Sound alarm method, device, equipment, storage medium and product for nuclear power plant

Abstract

The present application relates to a nuclear power plant audio alarm method, apparatus, computer equipment, storage medium, and computer program product. The method includes: the computer equipment detecting whether a first communication path between a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS has failed; detecting whether all alarm functions of the backup disk and workstation have failed; and if the first communication path has failed, or if all alarm functions of the backup disk and workstation have failed, controlling the post-accident parameter monitoring screen to emit an audio alarm. This method ensures that even under conditions of cabinet failure and computer information and control system failure, operators can be alerted to the occurrence of abnormal events, helping them bring the reactor to a safe shutdown state under accident conditions and ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the technical field of DCS alarms for nuclear power plants, and in particular to a sound alarm method, device, computer equipment, storage medium, and computer program product for a nuclear power plant. Background Art

[0002] With the advancement of computer technology, particularly the application of digital distributed control systems (DCS), alarm systems have become deeply integrated with DCS systems. Alarm systems are a crucial component of nuclear power plants and a crucial tool for operators to monitor the plant. They primarily alert operators to plant status and parameter deviations, or those imminent departures from normal operating ranges, guiding them to take corrective measures.

[0003] Under normal circumstances, operators monitor the nuclear power plant from their workstations, where digital alarms displayed on the workstation screens alert them to abnormal conditions. If the computer information and control systems fail, operators switch to a backup disk for monitoring.

[0004] However, traditional nuclear power plant alarm systems are unable to cope with the failure of the cabinet connected to the backup disk and the failure of the computer information and control system. As a result, operators are unable to obtain power plant abnormality information through effective alarms under such conditions. Summary of the Invention

[0005] Based on this, it is necessary to provide a sound alarm method, device, computer equipment, computer-readable storage medium and computer program product to address the above technical problems, which can ensure that the operator is prompted to the occurrence of abnormal events under the working conditions of cabinet failure and superimposed computer information and control system failure.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant, which is used in a digital distributed control system (DCS) alarm system of a nuclear power plant, wherein the DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen, and the non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation. The method comprises:

[0007] detecting whether a first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS fails;

[0008] Detecting whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid;

[0009] If the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the post-accident parameter monitoring screen is controlled to issue a sound alarm.

[0010] In one embodiment, the detecting whether all alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation have failed includes: detecting whether the computer information and control system in the DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant has failed; detecting whether the target cabinet provided in the non-safety-level DCS and connected to the backup disk for communication has failed; if the computer information and control system has failed and the target cabinet has failed, it is determined that all alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation have failed.

[0011] In one embodiment, the detecting whether the computer information and control system in the nuclear power plant DCS alarm system fails includes: detecting whether the real-time server provided in the non-safety-level DCS fails; detecting whether the computing server provided in the non-safety-level DCS fails; detecting whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration; detecting whether the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS fails; if the real-time server fails, or the computing server fails, or the workstation does not meet the minimum configuration, or the second communication path fails, then it is determined that the computer information and control system has failed.

[0012] In one embodiment, detecting whether a fault occurs in the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS includes: detecting whether a first gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS and a second gateway provided in the safety-level DCS fail, wherein the first gateway and the second gateway are used to transmit data sent from the non-safety-level DCS to the safety-level DCS; if the first gateway fails, or the second gateway fails, it is determined that the second communication path fails.

[0013] In one embodiment, detecting whether a failure occurs in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS includes: detecting whether a third gateway provided in the safety-level DCS and a fourth gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS fail, wherein the third gateway and the fourth gateway are used to transmit data sent from the safety-level DCS to the non-safety-level DCS; if the third gateway fails, or the fourth gateway fails, it is determined that a failure occurs in the first communication path.

[0014] In a second aspect, the present application further provides a sound alarm device for a nuclear power plant, which is used in a digital distributed control system (DCS) alarm system of a nuclear power plant, wherein the DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen, wherein the non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation, and the device includes:

[0015] A first detection module is used to detect whether a first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS fails;

[0016] A second detection module is used to detect whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid;

[0017] The control module is used to control the post-accident parameter monitoring screen to issue a sound alarm if the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail.

[0018] In a third aspect, the present application further provides a nuclear power plant digital distributed control system DCS alarm system, characterized in that the nuclear power plant DCS alarm system includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen, wherein the non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation;

[0019] The post-accident parameter monitoring screen is used to issue a sound alarm when a failure occurs in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS, or when all the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation fail.

[0020] In a fourth aspect, the present application further provides a computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and wherein the processor implements any one of the steps in the first aspect when executing the computer program.

[0021] In a fifth aspect, the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps described in any one of the first aspects are implemented.

[0022] In a sixth aspect, the present application further provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program, characterized in that when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps described in any one of the first aspects are implemented.

[0023] The aforementioned nuclear power plant audio alarm method, device, computer equipment, storage medium, and computer program product are used in the nuclear power plant digital distributed control system (DCS) alarm system. The nuclear power plant DCS alarm system includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen. The non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation. The computer equipment detects whether a fault has occurred in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS; detects whether all alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation have failed; if a fault has occurred in the first communication path, or if all alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation have failed, the post-accident parameter monitoring screen is controlled to emit an audio alarm. Thus, by detecting whether a fault has occurred in the first communication path or if all alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation have failed, the embodiment of the present application ensures that even under conditions of cabinet failure and computer information and control system failure, the operator can be notified of the occurrence of an abnormal event, thereby helping the operator to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown state under accident conditions and ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0024] Figure 1 1 is a flow chart of a method for providing an audible alarm in a nuclear power plant according to an embodiment;

[0025] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an exemplary nuclear power plant digital distributed control system DCS alarm system;

[0026] Figure 3 A flowchart of a computer device detecting whether all alarm functions of a backup disk and a workstation have failed is shown in one embodiment;

[0027] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a computer device detecting whether a computer information and control system in a nuclear power plant DCS alarm system has failed in one embodiment;

[0028] Figure 5 A flowchart of a computer device detecting whether a second communication path between a non-safety-level DCS and a safety-level DCS fails in one embodiment;

[0029] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of a flow chart of a computer device detecting whether a first communication path between a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS fails in one embodiment;

[0030] Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the alarm logic of the sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant provided in this application;

[0031] Figure 8 is a structural block diagram of a sound alarm device for a nuclear power plant in one embodiment;

[0032] Figure 9FIG. 1 is a diagram showing the internal structure of a computer device in one embodiment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0033] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of this application more clear, the following further describes this application in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain this application and are not intended to limit this application.

[0034] The embodiment of the present application provides a sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant, which is used in the DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant digital distributed control system. The DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen. The non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation. The computer equipment detects whether the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS is faulty; detects whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid; if the first communication path is faulty, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid, the post-accident parameter monitoring screen is controlled to emit a sound alarm. In this way, the embodiment of the present application ensures that the operator can be notified of the occurrence of abnormal events even under conditions of cabinet failure and computer information and control system failure by detecting whether the first communication path is faulty or whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid, thereby helping the operator to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown state under accident conditions and ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0035] Below, the implementation environment involved in the sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant provided in an embodiment of the present application is briefly described.

[0036] The nuclear power plant sound alarm method provided in the embodiments of the present application can be executed by a computer device, which can be a terminal or, of course, a server. The terminal can be, but is not limited to, various personal computers, laptops, smartphones, tablets, IoT devices, portable wearable devices, and medical electronic devices. IoT devices can be smart speakers, smart TVs, smart air conditioners, smart car devices, etc.; portable wearable devices can be smart watches, smart bracelets, head-mounted devices, etc.; the server can be implemented as a standalone server or a server cluster consisting of multiple servers.

[0037] In one embodiment, Figure 1 As shown, a sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant is provided, comprising the following steps:

[0038] Step 101: The computer device detects whether a failure occurs in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS.

[0039] Alarm logic can be divided into safety level and non-safety level. Generally speaking, safety level alarm logic is implemented in the safety level DCS and is used to warn operators of abnormal events during accident conditions and when bringing the reactor to a safe shutdown. Non-safety level alarm logic is implemented in the non-safety level DCS and is used to remind operators of events that affect the availability of the power plant under normal conditions.

[0040] Among them, the security-level DCS and non-security-level DCS transmit information through the gateway. Figure 2 An exemplary DCS alarm system for a nuclear power plant is provided. Figure 2 As shown, the first communication path includes a third gateway and a fourth gateway, which are used to transmit information between the security-level DCS and the non-security-level DCS.

[0041] Step 102: The computer device detects whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid.

[0042] like Figure 2 As shown in the figure, alarms can be divided into conventional hard alarms (HA) displayed on light-emitting diodes (LEDs) and digital alarms (CA) displayed on screens. Under normal circumstances, the operator monitors the power plant from a workstation (OWP). CA alarms on the workstation's screen alert the operator to abnormal conditions. If the computer information and control system fails, the operator switches to monitoring on the backup disk (BUP). The HA, an alarm light-emitting diode (LED) on the backup disk, notifies the operator of any abnormalities.

[0043] Step 103: If the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the computer equipment controls the post-accident parameter monitoring screen to issue a sound alarm.

[0044] like Figure 2 As shown, the backup disk is provided with a post-accident parameter monitoring screen (PAP-VDU), which has post-accident parameter monitoring, trend display and alarm functions, and can record HA alarms with alarm logic at the safety level. However, under normal circumstances, there will be no sound prompt after the alarm is triggered to prevent the alarms on the post-accident parameter monitoring screen and the backup disk from sounding at the same time. Only when the first communication path fails or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the alarm sound on the post-accident parameter monitoring screen will be activated, and the computer equipment will control the post-accident parameter monitoring screen to issue a sound alarm.

[0045] The above-mentioned sound alarm method of a nuclear power plant is used for the DCS alarm system of a nuclear power plant digital distributed control system. The DCS alarm system of a nuclear power plant includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen. The non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation. The computer equipment detects whether the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS is faulty; detects whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid; if the first communication path is faulty, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid, the post-accident parameter monitoring screen is controlled to emit a sound alarm. In this way, the embodiment of the present application ensures that the operator can be notified of the occurrence of abnormal events even under conditions of cabinet failure and computer information and control system failure by detecting whether the first communication path is faulty or whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid, thereby helping the operator to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown state under accident conditions and ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0046] In one embodiment, based on Figure 1 This embodiment relates to a computer device detecting whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid. Figure 3 As shown, the following steps are included:

[0047] Step 301: Computer equipment detects whether the computer information and control system in the nuclear power plant DCS alarm system is invalid.

[0048] Among them, computer information and control system failures include: failure of the real-time server set in the non-safety-level DCS, failure of the computing server set in the non-safety-level DCS, workstations not meeting the minimum configuration, and failure of the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS.

[0049] Step 302: The computer device detects whether the target cabinet in the non-safety-level DCS that is in communication with the backup disk is invalid.

[0050] like Figure 2 As shown, the target cabinet connected to the spare disk is Figure 2 The LCS cabinet in the system is connected to the backup disk through hard wiring to send alarm information to the backup disk.

[0051] Step 303: If the computer information and control system fails and the target cabinet fails, it is determined that the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all failed.

[0052] In this embodiment, the computer equipment detects whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid, ensuring that under specific working conditions, the nuclear power plant digital distributed control system DCS alarm system can still determine the specific invalid alarm link, thereby ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0053] In one embodiment, based on Figure 3 For an example, see Figure 4 This embodiment involves detecting whether the computer information and control system in the DCS alarm system of a nuclear power plant has failed using computer equipment. The process includes the following steps:

[0054] Step 401: The computer device detects whether the real-time server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid.

[0055] Step 402: The computer device detects whether the calculation server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid.

[0056] Step 403: The computer device detects whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration.

[0057] Step 404: The computer device detects whether a fault occurs in the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS.

[0058] Step 405: If the real-time server fails, or the computing server fails, or the workstation does not meet the minimum configuration, or the second communication path fails, it is determined that the computer information and control system fails.

[0059] In this embodiment, the computer equipment determines whether the computer information and control system has failed by detecting whether the real-time server set in the non-safety-level DCS has failed, whether the calculation server set in the non-safety-level DCS has failed, whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration, and whether the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS has failed, thereby improving the safety and reliability of the alarm system and ensuring the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0060] In one embodiment, based on Figure 4 For an example, see Figure 5 This embodiment involves a computer device detecting whether a fault occurs in the second communication path between a non-safety-level DCS and a safety-level DCS. The process includes the following steps:

[0061] In step 501 , a computer device detects whether a first gateway set in a non-safety-level DCS and a second gateway set in a safety-level DCS are invalid.

[0062] like Figure 2 As shown, the first gateway and the second gateway are used to transmit data sent by the non-security-level DCS to the security-level DCS.

[0063] Step 502: If the first gateway fails, or the second gateway fails, it is determined that the second communication path fails.

[0064] In this embodiment, the computer device determines whether the second communication path has a fault by detecting whether the first gateway set in the non-safety-level DCS and the second gateway set in the safety-level DCS have failed. This embodiment improves the safety and reliability of the alarm system and ensures the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0065] In one embodiment, based on Figure 1 For an example, see Figure 6 This embodiment involves a computer device detecting whether a fault occurs in a first communication path between a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS. The process includes the following steps:

[0066] In step 601 , the computer device detects whether the third gateway provided in the security-level DCS and the fourth gateway provided in the non-security-level DCS are invalid.

[0067] like Figure 2 As shown, the third gateway and the fourth gateway are used to transmit data sent from the security-level DCS to the non-security-level DCS.

[0068] Step 602: If the third gateway fails, or the fourth gateway fails, it is determined that the first communication path fails.

[0069] In this embodiment, the computer device determines whether the first communication path has failed by detecting whether the third gateway set in the safety-level DCS and the fourth gateway set in the non-safety-level DCS have failed. This embodiment improves the safety and reliability of the alarm system and ensures the safety of the nuclear power plant.

[0070] The sound alarm method of the nuclear power plant provided by the present application is that if the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the computer equipment controls the parameter monitoring screen after the accident to issue a sound alarm. Figure 7 As shown, Figure 7 The alarm logic of the sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant provided by this application is shown. The specific alarm implementation path provided by this application is as follows:

[0071] (1) If all the alarm triggering conditions come from the safety-level DCS, the alarm logic is definitely safety-level. The control cabinet 1 of the safety-level DCS sends the alarm signal to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen for recording and the non-safety-level DCS (via the first communication path) to implement the HA / CA alarm logic; the target cabinet sends the HA alarm result to the backup disk through hard wiring.

[0072] 1) Control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field equipment to generate safety-level alarm conditions, and generates alarm signals after performing logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - PAPMC - post-accident parameter monitoring screen;

[0073] 2) Control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field devices to generate safety-level alarm conditions, and generates alarm signals by performing logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - first communication path - system network - real-time server - monitoring network - calculation server (generates CA alarms by performing logical operations on alarm signals) - monitoring network - workstation;

[0074] 3) Control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field equipment to generate safety-level alarm conditions, and generates alarm signals through logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - first communication path - system network - target cabinet (generates HA alarms through logical operations on alarm signals) - backup disk.

[0075] (2) If the alarm triggering condition comes from the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS, and the alarm logic is safety-level, the control cabinet 2 of the non-safety-level DCS will send the alarm condition to the control cabinet 1 of the safety-level DCS through hard wiring, perform alarm logic in the safety-level DCS, and send the alarm signal to the post-accident parameter monitoring screen for recording and the non-safety-level DCS (via the first communication path) to implement the HA / CA alarm logic; the target cabinet will send the HA alarm result to the backup disk through hard wiring.

[0076] 1) Control cabinet 2 (collects information from non-safety-level field devices to generate non-safety-level alarm conditions) - control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field devices to generate safety-level alarm conditions, simultaneously receives non-safety-level alarm conditions from control cabinet 2, and generates alarm signals after performing logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - PAPMC - post-accident parameter monitoring screen;

[0077] 2) Control cabinet 2 (collects information from non-safety-level field devices to generate non-safety-level alarm conditions) - control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field devices to generate safety-level alarm conditions, simultaneously receives non-safety-level alarm conditions from control cabinet 2, and generates alarm signals by performing logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - first communication path - system network - real-time server - monitoring network - computing server (generates CA alarms by performing logical operations on alarm signals) - monitoring network - workstation;

[0078] 3) Control cabinet 2 (collects information from non-safety-level field equipment to generate non-safety-level alarm conditions) - control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field equipment to generate safety-level alarm conditions, and simultaneously receives non-safety-level alarm conditions from control cabinet 2, and generates alarm signals through logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - first communication path - system network - target cabinet (generates HA alarms through logical operations on alarm signals) - backup disk.

[0079] (3) If the alarm triggering condition comes from the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS, and the alarm logic is non-safety-level, the control cabinet 1 of the safety-level DCS sends the alarm condition to the non-safety-level DCS through the first communication path to implement the HA / CA alarm logic; the target cabinet sends the HA alarm result to the backup disk through hard wiring.

[0080] 1) Control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field devices to generate safety-level alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - first communication path - system network - control cabinet 2 (collects information from non-safety-level field devices to generate non-safety-level alarm conditions, simultaneously receives safety-level alarm conditions from control cabinet 1, and generates alarm signals through logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - system network - real-time server - monitoring network - calculation server (generates CA alarms through logical operations on alarm signals) - monitoring network - workstation;

[0081] 2) Control cabinet 1 (collects information from safety-level field equipment to generate safety-level alarm conditions) - safety bus - data transmission cabinet - safety-level system bus - first communication path - system network - control cabinet 2 - (collects information from non-safety-level field equipment to generate non-safety-level alarm conditions, and simultaneously receives safety-level alarm conditions from control cabinet 1, and generates alarm signals through logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - system network - target cabinet (generates HA alarms through logical operations on alarm signals) - backup disk.

[0082] (4) If all alarm triggering conditions come from non-safety-level DCS, the alarm logic must be non-safety-level, and the HA / CA alarm logic is implemented by the non-safety-level DCS; the target cabinet hard-wires to send the HA alarm result to the backup disk.

[0083] 1) Control cabinet 2 (collects information from non-safety-level field devices to generate non-safety-level alarm conditions, and generates alarm signals through logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - system network - real-time server - monitoring network - calculation server (generates CA alarms through logical operations on alarm signals) - monitoring network - workstation;

[0084] 2) Control cabinet 2 (collects information from non-safety-level field equipment to generate non-safety-level alarm conditions, and generates alarm signals through logical operations on multiple alarm conditions) - system network - target cabinet (generates HA alarms through logical operations on alarm signals) - backup disk.

[0085] It should be understood that, although the various steps in the flowcharts involved in the various embodiments described above are displayed in sequence according to the instructions of the arrows, these steps are not necessarily executed in sequence in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless otherwise specified herein, there is no strict order restriction on the execution of these steps, and these steps can be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least a portion of the steps in the flowcharts involved in the various embodiments described above can include multiple steps or multiple stages, and these steps or stages are not necessarily executed and completed at the same time, but can be executed at different times, and the execution order of these steps or stages is not necessarily to be carried out in sequence, but can be executed in turn or alternately with other steps or at least a portion of steps or stages in other steps.

[0086] Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of the present application also provide an audible alarm device for implementing the aforementioned nuclear power plant audible alarm method. The solution provided by this device is similar to the solution described in the aforementioned method. Therefore, the specific limitations of one or more nuclear power plant audible alarm device embodiments provided below can be found in the aforementioned limitations of the nuclear power plant audible alarm method and will not be further elaborated here.

[0087] In one embodiment, Figure 8 As shown, a sound alarm device for a nuclear power plant is provided, which is used in the digital distributed control system (DCS) alarm system of the nuclear power plant. The device includes:

[0088] The first detection module 801 is used to detect whether a first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS fails;

[0089] The second detection module 802 is used to detect whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid;

[0090] The control module 803 is configured to control the post-accident parameter monitoring screen to emit a sound alarm if the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail.

[0091] In one embodiment, the second detection module 802 includes:

[0092] A first detection unit is used to detect whether the computer information and control system in the nuclear power plant DCS alarm system has failed;

[0093] A second detection unit is used to detect whether a target cabinet in the non-safety-level DCS that is in communication with the backup disk fails;

[0094] If the computer information and control system fails, and the target cabinet fails, it is determined that the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all failed.

[0095] In one embodiment, the second detection module 802 further includes:

[0096] A third detection unit is used to detect whether the real-time server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0097] A fourth detection unit, configured to detect whether a computing server provided in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0098] A fifth detection unit, configured to detect whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration;

[0099] a sixth detection unit, configured to detect whether a fault occurs in the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS;

[0100] If the real-time server fails, or the computing server fails, or the workstation does not meet the minimum configuration, or the second communication path fails, it is determined that the computer information and control system fails.

[0101] In one embodiment, the second detection module 802 further includes:

[0102] a seventh detection unit, configured to detect whether a first gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS and a second gateway provided in the safety-level DCS are failed, wherein the first gateway and the second gateway are used to transmit data sent from the non-safety-level DCS to the safety-level DCS;

[0103] If the first gateway fails, or the second gateway fails, it is determined that the second communication path fails.

[0104] In one embodiment, the first detection module 801 includes:

[0105] an eighth detection unit, configured to detect whether a third gateway provided in the safety-level DCS and a fourth gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the third gateway and the fourth gateway are used to transmit data sent by the safety-level DCS to the non-safety-level DCS;

[0106] If the third gateway fails, or the fourth gateway fails, it is determined that the first communication path fails.

[0107] Each module in the aforementioned nuclear power plant sound alarm device may be implemented in whole or in part through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. Each module may be embedded in or independent of a processor in a computer device in the form of hardware, or may be stored in a memory in the computer device in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute the corresponding operations of each module.

[0108] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided. The computer device may be a server, and its internal structure diagram may be as follows: Figure 9 As shown. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, and a network interface connected via a system bus. The processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer device is used to store sound alarm data of the nuclear power plant. The network interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal via a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, a sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant is implemented.

[0109] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 9 The structure shown in the figure is only a block diagram of a part of the structure related to the solution of the present application, and does not constitute a limitation on the computer device to which the solution of the present application is applied. The specific computer device may include more or fewer components than shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have a different component arrangement.

[0110] In one embodiment, a nuclear power plant digital distributed control system (DCS) alarm system is provided. The nuclear power plant DCS alarm system includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen. The non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation. The post-accident parameter monitoring screen is used to issue an audible alarm when a first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS fails, or when all alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation fail.

[0111] The steps executed by the nuclear power plant digital distributed control system DCS alarm system can refer to the embodiment of the sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant described above.

[0112] The beneficial effects of the nuclear power plant digital distributed control system DCS alarm system of this embodiment are substantially the same as those produced by the above-mentioned sound alarm method, and will not be described in detail here.

[0113] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, including a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented:

[0114] Detect whether a fault occurs in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS;

[0115] Check whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and workstation are all invalid;

[0116] If the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the parameter monitoring screen after the control accident will issue a sound alarm.

[0117] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the processor further implements the following steps:

[0118] Detect whether the computer information and control systems in the DCS alarm system of a nuclear power plant are invalid;

[0119] Check whether the target cabinet connected to the backup disk in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0120] If the computer information and control system fails, and the target cabinet fails, it is determined that the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid.

[0121] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the processor further implements the following steps:

[0122] Detect whether the real-time server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0123] Detect whether the calculation server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0124] Check whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration;

[0125] Detect whether the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS is faulty;

[0126] If the real-time server fails, or the computing server fails, or the workstation does not meet the minimum configuration, or the second communication path fails, it is determined that the computer information and control system fails.

[0127] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the processor further implements the following steps:

[0128] Detecting whether a first gateway provided in a non-safety-level DCS and a second gateway provided in a safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the first gateway and the second gateway are used to transmit data sent from the non-safety-level DCS to the safety-level DCS;

[0129] If the first gateway fails, or the second gateway fails, it is determined that the second communication path fails.

[0130] In one embodiment, when the processor executes the computer program, the processor further implements the following steps:

[0131] Detecting whether a third gateway provided in the safety-level DCS and a fourth gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the third gateway and the fourth gateway are used to transmit data sent from the safety-level DCS to the non-safety-level DCS;

[0132] If the third gateway fails, or the fourth gateway fails, it is determined that the first communication path fails.

[0133] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are implemented:

[0134] Detect whether a fault occurs in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS;

[0135] Check whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and workstation are all invalid;

[0136] If the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the parameter monitoring screen after the control accident will issue a sound alarm.

[0137] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0138] Detect whether the computer information and control systems in the DCS alarm system of a nuclear power plant are invalid;

[0139] Check whether the target cabinet connected to the backup disk in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0140] If the computer information and control system fails, and the target cabinet fails, it is determined that the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid.

[0141] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0142] Detect whether the real-time server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0143] Detect whether the calculation server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0144] Check whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration;

[0145] Detect whether the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS is faulty;

[0146] If the real-time server fails, or the computing server fails, or the workstation does not meet the minimum configuration, or the second communication path fails, it is determined that the computer information and control system fails.

[0147] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0148] Detecting whether a first gateway provided in a non-safety-level DCS and a second gateway provided in a safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the first gateway and the second gateway are used to transmit data sent from the non-safety-level DCS to the safety-level DCS;

[0149] If the first gateway fails, or the second gateway fails, it is determined that the second communication path fails.

[0150] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0151] Detecting whether a third gateway provided in the safety-level DCS and a fourth gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the third gateway and the fourth gateway are used to transmit data sent from the safety-level DCS to the non-safety-level DCS;

[0152] If the third gateway fails, or the fourth gateway fails, it is determined that the first communication path fails.

[0153] In one embodiment, a computer program product is provided, comprising a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the following steps:

[0154] Detect whether a fault occurs in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS;

[0155] Check whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and workstation are all invalid;

[0156] If the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the parameter monitoring screen after the control accident will issue a sound alarm.

[0157] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0158] Detect whether the computer information and control systems in the DCS alarm system of a nuclear power plant are invalid;

[0159] Check whether the target cabinet connected to the backup disk in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0160] If the computer information and control system fails, and the target cabinet fails, it is determined that the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid.

[0161] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0162] Detect whether the real-time server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0163] Detect whether the calculation server set in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid;

[0164] Check whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration;

[0165] Detect whether the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS is faulty;

[0166] If the real-time server fails, or the computing server fails, or the workstation does not meet the minimum configuration, or the second communication path fails, it is determined that the computer information and control system fails.

[0167] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0168] Detecting whether a first gateway provided in a non-safety-level DCS and a second gateway provided in a safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the first gateway and the second gateway are used to transmit data sent from the non-safety-level DCS to the safety-level DCS;

[0169] If the first gateway fails, or the second gateway fails, it is determined that the second communication path fails.

[0170] In one embodiment, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the following steps are further implemented:

[0171] Detecting whether a third gateway provided in the safety-level DCS and a fourth gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the third gateway and the fourth gateway are used to transmit data sent from the safety-level DCS to the non-safety-level DCS;

[0172] If the third gateway fails, or the fourth gateway fails, it is determined that the first communication path fails.

[0173] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties.

[0174] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiment methods can be implemented by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium. When the computer program is executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application may include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, optical memory, high-density embedded non-volatile memory, resistive random access memory (ReRAM), magnetic random access memory (MRAM), ferroelectric random access memory (FRAM), phase change memory (PCM), graphene memory, etc. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory, etc. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM). The database involved in the various embodiments provided herein may include at least one of a relational database and a non-relational database. Non-relational databases may include, but are not limited to, distributed databases based on blockchains. The processor involved in the various embodiments provided herein may be, but are not limited to, a general-purpose processor, a central processing unit, a graphics processing unit, a digital signal processor, a programmable logic unit, a data processing logic unit based on quantum computing, and the like.

[0175] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined arbitrarily. To make the description concise, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0176] The above-described embodiments merely represent several implementation methods of the present application. While the descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the present application. It should be noted that a person of ordinary skill in the art may make various modifications and improvements without departing from the spirit of the present application, and these modifications and improvements fall within the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application shall be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A sound alarm method for a nuclear power plant, characterized in that: Used in a nuclear power plant digital distributed control system (DCS) alarm system, the nuclear power plant DCS alarm system includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen, the non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation, the method comprising: detecting whether a first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS fails; Detecting whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid; If the first communication path fails, or the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail, the post-accident parameter monitoring screen is controlled to emit an audible alarm; wherein the post-accident parameter monitoring screen has post-accident parameter monitoring, trend display and alarm functions; The step of detecting whether all alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are invalid includes: Detecting whether the computer information and control system in the DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant has failed; Detecting whether a target cabinet in the non-safety-level DCS that is in communication with the backup disk fails; If the computer information and control system fails, and the target cabinet fails, it is determined that the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all failed.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The detecting whether the computer information and control system in the DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant is invalid comprises: Detecting whether a real-time server provided in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid; Detecting whether a computing server provided in the non-safety-level DCS is invalid; Detecting whether the workstation meets the minimum configuration; detecting whether a fault occurs in a second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS; If the real-time server fails, or the computing server fails, or the workstation does not meet the minimum configuration, or the second communication path fails, it is determined that the computer information and control system fails.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The detecting whether a fault occurs in the second communication path between the non-safety-level DCS and the safety-level DCS includes: detecting whether a first gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS and a second gateway provided in the safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the first gateway and the second gateway are used to transmit data sent from the non-safety-level DCS to the safety-level DCS; If the first gateway fails, or the second gateway fails, it is determined that the second communication path fails.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein The detecting whether a fault occurs in the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS includes: detecting whether a third gateway provided in the safety-level DCS and a fourth gateway provided in the non-safety-level DCS are invalid, wherein the third gateway and the fourth gateway are used to transmit data sent from the safety-level DCS to the non-safety-level DCS; If the third gateway fails, or the fourth gateway fails, it is determined that the first communication path fails.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein The post-accident parameter monitoring screen is used to record HA alarms with a safety-level alarm logic, but under normal circumstances there will be no sound prompt after the alarm is triggered.

6. A sound alarm device for a nuclear power plant, characterized in that: Used in a nuclear power plant digital distributed control system (DCS) alarm system, the nuclear power plant DCS alarm system includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen. The non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation. The device includes: A first detection module is used to detect whether a first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS fails; A second detection module is used to detect whether the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all invalid; a control module configured to control the post-accident parameter monitoring screen to emit an audible alarm if the first communication path fails, or if the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail; wherein the post-accident parameter monitoring screen has post-accident parameter monitoring, trend display, and alarm functions; The second detection module is specifically configured to: Detecting whether the computer information and control system in the DCS alarm system of the nuclear power plant has failed; Detecting whether a target cabinet in the non-safety-level DCS that is in communication with the backup disk fails; If the computer information and control system fails, and the target cabinet fails, it is determined that the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation are all failed.

7. A nuclear power plant digital distributed control system DCS alarm system, characterized in that: The nuclear power plant DCS alarm system includes a safety-level DCS, a non-safety-level DCS, a backup disk, and a post-accident parameter monitoring screen, wherein the non-safety-level DCS includes a workstation; The post-accident parameter monitoring screen is used to issue a sound alarm when the first communication path between the safety-level DCS and the non-safety-level DCS fails, or when the alarm functions of the backup disk and the workstation all fail; wherein, the post-accident parameter monitoring screen has post-accident parameter monitoring, trend display and alarm functions.

8. A computer device comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, wherein: When the processor executes the computer program, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 are implemented.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that: When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 are implemented.

10. A computer program product comprising a computer program, characterized in that When the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 are implemented.

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