, such as the Internet) through a network adapter 360. The network adapter 360 may communicate with other modules of the electronic device 300 through the bus 330. It should be understood that although Figure 3 Not shown, other hardware and / or software modules may be used in conjunction with the electronic device 300, including but not limited to: microcode, device drivers, redundant processing units, external disk drive arrays, RAID devices, tape drives, and data backup storage devices.

[0082] Through the description of the above implementation methods, it is easy for those skilled in the art to understand that the exemplary embodiments described in the present invention can be implemented by software, or by software combined with necessary hardware. Therefore, the technical solution according to the implementation method of the present invention can be embodied in the form of a software product, which can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium (which can be a CD-ROM, USB flash drive, mobile hard disk, etc.) or on a network, including a number of instructions to enable a computing device (which can be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the above method according to the present invention. When the computer instructions are executed by a data processing device, the computer-readable medium can implement the above method of the present invention, that is: Figure 1 The method shown.

[0083] Reference Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a computer-readable medium provided for an embodiment of this specification.

[0084] accomplish Figure 1 The computer instructions of the method shown can be stored on one or more computer readable media. The computer readable medium can be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. The readable storage medium can be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor device, device or component, or any combination of the above. More specific examples (non-exhaustive list) of readable storage media include: an electrical connection with one or more wires, a portable disk, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the above.

[0085] The computer readable storage medium may include a data signal propagated in a baseband or as part of a carrier wave, wherein a readable program code is carried. This propagated data signal may take a variety of forms, including but not limited to an electromagnetic signal, an optical signal, or any suitable combination of the above. The readable storage medium may also be any readable medium other than a readable storage medium, which may send, propagate, or transmit a program for use by or in combination with an instruction execution device, device, or device. The program code contained on the readable storage medium may be transmitted using any suitable medium, including but not limited to wireless, wired, optical cable, RF, etc., or any suitable combination of the above.

[0086] Program code for performing the operations of the present invention may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, C++, etc., and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as "C" or similar programming languages. The program code may be executed entirely on the user computing device, partially on the user device, as a separate software package, partially on the user computing device and partially on a remote computing device, or entirely on a remote computing device or server. In cases involving a remote computing device, the remote computing device may be connected to the user computing device through any type of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or may be connected to an external computing device (e.g., through the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0087] In summary, the present invention can be implemented in hardware, or in a software module running on one or more processors, or in a combination thereof. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that general data processing devices such as microprocessors or digital signal processors (DSPs) can be used in practice to implement some or all of the functions of some or all of the components in the embodiments of the present invention. The present invention can also be implemented as a device or apparatus program (e.g., a computer program and a computer program product) for executing part or all of the methods described herein. Such a program implementing the present invention can be stored on a computer-readable medium, or can have the form of one or more signals. Such a signal can be downloaded from an Internet website, or provided on a carrier signal, or provided in any other form.

[0088] The specific embodiments described above further describe the purpose, technical solutions and beneficial effects of the present invention in detail. It should be understood that the present invention is not inherently related to any specific computer, virtual device or electronic device, and various general devices can also implement the present invention. The above description is only a specific embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included in the protection scope of the present invention.

[0089] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referenced to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments.

[0090] The above is only an embodiment of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application. For those skilled in the art, the present application may have various changes and variations. Any modification, equivalent replacement, improvement, etc. made within the spirit and principle of the present application should be included in the scope of the claims of the present application.

Claims

1. A quantum-resistant identity authentication method, characterized in that: Including a root of trust, the method comprises: Obtain a random number generated based on the identity authentication request, and sign the random number using a private key generated by the first national secret algorithm to obtain a random number signature; Obtaining a signature result of a mixed signature of the identity information and the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using a private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and a private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root; wherein the identity information is an identity identifier of the storage device; The random number signature, the signature result, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information are sent to the identity authentication end; the identity authentication end verifies the signature result using the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm, and after successful verification, verifies the random number signature using the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to achieve identity authentication.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The storage device is UKey.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The obtaining of a random number generated based on the identity authentication request includes: The storage device sends an identity authentication request to the identity authentication end; The identity authentication end controls a quantum random number generator preset in the identity authentication end to generate a quantum random number based on the identity authentication request, and sends the quantum random number to the storage device.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm includes the Dilithium signature algorithm, and the second national secret algorithm includes the SM2 algorithm; The obtaining of the signature result of a mixed signature of the identity information and the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using the private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root includes: The storage device sends the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to the trusted root; The trusted root uses the private key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to obtain the first sub-signature data; The trusted root uses the private key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the first sub-signature data, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to obtain the second sub-signature data, wherein the first sub-signature data and the second sub-signature data constitute the signature result; The root of trust sends the signature result to the storage device.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The obtaining of the signature result of a mixed signature of the identity information and the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm using the private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm in the trust root includes: The storage device sends the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to the trusted root; The trusted root uses the private key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to sign the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm and the identity information to obtain third sub-signature data; The trusted root uses the private key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to sign the third sub-signature data, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to obtain a fourth sub-signature data, wherein the third sub-signature data and the fourth sub-signature data constitute the signature result; The root of trust sends the signature result to the storage device.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that The identity verification end verifies the signature result using the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm, including: Performing signature verification on the first sub-signature data using the public key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to obtain a first verification result; Verify the second sub-signature data using the public key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to obtain a second verification result; When both the first verification result and the second verification result are successfully verified, the signature result verification is successful.

7. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that The identity verification end verifies the signature result using the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm, including: Verify the third sub-signature data using the public key generated by the SM2 algorithm and the SM2 algorithm to obtain a third verification result; Performing signature verification on the fourth sub-signature data using the public key generated by the Dilithium signature algorithm and the Dilithium signature algorithm to obtain a fourth verification result; When the third verification result and the fourth verification result are both successfully verified, the signature result verification is successful.

8. A quantum-resistant identity authentication device, characterized in that , including a storage device, a trust root, and an identity authentication terminal, the system includes: The storage device sends an identity authentication request to the identity authentication end; The identity authentication end controls a preset quantum random number generator in the identity authentication end to generate a quantum random number based on the identity authentication request, and sends the quantum random number to the storage device; The storage device signs the random number using a private key generated by a first national secret algorithm to obtain a random number signature; The trust root uses the private key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the private key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to perform a mixed signature on the identity information and the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to obtain a signature result; wherein the identity information is an identity identifier of the storage device; The trusted root sends the signature result to the storage device; The storage device sends the random number signature, the signature result, the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm, and the identity information to the identity authentication end; The identity authentication end uses the public key generated by the second national secret algorithm and the public key generated by the quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithm to verify the signature result, and after successful verification, uses the public key generated by the first national secret algorithm to verify the random number signature to achieve identity authentication.

9. An electronic device, characterized in that: The method comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores computer instructions, and the processor is configured to execute the computer instructions to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A storage medium, characterized in that: The storage medium stores computer instructions, and the computer instructions are configured to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 7 when executed.

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