Safety identification structure for misfire state of fuze

Abstract

The application discloses a safety identification structure of a blind fire state of a fuse, and is based on a traditional fuse structure (including a first explosion element, a body and a safety release mechanism). A radial safety identification channel which is connected to a transmission channel / blast channel in a cavity of the fuse is opened on an outer contour surface of the fuse body. A flame detonator, a diaphragm and a spiral are arranged in the radial safety identification channel. The safety state of the blind fire fuse can be determined by observing whether there are traces caused by predetermined internal explosion on the diaphragm and the spiral. Accordingly, corresponding methods can be adopted to deal with unexploded ammunition, so that the explosive processing procedure of the unexploded ammunition is simplified, the efficiency is improved, and the cost is reduced under the premise of ensuring safety. The structure of the application is simple, and the general layout and structure of the existing fuse are slightly changed. The application does not need to increase the occupied space, has strong universality, is suitable for various fuses, and is good in productivity.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application belongs to the technical field of fuzes and explosive disposal, and particularly relates to a safety recognition structure for a blind fire state of a fuze. BACKGROUND

[0002] A fuze is converted from an armed state to an unarming state to complete a predetermined firing function, and there are many influencing factors, including a ballistic environment and target characteristics, so that a blind fire of the fuze is inevitable. After the blind fire of the fuze, a projectile or a warhead provided by the fuze is unexploded ammunition. In order to ensure safety in a disposal process, explosive disposal of the unexploded ammunition requires more handling equipment, and a disposal procedure is more complex, low in efficiency and high in cost.

[0003] A three-self design of the fuze, i.e., self-destruction, self-disabling and self-inactivation, is helpful to solve the safety of explosive disposal of the unexploded ammunition. A design requirement of electric firing energy dissipation of an electric fuze is already relatively systematic and perfect, and implementation is relatively easy. Self-destruction of the fuze is mostly based on a timing principle independent of a ballistic environment to ensure reliability. Self-inactivation design, including a cold fire design, is often based on different design schemes according to different principles and structures of the fuze.

[0004] In order to accelerate explosive disposal of unexploded ammunition in a training and actual combat under the premise of ensuring safety, and in addition, for a type product development process, in order to find out a blind fire failure reason of the fuze as soon as possible, it is urgently needed to make a timely and accurate judgment on a blind fire state of the blind fire fuze, i.e., whether the blind fire fuze is in a blind fire state in an unarming state or in a blind fire state due to a blind fire of a first firing explosive element in an armed state. The blind fire fuze in the former state is safe, and can be usually disassembled and disposed. The blind fire fuze in the latter state still has a safety risk of accidental firing, so that the two states are distinguished.

[0005] Only a few types of fuzes, such as submunition fuze of some submunition projectiles with a slider structure, can be judged by a direct visual recognition method, i.e., whether the fuze is in an armed state or in an unarming state, and whether the fuze is safe. Except for this, most types of fuzes are difficult to judge whether the specific state of the fuze is safe or whether the fuze can be disassembled and disposed in a relatively safe manner after the blind fire of the fuze. Of course, the safety of the electric fuze after the electric firing energy dissipation is guaranteed to a certain extent.

[0006] For low-speed projectile fuzes (such as mortar projectile fuzes, rocket projectile fuzes, missile fuzes and gun grenade fuzes) and base fuzes and body fuzes, due to a low impact force or a small forward force, a problem of the blind fire of the fuze in the armed state due to the blind fire of the first firing explosive element is more prominent. SUMMARY

[0007] The purpose of the present application is to provide a safety identification structure for a misfire state of a fuze, to realize safe, fast, convenient and accurate determination of the safety state of a misfire fuze, and to improve the efficiency and safety of handling unexploded ordnance and misfire fuzes.

[0008] The technical solution for achieving the purpose of the present application is a safety identification structure for a misfire state of a fuze, which is based on the structure of a conventional fuze (including a first explosion element, a body and a safety arming mechanism), and has a radial safety channel on the outer wall of the fuze body, which leads to a transmission channel / booster channel in the inner cavity of the fuze. The channel is a radial three-step through-hole, which gradually increases in diameter from the inside to the outside, and sequentially includes a first step hole, a second step hole and a third step hole. A flame detonator with an output end facing outward is arranged in the second step hole, and a diaphragm is arranged in the third step hole and closely adjacent to the flame detonator. The diaphragm is also used for structural sealing, and is connected and fastened with the fuze body through a spiral ring. The safety state of a misfire fuze can be determined by observing whether there are traces caused by a predetermined internal explosion on the diaphragm and the spiral ring, so that appropriate methods can be taken to handle unexploded ordnance.

[0009] Compared with the prior art, the present application has the following significant advantages:

[0010] 1. The safety state of a misfire fuze can be determined safely, quickly, conveniently and accurately, so as to improve the efficiency and safety of handling unexploded ordnance and misfire fuzes.

[0011] 2. The overall layout and structure of the existing fuze are slightly changed, and generally no additional space is occupied, which has strong universality, good producibility and low cost.

[0012] The present application will be further described in detail below in combination with the drawings and specific embodiments. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0013] Figure 1 is an axial sectional view of a safety identification structure for a misfire state of a fuze.

[0014] In the figure, 1 is a first explosion element, 2 is a body, 3 is a flame detonator, 4 is a diaphragm, 5 is a spiral ring, and 6 is a safety and arming mechanism. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0015] The present application will be further described in detail below in combination with the drawings and specific embodiments.

[0016] In combination with Figure 1The application discloses a safety identification structure of a fuze misfire state, which is based on a traditional fuze structure (including a first explosion element 1, a body 2 and a safety release mechanism 6) and is characterized in that a radial safety identification channel is formed on the outer wall of the fuze body 2 and leads to the ignition channel / propagation channel in the fuze, the safety identification channel is arranged close to the bottom of the first explosion element 1, the channel is a radial three-step through hole, the diameter of the three-step through hole gradually increases from the inside to the outside, and the three-step through hole is sequentially provided with a first step hole, a second step hole and a third step hole, wherein the second step hole is provided with a flare 3 with an output end facing outward, the third step hole is provided with a diaphragm 4 close to the output end of the flare 3, the diaphragm 4 is also used for structural sealing, and the diaphragm 4 is connected and fastened with the fuze body 2 through a coil 5. The safety state of the misfire fuze can be determined by observing whether the diaphragm 4 and the coil 5 have traces caused by predetermined internal explosion, and then corresponding methods can be adopted to deal with unexploded ammunition, so that the explosive processing procedure of the unexploded ammunition is simplified, the efficiency is improved, and the cost is reduced under the premise of ensuring safety.

[0017] The charge amount of the flare 3 is not too much, and the power is not too large, and the flare can also be a relay pipe, so that the diaphragm 4 is smoked black or cracked or broken, but no dangerous fragments are formed.

[0018] The diaphragm 4 is a circular non-metallic sheet, and the material of the non-metallic sheet is required to have the characteristics of transparency or semi-transparency, high strength, low density and good flexibility, for example, polytetrafluoroethylene.

[0019] The working principle of the safety identification structure of the fuze misfire state is as follows:

[0020] The misfire state safety recognition structure of the present application is in the same state as the factory state (assembly state) in the launching and flying state. When the fuze hits the target or target area, the first explosion element 1 acts, and the flame or detonation output therefrom is transmitted to the safety and arming mechanism 6 and also radially to the flame detonator 3. If the safety and arming mechanism 6 is disarmed as scheduled, it will act to detonate the subsequent booster and warhead with a high probability. At this time, whether the flame detonator 3 acts or not does not matter, because the fuze and its body 2 and the misfire state safety recognition structure of the present application will all be blown to pieces. If the safety and arming mechanism 6 is not disarmed by accident, the flame detonator 3 will act as scheduled to ignite, blacken or blow the diaphragm 4 or cause it to deform significantly, indicating that the first explosion element 1 of the fuze has ignited, and the safety and arming mechanism 6 of the fuze has failed to disarm. At this time, the misfire state of the fuze is safe. According to the need, the split can be carried out under certain protection to obtain detailed misfire reasons. If the first explosion element 1 fails to ignite normally, the fuze will also not ignite, entering the misfire state, at which time the diaphragm 4 and the coil 5 will not have the traces caused by the scheduled implosion. That is, if the diaphragm 4 and the coil 5 do not have the traces caused by the scheduled implosion, it can be determined with a high probability that the first explosion element 1 of the fuze has failed to ignite normally, and the safety and arming mechanism 6 of the fuze has been disarmed with a high probability, so the fuze is in a dangerous misfire state. Such a dud, such unexploded ammunition, should not be split again, but should be handled as an explosive under the predetermined procedure, predetermined method and predetermined protection condition.

[0021] Further, in order to facilitate accurate observation and reliable identification, the position of the diaphragm 4 should be selected near the outer contour of the projectile or warhead and as far as possible not on the arc-shaped part. In order to improve the reliability of transmission from the first explosion element 1 to the flame detonator 3, a relay tube or plastic booster can be added between the first explosion element 1 and the flame detonator 3.

[0022] Further, the first explosion element 1 should be in a straight-line state in structure, which can be a primer, an electric ignition head, an electric ignition tube, or a needle-stick detonator or an electric detonator with a certain flame impulse output.

[0023] Further, the flame detonator 3 can also be a relay detonator, or even a needle-stick detonator, which is detonated by the first explosion element 1 with the property of a detonator in the radial direction.

[0024] Further, according to the need, in order to prevent affecting the predetermined correctness of the action of the fuze body structure, the flame detonator 3 can also be designed as a delay detonator.

Claims

1. A safety identification structure for a fuze misfire state, characterized in that: Based on the traditional fuse structure, a radial safety identification channel is opened on the outer wall of the fuse body (2) leading to the ignition / detonation channel inside the fuse. The traditional fuse structure includes the first explosive element (1), the body (2) and the safety release mechanism (6). The safety identification channel is located near the bottom of the first explosive element (1) of the fuse. A flame detonator (3), a diaphragm (4) and a spiral ring (5) are arranged in sequence in the safety identification channel. The safety identification structure channel is a radial three-stage through hole. The diameter of the three-stage through hole increases from the inside to the outside, and is in the order of first-stage hole, second-stage hole and third-stage hole. The second-stage hole is provided with a flame detonator (3). A diaphragm (4) is provided in the third-stage hole and close to the flame detonator (3). The diaphragm (4) is also used for structural sealing and is connected and fastened to the fuse body (2) by a screw ring (5). The diaphragm (4) is a circular non-metallic sheet with the characteristics of being transparent or semi-transparent, high strength, low density and good flexibility.

2. The fuse misfire state safety identification structure according to claim 1, characterized in that: The amount of explosive charge in the flame detonator (3) is limited to the amount that blackens, ruptures, or breaks the diaphragm (4) but does not form dangerous fragments.

3. The fuse misfire state safety identification structure according to claim 1, characterized in that: The diaphragm (4) is made of polytetrafluoroethylene.

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