An Auction-Based Load-Side Flexibility Resource Allocation Method and System
Through the auction-based flexible resource allocation method of load-side, combined with power consumption characteristics and response characteristics, reward and punishment prices are set, the problem of low enthusiasm for participation of flexible resource resources on the load-side is solved, and the dynamic balance of power grid supply and demand and optimal allocation of resources are achieved.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202211126670.9
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-09-16
- Publication Date
- 2025-08-05
- Estimated Expiration
- 2042-09-16
AI Technical Summary
The existing technology is difficult to effectively mobilize the participation of flexible resources on the load side, which makes it difficult to achieve dynamic balance between supply and demand in the power grid, and the traditional electricity price signal allocation principle cannot achieve optimal allocation of resources.
The auction-based method is adopted, by obtaining the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of load node power users, using auction theory to design flexible resource configuration strategies, setting reward and punishment prices, and combining British auctions and first-level closed auctions to achieve optimal resource allocation and dynamic balance between power grid supply and demand.
It has improved the enthusiasm for participating in flexible resources on the load side, achieved optimal allocation of resources and dynamic balance between power grid supply and demand, mobilized user participation through the auction strategy incentive mechanism to ensure execution results.
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Figure CN115496272B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of power system operation and control, and in particular relates to a load-side flexibility resource configuration method and system based on auction. Background Art
[0002] The statements in this section merely provide background information related to the present invention and do not necessarily constitute prior art.
[0003] The random variations in renewable energy generation and load demand cause net load fluctuations, generating a need for power system flexibility. Load-side flexibility resources, namely various types of controllable loads, have advantages such as fast response speed, flexible scheduling, and strong proactive response capabilities. They can participate in flexibility regulation through demand response, effectively improving load-side flexibility and alleviating regulation pressure on the power supply side. However, the participation of various types of power users in demand response may have an adverse impact on their normal production and life. Furthermore, shortcomings such as cumbersome participation rules and processes and unclear incentives and compensation also limit their enthusiasm for participation and affect the effectiveness of demand response. Therefore, when utilizing load-side flexibility resources for demand response, comprehensively considering the electricity consumption and response characteristics of various types of power users to conduct load-side flexibility resource auctions has high innovative and applicable value. This can deeply tap the response potential of load-side flexibility resources and constrain user performance to ensure effective implementation.
[0004] Reasonable analysis of load-side flexibility resources, namely the electricity consumption characteristics and response characteristics of power users, is the basis for implementing demand response projects and achieving the expected results. Demand response is essentially a resource allocation problem that optimally allocates the load-side target response amount among power users according to a certain allocation principle. However, the electricity consumption characteristics and response characteristics of various types of power users, and even the same type of power users, are different in different time periods. In addition, the traditional allocation principle guided by electricity price signals is direct and rigid, which cannot effectively improve the participation enthusiasm of power users. At the same time, it is difficult to achieve the optimal allocation of resources and the dynamic balance of supply and demand in the power grid cannot be achieved. Summary of the Invention
[0005] In order to solve the technical problems existing in the above-mentioned background technology, the present invention provides a load-side flexibility resource allocation method and system based on auction, which realizes the optimal allocation of resources and the dynamic balance of supply and demand of the power grid by utilizing the participation willingness and maximum response amount of different power users and the Pareto efficiency and profit maximization advantages of auction in solving the allocation problem.
[0006] In order to achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:
[0007] A first aspect of the present invention provides a method for allocating load-side flexibility resources based on auction, comprising:
[0008] Obtain the minimum power consumption, maximum power consumption, and benchmark power consumption of each power user under the load node, and calculate the maximum response amount when upstream and downstream flexibility requirements are required;
[0009] Obtain the target response amount of the load node, combine it with the maximum response amount of each power user, call the power users in the transaction pool and the substitute pool obtained through the auction to allocate the target response amount, so that each power user can call the load node resources according to the allocation result.
[0010] Furthermore, the maximum response amount during the upward flexibility demand is the difference between the power user's baseline power consumption and the minimum power consumption;
[0011] Alternatively, the maximum response amount in the case of downstream flexibility demand is the difference between the power user's baseline power consumption and the maximum power consumption.
[0012] Furthermore, each power user in the transaction pool is arranged in descending order according to the maximum response amount, and the key user set is searched in order.
[0013] Furthermore, the power users in the backup pool are arranged in descending order according to their bids, and the power users with the same bids are arranged in descending order according to the maximum response amount, and the key user set is found in this order.
[0014] Furthermore, the power users in the backup pool are arranged in descending order according to their bids, and the power users with the same bids are arranged in descending order according to the maximum response amount, and the key user set is found in this order.
[0015] Furthermore, the maximum response amount of the last power user in the key user set is at the critical point of whether the target response amount is met or not.
[0016] Furthermore, after each power user calls the load node resources according to the allocation results, the actual compliance rate of the power user is calculated by combining the allocation results, benchmark power consumption and actual power consumption.
[0017] A second aspect of the present invention provides an auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation system, comprising:
[0018] A maximum response quantity calculation module is configured to obtain the minimum power consumption, maximum power consumption, and baseline power consumption of each power user under the load node, and calculate the maximum response quantity when the upstream and downstream flexibility requirements are met;
[0019] The allocation module is configured to obtain the target response amount of the load node, combine the maximum response amount of each power user, call the power users in the transaction pool and the substitute pool obtained through the auction to allocate the target response amount, so that each power user can call the load node resources according to the allocation result.
[0020] A third aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps in the auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method as described above.
[0021] The fourth aspect of the present invention provides a computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein when the processor executes the program, the steps in the auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method as described above are implemented.
[0022] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0023] The present invention provides an auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation method, which uses the participation willingness and maximum response amount of different power users, and the Pareto efficiency and profit maximization advantages of auctions in solving allocation problems. It can deeply tap the response potential of load-side flexibility regulation resources, achieve optimal resource allocation and dynamic balance of power grid supply and demand.
[0024] The present invention provides an auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method. Based on the analysis of the electricity consumption characteristics and response characteristics of various types of power users, the load-side flexibility resource auction method is designed according to auction theory. By implementing the auction strategy, the load-side target response quantity is allocated on demand, effectively mobilizing the enthusiasm of users to participate.
[0025] The present invention provides an auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method, which rationally analyzes the load-side flexibility resources, i.e., the electricity consumption characteristics and response characteristics under two circumstances: the electricity users do not participate in the demand response project and the electricity users participate in the demand response project. The cardinal utility theory is applied to the power system to measure the satisfaction degree of the electricity consumption of the electricity users. The analysis takes into account the electricity consumption characteristics of different types of electricity users, the electricity prices and reward and punishment prices in each time period, and the willingness of each electricity user to participate in each time period.
[0026] The present invention provides a load-side flexibility resource allocation method based on auction, which designs a load-side flexibility resource auction strategy based on auction theory, and sets the auction mode as a combination of English auction and first-level closed auction. The auction is used to solve the allocation problem with the advantages of Pareto efficiency and profit maximization, ensuring that the target response quantity takes into account the actual response capability and social benefits of each power user during the allocation process; adopts the allocation principle guided by the incentive mechanism, increases the user's willingness to participate by setting a reward price, and emphasizes on-demand allocation; sets a penalty price, i.e., a penalty mechanism, to constrain the actual performance rate of the successful bidder to between the upper and lower limits of the specified performance rate, thereby ensuring the effective implementation of the auction strategy and achieving the expected goals. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0027] The accompanying drawings, which constitute a part of the present invention, are used to provide a further understanding of the present invention. The exemplary embodiments of the present invention and their descriptions are used to explain the present invention and do not constitute improper limitations on the present invention.
[0028] Figure 1 This is a flow chart of a load-side flexibility resource configuration method based on auction according to the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0029] Figure 2 This is an auction flow chart of the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0030] Figure 3 Schematic diagram of the IEEE 39-node system topology structure according to the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0031] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of the IEEE 14-node system topology structure according to the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0032] Figure 5 This is a reward price curve diagram of Example 1 of the present invention;
[0033] Figure 6 This is a diagram of user 1's willingness to participate and its reward price in Example 1 of the present invention;
[0034] Figure 7 This is a graph showing the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of user 1 according to the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0035] Figure 8 This is a graph showing the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of the load node 8 according to the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0036] Figure 9 This is a graph showing the number of auctions in each response period according to the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0037] Figure 10 A graph showing the number of users called during each response time period allocation phase in the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0038] Figure 11 The user ratio graph for regular allocation and backup allocation in the first embodiment of the present invention is called;
[0039] Figure 12 This is a graph showing the electricity consumption benefit curves of user 1 with different actual compliance rates according to the first embodiment of the present invention;
[0040] Figure 13 This is a diagram of the normal electricity consumption benefits of user 1 according to embodiment 1 of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0041] The present invention will be further described below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.
[0042] It should be noted that the following detailed descriptions are illustrative and intended to provide further explanation of the present invention. Unless otherwise specified, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which the present invention belongs.
[0043] Example 1
[0044] This embodiment provides a load-side flexibility resource configuration method based on auction, such as Figure 1 As shown, it specifically includes the following steps:
[0045] Step 1: In the preparation stage, the power system dispatching department, as the auction initiator, determines the target response quantity on the auction day, that is, obtains the target response quantity of the load node; analyzes the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of power users, and announces the reward price, electricity price and the upper and lower limits of the specified fulfillment rate, that is, sends the reward price, electricity price and the upper and lower limits of the specified fulfillment rate to each power user terminal.
[0046] Step 1.1: Analyze the electricity consumption characteristics of power users based on cardinality utility theory. Use electricity consumption utility to measure the satisfaction of power users. On this basis, estimate the electricity consumption benefits of power users and calculate their benchmark electricity consumption and benchmark electricity consumption benefits.
[0047] The cardinal utility theory is used to quantitatively evaluate the satisfaction of various types of electricity users in consuming electricity for production and life, such as industrial users using electricity for industrial production, commercial users using electricity for commercial activities, and residential users using electricity to complete daily life tasks using various household appliances. i It can be expressed as:
[0048]
[0049] Where: p i is the actual power consumption of the i-th power user. Assuming that the power consumption of each power user remains unchanged in each time period, the power consumption value is equal to the power consumption; α i and ω i is the electricity utility parameter of the i-th electricity user, usually α 工业 ≤α 商业 ≤α 居民 ,ω 工业 ≤ω 商业 ≤ω 居民 ; The maximum electricity utility that can be obtained by the i-th electricity user; The minimum electricity consumption when the i-th electricity user obtains the highest electricity utility.
[0050] After measuring the satisfaction of electricity users with electricity utility, the electricity benefits of electricity users are estimated based on it, including electricity costs and rewards and penalties for participating in demand response projects. The electricity benefit B of the i-th electricity user is i It can be expressed as:
[0051] B i =U i -F i +R i -P i (2)
[0052] Where: U i is the electricity consumption utility of the i-th electricity user; F i is the electricity cost of the i-th electricity user; R i and P i are the rewards and penalties received by the i-th electricity user for participating in the demand response project.
[0053] The electricity cost F of the i-th electricity user i It can be expressed as:
[0054] F i =PF i ×p i (3)
[0055] Where: PF i is the electricity price of the i-th electricity user, p i is the actual electricity consumption of the i-th electricity user.
[0056] Before the auction begins, the load side flexibility demand for each period of the auction day has been obtained. It is stipulated that the load demand that needs to be reduced is the upward flexibility demand, and the load demand that needs to be increased is the downward flexibility demand. The corresponding flexibility demand is the target response of the auction. The reward R for upward and downward flexibility demand is i It can be expressed as:
[0057]
[0058] Where: PR i is the reward price for the i-th electricity user to participate in the demand response project; p Bi is the benchmark electricity consumption of the i-th electricity user.
[0059] When electricity users participate in demand response projects, they will be penalized if their actual response exceeds or falls short of the prescribed response amount. The penalty for upward or downward flexibility demand is P i It can be expressed as:
[0060]
[0061] Where: pAi The auction specifies the response quantity for the i-th electricity user; PP i is the penalty price for the i-th electricity user to participate in the demand response project; PP i,up The penalty price corresponds to the two situations where the power user actually provides insufficient response when there is an upward flexibility demand and the power user actually provides too much response when there is a downward flexibility demand; PP i,down The penalty prices correspond to the two situations where the power user actually provides too much response when there is an upward flexibility demand and the power user actually provides insufficient response when there is a downward flexibility demand.
[0062] When estimating the benchmark electricity consumption for a period of time, that is, the normal electricity consumption of electricity users who do not participate in any demand response projects, there is no need to consider rewards and penalties. At this time, the electricity consumption income of the i-th electricity user is B i It can be expressed as:
[0063]
[0064] Where: U i is the electricity consumption utility of the i-th electricity user; F i is the electricity cost of the i-th electricity user; α i and ω i is the electricity utility parameter of the i-th electricity user; p i is the actual power consumption of the i-th power user; PF i is the electricity price of the i-th electricity user.
[0065] When the actual power consumption of the power user is located at the symmetric axis of the quadratic function of the power user's power consumption income and the actual power consumption of the power user, the power consumption income is the highest. The power consumption at this time is the benchmark power consumption p of the i-th power user. Bi , which can be expressed as:
[0066]
[0067] When the electricity user does not participate in any demand response project, its normal electricity consumption will be maintained at the benchmark electricity consumption to obtain the highest electricity benefit. The highest electricity benefit is the benchmark electricity benefit BB of the i-th electricity user. i , which can be expressed as:
[0068]
[0069] Step 1.2: Set the incentive price and analyze the response characteristics of power users. Based on the willingness to participate, set the incentive price. By finding the highest electricity benefit a power user can obtain from participating in the demand response program, calculate the minimum and maximum power consumption of the power user and solve for the maximum response amount.
[0070] When setting the reward price for a certain period, in order to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of power users to participate in demand response and thus expand the upper and lower limits of the response amount provided by power users, the reward price is linked to the collected power users' willingness to participate. At this time, the reward price PR of the i-th power user is i It can be expressed as:
[0071]
[0072] Where: a i and b i are the quadratic coefficient and the linear coefficient of the reward price for the i-th electricity user, and both are positive; θ i is the participation willingness of the i-th electricity user during a certain period of time on the auction day.
[0073] After the reward price is set, due to the existence of the penalty price, considering the rationality of users, each power user has the highest electricity revenue when the penalty is 0, which is the lowest or highest electricity consumption. Without considering the penalty, the electricity revenue of the i-th power user is B i It can be expressed as:
[0074]
[0075] Where: U i is the electricity consumption utility of the i-th electricity user; F i is the electricity cost of the i-th electricity user; R i The reward obtained by the i-th electricity user for participating in the demand response project; α i and ω i is the electricity utility parameter of the i-th electricity user; p i is the actual power consumption of the i-th power user; PF i is the electricity price of the i-th electricity user; PR i is the reward price for the i-th electricity user to participate in the demand response project; p Bi is the benchmark electricity consumption of the i-th electricity user.
[0076] When the actual power consumption of the power user is located on the symmetric axis of the quadratic function of the power user's power revenue and the actual power consumption of the power user during the upward or downward flow, the power revenue is the highest. At this time, each power user obtains the lowest or highest power consumption, which can be expressed as:
[0077]
[0078] Where: p i,min is the minimum power consumption of the i-th power user; p i,max The maximum electricity consumption of the i-th electricity user.
[0079] Given the minimum and maximum power consumption as well as the baseline power consumption, the maximum response for upstream and downstream flexibility requirements can be calculated separately:
[0080]
[0081] Where: Δp i,max is the maximum response of the i-th power user. The maximum response that the power user can provide is the same when there is flexibility demand for upstream and downstream.
[0082] Step 2: In the bidding stage, each load aggregator initiates an auction as a seller. The seller terminal obtains the participation intention sent by each power user terminal, counts the participation intention of each power user as a bidder, and uses the profit margin of each power user in each time period as its bid.
[0083] The participation willingness of each power user in each period of the auction day is collected. The participation willingness of power users is divided into 11 levels. The participation willingness of the i-th power user in the t-th response period of the auction day is θ i,t Select from [0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0], where 0 is the lowest level, indicating that the power user has no intention to participate in that period and will not provide any response; 1 is the highest level, indicating that the power user has a very high willingness to participate in that period and is willing to provide the maximum response. The willingness to participate is calculated by the load aggregator (the seller) before the auction day, from the power users within its jurisdiction who wish to participate. Specifically, this can be collected online through grid-related applications. This is done before each auction begins, and the user's willingness to participate is determined based on the value of the user's willingness to participate.
[0084] The value of each period of the auction day to each electricity user is calculated based on the participation intention submitted by each electricity user a few days ago:
[0085] A i,t =k i,t θ i,t (13)
[0086] Where: A i,t is the value of electricity to the i-th electricity user in the t-th period; k i,t is the participation willingness and value conversion coefficient of the i-th electricity user in the t-th period.
[0087] The auction type is a multi-product auction. Each electricity user can bid for multiple time periods and can eventually win multiple time periods. Therefore, the profit margin of each electricity user in each time period is calculated based on the value of each time period to each electricity user, and the profit margin is used as the electricity user's bid:
[0088] V i,t=A i,t -P i,t (14)
[0089] Where: V i,t is the profit margin of the i-th electricity user in the t-th period; P i,t is the current price of the i-th electricity user in the t-th period, initially a zero matrix.
[0090] Step 3: During the bidding phase, the seller (seller terminal) arranges the bids received in each time period and adds each electricity user to the transaction pool or substitute pool.
[0091] The seller collects the highest bids from all electricity users for all time periods and their corresponding time periods as bids for each time period in this round of auction. The auction principle is the highest bidder wins, and the bids for each time period are arranged in descending order. The auction method is a combination of English auction and first-level closed auction, that is, ascending bids are adopted and the highest bids for each time period are selected as the transaction price. The transaction price and the corresponding electricity user are added to the transaction pool, and other bids and corresponding electricity users are added to the substitute pool.
[0092] Update the pricing matrix P i,t , add the bids for each period in this round of auction and the numbers of the corresponding electricity users.
[0093] Step 4: During the allocation phase, the seller uses the auctioned transaction pool and the reserve pool to allocate the target response, taking into account each user's maximum response. The allocation results are then sent to each user's terminal, allowing each user to access load node resources accordingly. Specifically, the seller sequentially calls the transaction pool and the reserve pool for regular allocation and reserve allocation, respectively. Allocation is complete once a critical set of users is found. If this fails, reallocation is performed.
[0094] Step 4.1: Find the key user set and make regular allocation for each time period; that is, arrange the power users in the transaction pool in descending order according to the maximum response volume, find the key user set in this order, and make regular allocation.
[0095] The electricity users in the transaction pool are called to participate in the regular allocation. The bids of each electricity user in the transaction pool are the same as the transaction price, but the types of electricity users may be different, that is, α i The values of the users in the transaction pool may be different, so the power users in the transaction pool are arranged in descending order according to the maximum response amount, and the key user set is found in this order.
[0096] The key user set is defined as a set of key users that meet the target response volume. Finding the key user set is essentially finding the key user. The search method is similar to the residual search identification method. The users in the transaction pool are tested one by one until a key user is found whose maximum response volume is at the critical point of whether the target response volume is met in the response period:
[0097]
[0098] Where: Δp i,tmax is the maximum response of the i-th power user in the t-th period; T t is the target response volume in the tth period; k is the key user.
[0099] If the key user set is not found in a certain period of time, it means that even if the maximum response amount of all electricity users in the transaction pool is called, the target response amount of the period cannot be reached. At this time, all electricity users in the transaction pool use their maximum response amount as the specified response amount to successfully bid, and the remaining response amount is allocated as the regular allocation. The auction is partially successful in this period.
[0100] If a key user set is found in a certain period of time, it means that the maximum response amount of the electricity users in the transaction pool can meet the target response amount of the period. At this time, all electricity users with a maximum response amount higher than the key user and all electricity users in the key user set have successfully bid, and the former provide their maximum response amount as the prescribed response amount, and the remaining part is equally divided by the latter as the prescribed response amount. The auction for this period is successful.
[0101] Step 4.2: Perform backup allocation for the time periods in which the auction is partially successful; that is, arrange the electricity users in the backup pool in descending order of bids, and then arrange the electricity users with the same bid in descending order of maximum response volume, and find the key user set in this order to perform backup allocation.
[0102] Call the power users in the substitute pool to participate in the substitute allocation. The bids of each power user in the substitute pool are different, and the types of power users may also be different, that is, α i May be different. In order to better mobilize the participation enthusiasm of electricity users, between an electricity user with a low bid but a high maximum response volume and an electricity user with a high bid but a low maximum response volume, the latter is given priority. Therefore, the electricity users in the substitute pool are arranged in descending order according to the bid, and then the electricity users with the same bid are arranged in descending order according to the maximum response volume, and the key user set is found in this order.
[0103] If the key user set is not found in a certain period, it means that even if the maximum response amount of all power users in the backup pool is called, the remaining response amount of the regular allocation cannot be reached. At this time, all power users in the backup pool will use their maximum response amount as the required response amount to win the auction, and the remaining amount will be the remaining response amount of the backup allocation. The auction for this period will fail.
[0104] If a key user set is found in a certain period of time, it means that the maximum response amount of the power users in the substitute pool can meet the remaining response amount of the conventional allocation. At this time, all power users whose bids are higher than those of the key users and all power users in the key user set have won the auction, and the former provide their maximum response amount as the prescribed response amount, and the remaining part is equally divided by the latter as the prescribed response amount. The auction for this period is successful.
[0105] Step 4.3: Re-allocate the time slots that failed the auction; that is, if the key user set cannot be found after regular allocation and backup allocation, conduct the next round of auction and re-execute the bidding stage, auction stage and allocation stage.
[0106] Reallocation refers to the next round of auction for the time period when the maximum response of all electricity users in the transaction pool and the substitute pool after regular allocation and substitute allocation still cannot reach the target response amount. This round of auction is only conducted for the time period in which the auction failed, and the bidding, bidding and allocation of the auction are re-executed, namely steps 2, 3 and 4.
[0107] Since the pricing matrix P i,t In the presence of , the profit space of the successful bidding power user during the successful bidding period is set to 0, and the user exits the next round of auction, thereby calling the maximum response amount of other power users to meet the remaining response amount of the substitute allocation.
[0108] Step 5: At the end stage, the auction initiator publishes the successful bidding time period of each electricity user and the required response amount, and announces the penalty price, maximum electricity revenue, maximum allowable electricity consumption and minimum allowable electricity consumption.
[0109] Step 5.1: Set a penalty price based on the upper and lower limits of the fulfillment rate;
[0110] In a certain period, the actual compliance rate k of power users with upstream and downstream flexibility requirements can be expressed as:
[0111]
[0112] Where: p Ai The auction specifies the response amount (allocation result) for the i-th electricity user; p Bi is the benchmark power consumption of the i-th power user; p i is the actual electricity consumption of the i-th electricity user.
[0113] To constrain the difference between a user's actual response volume and the specified response volume within the permitted upper and lower limits, a penalty price is linked to the upper and lower limits of the specified compliance rate. When a user's actual response volume exceeds the maximum response volume corresponding to the upper limit of the specified compliance rate, or falls short of the minimum response volume corresponding to the lower limit of the specified compliance rate, the electricity revenue earned from participating in the demand response program will be less than the benchmark electricity revenue earned from normal electricity consumption. The penalty price is set so that the user's electricity revenue equals the benchmark electricity revenue when their actual compliance rate in the demand response program is equal to the upper and lower limits of the specified compliance rate.
[0114] In a certain period, the penalty price for upward flexibility demand can be expressed as:
[0115]
[0116] Where: PP i,up The penalty price for the i-th electricity user when the actual response quantity is insufficient; PP i,down The penalty price for the i-th electricity user when the actual response amount is too much; α i and ω i is the electricity utility parameter of the i-th electricity user; PF i is the electricity price of the i-th electricity user; PR i is the reward price for the i-th electricity user to participate in the demand response project; BB i is the benchmark electricity income of the i-th electricity user; k min and k max The lower and upper limits of the fulfillment rate will be announced by the power system dispatching department during the preparation stage.
[0117] In a certain period, the penalty price for downward flexibility demand can be expressed as:
[0118]
[0119] Where: PP i,up The penalty price for the i-th electricity user when the actual response amount is too much; PP i,down The penalty price for the i-th electricity user when the actual response quantity is insufficient.
[0120] Step 5.2: Calculate the maximum electricity benefit and the maximum and minimum allowable electricity consumption;
[0121] The maximum and minimum allowable electricity consumption of electricity users are obtained by setting upper and lower limits of the performance rate. In a certain period of time, the maximum and minimum allowable electricity consumption when the upward flexibility demand is required can be expressed as:
[0122]
[0123] Where: P imax is the maximum allowed power consumption of the i-th power user; Pimin is the minimum allowed power consumption of the i-th power user.
[0124] In a certain period, the maximum and minimum allowed power consumption when downstream flexibility is required can be expressed as:
[0125]
[0126] Where: P imax is the maximum allowed power consumption of the i-th power user; P imin is the minimum allowed power consumption of the i-th power user.
[0127] In a certain period of time, if the actual response amount of the power user is equal to the prescribed response amount, the power consumption at this time is the prescribed power consumption, and the maximum power consumption benefit at this time is:
[0128]
[0129] Where: B imax is the maximum electricity benefit that the i-th electricity user can obtain; p Ci is the prescribed electricity consumption of the i-th electricity user.
[0130] It should be understood that the meaning of response quantity is as follows: ① Carrying out load-side flexibility resource auction means utilizing the response capability of load-side power users to achieve demand response; ② The user's response capability is reflected in its maximum response capability. The calculation method is given in formula (12), which is the maximum response capability that power users can provide under different directions of flexibility demand; ③ From formula (12), it can be seen that the maximum response capability is proportional to the reward price. From formula (9), it can be seen that the higher the user's willingness to participate, the higher the reward price; ④ Therefore, the final goal is: the higher the user's enthusiasm for participating in demand response, that is, the higher the willingness to participate, the higher the reward price, the higher the maximum response capability that can be provided, and the higher the upper and lower limits of the response capability range. The response capability here refers to the difference between the power consumption of the user when participating in the demand response project and the power consumption when not participating in the project. The user subjectively changes his or her power consumption habits. When the project hopes that the load side will reduce power consumption, the value of the user's reduced power consumption is the response capability; when the project hopes that the load side will increase power consumption, the value of the user's increased power consumption is the response capability. The response capability in both directions is positive.
[0131] Auctioning load-side flexibility resources by comprehensively considering the electricity consumption and response characteristics of various types of electricity users is a feasible method for addressing the flexibility needs of the power system. In this embodiment, the power system dispatching department analyzes the electricity consumption and response characteristics of electricity users for the auction initiator and publishes the reward price, electricity price, and the upper and lower limits of the specified compliance rate. Each load aggregator, acting as a seller, calculates the participation willingness of each electricity user and uses the profit margin of each electricity user in each time period as its bid. The bids received in each time period are sorted and classified into categories. Then, regular allocation and backup allocation are carried out in sequence. If the key user set cannot be found in the current auction round, reallocation is carried out. The auction initiator publishes the auction results and announces the penalty price, maximum electricity revenue, maximum allowable electricity consumption, and minimum allowable electricity consumption.
[0132] This embodiment takes the IEEE 39-node standard calculation system and the IEEE 14-node standard calculation system as examples to further illustrate the specific implementation process of the present invention. The auction process is as follows: Figure 2 The IEEE 39-node standard example system consists of 10 power generation nodes, 18 load nodes, and 46 branches. Its topology is shown in the figure below. Figure 3 As shown in the figure, the IEEE 14-node standard example system contains 1 feeder node, 13 load nodes, and 13 branches. Its topology is as follows: Figure 4 Connect the feeder node 1 of the IEEE 14-bus system to the load node 8 of the IEEE 39-bus system (i.e. Figure 3 D), and each load node is assumed to include 1,000 power users. Then, load node 8, as a load aggregator, has a total of 13,000 power users in the distribution network D.
[0133] The power system dispatching department, as the auction initiator, analyzes the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of each power user in each period and sets a specified upper limit k for the fulfillment rate. max =1.1 and the lower limit k min =0.9; the flexibility demand direction of load node 8 in each period is downward, and its target response quantity T t As shown in Table 1.
[0134] Table 1 Target response of load node 8 in each period
[0135]
[0136] Set reward price PR i The quadratic coefficient a i =0.013, linear coefficient b i =0.013, calculate the reward price for electricity users at different levels of participation willingness, such as Figure 5As shown, it can be seen that the reward price and participation willingness have a quadratic function relationship and the opening is upward. The reward price increases with the increase of participation willingness, and the higher the participation willingness, the faster the reward price increases.
[0137] Select an electricity user for specific analysis, user 1's participation willingness and reward price in each period are as follows: Figure 6 As shown in the figure, it can be seen that user 1 has a higher willingness to participate in time periods 5, 10, 12, 16, 17, 20, 22, and 24, that is, the possibility of successful bidding is higher. i =0.05, user electricity utility parameter α i =0.5, the electricity utility parameter of each user in each time period ω i As shown in Table 2, calculate the benchmark power consumption p of each power user in each period. Bi , maximum power consumption p i,max and the maximum response Δp i,max , where the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics curves of user 1 are as follows Figure 7 After analyzing and calculating the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of 13,000 power users, namely the baseline power consumption, maximum power consumption and maximum response amount, the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of the load aggregator, namely the load node 8, to which they belong can be analyzed.
[0138] Table 2 Electricity utility parameters of each user in each time period
[0139]
[0140]
[0141] The minimum and maximum power consumption of load node 8 are 26.1MW and 522MW respectively. The maximum response power consumption is equal to the sum of the maximum power consumption of each power user. The current power consumption is determined by random load distribution. Its power consumption characteristics and response characteristic curves are shown as follows: Figure 8 As shown, it can be seen that the highest response power consumption curve of load node 8 is above the target response power consumption curve, that is, the maximum response amount provided by each power user in each time period is more than the target response amount, and after enough rounds of auction, there is no period in which the auction fails.
[0142] After the power system dispatching department, as the auction initiator, completes the analysis of the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of each power user in each time period, the load aggregator, i.e., the load node 8, as the seller, collects the day-ahead bids of each power user, i.e., the willingness to participate in each time period, and sets the participation willingness and value conversion coefficient k. i,t =10.
[0143] After each power user completes the bidding, the load aggregator, as the seller, bids for the time period when the target response quantity is not 0 and records the user's bid, and updates the pricing matrix at the same time. Then the auction allocation begins, and the number of auctions is as follows: Figure 9 As shown in the figure, it can be seen that the number of auctions is positively correlated with the target response volume. During periods with higher target response volumes, multiple rounds of auctions are required to tap the response potential of each power user. At this time, the requirements for selecting power users are lowered to allocate more power users to meet higher target response volumes. When the target response volume is lower, the selection of power users is more stringent.
[0144] Each round of auction includes two allocation stages: regular allocation and substitute allocation. The number of users called for regular allocation and substitute allocation in each round of auction in each period is as follows: Figure 10 As shown in the figure, it can be seen that the auction can be completed in any round of regular allocation or substitute allocation as long as the key users can be found. The ratio of the number of electricity users called by regular allocation and substitute allocation in each round of auction to the total number of electricity users called in this round is as follows: Figure 11 As shown, it can be seen that with the increase in the number of auctions, the proportion of electricity users called by conventional allocation gradually decreases, while the proportion of electricity users called by substitute allocation gradually increases. The reason is that when the number of auctions is small, the selection space is larger, and the user allocation tends to be completed in the conventional allocation stage. When the number of auctions is large, the selection space is smaller. At this time, it is necessary to use substitute allocation to call more electricity users in the substitute pool to meet the higher target response volume.
[0145] At this point, the power system dispatching department, acting as the auction initiator, obtained the successful bidding time slots and required response volumes for each power user. User 1 successfully bid in time slots 5, 12, and 22, with the required response volume for each time slot being its maximum response volume. In time slot 5, User 1's willingness to participate was only 0.7, but the target response volume for that response time slot was high. Therefore, User 1 successfully bid for the reserve allocation in the third round of auction with the maximum response volume of 0.039 MW. In time slots 12 and 22, the target response volume was not very high, but User 1's willingness to participate was extremely high, at 0.9 and 1, respectively. Therefore, User 1 successfully bid for the regular allocation in the second round of auction with the maximum response volume of 0.045 MW and the regular allocation in the first round of auction with the maximum response volume of 0.052 MW, respectively.
[0146] After the auction allocation is completed, the power system dispatching department, as the auction initiator, sets a penalty price to constrain the actual performance rate of each power user in the successful auction period to be between the upper and lower limits of the specified performance rate. The performance electricity income of user 1 under different actual performance rates in period 5 is as follows: Figure 12 As shown in the figure, it can be seen that when the actual performance rate of the power user is between the upper and lower limits of the specified performance rate, the electricity revenue is higher than the benchmark electricity revenue. The normal performance electricity revenue of user 1 is the highest electricity revenue. Figure 13As shown in the figure, the higher the required response volume, the higher the normal electricity revenue (i.e., the maximum electricity revenue) for contract fulfillment. The power system dispatching department, acting as the auction initiator, then announces the successful bidding period, along with the required response volume, penalty price, maximum electricity revenue, maximum permitted electricity consumption, and minimum permitted electricity consumption, to each electricity user. Each user then fulfills their contract during each successful bidding period.
[0147] After the auction day ends, the auction initiator, i.e. the power system dispatching department, pays remuneration or requests compensation to each seller, i.e. the load aggregator, based on the target response volume and actual response volume in each period of the auction day; the seller, i.e. each load aggregator, calculates the reward or penalty received by each power user based on the actual response volume of each power user as well as the reward price and penalty price, and records their performance.
[0148] Example 2
[0149] This embodiment provides an auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration system, which specifically includes the following modules:
[0150] A maximum response quantity calculation module is configured to obtain the minimum power consumption, maximum power consumption, and baseline power consumption of each power user under the load node, and calculate the maximum response quantity when the upstream and downstream flexibility requirements are met;
[0151] The allocation module is configured to obtain the target response amount of the load node, combine the maximum response amount of each power user, call the power users in the transaction pool and the substitute pool obtained through the auction to allocate the target response amount, so that each power user can call the load node resources according to the allocation result.
[0152] It should be noted here that the various modules in this embodiment correspond one-to-one to the various steps in Example 1, and the specific implementation processes are the same, which will not be repeated here.
[0153] Example 3
[0154] This embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon. When the program is executed by a processor, the steps of the auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method as described in the first embodiment above are implemented.
[0155] Example 4
[0156] This embodiment provides a computer device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the program, the steps of the auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method as described in the first embodiment above are implemented.
[0157] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Thus, the present invention may take the form of hardware embodiments, software embodiments, or embodiments combining software and hardware. Furthermore, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to magnetic disk storage and optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.
[0158] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, as well as combinations of processes and / or blocks in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowcharts and / or block diagrams. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0159] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.
[0160] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operational steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing the instructions executed on the computer or other programmable device for implementing the process. Figure 1 a process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.
[0161] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that all or part of the processes in the above-described method embodiments can be implemented by instructing related hardware through a computer program. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, the program can include the processes in the above-described method embodiments. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM), or a random access memory (RAM).
[0162] The foregoing description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the present invention. Those skilled in the art will readily appreciate that various modifications and variations of the present invention are possible. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, or improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention are intended to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A load-side flexibility resource allocation method based on auction, characterized in that: include: The power system dispatching department obtains the target response quantity of the load node, analyzes the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of the power users, and sends the reward price, electricity price and the upper and lower limits of the specified compliance rate to each power user terminal; Obtain the minimum power consumption, maximum power consumption, and benchmark power consumption of each power user under the load node, and calculate the maximum response amount when upstream and downstream flexibility requirements are required; Each load aggregator initiates an auction as a seller. The seller's terminal obtains the participation intention sent by each power user terminal, calculates the participation intention of each power user as a bidder, and uses the profit margin of each power user in each time period as its bid; The seller terminal arranges the bids received in each time period and adds each electricity user to the transaction pool or substitute pool; obtains the target response amount of the load node, combines the maximum response amount of each electricity user, calls the electricity users in the transaction pool and substitute pool obtained through the auction method to distribute the target response amount, and sends the allocation result to each electricity user terminal, so that each electricity user can call the load node resources according to the allocation result.
2. The auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The maximum response amount when upward flexibility is required is the difference between the power user’s baseline power consumption and the minimum power consumption; Alternatively, the maximum response amount in the case of downstream flexibility demand is the difference between the power user's baseline power consumption and the maximum power consumption.
3. The auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Arrange the power users in the transaction pool in descending order according to the maximum response volume, and search for the key user set in this order.
4. The auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation method according to claim 1, characterized in that: Arrange the power users in the backup pool in descending order according to their bids, and arrange the power users with the same bids in descending order according to the maximum response amount, and find the key user set in this order.
5. The auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation method according to claim 3 or 4, characterized in that: Arrange the power users in the backup pool in descending order according to their bids, and arrange the power users with the same bids in descending order according to the maximum response amount, and find the key user set in this order.
6. The auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The maximum response amount of the last power user in the key user set is at the critical point of whether the target response amount is met or not.
7. The auction-based load-side flexibility resource allocation method according to claim 1, characterized in that: After each electricity user calls the load node resources according to the allocation results, the actual compliance rate of the electricity user is calculated by combining the allocation results, benchmark electricity consumption and actual electricity consumption.
8. A load-side flexibility resource allocation system based on auction, characterized in that: include: The maximum response quantity calculation module is configured to: the power system dispatching department obtains the target response quantity of the load node, analyzes the power consumption characteristics and response characteristics of the power users, and sends the reward price, electricity price and the upper and lower limits of the specified compliance rate to each power user terminal; Obtain the minimum power consumption, maximum power consumption, and benchmark power consumption of each power user under the load node, and calculate the maximum response amount when upstream and downstream flexibility requirements are required; The allocation module is configured to: each load aggregator initiates an auction as a seller, the seller terminal obtains the participation intention sent by each power user terminal, calculates the participation intention of each power user as a bidder, and uses the profit margin of each power user in each time period as its bid; The seller terminal arranges the bids received in each time period and adds each electricity user to the transaction pool or substitute pool; obtains the target response amount of the load node, combines the maximum response amount of each electricity user, calls the electricity users in the transaction pool and substitute pool obtained through the auction method to distribute the target response amount, and sends the allocation result to each electricity user terminal, so that each electricity user can call the load node resources according to the allocation result.
9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the program is executed by a processor, the steps in the auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method as described in any one of claims 1 to 7 are implemented.
10. A computer device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein: When the processor executes the program, the steps in the auction-based load-side flexibility resource configuration method as described in any one of claims 1-7 are implemented.
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