Portable GNSS spoofing jamming device and spoofing jamming method

Abstract

The present application relates to the field of satellite navigation technology, in particular to a kind of portable GNSS deception jamming equipment and deception jamming method, using the equipment integrated with data simulation circuit board and signal generation circuit board to read GNSS prediction ephemeris and generate GNSS simulation data for deception jamming by signal synchronization;And through the transmitting antenna of the equipment, GNSS simulation data is transmitted to the target area range, and the attacker in the target area range is interfered with defense.The present application realizes portable design, and is easy to use, high degree of automation;The principle of deception jamming method is assisted by software radio idea, which greatly reduces the dependence on hardware equipment, can be applied in GNSS deception principle demonstration experiment, single-target close-in deception and other special occasions, is a useful supplement to existing GNSS deception equipment, is convenient for mobile target tracking deception, scientific research experiment and the application in the scene.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of satellite navigation technology, and in particular to a lightweight GNSS deception jamming device and a deception jamming method. Background Technology

[0002] Satellite navigation systems provide all-weather, continuous, and high-precision position, velocity, and time information to various users, playing a vital role in economic, social, and security fields. However, because satellite navigation signals reach the ground at a power of only -130 dBm, they are susceptible to various interferences. Deception jamming, due to its significant advantages in concealment and cost-effectiveness, has become a crucial means of satellite navigation jamming, playing an irreplaceable role in applications such as UAV management. However, to achieve better deception effects and longer deception distances, deception jamming equipment typically requires high-performance signal generators, high-power amplifiers, and specialized transmitting antennas. Sometimes, additional computers are needed to run accompanying deception jamming software, resulting in current deception jamming equipment being mostly bulky, power-hungry, and costly. In certain specific applications, such as tracking and deceiving single moving targets, to ensure the deception's effectiveness, high power is not required; instead, ease of use is prioritized. Similarly, in scientific research and experimental scenarios studying deception jamming principles and methods, lightweight operation is often preferred. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a lightweight GNSS deception device to meet the application requirements of GNSS deception jamming technology in various situations. Summary of the Invention

[0003] Therefore, the present invention provides a lightweight GNSS deception jamming device and a deception jamming method. The lightweight structural design facilitates the implementation of normal deception jamming in defensive situations. The device is easy to carry, deploy, and apply.

[0004] According to the design scheme provided by the present invention, a lightweight GNSS spoofing jamming device is provided, comprising a housing and a signal generator disposed within the housing. The signal generator comprises: a data simulation circuit board for reading GNSS forecast ephemeris and performing signal preprocessing to generate GNSS simulation data; a signal generation circuit board connected to the data simulation circuit board for converting the GNSS simulation data into radio spoofing jamming signals; a signal transmitting antenna connected to the signal generation circuit board for transmitting the radio spoofing jamming signals to a target area; and a power supply for powering the signal generation circuit board.

[0005] As a portable GNSS deception and jamming device of the present invention, the signal transmitting antenna is further described as a magnetic transmitting antenna that is fixed on the housing and electrically connected to the signal generation circuit board.

[0006] As a portable GNSS deception and jamming device of the present invention, the power supply is a rechargeable battery, which is fixed to the battery mounting area inside the upper cover of the housing by a gel; the data simulation circuit board and the signal generation circuit board are mounted side by side on the bottom plate of the inner cavity of the housing, and a reserved gap space is provided between the data simulation circuit board and the signal generation circuit board on the bottom plate of the inner cavity of the housing.

[0007] As a portable GNSS spoofing and jamming device of the present invention, the housing is further provided with an antenna interface for connecting an external signal transmitting antenna to the signal generation circuit board, a power display, a power charging port and a power switch connected to the power supply, and an HDMI interface for connecting an external data simulation debugging display screen and a USB interface for connecting an external data simulation debugging input device to the data simulation circuit board.

[0008] As a portable GNSS deception and jamming device of the present invention, a DC converter for voltage conversion is further provided between the power supply and the signal generation circuit board.

[0009] As a portable GNSS spoofing and jamming device of the present invention, the data simulation circuit board is further provided with an HDMI converter for connecting the HDMI interface of the housing and a USB splitter for connecting multiple USB interfaces of the housing.

[0010] As a lightweight GNSS spoofing and jamming device of the present invention, the data simulation circuit board adopts a Raspberry Cubieboard 7S700 motherboard, and the signal generation circuit board adopts a HackRF motherboard.

[0011] Furthermore, the present invention also provides a deception jamming method suitable for portable GNSS deception jamming devices, the implementation process of which includes the following:

[0012] GNSS prediction ephemeris data is read and signal synchronization is used to generate GNSS simulation data for deception and jamming.

[0013] GNSS simulation data is transmitted to the target area to provide interference defense against attackers within the target area.

[0014] As a further step in the deception jamming method of the present invention, GNSS simulation data for deception jamming is generated through signal synchronization, including: setting the GNSS simulation data power based on the landing power of the GNSS satellite navigation signal and the spatial distance between the attack target and the deception jamming device within the target area; generating code phase time compensation based on the spatial propagation time of the GNSS satellite navigation signal to the attacker's receiver and the deception jamming device, the spatial distance between the attacker's receiver and the deception jamming device, and the time difference between the deception jamming device reading the GNSS forecast ephemeris and transmitting the GNSS simulation data; and obtaining the satellite position velocity using the GNSS forecast ephemeris, and obtaining the Doppler frequency value by combining the attacker's receiver position velocity and the relative motion between the satellite, the attacker's receiver, and the deception jamming device.

[0015] As a further aspect of the deception and interference method of the present invention, interference defense against attackers within the target area includes:

[0016] First, by transmitting GNSS simulation data, the attacker's receiver's acquisition and tracking status of real GNSS satellite navigation signals is interfered with, and the loop search range of the attacker's receiver is captured, so that the attacker's receiver can capture and receive GNSS simulation data in a re-completion state.

[0017] Then, the GNSS simulation data approximates the real GNSS satellite navigation signal by increasing or decreasing the code phase, and by increasing the code phase of the real GNSS satellite navigation signal and the GNSS simulation data, it removes the attacker's receiver from tracking the real GNSS satellite navigation signal.

[0018] The beneficial effects of this invention are:

[0019] This invention features a highly integrated device that utilizes a data simulation circuit board and a signal generation circuit board to generate deception signals. These signals are then transmitted to the attacker's target area via a signal transmitting antenna. The device boasts a lightweight design, ease of use, and a high degree of automation. The deception jamming method leverages software-defined radio principles, significantly reducing reliance on hardware. It can be applied in special scenarios such as GNSS deception principle demonstration experiments and single-target close-range deception. It serves as a valuable supplement to existing GNSS deception devices and facilitates applications in scenarios such as moving target tracking deception and scientific research experiments. Attached image description:

[0020] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a lightweight GNSS deception and jamming device in the embodiment;

[0021] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the circuit board installation for the portable GNSS spoofing and jamming device in the embodiment;

[0022] Figure 3This is a schematic block diagram of the principle of a lightweight GNSS spoofing and jamming device in the embodiment;

[0023] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the rear panel of the portable GNSS spoofing and jamming device in the embodiment;

[0024] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the deception and interference process in the embodiment;

[0025] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the signal synchronization principle in the embodiment.

[0026] In the diagram, the labels are as follows: 1 represents the housing, 2 represents the signal generation circuit board, 3 represents the data simulation circuit board, 4 represents the antenna interface, 5 represents the power indicator, 6 represents the power charging port, 7 represents the power switch, 8 represents the HDMI interface, and 9 represents the USB interface. Detailed implementation method:

[0027] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer and more understandable, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and technical solutions.

[0028] According to the embodiments of the present invention, see Figure 1 and 2 As shown, a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device is provided for GNSS signal defense. It includes a housing 1 and a signal generator disposed within the housing 1. The signal generator includes: a data simulation circuit board 3 for reading GNSS forecast ephemeris and performing signal preprocessing to generate GNSS simulation data; a signal generation circuit board 2 connected to the data simulation circuit board 3 for converting the GNSS simulation data into radio spoofing jamming signals; a signal transmitting antenna connected to the signal generation circuit board 2 for transmitting the radio spoofing jamming signals to the target area; and a power supply for powering the signal generation circuit board 2.

[0029] In this embodiment, a highly integrated data simulation circuit board and signal generation circuit board are used to generate a deceptive signal, which is then transmitted to the attacker's target area via a signal transmitting antenna. The working principle of the device is as follows: Figure 3 As shown, it is roughly divided into four functional modules: a data simulation module to implement the data simulation circuit board function, a signal generation module to implement the signal generation circuit board function, and a signal transmission module and a power supply module to correspond to the signal transmission antenna and power supply, respectively. It features lightweight design, ease of use, and a high degree of automation, making it convenient to operate, carry, and deploy. It can be applied in special occasions such as GNSS deception principle demonstration experiments and single-target close-range deception, serving as a valuable supplement to existing GNSS deception equipment.

[0030] The GNSS radio signal generated by the signal generation circuit board is transmitted using a radio transmitting antenna. In order to improve the portability of the device, the signal transmitting antenna in this embodiment can be a lightweight magnetic transmitting antenna.

[0031] Furthermore, the power source can be a rechargeable battery, which is fixed to the battery mounting area inside the upper cover of the housing by a gel; the data simulation circuit board and the signal generation circuit board are mounted side by side on the bottom plate of the inner cavity of the housing, and a reserved gap space is provided between the data simulation circuit board and the signal generation circuit board on the bottom plate of the inner cavity of the housing.

[0032] The rechargeable and discharging battery can be placed separately in the upper cover of the spoofing and jamming device, separate from the lower cover where the circuit board is placed. This saves space and makes the spoofing and jamming device more portable, while also preventing the power supply from overheating and affecting the operation of the development board.

[0033] Regarding the positional relationship and wiring of the two circuit boards, a parallel but not parallel spatial layout can be adopted. Since the two circuit boards are different sizes and require different interfaces for external devices, their distances from the casing will differ in practice. The two circuit boards can be connected via a data cable. Before installation, ensure sufficient space is left between the two circuit boards for the data cable. Place the data cable close to the inside of the casing, achieving an internal connection. This makes the entire deceptive device simpler, more aesthetically pleasing, and the wiring clearer, facilitating future maintenance.

[0034] Further, see Figure 1 and Figure 4 As shown, the housing also includes an antenna interface for connecting an external signal transmitting antenna to the signal generation circuit board, a power indicator, a charging port, and a power switch connected to the power supply, and an HDMI interface for connecting an external data simulation and debugging display screen and a USB interface for connecting external data simulation and debugging input devices, all connected to the data simulation circuit board. A DC converter for voltage conversion is also provided between the power supply and the signal generation circuit board. The data simulation circuit board also includes an HDMI converter for connecting the housing's HDMI interface and a USB splitter for connecting the housing's multiple USB interfaces.

[0035] The device utilizes an antenna interface to connect the transmitting antenna; a power indicator monitors the remaining battery level in real time, and the remaining power can be displayed via a power button; a charging port (configurable as an Android MicroUSB port) charges the power supply; a power switch controls the power supply to the entire spoofing and jamming device; an HDMI interface connects to a display screen for debugging the internal development board; and a USB interface connects to input devices such as a mouse and keyboard for data input during debugging of the internal development board.

[0036] In practical use, the rechargeable battery can be powered by a 7000mA rechargeable power supply. This power supply operates at a current of 1A and a voltage of 5V. The discharge port is a DC 5.5 / 2.1 power supply discharge port, and the charging port is a mini-USB power charging port, allowing for convenient charging and discharging. The power supply's small size greatly satisfies the portability requirements of this deception / interference device. During installation, the power supply cable between the power supply and the development board can be routed internally using pre-reserved space, improving the overall portability and minimizing the device's size. Openings for the battery level indicator, charging port, and power switch are pre-reserved on the housing cover. The rechargeable battery can be fixed to the inside of the housing cover using hot melt adhesive. The battery level indicator, charging port, and power switch are then fixed to the openings using hot melt adhesive. The battery power cable runs along the inner edge of the device to the circuit board and is connected, saving space and facilitating circuit board wiring layout.

[0037] The antenna interface, power charging port, power switch, and power indicator can be located on the front panel of the housing. An HDMI high-definition interface and several USB ports can be located on the rear panel of the housing. USB ports can be extended from the circuit board to the spoofing / jamming device housing via a USB splitter, HDMI ports can be extended from the circuit board to the spoofing / jamming device housing via an HDMI converter, and power can be supplied by connecting the power supply cable to the circuit board via a DC power adapter.

[0038] The data simulation circuit board can use a Raspberry Cubieboard 7S700 motherboard to implement data simulation, and the signal generation circuit board can use a HackRF motherboard to convert GNSS simulation data into radio signals. It adopts the software radio approach, using two motherboards and a transmitting antenna to generate and transmit GNSS spoofing signals. The principle is simple and easy to implement.

[0039] Furthermore, based on the aforementioned deception jamming device, this embodiment of the invention also provides a deception jamming method suitable for portable GNSS deception jamming devices, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 5 As shown, the implementation process includes the following:

[0040] S101. Read GNSS forecast ephemeris and generate GNSS simulation data for deception and jamming through signal synchronization;

[0041] S102. Transmit GNSS simulation data to the target area to interfere with attackers within the target area.

[0042] Signal synchronization is typically achieved by receiving real satellite navigation signals to obtain relevant parameters. However, to reduce equipment complexity, this embodiment does not obtain parameters by receiving real satellite navigation signals. Instead, it directly reads the parameters from GNSS forecast ephemeris data published on the internet. While this approach relies somewhat on the accuracy of the forecast ephemeris, it eliminates the need for some receiving equipment, resulting in a lighter and more portable deception device. Furthermore, considering the relatively reliable accuracy of current GNSS forecast ephemeris data, it ensures the successful implementation of deception interference. The local deception signal generation unit generates a deception signal similar to the real signal based on the obtained GNSS forecast ephemeris, which is then transmitted to the target device by the local deception signal transmission unit. Once the deception signal reaches the attacker's target device, it can gradually occupy the target device's relevant peaks, causing the real signal to be stripped from the loop. This achieves the effect of the deception signal intruding into the capture and tracking loop, thus completing the deception interference against the target device.

[0043] As a preferred embodiment, the GNSS simulation data for deception jamming generated through signal synchronization can be designed to include the following: setting the GNSS simulation data power based on the landing power of the GNSS satellite navigation signal and the spatial distance between the attack target and the deception jamming device within the target area; generating code phase time compensation based on the spatial propagation time of the GNSS satellite navigation signal to the attacker's receiver and the deception jamming device, the spatial distance between the attacker's receiver and the deception jamming device, and the time difference between the deception jamming device reading the GNSS forecast ephemeris and transmitting the GNSS simulation data; and obtaining the satellite position and velocity using the GNSS forecast ephemeris, and obtaining the Doppler frequency value by combining the attacker's receiver position and velocity with the relative motion between the satellite, the attacker's receiver, and the deception jamming device.

[0044] The local deception signal generation section synchronizes the signal with the obtained GNSS forecast ephemeris and generates a deception signal similar to the real signal. The local deception signal transmission section then sends the deception signal to the target device. The main problems it solves include: local deception signal power estimation, code phase estimation, and Doppler shift estimation.

[0045] As is well known, satellites in satellite navigation systems typically operate in orbits approximately 20,000 km above the Earth. Therefore, if the target device and the jamming device are not far apart, the spatial distance from the satellite to both the target and jamming devices can be considered equal. Satellite signals experience propagation loss in free space, which is proportional to the spatial distance. Since the distances from the satellite to the target and jamming devices are assumed to be equal, the free space propagation loss from the satellite to the jamming device and from the satellite to the target device is equal. Therefore, the signal power of the real satellite signal reaching the jamming device after free space propagation loss can be considered equal to the signal power of the target device. This power value can be set as the satellite navigation signal landing power (which can be taken as -130 dBm) during the local jamming signal generation process, denoted as P0. However, when sending the locally generated jamming signal to the target device, since there is also a spatial distance between the jamming device and the target device, the free propagation loss of the local jamming signal must be considered during this process. This loss is proportional to the spatial distance between the jamming device and the target device. Assuming the distance between the jamming device and the target device is R, the power of the locally generated jamming signal is:

[0046]

[0047] In the formula, P S P0 represents the estimated power of the local spoofing signal; P0 represents the landing power of the satellite navigation signal, which can be taken as -130dBm; π represents pi; λ represents the wavelength of the satellite navigation signal; and R represents the distance between the spoofing jamming device and the target device.

[0048] When estimating code phase, the spoofing jamming device first needs to calculate the position of the visible satellite based on the GNSS predicted ephemeris, and then calculate the distance from the satellite to the spoofing jamming device based on the satellite position and its own position.

[0049] like Figure 6 As shown, T si R represents the space propagation time of a satellite signal obtained from GNSS predicted ephemeris to the jamming device; oi T represents the spatial distance between the satellite and the target receiver. oi R′ represents the space propagation time of a GNSS signal from a satellite to a target receiver. oi T′ represents the spatial distance from the satellite to the hypothetical deception location. oi Δr represents the propagation time of the GNSS signal from the satellite to the hypothetical deception location; r represents the spatial distance from the deception jamming equipment to the target receiver; Δr represents the spatial distance from the target receiver to the hypothetical deception location.

[0050] The space propagation time of a GNSS signal from a satellite to a target receiver can be expressed as:

[0051]

[0052] In the formula: R oi The distance between the satellite and the target receiver is represented by c; the speed of light is represented by T. ion Indicates ionospheric delay, T tro Indicates tropospheric delay, T oc This represents the satellite clock bias. In this embodiment, the distance between the spoofing jamming device and the target receiver is usually relatively short, and there is a strong correlation between ionospheric delay and tropospheric delay. Therefore, it can be approximately assumed that the ionospheric delay and tropospheric delay from the satellite to the spoofing jamming device and the target receiver are equal. Thus, the ionospheric and tropospheric delays of the spoofing jamming device can be used to replace the delay at the target receiver.

[0053] The time delay required for a deception jamming device to generate a deception signal and send it to the target receiver is denoted by T. d This represents the processing time of the deception jamming device from reading the GNSS forecast ephemeris to transmitting the locally generated deception signal, so T is:

[0054]

[0055] In the formula, T si The signal represents the spatial propagation time of the satellite signal obtained from GNSS predicted ephemeris to the jamming device; r represents the spatial distance from the jamming device to the target receiver; c represents the speed of light; see [link to documentation] for details. Figure 1 .

[0056] To achieve approximately equal inter-code phase between the deception signal and the real signal, time compensation is necessary, denoted by Δτ. From equation (3), we can see that:

[0057]

[0058] In the formula, T oi This represents the spatial propagation time of the GNSS signal from the satellite to the target receiver; other parameters are the same as in equation (3).

[0059] The propagation time of a GNSS signal from a satellite to the hypothetical location is:

[0060]

[0061] In the formula, R′ oi The distance from the satellite to the hypothetical location is represented by 'c'; 'c' represents the speed of light; and 'T' represents the speed of light. ion T tro T oc It has the same meaning as equation (2).

[0062] When the deception jamming device successfully intrudes into the target receiver with a deception signal, it gradually alters the target receiver's positioning, making it approach the target receiver's supposed deception location. At this point, the distance between the target receiver and the intended deception location is Δr, denoted by Δ'. τ This indicates that the code phase time compensation is in place, then we have

[0063]

[0064] In the formula, T′ oi Δr represents the propagation time of the GNSS signal from the satellite to the hypothetical deception location; T represents the time delay required for the deception jamming device to generate a deception signal and send it to the target receiver, as shown in equation (3); Δr represents the distance from the target receiver to the hypothetical deception location; and c represents the speed of light.

[0065] By using GNSS ephemeris forecasts to calculate the satellite's position and velocity information in advance, and combining this with the target receiver's position and velocity information, the relative motion between the satellite, the target receiver, and the deception jamming equipment can be calculated, thereby obtaining the corresponding Doppler frequency value.

[0066] Furthermore, the interference defense against attackers within the target area can be designed to include the following:

[0067] First, by transmitting GNSS simulation data, the attacker's receiver's acquisition and tracking status of real GNSS satellite navigation signals is interfered with, and the loop search range of the attacker's receiver is captured, so that the attacker's receiver can capture and receive GNSS simulation data in a re-completion state.

[0068] Then, the GNSS simulation data approximates the real GNSS satellite navigation signal by increasing or decreasing the code phase, and by increasing the code phase of the real GNSS satellite navigation signal and the GNSS simulation data, it removes the attacker's receiver from tracking the real GNSS satellite navigation signal.

[0069] Typically, before the deceptive signal reaches the target receiver, the receiver's acquisition loop has already successfully acquired the real signal, and the tracking loop is continuously tracking it. Therefore, for the deceptive signal to interfere with the target receiver's acquisition and tracking loops, it must first disrupt the receiver's original acquisition and tracking state of the real signal, preventing it from stably tracking the real GNSS signal. When the target receiver loses lock on the real signal, it enters a reacquisition state. If the deceptive signal can occupy the acquisition loop's search range during this process, the target receiver can acquire the deceptive signal, thus intruding into the receiver's acquisition loop.

[0070] In the reacquisition state, the target receiver will use the code phase and Doppler frequency before the loss of lock as a starting point and extend the search in the vicinity of the starting point. Therefore, given the known frequency search step size and code phase search step size, the search range for velocity and distance can be calculated. As long as the estimated code phase and Doppler frequency of the deception signal are highly similar to those of the real signal, the Doppler frequency and code phase of the deception signal sent to the target receiver are highly likely to coincide with the target receiver's Doppler frequency and code phase search range for reacquisition. At this time, the deception signal and the real signal will be simultaneously received by the target receiver. When the deception signal and the real signal are received simultaneously, the deception signal can suppress the real signal with its power advantage, making it easier for the target receiver to acquire, thus interfering with the acquisition loop.

[0071] After the deceptive signal has interfered with the acquisition loop, it needs to continue interfering with the target receiver's tracking loop to ensure stable tracking of the deceptive signal. The main strategy for intruding into the target receiver's tracking loop is to gradually approach the real signal with a deceptive signal that has a lagging code phase and a high-power peak. Once the target receiver tracks the deceptive signal, the code phase of the deceptive signal is gradually increased, causing the real signal to peel off, thus completing the intrusion into the target receiver's tracking loop. The entire deceptive interference process during the tracking phase can be described as follows:

[0072] 1) At the beginning, the deception signal is delayed by two code phases compared to the real signal, and the deception signal has higher power.

[0073] 2) Then, the deceptive signal is gradually brought closer to the real signal. During this process, the code phase of the deceptive signal is gradually reduced. When the code phase decreases to zero, there is no code phase difference between the deceptive signal and the real signal, and it can be considered that the deceptive signal and the real signal completely overlap at this point. Due to the power advantage of the deceptive signal, the target receiver will be able to completely track the deceptive signal at this point, but the real signal will still be tracked and will not be stripped away.

[0074] 3) In order to remove the real signal from the target receiver tracking loop, after the target receiver has fully tracked the deception signal, the code phase of the deception signal is gradually increased, so that the difference between the code phase of the real signal and the deception signal gradually increases until the target receiver tracking loop can no longer track the real signal, thus completing the complete removal of the real signal.

[0075] By leveraging software-defined radio (SDR) technology to achieve signal simulation and modeling, the dependence on hardware devices is significantly reduced, facilitating high integration and deployment.

[0076] Unless otherwise specifically stated, the relative steps, numerical expressions, and values ​​of the components and steps described in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the invention.

[0077] The various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, with each embodiment focusing on its differences from other embodiments. Similar or identical parts between embodiments can be referred to interchangeably. For the systems disclosed in the embodiments, since they correspond to the methods disclosed in the embodiments, the descriptions are relatively simple; relevant parts can be referred to the method section.

[0078] The units and method steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. To clearly illustrate the interchangeability of hardware and software, the components and steps of each example have been generally described in terms of functionality in the foregoing description. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementations are not considered to be beyond the scope of this invention.

[0079] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the above methods can be implemented by a program instructing related hardware, and the program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as a read-only memory, a disk, or an optical disk. Optionally, all or part of the steps in the above embodiments can also be implemented using one or more integrated circuits. Accordingly, each module / unit in the above embodiments can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional module. This invention is not limited to any particular combination of hardware and software.

[0080] Finally, it should be noted that the above-described embodiments are merely specific implementations of the present invention, used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit it. The scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that any person skilled in the art can still modify or easily conceive of changes to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments within the technical scope disclosed in the present invention, or make equivalent substitutions for some of the technical features; and these modifications, changes, or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and should all be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present invention should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A spoofing jamming method suitable for a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device, characterized in that, The implementation of the deception jamming device includes a shell and a signal generator arranged in the shell, and the signal generator includes: a data simulation circuit board for reading GNSS predicted ephemeris and performing signal preprocessing to generate GNSS simulation data; a signal generation circuit board connected with the data simulation circuit board for converting the GNSS simulation data into radio deception jamming signals; a signal transmitting antenna connected with the signal generation circuit board for transmitting the radio deception jamming signals to a target area; and a power supply for supplying power to the signal generation circuit board. The implementation process of the deception jamming device includes the following steps: Reading GNSS predicted ephemeris, setting the power of GNSS simulation data according to the landing power of GNSS satellite navigation signals and the spatial distance between the attack object in the target area and the deception jamming device; generating code phase time compensation according to the spatial propagation time of GNSS satellite navigation signals to the attacker receiver and the deception jamming device, the spatial distance between the attacker receiver and the deception jamming device, and the time difference between reading GNSS predicted ephemeris and transmitting GNSS simulation data by the deception jamming device; Using GNSS predicted ephemeris to obtain satellite position and speed, combining the position and speed of the attacker receiver and the relative motion among the satellite, the attacker receiver and the deception jamming device to obtain the Doppler frequency value, and generating GNSS simulation data for deception jamming through signal synchronization; Transmitting the GNSS simulation data to the target area, interfering with the capture and tracking state of the attacker receiver to the real GNSS satellite navigation signal by transmitting the GNSS simulation data, and capturing the loop search range of the attacker receiver, so as to capture and receive the GNSS simulation data in the reacquisition state of the attacker receiver; 2. The spoofing method suitable for a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device according to claim 1, characterized in that, The GNSS simulation data approaches the real GNSS satellite navigation signal by increasing and decreasing the code phase, and the GNSS simulation data is stripped from the tracking of the attacker receiver to the real GNSS satellite navigation signal by increasing the code phase of the real GNSS satellite navigation signal and the GNSS simulation data.

3. The spoofing method suitable for a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device according to claim 1, characterized in that, The signal transmitting antenna is a magnetic type transmitting antenna fixed on the shell and electrically connected with the signal generation circuit board.

4. The spoofing method suitable for a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device according to claim 1, characterized in that, The power supply is a charge-discharge battery fixed in the battery mounting area on the inner side of the upper cover of the shell by colloid; the data simulation circuit board and the signal generation circuit board are installed side by side on the inner cavity bottom plate of the shell, and a reserved gap space between the data simulation circuit board and the signal generation circuit board is arranged on the inner cavity bottom plate of the shell.

5. The spoofing jamming method suitable for a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device according to claim 1 or 4, characterized in that, The shell is further provided with an antenna interface connected with the signal generation circuit board for externally connecting the signal transmitting antenna, a power supply power display connected with the power supply, a power supply charging port and a power supply switch, and an HDMI interface connected with the data simulation circuit board for externally connecting a data simulation debugging display screen and a USB interface for externally connecting a data simulation debugging input device.

6. The spoofing method suitable for a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device according to claim 4, characterized in that, A DC converter for voltage conversion is further arranged between the power supply and the signal generation circuit board. The data simulation circuit board is further provided with an HDMI converter for connecting the HDMI interface of the shell and a USB splitter for connecting multiple USB interfaces of the shell.

7. The spoofing method suitable for a portable GNSS spoofing jamming device according to claim 1, characterized in that, The data simulation circuit board adopts a Raspberry Cubieboard7S700 mainboard, and the signal generation circuit board adopts a HackRF mainboard.

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