Device location tampering monitoring method and system

Abstract

The application provides a device position tampering monitoring method and system, wherein the method comprises the following steps: after a to-be-inspected device enters the communication range of a position-trustable device, the position-trustable device receives the position information reported by the to-be-inspected device, and records the position information of the position-trustable device and the position information reported by the to-be-inspected device in the position chain database of the position-trustable device located on a blockchain; the position chain databases are monitored in real time in the blockchain, if the position information of the same to-be-inspected device is recorded in different position chain databases within a preset time period, whether the distance between the position-trustable devices corresponding to the different position chain databases is greater than the estimated moving distance of the to-be-inspected device within the preset time period is determined, if yes, it is determined that the position information of the to-be-inspected device is tampered with. The technical scheme provided by the application can determine whether the device position is tampered with without the aid of GPS or other positioning systems, and solves the technical problems of high cost and misjudgment existing in the prior art.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a method for monitoring device location tampering, and a system for monitoring device location tampering. Background Technology

[0002] In recent years, with the rapid development of communication technology and the popularization of the Internet, mobile terminals have been increasingly used in more and more situations. Criminals have been using this information to commit fraud and other illegal activities, causing a negative impact on society.

[0003] Currently, common methods for detecting location tampering rely on GPS (Global Positioning System) or other positioning systems. While these offer high accuracy, the need for GPS or other systems results in high costs and hinders widespread adoption. Furthermore, the variety of cheating tools means that not all of them manipulate geographic locations using the positioning functions of a positioning system, increasing the risk of false positives. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention was completed in order to at least partially solve the technical problems of high cost and false judgment in existing schemes for determining device location tampering.

[0005] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a method for monitoring device location tampering is provided, the method comprising:

[0006] After the device under test enters the communication range of the location trusted device, the location trusted device receives the location information reported by the device under test connected to it;

[0007] The location-trusted device records its own location information and the location information reported by the device under inspection into its location chain database located on the blockchain.

[0008] In the blockchain, the location chain database of trusted devices at various locations is monitored in real time. If different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under inspection within a preset time period, it is determined whether the distance between the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under inspection within the preset time period. If so, it is determined that the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with.

[0009] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0010] The location-trusted device receives the MAC address (Media Access Control Address) bound to the location information of the device under test reported by the connected device under test; and,

[0011] The trusted location device records the MAC address bound to its own location information, along with the MAC address information reported by the device under inspection, into its location chain database;

[0012] The database of different location chains within the preset time period records the location information of the same device under inspection, specifically:

[0013] Within a preset time period, the database records the same MAC address in different locations.

[0014] Optionally, determining whether the distance between trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under test within the preset time period is achieved using the following formula:

[0015]

[0016] Where (xn,yn) is the location information of the location-trusted device Tn, (xm,ym) is the location information of the location-trusted device Tm; Δd is the preset distance deviation; Δt is the preset time period; and v is the estimated moving speed of the device under test.

[0017] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0018] In the blockchain, the location information of trusted devices recorded in the location chain database is compared with the location information of the device under inspection to determine whether the difference between the two locations is within a preset distance range. If not, it is determined that the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with.

[0019] Optionally, the location information of the trusted device recorded in the location chain database is compared with the location information of the device under inspection in the blockchain to determine whether the location difference between the two is within a preset distance range. Specifically:

[0020] Determine whether the location information of the device under inspection, recorded in the location chain database, is within the communication coverage area of ​​the location-trusted device.

[0021] Optionally, the method further includes:

[0022] In the blockchain, the location chain database of trusted devices at various locations is monitored in real time. If different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under inspection within the same time period, it is determined whether the location of the device under inspection is located in the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases. If not, it is determined that the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with.

[0023] Optionally, it is determined whether the location of the device under inspection is located within the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of the trusted location devices corresponding to the different location chain databases, specifically:

[0024] Calculate the distances between the device under inspection and the corresponding trusted devices in the different location chain databases;

[0025] Select a preset number of distance values ​​with smaller distance values ​​from the distance calculation results;

[0026] Determine the overlapping area of ​​the communication coverage of the trusted location devices corresponding to the preset number of distance values;

[0027] Determine whether the location of the device under inspection is within the intersection area.

[0028] According to a second aspect of the present invention, a device location tampering monitoring system is provided, the system comprising: a plurality of location-trusted devices connected to a blockchain, the blockchain further comprising a monitoring module and a judgment module;

[0029] The location-trusted device is configured to receive location information reported by the device under test after the device under test enters its communication range;

[0030] The location-trusted device is also configured to record its own location information and the location information reported by the device under inspection into its location chain database located on the blockchain.

[0031] The monitoring module is configured to monitor the blockchain database at various locations in the blockchain in real time.

[0032] The judgment module is configured such that if the monitoring module detects that different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under test within a preset time period, it determines whether the distance between the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under test within the preset time period. If so, it determines that the location information of the device under test has been tampered with.

[0033] Optionally, the location-trusted device is further configured to receive the MAC address bound to the location information of the device under test reported by the device connected to it; and to record the MAC address bound to its own location information together with the MAC address information reported by the device under test into its location chain database.

[0034] The monitoring module detected that different location chain databases recorded the location information of the same device under inspection within a preset time period. Specifically, the monitoring module detected that different location chain databases recorded the same MAC address within a preset time period.

[0035] Optionally, the determination module determines whether the distance between the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under test within the preset time period, using the following formula:

[0036]

[0037] Where (xn,yn) is the location information of the location-trusted device Tn, (xm,ym) is the location information of the location-trusted device Tm; Δd is the preset distance deviation; Δt is the preset time period; and v is the estimated moving speed of the device under test.

[0038] The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present invention may include the following beneficial effects:

[0039] The device location tampering monitoring method and system provided in this invention, by designating a trusted location device, records the location information of both the device under test and the trusted location device in a blockchain when the device under test enters the communication range of the trusted location device. If the blockchain records find that the same device under test appears within the communication range of an unreachable trusted location device within the same time period, it is considered that the location information of the device under test has been tampered with. This method does not require the use of GPS or other positioning systems, has low cost, is simple and convenient to implement, is easy to promote, and has high accuracy in determining location tampering.

[0040] Other features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the description which follows, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing the invention. The objects and other advantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of the structures particularly pointed out in the description, claims, and drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0041] The accompanying drawings are provided to further understand the technical solutions of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. They are used together with the embodiments of the present invention to explain the technical solutions of the present invention, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions of the present invention.

[0042] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the device location tampering monitoring method provided in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating how the device under test uploads its location information to trusted devices in its vicinity, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0044] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the simultaneous connection of the same device under test to two trusted devices in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0045] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the device location tampering monitoring system provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0046] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the specific implementation methods of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific implementation methods described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the present invention.

[0047] In the following description, the use of suffixes such as "module," "part," or "unit" to denote elements is solely for the purpose of illustrative purposes and has no specific meaning in itself. Therefore, "module," "part," or "unit" may be used interchangeably.

[0048] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the device location tampering monitoring method provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps S101 to S103.

[0049] S101. After the device under test enters the communication range of the location trusted device, the location trusted device receives the location information reported by the device under test connected to it.

[0050] In this step, whenever a device under test enters the communication range of a trusted location device, its location information is reported to the trusted location device connected to it; if the same device under test enters the communication range of multiple trusted location devices at the same time, its location information is reported to each of the trusted location devices connected to it.

[0051] like Figure 2 As shown, after entering a certain communication range, the device under test E will establish a connection with the trusted location devices (T1, T2, T3 and T4) around it. Then, the device under test E will report its location information PE(x,y) to the trusted location devices T1, T2, T3 and T4.

[0052] S102. The location-trusted device records its own location information and the location information reported by the device under inspection into its location chain database located on the blockchain.

[0053] Among them, the location information of the trusted location device has only read permissions. Moreover, the location information of the device under inspection and the location information of the trusted location device can specifically be latitude and longitude coordinates.

[0054] In this step, each trusted location device records its own location information, along with the location information reported by all connected devices under inspection, into its location chain database on the blockchain, thus forming multiple location chain databases. Each location chain database corresponds to one trusted location device and records not only the location information of the corresponding trusted location device but also the location information of all devices under inspection that enter the communication range of the corresponding trusted location device and connect to it, including the timestamps of the location information recordings. Furthermore, recording the location information in the blockchain prevents the recorded data from being tampered with.

[0055] S103. In the blockchain, monitor the location chain databases of trusted devices at various locations in real time. If different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under inspection within a preset time period, determine whether the distance between the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under inspection within the preset time period. If so, determine that the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with. Of course, if the distance between the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases is not greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under inspection within the preset time period, it can be determined that the location information of the device under inspection has not been tampered with.

[0056] The preset time period is a time difference used to measure whether the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with. The specific time period can be set and adjusted by those skilled in the art according to actual circumstances, and this invention does not limit this. The device under inspection can be a mobile terminal, and the location-trusted device can be a base station.

[0057] In this embodiment, by designating a trusted location device, when other devices (the devices under inspection) enter the communication range of the trusted location device, the location information of both the devices under inspection and the trusted location device is recorded in the blockchain. If the blockchain records find that the same device under inspection appears within the communication range of an unreachable trusted location device within the same time period, it is considered that the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with. This is done without relying on GPS or other positioning systems, has low cost, is simple and convenient to implement, is easy to promote, and has high accuracy in determining location tampering.

[0058] In one specific implementation, step S101 further includes the following steps: the location-trusted device receives the MAC address reported by the device under test, which is bound to the location information of the device under test; step S102 further includes the following steps: the location-trusted device records the MAC address bound to its own location information, along with the MAC address information reported by the device under test, into its location chain database. Correspondingly, in step S103, different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under test within a preset time period, specifically: different location chain databases record the same MAC address within the preset time period.

[0059] In this embodiment, the location information of the device under test is bound to its MAC address (also known as a local area network address, Ethernet address, or physical address, which is a location used to confirm the location of a network device), giving the location information reported by the device under test an immutable attribute. Simultaneously, the location information of a trusted device is also bound to its MAC address, which also has an immutable attribute. Therefore, when the same MAC address appears in different location chain databases within a preset time period, since the MAC address is bound to the location information, it indicates that different location chain databases recorded the location information of the same device under test within the preset time period.

[0060] Taking the location chain databases of trusted devices T1 and T2 as examples, they record the location information (PE) and MAC address (ME) of the device under inspection E that has been connected, as well as their respective location information (PT) and MAC address (MT). The location chain database of T1 is shown in Table 1, and the location chain database of T2 is shown in Table 2.

[0061]

[0062] In one specific implementation, step S103 determines whether the distance between the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under test within the preset time period, using the following formula:

[0063]

[0064] Where (xn, yn) represents the location information of the trusted location device Tn, and (xm, ym) represents the location information of the trusted location device Tm; Δd represents the preset distance deviation; Δt represents the preset time period; and v represents the estimated moving speed of the device under test. Δd ≤ max(dn, dm), where dn and dm are the communication coverage radius of the trusted location device Tn and the communication coverage radius of the trusted location device Tm, respectively. The estimated moving speed v can be set and adjusted by those skilled in the art according to actual conditions, and this invention does not limit this.

[0065] In this embodiment, if the same MAC address appears in the location chain databases maintained by the location trusted devices Tn and Tm within a certain time period Δt, then it is determined whether the above formula is satisfied. Then it is assumed that the location information of the device under inspection corresponding to the MAC address has not been tampered with; if If Δt×v is obtained, it is considered that the location information of the device under inspection corresponding to the MAC address has been tampered with, and its location information is unreliable.

[0066] In one specific embodiment, after step S102, the following step S104 is further included:

[0067] S104. In the blockchain, the location information of the trusted device recorded in the location chain database is compared with the location information of the device under inspection to determine whether the difference between the two locations is within a preset distance range. If not, it is determined that the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with. Of course, if the difference between the two locations is within the preset distance range, it can be determined that the location information of the device under inspection has not been tampered with.

[0068] The preset distance range can be set and adjusted by those skilled in the art according to the actual situation, and the present invention does not limit it.

[0069] In this embodiment, if the location difference between a device under inspection and a trusted device connected to it is found to be within a certain permissible deviation range in the blockchain record, the physical location of the device under inspection is considered to be trustworthy; otherwise, the physical location information of the device under inspection is considered to have been tampered with. Applying this scheme can prevent the location information of mobile devices from being tampered with.

[0070] In one specific embodiment, step S104 specifically includes:

[0071] The system determines whether the location information of the device under test, recorded in the location chain database, is within the communication coverage area of ​​the trusted location device. If not, it is determined that the location information of the device under test has been tampered with. Conversely, if the location information of the device under test is within the communication coverage area of ​​the trusted location device it is connected to, it can be determined that the location information of the device under test has not been tampered with.

[0072] In this embodiment, the preset distance range is refined into the communication coverage range of the location-trusted device. When monitoring the location chain databases recorded in the blockchain, once it is found that the location information of the device under test recorded in a certain location chain database exceeds the communication coverage range of the location-trusted device corresponding to that location chain database, it is determined that the location of the device under test has been tampered with. The judgment method is simple and convenient.

[0073] In one specific embodiment, after step S102, the following step S105 is further included:

[0074] S105. Monitor the location chain database of trusted devices in the blockchain in real time. If different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under test within the same time period, determine whether the location of the device under test is located in the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of the trusted devices corresponding to the different location chain databases. If not, determine that the location information of the device under test has been tampered with.

[0075] In this embodiment, considering that the device under test can establish communication connections with multiple trusted location devices at the same time, it is necessary to determine whether the location of the device under test is within the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of each trusted location device within the same time period, so as to determine whether the location of the device under test has been tampered with, and the judgment result is highly accurate.

[0076] In one specific embodiment, step S105 includes the following steps S105a to S105d.

[0077] S105a. Monitor the location chain database of trusted devices in the blockchain in real time. If different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under inspection within the same time period, calculate the distance between the device under inspection and the corresponding trusted device in each of the different location chain databases.

[0078] For example, the distances between the device under test E and the trusted location devices T1, T2, T3, T4, ..., Tn are calculated; the distance di between the device under test E and the trusted location device Ti is calculated using the following formula:

[0079]

[0080] Based on the above formula, d1, d2, d3, ..., dn can be calculated.

[0081] S105b. Select a preset number of distance values ​​with smaller distance values ​​from the distance calculation results.

[0082] Arrange the aforementioned distance calculation results d1, d2, d3, ..., dn in ascending order, and select the few with the smallest distance values. Taking the two with the smallest distance values ​​as an example, we will denote them as dm1 and dm2.

[0083] S105c. Determine the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of the location trusted device corresponding to each of the preset number of distance values.

[0084] Assuming dm1 corresponds to trusted device T1 and dm2 corresponds to trusted device T2, then determine the overlapping coverage area of ​​T1 and T2, that is, the intersection area of ​​their communication coverage areas, such as... Figure 3 The × area shown.

[0085] S105d. Determine whether the location of the device under inspection is within the intersection area. If not, determine that the location information of the device under inspection has been tampered with.

[0086] If the device under test E is located in the intersection area of ​​trusted devices T1 and T2, its location information is determined to be trusted and has not been tampered with; otherwise, its location information is considered to have been tampered with.

[0087] It should be noted that the order of the above steps is only a specific example to illustrate the embodiments of the present invention. The present invention does not limit the order of the above steps, and those skilled in the art can adjust them as needed in practical applications.

[0088] The device location tampering monitoring method based on blockchain provided in this invention ensures that when the device under test enters the communication range of a trusted location device, the location information of the device under test can only be within a certain deviation range from the location information of the trusted location device; otherwise, its location is considered to have been tampered with. Within a certain time range, if the same device under test appears within the communication coverage range of a trusted location device that is unreachable within the same time period, its location is also considered to have been tampered with. The above-mentioned scheme for monitoring whether the device location has been tampered with does not require the use of GPS or other positioning systems, has low cost, is simple and convenient to implement, is easy to promote, and has high accuracy in determining location tampering.

[0089] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the device location tampering monitoring system provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 4 As shown, the system includes several trusted location devices T1, T2, ..., Tn (n>1) connected to the blockchain 100. The blockchain 100 also includes a monitoring module 101 and a judgment module 102.

[0090] The location-trusted device T is configured to receive location information reported by the device under test (E) after it enters its communication range. The location-trusted device T is also configured to record its own location information and the location information reported by the device under test (E) in its location chain database on blockchain 100. The monitoring module 101 is configured to monitor each location chain database in blockchain 100 in real time. The judgment module 102 is configured to, if the monitoring module 101 detects that different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under test (E) within a preset time period, determine whether the distance between the location-trusted devices T corresponding to each of the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under test (E) within the preset time period. If so, it is determined that the location information of the device under test (E) has been tampered with. Conversely, if the distance between the location-trusted devices T corresponding to each of the different location chain databases is not greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under test (E) within the preset time period, it can be determined that the location information of the device under test (E) has not been tampered with.

[0091] In this embodiment, when another device (the device under test) enters the communication range of the location-trusted device, the location information of both the device under test and the location-trusted device is recorded in the blockchain. If the blockchain records find that the same device under test appears within the communication range of the location-trusted device that is inaccessible within the same time period, it is considered that the location information of the device under test has been tampered with. This is done without relying on GPS or other positioning systems, has low cost, is simple and convenient to implement, is easy to promote, and has high accuracy in determining location tampering.

[0092] In one specific embodiment, the location-trusted device T is further configured to receive the MAC address reported by the device under test E connected to it, which is bound to the location information of the device under test E; and to record the MAC address bound to its own location information, along with the MAC address information reported by the device under test E, into its location chain database. Correspondingly, the monitoring module 101 detects that different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under test E within a preset time period, specifically: the monitoring module 101 detects that different location chain databases record the same MAC address within a preset time period.

[0093] In this embodiment, the location information of the device under test is bound to its MAC address, giving the reported location information an unchangeable attribute. Simultaneously, the location information of a trusted device is also bound to its MAC address, thus also having an unchangeable attribute. Therefore, when the same MAC address appears in different location chain databases within a preset time period, since the MAC address is bound to the location information, it indicates that different location chain databases recorded the location information of the same device under test within the preset time period.

[0094] In one specific implementation, the determination module 102 uses the following formula to determine whether the distance between the trusted devices T corresponding to the different location chain databases is greater than the estimated movement distance of the device under test within the preset time period:

[0095]

[0096] Where (xn,yn) is the location information of the location-trusted device Tn, (xm,ym) is the location information of the location-trusted device Tm; Δd is the preset distance deviation; Δt is the preset time period; and v is the estimated moving speed of the device under test.

[0097] In this embodiment, Δd ≤ max(dn, dm), where dn is the communication coverage radius of the location-trusted device Tn, and dm is the communication coverage radius of the location-trusted device Tm. The estimated movement speed v can be set and adjusted by those skilled in the art according to actual conditions, and this invention does not limit it in this regard.

[0098] In one specific implementation, the judgment module 102 is further configured to compare the location information of the trusted device T recorded in the location chain database in the blockchain 100 with the location information of the device under inspection E, and determine whether the location difference between the two is within a preset distance range. If not, it is determined that the location information of the device under inspection E has been tampered with. Of course, if the location difference between the two is within the preset distance range, it can be determined that the location information of the device under inspection E has not been tampered with.

[0099] The preset distance range can be set and adjusted by those skilled in the art according to the actual situation, and the present invention does not limit it.

[0100] In this embodiment, if the location difference between a device under inspection and a trusted device connected to it is found to be within a certain permissible deviation range in the blockchain record, the physical location of the device under inspection is considered to be trustworthy; otherwise, the physical location information of the device under inspection is considered to have been tampered with. Applying this scheme can prevent the location information of mobile devices from being tampered with.

[0101] Furthermore, the judgment module 102 determines whether the difference between the location information of the trusted device T recorded in the location chain database and the location of the device E under test is within a preset distance range, specifically:

[0102] Determine whether the location information of the device under inspection, E, recorded in the location chain database is within the communication coverage area of ​​the location-trusted device, T.

[0103] In this embodiment, the preset distance range is refined into the communication coverage range of the location-trusted device. When monitoring the location chain databases recorded in the blockchain, once it is found that the location information of the device under test recorded in a certain location chain database exceeds the communication coverage range of the location-trusted device corresponding to that location chain database, it is determined that the location of the device under test has been tampered with. The judgment method is simple and convenient.

[0104] In one specific implementation, the judgment module 102 is further configured to, if the monitoring module 101 detects that different location chain databases record the location information of the same device under test E within the same time period, determine whether the location of the device under test E is located within the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of the location trusted device T corresponding to the different location chain databases; if not, determine that the location information of the device under test E has been tampered with.

[0105] In this embodiment, considering that the device under test can establish communication connections with multiple trusted location devices at the same time, it is necessary to determine whether the location of the device under test is within the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of each trusted location device within the same time period, so as to determine whether the location of the device under test has been tampered with, and the judgment result is highly accurate.

[0106] In one specific implementation, the monitoring module 101 is specifically configured to monitor the location chain databases of trusted devices T in the blockchain 100 in real time. If different location chain databases record the location information of the same device E under inspection within the same time period, the distance between the device E under inspection and the trusted devices T corresponding to the different location chain databases is calculated respectively. A preset number of distance values ​​with smaller distance values ​​are selected from the distance calculation results. And, the intersection area of ​​the communication coverage of the trusted devices T corresponding to the preset number of distance values ​​is determined.

[0107] The judgment module 102 is further configured to determine whether the location of the device under inspection E is within the intersection area; if not, it is determined that the location information of the device under inspection E has been tampered with.

[0108] The device location tampering monitoring system based on blockchain provided in this invention determines whether a device's location has been tampered with. When a device under inspection enters the communication range of a trusted location device, the device's location information must be within a certain deviation range from the trusted location device's location information; otherwise, its location is considered tampered with. Furthermore, if the same device appears within the communication coverage of an unreachable trusted location device within a certain time period, its location is also considered tampered with. This method of monitoring whether a device's location has been tampered with does not require GPS or other positioning systems, has low cost, is simple and convenient to implement, easy to promote, and provides high accuracy in determining location tampering.

[0109] It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or some of the steps, systems, or apparatuses disclosed above, and their functional modules / units, can be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, or suitable combinations thereof. In hardware implementations, the division between functional modules / units mentioned in the above description does not necessarily correspond to the division of physical components; for example, a physical component may have multiple functions, or a function or step may be performed collaboratively by several physical components. Some or all physical components may be implemented as software executed by a processor, such as a central processing unit, digital signal processor, or microprocessor, or as hardware, or as an integrated circuit, such as an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). Such software may be distributed on a computer-readable medium, which may include computer storage media (or non-transitory media) and communication media (or transient media). As is known to those skilled in the art, the term computer storage media includes volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storing information (such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data). Computer storage media include, but are not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical disc storage, magnetic cartridges, magnetic tape, disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to store desired information and can be accessed by a computer. Furthermore, it is well known to those skilled in the art that communication media typically contain computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in modulated data signals such as carrier waves or other transmission mechanisms, and may include any information delivery medium.

[0110] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A device position tampering monitoring method characterized by, Comprise: After the to-be-inspected device enters the communication range of the location-trustable device, the location-trustable device receives the location information reported by the to-be-inspected device connected thereto; wherein the to-be-inspected device is a mobile terminal, and the location-trustable device is a base station; The location-trustable device records both the location information of itself and the location information reported by the to-be-inspected device in the location chain database on the blockchain, each location chain database corresponds to a location-trustable device, wherein the location information of the corresponding location-trustable device, the location information of all to-be-inspected devices entering the communication range of the corresponding location-trustable device and being connected thereto, and the time stamp of the location information record are recorded; In the blockchain, the location chain databases of the location-trustable devices are monitored in real time, if the location information of the same to-be-inspected device is recorded in different location chain databases within a preset time period, it is judged whether the distance between the location-trustable devices corresponding to the different location chain databases respectively is greater than the estimated moving distance of the to-be-inspected device within the preset time period, if yes, it is determined that the location information of the to-be-inspected device is tampered with. The method further comprises: The location-trustable device receives the MAC address bound with the location information of the to-be-inspected device reported by the to-be-inspected device connected thereto; and The location-trustable device records the MAC address bound with the location information of itself and the MAC address information reported by the to-be-inspected device in the location chain database thereof; The location information of the same to-be-inspected device is recorded in different location chain databases within a preset time period, specifically: The same MAC address is recorded in different location chain databases within a preset time period.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, Whether the distance between the location-trustable devices corresponding to the different location chain databases respectively is greater than the estimated moving distance of the to-be-inspected device within the preset time period is judged by using the following formula: Wherein (xn, yn) is the location information of the location-trustable device Tn, (xm, ym) is the location information of the location-trustable device Tm; Δd is a preset distance deviation; Δt is a preset time period; v is the estimated moving speed of the to-be-inspected device.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, Further comprising: In the blockchain, the location information of the location-trustable device recorded in the location chain database is compared with the location information of the to-be-inspected device, and it is judged whether the location difference between the two is within a preset distance range, if not, it is determined that the location information of the to-be-inspected device is tampered with.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, In the blockchain, the location information of the location-trustable device recorded in the location chain database is compared with the location information of the to-be-inspected device, and it is judged whether the location difference between the two is within a preset distance range, specifically: It is judged whether the location information of the to-be-inspected device recorded in the location chain database is within the communication coverage range of the location-trustable device.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, Further comprising: In the blockchain, the location chain databases of the location-trustable devices are monitored in real time, if the location information of the same to-be-inspected device is recorded in different location chain databases within a same time period, it is judged whether the location of the to-be-inspected device is located in the intersection area of the communication coverage ranges of the location-trustable devices corresponding to the different location chain databases respectively, if not, it is determined that the location information of the to-be-inspected device is tampered with.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, judging whether the position of the to-be-inspected device is located in the intersection area of the communication coverage ranges of the position-trustable devices corresponding to the different position-chain databases, specifically comprising: calculating the distances between the to-be-inspected device and the position-trustable devices corresponding to the different position-chain databases respectively; selecting a preset number of distance values with smaller distance values from the distance calculation results; determining the intersection area of the communication coverage ranges of the position-trustable devices corresponding to the preset number of distance values respectively; judging whether the position of the to-be-inspected device is in the intersection area.

7. A device location tamper monitoring system characterized by, comprise: a plurality of position-trustable devices accessing a blockchain, the blockchain further comprising a monitoring module and a judging module; the position-trustable devices are configured to receive the position information reported by the to-be-inspected device connected thereto after the to-be-inspected device enters the communication range thereof; wherein the to-be-inspected device is a mobile terminal, and the position-trustable device is a base station; the position-trustable devices are further configured to record the position information of the position-trustable devices and the position information reported by the to-be-inspected device in the position-chain databases located in the blockchain, each position-chain database corresponding to a position-trustable device, wherein the position-chain database records the position information of the corresponding position-trustable device, the position information of all to-be-inspected devices entering the communication range of the corresponding position-trustable device and connected thereto, and the time stamp of the position information record; the monitoring module is configured to monitor the position-chain databases in the blockchain in real time; the judging module is configured to, if the monitoring module monitors that the different position-chain databases record the position information of the same to-be-inspected device within a preset time period, judge whether the distances between the position-trustable devices corresponding to the different position-chain databases are greater than the estimated moving distance of the to-be-inspected device within the preset time period, and if so, determine that the position information of the to-be-inspected device is tampered with; the position-trustable devices are further configured to receive the MAC address bound with the position information of the to-be-inspected device reported by the to-be-inspected device connected thereto, and record the MAC address bound with the position information of the position-trustable devices and the MAC address information reported by the to-be-inspected device in the position-chain databases; the monitoring module monitors that the different position-chain databases record the position information of the same to-be-inspected device within a preset time period, specifically comprising: the monitoring module monitors that the different position-chain databases record the same MAC address within a preset time period.

8. The system of claim 7, wherein, the judging module judges whether the distances between the position-trustable devices corresponding to the different position-chain databases are greater than the estimated moving distance of the to-be-inspected device within the preset time period, which is realized by the following formula: wherein (xn, yn) is the position information of the position-trustable device Tn, (xm, ym) is the position information of the position-trustable device Tm; Δd is a preset distance deviation; Δt is a preset time period; and v is the estimated moving speed of the to-be-inspected device.

Images