Safety assessment method, equipment and medium based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium

The fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium-based method addresses subjective quantification and static evaluation issues in network security, offering dynamic and accurate defense strategies through a profit matrix and global utility function.

CN113935039BActive Publication Date: 2024-12-06NO 30 INST OF CHINA ELECTRONIC TECH GRP CORP
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202111012166.1
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2021-08-31
Publication Date
2024-12-06
Estimated Expiration
2041-08-31

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing network security risk assessment methods struggle with high false alarm rates, missed alarms, and subjective quantification of attack benefits, failing to provide an efficient and reliable security protection system due to their static nature and reliance on expert knowledge.

Method used

A security assessment method using a fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium game theory model to dynamically evaluate network attacks and defenses, incorporating a profit matrix and global utility function to objectively quantify attack benefits and derive optimal defense strategies.

Benefits of technology

The method provides accurate, adaptable, and scalable network security evaluations by combining subjective and objective quantification, enabling effective defense strategies against dynamic network threats.

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Abstract

The present invention discloses a security assessment method, device and medium based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium, wherein the method comprises the following steps: initializing the attack and defense action set in the game model: setting the attacker's action set A and the defender's action set D; constructing a profit matrix: assigning values ​​to each combination of attack behavior and defense behavior to form a profit matrix τ, wherein the profit function γ of each combination is ij Including maintenance costs, losses and recovery costs; construct a global utility function: construct a global utility function as the sum of the probability of the strategies taken by the attacker and the defender respectively multiplied by the corresponding benefit function γ ij ; Find the optimal strategy: Consider all combinations of defense strategies, and determine the best defense strategy by comparing the global utility of the optimal hybrid strategy of each combination and comparing it with the corresponding maintenance cost. The present invention combines subjective and objective quantitative methods to make the evaluation of network information systems more accurate.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of network information security technology, and in particular to a security assessment method, device and medium based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of computer network technology, more and more attack methods have emerged in the network, and network security incidents have occurred frequently. As a result, network security issues have received great attention from all walks of life, and cyberspace has gradually become the main battlefield for mutual competition between countries or regions. In particular, the security issues of cyberspace directly determine the ownership of cyberspace. Security protection measures such as firewalls, intrusion detection and biometric recognition that have been formed for a long time will cause high false alarm rates and missed alarm rates in the absence of effective warning information generated by network security risk assessment, making it difficult to form an efficient and reliable security protection system to ensure the security of network information systems.

[0003] Network security risk assessment is an active defense technology. Its basic purpose is to control network risks within an acceptable range and effectively evaluate risk factors. Through network security assessment, the security environment of the system can be obtained, the attacks to be suffered can be predicted, and suggestions can be provided for security administrators to take security measures. Network security risk assessment is divided into quantitative assessment methods, qualitative assessment methods and comprehensive assessment methods that combine qualitative and quantitative methods.

[0004] Quantitative assessment methods refer to the use of quantitative indicators to assess risks. Typical quantitative analysis methods include factor analysis, cluster analysis, risk graph, decision tree, etc. The results of quantitative risk assessment methods are more intuitive, but sometimes in order to quantify the risk value, complex things are simplified, which may cause risk factors to be misunderstood or misinterpreted.

[0005] Qualitative risk assessment methods are mainly based on the experience, knowledge, and skills of the assessor, and their assessment results are relatively comprehensive. Typical qualitative analysis methods include factor analysis, logical analysis, and historical comparison. However, they are too subjective and require the assessor to have high quality.

[0006] The comprehensive assessment method combining qualitative and quantitative methods combines the advantages of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methods and is widely used in risk assessment of complex information systems. However, this method cannot make an overall quantitative evaluation of the entire system, and it is also impossible to derive the level of the overall security risk status of the information system. Summary of the invention

[0007] In order to overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention proposes a security assessment method, device and medium based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium, aiming to solve the following technical problems:

[0008] (1) Network attack and defense are dynamic. A network attack and defense game model based on Nash equilibrium game theory is established to continuously evaluate the attack and defense status of network information systems and derive the best defense strategy to solve the problem that conventional static evaluation is difficult to adapt to the dynamic and continuous network information environment.

[0009] (2) Traditional risk assessment methods based on game theory require expert knowledge to quantify the benefits of a certain attack. To this end, a network security risk assessment system combining qualitative and quantitative methods is established using the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation matrix in fuzzy mathematics theory to quantify the benefits of an attack in a subjective and objective way, solving the problem that the quantification of attack benefits is too subjective.

[0010] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0011] A security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium includes the following steps:

[0012] S1. Initialize the attack and defense action set in the game model: take two participants as decision makers, namely the attacker and the defender; adopt a zero-sum game, that is, the attacker's goals are opposite to the defender's and the total benefit is zero; set the attacker's action set A and the defender's action set D, the action set A includes all malicious operations that can damage the network information system and create vulnerabilities, and the action set D includes all feasible defense strategies;

[0013] S2. Construct the profit matrix: Assign values ​​to each combination of attack and defense behaviors to form a profit matrix τ, where the profit function of each combination is γ ij It includes the maintenance cost of the defense strategy, the loss caused by the network information system being paralyzed or the data being lost due to the attack, and the recovery cost of the attacked network information system, and the loss is expressed by fuzzy numbers according to the method of fuzzy comprehensive evaluation;

[0014] S3. Constructing a global utility function: The global utility function is constructed by multiplying the sum of the probability of the strategies taken by the attacker and the defender by the corresponding benefit function γ ij ;

[0015] S4. Finding the optimal strategy: Consider all combinations of defense strategies and determine the best defense strategy by comparing the global utility of the optimal hybrid strategy for each combination and comparing it with the corresponding maintenance cost.

[0016] Furthermore, in step S2, the profit matrix τ is expressed as:

[0017]

[0018] Among them, m is the number of security protection strategies that can be adopted, n is the number of vulnerabilities in the network information system, and the benefit function γ ij It is expressed as:

[0019]

[0020] Among them, s j (1-e ij ) is the maintenance cost of the defense strategy, s = {s1, s2, …, s m} is the set of costs including the implementation and maintenance of each defense strategy, T i (1-e ij ) is the loss caused by the network information system being paralyzed or data being lost due to an attack, i (1-e ij ) is the recovery cost of the attacked network information system.

[0021] Furthermore, each defense strategy may be completely effective, partially effective, or even ineffective against one or more attack actions, and can be described as the following matrix:

[0022]

[0023] In this matrix, if the element e ij is equal to 1, then defense strategy j is completely effective in preventing the attacker's action i; if element e ij is equal to 0, then the effectiveness of defense strategy j in preventing the attacker's action i is zero, and it cannot be considered as a strategy for defending against the attacker's action i; therefore, element e ij The larger it is, the more effective it is at preventing certain types of attacks.

[0024] Furthermore, the method of expressing the loss by a fuzzy number according to the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation includes the following sub-steps:

[0025] S201. The loss C caused by the attacker's action i in the network attack and defense confrontation i Integrity loss C t Confidentiality loss C c and availability loss C a , that is, the loss C i =(C t , C c , C a ) i , use p=(p t , p c , p a ) to indicate the preference for the loss of these three security attributes, and satisfy p t +p c +pa =1;

[0026] S202. Using fuzzy numbers to represent the loss of security attributes, the expected effect of the attacker on the network information system is:

[0027] T i =||C i ·p T ||

[0028] Among them, p T represents the p-transposed matrix.

[0029] Furthermore, in step S3, if the attacker's strategy is π(a i )={π(a1), π(a2),…,π(a n )}, the defender strategy is Then the global utility function is the attacker adopts strategy a i and the defender adopts strategy d j The sum of the probabilities of multiplying by the corresponding payoff function is:

[0030]

[0031] Furthermore, in step S4, the formulated behaviors of the attacker and defender are optimized and solved using the minimax function. From the perspective of the defender, the maximum reward that the attacker can obtain is minimized, that is:

[0032]

[0033] Furthermore, according to Nash's theorem, the optimal mixed strategy is expressed as:

[0034]

[0035] Then transform the above formula into linear programming, transform the model into two sets of linear programming, and find the optimal hybrid strategy. The calculation formula is as follows:

[0036]

[0037]

[0038] as well as:

[0039]

[0040]

[0041] Finally, all combinations of defense strategies are considered, and the best defense strategy is determined by comparing the global utility of the optimal hybrid strategy of each combination and comparing it with the corresponding maintenance cost.

[0042] Furthermore, the total number of combinations of defense strategies is 2 m -1, where m is the number of security protection strategies that can be adopted.

[0043] A computer device comprises a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps of the above-mentioned security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium when executing the computer program.

[0044] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the above-mentioned security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium.

[0045] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following positive effects:

[0046] (1) The profit function is the core of the game model. In the existing technical research results, the quantification method of the loss caused by a specific type of attack is too subjective and only relies on the knowledge and experience of experts in the field. Therefore, the present invention creatively proposes a new loss function measurement method. On the basis of the network attack and defense game model based on Nash equilibrium, the method of fuzzy mathematics is introduced, combined with the method of security attribute cost, to form a fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method. This method combines subjective and objective quantification methods to make the evaluation of network information systems more accurate.

[0047] (2) The present invention can be customized, and the number and values ​​of key components of the benefit function can be flexibly formulated according to actual conditions, so it has strong scalability and adaptability. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0048] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium in Example 1 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0049] In order to have a clearer understanding of the technical features, purposes and effects of the present invention, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are now described. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not used to limit the present invention, that is, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without making creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0050] Example 1

[0051] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium, including the following steps:

[0052] S1. Initialize the attack and defense action set in the game model:

[0053] This embodiment considers two parties as decision makers, namely, an attacker and a defender, where the attacker benefits from damaging the system and the defender is a system or organization that uses countermeasures to defend the system and reduce the damage caused by the attack.

[0054] The type of network attack and defense game adopts a zero-sum game, that is, the goals of the attacker and the defender are opposite and the sum of the benefits is zero. In other words, if the attacker and the defender use actions i and j respectively, then γ ij It is the gain of the attacker and the loss of the defender.

[0055] Set the attacker's action set A and the defender's action set D. Action set A includes all malicious operations that can damage the network information system and create vulnerabilities, which can be expressed as A = {a1, a2, ..., a n}, where n is the number of vulnerabilities in the network information system; the action set D includes all feasible defense strategies and can be expressed as D = {d1, d2, ..., d m}, where m is the number of security protection strategies that can be adopted. Preferably, the attack and defense action set can be customized according to different industries and network information systems with different characteristics.

[0056] S2. Construct the profit matrix:

[0057] In order to simulate the attacker’s motivation, we use the concept of reward and cost to assign a value (γ ij ) forms a payoff matrix τ, which can be displayed as an n×m matrix, where the payoff set of the attacker taking a certain action is listed as the payoff set of the defender taking a certain action. The payoff matrix τ is as follows:

[0058]

[0059] Among them, m is the number of security protection strategies that can be adopted, n is the number of vulnerabilities in the network information system, and the benefit function γ ij It is expressed as:

[0060]

[0061] Among them, s j (1-e ij ) is the maintenance cost of the defense strategy, T i (1-e ij) is the loss caused by the network information system being paralyzed or data being lost due to an attack, i (1-e ij ) is the recovery cost of the attacked network information system.

[0062] For maintenance costs j (1-e ij ), where s = {s1, s2, ..., s m} is a set of costs including the implementation and maintenance of each defense strategy. From a game theory perspective, when a defense strategy is effective, the element s is negative. Therefore, for each functional element, the cost of ineffectiveness is the attacker's benefit. Each defense strategy may be fully effective, partially effective, or even ineffective against one or more attack actions, and can be described as the following matrix:

[0063]

[0064] In this matrix, if the element e ij is equal to 1, then defense strategy j is completely effective in preventing the attacker's action i; if element e ij is equal to 0, then the effectiveness of defense strategy j in preventing the attacker's action i is zero, and it cannot be considered as a strategy for defending against the attacker's action i. Therefore, element e ij The larger it is, the more effective it is at preventing certain types of attacks.

[0065] For the loss T i (1-e ij ), applying fuzzy mathematics theory and adopting fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method, we can get the subjective and objective benefit function quantification method. Specifically, the loss C caused by the attacker's action i in the network attack and defense confrontation is i Integrity loss C t Confidentiality loss C c and availability loss C a , that is, the loss C i =(C t , C c , C a ) i , use p=(p t , p c , p a ) to indicate the preference for the loss of these three security attributes, and satisfy p t +p c +p a =1. Using fuzzy numbers to represent the loss of security attributes, the expected effect of the attacker on the network information system is:

[0066] T i =||Ci ·p T ||

[0067] Among them, p T represents the p-transposed matrix.

[0068] For the recovery cost r i (1-e ij ), where r = {r1, r2, ..., r n}, each element shows the recovery cost caused by a specific attack.

[0069] S3. Construct a global utility function:

[0070] Define the attacker’s strategy as π(a i )={π(a1), π(a2),…, π(a n )}, the defender's strategy is If a player always chooses only one of the actions, which means that the probability of that action is 100%, the game is called a pure strategy (saddle point). In addition, each player chooses from a set of actions in which all players have a certain strategy.

[0071]

[0072] In mixed strategy games, global utility describes the credibility of the system, which represents the reward or benefit value of the participants in the long-term attack and defense game. The global utility function is constructed as the attacker adopts strategy a i and the defender adopts strategy d j The sum of the probabilities of multiplying by the corresponding payoff function is:

[0073]

[0074] The game model is also a random zero-sum game with complete information assuming that the participants are absolutely rational. Therefore, each participant tries to maximize their global utility, and they will choose actions with better returns while taking into account the actions of other participants. Moreover, complete information means that both players know the consequences (rewards) of each action.

[0075] S4. Find the optimal strategy:

[0076] After establishing the attack and defense game model, it can be formulated as an optimization problem, where each participant tries to increase his or her own benefits through various combinations of actions. In order to optimize the behavior of the participants after formulation, the minimax function is used. From the perspective of the defender, we strive to minimize the maximum reward that the attacker can obtain, that is:

[0077]

[0078] According to the Nash theorem, every finite game has at least one Nash equilibrium point, at which each participant cannot further improve their payoffs and reach a balance, which is called the optimal mixed strategy. The relevant definitions and constraints are expressed as follows.

[0079]

[0080] Convert the above formula into linear programming, convert the model into two sets of linear programming, and find the optimal hybrid strategy. The calculation formula is as follows:

[0081]

[0082]

[0083] as well as:

[0084]

[0085]

[0086] To find the best strategy for the defense system, consider all possible combinations of defense strategies, the total number of which is 2 m -1, where m is the number of security protection strategies that can be adopted. The best defense strategy is determined by comparing the global utility of the optimal hybrid strategy for each combination and comparing it with the corresponding maintenance cost. In general, the lower the maintenance cost and the lower the global utility, the better, but finding the best strategy is very dependent on the company or organizational structure's policy on the best strategy, and the optimal strategy set is selected with emphasis based on the needs of the enterprise. For example, for a large and mature enterprise, a strategy with minimum loss (minimum global utility) may be needed; while for small and medium-sized companies, maintenance cost may be the key factor.

[0087] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity of description, the embodiment of the method is described as a series of action combinations, but those skilled in the art should be aware that the present application is not limited by the order of the actions described, because according to the present application, certain steps can be performed in other orders or simultaneously. Secondly, those skilled in the art should also be aware that the embodiments described in the specification are all preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily required by the present application.

[0088] Example 2

[0089] This embodiment is based on embodiment 1:

[0090] This embodiment provides a computer device, including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium of embodiment 1 are implemented. The computer program may be in source code form, object code form, executable file, or some intermediate form.

[0091] Example 3

[0092] This embodiment is based on embodiment 1:

[0093] This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium of Embodiment 1. The computer program may be in source code form, object code form, executable file, or some intermediate form, etc. The storage medium includes: any entity or device capable of carrying computer program code, recording medium, computer memory, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), electric carrier signal, telecommunication signal, and software distribution medium, etc. It should be noted that the content contained in the storage medium may be appropriately increased or decreased according to the requirements of legislation and patent practice in the jurisdiction. For example, in some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, the storage medium does not include electric carrier signals and telecommunication signals.

Claims

1. A security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: S1. Initialize the attack and defense action set in the game model: take two participants as decision makers, namely the attacker and the defender; adopt a zero-sum game, that is, the goals of the attacker and the defender are opposite and the total benefits are zero; Set an action set A of the attacker and an action set D of the defender, wherein the action set A includes all malicious operations that can damage the network information system and create vulnerabilities, and the action set D includes all feasible defense strategies; S2. Construct the profit matrix: Assign values ​​to each combination of attack and defense behaviors to form a profit matrix τ, where the profit function of each combination is γ ij It includes the maintenance cost of the defense strategy, the loss caused by the network information system being paralyzed or the data being lost due to the attack, and the recovery cost of the attacked network information system, and the loss is expressed by fuzzy numbers according to the method of fuzzy comprehensive evaluation; S3. Constructing a global utility function: The global utility function is constructed by multiplying the sum of the probability of the strategies taken by the attacker and the defender by the corresponding benefit function γ ij ; S4. Find the optimal strategy: Consider all combinations of defense strategies, and determine the best defense strategy by comparing the global utility of the optimal hybrid strategy of each combination and comparing it with the corresponding maintenance cost; In step S2, the profit matrix τ is expressed as: Among them, m is the number of security protection strategies that can be adopted, n is the number of vulnerabilities in the network information system, and the benefit function γ ij It is expressed as: Among them, s j (1-e ij ) is the maintenance cost of the defense strategy, s = {s1, s2, …, s m } is the set of costs including the implementation and maintenance of each defense strategy, T i (1-e ij ) is the loss caused by the network information system being paralyzed or data being lost due to an attack, i (1-e ij ) is the recovery cost of the attacked network information system; Each defense strategy may be fully effective, partially effective, or even ineffective against one or more attack actions, and can be described as the following matrix: In this matrix, if the element e ij is equal to 1, then defense strategy j is completely effective in preventing the attacker's action i; if element e ij is equal to 0, then the effectiveness of defense strategy j in preventing the attacker's action i is zero, and it cannot be considered as a strategy for defending against the attacker's action i; therefore, element e ij The larger it is, the more effective it is at preventing certain types of attacks; The method of expressing the loss by a fuzzy number according to the fuzzy comprehensive evaluation comprises the following sub-steps: S201. The loss C caused by the attacker's action i in the network attack and defense confrontation i Integrity loss C t Confidentiality loss C c and availability loss C a , that is, the loss C i =(C t , C c , C a ) i , use p=(p t , p c , p a ) to indicate the preference for the loss of these three security attributes, and satisfy p t +p c +p a =1; S202. Using fuzzy numbers to represent the loss of security attributes, the expected effect of the attacker on the network information system is: T i =||C i ·p T ||; Among them, p T p-transposed matrix represented by; In step S3, if the attacker's strategy is π(a i )={π(a1), π(a2),…, π(a n )}, the defender strategy is Then the global utility function is the attacker adopts strategy a i and the defender adopts strategy d j The sum of the probabilities of multiplying by the corresponding payoff function is:

2. The security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium according to claim 1 is characterized in that: In step S4, the formulated behaviors of the attacker and defender are first optimized using the minimax function. From the defender's perspective, the maximum reward that the attacker can obtain is minimized, that is:

3. The security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium according to claim 2 is characterized in that: According to Nash's theorem, the optimal mixed strategy is expressed as: Then transform the above formula into linear programming, transform the model into two sets of linear programming, and find the optimal hybrid strategy. The calculation formula is as follows: as well as: Finally, all combinations of defense strategies are considered, and the best defense strategy is determined by comparing the global utility of the optimal hybrid strategy of each combination and comparing it with the corresponding maintenance cost.

4. The security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The total number of combinations of defense strategies is 2 m -1, where m is the number of security protection strategies that can be adopted.

5. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium described in any one of claims 1 to 4 are implemented.

6. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the security assessment method based on fuzzy matrix and Nash equilibrium described in any one of claims 1 to 4 are implemented.