Method and system for blockchain-based cyber protection of network entities
Through the combination of blockchain network and game mechanism, privacy leakage and user experience problems in existing anti-online robot solutions are solved, and transparent detection of malicious activities and effective protection of IoT devices are achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN201980042983.6
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2018-11-06
- Filing Date
- 2019-04-15
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-04-15
AI Technical Summary
Existing anti-online bot solutions have privacy breaches and user experience issues when identifying and blocking botnet attacks, and it is difficult to effectively detect malicious activity, especially on IoT devices and other GUI-free client devices.
Adopt blockchain-based access authorization method, establish deviations through game mechanisms and use access tokens to determine client behavior, ensure that the process of accessing protected entities is transparent and private, and use blockchain network to monitor and record transactions for access and authentication.
Effectively maintain user privacy, while providing transparent and accurate detection of malicious activities, improving the scalability and user experience of network security, suitable for GUI-free client devices.
Smart Images

Figure CN112424775B_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS
[0002] This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62 / 663,132, filed on April 26, 2018. This application is also a continuation-in-part of pending U.S. Patent Application No. 16 / 182,011, filed on November 6, 2018, which claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application No. 62 / 663,132, filed on April 26, 2018.
[0003] The contents of the above-referenced applications are incorporated herein by reference. Technical Field
[0004] The present disclosure relates generally to network security technologies and, more particularly, to the protection of network entities using blockchain-based technologies. Background Art
[0005] A bot is a software application that is configured to perform automated tasks, usually over a large network such as the Internet. Bots can be used to perform useful functions, but are often used for more malicious purposes. A botnet is a collection of coordinated bots that run on one or more systems and can be programmed to execute harmful code. Because botnets are typically implemented using infected home computers or Internet of Things (IoT) devices with random IP addresses, or virtual machines that can periodically change certain identifying characteristics such as MAC addresses or Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, it may be difficult to identify, track, and prevent attacks launched by such botnets. Botnets can share attacked systems with legitimate users, effectively hiding the existence of botnets.
[0006] Advanced botnets use machine learning techniques to better coordinate attacks. This machine learning technology is used to reduce the command and control (C&C) burden, optimize attacks, and evade countermeasures. A common technique used is based on swarm intelligence that allows botnets to self-organize.
[0007] The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Foundation has classified automated threats (bots) against web applications into six categories: Account Credentials, Inventory Availability, (Other) Functionality Abuse, Payment Cardholder Data, Vulnerability Identification, and Denial of Service (DoS). The nature and operation of the threats in each such category are different and should be handled differently. For example, in the "Inventory Availability" category, threats related to denial of inventory, wiping, and sniping are performed. On the other hand, threats in the "Vulnerability Identification" category include vulnerability scanning, footprinting, and fingerprinting. Therefore, for different types of detected threats, different detection and mitigation techniques should be used.
[0008] Existing anti-bot solutions use a simple "human or machine" test to establish trust and security context, i.e., humans are trusted and machines are not. Current solutions utilize interactive challenges to verify that a transaction is initiated by a legitimate client application (e.g., a web browser) and is controlled by a human. Examples of such challenges are SYN cookies, network redirects (e.g., 302 HTTP redirect messages), JavaScript challenges, CAPTCHAs, etc., used alone or orchestrated into a single stream.
[0009] Establishing security context and trust based on network challenges is subject to several limitations. For example, such challenges require an interactive session with the client device. In addition, at least for captcha challenges, a graphical user interface (GUI) is also required. Therefore, these challenges negatively affect the user experience when accessing network services. In addition, challenges that require a GUI cannot be operated to allow machine-to-machine authentication such as through an application programming interface (API). This is a major disadvantage because many legitimate clients (such as IoT devices) are not equipped with a suitable GUI today.
[0010] Additionally, in the related art, existing anti-bot solutions rely on the use of "fingerprinting" technology to track user activity and devices to monitor and identify bot activity. A computing device's fingerprint is information collected about a device (e.g., a smartphone) for identification purposes. Fingerprints can be used to fully or partially identify individual users or devices even when web cookies are turned off. Tracking user activity includes collecting behavioral data over time.
[0011] Generating unique fingerprints for a large number of devices requires that the fingerprints are very sensitive to changes in the collected data, so such fingerprints become less stable over time, and as a result, a device may not present the same fingerprint over time. This adversely affects the value of the collected data. Fingerprinting technology is also susceptible to spoofing. A bot can actively modify its fingerprint to change its historical date or identify its data as that of another device. In addition, anti-bot solutions impose partial penalties when verifying fingerprints.
[0012] Furthermore, existing anti-bot solutions attempt to cross-correlate data with device or personal information such as usernames, phone numbers, login credentials, etc. In this way, existing anti-bot solutions undermine user privacy and therefore may not be effective due to privacy regulations. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) prohibits sharing device fingerprints between sites.
[0013] Currently, there are no available network security solutions that maintain the privacy of users while providing effective detection. Therefore, with malicious bot activity accounting for approximately one-third of all Internet traffic, it would be advantageous to provide an effective solution that would eliminate the deficiencies of existing anti-bot solutions. Summary of the invention
[0014] Below is an overview of several exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure. This overview is provided for the convenience of providing the reader with a basic understanding of these embodiments, rather than fully limiting the breadth of the present disclosure. This overview is not an extensive review of all contemplated embodiments, and is neither intended to identify the key or important elements of all embodiments, nor to describe the scope of any or all aspects. Its sole purpose is to present some ideas of one or more embodiments in a simplified form as a preface to a more detailed description presented later. For convenience, the term "certain embodiments" may be used herein to refer to a single embodiment or multiple embodiments of the present disclosure.
[0015] Certain embodiments disclosed herein include a method for blockchain-based access authorization to a protected entity. The method includes: receiving, by the protected entity, an access request to the protected entity, wherein the access request is received from a client device; extracting a unique client identifier from the received access request; causing the client device to perform an admission transaction; monitoring a blockchain network to identify at least one admission transaction, wherein the at least one admission transaction specifies admission criteria; determining whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected entity; and granting access to the client device when the admission criteria satisfies the set of conditions, wherein the access is access to the protected entity.
[0016] Certain embodiments disclosed herein also include a non-transitory computer-readable medium having instructions stored thereon for causing a processing circuit to perform a process for blockchain-based access authorization to a protected entity, the process comprising: receiving, by the protected entity, an access request to the protected entity, wherein the access request is received from a client device; extracting a unique client identifier from the received access request; causing the client device to perform an admission transaction; monitoring a blockchain network to identify at least one admission transaction, wherein the at least one admission transaction specifies admission criteria; determining whether the admission criteria satisfy a set of conditions for access to the protected entity; and granting access to the client device when the admission criteria satisfy the set of conditions, wherein the access is access to the protected entity.
[0017] Certain embodiments disclosed herein also include a system for blockchain-based access authorization to a protected entity. The system includes: a processing circuit; and a memory containing instructions, which, when executed by the processing circuit, configure the system to: receive an access request to a protected entity by a protected entity, wherein the access request is received from a client device; extract a unique client identifier from the received access request; cause the client device to perform an admission transaction; monitor the blockchain network to identify at least one admission transaction, wherein the at least one admission transaction specifies admission criteria; determine whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected entity; and grant access to the client device when the admission criteria satisfies the set of conditions, wherein the access is access to the protected entity. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0018] The subject matter disclosed herein is particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed in the claims at the conclusion of the specification.The foregoing and other objects, features and advantages of the embodiments of the present disclosure will become apparent from the following detailed description taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
[0019] Figure 1 is a network diagram used to describe various disclosed embodiments.
[0020] Figure 2 is a flow chart illustrating a method for a blockchain-based anti-bot protection mechanism according to an embodiment.
[0021] Figure 3 is an exemplary block diagram of a trust broker system according to an embodiment.
[0022] Figure 4 is a flow chart illustrating an admission-based process performed by a protected entity according to an embodiment.
[0023] Figure 5is a flow chart illustrating a game-based admission process according to an embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0024] The embodiments disclosed herein are merely examples of many possible advantageous uses and implementations of the innovative teachings presented herein. Generally, the statements made in the specification of the present application do not necessarily limit any of the various claimed embodiments. In addition, some statements may apply to some inventive features but not to other features. Generally, unless otherwise stated, singular elements may be plural, and vice versa, without loss of generality. In the accompanying drawings, the same reference numerals represent the same parts in each view.
[0025] According to the disclosed embodiments, a method and system for blockchain-based anti-cyberbot protection are provided. In an exemplary embodiment, gaming is used to control access to a protected entity. Specifically, gaming is a mechanism by which bias is established and access rights and privileges are thereafter obtained, exchanged, or otherwise used. When gaming is performed, gaming can also reveal the behavior of a client (or its user). Bias can be defined as metadata for cybersecurity assessment. Different types of bias are defined herein. This type includes, but is not limited to, cognitive bias, behavioral bias, and intentional bias. Various types of bias are determined using different types of gaming performed by a client attempting to access a protected entity.
[0026] The type, scope, and available strategies of the game are set in the access policy defined for the protected entity. A deviation is determined based on the result of the game. Based on the deviation, it can be determined whether the client accessing the protected entity is, for example, a bot. That is, a drift or deviation from an expected or previously established deviation will indicate a bot.
[0027] Figure 1 An example network diagram 100 is shown for describing various disclosed embodiments. Figure 1 The network diagram 100 shown in the diagram includes an admission system 110, a client 120, a blockchain peer-to-peer network 130 (hereinafter referred to as blockchain network 130 for simplicity only), a protected entity 140, a trust broker 160, and an audit system 170. The entities in the network diagram 100 communicate via a network 150, exist in the network 150, or communicate via the network 150 and exist in the network 150.
[0028] The client 120 may be a PC, a mobile phone, a smart phone, a tablet, a server, etc. The client 120 may be operated by a legitimate user or a legitimate program, or may be an attack tool. The client 120 may execute an application or program to access the protected entity 140 .
[0029] The protected entity 140 is an entity to be protected from malicious threats. The protected entity 140 can be any network or computing element including resources accessible by the client 120. For example, the protected entity 140 can be a function in a serverless architecture, an application server, a network server, a cloud application, a data center, a network device (e.g., a router, ADC, etc.), a firewall (e.g., a network application firewall), etc.
[0030] In some embodiments, the audit system 170 is used to record or register any transaction performed between two or more of the access system 110, the client 120, the trust broker 160, and the protected entity 140. For example, the audit system 170 is configured to record any suspicious user or online robot activity (e.g., many access attempts by the client, a high rate of access token utilization, etc.). In another embodiment, the function of registering transactions by the audit system 170 is performed on the blockchain network 130, that is, using a distributed ledger maintained on the blockchain network 130.
[0031] According to an embodiment, the trust broker 160 may be connected to the protected entity 140, wherein the trust broker 160 and the protected entity 140 are both points in the blockchain network 130, and each point may act as a proxy server for the network 150. For example, acting as a proxy server may include converting HTTPS messages into messages that can be transmitted on the network 150. Each of the trust broker 160 and the protected entity 140 may be configured to receive or otherwise intercept requests generated by the client 120 (e.g., but not limited to HTTP / HTTPS requests).
[0032] In one embodiment, trust broker 160 is configured to manage the games that client 120 needs to participate in to gain access to protected entity 140 or specific resources (not shown) within protected entity 140. In an embodiment, trust broker 160 is configured with multiple access policies. The access policies define at least: the protected entities and resources to be protected, one or more games used in the protection template, the game scope of each game, the initialization parameters of each game, the completion criteria of each game, and the steps to be performed upon completion of a successful game or a game completion reward.
[0033] The scope of a game is the group of collaborating protected entities or resources within a protected entity 140 and the visibility and validity of access tokens within that group. A game scope can be private, in which case there is one active instance of the game per protected entity resource. An entity game is a single game instance shared by multiple protected resources within a protected entity 140. A global game is a single game instance shared by all protected resources between multiple protected entities within a trust broker. The various games and their respective strategies are discussed in more detail below.
[0034] It should be noted that although for simplicity only Figure 1 1 shows a client 120, an admission server 110, and a protected entity 140, but the embodiments disclosed herein can be applied to multiple clients, multiple admission servers, multiple protected entities, or any combination thereof. In addition, multiple admission systems and trust brokers can be utilized or configured in a distributed implementation. The clients can be in different geographical locations. In addition, a single client 120 can be served by multiple admission servers 110 or trust brokers 160 simultaneously.
[0035] It should also be noted that in some embodiments, the admission system 110 and the trust broker 160 can be implemented in a single system or as a distributed system. In addition, each of the above elements can also be integrated into a single system, for example, the admission system 110 and the protected entity 140 can be implemented as a single unified gateway. In one embodiment, the audit system 170 is integrated into the admission system 110.
[0036] In another embodiment, admission system 110, trust broker 160, protected entity 140, or a combination thereof may be implemented in a network device (not shown) that has been deployed in network 150. Examples of such network devices include application delivery controllers (ADCs), load balancers, network application firewalls (WAFs), routers, firewalls, and the like.
[0037] In some embodiments, the protected entity may perform a blockchain-based process to authorize access to one of the protected entity resources. To this end, the protected entity 140 may be configured with a software agent, a processor, or both to perform the authorization process. The software agent may be implemented as a virtual machine, a software container, etc. In some embodiments, the protected entity 140 may be connected to a gateway 145 that is configured to perform the authorization process on behalf of the protected entity 140. The gateway 145 may be any network device, examples of which are provided above. Figure 4 Discussing the authorization process, in one embodiment, the gateway 145 may be configured to provide a new access policy or a modified access policy to a protected entity. An access policy defines the requirements that must be met in order to access a protected entity, for example, by a client.
[0038] The blockchain network 130 is a collection of one or more (unlabeled) nodes for maintaining a decentralized ledger and validated blocks as described above. A node may be a physical machine, or a virtual machine executed by a machine with sufficient computing power to validate blocks. In an embodiment, a node of the blockchain network 130 (e.g., a validated block for transactions that convert proprietary tokens) may be configured to process proprietary access tokens. The proprietary access tokens may be of different types.
[0039] In another embodiment, the nodes of the blockchain network 130 may be configured to process tokens. For example, the infrastructure of the Ethereum blockchain network is based on a collection of nodes implemented as the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) connected in a mesh. Each such node runs a copy of the entire blockchain and competes to mine the next block or verify transactions. In addition, each node in the blockchain network 130 implemented as Ethereum maintains an updated copy of the entire Ethereum blockchain. In an embodiment, the blockchain network 130 may be configured as a private network. In this embodiment, the access token (or contract) accessible by the nodes connected to the blockchain network 130 operates in a private mode. In another embodiment, the private token is used as part of a public or private Ethereum blockchain.
[0040] In another embodiment, the trust broker 160 can be implemented as a smart contract using cryptographic EVM capabilities. A smart contract is a computer protocol designed to digitally facilitate, verify, or enforce the negotiation or execution of a contract, and a smart contract is defined as a collection of executable computer code in one of many possible computer languages, such as but not limited to "Python", "Java", "R", "Solidity" or any other computer language used now or in the future to implement such smart contracts. Smart contracts allow trusted transactions to be performed without the presence of a trusted third party. These transactions are traceable and irreversible.
[0041] It should be understood that in some embodiments, utilizing the blockchain network 130 for the admission process allows for maintaining the privacy of users accessing the protected entity 140 while providing transparency of the admission transaction. In addition, the blockchain network 130 can be easily extended, thus providing a scalable solution.
[0042] According to the disclosed embodiment, any client, such as client 120, attempting to access protected entity 140 is required to perform a game as defined by an access policy provided by trust broker 160 for protected entity 140 or one of the resources accessed by protected entity 140. The game and the scope of the game are defined in the access policy selected by trust broker 160.
[0043] According to the disclosed embodiments, the game may be implemented as executable code executed by the trust broker 160. In another embodiment, the game may be implemented as parameter data dynamically loaded by the trust broker 160. In yet another embodiment, a rule engine or other programming mechanism is utilized to implement the game process according to the established game rules.
[0044] The game may be performed in the trust broker 160 , or may be performed by the client 120 , where the performance of the blockchain network 130 is used to protect the interaction between the client 120 and the trust broker 160 .
[0045] Each game is designed to allow the trust broker 160 to establish biases for the client 120. The bias is established when the client 120 plays the game, when the game is completed, or both. In one embodiment, the game is used to establish behavioral biases using risks expressed as access tokens. The tokens can be proprietary tokens or contracts. In addition, the access tokens can be of the same type or different types. In one embodiment, the trust broker 160 is also configured to set a dynamic conversion value from a first type of token to a second type of token based on the client's historical gaming behavior and knowledge of the game rules.
[0046] In one embodiment, a cognitive bias may be established based on the accumulation of access tokens. To this end, when the game is executed, the game will present the user with the option of picking up access tokens while solving puzzles, navigating through a maze, etc.
[0047] As a non-limiting example of a game for establishing cognitive biases, a maze with treasure is used. The maze is generated based on the complexity level defined in the corresponding access policy. For example, for a highly secure protected entity, a complex maze will be generated. The maze can be implemented as a portable executable code or parameter data dynamically loaded into the rule engine by the client 120. The user of the client 120 is required to navigate the maze to collect objects. The collection of objects causes the user to be rewarded with an access token, i.e., the object represents an access token. As another non-limiting example, the game can include a series of questions, the answers to which reveal cognitive bias tendencies.
[0048] The progress of the game is monitored to determine how the client (or its user) interacts with the game. This allows cognitive biases to be determined. Progress can be measured relative to, but not limited to, activity time, choices made by the user, etc. For example, the time required to collect objects, the number of objects collected, the type of objects collected (candy or bugs), etc. The cognitive bias is associated with the client 120 and is saved as an encrypted block in the blockchain network 130. Therefore, no entity other than the trust broker 160 is aware of the determined bias.
[0049] In another embodiment, behavioral biases may be established based on access token spending. To this end, the executed game will present the client 120 (or its user) with the option to spend access tokens, and determine behavioral biases based on the actual tokens spent.
[0050] As a non-limiting example of a game for establishing a behavioral deviation, the game may be a bidding game, where users are asked to bid, for example, to access a protected entity, purchase an access token, etc. The higher the bid, the behavioral deviation is determined to be a behavioral deviation of the spender.
[0051] In yet another embodiment, intent bias may be established based on the balance of access tokens. Intent bias also defines the intent of the client in navigating within a protected entity. For example, if the protected entity is an e-commerce website, the intent may indicate whether the user is intercepting information, comparing prices, or shopping. In one embodiment, gaming may be hidden in links to products in such an e-commerce website. For example, gaming may include making interactions with intent hidden in the gaming for selection (e.g., "are you looking for similar products" vs. "are you looking for cheap gifts for friends").
[0052] Other embodiments of establishing intent bias may include presenting multiple games to the client 120 and requesting the client to select a game. Based on the game selection, the intent is established. As another exemplary embodiment, by establishing a hidden decision tree in the game, each decision branch allocates / deallocates a certain number of tokens for the client 120. In addition, by tracking the selected branch, the trust broker 160 can infer the intent bias.
[0053] Trust broker 160 is configured to allow or deny access to protected entity 140 based on the deviation or any deviation thereof. Trust broker 160 may also provide a recommendation as to whether to allow access. It should be emphasized that access is granted not based solely on the fact that the user successfully completed the game, but based on the determined deviation. For example, a maze game may be successfully completed when a user has collected multiple objects, but the cognitive bias is determined based on the type of objects collected (e.g., candy vs. vulnerability). Therefore, even if all objects have been collected, access may still not be granted. Any failed access may be registered in audit system 170.
[0054] It should be noted that awarding access tokens, saving the established deviations, and all transactions related to the game to be performed are performed through the blockchain network 130.
[0055] Specifically, the granting of access tokens is recorded as a transaction included in a block of the blockchain maintained by the blockchain network 130. When access to the protected entity 140 is requested by the client 120, the client 120 "pays" the protected entity 140 the required number of access tokens.
[0056] This may be performed by revoking (spending) an access token granted to the client 120 to gain access. In other words, the use of the access token is recorded as a transaction and included in a block of the blockchain maintained by the blockchain network 130. Thus, verification of the transaction (access request) is performed by the blockchain network 130. The verification may be performed before granting access to the protected entity 140. In yet another embodiment, the verification is performed after access is conditionally granted to the client. If the verification fails, the client 120 is disconnected from the protected entity 140.
[0057] Policies, games, and deviations can be used to detect various types of attacks, including account takeover, denial of inventory, denial of service, and anti-scraping.
[0058] As an example, the access policy may periodically perform a similar cognitive bias game on the client 120 by monitoring the cognitive bias drift. If such a bias drift is identified, the protected entity 140 may conclude that the client 120 has experienced an account takeover attack.
[0059] As another example, the access policy may cross-reference the intent of the client 120 with the behavior of the client 120. When the protected entity 140 recognizes that the behavior of the client 120 is similar, but the intent has changed, it may be determined that the client 120 has now changed its persona, and a cognitive bias game may be performed to further verify the user's authenticity.
[0060] As another example, the intention deviation may represent the role of the user in the system, and deviation from the intention deviation indicates an attack. For example, the user's intention deviation may be determined to be only about read transactions. If the deviation intention is modified to be a write transaction, this may indicate an access violation.
[0061] It should be noted that changes in intent bias may not be deterministic. For example, many embodiments may utilize a numerical dimension for intent bias. For example, a user may have a 20 / 80 write / read intent bias. By monitoring changes in the ratio between intent biases, potential security risks may be determined based on the change in ratio, and thus protected entity 140 may change its access restrictions.
[0062] In yet another embodiment, the client 120 and protected entity 140 may optionally include means for maintaining tokens issued by the admission system 110 and the trust broker 160, or may utilize the wallets described herein.
[0063] Furthermore, each deviation established for client 120 is recorded as a transaction included in a block of the blockchain maintained by blockchain network 130. The transaction may be signed by the keys of client 120 and trust broker 160.
[0064] In another embodiment, the blockchain network 130 may maintain the entire game instance or a URL to the game location. After retrieving and playing the game, the client 120 stores the game completion results or criteria as metadata in the blockchain transaction.
[0065] Figure 2 An exemplary flow chart 200 for establishing bias and trust for a client attempting to access a protected entity according to an embodiment is shown. The method can be performed by a trust broker 160 using a blockchain network 130.
[0066] At S210, the blockchain network is monitored to identify that the client 120 can bet with a plurality of previously awarded access tokens. The betted access tokens are provided as a payment transaction in the blockchain network 130. The betted access tokens may be associated with a request to access a protected entity. The access request includes at least one identifier (e.g., an IP address, a URL, etc.) of a protected entity (or resource) to be accessed.
[0067] At S215, the blockchain transaction is analyzed to identify the protected entity ("entity ID") addressed by the client from the transaction metadata. That is, the entity ID is extracted from the transaction. S215 also includes an identifier ("client ID") that identifies the client. The client ID can be provided by the protected entity 140 or the admission system 110. In other embodiments, the client 120 can generate its own ID. To this end, the client ID can be randomly selected or derived based on the client's system parameters (for example, but not limited to, IP address, MAC address, etc.). The client ID can be mathematically derived using proof of knowledge to track client activity across multiple protected entities. In another embodiment, the client ID can be a user ID provided by an external authentication service such as one that uses an OAuth or SAML system and is used as an admission controller 110.
[0068] It should be noted that the client ID does not reveal any information about the user of the client 120. Furthermore, generating the client ID on the client 120 does not require exposing or sharing personal information related to the user's device, or even identifying details of the device or user. The client 120 only shares proof of the client ID.
[0069] At S220, using the entity ID, a corresponding access policy assigned to the attempted protected entity is retrieved.
[0070] The access policy defines the game type and the scope of the game. The scope of the game can be a private game, an entity game, or a global game. For each game instance, game specific parameters are defined. Game parameters can include, for example, conversion value, number of initiator tokens participating in the game, expiration time, terms regarding the availability of access tokens, etc.
[0071] The access policy also specifies the protected entity (or protected entity's resource) and the corresponding game that the client must perform in order to access the specified protected entity or resource. As described above, multiple games can be assigned to a protected entity resource, and each game can be assigned its own priority (e.g., optional, required, necessary, and sufficient, etc.). The access policy can define supplementary methods.
[0072] In an embodiment, multiple access policies may be associated with a single protected entity. In such an embodiment, the selection of an access policy is based on the protected entity specified in the received access request. In addition, the selection may be based on multiple selection parameters. These parameters may be associated with the client 120, the protected entity 140, or a combination thereof.
[0073] In an embodiment, the selection of a policy is based on information retrieved from an external source. Examples of such sources include, for example, external databases, reputation services, and historical records. The historical records may include, for example, successful or failed access attempts, previously selected games, etc. The historical records are retrieved from the audit system 170. As an example, for a client with a "bad" reputation, an access policy with multiple games will be selected.
[0074] At S230, the wagered access tokens are converted to a first type of access token, thereby allowing the client 120 to perform the game. The conversion value may be dynamically determined based on an access policy, a historical record (e.g., of the client's past gaming behavior), or both. The first type of token is stored on the blockchain network 130. It should be noted that if the client 120 does not hold enough wagered access tokens, no conversion is performed and execution is terminated.
[0075] At S240, the blockchain network 130 is monitored to determine whether the client 120 has deposited enough access tokens of the first type to participate in the game. The first type of access token may be a proprietary token. The type and sum of tokens required to participate in the game are specified in the access policy. In an embodiment, the client 120 is required to deposit (pay) the sum of the specified access tokens at each instance of the game.
[0076] After identifying such a token, at S250, the game to be executed by the client 120 is published as a transaction on the blockchain network 130. As described above, the game instance can be fully embedded in the blockchain network 130, or in another embodiment, the blockchain network 130 can hold a URL to the game location.
[0077] The games and their complexity to be performed by the client 120 are defined in the corresponding policies. As described above, different games can be utilized to determine different biases, such as intention bias, cognitive bias, or behavioral bias.
[0078] At S260, the blockchain network 130 is monitored to identify the game completion result stored by the client 120. The result can be stored as metadata in the blockchain transaction.
[0079] At S270, based on the identified completion results, corresponding biases are established for the executed game. As described above, access token accumulation represents cognitive biases, access token balance represents intention biases, and access token spending represents behavioral biases. The above provides an example of establishing biases using the executed game.
[0080] At S280, access to the protected entity is granted or denied based on the established deviations. That is, rather than granting access based solely on the fact that the client 120 (or its user) successfully completed the game, access is granted based on the determined deviations. For example, if the behavioral deviation is established as a spender, access may not be granted. This is because more tokens will be required to spend due to the online robot behavior that will attempt to access the protected entity multiple times.
[0081] It should be noted that reference Figure 1 The methods discussed are for simplicity and ease of description only. The disclosed embodiments are not limited to Figure 1 Arrangement shown.
[0082] Figure 3 is an example block diagram of a trust broker 160 according to an embodiment. Trust broker 160 includes processing circuitry 310 coupled to memory 320, storage 330, and network interface 340. In an embodiment, the components of trust broker 160 may be communicatively connected via bus 350.
[0083] Processing circuit 310 may be implemented as one or more hardware logic components and circuits. For example, but not limited to, illustrative types of hardware logic components that may be used include: field programmable gate array (FPGA), application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), application specific standard product (ASSP), GPU, system on chip (SOC), general purpose microprocessor, microcontroller, digital signal processor (DSP), etc., or any other hardware logic component that can perform calculations or other manipulations of information. In an embodiment, processing circuit 310 (or the entire system 110) may be implemented as a Turing machine on a blockchain network.
[0084] The memory 320 may be volatile (e.g., RAM, etc.), non-volatile (e.g., ROM, flash memory, etc.), or a combination thereof. In one configuration, computer readable instructions for implementing one or more embodiments disclosed herein may be stored in the storage device 330 .
[0085] In another embodiment, the memory 320 is configured to store software. Software should be broadly interpreted to mean any type of instructions, whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, or hardware description language. The instructions may include code (e.g., in source code format, binary code format, executable code format, or any other suitable code format). When the instructions are executed by one or more processors, the instructions cause the processing circuit 210 to perform the various processes described herein. Specifically, when the instructions are executed, the instructions cause the processing circuit 310 to perform blockchain-based access as discussed above. In another embodiment, the memory 320 may further include a memory portion 325 containing instructions.
[0086] Storage 330 may be a magnetic storage device, an optical storage device, etc., and may be implemented as, for example, flash memory or other memory technology, a CD-ROM, a digital versatile disk (DVD), a hard drive, an SSD, or any other medium capable of storing desired information such as transaction logs, public keys, etc. Storage 330 may include various access policies and games.
[0087] The network interface 340 allows the trust broker 160 to communicate with the blockchain network, clients, trust brokers, and protected entities. The network interface 340 further communicates with these elements point-to-point.
[0088] It should be understood that the embodiments described herein are not limited to Figure 3 The specific architectures shown in , and other architectures may equally be used without departing from the scope of the disclosed embodiments.
[0089] It should also be noted that you can use Figure 3Trust broker 160 may be implemented using a computing architecture similar to the architecture shown in , but other architectures may equally be used without departing from the scope of the disclosed embodiments. In addition, memory 320 may include instructions for executing the functions of trust broker 160.
[0090] Figure 4 is an exemplary flow chart 400 illustrating an admission-based process for accessing a protected entity according to an embodiment. Figure 1 The method is discussed with reference to the elements described in . In an embodiment, the method may be performed by a protected entity 140 or a gateway device 145 connected to the protected entity 140. In both embodiments, the method is based on data collected by continuously monitoring the blockchain network 130.
[0091] At S410, an access request is received from a client. The request is a non-interactive request with or without any session context. The request may be received via a dedicated API, or may be received via a standard layer 7 protocol such as HTTP, SMTP, HTTP, etc. The access request may be sent using a standard layer 7 protocol such as HTTP or HTTPS. In yet another embodiment, the access request may be sent as a non-interactive payment via the blockchain network 130.
[0092] At S420, an identifier (ID) of the client sending the access request is extracted. The validity of the client ID is determined. This can be performed using, for example, a client certificate, a one-time password (OTP), etc. to identify, prove, verify, check the balance or history position of the client 120, or a combination thereof. When maintaining the privacy of the client 120 is mandatory, knowledge proofs such as SK-SNAKS and Zcach can be used instead of directly exposing the client identity.
[0093] In some embodiments, when the request does not include a valid client ID, the request is forwarded to admission system 110 .
[0094] At S430, an admission process is initiated. The client 120 undergoes this admission process. The admission process may be performed based on techniques such as, but not limited to, admission based on the game being played, access tokens (of one of multiple types), or any combination thereof.
[0095] Reference below Figure 5 Exemplary embodiments of a game-based admission process are discussed.
[0096] In another embodiment, the admission process includes causing the client 120 to convert the first type of access token into the second type of access token based on the conversion value. The conversion value is dynamically determined based on multiple access parameters, interactions between access parameters, or both. The conversion value may also be updated based on game participation.
[0097] The first set of access parameters is related to the client 120. For example, the reputation of the client 120, the geographic location of the client 120, or both can be used to determine the conversion value. The behavior of the client 120 can also determine the conversion value. The conversion value can be determined on multiple access tokens representing different granularity access permissions. For example, a read access token indicating access for the client 120 can incur a lower cost than a write access token indicating permission for the client 120 to edit data, and thereby incur a higher cost to control client time authorization at a fine granularity at multiple scales as indicated by the risk analysis and the protected entity access granularity.
[0098] The second set of access parameters is related to protected entity 140. For example, sensitive resources or services of protected entity 140 will require a higher translation value regardless of the trustworthiness of client 120. As another example, the current load on protected entity 140 may affect the translation value, i.e., the translation value increases as the load increases.
[0099] The third group of access parameters includes global indications. Global indications can include indications of ongoing cyber attacks against protected entities or other entities in the network. The amount of ongoing attacks is also considered a global parameter. Such indications can be received from an external system (not shown) connected to the admission system 110, the trust broker 160, or both. For example, an indication of an ongoing cyber attack will result in a higher conversion value. Other examples of global parameters can include time of day, a particular day (weekend, weekday, or holiday), etc.
[0100] In all of the access parameters of the above examples, the weights (i.e., conversion values) can be adapted as non-linear functions. The non-linear function is configured so that it does not affect legitimate users who occasionally access the protected entity 140, but such a function significantly affects attackers who frequently access the protected entity 140. Therefore, using access parameters to determine conversion values allows "distinguishing" between clients while the clients can maintain their privacy. The access parameters mentioned in the above examples can be determined based on historical data registered in the audit system 170. For example, such data can include identified conversion transactions, determined conversion values, etc.
[0101] When the admission criteria are published as a transaction (hereinafter referred to as an "admission transaction") on the blockchain network 130, the admission process performed by the client 120 is completed.
[0102] In one embodiment, the admission transaction includes transaction data, a transaction hash, and hashes of one or more previous transactions. In an embodiment, the admission transaction may also include admission criteria and any number of metadata elements as specified and requested by the admission system 110, the client 120, the protected object 140, or a combination thereof. The admission criteria may include game completion results, the number of access tokens of a particular type, etc.
[0103] In an exemplary implementation, the transaction data may also include a unique transaction ID, an identification of the admission system 110 as the source of the access token, and the requested target. The requested target may be a service, application, or resource at the protected entity 140 to which the client 120 requests access. It should be noted that in some implementations, the admission transaction need not include any information identifying the client 120 or the user using the client 120. The hash of the transaction is a cryptographic hash of the transaction contents. The owner of the transaction, such as the admission system 110, signs the transaction with its private key or other cryptographic identity. The transaction may be verified using the public key of the transaction owner.
[0104] At S440, the blockchain network is monitored to identify at least one admission transaction associated with the client. The search is for admission transactions including search criteria, such as but not limited to client ID, game ID, etc.
[0105] At S450, it is checked whether an admission transaction is identified and admission criteria that satisfy a set of conditions to access the protected entity are specified. For example, it may be checked whether the number of access tokens is sufficient. If the result at S450 is a "yes" answer, execution continues to S460; otherwise, at S455, an error message denying access is sent to the client. Alternatively or in combination, at S455, the client may be redirected to the admission system 110. In addition, any failed access attempts may be registered at the audit system 170. The set of conditions may be predefined or dynamically determined.
[0106] At S460, the admission transaction is verified by the blockchain network 130. In an embodiment, such verification is performed by immediately spending the access token specified in the admission transaction as payment to the admission system 110. As a result, the admission transaction is marked as "spent" in the corresponding block maintained in the blockchain network 130 and cannot be referenced again by the client 120. It should be noted that the transaction is never deleted from the block maintained in the blockchain network 130.
[0107] At S470, once the transaction is verified and the access token is paid, access is granted to the client 120. In an embodiment, S470 includes allowing the client 120 to access the requested resource or service at the protected entity 140. In an embodiment, the protected entity 140 may use the amount and type of access tokens paid to set a temporal ACL on the access client 120. That is, access may be restricted in time based on the amount and type of access tokens being paid.
[0108] It should be noted that access tokens are typically paid to admission system 110 when fulfilling an access request. Fulfillment of an access request may include allowing client 120 access to protected object 140, conditionally allowing client 120 access to protected object 140, or denying access to protected object 140.
[0109] It should also be noted that each transaction is a transfer of a specific value of an access token between the client 120, the system 110, and the entity 140. Block signatures also prevent transactions from being altered once they are published. Transactions are broadcast among the nodes of the blockchain network 130 and verified through a mining process.
[0110] In an embodiment, to grant an access token, the admission system 110 and the client 120 may exchange their public keys. To revoke an access token, the system 110 and the protected entity 140 may exchange their public keys. That is, there is no direct transaction regarding the use of access tokens between the client 120 and the protected entity 140. The (private or public) key may be a cryptographic key. Alternatively or in combination, the protected entity 140 and the admission system 110 may employ other secure communication means, such as a pre-shared key. In addition, the admission system 110, the client 120, and the protected entity 140 may function under a public key infrastructure (PKI) or a certificate authority (CA) mechanism.
[0111] As an example, an access token can be a chain of digital signatures. System 110 can transmit access tokens to clients by digitally signing a hash of a previous transaction and the public key of protected entity 140. The signature (hash value) can be attached to each access token. To grant access to client 120, the entity can verify the signature to verify the chain of ownership.
[0112] Figure 5 An exemplary flow chart 500 of a game-based admission process according to an embodiment is shown. Figure 1 The elements shown describe the method. In an embodiment, the method may be performed by a protected entity 140 or a gateway device 145 connected to the protected entity 140. In both embodiments, the method is based on data collected by continuously monitoring the blockchain network 130.
[0113] At S510, the blockchain network is monitored to identify access policies assigned to each client (e.g., client 120). As described above, the access policy defines the type of game and the scope of the game. In an embodiment, the access policy is assigned to a protected entity. The access policy defines the game and the tokens participating in the session. The access policy may also define security associations that will be implemented based on the cumulative state of "paid" tokens and the state of the game process (including derived deviations). Definitions and examples of access policies are discussed above. In some embodiments, upon receiving an access request, the access policy assigned to the client is retrieved from the blockchain network.
[0114] At S520, the game executed by the client 120 is published as a transaction on the blockchain network 130, so that the client 120 executes the game. The game instance can be completely embedded in the blockchain network 130, or in another embodiment, the blockchain network 130 can hold a URL to the game location. The game to be executed by the client 120 and its complexity are defined in the corresponding policy. As described above, different games can be used to determine different deviations, such as intentional deviations, cognitive deviations, or behavioral deviations.
[0115] In some embodiments, client 120 may require an access token with multiple bets (or other types) before executing a game. Client 120 may request or perform a process to obtain some tokens. Some embodiments for obtaining such tokens are discussed above.
[0116] At S530, the blockchain network 130 is monitored to identify the game completion results stored by each client (e.g., client 120). As described above, the results can be stored as metadata in the blockchain transaction. Completion can be a session of gaming. Such a session can be a cycle, stage, etc. of gaming. That is, gaming can continue, and in some embodiments, S520 may not require the completion of gaming.
[0117] At S540, the client ID and its corresponding access policy and the completion result are saved in association with the client ID of the corresponding client. If such metadata (or any completion result) cannot be identified, a NULL indication is saved. In an embodiment, the access policy is saved together with the completion result as a transaction on the blockchain network 130.
[0118] At S550, a bias of the client is determined or established. The bias may be a cognitive bias, an intentional bias, or a behavioral bias. Access token accumulation characterizes cognitive bias, access token balance characterizes intentional bias, and access token spending characterizes behavioral bias. An example of establishing a bias using the executed game is described above. It should be noted that the established bias may be re-evaluated after the client device performs any action.
[0119] In some embodiments, the deviation may be established by trust broker 160. In such embodiments, the established deviation is also retrieved from trust broker 160. Such a cookie indicates whether access to the protected entity is granted or denied based on the established deviation determined by the trust broker.
[0120] At S560 , the completion result, the established deviation, or both are returned.
[0121] It should be noted that for simplicity only, reference Figure 1 The disclosed embodiments are not limited to application to Figure 1 Arrangement shown.
[0122] refer to Figure 4 and 5 The methods discussed are performed by a protected entity or a gateway (or any device) connected to the protected entity. In some embodiments, the protected entity, the gateway, or both that perform the methods discussed herein are implemented as, for example, reference Figure 3 The hardware devices implemented are discussed.
[0123] The various embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented as any combination of hardware, firmware and software. In addition, the software is preferably implemented as an application program tangibly presented on a program storage unit or a computer-readable medium. The application program can be uploaded to a machine including any suitable architecture and executed by the machine. Preferably, the machine is implemented on a computer platform with hardware (such as one or more central processing units ("CPU"), memory and input / output interface). The computer platform can also include an operating system and microinstruction code. The various processes and functions described herein can be a part of the microinstruction code or a part of the application program or any combination thereof, which can be executed by the CPU, regardless of whether such a computer or processor is explicitly shown. In addition, various other peripheral units such as additional data storage units and printing units can be connected to the computer platform. In addition, non-transitory computer-readable media are any computer-readable media other than temporary propagation signals.
[0124] It should be understood that any reference to an element using names such as "first", "second", etc. herein does not generally limit the number or order of these elements. On the contrary, these names are generally used as a convenient method for distinguishing between two or more elements or instances of elements in this article. Therefore, the reference to the first element and the second element does not mean that only two elements can be adopted there or that the first element must be before the second element in some way. Similarly, unless otherwise specified, a group of elements includes one or more elements. In addition, the term "at least one of A, B or C" or "one or more of A, B or C" or "at least one of the group including A, B and C" or "at least one of A, B and C" used in the specification or claims refers to "A or B or C or any combination of these elements". For example, the term may include A or B or C, or A and B, or A and C, or A and B and C, or 2A, or 2B, or 2C, etc.
[0125] All examples and conditional language described herein are intended to be used for teaching purposes to help the reader understand the disclosed embodiments and the ideas contributed by the inventor to promote this area, and will be interpreted as not being limited to such specific examples and conditions of narration. In addition, all statements describing the principles, aspects and embodiments of the present invention and its specific examples herein are intended to cover both its structural and functional equivalents. In addition, such equivalents are intended to include currently known equivalents and equivalents developed in the future (that is, any element of the development that performs the same function regardless of the structure).
Claims
1. A method for blockchain-based access authorization to control access to a protected entity, comprising: receiving an access request for accessing the protected entity, wherein the access request is received from a client device; identifying, in response to a request to access a protected resource received from the client device, an access policy on a blockchain network; wherein the access policy includes at least one game to be performed by the client device; causing the client device to perform an admission process including executing the at least one game; Monitoring a blockchain network to identify at least one admission transaction, wherein the at least one admission transaction specifies admission criteria; determining whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected entity; identifying a completion result of the at least one game on the blockchain network, wherein the completion result is stored by the client upon completion of at least one cycle of the at least one game, wherein determining whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected resource is based on the completion result of the at least one game; and Access is granted to the client device when the admission criteria satisfies the set of conditions, wherein the access is to the protected entity.
2. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: A deviation of the client is determined based on the completion result, wherein the determined deviation is used for network security assessment of the client, wherein whether the admission criteria satisfies the set of conditions for accessing the protected entity is determined further based on the determined deviation.
3. The method according to claim 2, wherein: Granting access to the client device further comprises: determining a drift from a previously determined deviation, wherein the determined deviation is continuously re-evaluated for any action performed by the client; and When a drift from a previously established deviation is determined, access is denied.
4. The method according to claim 1, wherein: Granting access to the client further comprises: determining whether the client executes the at least one game defined in the access policy; and Access to the protected entity is denied when the client does not perform the at least one game defined in the access policy.
5. The method according to claim 1, wherein: Granting access to the client further comprises: Determining whether a completed result of the game executed by the client has been stored on the blockchain network; and When no completion results are stored, access to the protected entity is denied.
6. The method according to claim 2, wherein: The bias includes any one of the following: cognitive bias, behavioral bias, and intentional bias; wherein each type of bias is defined to detect a cybersecurity threat; wherein the cybersecurity threat is any one of the following: account takeover, denial of inventory, denial of service, and anti-wipe.
7. The method according to claim 1, further comprising: extracting a unique client identifier from the received access request; Wherein, the unique client identifier does not reveal any information about the user of the client device.
8. The method according to claim 7, wherein: The admission transaction is implemented as at least one of: a smart contract on the blockchain network and an off-chain oracle database on the blockchain network.
9. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The at least one game is shared with the client via the blockchain network, wherein the access policy is selected based on the protected entity, wherein the access policy specifies at least one of: at least one game, the protected entity, resources within the protected entity, and a scope of the at least one game.
10. The method according to claim 1, wherein: Enabling the client device to perform an admission process further includes: The client is caused to spend a first sum of access tokens of a specified type.
11. The method according to claim 10, further comprising: causing the client to convert the first type of access token into a second type of access token based on a conversion value, wherein the conversion value is determined based on at least one access parameter; and The client is caused to spend a second sum of access tokens of the second type to access the protected entity.
12. The method according to claim 10, wherein: The first type of access token and the second type of access token are of different types, wherein the first type of access token and the second type of access token are tokens with different encrypted identities.
13. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The method is performed by a gateway connected to the protected entity.
14. The method according to claim 1, wherein: The protected entity includes at least one of: a network element and a computing element accessed by the client.
15. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having stored thereon instructions for causing a processing circuit to perform a process for blockchain-based access authorization to control access to a protected entity, the process comprising: receiving an access request for accessing the protected entity, wherein the access request is received from a client device; identifying, in response to a request to access a protected resource received from the client device, an access policy on a blockchain network; wherein the access policy includes at least one game to be performed by the client device; causing the client device to perform an admission process including executing the at least one game; Monitoring a blockchain network to identify at least one admission transaction, wherein the at least one admission transaction specifies admission criteria; determining whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected entity; identifying a completion result of the at least one game on the blockchain network, wherein the completion result is stored by the client upon completion of at least one cycle of the at least one game, wherein determining whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected resource is based on the completion result of the at least one game; and Access is granted to the client device when the admission criteria satisfies the set of conditions, wherein the access is to the protected entity.
16. A system for controlling access to a protected entity using blockchain-based access authorization, comprising: Processing circuit; as well as a memory comprising instructions that, when executed by the processing circuit, configure the system to: receiving an access request for accessing the protected entity, wherein the access request is received from a client device; identifying, in response to a request to access a protected resource received from the client device, an access policy on a blockchain network; wherein the access policy includes at least one game to be performed by the client device; causing the client device to perform an admission process including executing the at least one game; Monitoring a blockchain network to identify at least one admission transaction, wherein the at least one admission transaction specifies admission criteria; determining whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected entity; identifying a completion result of the at least one game on the blockchain network, wherein the completion result is stored by the client upon completion of at least one cycle of the at least one game, wherein determining whether the admission criteria satisfies a set of conditions for accessing the protected resource is based on the completion result of the at least one game; and Access is granted to the client device when the admission criteria satisfies the set of conditions, wherein the access is to the protected entity.
17. The system of claim 16, wherein: The system is also configured to: A deviation of the client is determined based on the completion result, wherein the determined deviation is used for network security assessment of the client, wherein whether the admission criteria satisfies the set of conditions for accessing the protected entity is determined further based on the determined deviation.
18. The system of claim 17, wherein the system is further configured to: Determine the drift from the previously determined deviation, where, continuously re-evaluating the determined deviation for any actions performed by the client; and When a drift from a previously established deviation is determined, access is denied.
19. The system of claim 16, wherein the system is further configured to: determining whether the client executes the at least one game defined in the access policy; and Access to the protected entity is denied when the client does not perform the at least one game defined in the access policy.
20. The system of claim 16, wherein the system is further configured to: Determining whether a completed result of the game executed by the client has been stored on the blockchain network; and When no completion results are stored, access to the protected entity is denied.
21. The system of claim 17, wherein: The bias includes any one of the following: cognitive bias, behavioral bias, and intentional bias; wherein each type of bias is defined to detect a cybersecurity threat; wherein the cybersecurity threat is any one of the following: account takeover, denial of inventory, denial of service, and anti-wipe.
22. The system of claim 16, wherein: The system is further configured to extract a unique client identifier from the received access request; Wherein, the unique client identifier does not reveal any information about the user of the client device.
23. The system of claim 22, wherein: The admission transaction is implemented as at least one of: a smart contract on the blockchain network and an off-chain oracle database on the blockchain network.
24. The system of claim 16, wherein: The at least one game is shared with the client via the blockchain network, wherein the access policy is selected based on the protected entity, wherein the access policy specifies at least one of: at least one game, the protected entity, resources within the protected entity, and a scope of the at least one game.
25. The system of claim 16, wherein: The system is also configured to: The client is caused to spend a first sum of access tokens of a specified type.
26. The system of claim 25, wherein: The system is also configured to: causing the client to convert the first type of access token into a second type of access token based on a conversion value, wherein the conversion value is determined based on at least one access parameter; and The client is caused to spend a second sum of access tokens of the second type to access the protected entity.
27. The system of claim 25, wherein: The first type of access token and the second type of access token are of different types, wherein the first type of access token and the second type of access token are tokens with different encrypted identities.
28. The system of claim 16, wherein: The configuring is performed by a gateway connected to the protected entity.
29. The system of claim 16, wherein: The protected entity includes at least one of: a network element and a computing element accessed by the client.
