Quantum secure communication system wavelength division multiplexer vulnerability detection device and method

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of quantum secure communication system wave division multiplexer's vulnerability detection device and method, the vulnerability detection device of sending end wave division multiplexer includes first attack module, first spectrometer one, first spectrometer two, first spectrometer three, first beam splitter one, first beam splitter two, first beam splitter three, first isolator one, first isolator two, first tunable laser one, first tunable laser two;The vulnerability detection device of receiving end wave division multiplexer, including second attack module, second spectrometer one, second spectrometer two, second spectrometer three, second beam splitter, second tunable laser.The application can determine whether wave division multiplexer exists vulnerability, simultaneously can identify whether commercial QKD system equipped with wave division multiplexer can resist laser damage attack.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application belongs to the technical field of quantum secure communication, and particularly relates to a vulnerability detection method and device for a wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system. BACKGROUND

[0002] With the rapid development of information technology, communication has become an essential part of our lives. Therefore, how to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of transmitted data has become the focus of information security technology research. In today's classical encryption system, the RSA algorithm based on asymmetric encryption is widely used. The security of this algorithm is based on the mathematical assumption of large number prime factorization. However, with the development of quantum information technology, in 1994, Professor Peter Shor of MIT invented a Shor algorithm, which proved that when a practical quantum computer is invented, the RSA encryption algorithm will be cracked in polynomial time by a new computing paradigm called quantum computing.

[0003] In order to cope with this challenge, quantum key distribution (QKD) has emerged, providing a revolutionary new method for secure and confidential communication. With the rapid development of QKD technology, quantum secure communication has gradually begun to be practical. However, due to the imperfection of devices in practice, it is a long process to achieve an unattackable QKD system. Although a variety of QKD protocols have been proven to be unconditionally secure in information theory, due to the differences between physical devices in actual QKD and the model assumed by ideal QKD protocols, researchers have found that physical defects in actual QKD systems can lead to information leakage. Or the attacker can also change the running state of the QKD system by injecting attack light to actively create exploitable vulnerabilities to attack and steal keys.

[0004] In 2014, Audun Nystad Bugge et al. proposed a new type of attack against actual QKD systems - laser damage attack. The basic attack idea of this type of attack is that the eavesdropper Eve injects strong laser light into a device used to implement an actual QKD system through a quantum channel, observes the temporary or permanent changes in the core performance indicators of the device by changing the intensity and injection time of the laser light injected into the device, and then finds out the security vulnerabilities that can be exploited for attack from these changes, thereby successfully stealing the keys without exposing himself.

[0005] In the previous laser damage attack test, the researchers respectively carried out laser damage attack test on avalanche photodiode detector, optical attenuator, optical isolator and optical circulator and other devices commonly used in general QKD system, and found the actual vulnerability of these devices under laser damage attack, and closed the corresponding security vulnerabilities. For QKD system, in addition to the commonly used devices and equipment mentioned above, a kind of intermediate transmission device-wavelength division multiplexer (WDM) is usually used. However, the actual security of this kind of device under laser damage attack has not been strictly tested. Therefore, according to the different use scenarios of wavelength division multiplexer in QKD system, we designed laser damage attack schemes for wavelength division multiplexer of QKD system sending end and receiving end respectively by simulating the behavior of eavesdropper Eve to explore the robustness of wavelength division multiplexer under laser damage attack, and designed the following detection methods. Detection method one, Eve uses continuous light of different power to irradiate the wavelength division multiplexer, and observes the real-time spectrum change of the wavelength division multiplexer under different power continuous light to determine whether there is an exploitable vulnerability. Detection method two, first pre-calibrate the isolation of each port of the wavelength division multiplexer, and then compare the actual isolation of each port of the wavelength division multiplexer when Eve uses continuous light of different power to attack with the pre-calibrated isolation to determine whether there is a vulnerability. SUMMARY

[0006] The purpose of the application is to detect the security vulnerabilities of the wavelength division multiplexer in the quantum secure communication system.

[0007] Technical scheme: In order to achieve the above purpose, the technical scheme adopted by the application is:

[0008] A vulnerability detection device for a wavelength division multiplexer of a sending end of a quantum secure communication system, comprising a first attack module, a first spectrometer one, a first spectrometer two, a first spectrometer three, a first beam splitter one, a first beam splitter two, a first beam splitter three, a first isolator one, a first isolator two, a first tunable laser one, and a first tunable laser two, wherein:

[0009] One side of the first beam splitter one is provided with two optical paths, namely first optical path one and first optical path two, the first optical path one is connected with the first attack module, and the first optical path two is connected with the first spectrometer one. The other side of the first beam splitter one is provided with a first optical path three, which is used to connect with the Com port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer.

[0010] The first beam splitter two is provided with two light paths on one side, which are first light path two one and first light path two two, and the first light path two one is used for connecting with the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer, and the first light path two two is connected with the first optical spectrum analyzer two.

[0011] The first beam splitter three is provided with two light paths on one side, which are first light path three one and first light path three two, and the first light path three one is used for connecting with the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer, and the first light path three two is connected with the first optical spectrum analyzer three. The other side of the first beam splitter three is provided with the first light path three three, and the first light path three three is connected with the first tunable laser one through the first isolator one.

[0012] Preferably, the first watchdog is connected with the first light path one one, the first light path one three and the first attack module respectively.

[0013] A vulnerability detection method of a sending end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, comprising the following steps:

[0014] S101, the first tunable laser two is turned on, and the first tunable laser one is turned off. The spectral conditions of the Com port and the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer under the tested wavelength when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally are calibrated through the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer two. At this time, the spectra recorded by the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer two are used to calculate the isolation degree of the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally.

[0015] S102, the first tunable laser one is turned on, and the first tunable laser two is turned off. The spectral conditions of the Com port and the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer under the tested wavelength when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally are calibrated through the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer three. At this time, the spectra recorded by the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer three are used to calculate the isolation degree of the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally.

[0016] S103, the first tunable laser one and the first tunable laser two are turned on at the same time. The first tunable laser two outputs quantum light and classical light output by the sending end Alice through the first isolator two and the first beam splitter two, the first tunable laser one outputs quantum light and classical light output by the sending end Alice through the first isolator one and the first beam splitter three, the eavesdropper Eve injects laser with different powers into the Com port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer through the first beam splitter one to attack, and the change of the real-time spectrum of the Com port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer is observed through the first optical spectrum analyzer one. At this time, the first optical spectrum analyzer one is used to monitor whether the filtering characteristics of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer change greatly.

[0017] S104, turn off the first tunable laser, set the Pass port of the transmitter WDM to wavelength progressive output, and calibrate the spectrum of the Com port and the Pass port of the transmitter WDM at the tested wavelength when the transmitter WDM is attacked by Eve with different laser powers through the first spectrometer I and the second spectrometer I. At this time, the spectrum recorded by the first spectrometer I and the second spectrometer I is used to calculate the isolation of the Pass port of the transmitter WDM when it is attacked by Eve.

[0018] S105, turn off the first tunable laser, set the Ref port of the transmitter WDM to wavelength progressive output, and calibrate the spectrum of the Com port and the Ref port of the transmitter WDM at the tested wavelength when the transmitter WDM is attacked by Eve with different laser powers through the first spectrometer I and the third spectrometer I. At this time, the spectrum recorded by the first spectrometer I and the third spectrometer I is used to calculate the isolation of the Ref port of the transmitter WDM when it is attacked by Eve.

[0019] Preferably, according to the spectrum data recorded by the first spectrometer I, the second spectrometer I, and the third spectrometer I, the changes in the isolation of each port of the transmitter WDM when it is normally working and when it is attacked by Eve are compared. The robustness of the transmitter WDM under different power laser attacks is determined according to the comparison of the isolation.

[0020] Preferably, the first watchdog is used to detect whether the optical fiber is fused. When the optical fiber is fused, it will be detected by the first watchdog detector. The first watchdog then sends a warning message to Eve, and Eve immediately closes the first attack module after receiving the warning message.

[0021] A vulnerability detection device for a receiver WDM of a quantum secure communication system, comprising a second attack module, a second spectrometer I, a second spectrometer II, a second spectrometer III, a second beam splitter, and a second tunable laser, wherein:

[0022] One side of the second beam splitter is provided with two optical paths, namely a second optical path I and a second optical path II, the second optical path I is connected with the second attack module, and the second optical path II is connected with the second tunable laser. The other side of the second beam splitter has two optical paths, namely a second optical path III and a second optical path IV, the second optical path III is used to be connected with the Com port of the receiver WDM, and the second optical path IV is connected with the second spectrometer I.

[0023] The second spectrometer II is used to be connected with the Pass port of the receiver WDM, and the second spectrometer III is used to be connected with the Ref port of the receiver WDM.

[0024] Preferably, a second watchdog is connected with the second optical path one, the second optical path three and the second attack module respectively.

[0025] A vulnerability detection method of a receiving end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, comprising the following steps:

[0026] S201, turn on the second tunable laser. The Com port, the Pass port and the Ref port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer under normal working condition are calibrated by the second spectrometer one, the second spectrometer two and the second spectrometer three at the tested wavelength. At this time, the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and the second spectrometer two are used to calculate the isolation degree of the Pass port under normal working condition of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer, and the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and the second spectrometer three are used to calculate the isolation degree of the Ref port under normal working condition of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer.

[0027] S202, the eavesdropper Eve attacks the Com port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer by injecting laser with different powers through the second beam splitter, and the real-time spectrum changes of the Pass port and the Ref port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer are observed by the second spectrometer two and the second spectrometer three. At this time, the second spectrometer two and the second spectrometer three are used to monitor whether the filtering characteristics of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer change greatly.

[0028] S203, turn on the second tunable laser. The Com port, the Pass port and the Ref port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer under the attack of the eavesdropper Eve with laser with different powers are recorded by the second spectrometer one, the second spectrometer two and the second spectrometer three at the tested wavelength. At this time, the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and the second spectrometer two are used to calculate the isolation degree of the Pass port under the attack of the eavesdropper Eve, and the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and the second spectrometer three are used to calculate the isolation degree of the Ref port under the attack of the eavesdropper Eve.

[0029] Preferably, according to the spectrum data recorded by the second spectrometer one, the second spectrometer two and the second spectrometer three, the isolation degree changes of each port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer under normal working condition and under the attack of the eavesdropper Eve are compared. The robustness of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer under the attack of laser with different powers is judged according to the comparison of the isolation degrees.

[0030] Preferably, the second watchdog is used to detect whether the optical fiber is fused, and the second watchdog detector can detect the fusion of the optical fiber. The second watchdog sends a warning message to the eavesdropper Eve, and the eavesdropper Eve closes the second attack module immediately after receiving the warning message.

[0031] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following beneficial effects:

[0032] The present application analyzes the real-time spectrum and isolation of the wavelength division multiplexer according to the different use scenarios of the wavelength division multiplexer in the QKD system, and determines whether the wavelength division multiplexer has a vulnerability according to the comparison between the spectrum when the wavelength division multiplexer is normally working and the spectrum when the wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by Eve. The present application can identify whether the commercial QKD system equipped with the wavelength division multiplexer can resist the laser damage attack. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0033] Figure 1 The figure is a structural schematic diagram of a vulnerability detection device for a sending-end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system.

[0034] Figure 2 The figure is a structural schematic diagram of a vulnerability detection device for a receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0035] The present application will be further illustrated below in combination with the drawings and specific embodiments, and it should be understood that these examples are only used to illustrate the present application and not used to limit the scope of the present application, and after reading the present application, various equivalent modifications of the present application by those skilled in the art all fall within the scope defined by the claims attached hereto.

[0036] A vulnerability detection device for a sending-end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, as shown in the figure, comprises a first attack module, a first spectrometer one, a first spectrometer two, a first spectrometer three, a first beam splitter one, a first beam splitter two, a first beam splitter three, a first isolator one, a first isolator two, a first tunable laser one, and a first tunable laser two. Figure 1 The ratio of the optical beam splitter connected to the Pass port and the Ref port is 90:10, that is, the ratio of the first beam splitter two and the first beam splitter three is 90:10, and the ratio of the optical beam splitter connected to the Com port is 99:1, that is, the ratio of the first beam splitter one is 99:1. The laser power of the first attack module can not be limited, that is, the laser power injected by Eve can not be limited; wherein:

[0037] The first beam splitter one is provided with two optical paths on one side, that is, a first optical path one and a first optical path two, the first optical path one is connected with the first attack module, and the first optical path two is connected with the first spectrometer one. The other side of the first beam splitter one is provided with a first optical path three, which is used to be connected with the Com port of the sending-end wavelength division multiplexer.

[0038] The first beam splitter two is provided with two light paths on one side, which are first light path two one and first light path two two, the first light path two one is used for connecting with the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer, and the first light path two two is connected with the first optical spectrum analyzer two. The other side of the first beam splitter two is provided with the first light path two two, and the first light path two two is connected with the first tunable laser two through the first isolator two.

[0039] The first beam splitter three is provided with two light paths on one side, which are first light path three one and first light path three two, the first light path three one is used for connecting with the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer, and the first light path three two is connected with the first optical spectrum analyzer three. The other side of the first beam splitter three is provided with the first light path three three, and the first light path three three is connected with the first tunable laser one through the first isolator one.

[0040] The optical isolator plays an isolation role, prevents the strong power laser output by Eve from damaging the tunable laser used to simulate the Alice end output, and the optical spectrum analyzer is used to monitor whether the filtering characteristic of the wavelength division multiplexer changes greatly in real time. The isolator is used to protect the tunable laser, and avoid the laser of Eve from entering the laser to damage the equipment.

[0041] The first watchdog is connected with the first light path one one, the first light path one three and the first attack module respectively.

[0042] A vulnerability detection method of a sending end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, comprising the following steps:

[0043] S101, the first tunable laser two is started, and the first tunable laser one is closed. The spectral conditions of the Com port and the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer under the tested wavelength when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally are calibrated through the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer two. At this time, the spectrum recorded by the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer two is used to calculate the isolation degree of the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally.

[0044] S102, the first tunable laser one is started, and the first tunable laser two is closed. The spectral conditions of the Com port and the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer under the tested wavelength when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally are calibrated through the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer three. At this time, the spectrum recorded by the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer three is used to calculate the isolation degree of the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer works normally.

[0045] S103, simultaneously turn on the first tunable laser one and the first tunable laser two. The first tunable laser two outputs quantum light and classical light used to simulate the output of the sending end Alice through the first isolator two and the first beam splitter two, and the first tunable laser one outputs quantum light and classical light used to simulate the output of the sending end Alice through the first isolator one and the first beam splitter three. The eavesdropping end Eve injects laser with different powers into the sending end wavelength division multiplexer Com port through the first beam splitter one to attack, and observes the real-time spectrum change of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer Com port through the first optical spectrum analyzer one. At this time, the first optical spectrum analyzer one is used to monitor whether the filtering characteristics of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer change greatly.

[0046] S104, turn off the first tunable laser one, set the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer to wavelength progressive output, and calibrate the spectrum of the Com port and the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer under the tested wavelength when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by the eavesdropping end Eve with different laser powers through the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer two. At this time, the spectrum recorded by the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer two is used to calculate the isolation degree of the Pass port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer when it is attacked by the eavesdropping end Eve.

[0047] S105, turn off the first tunable laser two, set the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer to wavelength progressive output, and calibrate the spectrum of the Com port and the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer under the tested wavelength when the sending end wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by the eavesdropping end Eve with different laser powers through the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer three. At this time, the spectrum recorded by the first optical spectrum analyzer one and the first optical spectrum analyzer three is used to calculate the isolation degree of the Ref port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer when it is attacked by the eavesdropping end Eve.

[0048] S106, detect whether the optical fiber is fused by the first watchdog. When the optical fiber is fused, it will be detected by the first watchdog detector. The first watchdog then sends a warning message to the eavesdropping end Eve, and the eavesdropping end Eve closes the first attack module immediately after receiving the warning message.

[0049] S107, compare the change of the isolation degree of each port of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer when it is normally working and when it is attacked by the eavesdropping end Eve according to the spectrum data recorded by the first optical spectrum analyzer one, the first optical spectrum analyzer two and the first optical spectrum analyzer three. The robustness of the sending end wavelength division multiplexer under different power laser attacks is judged according to the comparison of the isolation degrees.

[0050] Result analysis: record the spectrum recorded by the three optical spectrum analyzers into a computer and analyze the spectrum data. Whether the wavelength division multiplexer has a vulnerability is judged according to the change of the real-time spectrum and the isolation degree of each port when the wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by Eve.

[0051] Specific detection method one: Eve uses different power continuous light to irradiate the wavelength division multiplexer, to observe the real-time spectrum change of the wavelength division multiplexer under different power continuous light, the specific steps are as follows:

[0052] Step one: set the wavelength of the Pass port tunable laser to 1550.12nm, set the wavelength of the Ref port tunable laser to 1569.69nm to simulate quantum light and classical light, and set the output power of Eve's high-power laser to 10% of the maximum output power.

[0053] Step two: turn on the high-power laser, irradiate the wavelength division multiplexer through the Com port of the wavelength division multiplexer for five minutes, and record the real-time spectrum of the Com port every 0.5s through the spectrometer 1.

[0054] Step three: if the real-time spectrum of the Com port of the wavelength division multiplexer does not change significantly, increase the output power of the high-power laser by 10%, and repeat step two until the output power of the high-power laser reaches the maximum or the filter characteristic of the wavelength division multiplexer changes significantly.

[0055] Through detection method one, we can test whether the filter characteristic of the wavelength division multiplexer changes under laser damage attack. If the filter characteristic of the wavelength division multiplexer does not change significantly, Eve can further compare the actual isolation of each port of the wavelength division multiplexer when Eve uses different power continuous light to attack with the pre-calibrated isolation through detection method two to determine whether there is a vulnerability.

[0056] The specific steps of detection method two are as follows:

[0057] Step one: turn on the Pass port tunable laser and Eve's high-power laser, turn off the Ref port tunable laser, and set the output power of the high-power laser to 10% of the maximum output power.

[0058] Step two: record the real-time spectrum of the Com port and the Pass port under the current power using the spectrometer 1 and the spectrometer 2.

[0059] Step three: increase the output of the high-power laser by 10% and repeat step two until the output power of the high-power laser is maximum.

[0060] Step four: analyze and calculate the isolation of each port of the wavelength division multiplexer when it is working normally and when it is attacked by Eve with different power continuous light according to the recorded spectrum, and compare them.

[0061] Step five: turn on the Ref-port tunable laser and Eve's high-power laser, turn off the Pass-port tunable laser, test the Ref-port according to the method of testing the Pass-port isolation and make a comparison.

[0062] If the isolation of each port is significantly reduced when attacked by Eve, it is considered that the commercial wavelength division multiplexer has a vulnerability.

[0063] A vulnerability detection device of a receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, as shown in the accompanying drawings, comprises a second attack module, a second spectrometer one, a second spectrometer two, a second spectrometer three, a second beam splitter, and a second tunable laser. Figure 2

[0064] One side of the second beam splitter is provided with two optical paths, namely a second optical path one and a second optical path two, the second optical path one is connected with the second attack module, and the second optical path two is connected with the second tunable laser. The other side of the second beam splitter has two optical paths, namely a second optical path three and a second optical path four, the second optical path three is used to be connected with a Com port of the receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer, and the second optical path four is connected with the second spectrometer one.

[0065] The second spectrometer two is used to be connected with a Pass port of the receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer, and the second spectrometer three is used to be connected with a Ref port of the receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer.

[0066] The second watchdog is connected with the second optical path one, the second optical path three, and the second attack module.

[0067] A vulnerability detection method of a receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, comprising the following steps:

[0068] S201, turn on the second tunable laser. The spectra of the Com port, the Pass port, and the Ref port of the receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer under the tested wavelength when working normally are calibrated by the second spectrometer one, the second spectrometer two, and the second spectrometer three. At this time, the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and the second spectrometer two are used to calculate the isolation of the Pass port when the receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer works normally, and the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and the second spectrometer three are used to calculate the isolation of the Ref port when the receiving-end wavelength division multiplexer works normally.

[0069] ​S202, the eavesdropping end Eve injects laser with different power into the Com port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer through the second beam splitter, and the real-time spectrum changes of the Pass port and the Ref port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer are observed through the second optical spectrum analyzer two and the second optical spectrum analyzer three. At this time, the second optical spectrum analyzer two and the second optical spectrum analyzer three are used to monitor whether the filtering characteristics of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer change greatly.

[0070] S203, the second tunable laser is started. The spectra of the Com port, the Pass port and the Ref port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer under the test wavelength when the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by the eavesdropping end Eve with laser with different power are recorded through the second optical spectrum analyzer one, the second optical spectrum analyzer two and the second optical spectrum analyzer three. At this time, the spectra recorded by the second optical spectrum analyzer one and the second optical spectrum analyzer two are used to calculate the isolation of the Pass port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer when the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by Eve, and the spectra recorded by the second optical spectrum analyzer one and the second optical spectrum analyzer three are used to calculate the isolation of the Ref port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer when the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by Eve.

[0071] S204, whether the optical fiber is fused is detected through the second watchdog, and when the optical fiber is fused, the second watchdog detector can detect it. The second watchdog sends a warning message to the eavesdropping end Eve, and the eavesdropping end Eve closes the second attack module immediately after receiving the warning message.

[0072] S205, according to the spectrum data recorded by the second optical spectrum analyzer one, the second optical spectrum analyzer two and the second optical spectrum analyzer three, the isolation changes of each port of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer when the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer is normally operated and attacked by the eavesdropping end Eve are compared. According to the comparison of the isolation, the robustness of the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer under the attack of laser with different power is judged.

[0073] Result analysis: the spectra recorded by the three optical spectrum analyzers are input into a computer, and the spectrum data is analyzed. According to the analysis of the real-time spectrum and the isolation changes of each port when the wavelength division multiplexer is attacked by Eve, whether the wavelength division multiplexer has a vulnerability is judged.

[0074] According to the different use scenarios of the wavelength division multiplexer at the sending end and the receiving end in the quantum secure communication system, the application simulates the behavior of the eavesdropper Eve, and respectively introduces an attack device suitable for the sending end wavelength division multiplexer and an attack device suitable for the receiving end wavelength division multiplexer in the quantum channel of the legal communication parties.

[0075] The above only describes the preferred embodiments of the application, and it should be pointed out that, for ordinary skilled in the art, without departing from the principles of the application, a number of improvements and refinements can be made, and these improvements and refinements should also be regarded as the protection scope of the application.

Claims

1. A vulnerability detection method for a transmitter wavelength division multiplexer in a quantum secure communication system, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S101, turn on the first tunable laser II and turn off the first tunable laser I; calibrate the spectral characteristics of the Com port and Pass port at the test wavelength when the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer is working normally using the first spectrometer I and the first spectrometer II; at this time, the spectra recorded by the first spectrometer I and the first spectrometer II are used to determine the isolation of the Pass port when the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer is working normally. S102, turn on the first tunable laser and turn off the first tunable laser; calibrate the spectrum of the Com port and Ref port at the test wavelength when the transmitter wavelength division multiplexer is working normally using the first spectrometer and the first spectrometer; at this time, the spectra recorded by the first spectrometer and the first spectrometer are used to determine the isolation of the Ref port when the transmitter wavelength division multiplexer is working normally. S103, simultaneously turn on the first tunable laser I and the first tunable laser II; the output of the first tunable laser II after passing through the first isolator II and the first beam splitter II is used to simulate the quantum light and classical light output by the transmitting end Alice; the output of the first tunable laser I after passing through the first isolator I and the first beam splitter III is used to simulate the quantum light and classical light output by the transmitting end Alice; the eavesdropping end Eve injects lasers of different powers into the Com port of the transmitting end wavelength division multiplexer through the first beam splitter I to launch an attack; and observes the real-time spectral changes of the Com port of the transmitting end wavelength division multiplexer through the first spectrometer I. S104, turn off the first tunable laser, set the Pass port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer to wavelength progressive output, and calibrate the spectral characteristics of the Com port and Pass port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer at the test wavelength when attacked by Eve with different laser powers; at this time, the spectra recorded by the first spectrometer and the first spectrometer are used to determine the isolation of the Pass port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer when attacked by Eve. S105, turn off the first tunable laser 2, set the Ref port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer to wavelength progressive output, and calibrate the spectral characteristics of the Com port and Ref port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer at the test wavelength when attacked by Eve at the eavesdropping end with different laser powers using the first spectrometer 1 and the first spectrometer 3. At this time, the spectra recorded by the first spectrometer 1 and the first spectrometer 3 are used to determine the isolation of the Ref port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer when attacked by Eve at the eavesdropping end.

2. The vulnerability detection method for the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 1, characterized in that: Based on the spectral data recorded by the first spectrometer, the first spectrometer, and the first spectrometer, the changes in the isolation of each port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer are compared between normal operation and when attacked by the eavesdropping end, Eve. The robustness of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer under different power laser attacks is judged based on the comparison of isolation.

3. The vulnerability detection method for the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 2, characterized in that: The first watchdog timer detects whether the optical fiber is broken. When the optical fiber is broken, it will be detected by the first watchdog timer. The first watchdog timer then sends a warning message to the eavesdropping end Eve. After receiving the warning message, the eavesdropping end Eve immediately shuts down the first attack module.

4. A vulnerability detection device for the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, characterized in that: The vulnerability detection method for the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 1 includes a first attack module, a first spectrometer one, a first spectrometer two, a first spectrometer three, a first beam splitter one, a first beam splitter two, a first beam splitter three, a first isolator one, a first isolator two, a first tunable laser one, and a first tunable laser two, wherein: Two optical paths are provided on one side of the first beam splitter, namely the first optical path 11 and the first optical path 12. The first optical path 11 is connected to the first attack module, and the first optical path 12 is connected to the first spectrometer 1. The first optical path 13 is provided on the other side of the first beam splitter, and the first optical path 13 is used to connect to the Com port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer. Two optical paths are provided on one side of the first beam splitter, namely the first optical path 21 and the first optical path 22. The first optical path 21 is used to connect to the Pass port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer, and the first optical path 22 is connected to the first spectrometer 2. The first optical path 22 is provided on the other side of the first beam splitter, and the first optical path 22 is connected to the first tunable laser 2 through the first isolator 2. Two optical paths are provided on one side of the first beam splitter three, namely the first optical path three-one and the first optical path three-two. The first optical path three-one is used to connect to the Ref port of the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer, and the first optical path three-two is connected to the first spectrometer three. The first optical path three-three is provided on the other side of the first beam splitter three, and the first optical path three-three is connected to the first tunable laser one through the first isolator one.

5. The vulnerability detection device for the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 4, characterized in that: It includes a first watchdog, which is connected to the first optical path 11, the first optical path 13 and the first attack module.

6. A method for detecting vulnerabilities in a receiver wavelength division multiplexer of a quantum secure communication system, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S201, turn on the second tunable laser; calibrate the spectra of the Com port, Pass port, and Ref port at the test wavelength when the receiver wavelength division multiplexer is working normally using the second spectrometer one, second spectrometer two, and second spectrometer three; at this time, the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and second spectrometer two are used to determine the isolation of the Pass port when the receiver wavelength division multiplexer is working normally, and the spectra recorded by the second spectrometer one and second spectrometer three are used to determine the isolation of the Ref port when the receiver wavelength division multiplexer is working normally. S202, the eavesdropping device Eve injects lasers of different powers into the Com port of the receiving wavelength division multiplexer through the second beam splitter to attack it, and observes the real-time spectral changes of the Pass port and Ref port of the receiving wavelength division multiplexer through the second spectrometer and the second spectrometer. S203, turn on the second tunable laser; record the spectral characteristics of the Com port, Pass port, and Ref port of the receiver wavelength division multiplexer at the test wavelength when attacked by Eve with lasers of different power at the eavesdropping end using second spectrometer one, second spectrometer two, and second spectrometer three; at this time, the spectra recorded by second spectrometer one and second spectrometer two are used to determine the isolation of the Pass port of the receiver wavelength division multiplexer when attacked by Eve, and the spectra recorded by second spectrometer one and second spectrometer three are used to determine the isolation of the Ref port of the receiver wavelength division multiplexer when attacked by Eve.

7. The vulnerability detection method for the receiver wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 6, characterized in that: Based on the spectral data recorded by the second spectrometers (first, second, and third), the changes in the isolation of each port of the receiver wavelength division multiplexer (WDM) are compared between normal operation and when attacked by Eve at the eavesdropping end. The robustness of the receiver WDM under laser attacks of different power levels is then determined based on the comparison of isolation levels.

8. The vulnerability detection device for the receiver wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 7, characterized in that: The second watchdog detects whether the optical fiber is broken. When the optical fiber is broken, it will be detected by the second watchdog detector. The second watchdog then sends a warning message to the eavesdropping end Eve. After receiving the warning message, the eavesdropping end Eve immediately shuts down the second attack module.

9. A vulnerability detection device for a receiver wavelength division multiplexer in a quantum secure communication system, characterized in that: The vulnerability detection method for the transmitting wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 6 includes a second attack module, a second spectrometer one, a second spectrometer two, a second spectrometer three, a second beam splitter, and a second tunable laser, wherein: The second beam splitter has two optical paths on one side, namely the second optical path 11 and the second optical path 12. The second optical path 11 is connected to the second attack module, and the second optical path 12 is connected to the second tunable laser. The second beam splitter has two optical paths on the other side, namely the second optical path 13 and the second optical path 14. The second optical path 13 is used to connect to the Com port of the receiving wavelength division multiplexer, and the second optical path 14 is connected to the second spectrometer 1. The second spectrometer is used to connect to the Pass port of the receiving wavelength division multiplexer, and the second spectrometer is used to connect to the Ref port of the receiving wavelength division multiplexer.

10. The vulnerability detection device for the receiver wavelength division multiplexer of the quantum secure communication system according to claim 9, characterized in that: It includes a second watchdog, which is connected to the second optical path 11, the second optical path 13 and the second attack module respectively.

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