Method and apparatus for uplink encryption transmission

Abstract

The application relates to an uplink encryption transmission method and device, and belongs to the technical field of wireless communication, which aims to solve the problem of low confidentiality of target data in the prior art. The method comprises the following steps: a sending device determines a matching parameter based on historical transmission conditions of uplink; the sending device determines target data to be sent based on the matching parameter; the sending device constructs to-be-sent data based on the target data and interference data; the interference data is respectively preset in the sending device and a legal receiving device; and the sending device sends the to-be-sent data to the receiving device through uplink. The sending device reduces the accuracy of eavesdropping of an illegal receiving device by adding interference data in the to-be-sent data, thereby reducing the eavesdropping rate of the illegal receiving device without affecting the receiving of the target data by the legal receiving device, and improving the confidentiality of information transmission of the sending device in the uplink.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] One or more embodiments relate to the field of wireless communication technology, and more particularly to an uplink encrypted transmission method and apparatus. Background Technology

[0002] With the continuous development of technology, due to the openness of wireless communication media, the propagation of electromagnetic waves allows both legitimate and illegitimate receiving devices to receive the target data sent by the transmitting device. This enables illegitimate receiving devices to eavesdrop on the target data sent by the transmitting device, seriously affecting the confidentiality of the target data in the wireless system.

[0003] Currently, according to research findings, most studies focus on secure transmission in the downlink. However, due to the openness of wireless communication media, the confidentiality of target data in the uplink is relatively low.

[0004] In summary, improving the confidentiality of target data in the uplink is a pressing technical problem that needs to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0005] An uplink encrypted transmission method and apparatus provided in one or more embodiments are used to solve the problem of low confidentiality of target data in the uplink in the prior art.

[0006] In a first aspect, an uplink encrypted transmission method is provided in one or more embodiments, comprising: a transmitting device determining a matching parameter based on historical uplink transmission data; the matching parameter being used to match the power ratio between target data to be transmitted and interference data; the transmitting device determining target data to be transmitted based on the matching parameter; the transmitting device constructing data to be transmitted based on the target data to be transmitted and the interference data; the interference data being preset in both the transmitting device and a legitimate receiving device; and the transmitting device transmitting the data to be transmitted to the receiving device via the uplink.

[0007] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device reduces the accuracy of eavesdropping by unauthorized receiving devices by adding interference data to the data to be transmitted, thereby reducing the eavesdropping rate of unauthorized receiving devices without affecting the reception of target data by authorized receiving devices, and thus improving the confidentiality of information transmission of the transmitting device in the uplink.

[0008] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on at least one of the following information: the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, the distance between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted.

[0009] In one or more embodiments, by determining the ratio parameter, the proportion of target data and interference data can be determined according to the ratio parameter, thereby reducing the eavesdropping rate of unauthorized receiving devices and improving the confidentiality of information transmission of the transmitting device in the uplink.

[0010] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device determines the matching parameter based on the historical transmission status of the uplink, including: if the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets a first condition, the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a second condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the transmitting device determines the matching parameter to a preset value; or if the transmitting device determines that the channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the transmitting device determines the matching parameter to a preset value.

[0011] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, which facilitates the subsequent improvement of the confidentiality of the target data of the uplink based on the matching parameters.

[0012] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: the transmitting device determining that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets a first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is unknown; the transmitting device acquiring a first area where the illegitimate receiving devices are distributed; the transmitting device determining the matching parameters based on the first area, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving devices, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving devices, and the distance between the legitimate receiving devices and the transmitting device.

[0013] In one or more embodiments, since the transmitting device does not know the location of the illegitimate receiving device, in order to determine the matching parameters, it is necessary to first obtain a first area where the illegitimate receiving devices are distributed, and then determine the matching parameters based on the first area, uplink data, the number of antennas of the receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, thereby improving the confidentiality of the target data of the uplink based on the matching parameters.

[0014] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device determines the matching parameter based on the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device.

[0015] In one or more embodiments, since the transmitting device knows the location of the illegitimate receiving device, it determines the matching parameters based on the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, thereby improving the confidentiality of the target data of the uplink according to the matching parameters.

[0016] Secondly, an uplink encrypted transmission method is provided in one or more embodiments, comprising: a receiving device receiving data to be transmitted sent by a transmitting device through an uplink; the receiving device determining target data from the data to be transmitted based on the matching parameters and interference data; the interference data being preset in the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device respectively.

[0017] In one or more embodiments, since the data to be transmitted contains target data and interference data, and the illegitimate receiving device cannot determine the target data from the data to be transmitted, the accuracy of eavesdropping by the illegitimate receiving device is reduced by adding interference data to the data to be transmitted. This reduces the eavesdropping rate of the illegitimate receiving device without affecting the legitimate receiving device's reception of the target data, thereby improving the confidentiality of information transmission by the transmitting device in the uplink.

[0018] In one or more embodiments, the matching parameter can be determined in one of the following ways: Method 1: The transmitting device determines the matching parameter based on at least one of the following information: the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, the distance between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted. Method 2: The transmitting device determines the matching parameter based on the historical transmission situation of the uplink, including: if the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets a first condition, the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a second condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the matching parameter is determined to be a preset value; or if the transmitting device determines that the channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the matching parameter is determined to be a preset value. Method 3: The transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets a first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is unknown; the transmitting device acquires a first area where the illegitimate receiving device is distributed; the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the first area, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device. Method 4: The transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted does not meet a third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known; the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device.

[0019] Thirdly, an uplink encrypted transmission apparatus provided in one or more embodiments includes: a determining unit, configured to: determine a matching parameter based on historical uplink transmission data; the matching parameter is used to match the power ratio between target data to be transmitted and interference data; the transmitting device determines the target data to be transmitted based on the matching parameter; and a processing unit, configured to: construct data to be transmitted based on the target data to be transmitted and the interference data; the interference data is preset in both the transmitting device and a legitimate receiving device; and the transmitting device transmits the data to be transmitted to the receiving device via the uplink.

[0020] Fourthly, an uplink encrypted transmission device is provided in one or more embodiments, comprising: a determining unit, configured to receive data to be transmitted sent by a transmitting device via an uplink; and a processing unit, configured to determine target data from the data to be transmitted based on the matching parameters and interference data; wherein the interference data is preset in the transmitting device and in a legitimate receiving device.

[0021] Fifthly, embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer device, including at least one processor and at least one memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the program is executed by the processor, the processor executes the above-described uplink encrypted transmission method.

[0022] In a sixth aspect, embodiments of the present invention also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing computer-executable instructions, the computer-executable instructions being used to cause a computer to execute the above-described uplink encrypted transmission method. Attached Figure Description

[0023] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in one or more embodiments, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0024] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating one possible application scenario provided in one or more embodiments;

[0025] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating an encrypted uplink transmission provided in one or more embodiments;

[0026] Figure 3 A flowchart of a method for determining the secure rate of target data in an uplink, provided in one or more embodiments;

[0027] Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating a method for determining the eavesdropping rate of target data in an uplink, provided in one or more embodiments;

[0028] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an uplink encrypted transmission device provided in one or more embodiments;

[0029] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an uplink encrypted transmission device provided in one or more embodiments;

[0030] Figure 7A schematic diagram of the structure of a computer is also provided in one or more embodiments. Detailed Implementation

[0031] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are merely some embodiments of this invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.

[0032] like Figure 1 The diagram illustrates a possible application scenario provided in one or more embodiments. This application scenario uses transmitting devices 100, 101, 102, and 103, a legitimate receiving device 104, and an illegitimate receiving device 105 as examples. Due to the openness of the wireless communication medium, transmitting devices 100, 101, 102, and 103 transmit data to the legitimate receiving device via the uplink, and also transmit data to the illegitimate receiving device via the uplink. For example, consider a legitimate receiving device 104 as a base station with M antennas, and transmitting devices 100, 101, 102, and 103 as single-antenna users, where M ≥ 4. The illegitimate receiving device 105 is an illegitimate receiving device with N antennas. Due to cost limitations, the antennas of eavesdropping devices are typically smaller than those of the base station; therefore, M > N. If transmitting devices 100, 101, 102, and 103 send uplink data to the base station via the uplink, due to the openness of the wireless communication medium, an eavesdropping device can also receive the uplink data sent by transmitting devices 100, 101, 102, and 103 via the uplink. Therefore, there is a possibility of data leakage when transmitting information via the uplink, resulting in low confidentiality of information transmission by transmitting devices 100, 101, 102, and 103 via the uplink.

[0033] In view of this, one or more embodiments provide an encrypted transmission method for uplink data, which can solve the problem of low confidentiality in uplink information transmission.

[0034] like Figure 2 The diagram illustrates a flowchart of an uplink encrypted transmission provided in one or more embodiments, the method comprising the following steps:

[0035] Step 201: The sending device determines the matching parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink.

[0036] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device adds interference data to the data to be transmitted, ensuring that the data sent by the transmitting device to an unauthorized receiving device via the uplink contains not only target data but also interference data. Since the unauthorized receiving device cannot distinguish between target data and interference data, the eavesdropping rate of the target data in the uplink is reduced, thereby improving the confidentiality of information transmission in the uplink. The transmitting device determines a ratio parameter based on historical uplink transmission data, where the ratio parameter is the proportion of historical target data and interference data in the historical data to be transmitted. By determining the power ratio between target data and interference data in the data to be transmitted according to the ratio parameter, the eavesdropping rate of the target data in the uplink can be reduced to a low level, thus achieving optimal confidentiality of the target data in the uplink. At least one of the determined ratio parameters includes: the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the receiving device, the number of antennas of the unauthorized receiving device, the distance between the receiving device and the transmitting device, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical uplink data.

[0037] Step 202: The transmitting device determines the target data and interference data to be transmitted based on the matching parameters.

[0038] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device can determine the ratio of target data and interference data to be transmitted based on the matching parameters. Since the interference data is preset in the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device respectively, the legitimate receiving device can distinguish between target data and interference data, while the illegitimate receiving device cannot distinguish between target data and interference data. This achieves the goal of reducing the accuracy of eavesdropping by illegitimate receiving devices through interference data, thereby reducing the eavesdropping rate of illegitimate receiving devices. After receiving the target data and interference data, the legitimate receiving device can distinguish between the target data and interference data. Therefore, the interference data will not affect the legitimate receiving device's reception of the target data.

[0039] Step 203: The transmitting device constructs the data to be transmitted based on the target data and the interference data.

[0040] In one or more embodiments, the data to be transmitted includes target data and interference data. As can be seen from step 202, interference data can reduce the eavesdropping rate of illegitimate receiving devices, which will not be elaborated here. Therefore, when the transmitting device subsequently sends the data to be transmitted to the receiving device, it can reduce the eavesdropping rate of illegitimate receiving devices without affecting the legitimate receiving device's reception of the target data, thereby improving the confidentiality of information transmission in the uplink.

[0041] Step 204: The sending device sends the data to be sent to the receiving device via the uplink.

[0042] In one or more embodiments, since the receiving device includes both legitimate and illegitimate receiving devices, if the sending device sends the data to be sent to the legitimate receiving device via the uplink, the interference data is pre-installed in the legitimate receiving device. Therefore, the legitimate receiving device is aware of the interference data and can obtain the target data within it upon receiving the data. This does not affect the subsequent processing by the legitimate receiving device after obtaining the target data. However, if the sending device sends the data to be sent to an illegitimate receiving device via the uplink, the illegitimate receiving device does not know which is the target data and which is the interference data. Therefore, upon receiving the data, the illegitimate receiving device can only perform subsequent processing based on the data itself. Since the data contains both target data and interference data, the interference data reduces the accuracy of eavesdropping by the illegitimate receiving device, thereby reducing the eavesdropping rate and improving the confidentiality of information transmission in the uplink.

[0043] As can be seen from steps 201 to 204 above, the transmitting device reduces the accuracy of eavesdropping by unauthorized receiving devices by adding interference data to the data to be transmitted. This reduces the eavesdropping rate of unauthorized receiving devices without affecting the reception of target data by authorized receiving devices, thereby improving the confidentiality of information transmission in the uplink.

[0044] To better understand this scheme, it's important to understand that a higher security level for the target data in the uplink leads to better security for the uplink information transmission. The following explains how to determine the security level of the target data in the uplink. This security level is related to the security rate and eavesdropping rate of the target data in the uplink; therefore, determining the security level requires first determining these two rates.

[0045] It should be noted that the number of transmitting devices, legitimate receiving devices, and illegitimate receiving devices can be one or more; there is no limitation here. The following scheme will be illustrated using an example of K single-antenna transmitting devices sending uplink data to one legitimate receiving device.

[0046] like Figure 3 The diagram illustrates a method for determining the secure rate of target data in an uplink, provided in one or more embodiments. The method includes the following steps:

[0047] Step 301: The transmitting device sends a pilot signal to the legitimate receiving device.

[0048] In one or more embodiments, the legitimate receiving device uses the pilot signal sent by the transmitting device to facilitate subsequent channel estimation and determine channel state information, thereby enabling the determination of the safe rate of the target data in the uplink. First, it is necessary to determine the channel state information. Channel state information is a crucial and widely used data describing the channel in wireless communication. It represents the propagation characteristics of the communication link, describing the combined effects of various factors such as scattering, fading, and power attenuation. Obtaining channel state information requires the legitimate receiving device to perform channel estimation based on the pilot signal. Therefore, to obtain channel state information, the transmitting device needs to send the pilot channel to the legitimate receiving device before data transmission.

[0049] Step 302: The legitimate receiving device determines the channel estimate from the transmitting device to the legitimate receiving device based on the first pilot signal.

[0050] In one or more embodiments, due to signal attenuation and phase changes during transmission of the pilot signal, the transmitting device sends a pilot signal to the legitimate receiving device. However, the legitimate receiving device may receive a first pilot signal instead of the pilot signal, where the first pilot signal is not equal to the pilot signal. The legitimate receiving device performs channel estimation based on the first pilot signal to facilitate subsequent recovery of the received signal from the legitimate receiving device based on the channel estimation results. Specifically, the first pilot signal received by the legitimate receiving device can be represented by Equation 1:

[0051]

[0052] Where ρ is the pilot transmission power; Defined as a pilot sequence of length τ with ΦΦ H =I K ; Represents the fast fading coefficient, its inner element It is a diagonal matrix, and its elements are [D]. kk =β k This is the large-scale fading coefficient. Here, we assume β... k This was known in advance. Therefore, the channel G = HD. 1 / 2 The (m,k)th element is It is a noise matrix whose elements follow a distribution.

[0053] The legitimate receiving device determines the channel estimate from the transmitting device to the legitimate receiving device based on the received first pilot signal. This channel estimate is obtained using the minimum mean square error and can be expressed by Equation 2:

[0054]

[0055] in, Channel estimation error is defined as Its internal elements follow a distribution. Based on the properties of channel estimation and They are independent of each other.

[0056] Step 303: The transmitting device sends a first signal and a first distance to the legitimate receiving device.

[0057] In one or more embodiments, since the transmitting device knows the location of the legitimate receiving device, it can determine a first distance, where the first distance is the distance between the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device. The first signal includes target data transmitted by the transmitting device to the legitimate receiving device via the uplink. To enable information exchange between the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device, the transmitting device needs to send the first signal and the first distance to the legitimate receiving device.

[0058] Step 304: The legitimate receiving device receives the second signal and the first distance.

[0059] In one or more embodiments, since signal attenuation and signal phase changes may occur during signal transmission, the signal sent by the transmitting device to the legitimate receiving device is a first signal, while the signal received by the legitimate receiving device may not be the first signal, but becomes a second signal.

[0060] Step 305: The legitimate receiving device performs coherent signal detection on the second signal to determine the third signal.

[0061] In one or more embodiments, in order for the legitimate receiving device to receive a more accurate first signal, it is necessary to process the second signal to recover the first signal. Specifically, the legitimate receiving device performs coherent signal detection on the second signal based on the channel estimation result, thereby enabling the recovery of the first signal from the second signal. For example, if K transmitting devices send K first signals to the legitimate receiving device, where the target data in the K first signals to be sent by the K transmitting devices is... in After receiving K second signals, the legitimate receiving device performs coherent signal detection on the K second signals to obtain K first signals. Taking the appropriate expression of the kth first signal as an example, the vector expression of the kth first signal received by the legitimate receiving device can be expressed by Equation 3:

[0062]

[0063] Where p u The transmit power of the payload data is assumed to be 1 (due to this assumption, p in the following analysis) u (This will be removed). Represents the detection matrix. Represents additive noise and follows a distribution.

[0064] The scalar expression for the Kth first signal received by a legitimate receiving device can be represented by Equation 4:

[0065]

[0066] Among them, a k It is the k-th row of A. and They are and The i-th column. It is worth noting that the first term in Formula 4 is the target signal, while the others are interference or noise.

[0067] Step 306: The legitimate receiving device determines the first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the first signal based on the first signal and the first distance.

[0068] In one or more embodiments, since there is a correlation between the secure rate and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), the formula for calculating the secure rate can be expressed by Formula 5:

[0069] R = log2(1 + SINR) (Formula 5)

[0070] Here, R represents the secure rate, and SINR represents the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). Therefore, to determine the secure rate of the target data in the uplink, it is necessary to first determine the first SINR of the first signal. The following describes how to determine the first SINR of the first signal.

[0071] The first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINNR) of the first signal refers to the ratio of the energy of the first signal to the sum of the interference energy and noise energy. Since the energy of the first signal varies depending on the distance from the transmitting device to the legitimate receiving device, the legitimate receiving device can determine the first SINNR based on the first signal and the first distance. The formula for calculating the first SINNR can be expressed by Formula 6:

[0072]

[0073] Step 307: The legitimate receiving device sends the first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio to the transmitting device.

[0074] In one or more embodiments, after the legitimate receiving device determines the first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR), it feeds back the SIR information to the transmitting device.

[0075] Step 308: The transmitting device determines the safe rate of the target data in the uplink based on the first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio.

[0076] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device can determine the secure rate of the target data in the uplink according to Formula 5, wherein the formula for calculating the secure rate of the target data can be expressed by Formula 7:

[0077]

[0078] in,

[0079] The transmitting device inputs Formula 7 into the zero-forcing detector, because Therefore, formula 7 can be rewritten to obtain formula 8:

[0080]

[0081] in,

[0082] As can be seen from steps 301 to 308, by determining the first signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the first signal, the security rate of the uplink target data can be determined, which facilitates the subsequent determination of the confidentiality rate of the uplink target data based on the security rate of the uplink target data.

[0083] Since the confidentiality rate of the uplink target data is determined based on the security rate and the eavesdropping rate of the uplink target data, the following describes how to determine the eavesdropping rate of the uplink target data.

[0084] like Figure 4 The diagram shows a flowchart of a method for determining the eavesdropping rate of target data in an uplink, provided in one or more embodiments. The method includes the following steps:

[0085] Step 401: The transmitting device sends a pilot signal to an unauthorized receiving device.

[0086] In one or more embodiments, due to the openness of the wireless medium, the transmitting device sends pilot signals to legitimate receiving devices while simultaneously sending pilot signals to illegitimate receiving devices.

[0087] Step 402: The illegitimate receiving device determines the channel estimate from the transmitting device to the illegitimate receiving device based on the second pilot signal.

[0088] In one or more embodiments, due to signal attenuation and phase changes during transmission of the pilot signal, the transmitting device sends a pilot signal to the illegitimate receiving device. However, the illegitimate receiving device may receive a second pilot signal instead of the pilot signal, which is not equal to the original pilot signal. The illegitimate receiving device performs channel estimation based on the second pilot signal to facilitate subsequent recovery of the received signal from the illegitimate receiving device based on the channel estimation results. Specifically, the second pilot signal received by the illegitimate receiving device can be represented by Equation 9:

[0089]

[0090] in, Represents the fast fading coefficient, its inner element and It is a diagonal matrix whose elements are [L]. kk =θ k This is the large-scale fading coefficient. Similarly, the channel F = QL 1 / 2 The (n,k)th element is It is a noise matrix whose elements obey the following rules: distributed.

[0091] The illegitimate receiving device determines the channel estimate from the transmitting device to the illegitimate receiving device based on the received second pilot signal. This channel estimate is obtained using the minimum mean square error and can be expressed by Equation 10:

[0092]

[0093] in As mentioned earlier, the channel estimation error is defined as... and They are independent of each other. Furthermore, The elements follow a distribution

[0094] Step 403: The transmitting device sends a first signal and a second distance to the illegitimate receiving device.

[0095] In one or more embodiments, it is assumed that the transmitting device knows the location of the illegitimate receiving device. Therefore, the transmitting device can determine a second distance, where the second distance is the distance between the transmitting device and the illegitimate receiving device. The first signal includes target data sent by the transmitting device to the illegitimate receiving device via the uplink. Due to the openness of the wireless communication medium, the transmitting device sends the first signal not only to the legitimate receiving device but also to the illegitimate receiving device, enabling the illegitimate receiving device to steal the target data sent by the transmitting device. This could lead to a data leakage issue during information transmission via the uplink.

[0096] Step 404: The illegitimate receiving device receives the third signal and the second distance.

[0097] In one or more embodiments, since signal attenuation and signal phase changes may occur during signal transmission, the signal sent by the transmitting device to the illegitimate receiving device is the first signal, while the signal received by the illegitimate receiving device may not be the first signal, but becomes the third signal.

[0098] Step 405: The illegitimate receiving device performs coherent signal detection on the third signal to determine the first signal.

[0099] In one or more embodiments, in order for an unauthorized receiving device to receive a more accurate first signal, the third signal needs to be processed to recover the first signal. Specifically, the unauthorized receiving device performs coherent signal detection on the third signal based on the channel estimation result from the transmitting device to the unauthorized receiving device, thereby recovering the first signal from the third signal. For example, if K transmitting devices send K first signals to an unauthorized receiving device, where the target data in the K first signals to be sent by the K transmitting devices is... in After receiving K third signals, the illegitimate receiving device performs coherent signal detection on the K third signals to obtain K first signals. Taking the appropriate expression of the kth first signal as an example, the vector expression of the kth first signal received by the illegitimate receiving device can be expressed by Equation 11:

[0100]

[0101] in Here is the detection matrix used by Eve, n E With n A They follow the same distribution.

[0102] The scalar expression for the Kth first signal received by an illegitimate receiving device can be represented by Equation 12:

[0103]

[0104] Among them, b k For row k of B, and They are respectively and The i-th column. It is worth noting that the first term in Formula 12 is the target signal, while the others are interference or noise.

[0105] Step 406: The illegitimate receiving device determines the second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the first signal based on the first signal and the second distance.

[0106] In one or more embodiments, since there is a correlation between the eavesdropping rate and the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIN / NNR), it is necessary to first determine the second SIN / NNR of the first signal in order to determine the eavesdropping rate of the target data in the uplink. The following describes how to determine the second SIN / NNR of the first signal.

[0107] The second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINNR) of the first signal refers to the ratio of the energy of the first signal to the sum of the interference energy and noise energy. Since the energy of the first signal varies depending on the distance from the transmitting device to the illegitimate receiving device, the legitimate receiving device can determine the second SINNR based on the first signal and the second distance. The formula for calculating the second SINNR can be expressed by Formula 13:

[0108]

[0109] Step 407: The illegitimate receiving device sends the second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio to the transmitting device.

[0110] In one or more embodiments, after determining the second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), the illegitimate receiving device will feed back the SINR information to the transmitting device.

[0111] Step 408: The transmitting device determines the eavesdropping rate of the target data based on the second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio.

[0112] In one or more embodiments, the transmitting device can determine the eavesdropping rate of the target data based on the second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio, wherein the formula for calculating the eavesdropping rate of the target data can be expressed by Formula 14:

[0113]

[0114] in,

[0115] The transmitting device can rewrite Equation 14 by inputting it into the zero-forcing detector, resulting in Equation 15:

[0116]

[0117] As can be seen from steps 401 to 408, by determining the second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the first signal, the eavesdropping rate of the uplink target data can be determined, which facilitates the subsequent determination of the confidentiality rate of the uplink target data based on the eavesdropping rate of the uplink target data.

[0118] In one or more embodiments, the security rate of the uplink target data can be determined through steps 301 to 308 described above, and the eavesdropping rate of the uplink target data can be determined through steps 401 to 408 described above. The formula for calculating the confidentiality rate of the uplink target data can be expressed by Formula 16:

[0119]

[0120] in,

[0121] In one possible scenario, as can be seen from Equation 16, if an illegitimate receiving device continuously optimizes the channel estimation from the non-transmitting device to the legitimate receiving device, thereby increasing the second signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SNR) of the illegitimate receiving device, it will further increase the eavesdropping rate of the uplink target data. It is understandable that if the eavesdropping rate of the uplink target data increases, the confidentiality rate of the uplink target data will decrease.

[0122] To improve the confidentiality of target data in the uplink, the transmitting device adds interference data to the data to be transmitted. Since the interference data is preset in both the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device, the legitimate receiving device can identify the interference data and the target data, while the illegitimate receiving device cannot distinguish between the interference data and the target data. Therefore, by adding artificial noise to the data to be transmitted, the eavesdropping rate of the target data in the uplink is reduced, thereby improving the confidentiality of the target data in the uplink.

[0123] Since the data to be transmitted includes target data and interference data, a power matching ratio needs to be established between the target data and interference data. If the matching parameter is α, the transmitting device sends a fourth signal to the receiving device through the uplink. This fourth signal includes the data to be transmitted, and its vector expression can be represented by Equation 17:

[0124]

[0125] in, Defined as an artificial noise vector; It is a diagonal matrix and its k-th diagonal element is the power allocation factor of the k-th Bob; The power allocation matrix representing the artificial noise vector satisfies D α +D λ =IK The power allocation parameter refers to the power distribution ratio between the target data and the interference data in the data to be transmitted.

[0126] By determining the optimal ratio between historical target data and interference data in the historical data to be transmitted, the matching parameter is determined. Then, based on the matching parameter, the eavesdropping rate of the target data in the uplink can be minimized, and the confidentiality rate of the target data in the uplink can be adjusted to the optimal level.

[0127] The following four scenarios illustrate how to determine the allocation parameters based on historical transmission data:

[0128] First scenario

[0129] In one or more embodiments, it is assumed that, under historical transmission conditions, the state of the uplink historical channel state information of the transmitting device satisfies a first condition, and the transmitting device knows the location of the illegitimate receiving device. The first condition is that the state of the uplink historical channel state information of the transmitting device is perfect. To determine the matching parameters based on the confidentiality rate of the uplink historical target data, and to facilitate subsequent improvement of the confidentiality of the uplink target data based on the matching parameters, since the confidentiality rate of the uplink historical target data is determined based on the security rate and eavesdropping rate of the uplink historical target data, it is necessary to first determine the security rate and eavesdropping rate of the uplink historical target data. The following describes how to determine the security rate of the uplink historical target data.

[0130] Since the channel state information is perfect, it indicates that the legitimate receiving device possesses perfect channel state information, and the channel estimation is relatively accurate. The fourth signal received by the legitimate receiving device through the uplink includes historical data to be transmitted, which contains historical target data and interference data. The scalar expression for the fourth signal can be represented by expression 18:

[0131]

[0132] Formula 18 is determined based on step 305 above, and will not be elaborated here.

[0133] Among them, a k yes The k-th row, and g k It is the k-th column of G.

[0134] Since the interference data is pre-set in the legitimate receiving device, and since the third term in Formula 18 represents the interference data, the third term can be eliminated. Also, because a... k g i=0, k≠i, so the second term is 0.

[0135] As can be seen from step 306 above, the legitimate receiving device can determine the third signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINNR) of the fourth signal based on the fourth signal and the first distance. The expression for the third SINNR of the fourth signal can be represented by formula 19:

[0136]

[0137] As can be seen from steps 307 to 308 above, the transmitting device determines the secure rate of the historical target data of the uplink based on the third signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio of the fourth signal. The expression for the secure rate of the historical target data of the uplink can be represented by formula 20:

[0138]

[0139] The following describes how to determine the eavesdropping rate of historical target data in the uplink.

[0140] Since the channel state information is perfect, it indicates that the illegitimate receiving device possesses perfect channel state information, and its channel estimation is relatively accurate. The scalar expression for the fourth signal received by the illegitimate receiving device via the uplink can be represented by expression 21:

[0141]

[0142] Formula 21 is determined based on step 405 above, and will not be elaborated here.

[0143] Among them, b k yes The k-th row, f k It is the kth column of F.

[0144] Since illegitimate receiving devices cannot distinguish between historical target data and interference data, they cannot identify interference data. Because the third term in Formula 21 represents interference data, it cannot be eliminated. Furthermore, because a... k g i =0, k≠i, so the second term is 0.

[0145] The illegitimate receiving device can determine the fourth signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SIR / NRR) of the fourth signal according to formulas 21 and 19. As can be seen from steps 407 to 408 above, the transmitting device determines the eavesdropping rate of the uplink historical target data based on the fourth SIR / NRR of the fourth signal. The expression for the eavesdropping rate of the uplink historical target data can be represented by formula 22.

[0146]

[0147] The confidentiality rate of historical target data in the uplink can be determined based on the security rate and eavesdropping rate of historical target data in the uplink, and can be expressed by formula 23:

[0148]

[0149] When the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted by the transmitting device meets the second condition, where the second condition is to approach infinity, then there is no difference between the third SINR of the fourth signal of the legitimate receiving device and the fourth SINR of the fourth signal of the illegitimate receiving device. Therefore, when the value of the matching parameter is 1 / 2, it is convenient to improve the confidentiality of the target data of the uplink according to the matching parameter.

[0150] The second scenario

[0151] In one or more embodiments, it is assumed that the state of the historical channel state information satisfies a first condition, and the transmitting device is unaware of the location information of the illegitimate receiving device. Since the transmitting device is unaware of the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, in order to determine the confidentiality rate of the historical target data in the uplink, it is necessary to first determine the eavesdropping rate of the historical target data in the uplink and the secure rate of the historical target data in the uplink.

[0152] Since the transmitting device knows the location of the legitimate receiving device and the status of the historical channel state information meets the first condition, the method for determining the secure rate of the historical target data in the uplink is the same as in Embodiment 1, and will not be repeated here. The following describes how to determine the eavesdropping rate of the historical target data in the uplink.

[0153] Since illegitimate receiving devices need to be concealed around the transmitting device, but cannot be too close to the transmitting device, as this would expose the location of the illegitimate receiving device, nor can they be too far from the transmitting device, as this would reduce the eavesdropping rate of the illegitimate receiving device, the distance between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device should satisfy the condition of a first area, in which the illegitimate receiving devices are randomly distributed.

[0154] For example, the sending device definition in, in U is the road loss factor. k Let u be the distance from the Kth transmitting device to the illegitimate receiving device. Since the illegitimate receiving devices are evenly distributed in the first region, u k The probability distribution function can be expressed by Equation 24:

[0155]

[0156] The transmitting device can determine the eavesdropping rate of historical target data in the uplink according to formula 24, which is expressed by formula 25:

[0157]

[0158] In one or more embodiments, since the confidentiality rate of the historical target data of the uplink can be determined according to the above formula 23, when the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted by the transmitting device tends to infinity, there is no difference between the third SINR of the fourth signal of the legitimate receiving device and the fourth SINR of the fourth signal of the illegitimate receiving device. Therefore, when the value of the matching parameter is 1 / 2, it is convenient to improve the confidentiality of the target data of the uplink according to the matching parameter.

[0159] In one or more embodiments, when the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted by the transmitting device does not tend to infinity, the transmitting device can determine the matching parameters based on the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving devices, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving devices, the first region, and the distance between the legitimate receiving devices and the transmitting device, thereby maximizing the confidentiality of the historical target data in the uplink. Specifically, assume the difference in the number of antennas is δ1 = MN, where M is the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving devices and N is the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving devices. The distance difference is δ2 = d AB -d EB d AB The distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device and d EB This is the first area between an unauthorized receiving device and a transmitting device.

[0160] If the influence of δ1 on the matching parameter is greater than that of δ2, then the matching parameter is determined based on δ1. If the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device is greater than the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, it indicates that the third signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SNR) of the legitimate receiving device is greater than the fourth SNR of the illegitimate receiving device. In order to maximize the confidentiality of historical target data in the uplink, the matching parameter must satisfy 1 > α. k >1 / 2. If the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device is less than the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, it means that the third signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SNR) of the legitimate receiving device is less than the fourth SNR of the illegitimate receiving device, when the matching parameter α k When the range is (0, 1 / 2), it is convenient to improve the confidentiality of the target data in the uplink according to the matching parameters.

[0161] If the influence of δ1 on the matching parameter is less than that of δ2, then the matching parameter is determined based on δ2. If the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device is greater than that of the first region, it indicates that the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device is greater than that between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device. In order to maximize the confidentiality rate of the historical target data in the uplink, the matching parameter α... kWithin the range (0, 1 / 2). If the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device is less than the first region, it indicates that the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device is closer than the distance between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, when the ratio parameter satisfies 1 > α. k When the ratio is greater than 1 / 2, it is easier to improve the confidentiality of the target data in the uplink according to the ratio parameters.

[0162] The third scenario

[0163] In one or more embodiments, it is assumed that the state of the historical channel state information satisfies a second condition, wherein the second condition is that the state of the uplink channel state information of the transmitting device is imperfect, and the transmitting device knows the location information of the illegitimate receiving device. To determine the confidentiality of the uplink historical target data, it is necessary to first determine the secure rate and the eavesdropping rate of the uplink historical target data. The following describes how to determine the secure rate of the uplink historical target data.

[0164] Since the historical channel state information is imperfect, it indicates that the legitimate receiving device possesses imperfect channel state information, leading to errors in channel estimation. The vector of the fourth signal received by the legitimate receiving device via the uplink is... The fourth signal vector received by an illegitimate receiving device via the uplink is The vector expression for the fourth signal can be represented by expression 26:

[0165]

[0166] in, and

[0167] The scalar of the fourth signal obtained by a legitimate receiving device after performing coherent signal detection is: The scalar of the fourth signal obtained by the illegitimate receiving device after coherent signal detection is: The scalar expression for the fourth signal can be represented by expression 27:

[0168]

[0169] in and Defined respectively and The kth column; and They are respectively represented as and The i-th column. Furthermore, based on the characteristics of the zero-forcing (ZF) detection algorithm, there exists...

[0170] The confidentiality rate of historical target data in the uplink can be determined based on the security rate and eavesdropping rate of historical target data in the uplink, and can be expressed by formula 28:

[0171] In this case, the safe rate can be expressed as in and They are respectively:

[0172]

[0173] If the transmission power of the pilot signal for historical uplink data satisfies the third condition, where the transmission power of the pilot signal for historical data to be transmitted tends to infinity, then the ratio parameter is 1 / 2, thereby maximizing the confidentiality rate of historical target data in the uplink.

[0174] If the transmission power of the pilot signal for the historical data to be transmitted does not meet the third condition, the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, the uplink data, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device. This facilitates the subsequent improvement of the confidentiality of the target data in the uplink based on the matching parameters.

[0175] Fourth case

[0176] In one or more embodiments, it is assumed that the state of the uplink historical channel state information of the transmitting device does not meet the first condition, and the transmitting device is unaware of the location of the illegitimate receiving device. To determine the confidentiality of the uplink historical target data, it is necessary to first determine the secure rate and the eavesdropping rate of the uplink historical target data. The secure rate of the uplink historical target data can be determined according to the method of one of the above embodiments. The following describes how to determine the eavesdropping rate of the uplink historical target data.

[0177] Since the transmitting device is unaware of the location of the illegitimate receiving devices, assuming that the illegitimate receiving devices are uniformly distributed within the first area, the eavesdropping rate of historical target data in the uplink can be expressed by Equation 29:

[0178]

[0179] Among them, due to and It's a multi-integral system; you need to obtain it. The closed expression is not feasible, therefore. By deriving Equation 29 using Equation 30 below, we can obtain Equation 31, the expression for the eavesdropping rate of historical target data in the uplink.

[0180]

[0181]

[0182] The confidentiality rate of historical target data in the uplink can be determined based on the security rate and eavesdropping rate of historical target data in the uplink, which can be expressed by formula 32:

[0183]

[0184] The allocation of power between the transmitting device and the historical target data and interference data according to the ratio parameters can be expressed by formula 33:

[0185]

[0186] The transmitting device can improve the confidentiality of the target data in the uplink by adjusting the ratio parameters.

[0187] Based on the same technical concept described above, one or more embodiments further provide an uplink encrypted transmission device, which can perform the methods described in the above method embodiments. The structure of the uplink encrypted transmission device provided in one or more embodiments can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 5 The device 500 includes a determining unit 501, used by the transmitting device to determine a matching parameter based on the historical transmission data of the uplink; the transmitting device determines the target data to be transmitted based on the matching parameter. A processing unit 502 is used by the transmitting device to construct the data to be transmitted based on the target data to be transmitted and the interference data; the interference data is preset in both the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device; the transmitting device transmits the data to be transmitted to the receiving device via the uplink.

[0188] In one or more embodiments, the determining unit 501 is specifically configured to determine the matching parameters based on at least one of the following information: the transmission power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, the distance between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted.

[0189] In one or more embodiments, the determining unit 501 is specifically configured to: determine the matching parameter based on the historical transmission status of the uplink, including: if the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets a first condition, the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a second condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the matching parameter is determined to be a preset value; or if the transmitting device determines that the channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the matching parameter is determined to be a preset value.

[0190] In one or more embodiments, the determining unit 501 is specifically configured to: determine the matching parameters based on the historical transmission status of the uplink, including: the transmitting device determining that the historical channel state information of the uplink satisfies a first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is unknown; the transmitting device acquiring a first area where the illegitimate receiving devices are distributed; the transmitting device determining the matching parameters based on the first area, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving devices, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving devices, and the distance between the legitimate receiving devices and the transmitting device.

[0191] In one or more embodiments, the determining unit 501 is specifically configured to determine the matching parameters when the transmitting device determines that the channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted does not meet the third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known; the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device.

[0192] Based on the same technical concept described above, one or more embodiments further provide an uplink encrypted transmission device, which can perform the methods described in the above method embodiments. The structure of the uplink encrypted transmission device provided in one or more embodiments can be found in [reference needed]. Figure 6 The device 600 includes a determining unit 601, used to receive data to be transmitted from a transmitting device via an uplink. A processing unit 602 is used by the receiving device to determine target data from the data to be transmitted based on the matching parameters and interference data; the interference data is preset in both the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device.

[0193] In one or more embodiments, the matching parameter can be determined in one of the following ways: Method 1: The transmitting device determines the matching parameter based on at least one of the following information: the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, the distance between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted. Method 2: The transmitting device determines the matching parameter based on the historical transmission situation of the uplink, including: if the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets a first condition, the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a second condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the matching parameter is determined to be a preset value; or if the transmitting device determines that the channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets a third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the matching parameter is determined to be a preset value. Method 3: The transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets a first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is unknown; the transmitting device acquires a first area where the illegitimate receiving device is distributed; the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the first area, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device. Method 4: The transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted does not meet a third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known; the transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device.

[0194] Based on the same technical concept, embodiments of this application also provide a computer device, such as... Figure 7 As shown, the computer device 700 includes at least one processor 701 and a memory 702 connected to the at least one processor. In this embodiment, the specific connection medium between the processor 701 and the memory 702 is not limited. Figure 7 Taking the connection between the processor 701 and the memory 702 via a bus as an example, the bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc.

[0195] In this embodiment of the application, the memory 702 stores instructions that can be executed by at least one processor 701. By executing the instructions stored in the memory 702, at least one processor 701 can perform the steps included in the aforementioned uplink-based encrypted transmission method.

[0196] The processor 701 is the control center of the computing device, capable of connecting various parts of the device via various interfaces and lines. It performs data processing by running or executing instructions stored in the memory 702 and accessing data stored in the memory 702. In one or more embodiments, the processor 701 may include one or more processing units. The processor 701 may integrate an application processor and a modem processor. The application processor primarily handles the operating system, user interface, and applications, while the modem processor primarily handles issuing instructions. It is understood that the modem processor may not be integrated into the processor 701. In some embodiments, the processor 701 and the memory 702 may be implemented on the same chip; in other embodiments, they may be implemented on separate chips.

[0197] The processor 701 can be a general-purpose processor, such as a central processing unit (CPU), digital signal processor, application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), field-programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, or discrete hardware component, capable of implementing or executing the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of this application. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the methods disclosed in the embodiments of the uplink encrypted transmission method can be directly manifested as being executed by a hardware processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules within the processor.

[0198] Memory 702, as a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store non-volatile software programs, non-volatile computer-executable programs, and modules. Memory 702 may include at least one type of storage medium, such as flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory, random access memory (RAM), static random access memory (SRAM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), magnetic storage, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc. Memory 702 can be any other medium capable of carrying or storing desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures that can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto. In the embodiments of this application, memory 702 can also be a circuit or any other device capable of implementing storage functions for storing program instructions and / or data.

[0199] Based on the same technical concept, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program executable by a computing device, which, when run on the computing device, causes the computing device to perform the steps of the above-described uplink encrypted transmission method.

[0200] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of this application can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, this application can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, this application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0201] This application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to this application. It should be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart illustrations. Figure 1One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0202] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0203] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0204] Although preferred embodiments of this application have been described, those skilled in the art, upon learning the basic inventive concept, can make other changes and modifications to these embodiments. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments as well as all changes and modifications falling within the scope of this application.

[0205] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this application without departing from the spirit and scope of this application. Therefore, if such modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this application and their equivalents, this application also intends to include such modifications and variations.

Claims

1. An encrypted transmission method for an uplink, characterized in that, Applications include scenarios where multiple sending devices transmit data to a receiving device, including: The transmitting device determines the power ratio parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink; the power ratio parameters are used to balance the power ratio between the target data to be transmitted and the interference data. The transmitting device determines the target data to be transmitted based on the ratio parameters; The transmitting device constructs the data to be transmitted based on the target data to be transmitted and the interference data; the interference data is preset in both the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device. The transmitting device sends the data to be transmitted to the receiving device via the uplink; The transmitting device determines the allocation parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: When the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets the first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is unknown, the transmitting device obtains the first area where the illegitimate receiving device is distributed. The transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on the first region, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The transmitting device determines the matching parameters based on at least one of the following information: the transmission power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted, the distance between the illegitimate receiving device and the transmitting device, and the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted.

3. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The transmitting device determines the allocation parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: If the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets the first condition, the signal-to-noise ratio of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets the second condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then it determines that the matching parameter is a preset value; or If the transmitting device determines that the channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted in the uplink meets the third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, then the matching parameter is determined to be a preset value.

4. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The transmitting device determines the allocation parameters based on the historical transmission data of the uplink, including: When the transmitting device determines that the historical channel state information of the uplink does not meet the first condition, the transmit power of the pilot signal of the historical data to be transmitted does not meet the third condition, and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is known, the transmitting device determines the matching parameter based on the location information of the illegitimate receiving device, the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device.

5. An uplink encrypted transmission method, characterized in that, Applications include scenarios where multiple sending devices transmit data to a receiving device, including: The receiving device receives the data to be transmitted from the transmitting device via the uplink; The receiving device determines the target data from the data to be transmitted based on the matching parameters and interference data; the interference data is preset in the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device respectively; the matching parameters are determined by the transmitting device when the historical channel state information of the uplink meets the first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving devices is unknown; the transmitting device obtains a first area where the illegitimate receiving devices are distributed; the transmitting device determines the data based on the first area, the historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving devices, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving devices, and the distance between the legitimate receiving devices and the transmitting device.

6. The method as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The proportioning parameters are determined using the method described in any one of claims 2-4.

7. An uplink encrypted transmission device, characterized in that, Applications include scenarios where multiple sending devices transmit data to a receiving device, including: A determining unit is used for the transmitting device to determine a matching parameter based on the historical transmission data of the uplink; the matching parameter is used to match the power ratio between the target data to be transmitted and the interference data; the transmitting device determines the target data to be transmitted based on the matching parameter; The processing unit is configured to: the transmitting device constructs data to be transmitted based on the target data to be transmitted and the interference data; the interference data is preset in both the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device; the transmitting device transmits the data to be transmitted to the receiving device via the uplink. The determining unit is further configured to: when the historical channel state information of the uplink satisfies the first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is unknown, obtain a first area where the illegitimate receiving device is distributed; and determine the matching parameter based on the first area, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device.

8. An uplink encrypted transmission device, characterized in that, include: The determining unit is used for receiving data to be transmitted from the transmitting device via the uplink; The processing unit is used by the receiving device to determine the target data from the data to be transmitted based on the matching parameters and interference data; the interference data is preset in the transmitting device and the legitimate receiving device respectively; The matching parameter is determined by the transmitting device when it is determined that the historical channel state information of the uplink meets the first condition and the location information of the illegitimate receiving device is unknown; the transmitting device obtains the first area where the illegitimate receiving device is distributed; The transmitting device is determined based on the first region, historical data to be transmitted, the number of antennas of the legitimate receiving device, the number of antennas of the illegitimate receiving device, and the distance between the legitimate receiving device and the transmitting device.

9. A computer device, characterized in that, The method includes at least one processor and at least one memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program that, when executed by the processor, causes the processor to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The storage medium stores a program that, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

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