A method, device and program product for verifying authenticity

By collecting and comparing the measured values ​​and behavioral data of equipment components, and using the platform configuration list to verify the authenticity of the equipment, it solves the problem of tampering or replacing inspections of consumer electronic products after production, and improves the accuracy and safety of equipment authenticity detection.

CN114144786BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-29HEWLETT PACKARD DEVELOPMENT COMPANY LP
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN201980098301.3
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2019-08-20
Publication Date
2024-11-29
Estimated Expiration
2039-08-20

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The prior art is difficult to effectively detect and verify whether consumer electronic products have been tampered with or replaced after production, especially changes in hardware, software and data components, resulting in equipment behavior not meeting the expected characteristics.

Method used

By collecting measurement and behavioral data related to components, comparing with expected characteristics, using platform configuration list (PCL) for verification, if the data does not match, perform verification operations, such as isolation or reporting, updating profiles to reflect changes, ensuring the device is secured Authenticity.

Benefits of technology

Improves the accuracy and security of device authenticity detection, prevents unauthorized or malicious component replacement, and ensures that the device is difficult to imitate the functions of real devices without being detected.

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Abstract

The present disclosure provides a method for verifying the authenticity of a component in a product. The method may include collecting data related to the characteristics of the component. The method may further include comparing the data with a profile of the component. The profile may include expected characteristics of the component. The method may further include determining whether the collected data matches the expected characteristics. The present disclosure further provides an apparatus and a program.
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Description

Background Art

[0001] Electronic devices such as consumer electronics can be described as platforms or devices, and can include, for example, hardware, software, and data. Such a platform can include components such as a hard drive, CPU, RAM, HID devices, BIOS, and configuration settings such as serial numbers. Similar devices such as two PCs may have the same type of hardware, but different firmware versions and serial numbers. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0002] Examples will now be described, by way of non-limiting example, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

[0003] Figure 1 is a flowchart of an example of a method according to some examples;

[0004] Figure 2 is a simplified schematic diagram of an example of an apparatus according to some examples;

[0005] Figure 3 is a simplified schematic diagram of another example of an apparatus according to some examples; and

[0006] Figure 4 is a flow chart of another example of a method according to some examples. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0007] Electronic products such as consumer electronics can be inspected during manufacturing or assembly to ensure that the product's components are correct, authentic, and operating to specified standards.

[0008] However, after production, these products may be modified or replaced, but these changes are difficult to detect.

[0009] In some examples, a platform is a computing device composed of hardware, software, and data. These components affect the behavior of the device, and thus the device can be characterized by the presence or absence of these components. Each component can exhibit behavior that is characteristic of that particular component. For example, memory can behave like memory, a CPU can behave like a CPU, and so on.

[0010] In order to improve the detection of these changes, methods for characterizing devices at different granularity levels can be provided in some examples. According to some examples, the device can collect measurements or other data related to the components of the platform. The components can be individually characterized by values ​​and / or behavior patterns that are uniquely associated with the components. For example, each hardware component can have a serial number and / or manufacturer ID. The software can have a version number. Other components can exhibit characteristic behaviors, such as it can be expected that a USB mass storage device behaves like a USB mass storage device by following expected requests.

[0011] According to some examples, such as Figure 1 As shown, a method for verifying the authenticity of a component in a product is provided. The method may include S101 collecting data related to the characteristics of the component. The method may further include S102 comparing the data with a profile of the component. The profile may include expected characteristics of the component. The method may further include S103 determining whether the collected data matches the expected characteristics.

[0012] According to some examples, the method can achieve authentication of a product by verifying that the product has not been modified based on comparing characteristic data associated with the component to expected characteristics defined in a profile of the component of the product. The profile can, for example, include a component configuration / characteristic list or platform configuration list (PCL) associated with the product. Such a list can include all components expected to be present in the product and the expected characteristic data for each component. If a component is present on the PCL but is not detected based on the collected data, there may be a strong indication that the product may have been tampered with.

[0013] In some examples, the component or device may be a hardware component. A product may include at least one component. For example, the product may be a personal computer or a laptop computer. In the event that it is unlikely that the component has been tampered with or replaced based on the above method, the component may be verified as authentic. When authorized repair or replacement of the component is performed, the profile may be updated to reflect the change. The profile update may be performed, for example, by a trusted party.

[0014] Component characteristics may include component behavior, measurements, version numbers, and assigned identification numbers. A profile may include at least one of these characteristics that enables a device to be identified. Combining characteristics allows for greater certainty of identification, meaning that it is more difficult for an unauthorized or malicious component to mimic an authorized component. For example, if a component (such as a hard drive or memory) is replaced with an unauthorized component but shows an "authorized" identification number, the unauthorized component will inevitably exhibit different behavior. For example, otherwise identical devices may differ in response time, power usage, or runtime for a variety of reasons including age, variations in the manufacturing process, and so on.

[0015] When the collected data and the expected characteristic or data related to the expected characteristic are the same or similar within a predetermined threshold tolerance, the two may be considered to match. The tolerance may be set, for example, to account for differences in the behavior of components due to aging.

[0016] In some examples, the method may include collecting a set of measurements and behaviors from the components using available interfaces and probes. The method may further include comparing a profile, which may include a platform configuration list (PLC), with the collected data or evidence. This comparison may not be an exact match, and may be consistent to some extent with certain acceptable characteristics (e.g., where some data is associated with a statistical representation or the platform configuration list is a set of acceptable characteristics).

[0017] In some examples, a component may differ from expected characteristics in one category (or at least not all) of the collected data. For example, a component may have an authorized identification number and may respond to commands in an expected manner, but may consume more power than expected. In this case, the collected data may be determined to not match the profile.

[0018] The platform configuration list may be a collection of characteristics that identify the platform. These characteristics may include static information and / or dynamic information about each component. The information may be deterministic or statistically representative. Examples of relevant information may be stored values ​​or component behaviors.

[0019] In some examples, if the collected data is determined not to match expected characteristics, the method may further include performing a validation operation to establish an operational state of the component.

[0020] There may be instances where the collected data does not match the expected characteristics. This may indicate that the product has been tampered with, or it may indicate that the part has been legitimately replaced or updated. Therefore, further action may be taken to determine if the part is authentic.

[0021] In some examples, the verification operation includes sending a request to a component to perform a function normally associated with the component.

[0022] The functionality may be based on the intended function of the component.

[0023] In some examples, if the component is unable to perform the function, the method may further include isolating the component so that the component cannot communicate with other components.

[0024] If the component fails to perform the function, there may be strong indications that the component is not authentic or may be malicious. Isolating the component from the other components may be one option to resolve this issue. Removing power to the component may be another option. Other options may be to issue a report to an authorized or trusted party. The component may then be manually inspected, for example, or removed / replaced with an authentic component. The method may then be rerun to verify the authenticity of the replacement component.

[0025] In some examples, if the collected data is determined to match the expected characteristics, the method may further include updating the profile to include the collected data.

[0026] In this way, the profile can become more detailed over time, making it more difficult for a counterfeit device to replicate or mimic the functionality of a corresponding authentic device without being detected.

[0027] In some examples, a profile may include data related to operating parameters, startup time, runtime, and / or power usage of a component.

[0028] Comparing values ​​based on multiple metrics can improve the quality of the profile, making it difficult for counterfeit components to continue operating without being detected.

[0029] In some examples, this determination is performed by a trusted evaluator located within the product.

[0030] Performing this determination by a local trust evaluator may have the additional advantage that no external connection is required to perform the verification.

[0031] In some examples, the profile is created by a trust evaluator based on measured or detected characteristics of the component.

[0032] The trusted evaluator itself can be a separate hardware component (such as a microcontroller) that has the ability to communicate with the component and the ability to measure the component and the resources used by the component. In some examples, communication with the device can be used to evaluate whether the component is consistent with the expected bus or device protocol standard. In other examples, the measurement capabilities can include probes for temperature and power to detect abnormal patterns or usage. Further examples include monitoring traffic on a bus to a storage device external to the component or component. In some examples, the evaluator can be a system BIOS, which can be protected by an integrity protection mechanism to ensure that the measurement is trustworthy.

[0033] The profile may form a standard against which subsequently collected data is compared. Thus, the profile may be created by a trusted evaluator to ensure that the accuracy and reliability of the data contained in the profile corresponding to the expected characteristics is at a specified or predetermined level.

[0034] In some examples, the authentication operation includes a challenge-response operation.

[0035] Challenge-response authentication can provide a higher level of confidence in the authentication results.

[0036] In some examples, if the component is verified as authentic based on the verification operation, the method may further include updating the profile to include the collected data.

[0037] Adding collected data related to real parts based on validation to the profile can help build a more comprehensive description of the part's characteristics. For example, collecting data related to a single part multiple times can allow for changes in the part's characteristics over time to be considered. Most parts are likely to experience performance changes over time. Therefore, in such an example, the age of the part can be estimated.

[0038] In some examples, a program for performing the above method is provided.

[0039] In some other examples, a program for verifying the authenticity of a device is provided. The program, when executed on a computer, may cause the computer to perform a process. The process may include comparing data related to characteristics of the device with a profile of the device. The profile may include data related to expected characteristics of the device. The process may further include determining whether the collected data matches the profile.

[0040] In some examples, such as Figure 2 As shown, an apparatus 10 for verifying the authenticity of a device is provided. The apparatus 10 may include a processor 100 for comparing the collected data related to the characteristics of the device with a profile of the device. The profile includes profile data related to the expected characteristics of the device. The processor 100 may further determine whether the collected data matches the profile data.

[0041] According to some examples, the device may be hardware, such as a CPU, a memory, an input device, or an output device.The processor 100 may include a data collector and / or a data analyzer.

[0042] In some examples, such as Figure 3 As shown, the apparatus 10 may further include a data collector 200 separate from the processor 100, for collecting data related to the characteristics of the component.

[0043] In some examples, if the collected data is determined not to match, processor 100 may perform a challenge-response type authentication.

[0044] In some examples, if the component is verified as authentic based on a challenge-response type authentication, processor 100 may update the profile to include the collected data.

[0045] In some examples, when a profile or PCL is updated, the profile or PCL may be versioned or timestamped. For example, if the updated profile is authorized (e.g., signed by an authority) and the version or timestamp is newer than the existing profile or list, the updated profile may be accepted. For example, if the profile version number or timestamp is not newer than the existing profile or list, the updated profile may not be accepted.

[0046] When creating a profile for a component, the characteristics of the component are collected or read and stored, for example, as a list, for future comparison. Updates to the list may require explicit authorization by a trusted party. A profile may include a list of component characteristics based on a list of ordered parts and inserted into a product, the list of component characteristics being obtained, for example, from a contractual agreement.

[0047] In some examples, the list may be collected at the factory and certified by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM).

[0048] In some examples, there may be several methods for measuring or collecting component data. In one example, a cryptographic identity may be used, such as an attestation identity authenticated using a cryptographic protocol and a key stored in the component. For example, a key may be provided to the component on a per-device or device family basis. A component authentication protocol such as USB Type-C may be an example of this method.

[0049] In some examples, the method may include using component measurement instruments to monitor the behavior of the component or its IO (input / output). In one example, the behavior may be monitored by a trusted evaluator. This may ensure, for example, that the component behaves in an expected manner (e.g., behaves as a hard drive or performs to a specified performance level). Through these examples, it is more difficult for a rogue device to implement functionality that differs significantly from the expected functionality.

[0050] In some examples, components can be actively probed. For example, an encrypted challenge-response authentication type challenge can be sent to the component. The behavior of the component can be actively tested by sending inputs and testing outputs. It is also possible to check whether the component is in a given location on the motherboard, for example by timing the challenge-response. In some examples, the component can perform a signing operation on a challenge provided by a trusted verifier.

[0051] In some examples, a boot time assessment may be performed. The purpose of a secure boot mechanism may be to prevent a compromised device from using keys and secrets intended for a properly operating device. In one example, a boot time assessment may supplement a secure boot mechanism to ensure that components have not been altered. In some examples, a runtime assessment may be performed. Some components, such as user authentication components or antivirus functionality, may always be required. If the component is removed or damaged, the assessment results may trigger remediation, such as stopping a sensitive task or prompting the user to replace the component. In some examples, an on-demand assessment may be performed.

[0052] In some examples, such as Figure 4 As shown, a method is provided, the method comprising S201 performing component inspection. The component inspection may correspond to Figure 1Based on a comparison of the collected data with the data contained in the profile, it may be determined at S202 that the data matches. If the data is determined to match, the profile may be updated at S203 to include the collected data.

[0053] If it is determined at S204 that the data does not match, the method may proceed to S205 to perform a challenge-response probe. Based on the challenge-response probe, it may be determined at S206 that the component is not suspicious. For example, in this case, the component may behave in an expected manner and give an expected response to the challenge issued. If the component is determined to be not suspicious, the profile may be updated at S207 to include the collected data and the response to the challenge issued.

[0054] Based on the challenge-response detection, it can be determined at S208 that the component is suspicious. If the component is determined to be suspicious, the component can be isolated from the rest of the product at S209. In some examples, alternative actions can be taken in response to the suspicious component. For example, if the component is determined to be suspicious, the product or component can be restarted.

[0055] According to some examples, suspect components may be securely isolated from other components of a product, and non-suspect components may provide data that contributes to a more complete component profile, resulting in greater security.

[0056] Examples in the present disclosure may be provided as methods, systems, or machine-readable instructions (such as any combination of software, hardware, firmware, etc.). Such machine-readable instructions may be included on a computer-readable storage medium (including but not limited to disk storage devices, CD-ROMs, optical storage devices, etc.) having computer-readable program code therein or thereon.

[0057] The present disclosure is described with reference to the flowcharts and / or block diagrams of the methods, devices and systems according to the examples of the present disclosure. Although the flowcharts described above show a specific execution order, the execution order may be different from the depicted order. The boxes described in one flowchart may be combined with the boxes of another flowchart. It should be understood that each flow and / or box in the flow chart and / or block diagram and the combination of the flow chart and / or the diagram in the flow chart and / or the block diagram may be implemented by machine-readable instructions.

[0058] The functions described in the specification and the drawings can be implemented, for example, by executing machine-readable instructions by a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device. Specifically, a processor or a processing device can execute machine-readable instructions. Therefore, the functional modules of the device and the apparatus can be implemented by a processor that executes machine-readable instructions stored in a memory or a processor that operates according to instructions embedded in a logic circuit system. The term 'processor' should be broadly interpreted to include a CPU, a processing unit, an ASIC, a logic unit, or a programmable gate array, etc. The methods and functional modules can all be executed by a single processor, or divided between several processors.

[0059] Such machine-readable instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage device, which may direct a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to operate in a particular mode.

[0060] Such machine-readable instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that the computer or other programmable data processing device performs a series of operations to produce a computer-implemented process. Thus, the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device implement the functions specified by the (multiple) processes in the flowchart and / or the (multiple) boxes in the block diagram.

[0061] Furthermore, the teachings herein may be implemented in the form of a computer software product that is stored in a storage medium and includes a plurality of instructions for causing a computer device to implement the methods recited in the examples of the present disclosure.

[0062] Although the methods, apparatus, and related aspects have been described with reference to certain examples, various modifications, changes, omissions, and substitutions may be made without departing from the scope of the present disclosure. Therefore, the methods, apparatus, and related aspects are intended to be limited only by the scope of the following claims and their equivalents. It should be noted that the examples mentioned above illustrate rather than limit what is described herein, and that those skilled in the art will be able to design many alternative embodiments without departing from the scope of the appended claims.

[0063] The word “comprising” does not exclude the presence of elements other than those listed in a claim, “a” or “an” does not exclude a plurality, and a single processor or other unit may fulfill the functions of several units listed in a claim.

[0064] Features from any dependent claim may be combined with features from any independent claim or from other dependent claims.

Claims

1. A method for verifying the authenticity of a component in a product, the method include: collecting data, wherein the collected data includes characteristics of the component, and wherein the characteristics are associated with a behavior pattern of the component; comparing the data to a profile of the component, the profile comprising expected characteristics of the component; as well as Determine whether the collected data matches the expected characteristics, in response to the collected data being determined to not match the expected characteristic, performing a verification operation to establish an operational state of the component, wherein the verification operation comprises a challenge-response operation; In response to verifying the component as authentic based on the verification operation, updating the profile to include the collected data.

2. The method according to claim 1, in, The verification operation includes sending a request to the component to perform a function normally associated with the component.

3. The method according to claim 1, in, The profile includes data related to operating parameters, startup time, operating time, and / or power usage of the component.

4. The method according to claim 1, in, The determination is performed by a trusted evaluator located within the product.

5. The method according to claim 1, in, The profile is created by a trustworthy evaluator based on measured or detected characteristics of the component.

6. A program product for verifying the authenticity of a device, in, When the program product is executed on a computer, the computer is caused to perform a process including the following operations: collecting data, comparing the collected data to a profile of the device, the profile comprising data related to expected characteristics of the device, wherein the collected data comprises characteristics of the device, and wherein the characteristics are associated with a behavioral pattern of the device; determining whether the collected data matches the profile; in response to the collected data being determined not to match the expected characteristic, performing a verification operation to establish an operational state of the device, wherein the verification operation comprises a challenge-response operation; In response to the challenge-response operation indicating that the device is suspicious, isolating the device from communications with other devices.

7. A device for verifying the authenticity of a device, the device include: a processor configured to collect data, compare the collected data including characteristics of the device to a profile of the device, the profile including profile data associated with expected characteristics of the device; determining whether the collected data matches the profile data, wherein the characteristic of the device is associated with a behavioral pattern of the device; in response to the collected data being determined not to match the expected characteristic, performing a verification operation to establish an operational state of the device, wherein the verification operation comprises a challenge-response type authentication; And in response to verifying the device as authentic based on the verification operation, updating the profile to include the collected data.

8. The device according to claim 7, further comprising: include: A data collector is used to collect the data related to the characteristics of the device.

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