Method, control device and vehicle for certifying a transport task
By using password functions to sign and verify transportation task information in groups of autonomous vehicles and off-vehicle systems, the problems of autonomous vehicle task hijacking and security threats are solved, and the authenticity authentication and security improvement of transportation tasks are achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN201980074519.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2018-12-07
- Filing Date
- 2019-10-30
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-08
- Estimated Expiration
- 2039-10-30
AI Technical Summary
Autonomous vehicles are vulnerable to malicious attacks, resulting in potential mission hijacking and security threats, and it is difficult for the existing technology to effectively verify the authenticity of transportation tasks.
By using a password function in the group of autonomous vehicles and off-vehicle systems to sign the transport task information and sending the signature information to multiple members for verification, at least one transport task bearer's signature is ensured, thereby improving the reliability of authentication.
This method improves the authenticity and authentication reliability of transportation tasks, prevents the execution of malicious tasks, and enhances the safety of autonomous vehicles.
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Figure CN113015945B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present disclosure relates to technology in the context of vehicles and to a method for enabling certification of a transport task, and to a corresponding method for certifying a transport task. The present disclosure also relates to a corresponding control device, a computer program and a computer-readable storage medium for executing the proposed method, and to an autonomous vehicle comprising such a control device. Background Art
[0002] An autonomous vehicle can be defined as a vehicle that can guide itself without human control. Autonomous vehicles are also called driverless vehicles, robotic vehicles, or self-driving vehicles.
[0003] Autonomous vehicles may offer several advantages to society. Costs may be reduced because the vehicles are driverless and their operation is not subject to driver time regulations. Autonomous vehicles use a variety of sensors to perceive their surroundings in order to navigate and avoid obstacles. Extensive sensing systems may improve safety because sensors are typically always paying attention, compared to human drivers who may be distracted by other things.
[0004] However, autonomous driving also faces problems. Autonomous vehicles are typically highly connected and are often connected to infrastructure such as traffic management systems, other vehicles, and the Internet. This connectivity makes autonomous vehicles vulnerable to malicious attacks, which may harm the vehicle and endanger the safety of the vehicle, load (if any), and passengers. The article "BlockChain: ADistributed Solution to Automotive Security and Privacy", Ali Dorri et al., IEEE Communications Magazine, describes a blockchain-based automotive security and privacy architecture. Here, each vehicle is connected to an overlay network, where a public blockchain is managed by an overlay node, which is, for example, a smart vehicle, a car manufacturer, a vehicle assembly line, etc. Each vehicle is equipped with a wireless vehicle interface and a local storage device. The storage device is used to store privacy-sensitive data, such as location and maintenance history. The overlay network can be used to send data from the vehicle to an insurance company in a secure manner, or for remote software updates. Therefore, the proposed architecture is implemented using a public blockchain.
[0005] Autonomous vehicles typically retrieve new missions from off-board systems. Details of a mission (e.g., final destination and schedule) are typically included in the mission data. Autonomous vehicles could potentially retrieve the wrong mission from a malicious sender and be hijacked by unknowingly driving to a destination defined by the wrong mission. Summary of the invention
[0006] It is an object of the present disclosure to alleviate at least some of the disadvantages of the prior art.Another object is to provide a method for ensuring that autonomous vehicles only perform genuine transport tasks.
[0007] These and other objects are achieved at least in part by the independent claims and by the embodiments according to the dependent claims.
[0008] According to a first aspect, the disclosure relates to a method for enabling authentication of a transport task. The method is performed in a control device of a member of a group comprising a plurality of autonomous vehicles and an off-board system. Each member of the group comprises a cryptographic function known to all other members. The method comprises signing, using the cryptographic function, information defining at least one transport task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle of the group. The method further comprises sending the signed information to a plurality of other members of the group in order to request them to authenticate the transport task.
[0009] The method ensures that at least one transport task carries the signature of the sender, so that the recipient member can verify the sender of the transport task. When the signature information is sent to multiple other members, the authenticity of the transport task can be verified by multiple members, and the multiple member verification can detect whether the transport task is not authentic. Thus, the reliability of authentication is improved.
[0010] According to a second aspect, the present disclosure relates to a control device for authorizing members of a group including a plurality of autonomous vehicles and an off-board system to perform a transport task. Each member of the group comprises a cryptographic function known to all other members. The control device is configured to perform the method according to the first aspect.
[0011] According to a third aspect, the disclosure relates to a method for authenticating a transport task. The method is performed by a control device of a member of a group including a plurality of autonomous vehicles and an off-board system. Each member of the group includes a cryptographic function known to all other members. The method includes receiving from the members of the group signature information defining at least one transport task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle in the group. The method also includes verifying the authenticity of the transport task using the cryptographic function.
[0012] The method provides a method for authenticating the transport mission of an autonomous vehicle. Thus, it can be ensured that the transport mission of the autonomous vehicle is authentic.
[0013] According to a fourth aspect, the present disclosure relates to a control device for authenticating members of a group of a plurality of autonomous vehicles and an off-board system for a transport task. Each member of the group comprises a cryptographic function known to all other members. The control device is configured to perform the method according to the third aspect.
[0014] According to a fifth aspect, the present disclosure relates to an autonomous vehicle, comprising a control device according to the second aspect and / or a control device according to the fourth aspect.
[0015] According to a sixth aspect, the present disclosure relates to a computer program comprising instructions, which, when the program is executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to the first aspect.
[0016] According to a seventh aspect, the present disclosure relates to a computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions, which, when executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to the first aspect.
[0017] According to an eighth aspect, the present disclosure relates to a computer program comprising instructions, which, when the program is executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to the second aspect.
[0018] According to a ninth aspect, the present disclosure relates to a computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions, which, when executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to the second aspect. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0019] Figure 1 A set of modules, a vehicle assembled from the set of modules, and an off-vehicle system are shown.
[0020] Figure 2 The drive module is schematically shown in more detail in a side view.
[0021] Figure 3 A group of members is shown, which includes multiple autonomous vehicles and off-board systems in an urban environment.
[0022] Figure 4 A method according to the first aspect according to some embodiments is shown.
[0023] Figure 5 A method according to the third aspect according to some embodiments is shown.
[0024] Figure 6 A signaling scheme is shown which includes successfully authenticating a transport mission and thus authorizing at least one autonomous vehicle to perform the mission.
[0025] Figure 7 A signal scheme including a non-authentication transport mission is shown.
[0026] Figure 8 A control device included in the off-board system is shown.
[0027] Fig. 9 A control device included in a member such as a vehicle is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0028] The following description will explain the method for authenticating a transport task from the perspective of a task sender (assignor), and the method for authenticating a transport task from the perspective of a task receiver (assignee). The method is typically performed by a control device of a member of a group of members. The sender is typically an off-board system that signs a new task and transmits it to a vehicle in the group. The new task is communicated to multiple or all other members of the group. When a member receives a signed task, the member attempts to verify the authenticity of the transport task. Thus, each member that receives the transport task attempts to verify the authenticity of the transport task, so in a sense, all members try Figure 1 Verify authenticity.
[0029] The method provides a secure way to verify whether a transport task is genuine. Therefore, malicious transport tasks will be stopped from being executed because they will never be authenticated.
[0030] Before explaining the method, an example of an autonomous vehicle and the assembly of such a vehicle will be described. Thus, this exemplary vehicle may be a member of the group. Reference will be made to Figure 1 and 2 The described vehicle is a modular vehicle. The modular vehicles described herein are generally configured to operate autonomously.
[0031] Figure 1 An example set of modules 20 for assembling a vehicle 1 is shown. Examples of off-board systems and assembled vehicles 1 are also shown. The set of modules 20 includes a plurality of drive modules 30 and a plurality of functional modules 40. The primary function of the drive modules 30 is generally to drive (e.g., propel, steer, and brake) the vehicle 1. The drive modules 30 include a pair of wheels 37 and are configured to operate autonomously. The functional modules 40 are configured to perform a certain function, such as carrying a load such as merchandise or a person.
[0032] Each module 30, 40 in the set of modules 20 comprises at least one interface 50 which can be releasably connected to a corresponding interface 50 on another module 30, 40. Since the drive module 30 can be configured to operate as an independent drive unit by means of the control device 200, the drive module 30 can be connected or disconnected from the functional module 40 without manual operation.
[0033] By combining the drive module 30 and the functional module 40, different types of vehicles 1 can be realized. According to the structural configuration of the functional module 40, some vehicles 1 require two drive modules 30, while some vehicles 1 only require one drive module 30. Each drive module 30 includes a control device 200 and is configured to communicate with a control device 100 in a control center or an off-vehicle system. Each functional module 40 may include a control device 300 and therefore may also communicate with a control device 100 in a control center or an off-vehicle system.
[0034] In some embodiments, the control device 200 of the driving module 30 is configured to communicate with the control device 300 of the functional module 40, such as Figure 1 As shown by the dashed lines in . The communication between the modules 30, 40 can be wireless or inductive or wired. The wireless communication can be directly between the modules or via an off-board system (i.e., including the first control device 100). The modules 30, 40 of the assembled vehicle can communicate with each other and / or with the first control device via 4G, 5G, V2V (vehicle to vehicle), Wi-Fi or any other wireless communication means.
[0035] Considering that the assembled vehicle 1 includes two drive modules, the first control device 100 may designate one drive module as a master drive module and the other as a slave drive module.
[0036] Here Figure 1 In the embodiment, the driving module 30 is shown as having only one interface 50, on one side of the driving module 30. However, it should be understood that each driving module 30 may include multiple interfaces 50 for releasably connecting with other modules 40. The (multiple) interfaces 50 of the driving module 30 may be arranged on different sides of the driving module 30, and thus can be connected with other modules 30, 40 on multiple sides of the driving module 30. The interfaces 50 on the driving module 30 and the functional module 40 are respectively appropriately arranged at corresponding positions to realize the connection between the modules 30, 40.
[0037] The driving module 30 includes a sensor system 250, which includes various sensors for sensing the environment, autonomously navigating, and avoiding obstacles. The functional module 40 may also include sensors (not shown) for sensing the environment.
[0038] Figure 2 The drive module 30 is schematically shown in more detail in a side view. The drive module 30 comprises at least one (only one is shown) propulsion system 91, energy storage device 92, interface 50 and control device 200. The energy storage device 92 provides energy to the propulsion system 91. The propulsion system 91 comprises at least one electric machine, thus an electric motor. The propulsion system 91 is arranged to propel a pair of wheels 37 of the drive module 30.
[0039] An example of a sequence for assembling a vehicle 1 will be described below. An operator may receive a task from a customer to transport goods from one location to another. The operator inputs information about the task into the first control device 100 via a user interface such as a touch screen or the like. It should be noted that this is merely an example, and the received task may be automatically converted and / or input to the first control device 100. The first control device 100 then determines which function is to be performed, and therefore determines which type of vehicle 1 is required to complete the task. In this example, the required vehicle 1 may be a truck. The first control device 100 selects which module 30, 40 is used for the required vehicle. For example, the type and module 30, 40 of the vehicle 1 required to complete the task may be selected based on information about the goods, the travel distance, and / or the geographic location. The first control device 100 then appropriately converts the task into a command to physically and electrically connect one or two selected drive modules 30 to the selected functional module 40. The control devices 200 of the drive modules 30 each receive the command and convert the command into a control signal for the corresponding drive module 30. The drive module 30 is thereby controlled to be physically and electrically connected to the functional module 40. Controlling the drive module 30 to connect with the functional module 40 may include controlling the drive module 30 to identify the position of the selected functional module 40 and move to the position. The position of the selected functional module 40 may be determined based on information received in the command to connect the drive module 30 with the functional module 40. Alternatively, the command to connect the drive module 30 and the functional module 40 is transmitted to both the drive module 30 and the functional module 40, whereby the functional module 40 is ready to connect and starts transmitting signals. The drive module 30 may then determine the position of the functional module based on the transmitted signal. Thus, the drive module 30 is autonomously operated to find the selected functional module 40 and connect with the functional module 40. At least one sensor device 60 arranged at the drive module 30 and / or the functional module 40 may be configured to sense when a physical and / or electrical connection has been performed. At least one sensor device 60 may send a signal to the control device 200 indicating that the connection has been performed. Based on the signal from the at least one sensor device 60, the control device 200 may send a verification signal to the first control device 100 to verify the connection.
[0040] Then, the first control device 100 may generate a unique vehicle identification of the assembled vehicle 1. In this way, the vehicle 1 is assembled and the vehicle 1 is ready to perform a mission.
[0041] Now refer to Figure 3 A group of members in an urban environment, Figure 4 and 5 Methods and Figure 6-8 The proposed method is explained in detail using the signal scheme of the
[0042] Figure 3 A group of members in an urban environment is shown. The members include a plurality of autonomous vehicles 1, off-board systems 2, and mobile devices 3. Thus, each individual autonomous vehicle is a member, the off-board system is a member, and the mobile device 3 is another member. The illustration is merely an example, and the group may include more or fewer members. For example, one of the plurality of autonomous vehicles is Figure 1 and 2 Each member 1, 2, 3 includes a wireless communication interface (130, Figure 8 ; 230, Fig. 9 ). The vehicle 1 operates along the streets of an urban environment for performing different transport tasks, such as transporting people or loads to various locations, serving as a taxi or bus, etc.
[0043] Figure 4 It is shown that the user can use the Figure 3 A method for authenticating a transport task in a group of members shown in . The method is executed in the control device 100, 200, 300 of the member. The member is, for example, an off-board system 2 or a mobile device 3. Each member in the group, that is, its control device 100, 200, 300, includes a cryptographic function known to all other members. The cryptographic function is, for example, a cryptographic algorithm. In some embodiments, the cryptographic function includes a public key of a key pair, wherein the key pair also includes a private key known only to the member. Then, before the method starts, all members in the group will announce (e.g., exchange) the public key of each member. Therefore, each member in the group knows the public keys of all other members. In some embodiments, the cryptographic function includes a hash function, such as MD 5, SHA1, SHA256, Keccak-256 or RIPEDM. The hash function takes an input of any size and produces an output, hash or digest of a fixed size. If the same input and hash function are used, the output is always the same. Therefore, the hash output can be used as a fingerprint of the data being sent. The hash function is the same in all members of the group.
[0044] Cryptographic hash functions can be defined by certain properties that are considered secure. Such properties include: determinism, meaning that if a hash function is given a certain input, it will always give the same output; fast computation, meaning that the hash function should be able to return a hash quickly; and pre-imageability, meaning that it is infeasible to determine the input A given H(A), where H(A) is the output hash of the hash function.
[0045] One member performing the method is referred to herein as the first member (e.g., an off-vehicle system 2, a computer or a mobile device 3, including information defining at least one transport task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle in the group. This information can be input into the off-vehicle system by an operator via an input device. Alternatively, the operator can input such information into the computer or mobile device. The information is typically stored in a memory of the off-vehicle system, computer or mobile device. The information defining the transport task includes, for example, data defining the vehicle route. The information may include a starting point, a start time, a destination point, a destination time at which the vehicle should be at the destination point, and optionally one or more waypoints. The information may also include detailed information about the load included in the task, for example, whether passengers or cargo should be transported, and optionally which type of cargo. The information also includes information defining the identity of the vehicle assigned to perform the transport task.
[0046] The method comprises signing S11 information defining at least one transport task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle in the group using a cryptographic function. By signing the information, a recipient of the signed information is able to verify the identity of the sender. The signing process comprises adding a member's signature, thus a first member's signature, to the information to generate a "signed information" comprising a signature and the information. The member generates the signature using a cryptographic function. The signature may be generated using one of the sender's key pairs. For example, the sender encrypts the information using the sender's private key, thereby generating a signature. Thus, the recipient will be able to verify the sender's identity by decrypting the "signed information" using the sender's public key.
[0047] Signing can also include creating "wrapped and encrypted data" by combining the information with the "signed information" and encrypting the information using the recipient's public key. Thus, an intruder will be prevented from understanding the information because only the recipient's private key can decrypt the "wrapped and encrypted data".
[0048] To reduce the amount of data sent, as previously mentioned, a cryptographic hash function can be used as a step to generate a signature. The actual information can then be input into the hash function to generate a hash. The "signed information" will then include the signature plus the hash (rather than the signature plus the information). The sender of the hash can then be made a trusted sender by signing the hash using, for example, public encryption.
[0049] When the information has been signed, the member sends S12 the signed information to a plurality of other members of the group in order to request them to authenticate the transport task. Figure 8 ) to perform the sending. The signature information may include a request to authenticate the signature information.
[0050] By sending signature information to multiple other members, individual members can be used to authenticate the transport task. Therefore, multiple objective instances can be used to ensure that the transport task is authentic, and the authentication becomes secure. Moreover, it is possible to detect whether the transport task is authentic, and the system (e.g., an off-board system) can react accordingly.
[0051] In some embodiments, signing S11 includes generating a signature using a cryptographic function based on information defining the task to be performed and information associated with previously authenticated tasks performed by autonomous vehicles in the group. Thus, authentication can be even more secure by using a history of proven, and therefore authenticated, tasks. For example, as previously described, a cryptographic hash function can be used as a step to generate a signature. The information defining the current transport task and the information associated with the previously authenticated transport task are then used as inputs to the hash function. As previously explained, the hash function generates a hash. The hash is here associated with the previously authenticated transport task and is very difficult, if not impossible, to manipulate. As in the previous example, signing can also include encrypting the signature plus information using the recipient's public key.
[0052] In an exemplary embodiment, signing S11 includes generating a block including information defining the task to be performed using a cryptographic function for use in a blockchain. Cryptographic hash functions are commonly used in blockchain technology. A blockchain is a linked list containing data and a hash pointer, which points to its previous block, thereby generating a chain. A hash pointer is similar to a pointer, but in addition to including the address of the previous block, it also contains a hash of the data inside the previous block. Thus, a history of proven and therefore authenticated tasks is obtained. When a new transport task is obtained, a new block or "candidate block" is created by hashing using a hash function, the information defining the transport task and the hash of the data inside the previous block. The new "block" is also signed using, for example, public encryption and is sent to other members. Therefore, sending S12 includes sending the signed information including the block to multiple other members in the group.
[0053] The first member 2, 3 typically stores the signature information in a memory of its control device 100. In other words, the method includes storing the signature information S14 in the member. In order to ensure that the transport task is authentic, in some embodiments, the first member 2, 3 does not permanently (e.g., in a blockchain) store the signature information before receiving the certification of the transport task from a predefined number of members. In other words, storage S14 includes storing the signature information in the member, such as in a blockchain, in response to receiving the certification of the transport task S13 from at least a predefined number of other members of the group. The predefined number is, for example, 50% of the multiple other members of the group to which the signature information is sent. In some other examples, the predefined number is, for example, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% or 100% of the multiple other members of the group to which the signature information is sent. Therefore, the process of authenticating the transport task can be made safer than requiring only certification from one or a few other members.
[0054] Figure 5 is a flow chart showing a method for authenticating a transport task. As explained previously, one or several transport tasks usually come from the control device 100 of the off-board system. The method is executed by the control devices 100, 200, 300 of a member of a group. The group is, for example, Figure 3 The method comprises receiving S21 from a member of the group a signed message defining at least one transport task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle in the group. For example, the signed message is sent from an off-board system, wherein the message has also been signed using a cryptographic function known to all members of the group. The method further comprises verifying S22 the authenticity of the transport task using a cryptographic function. To verify the authenticity of the transport task, it is included, for example, to verify the identity of the sender. This is typically accomplished by decrypting the signed message using the sender's public key and, in some cases, the receiving member's private key. For example, if the sender encrypts the message using the sender's private key and thereby generates a signature, the receiver verifies the sender's identity by decrypting the "signed message" using the sender's public key.
[0055] If the signed message includes "wrapped and encrypted data", the recipient will use the recipient's private key to decrypt the "wrapped and encrypted data". The recipient now sees the "message", which was decrypted first, but not the "signed message", and therefore not the signature. Thereafter, the recipient will decrypt the "signed message" using the sender's public key and see this "message" a second time. This later decrypted "message" can be compared to the first decrypted "message". If they match, it can be ensured that the message was indeed sent by the identified sender. Data matching also ensures that the message has not been corrupted.
[0056] If the "signed message" consists of a signature plus a hash (rather than a signature plus a message), the recipient can then hash the received message using the same cryptographic hash function used on the sender's side. If the resulting computed hash on the recipient's side is the same as the hash sent, then the messages match and it can be ensured that the message was indeed sent by the identified sender.
[0057] If this hash is also calculated based on information associated with previously authenticated transport tasks, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to manipulate. The recipient has included information associated with previously authenticated transport tasks. The recipient will decrypt the received data as explained previously and use the history of information associated with previously authenticated transport tasks and the newly received decrypted information as input to the hash function. If the resulting calculated hash on the recipient side is the same as the received hash, they match and it can be ensured that the message was indeed sent by the identified sender.
[0058] Thus, each member can verify the authenticity of the transport task in a variety of ways. For example, if the identity of the sender can be verified, the transport task can be authenticated as authentic. This verification can be enhanced by also cryptographically signing the information, by hashing the information, and / or by using a history of authenticated transport tasks combined with the new transport task.
[0059] The authentication may also include a authenticity check of the received information. This check may include comparing the details of the information with previously received transport tasks. For example, if on a certain day the destination of a previous transport task for a vehicle was in Finland, and the next day the starting point of a new transport task for the same vehicle is in Spain, it may be determined that the transport task is invalid because the vehicle cannot possibly reach the starting point in time. The group members may also have general rules that all members are aware of. For example, these rules may specify the areas in which members are allowed to operate. If the transport task indicates a location outside of this area, it may be determined that the transport task is invalid.
[0060] Therefore, each member that has received the signature information attempts to authenticate the signature information. If the member succeeds, the authentication is sent to at least one autonomous vehicle indicated as the vehicle to perform the transport task. Therefore, according to some embodiments, the method includes sending S23 the authentication of the transport task to at least one autonomous vehicle in response to the task being verified as authentic. Thereby, at least one autonomous vehicle can be enabled to know whether the transport task is authentic.
[0061] The member receiving the signature information may be at least one autonomous vehicle that is also to perform the transport task. In other words, in some embodiments, the control device 200, 300 that performs the method is arranged in at least one autonomous vehicle. Therefore, whether the at least one autonomous vehicle itself performs the transport task can be verified as a true check. However, in order for at least one autonomous vehicle to actually be authorized to perform the transport task, in addition to self-certification, at least one autonomous vehicle may also be required to receive a predefined number of individual certifications. In other words, in some embodiments, the method includes in response to receiving the certification of the transport task from at least a predefined number of other members of the group, authorizing S25 the at least one autonomous vehicle to perform the transport task. The predefined number is, for example, 50% of the multiple other members of the group to which the signature information is sent. In some other examples, the predefined number is, for example, 60%, 70%, 80%, 90% or 100% of the multiple other members of the group to which the signature information is sent. Therefore, the process of certifying the transport task can be made safer than requiring only certification from one or a few other members. The percentage can be a predefined number instead, such as 2, 3, 5 or 10 individual members. However, for a transport task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle, it may not be necessary for the at least one autonomous vehicle to verify whether the transport task itself is authentic.
[0062] If at least one autonomous vehicle is authorized to perform the transport task, then the off-board system may be informed that the at least one autonomous vehicle is aware of the authorization to perform. Thus, in some embodiments, the method comprises sending S26 to the off-board system a confirmation of the authorization to perform the transport task by the at least one autonomous vehicle. The off-board system receives the confirmation and typically stores a representation of the confirmation in the control device 100.
[0063] In addition to sending the certification to at least one autonomous vehicle to perform the transport task, the certification may also be sent to other members of the group. Thus, in some embodiments, the method includes sending S24 the certification of the transport task to a plurality of members of the group in response to the task being verified as authentic.
[0064] The members of the group can also monitor one by one how many verified authentications the member has received. If the member receives a predefined number of verified authentications, the signature information is stored in the member. In other words, the method includes storing S27 the signature information in the control device 100, 200, 300 in response to receiving authentication of the transport task from at least a predefined number of other members of the group. Therefore, multiple members will include information of all authenticated transport tasks. In some embodiments, storing S27 includes adding the signature information to the blockchain in the control device 100, 200, 300. Therefore, the signature information will be part of a chain list that is difficult to manipulate. Since the chain list is the same in all multiple members of the group, the link can also be used to verify the authenticity of the transport task as previously explained. Chain list, so the blockchain includes multiple blocks, each of which includes a hash of the previous block. If you want to retroactively change an entry in the ledger, you must calculate a new hash not only for the block in which it is located, but also for each subsequent block. And it must be possible to add new blocks to the chain faster than other nodes. Therefore, any blocks added will conflict with existing blocks, if not faster, and other nodes will automatically reject the change. This is what makes the blockchain tamper-proof or "immutable."
[0065] According to some embodiments, the member will wait for authentication from other members of the group. In order to avoid the authentication process taking too long, or if the transport task has been affected and cannot be authenticated, the member can implement a timer. Therefore, according to some embodiments, the method includes determining S28 that at least one transport task is not authentic in response to the expiration of a predetermined time before receiving authentication from at least a predefined number of other members of the group. Then, the signature information will not be saved in the member performing the method. If the determination is performed in at least one autonomous vehicle considered for the transport task, the at least one vehicle will not be authorized to perform the transport task. For example, when the signature information is sent, or when a request to sign the transport task is received, the timer is triggered to start counting.
[0066] If a member is added to the group (e.g., a new autonomous vehicle), or if an old member has been inactive for a while (e.g., was turned off) and is now active again, in an exemplary embodiment, that member receives a copy of the blockchain currently available in another active member (e.g., an off-board system).
[0067] Now refer to Figure 6 and 7 The signal scheme is used to explain the method. Figure 7, an example group of three members is shown. The group includes a first member (member 1), i.e., an off-board system, a second member (member 2), i.e., a first autonomous vehicle, and a third member (member 3), i.e., a second autonomous vehicle, and also includes an autonomous vehicle to perform a new, not yet certified, transportation task. Reference will now be made to Figure 6 An exemplary scenario of successful authentication is explained with the signal scheme in FIG.
[0068] The user inputs a new transport task to the first member. The new transport task is intended for the third member. The first member uses a public encryption (corresponding to Figure 4 Step S11 in step 11), optionally also using the authenticated history of the transport task to sign the information defining the new transport task, and sending the signed information to the second member (corresponding to Figure 4 Step S12 in (corresponding to Figure 4 The encryption is performed using at least the public keys of the second member and the third member, respectively. The signature information is received by the second member (corresponding to Figure 5 The second member verifies the authenticity of the transport task (corresponding to step S21 in Figure 5 The transport task is verified to be authentic, and the second member sends authentication to the off-board system and the third member respectively (corresponding to Figure 5 In an alternative embodiment, for example, the second member sends the certification only to the member who is to perform the transport task, here the third member. This would correspond to Figure 5 Follow step 23 in the tutorial.
[0069] The signature information is also received by the third member (corresponding to Figure 5 The third member verifies the authenticity of the transport task (corresponding to step S21 in FIG. Figure 5 The third member also detects that the transport task is for itself. The transport task is verified as authentic by the third member, and the third member sends a certification to the off-board system and the second member respectively (corresponding to Figure 5 In response to the authorization from the second member and the authorization to self-perform, the third member authorizes itself to perform the transport task (corresponding to Figure 5 The predetermined number is therefore one (1) here because the group is small and is for illustration only. The third member sends a confirmation of the authorization to perform the transport task to the first member (corresponding to Figure 5 Step S26 in ), and store the signature information (corresponding to Figure 5 , step S27 in the process.
[0070] Thus, the second member has received the authentication from the third member, and in response to this authentication, it stores the signature information in the second member (corresponding to Figure 5 , step S27 in the process.
[0071] The first member has received authentications from the second member and the third member. In response to one or both authentications, it stores the signature information in the first member (corresponding to Figure 4 The first member also receives confirmation of the transport task from the third member in step S15, and in response thereto, stores information related to the confirmation.
[0072] Now refer to Figure 7 The signal scheme in is used to explain an exemplary scenario of unsuccessful authentication. Figure 6 As in the case of Figure 4 Step S11 in step 11), optionally also using the authenticated history of the transport task to sign the information defining the new transport task, and sending the signed information to the second member (corresponding to Figure 4 Step S12 in (corresponding to Figure 4 The second member and the third member attempt to verify the authenticity of the transport task, but are unsuccessful. Since no authentication is received from any other member within the predetermined time, the transport task is determined to be authentic and therefore invalid (corresponding to Figure 5 Furthermore, since the first member has not received any authentication, it is determined that the transport task is not authentic and is therefore invalid (corresponding to step S16). The first member can now try to repeat the method and send the signature information of the transport task again.
[0073] Now go to Figure 8 , which shows another exemplary embodiment, namely a control device configured to implement the proposed method. In this example, the control device is embodied as a control device 100 in an off-board system, for example.
[0074] In some embodiments, the control device 100 is a "unit" in a functional sense. Thus, in some embodiments, the control device 100 is a control arrangement that includes several physical control devices that operate in coordination. The control device 100 includes hardware and software. The hardware basically includes various electronic components on a printed circuit board PCB. The most important of these components are usually a processor 110 and a memory 120.
[0075] The control device 100 also includes a communication interface 130, which enables the control device 100 to communicate with the modules 30, 40 of the modular vehicle 1 and other external entities such as a traffic system. For example, the communication interface 130 enables an Internet connection. The communication of the control device 100 is implemented, for example, using the Internet Protocol (IP).
[0076] The control device 100, or more specifically the processor 110 of the control device 100, is configured to cause the control device 100 to perform all aspects of the method described above and below, and in particular, to perform the method according to the first aspect. Therefore, the control device 100 is configured to be able to authenticate the transport task. This is usually done by running a computer program code stored in the memory 120 in the processor 110 of the control device 100. Therefore, the computer program includes instructions that, when the program is executed by the control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to any one of the embodiments as described herein. The program can be stored on a computer-readable storage medium including instructions that, when executed by the control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to any one of the embodiments as described herein.
[0077] Now go to Fig. 9 , which shows another exemplary embodiment, namely a control device configured to implement the method according to the third aspect. In this example, the control device is embodied as a vehicle 1, for example Figures 1 to 3 The control devices 200, 300 in the modular vehicle described in the specification. In some embodiments, the control devices 200, 300 are "units" in a functional sense. Therefore, in some embodiments, the control devices 200, 300 are control arrangements that include several physical control devices that operate in coordination. The control devices 200, 300 include hardware and software. The hardware basically includes various electronic components on a printed circuit board PCB. The most important of these components are usually a processor 210 and a memory 220.
[0078] The control device 200, 300 also includes one or more communication interfaces 230, which enable the control device 200, 300 to communicate with the modules 30, 40 of the modular vehicle 1 or other vehicles. As described above, the communication between the modules is wireless, inductive or wired. The wired communication can be implemented as a standard protocol, such as a controller area network, CAN. CAN is a robust vehicle bus standard designed to allow microcontrollers and devices to communicate with each other in applications without a host computer. Wireless communication between modules can be implemented using any short-range communication protocol such as Bluetooth or 802.11.
[0079] The one or more communication interfaces 230 are also configured to be able to communicate wirelessly with the control device 100, that is, with the off-vehicle system. For example, 4G, 5G, V2V (vehicle to vehicle) or any other suitable wireless communication protocol is used to implement wireless communication between the control devices 200, 300 in the vehicle and the control device 100 in the off-vehicle system.
[0080] The control device 200, 300, or more specifically the processor 210 of the control device 200, 300, is configured to cause the control device 200, 300 to perform all aspects of the method described above and below, and in particular, to perform the method according to the third aspect. Therefore, the control device 200, 300 is configured to certify the transport task. This is usually accomplished by running a computer program code stored in the memory 220 in the processor 210 of the control device 200, 300. Therefore, the computer program includes instructions that, when the program is executed by the control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to any one of the embodiments described herein. The program can be stored on a computer-readable storage medium including instructions that, when executed by the control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to any one of the embodiments described herein.
[0081] As shown in the accompanying drawings, the terms used in the description of the embodiments are not intended to limit the described methods, control arrangements or computer programs. Various changes, substitutions and / or alterations may be made without departing from the embodiments of the present invention as defined by the appended claims.
[0082] As used herein, unless expressly stated otherwise, the term "or" should be interpreted as a mathematical OR, i.e., as an inclusive disjunction, and not as a mathematical exclusive OR (XOR). In addition, the singular forms "a", "an", and "the" should be interpreted as "at least one", and therefore, unless expressly stated otherwise, multiple entities of the same kind may also be included. It should also be understood that the terms "includes / including", "comprising", and / or "containing" specify the presence of stated features, actions, integers, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, actions, integers, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or groups thereof. A single unit, such as a processor, can implement the functions of several items described in the claims.
Claims
1. A method for enabling authentication of a transport task, the method being performed in a control device (100, 200, 300) of a member of a group comprising a plurality of autonomous vehicles and an off-board system, wherein each member of the group comprises a cryptographic function known to all other members, the method comprising: signing, using the cryptographic function, information defining at least one transportation task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle in the group; as well as sending the signature information to a plurality of other members of the group in order to request them to authenticate the transport task, The method is characterized in that the signing comprises generating a signature using the cryptographic function based on information defining the task to be performed and based on information associated with previously authenticated tasks performed by autonomous vehicles in the group.
2. The method of claim 1, comprising storing the signature information in the member.
3. The method of claim 2, wherein the storing comprises storing the signature information in a blockchain in response to receiving authentication of the transportation task from at least a predefined number of other members of the group.
4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, wherein: The signing includes generating, using the cryptographic function, a block including information defining a task to be performed for use in a blockchain, and wherein the sending includes sending the signed information including the block to a plurality of members of the group.
5. A computer program product comprising instructions which, when the computer program product is executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to any one of the preceding claims. 6 . A computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions, which, when executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to claim 1 .
7. A control device (100, 200, 300) for being able to authenticate a transport task, wherein the control device (100, 200, 300) is a control device (100, 200, 300) of a member of a group comprising a plurality of autonomous vehicles and off-vehicle systems, wherein each member of the group comprises a cryptographic function known to all other members, wherein the control device (100, 200, 300) is configured to perform a method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.
8. A method for authenticating a transport task, the method being performed by a control device (100, 200, 300) of a member of a group comprising a plurality of autonomous vehicles and an off-board system, wherein each member of the group comprises a cryptographic function known to all other members, wherein the method comprises: receiving, from members of the group, signed information defining at least one transport task to be performed by at least one autonomous vehicle in the group; Verify the authenticity of the transport task using the cryptographic function, The method is characterized in that the signature information includes a history of certified transport tasks, which are combined with new transport tasks. 9 . The method of claim 8 , further comprising sending authentication of the transport task to the at least one autonomous vehicle in response to the task being verified as authentic.
10. The method of claim 8 or 9, comprising sending certification of the transport task to a plurality of members of the group in response to the task being verified as authentic.
11. The method according to claim 8, wherein the method comprises: In response to receiving authentication of the transport task from at least a predefined number of other members of the group, the at least one autonomous vehicle is authorized to perform the transport task.
12. The method according to claim 11, wherein: The method comprises: A confirmation of authorization for the at least one autonomous vehicle to perform the transport task is sent to the off-board system.
13. The method according to claim 8 or 9, comprising: In response to receiving authentication of the transport task from at least a predefined number of other members of the group, the signature information is stored in the control device (100, 200, 300).
14. The method according to claim 13, wherein the storing comprises adding the signature information to a blockchain in the control device (100, 200, 300).
15. The method according to claim 8 or 9, comprising: In response to expiration of a predetermined time before receiving authentication from at least a predefined number of other members of the group, determining that the at least one transport task is not authentic. 16 . A computer program product comprising instructions, which, when the computer program product is executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method according to claim 8 . 17 . A computer-readable storage medium comprising instructions, which, when executed by a control device, cause the control device to perform the method of any one of claims 8 to 15.
18. A control device (100, 200, 300) for authenticating a transport task, wherein the control device (100, 200, 300) is a control device (100, 200, 300) of a member of a group comprising a plurality of autonomous vehicles and off-vehicle systems, wherein each member of the group comprises a cryptographic function known to all other members, wherein the control device (100, 200, 300) is configured to perform a method according to any one of claims 8 to 15.
19. An autonomous vehicle (1), comprising a control device (100, 200, 300) according to claim 7 and / or a control device (100, 200, 300) according to claim 18.
