A data transmission protection method, device and system

Abstract

The application discloses a data transmission protection method, device and system, relates to the technical field of communication, and can simplify the security verification and integrity verification process while guaranteeing the security and integrity of data transmission. In the scheme disclosed by the application, network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities, so as to synchronize the security protection capabilities between the network nodes. Based on this, when data or signaling transmission is performed, matching security parameters (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters and the like) can be selected to perform security protection on data, or matching security parameters can be selected to perform decryption and integrity verification on data, so that the transmission of redundant parameters is avoided, the decryption and integrity verification process is simplified, and the decryption and integrity verification power is saved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] Embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communication technology, and in particular to a data transmission protection method, device and system. BACKGROUND

[0002] Communication security has always been a problem that attracts much attention in the field of mobile communication. In order to ensure the privacy and integrity of data in the transmission process, as an implementation manner, the sending end can transmit the data to the receiving end after encryption protection and integrity protection. The encryption protection is used to avoid data from being eavesdropped and illegally acquired in the transmission process, and the integrity protection is used to perform integrity check on the data to determine whether the data is tampered in the transmission process. After the received encrypted data is decrypted and the integrity verification is passed, the receiving end can continue the subsequent communication process.

[0003] However, with the increasing complexity of network environment and the continuous updating and upgrading of communication technology, network equipment or terminal equipment, there are many problems in the encryption protection and integrity protection process in the information transmission process, such as the security protection capability is not synchronized, the security protection is not comprehensive, and the information is easy to be tampered. SUMMARY

[0004] The present application provides a data transmission protection method, device and system, which can simplify the process of security verification and integrity verification while ensuring the security and integrity of data transmission.

[0005] To achieve the above object, the embodiments of the present application adopt the following technical solutions:

[0006] In a first aspect, a data transmission protection method is provided, comprising: a first node sending information representing security protection capability supported by the first node to a second node; wherein the information representing security protection capability supported by the first node is used for the second node to perform integrity verification on data from the first node.

[0007] The above first aspect provides a solution that network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities with each other to facilitate synchronization of security protection capabilities among the network nodes. Based on this, when data or signaling is transmitted between the network nodes, for example, the second node serves as a serving base station of a user equipment (UE) and requests a radio resource control (RRC) context of the UE from an anchor base station of the UE, such as the first node, the second node can accurately select security parameters (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node to perform security protection on the data. Further, the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node, which avoids transmission of redundant parameters and simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process and saves decryption and integrity verification computing power.

[0008] In a possible implementation, the first node establishes a communication interface setup request message to send the security parameters of the first node to the second node, where the security parameters of the first node are used to represent information about the security protection capabilities supported by the first node. The present application does not limit the specific manner in which the network nodes share the supported security protection capabilities, for example, the first node can share the supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing the communication interface with the second node.

[0009] In a possible implementation, the method further includes that the first node receives information about the security protection capabilities supported by the second node from the second node. To ensure synchronization of security protection capabilities among the network nodes, the second node can also share the supported security protection capabilities with the first node.

[0010] In a possible implementation, the communication interface setup request message is an Xn interface setup request message (Xn Setup Request message). The present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structure and function of the first node and the second node, for example, the communication interface is an Xn interface. The first node can share the supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing the Xn interface with the second node.

[0011] In a possible implementation, the first node obtains the information for representing the security protection capability supported by the second node by receiving an Xn interface setup response message from the second node. The present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing the supported security protection capability between network nodes. For example, the second node can share its supported security protection capability to the first node through a communication interface setup response message (XnSetup Response message). In addition, the present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structure and function of the first node and the second node. For example, the communication interface is the Xn interface.

[0012] In a possible implementation, the first node sends the security parameters of the first node to the second node through a configuration update message. The present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing the supported security protection capability between network nodes. For example, the first node can share its supported security protection capability to the second node through a configuration update message.

[0013] In a possible implementation, the configuration update message is a next generation radio access network node configuration update message (NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message), and the method further includes that the first node receives a next generation radio access network node configuration update acknowledgement message (NG-RAN Node Configuration UpdateAcknowledge message) from the second node. The present application does not limit the specific configuration update message. For example, the configuration update message is the NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message, taking the first node and the second node as next generation radio access network (NG-RAN) devices.

[0014] In a possible implementation, the configuration update message is sent by the first node to the second node when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated. The present application does not limit the specific timing of sharing the supported security protection capability by the first node to the second node. For example, the first node can share its supported security protection capability to the second node when the supported security protection capability is updated, so as to ensure real-time update of the security protection capability.

[0015] In a possible implementation, the method further includes that the first node sends information for representing the latest supported security protection capability of the first node to the second node when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated. Based on the sharing of the security protection capability between the network nodes, in order to ensure real-time update of the security protection capability, the network node can also update its latest supported security protection capability to other network nodes when the supported security protection capability is updated.

[0016] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the first node sending, to the third node, information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node. As an implementation, a network node can share its own supported security protection capability and / or the supported security protection capability of other network nodes, so as to synchronize the security protection capability among network nodes.

[0017] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the first node sending a broadcast message; wherein the broadcast message carries information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node. The network node broadcasts its supported security protection capability and / or the supported security protection capability of other network nodes, so as to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capability of the network node in real time, thereby selecting a suitable security algorithm to perform security protection on data / signaling when there is a data / information transmission requirement.

[0018] In a possible implementation, the security parameter of the first node includes one or more of the following: an encryption algorithm supported by the first node, an integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node, a security key calculation parameter supported by the first node, and an integrity key calculation parameter supported by the first node. In order to ensure the security and integrity of data transmission, the security parameter of the node can include an encryption algorithm and a security key calculation parameter for security protection, and an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter for integrity protection.

[0019] In a possible implementation, the security parameter of the first node includes a first index identifier representing an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter supported by the first node. The application does not limit the specific forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter. For example, the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter can be represented in the form of an index identifier.

[0020] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: receiving, by the first node, a radio resource control resume request message (RRCResumeRequest message) from the UE, the RRCResumeRequest message including: an inactive radio network temporary identifier (I-RNTI), a message authentication code for integrity (MAC-I), and a resume cause; determining, by the first node, that the anchor base station of the UE is the second node; and sending, by the first node, a retrieve UE context request message (Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message) to the second node, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carrying a cell identity of a target cell, the I-RNTI, the MAC-I, and the resume cause. Based on the above security protection capability sharing scheme, the UE can request the anchor base station (e.g., the second node) to resume the RRC context through the serving base station (e.g., the first node) when the UE has a RRC connection resume requirement.

[0021] In some examples, the UE can perform security protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information broadcast by the first node for characterizing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or the information for characterizing the security protection capability supported by the second node.

[0022] In a possible implementation, the RRCResumeRequest message and the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message further carry a second index identifier, which is used to represent an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE when performing security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message. In order to simplify the process of integrity verification on the message by the network device, for example, to reduce the design of iterative network side redundant transmission parameters and the attempt of iterative security decoding, the UE or the first node can indicate the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE when performing security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message to the second node. In addition, the present application does not limit the specific representation form of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter, for example, which can be represented in the form of an index identifier.

[0023] In a possible implementation, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message includes a message body container Container, and the Container encapsulates one or more of the following information: I-RNTI, MAC-I, request cause, cell identity, and second index identity. By encapsulating the important information in the Container for transmission, the security of data transmission can be further protected.

[0024] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: receiving, by the first node, a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carrying information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node; and sending, by the first node, a radio resource control release message (RRCRelease message) to the UE, the RRCRelease message carrying the information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, for the UE to re-perform security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node. Based on this, when the integrity verification fails, the UE can re-perform integrity protection on the to-be-transmitted data according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node, and then re-initiate the request, so as to ensure the smooth passing of the integrity verification.

[0025] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: receiving, by the first node, a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carrying a failure cause; and sending, by the first node, a radio resource control reject message (RRCReject message) to the UE, the RRCReject message carrying a waiting duration, for indicating the UE not to repeatedly send the RRCResumeRequest message within the waiting duration. Through this solution, the first node can reject the same request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again, or the first node can reject the response to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset duration, so as to ensure that the network node responds to the tampered message incorrectly.

[0026] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the first node receiving a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carrying a failure cause; and the first node sending an RRCRelease message to the UE, the RRCRelease message carrying the failure cause. Through the method, the UE can take corresponding measures according to the specific cause when the context request fails. For example, the failure cause can be that the security protection algorithm does not match or the integrity verification fails. For example, if the failure cause is that the integrity verification fails, the UE can speculate that the message is more likely to be tampered. For such a request, in order to avoid the message from being tampered again when the request is initiated again, the UE can not initiate the same request again within a preset time period.

[0027] In a second aspect, a data transmission protection method is provided, which includes: a second node receiving information representing security protection capabilities supported by a first node from the first node; and the second node sending information representing security protection capabilities supported by the second node to the first node.

[0028] The scheme provided in the second aspect can be used for the network nodes to share the security protection capabilities supported by the network nodes, so as to synchronize the security protection capabilities between the network nodes. Based on this, when data or signaling is transmitted between the network nodes, for example, the second node is a serving base station of a UE, and the second node requests an RRC context of the UE from an anchor base station of the UE, such as the first node, the security parameters (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node can be accurately selected to protect the data. Further, the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, and saves the decryption and integrity verification power.

[0029] In a possible implementation, the second node obtains the security parameters of the first node from the first node through a communication interface, wherein the security parameters of the first node are used to represent the information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the first node. The present application does not limit the specific method for the network nodes to share the security protection capabilities supported by the network nodes. For example, the first node can share the security protection capabilities supported by the first node to the second node when the first node and the second node initially establish the communication interface.

[0030] In a possible implementation, the second node establishes the response message through the communication interface, and sends the security parameter of the second node to the first node; wherein the security parameter of the second node is used to represent information of the security protection capability supported by the second node. The application does not limit the specific manner of sharing the supported security protection capability between network nodes. For example, the second node can share its supported security protection capability to the first node when initially establishing the communication interface with the first node.

[0031] In a possible implementation, the communication interface establishment request message is an Xn Setup Request message, and the communication interface establishment response message is an Xn Setup Response message. The application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structure and function of the first node and the second node. For example, the communication interface is an Xn interface. The first node can share its supported security protection capability to the second node when initially establishing the Xn interface with the second node.

[0032] In a possible implementation, the second node obtains the security parameter of the first node from the first node through a configuration update message, and the second node sends the security parameter of the second node to the first node through a configuration update acknowledgement message.

[0033] In a possible implementation, the configuration update message is an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message, and the configuration update acknowledgement message is an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message. The application does not limit the specific configuration update message. For example, when the first node and the second node are NG-RAN devices, the configuration update message can be an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message, and the configuration update acknowledgement message can be an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message.

[0034] In a possible implementation, the method further comprises: when the security protection capability supported by the second node is updated, the second node sends information representing the latest supported security protection capability of the second node to the first node. Based on the sharing of the security protection capability between the network nodes, in order to ensure the real-time update of the security protection capability, the network node can also update its latest supported security protection capability to other network nodes when its supported security protection capability is updated.

[0035] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the second node sending, to the third node, information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node. As an implementation, the network node can share its own supported security protection capability and / or the supported security protection capability of other network nodes with other network nodes, so as to synchronize the security protection capability among the network nodes.

[0036] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the second node sending a broadcast message; wherein the broadcast message carries information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node. The network node broadcasts its supported security protection capability and / or the supported security protection capability of other network nodes, so as to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capability of the network node in real time, thereby selecting a suitable security algorithm to perform security protection on data / signaling when there is a data / information transmission requirement.

[0037] In a possible implementation, the security parameters of the second node include one or more of the following: an encryption algorithm supported by the second node, an integrity protection algorithm supported by the second node, a security key calculation parameter supported by the second node, and an integrity key calculation parameter supported by the second node. In order to ensure the security and integrity of data transmission, the security parameters of the node can include an encryption algorithm and a security key calculation parameter for security protection, and an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter for integrity protection.

[0038] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the second node receiving a Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message from the first node, wherein the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries a cell identity of a target cell, an I-RNTI, a MAC-I, and a request cause; and the second node performing integrity verification on the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.

[0039] In some examples, the information carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is protected by security and integrity according to the information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or the information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node broadcast by the first node and / or the second node.

[0040] In a possible implementation, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message further carries a second index identifier, which is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE to perform security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message. In order to simplify the integrity verification process of the network device on the message, for example, to reduce the iteration of the network side redundant transmission parameter design and the iteration of the security decoding attempt, the UE or the first node can indicate the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE to perform security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message to the second node. In addition, the present application does not limit the specific representation form of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter, for example, which can be represented in the form of an index identifier.

[0041] In a possible implementation, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message includes a message body container Container, and the Container encapsulates one or more of the following information: I-RNTI, MAC-I, request reason, cell identifier, and second index identifier. By encapsulating the important information in the Container for transmission, the security of data transmission can be further protected.

[0042] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: sending, by the second node, a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries information used to represent the latest supported security protection capability of the second node. Based on this, the first node can instruct the UE to re-perform integrity protection on the to-be-transmitted data according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node when the integrity verification of the second node fails, and re-initiate the request, so as to ensure the smooth passing of the integrity verification.

[0043] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the second node sending a RetrieveContext failure message to the first node, the Retrieve Context failure message carrying a failure cause. Through this scheme, the first node can reject the same request when the UE initiates the same request again frequently, or the first node can reject the response to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period, so as to ensure that the network node responds to the tampered message incorrectly. Alternatively, the first node can instruct the UE to respond accordingly according to the specific reason. For example, the failure cause is that the security protection algorithm does not match or the integrity verification fails. For example, if the failure cause is that the integrity verification fails, the UE supposes that the message is more likely to be tampered. For such a request, in order to avoid the message being tampered again when the request is initiated again, the UE can not initiate the same request again within a preset time period.

[0044] In a third aspect, a data transmission protection method is provided, which includes: a first node sending information representing security protection capabilities supported by the first node to a second node; and the second node sending information representing security protection capabilities supported by the second node to the first node.

[0045] The scheme provided in the third aspect above enables the network nodes to share the security protection capabilities supported by them, so as to synchronize the security protection capabilities between the network nodes. Based on this, when data or signaling is transmitted between the network nodes, for example, the second node as a serving base station of a UE requests the RRC context of the UE from an anchor base station of the UE, such as the first node, the second node can accurately select security parameters (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) matching the security protection capabilities supported by the second node to protect the data. Further, the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters matching the security protection capabilities supported by the second node, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process and saves the decryption and integrity verification power.

[0046] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the first node sending a broadcast message; wherein the broadcast message carries information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the second node. The network node broadcasts the security protection capabilities supported by it and / or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes, so as to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capabilities of the network node in real time, thereby selecting appropriate security algorithms to protect the data / signaling when there is a data / information transmission demand.

[0047] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: performing, by the UE, security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and the information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the second node, wherein the RRCResumeRequest message includes an I-RNTI, a MAC-I, and a request cause (ResumeCause); sending, by the UE, the RRCResumeRequest message to the first node; determining, by the first node, that the anchor base station of the UE is the second node; sending, by the first node, a Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message to the second node, wherein the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries a cell identity of a target cell, the I-RNTI, the MAC-I, and the request cause; and performing, by the second node, integrity verification on the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message according to the security protection capability supported by the second node. Based on the security protection capability sharing solution, the UE can request the anchor base station (such as the second node) to resume the RRC context through the serving base station (such as the first node) when the UE has a demand for RRC connection resumption.

[0048] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: sending, by the second node, a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, wherein the Retrieve Context failure message carries information used to represent the latest security protection capability supported by the second node; and sending, by the first node, a radio resource control release message (RRCRelease message) to the UE, wherein the RRCRelease message carries the information used to represent the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, and the information is used by the UE to re-perform security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the latest security protection capability supported by the second node. Based on this, the UE can re-perform integrity protection on the data to be transmitted according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node when the integrity verification fails, and then re-initiate the request, so as to ensure the smooth passing of the integrity verification.

[0049] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the second node sending a RetrieveContext failure message to the first node, the RetrieveContext failure message carrying a failure cause; and the first node sending a radio resource control reject message (RRCReject message) to the UE, the RRCReject message carrying a waiting duration, used to instruct the UE not to repeatedly send the RRCResumeRequest message within the waiting duration. Through the scheme, the first node can reject the same request when the UE initiates the same request again frequently, or the first node can reject the response to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset duration, to ensure that the network node responds to the tampered message incorrectly.

[0050] In a possible implementation, the method further includes: the second node sending a RetrieveContext failure message to the first node, the RetrieveContext failure message carrying a failure cause; and the first node sending an RRCRelease message to the UE, the RRCRelease message carrying the failure cause. Through the method, the UE can respond to the context request failure according to the specific cause. For example, the failure cause is that a security protection algorithm does not match or integrity verification fails. For example, if the failure cause is that the integrity verification fails, the UE supposes that the message is more likely to be tampered. For such a request, to avoid the message being tampered again when the request is initiated again, the UE can not initiate the same request again within a preset duration.

[0051] In a fourth aspect, a first node is provided, and the first node includes: a communication unit configured to send information representing security protection capabilities supported by the first node to a second node; and wherein the information representing security protection capabilities supported by the first node is used by the second node to perform integrity verification on data from the first node.

[0052] The fourth aspect provides a solution that network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities with each other, so as to synchronize the security protection capabilities between the network nodes. Based on this, when data or signaling is transmitted between the network nodes, for example, the second node serves as a serving base station of a UE, and requests an RRC context of the UE from an anchor base station of the UE, such as the first node, the second node can accurately select security parameters (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, and the like) that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node to perform security protection on data. Further, the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node, which not only avoids transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, and saves decryption and integrity verification computing power.

[0053] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is specifically configured to: establish a communication interface establishment request message, and send the security parameters of the first node to the second node; and the security parameters of the first node are used to represent information of the security protection capabilities supported by the first node. The application does not limit the specific manner in which the network nodes share the supported security protection capabilities. For example, the first node can share the supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing the communication interface with the second node.

[0054] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: receive information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the second node from the second node. In order to ensure synchronization of the security protection capabilities between the network nodes, the second node can also share the supported security protection capabilities with the first node.

[0055] In a possible implementation, the communication interface establishment request message is an Xn Setup Request message. The application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which is determined according to the specific structure and function of the first node and the second node. For example, the communication interface is an Xn interface. The first node can share the supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing the Xn interface with the second node.

[0056] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: receive an Xn Setup Response message from the second node, so as to obtain the information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the second node. The application does not limit the specific manner in which the network nodes share the supported security protection capabilities. For example, the second node can share the supported security protection capabilities with the first node through the Xn Setup Response message. In addition, the application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which is determined according to the specific structure and function of the first node and the second node. For example, the communication interface is an Xn interface.

[0057] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is specifically configured to: send, to the second node, information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the first node when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated. The application does not limit the specific timing of the first node sharing the security protection capability supported by the first node with the second node. For example, the first node can share the security protection capability supported by the first node with the second node when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated, so as to ensure real-time updating of the security protection capability.

[0058] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: send, to the second node, information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the first node when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated. Based on the sharing of the security protection capability between the network nodes, the network node can also update the latest security protection capability supported by the network node to other network nodes when the security protection capability supported by the network node is updated, so as to ensure real-time updating of the security protection capability.

[0059] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: send, to the third node, the information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or the information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node. As an implementation, the network node can share the security protection capability supported by the network node and / or the security protection capability supported by other network nodes with other network nodes, so as to facilitate synchronization of the security protection capability between the network nodes.

[0060] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: send a broadcast message; and the broadcast message carries the information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or the information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node. The network node broadcasts the security protection capability supported by the network node and / or the security protection capability supported by other network nodes, so as to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capability of the network node in real time, thereby selecting a suitable security algorithm to perform security protection on data / signaling when there is a data / information transmission requirement.

[0061] In a possible implementation, the security parameters of the first node include one or more of the following: an encryption algorithm supported by the first node, an integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node, a security key calculation parameter supported by the first node, and an integrity key calculation parameter supported by the first node. In order to ensure the security and integrity of data transmission, the security parameters of the node can include an encryption algorithm and a security key calculation parameter for security protection, and an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter for integrity protection.

[0062] In a possible implementation, the security parameter of the first node comprises: a first index identifier, the first index identifier being used to represent an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter supported by the first node. The present application does not limit the specific forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter. For example, the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter can be represented in the form of an index identifier.

[0063] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: receive an RRCResumeRequest message from the UE, the RRCResumeRequest message comprising: an I-RNTI, a MAC-I, and a request cause (ResumeCause); determine, by the first node, that the anchor base station of the UE is the second node; and send, by the first node, a Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message to the second node, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carrying the cell identifier of the target cell, the I-RNTI, the MAC-I, and the request cause. Based on the above security protection capability sharing scheme, the UE can request the anchor base station (e.g., the second node) to resume the RRC context through the serving base station (e.g., the first node) when the UE has a demand for RRC connection resumption.

[0064] In some examples, the UE can perform security protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information broadcast by the first node for representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or the information for representing the security protection capability supported by the second node.

[0065] In a possible implementation, the RRCResumeRequest message and the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message further carry a second index identifier, the second index identifier being used to represent an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE when performing security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message. In order to simplify the process of integrity verification on the message by the network device, for example, to reduce the design of iterative network side redundant transmission parameters and the attempt of iterative security decoding, the UE or the first node can indicate the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE when performing security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message to the second node. In addition, the present application does not limit the specific representation forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter. For example, the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter can be represented in the form of an index identifier.

[0066] In a possible implementation, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message includes a message body container Container, and the Container encapsulates one or more of the following information: I-RNTI, MAC-I, request cause, cell identity, and second index identity. By encapsulating the important information in the Container for transmission, the security of data transmission can be further protected.

[0067] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: receive a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carrying information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node; and send an RRCRelease message to the UE, the RRCRelease message carrying the information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, so that the UE re-performs security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node. Based on this, when the integrity verification fails, the UE can re-perform integrity protection on the data to be transmitted according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node, and then re-initiate the request, so as to ensure the smooth passing of the integrity verification.

[0068] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: receive a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carrying a failure cause; and send an RRCReject message to the UE, the RRCReject message carrying a waiting duration, so as to instruct the UE not to repeatedly send the RRCResumeRequest message within the waiting duration. Through this solution, the first node can reject the same request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again, or the first node can reject the response to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset duration, so as to ensure that the network node responds to the tampered message incorrectly.

[0069] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: receive a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carrying a failure cause; and send an RRCRelease message to the UE, the RRCRelease message carrying the failure cause. In this way, when the context request fails, the UE can take corresponding measures according to the specific cause. For example, the failure cause can be that the security protection algorithm does not match or the integrity verification fails. For example, if the failure cause is that the integrity verification fails, the UE can speculate that the message is more likely to be tampered. For such a request, in order to avoid the message being tampered again when the request is initiated again, the UE can not initiate the same request again within a preset time period.

[0070] In a fifth aspect, a second node is provided, which includes: a communication unit configured to receive information representing security protection capabilities supported by a first node from the first node, and send information representing security protection capabilities supported by the second node to the first node.

[0071] The scheme provided in the fifth aspect above allows the network nodes to share their supported security protection capabilities, so as to synchronize the security protection capabilities between the network nodes. Based on this, when data or signaling is transmitted between the network nodes, for example, the second node is a serving base station of a UE, and the first node is an anchor base station of the UE, the second node can accurately select security parameters (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) matching the security protection capabilities supported by the second node to protect the data, so as to protect the data. Further, the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters matching the security protection capabilities supported by the second node, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, and saves the decryption and integrity verification power.

[0072] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is specifically configured to: establish a request message through a communication interface, and obtain security parameters of the first node from the first node, wherein the security parameters of the first node represent the information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the first node. The present application does not limit the specific way of sharing the supported security protection capabilities between the network nodes. For example, the first node can share its supported security protection capabilities to the second node when the communication interface is initially established with the second node.

[0073] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is configured to: establish the response message through the communication interface, and send the security parameter of the second node to the first node; wherein the security parameter of the second node is used to represent the information of the security protection capability supported by the second node. The application does not limit the specific manner of sharing the supported security protection capability between the network nodes. For example, the second node can share its supported security protection capability to the first node when initially establishing the communication interface with the first node.

[0074] In a possible implementation, the communication interface establishment request message is an Xn Setup Request message, and the communication interface establishment response message is an Xn Setup Response message. The application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structure and function of the first node and the second node. For example, the communication interface is an Xn interface. The first node can share its supported security protection capability to the second node when initially establishing the Xn interface with the second node.

[0075] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is configured to: obtain the security parameter of the first node from the first node through the configuration update message, and send the security parameter of the second node to the first node through the configuration update confirmation message.

[0076] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: when the security protection capability supported by the second node is updated, send the information representing the latest supported security protection capability of the second node to the first node. Based on the sharing of the security protection capability between the network nodes, in order to ensure the real-time update of the security protection capability, the network node can also update its latest supported security protection capability to other network nodes when its supported security protection capability is updated.

[0077] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: send the information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or the security protection capability supported by the second node to the third node. As an implementation, the network node can share its own supported security protection capability and / or the supported security protection capability of other network nodes to other network nodes, so as to synchronize the security protection capability between the network nodes.

[0078] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is specifically configured to: send a broadcast message; and wherein the broadcast message carries information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node. The network node broadcasts its supported security protection capability and / or the security protection capability supported by other network nodes, so as to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capability of the network node in real time, thereby selecting a suitable security algorithm to perform security protection on data / signaling when there is a data / information transmission requirement.

[0079] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is specifically configured to: receive a Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message from the first node, wherein the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries a cell identity of a target cell, an I-RNTI, a MAC-I, and a request cause; and the second node further comprises a processing unit configured to perform integrity verification on the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.

[0080] In some examples, the information carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is secured and integrity-protected by the UE according to the information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or the information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node broadcast by the first node and / or the second node.

[0081] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to: send a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, wherein the Retrieve Context failure message carries information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node. Based on this, the first node can instruct the UE to re-perform integrity protection on the to-be-transmitted data according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node when the integrity verification of the second node fails, and further re-initiate the request, so as to ensure that the integrity verification is successfully passed.

[0082] In a possible implementation, the communication unit is further configured to send a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure cause. Through this scheme, the first node can reject the same request again if the UE frequently initiates the same request, or the first node can reject the response to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period, so as to ensure that the network node responds to the tampered message incorrectly. Alternatively, the first node can instruct the UE to respond according to a specific reason. For example, the failure cause is that the security protection algorithm does not match or the integrity verification fails. For example, if the failure cause is that the integrity verification fails, the UE supposes that the message is more likely to be tampered. For such a request, in order to avoid the message being tampered again when the same request is initiated again, the UE can not initiate the same request again within a preset time period.

[0083] In a sixth aspect, a first node is provided, which comprises a memory configured to store a computer program; a transceiver configured to receive or send a radio signal; and a processor configured to execute the computer program, so that the first node performs the method in any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0084] In a seventh aspect, a second node is provided, which comprises a memory configured to store a computer program; a transceiver configured to receive or send a radio signal; and a processor configured to execute the computer program, so that the second node performs the method in any possible implementation of the first aspect.

[0085] In an eighth aspect, a communication system is provided, which comprises the UE in any possible implementation of the fourth aspect or the sixth aspect, and the second node in any possible implementation of the fifth aspect or the seventh aspect.

[0086] In a ninth aspect, a computer readable storage medium is provided, which stores computer program codes, and the computer program codes are executed by a processor to make the processor implement the method in any possible implementation of the first aspect or the second aspect.

[0087] In a tenth aspect, a chip system is provided, which comprises a processor and a memory, and the memory stores computer program codes; the computer program codes are executed by the processor to make the processor implement the method in any possible implementation of the first aspect or the second aspect. The chip system can be composed of a chip, or can comprise a chip and other discrete devices.

[0088] In an eleventh aspect, a computer program product is provided, which includes computer instructions. When the computer instructions are run on a computer, the computer is caused to implement the method in any possible implementation manner of the first aspect or the second aspect. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0089] Figure 1 A communication network architecture diagram is provided for the embodiments of the present application.

[0090] Figure 2 A hardware structure diagram of a user equipment (UE) is provided for the embodiments of the present application.

[0091] Figure 3 An interaction process diagram of the UE requesting to recover a radio resource control (RRC) connection is provided for the embodiments of the present application.

[0092] Figure 4 Two RRC recovery request message format example diagrams are provided for the embodiments of the present application.

[0093] Figure 5A Synchronization interaction of security protection capabilities between network nodes is provided for the embodiments of the present application Figure 1 .

[0094] Figure 5B Synchronization interaction diagram of security protection capabilities between network nodes when establishing an initial Xn connection is provided for the embodiments of the present application.

[0095] Figure 6A Synchronization interaction of security protection capabilities between network nodes is provided for the embodiments of the present application Figure 2 .

[0096] Figure 6B Interaction diagram of network nodes updating supported security protection capabilities through an Xn interface is provided for the embodiments of the present application.

[0097] Figure 7 Synchronization interaction of security protection capabilities between network nodes is provided for the embodiments of the present application Figure 3 .

[0098] Figure 8 Synchronization interaction of security protection capabilities between network nodes is provided for the embodiments of the present application Figure 4 .

[0099] Figure 9 Interaction of network nodes broadcasting security protection capabilities of the network nodes to UEs is provided for the embodiments of the present application Figure 1 .

[0100] Figure 10 The network node broadcasts its security protection capabilities to the UE in the embodiments of this application. Figure 2 ;

[0101] Figure 11 Figure 5 illustrates the synchronous interaction of network node security protection capabilities provided in this application embodiment;

[0102] Figure 12 Schematic diagram of the data transmission protection method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 1 ;

[0103] Figure 13 Schematic diagram of the data transmission protection method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 2 ;

[0104] Figure 14 A schematic diagram illustrating the information format of two types of protection index identifiers provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0105] Figure 15A This application provides a schematic diagram of an information format for protecting MAC layer messages.

[0106] Figure 15B This is a schematic diagram illustrating another information format for protecting MAC layer messages provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0107] Figure 16 Schematic diagram of the data transmission protection method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 3 ;

[0108] Figure 17 Schematic diagram of the data transmission protection method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 4 ;

[0109] Figure 18 The fifth diagram illustrates the interactive flow of the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0110] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. In the description of the embodiments of this application, unless otherwise stated, " / " means "or," for example, A / B can mean A or B; "and / or" in this text is merely a description of the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, A and / or B can represent: A existing alone, A and B existing simultaneously, and B existing alone. Furthermore, in the description of the embodiments of this application, "multiple" refers to two or more than two.

[0111] Hereinafter, the terms "first", "second", "third", "fourth", "fifth", "sixth", "seventh" and "eighth" are used only for descriptive purposes and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or a specific number of the technical features indicated. Thus, the features defined with "first", "second", "third", "fourth", "fifth", "sixth", "seventh" and "eighth" can explicitly or implicitly include one or more of the features. In the description of the embodiments, unless otherwise specified, the meaning of "a plurality of" is two or more.

[0112] The embodiments of the present application can be applied to, but are not limited to, the following communication systems: a Narrow Band-Internet Of Things (NB-IoT) system, a Wireless Local Access Network (WLAN) system, a Long Term Evolution (LTE) system, a 5th Generation Mobile Networks Or 5th Generation Wireless Systems (5G) also known as a New Radio (NR) system, or a communication system after 5G, such as a 6G system, a Device To Device (D2D) communication system, a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) system, etc.

[0113] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 A communication network architecture diagram provided by an embodiment of the present application is shown. Among them, Figure 1The interaction relationship between network functions and entities and the corresponding interfaces are demonstrated by taking the network service architecture of a 5G system as an example. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Service-Based Architecture (SBA) of the 5G system includes network functions and entities such as User Equipment (UE), Access Network (AN) or Radio Access Network (RAN), User Plane Function (UPF), Data Network (DN), Access Management Function (AMF), Session Management Function (SMF), Authentication Server Function (AUSF), Policy Control Function (PCF), Application Function (AF), Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF), Unified Data Management (UDM), Network Exposure Function (NEF), and Network Repository Function (NRF).

[0114] Among them, the UE, AN / RAN, UPF, and DN are generally referred to as user plane network functions and entities (or user plane network elements), and the other parts are generally referred to as control plane network functions and entities (or control plane network elements). The control plane network element is defined by 3GPP as a processing function in a network, and has a 3GPP-defined function behavior and a 3GPP-defined interface. The network function can be a network element running on a dedicated hardware, or a software instance running on a dedicated hardware, or a virtual function instantiated on a suitable platform, such as a cloud infrastructure.

[0115] The main functions of each network element are described below.

[0116] AN / RAN: AN / RAN can be various forms of base stations, such as: macro base stations, micro base stations (also known as "small stations"), distribute unit-control unit (DU-CU), and the like. In addition, the above base stations can also be wireless controllers in a cloud radio access network (CRAN) scenario, or relay stations, access points, vehicle-mounted devices, wearable devices, or network devices in a future evolved public land mobile network (PLMN) network, and the like. AN / RAN can also be a broadband network gateway (BNG), a convergence switch, a non-3GPP access device, and the like. AN / RAN is mainly responsible for functions such as radio resource management on the air interface side, uplink and downlink data classification, quality of service (QoS) management, data compression and encryption, signaling processing with control plane network elements, or data forwarding with user plane function network elements, and the like. The specific form and structure of the AN / RAN are not limited in the embodiments of the present application. For example, in systems using different wireless access technologies, the names of devices with base station functions may be different. For example, the base station can be an evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (E-UTRAN) device in LTE, such as an evolutional node B (eNB or e-NodeB), or a next generation radio access network (NG-RAN) device (such as a gNB) in a 5G system, and the like.

[0117] UPF: mainly responsible for packet routing and forwarding, and QoS processing or charging information statistics of user plane data. The transmission resources and scheduling functions provided for the UE in the UPF are managed and controlled by the SMF.

[0118] DN: DN is a network for transmitting data. For example: DN can be an operator service network, an Internet access, or a third-party service network, and the like.

[0119] AMF: mainly responsible for processing of control plane messages, such as: access control, mobility management, lawful interception, access authentication / authorization, etc. Specifically, the functions of AMF mainly include: 1) processing of access network control plane; 2) processing of NAS messages, responsible for NAS encryption protection and integrity protection; 3) registration management; 4) connection management; 5) access management; 6) mobility management; 7) lawful interception of information; 8) providing session management messages between UE and SMF; 9) implementing transparent transmission of routing session management (SM) messages, similar to a transparent proxy; 10) access authentication; 11) access authorization; 12) forwarding SMS messages (short messages) between UE and short message service function SMSF; 13) interacting with AUSF and UE to obtain UE authentication intermediate key; 14) calculating access network specific keys.

[0120] SMF: mainly used for session management, UE network interconnection protocol (Internet Protocol, IP) address allocation and management, selection of manageable user plane functions, terminal point of policy control and charging function interface, downlink data notification, etc.

[0121] PCF: mainly used to provide UE policy rules, AM policy rules and SM policy rules related parameters to UE, AMF or SMF respectively, manage user subscription information, access UDM to access subscription user information related to policy decision, etc.

[0122] NRF: mainly used to provide internal / external addressing functions, receive query requests of other network elements for certain network elements and return information of related network elements, etc.

[0123] AUSF: mainly responsible for network security, used to generate keys, implement bidirectional authentication for UEs, and support a unified authentication framework.

[0124] AF: used to provide services, mainly used for: 1) application influence on service routing; 2) access to network capability exposure; 3) interact with the policy framework for policy control.

[0125] NSSF: mainly used for selection and management of network slice instances (Network Slice Instance, NSI), determining the mapping of allowed network slice information and used network slice information, and determining the mapping of configured network slice information and subscribed network slice information.

[0126] NEF: is an interface network element for bidirectional interaction of information between network internal and external entities, and is also a logical unit for internal information distribution and aggregation, mainly including three capabilities: monitoring capability, supply capability, and policy / charging capability.

[0127] UDM: consists of two parts, one part is called application front end (FE), and the other part is called user data warehouse (UDR).

[0128] Wherein, the to-be-transmitted data can be transmitted through the PDU session (i.e. the communication bearer described in the specification) established between the UE and the DN, the transmission will pass through two network function entities of (R)AN and UPF, the UE and the (R)AN communicate with each other by using a certain air interface technology, N1 is the interface between the UE and the AMF, N2 is the interface between the (R)AN and the AMF, N3 is the interface between the (R)AN and the UPF, N4 is the interface between the SMF and the UPF, N6 is the interface between the UPF and the DN; Namf is the service-based interface exhibited by the AMF, Nsmf is the service-based interface exhibited by the SMF, Nausf is the service-based interface exhibited by the AUSF, Nnssf is the service-based interface exhibited by the NSSF, Nnef is the service-based interface exhibited by the NEF, Nnrf is the service-based interface exhibited by the NRF, Npcf is the service-based interface exhibited by the PCF, Nudm is the service-based interface exhibited by the UDM, and Naf is the service-based interface exhibited by the AF.

[0129] For the functions of UPF, DN, AUSF, NSSF, NEF, NRF and UDM, etc., reference can be made to the explanations and descriptions in the conventional technology, and no further description is given here.

[0130] For the convenience of understanding, the following briefly introduces several terms related to the present application.

[0131] 1. Security key: including encryption key and decryption key. The parameter input by the sending end when encrypting the plaintext to generate ciphertext according to the encryption algorithm is the encryption key. The receiving end can decrypt the ciphertext according to the encryption algorithm and the decryption key.

[0132] For example, in some cases, if a symmetric encryption method is used, the encryption key and the decryption key are the same, and then the receiving end can decrypt the ciphertext according to the same encryption algorithm and the security key.

[0133] The encryption protection of plaintext is used to avoid eavesdropping and illegal acquisition of data during transmission.

[0134] 2. Integrity protection key: the parameter input by the sending end when performing integrity protection on plaintext or ciphertext according to the integrity protection algorithm. The receiving end can perform integrity verification on the data that has been integrity protected according to the same integrity protection algorithm and the integrity protection key.

[0135] The integrity protection of plaintext or ciphertext is used for integrity check of data to determine whether the data has been tampered with during transmission.

[0136] 3、Security algorithm: also referred to as encryption algorithm, an algorithm used when data is encrypted for protection. For example, the security algorithm can include: encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm.

[0137] 4、Integrity protection algorithm: an algorithm used when data is integrity protected.

[0138] Among them, the integrity protection algorithm is, for example, an access stratum (AS) integrity protection algorithm.

[0139] 5、CONNECTED state: also referred to as connected state. The connection state refers to that the radio resource control (RRC) connection has been established, and is also referred to as RRC_CONNECTED. When the UE is in the connection state, the connection between the UE and the access network (such as a base station) and the core network (such as an access management function (AMF) unit) is established, and if there is data to be transmitted, it can be directly completed through the established connection. Among them, the RRC connection is used to process the control plane messages between the UE and the access network.

[0140] 6、INACTIVE state: also referred to as deactivation state (RRC_INACTIVE) or third state. The inactive state refers to that the RRC connection between the UE and the access network (such as a base station) has been disconnected, but the connection between the access network (such as a base station) and the core network (such as an AMF) of the UE has not been disconnected. When the UE is in the deactivation state, if there is data to be transmitted, the RRC connection between the UE and the access network (such as a base station) needs to be restored first, and then data transmission can be performed.

[0141] When the UE enters the INACTIVE state, the RRC context of the UE is suspended (Suspend) at the terminal and the base station side, for example, is saved in the last cell in which the UE camps before entering the INACTIVE state, or the last cell (also referred to as anchor cell) that provides service for the UE. When there is data and / or signaling transmission demand, the UE can obtain the RRC context of the UE by initiating an RRC resume request (such as RRCResumeRequest) to restore the RRC connection according to the RRC context. Among them, the RRC context of the UE is, for example, the security context of the UE, UE capability information, etc.

[0142] 7. IDLE state: also referred to as RRC_IDLE. The IDLE state refers to a state in which an RRC connection between a UE and an access network (e.g., a base station) is not established, and a connection between the access network (e.g., a base station) of the UE and a core network (e.g., an AMF) is not established. When the UE is in the IDLE state, if data needs to be transmitted, the connection between the UE and the access network (e.g., a base station) and the connection between the access network (e.g., a base station) of the UE and the core network (e.g., an AMF) need to be established first, before data transmission can be performed.

[0143] 8. Serving base station: a base station to which a cell in which the UE is currently located belongs, or a base station currently providing services to the UE.

[0144] 9. Anchor base station: a base station to which a last cell in which the UE was located before entering the INACTIVE state belongs, or a base station last providing services to the UE.

[0145] It can be understood that, in the embodiments of the present application, for uplink transmission, the UE can be the encryption end and the integrity protection end, and the user plane network function and entity (or user plane network element) can be the decryption end and the integrity verification end. For downlink transmission, the user plane network function and entity (or user plane network element) can be the encryption end and the integrity protection end, and the UE can be the decryption end and the integrity verification end.

[0146] The terms "system" and "network" used in the embodiments of the present application can be used interchangeably.

[0147] In the embodiments of the present application, the terms "base station (BS)", "wireless base station", "eNB", "gNB", "cell", "sector", "cell group", "carrier", and "component carrier" can be used interchangeably. The base station is also sometimes referred to as a fixed station, a NodeB, an eNodeB (eNB), an access point, a transmission point, a reception point, a cell, a pico cell, a femto cell, a small cell, and the like. The base station can accommodate one or more (for example, three) cells (also referred to as sectors). When the base station accommodates multiple cells, the entire coverage area of the base station can be divided into multiple smaller areas, each of which can also be provided with communication services by a base station subsystem (for example, an indoor small base station (Remote Radio Head (RRH))). The terms "cell" or "sector" refer to a part or the entirety of the coverage area of the base station and / or the base station subsystem in the coverage in which communication services are provided.

[0148] In the embodiments of the present application, the terms "mobile station (MS)", "user terminal", "user equipment (UE)", and "terminal" can be used interchangeably. A mobile station is also called by those skilled in the art as a subscriber station, a mobile unit, a user unit, a wireless unit, a remote unit, a mobile device, a wireless device, a wireless communication device, a remote device, a mobile subscriber station, an access terminal, a mobile terminal, a wireless terminal, a remote terminal, a handset, a user agent, a mobile client, a client, or a number of other appropriate terms.

[0149] Furthermore, the wireless base station in the embodiments of the present application can also be replaced with a user terminal. For example, for a structure in which the communication between the wireless base station and the user terminal is replaced with a Device-to-Device (D2D) communication between a plurality of user terminals, each of the modes / embodiments of the present disclosure can also be applied. At this time, the functions possessed by the wireless base station can be regarded as the functions possessed by the user terminal. Furthermore, the words such as "uplink" and "downlink" can also be replaced with "side". For example, the uplink channel can also be replaced with a side channel. Likewise, the user terminal in the embodiments of the present application can also be replaced with a wireless base station. At this time, the functions possessed by the user terminal described above can be regarded as the functions possessed by the wireless base station.

[0150] In the embodiments of the present application, the UE can be a desktop device, a laptop device, a handheld device, a wearable device, a smart home device, a computing device, a vehicle-mounted device, and the like with a wireless connection function. For example, a netbook, a tablet computer, a smart watch, a personal computer (PC), an ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), a smart camera, a netbook, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a cellular phone, a cordless phone, a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phone, a Wireless Local Loop (WLL) station, a Portable Multimedia Player (PMP), an Augmented Reality (AR) / Virtual Reality (VR) device, a wireless device on an aircraft, a wireless device on a robot, a wireless device in industrial control, a wireless device in telemedicine, a wireless device in a smart grid, a wireless device in a smart city, a wireless device in a smart home, and the like. The specific type and structure of the UE are not limited in the embodiments of the present application.

[0151] Please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a hardware structure of a UE is shown. As Figure 2 indicated, in some embodiments, the structure of the UE can be as Figure 2As shown, the UE can include a processor 210, an external memory interface 220, an internal memory 221, a universal serial bus (USB) interface 230, a charging management module 240, a power management module 241, a battery 242, an antenna 1, an antenna 2, a mobile communication module 250, a wireless communication module 260, an audio module 270, a speaker 270A, a receiver 270B, a microphone 270C, a headset jack 270D, a sensor module 280, a key 290, a motor 291, an indicator 292, a camera 293, a display screen 294, and a subscriber identification module (SIM) card interface 295, etc. The sensor module 280 can include a pressure sensor 280A, a gyroscope sensor 280B, a barometric pressure sensor 280C, a magnetic sensor 280D, an acceleration sensor 280E, a distance sensor 280F, a proximity light sensor 280G, a fingerprint sensor 280H, a temperature sensor 280J, a touch sensor 280K, an ambient light sensor 280L, a bone conduction sensor 280M, etc.

[0152] It can be understood that the structure shown in the embodiment does not constitute a specific limitation on the UE. In other embodiments, the UE can include more or fewer components than those shown, or combine certain components, or split certain components, or different component arrangements. The components shown can be implemented in hardware, software, or a combination of software and hardware.

[0153] The processor 210 can include one or more processing units, for example: the processor 210 can include an application processor (AP), a Modem, a graphics processing unit (GPU), an image signal processor (ISP), a controller, a video codec, a digital signal processor (DSP), a baseband processor, and / or a neural-network processing unit (NPU), etc. Different processing units can be independent devices, or can be integrated in one or more processors.

[0154] The charging management module 240 is configured to receive a charging input from a charger. The charger can be a wireless charger or a wired charger.

[0155] The power management module 241 is configured to connect the battery 242 and the charging management module 240 to the processor 210. The power management module 241 receives input from the battery 242 and / or the charging management module 240 to power the processor 210, the internal memory 221, the display screen 294, the camera 293, and the wireless communication module 260.

[0156] The wireless communication function of the UE can be implemented by the antenna 1, the antenna 2, the mobile communication module 250, the wireless communication module 260, the modem, and the baseband processor.

[0157] The antenna 1 and the antenna 2 are configured to transmit and receive electromagnetic wave signals. Each antenna in the UE can be used to cover a single or multiple communication frequency bands. Different antennas can also be multiplexed to improve the utilization of the antennas.

[0158] The mobile communication module 250 can provide a solution for wireless communication including 2G / 3G / 4G / 5G, etc. applied to the UE.

[0159] The wireless communication module 260 can provide a solution for wireless communication including wireless local area networks (WLAN) (such as wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) networks), Bluetooth (BT), global navigation satellite system (GNSS), frequency modulation (FM), near field communication (NFC), infrared (IR) technology, etc. applied to the UE. The wireless communication module 260 can be one or more devices integrated with at least one communication processing module. The wireless communication module 260 receives electromagnetic waves via the antenna 2, performs frequency modulation and filtering processing on the electromagnetic wave signals, and sends the processed signals to the processor 210. The wireless communication module 260 can also receive signals to be sent from the processor 210, perform frequency modulation, amplification, and convert the signals to electromagnetic wave radiation via the antenna 2.

[0160] In the embodiments of the present application, the wireless communication module 260 can be used for the UE to send a request for resuming an RRC connection to a network node, and receive a response message from the network node.

[0161] The UE can realize the display function by the GPU, the display screen 294, and the application processor. The GPU is a microprocessor for image processing, connected to the display screen 294 and the application processor.

[0162] The display 294 is configured to display images, videos, and the like. A series of graphical user interfaces (GUIs) can be displayed on the display 294 of the UE.

[0163] The UE can implement a photographing function through the ISP, the camera 293, the video codec, the GPU, the display 294, and the application processor, and the like.

[0164] The camera 293 is configured to capture still images or videos.

[0165] The external memory interface 220 can be configured to connect an external memory card, such as a Micro SD card, to expand the storage capacity of the UE.

[0166] The internal memory 221 can be configured to store computer-executable program code including instructions. The processor 210 performs various functional applications and data processing of the UE by running the instructions stored in the internal memory 221.

[0167] The UE can implement an audio function through the audio module 270, the speaker 270A, the receiver 270B, the microphone 270C, the earphone interface 270D, the application processor, and the like. For example, music playing, voice recording, and the like. The UE can further include a pressure sensor 280A, an air pressure sensor 280C, a gyroscope sensor 280B, a magnetic sensor 280D, an acceleration sensor 280E, a distance sensor 280F, a proximity light sensor 280G, an ambient light sensor 280L, a fingerprint sensor 280H, a temperature sensor 280J, a touch sensor 280K, a bone conduction sensor 280M, a key 290, a motor 291, an indicator 292, and the like.

[0168] The SIM card interface 295 is configured to connect a SIM card. The SIM card can be inserted into or pulled out of the SIM card interface 295 to achieve contact and separation with the UE. The UE can support one or N SIM card interfaces, where N is a positive integer greater than 1. The SIM card interface 295 can support a Nano SIM card, a Micro SIM card, a SIM card, and the like. The same SIM card interface 295 can simultaneously insert multiple cards. The SIM card interface 295 can also be compatible with an external memory card. The UE interacts with the network through the SIM card to implement functions such as calling and data communication.

[0169] In addition, an operating system, such as an iOS operating system, an Android operating system, a Windows operating system, and the like, is run on the above-mentioned components. Application programs can be installed and run on the operating system. In some embodiments, the operating system running in the UE can be multiple.

[0170] It should be understood that Figure 2 The hardware modules included in the UE are described only by way of example, and do not limit the specific structure of the UE. In fact, the UE provided by the embodiments of the present application can also include other hardware modules that have an interaction relationship with the hardware modules shown in the figure, which are not specifically limited here. For example, the UE can also include a flash, a micro projection device, etc. For another example, if the UE is a PC, the UE can also include a keyboard, a mouse, etc.

[0171] It can be understood that, as the network environment becomes more and more complex, and the communication technology, network equipment or terminal equipment is constantly updated and upgraded, there are many problems in the encryption protection and integrity protection process in the information transmission process, such as the security protection ability is not synchronized, the security protection is not comprehensive, and the information is easy to be tampered with.

[0172] For example, after the introduction of some new mechanisms (such as RAN slice, small data transmission (Small Data Transmission), positioning (Position) or coverage enhancement mechanism, etc.), the introduction of the new mechanism will change the structure of some message bodies (such as the RRCResumeRequest message body), in this case, how to protect the integrity of the message?

[0173] For another example, for UEs with different security protection capabilities, how to avoid the design of redundant transmission parameters and iterative security decoding attempts on the network side due to the difference of encrypted input parameters?

[0174] For another example, how to ensure the synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes to avoid the design of redundant transmission parameters and iterative security decoding attempts on the network side? Similar problems as described above are urgently needed to be considered and solved.

[0175] For another example, in some data and / or signaling transmission process, the sending end does not encrypt and protect or integrity protect all the to-be-transmitted data, but only encrypts and protects or integrity protects part of the to-be-transmitted data. For this case, there is still a risk of tampering of data in the transmission process.

[0176] Taking the resume radio resource control (RRC) connection process in 5G NR as an example, a UE in an inactive (INACTIVE) state requests a network side device to resume an RRC connection to enter a connected (CONNECTED) state to perform data and / or signaling transmission. Figure 3 An interaction process diagram provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in FIG. 1. As shown in FIG. 1, the UE in the INACTIVE state sends an RRCResumeRequest message to the network side device to request the network side device to resume the RRC connection. Figure 3As shown in S301, the UE can send an RRCResumeRequset message to the current serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) to request the RRC context of the UE. In order to ensure that the RRCResumeRequset message is correctly identified at the network side device, the information carried in the RRCResumeRequset message includes a Resume Identity (i.e., request identity), a Resume message integrity authentication code (Message Authentication Code for Integrity, MAC-I) (or shortResumeMAC-I, hereinafter referred to as MAC-I), and a Resume Cause (i.e., request reason).

[0177] Among them, the Resume Identity is used for the network side device to identify the RRC context. For example, the Resume Identity can be an inactive radio network temporary identifier (Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier, I-RNTI).

[0178] In some cases, the RRCResumeRequset message also includes a reserved bit. For example, Figure 4 Two RRC resume request message format examples provided by the embodiments of the present application are shown in the following figures. Figure 4 As shown in (a) of Figure 4 or (b) of

[0179] As shown in Figure 4 , the I-RNTI can include a ShortI-RNTI (as shown in (a) of Figure 4 ) and a FullI-RNTI (as shown in (b) of Figure 4The I-RNTI can be configured to the UE by a network side device (e.g., an anchor base station) in an RRCRelease message, or can be indicated by a network side device (e.g., a serving base station) in a broadcast message, such as a System Information Block (SIB) 1 message, through useFullResumeID. For example, if the SIB 1 message includes useFullResumeID, it indicates that the Full I-RNTI is used; if the SIB 1 message does not include useFullResumeID, it indicates that the Short I-RNTI is used. For example, the Full I-RNTI is 40 bits, and the Short I-RNTI is 24 bits. For example, the Full I-RNTI can be composed of a UE ID, a gNB ID, and a Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN).

[0180] The MAC-I is used for message legitimacy verification and message integrity verification by the network side device. For example, the MAC-I can be calculated by the UE according to a security algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm. For example, the MAC-I can be 16 bits. As an example, the UE can calculate the MAC-I based on the following parameters: KRRCint, KEY, BEARER, DIRECTION, COUNT, and MESSAGE. KRRCint is an integrity protection key. KEY can be set to the value of KRRCint. MESSAGE can be set to VarResumeMAC-Input, which can be calculated based on the following parameters: source Physical cell identification (PCI), target cell-ID, and source cell-Radio Network Temporary Identity (C-RNTI).

[0181] As a possible implementation, the UE can send an RRCResumeRequset message to the current serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) through a Signalling Radio Bearers (SRB), such as SRB0. For example, the format of the RRCResumeRequset message can be as follows: Figure 4 as shown in (a) or Figure 4 as shown in (b).

[0182] Further, if the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) is not the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) of the UE, the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) determines the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) of the UE according to the Resume Identity carried in the RRCResumeRequset message, and requests the RRC context of the UE from the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) of the UE. For example, Figure 3 As shown in S302, the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) sends a Retrieve UE Context Request message (Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message) to the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) of the UE to request the RRC context. The Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the target cell ID (cell-ID) and the Resume Identity, MAC-I and Resume Cause from the UE.

[0183] In the case that the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) of the UE is determined by the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) according to the Resume Identity carried in the RRCResumeRequset message and is different from the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB), the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) of the UE can be determined by the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) according to the Resume Identity.

[0184] Further, after receiving the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message from the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB), the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) verifies the MAC-I to perform message legitimacy verification and message integrity verification. If the legitimacy and message integrity verification of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message pass, the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) sends a Retrieve UE Context Response message (Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message) to the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB). For example, Figure 3 As shown in S303, the anchor base station (e.g., Anchor-gNB) sends the Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message to the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB). The Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message carries the RRC context of the UE.

[0185] Further, as shown in S304, the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) sends an RRCResume message to the UE to resume the RRC connection. The RRCResume message carries the RRC context of the UE. Figure 3As shown in S304, after obtaining the RRC context of the UE, the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) sends an RRCResume message to the UE to resume the RRC connection (CONNECTED) state of the UE. As shown in S305, after receiving the RRCResume message, the UE resumes the connection (CONNECTED) state and sends an RRCResumeComplete message to the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) to inform the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) that the UE has resumed the connection (CONNECTED) state (e.g., as shown in S306). Furthermore, as shown in S307, after determining that the UE has resumed the connection (CONNECTED) state, the serving base station (e.g., Serving-gNB) can continue to process subsequent workflows. For example, the serving base station can perform Xn-U address indication to the anchor base station, the AMF unit serving base station can switch downlink routing according to the request of the serving base station, and the anchor base station can release the RRC context of the UE, etc. Figure 3 Figure 3

[0186] However, the request reason (e.g., Resume Cause) is not integrity protected in the conventional RRC resume request procedure, so if the request reason (e.g., Resume Cause) is tampered with, the network side device verification will fail, resulting in the UE RRC resume request failure. For example, if the UE requests to resume the RRC for the service type of initiating transmission data, and a malicious attacker tampers the service type in the request reason to periodic location update, the UE RRC resume request will fail, resulting in the failure of the transmission data service that the UE wants to initiate. Therefore, how to ensure that the data is not tampered with during transmission is also a problem that needs to be considered and solved.

[0187] In order to ensure the privacy and integrity of data during transmission in various cases such as considering system forwards compatibility (Forwards Compatibility) design, etc., the embodiment of the present application provides a data transmission protection method, which provides a unified solution that can simplify the processing process and computing power of integrity verification while ensuring the privacy and integrity of data during transmission in various cases such as communication technology upgrade, introduction of new communication mechanism, different UE security protection capabilities, different network node security protection capabilities, etc.

[0188] In the following, a data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application will be described in detail in combination with specific embodiments.

[0189] ​​In some embodiments of this application, network nodes can share their respective supported security protection capabilities to ensure the synchronization of security protection capabilities among network nodes and avoid redundant parameter transmission and iterative security decoding attempts on the network side.

[0190] Network nodes include base stations. Base stations include macro base stations, micro base stations, DU-CUs, wireless controllers, relay stations, access points, BNGs, aggregation switches, E-UTRAN equipment, eNBs, gNBs, etc., which are not limited in this application.

[0191] In some embodiments, network nodes notify each other of the security protection capabilities they support to ensure the synchronization of security protection capabilities among network nodes.

[0192] In one possible implementation, network nodes (such as the first node and the second node) can exchange their respective supported security protection capabilities when establishing an initial connection.

[0193] The initial connection established between network nodes includes the initial establishment of a communication interface between them. The type of communication interface depends on the specific device and is not limited in this application. For example, the communication interface between gNB 1 and gNB 2 is an Xn interface.

[0194] Figure 5A Synchronous interaction of network node security protection capabilities provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 1 .like Figure 5A As shown, the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment can be implemented based on the steps shown in S501-S504:

[0195] S501: The first node sends a communication interface establishment request message to the second node. This message carries the first node's security parameters.

[0196] The communication interface establishment request message is used to request the establishment of a communication interface. Taking the communication interface between the first node and the second node as the Xn interface as an example, the communication interface establishment request message is as follows: Xn interface establishment request message (Xn SetupRequest message).

[0197] Among them, the security parameters of the first node are used to characterize the security protection capabilities supported by the first node.

[0198] As an example, the security parameters of the first node may include, but are not limited to, one or more of the following: the encryption algorithm supported by the first node, the integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node, the computational parameters required for the encryption algorithm supported by the first node (also known as security key computation parameters), and the computational parameters required for the integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node (also known as integrity key computation parameters).

[0199] As another example, the security parameters of the first node can further comprise an index (index) identity. The index identity is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter currently supported by the first node.

[0200] As another example, the security parameters of the first node can further comprise indication information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node, such as the message domain supported by the first node for integrity protection.

[0201] S502: The second node sends a communication interface establishment response message to the first node. Wherein the security parameters of the second node are carried in the communication interface establishment response message.

[0202] Wherein, the communication interface establishment response message is used to inform the agreement to establish the communication interface. Taking the communication interface between the first node and the second node as an example, the communication interface establishment request message is, for example, an Xn interface establishment response message (XnSetup Response message).

[0203] Wherein, the security parameters of the second node are used to represent the security protection capability supported by the second node.

[0204] As an example, the security parameters of the second node can include but are not limited to one or more of the following: encryption algorithm supported by the second node, integrity protection algorithm supported by the second node, calculation parameter required for the encryption algorithm supported by the second node (also referred to as security key calculation parameter), calculation parameter required for the integrity protection algorithm supported by the second node (also referred to as integrity key calculation parameter).

[0205] As another example, the security parameters of the second node can further comprise an index (index) identity. The index identity is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter currently supported by the second node.

[0206] As another example, the security parameters of the second node can further comprise indication information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the second node, such as the message domain supported by the second node for integrity protection.

[0207] S503: The first node saves the security parameters of the second node.

[0208] S504: The second node saves the security parameters of the first node.

[0209] Wherein, the security parameters of the opposite end saved by the first node and the second node can be used for but not limited to one or more of the following: reference when performing decryption and integrity check in the subsequent, sharing with other network nodes, sharing with UEs.

[0210] With the first node being a Serving-gNB of the UE and the second node being an Anchor-gNB of the UE, and taking the communication interface establishment request message, such as the Xn Setup Request message, as an example, the Serving-gNB and the Anchor-gNB can exchange the security protection capabilities supported by each other when establishing an initial Xn connection. Figure 5B The synchronization interaction between network nodes provided by the embodiments of the present application for exchanging the security protection capabilities supported by each other when establishing an initial Xn connection Figure 1 As shown in FIG. 5, Figure 5B the Serving-gNB and the Anchor-gNB can obtain the security protection capabilities of the opposite end through S501-S504. Specifically, S501-S504 are as follows:

[0211] S501: The Serving-gNB sends an Xn Setup Request message to the Anchor-gNB. The Xn Setup Request message carries the security parameters of the Serving-gNB.

[0212] S502: The Anchor-gNB sends an Xn Setup Response message to the Serving-gNB. The Xn Setup Response message carries the security parameters of the Anchor-gNB.

[0213] S503: The Serving-gNB saves the security parameters of the Anchor-gNB.

[0214] S504: The Anchor-gNB saves the security parameters of the Serving-gNB.

[0215] It should be noted that in the present application, Figure 5A and Figure 5B only as an example of the network nodes informing each other of the security protection capabilities supported by each other, and the specific timing relationship of each step is not limited. For example, S504 can also be executed at the same time as S502 or S503, or before S502.

[0216] It is understandable that if the security protection capabilities of the first node and the second node are not synchronized, during data or signaling transmission between them—for example, when the first node, acting as the serving base station of the UE, requests the UE's RRC context from the anchor base station of the UE, such as the second node—the first node may send all the security parameters it supports (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) to the second node. In this case, the transmission of too many redundant parameters will waste communication resources and increase transmission latency. In addition, too many redundant parameters will require the second node to continuously iterate and try during decryption and integrity verification, thereby complicating the second node's processing and wasting computing power.

[0217] Based on the method provided in this application, after the first node and the second node exchange their respective supported security protection capabilities, the security protection capabilities between the first node and the second node can be synchronized. Therefore, when data or signaling is transmitted between the first node and the second node, for example, when the first node, acting as the serving base station of the UE, requests the UE's RRC context from the UE's anchor base station, such as the second node, it can accurately select security parameters (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node to protect the data. Furthermore, the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification based on the security parameters that match its supported security protection capabilities, avoiding the transmission of redundant parameters, simplifying the decryption and integrity verification process, and saving computational power for decryption and integrity verification.

[0218] In another possible implementation, a network node (such as the first node) can update the security protection capabilities it supports to other network nodes (including the second node) when there are updates to the security protection capabilities it supports.

[0219] like Figure 6A As shown, the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment can be implemented based on the steps shown in S601-S603:

[0220] S601: When the first node updates its supported security protection capabilities, it sends a configuration update message to the second node. The configuration update message carries the latest security parameters of the first node.

[0221] The latest security parameters of the first node characterize the latest security protection capabilities supported by the first node. Specifically, the latest security parameters of the first node correspond to the security protection capabilities supported by the updated first node.

[0222] In the embodiments of the present application, the security protection capability update can include but is not limited to the increase / deletion / modification of security algorithms (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms), security key calculation parameters or key calculation parameters due to the update of the application layer configuration between network nodes.

[0223] In the embodiments of the present application, the latest security parameters of the first node can include but are not limited to one or more of the following: the latest encryption algorithm supported by the first node, the latest integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node, the updated security key calculation parameter of the first node, and the updated integrity key calculation parameter of the first node.

[0224] As another example, the security parameters of the first node can also include an index (index) identifier. The index identifier is used to represent the latest integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameter supported by the first node.

[0225] As another example, the security parameters of the first node can also include indication information for representing the latest security protection capability of the first node, such as the latest message field supported by the first node for integrity protection.

[0226] As an example, in the embodiments of the present application, the communication interface between the first node and the second node has been established. Taking the example that the first node and the second node are NG-RAN and the communication interface between the first node and the second node is the Xn interface, the first node can send a configuration update message, such as an NG-RAN node configuration update message (NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message), to the second node through the Xn interface.

[0227] S602: The second node sends a configuration update confirmation message to the first node.

[0228] The configuration update confirmation message is used to confirm the receipt of the latest security parameters of the first node from the first node. Taking the example that the first node and the second node are NG-RAN, the configuration update confirmation message is an NG-RAN node configuration update confirmation message (NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message).

[0229] S603: The second node saves the latest security parameters of the first node.

[0230] The second node saving the latest security parameters of the first node can be used for but is not limited to one or more of the following: reference when performing decryption and integrity verification in the future, sharing with other network nodes, and sharing with UEs.

[0231] Taking a case that the first node is a Serving-gNB of a UE and the second node is an Anchor-gNB of the UE, Figure 6B The network node provided by the embodiment of the present application provides an interaction diagram for updating the supported security protection capability through an Xn interface. As shown in Figure 6B , when the security protection capability supported by the Serving-gNB is updated, the Serving-gNB can update the security protection capability supported by it to the Anchor-gNB through S601-S603. Specifically, S601-S603 are as follows:

[0232] S601: When the security protection capability supported by the Serving-gNB is updated, the Serving-gNB sends an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message to the Anchor-gNB. The latest security parameter of the Serving-gNB is carried in the NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message.

[0233] S602: The Anchor-gNB sends an NG-RAN Node Configuration UpdateAcknowledge message to the Serving-gNB.

[0234] S603: The Anchor-gNB saves the latest security parameter of the Serving-gNB.

[0235] It should be noted that in the present application, Figure 6A and Figure 6B only as an example of updating the supported security protection capability between network nodes, and the specific time sequence of each step is not limited. For example, Figure 6A or Figure 6B S603 can also occur before S602 or be executed at the same time as S602.

[0236] It should be noted that the above Figure 6B The method shown in the above Figure 5B The method shown in the above can also be executed on the basis of the method. After the security protection capability supported by the Serving-gNB and the Anchor-gNB is exchanged when the initial Xn connection is established between the Serving-gNB and the Anchor-gNB, if the security protection capability supported by the Serving-gNB is updated, the Serving-gNB updates the security protection capability supported by it to other network nodes (including the Anchor-gNB). Figure 7 The synchronization interaction of the security protection capability between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application is shown in Figure 3 . As shown in Figure 7As shown, the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment can be implemented based on the steps shown in S701-S707, wherein S701-S704 and Figure 5B Similar to S501-S504, and S705-S707 are similar. Figure 6B Similar to S601-S603.

[0237] In some embodiments, network nodes can also multicast their supported security protection capabilities to multicast domains via multicast messages. These multicast messages can be broadcast messages (such as SIB messages), and multicast domains can be broadcast domains; or multicast messages can be multicast messages, and multicast domains can be multicast domains.

[0238] As an example, network nodes can update the security protection capabilities they support to user devices within a multicast domain.

[0239] For example, network nodes can Figure 5A Based on the method shown, the security protection capabilities supported by user equipment within the broadcast domain are updated. User equipment within the broadcast domain includes cells residing in network nodes. Taking the Serving-gNB of the UE as the first node and the Anchor-gNB of the UE as the second node as an example... Figure 8 Synchronous interaction of network node security protection capabilities provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 4 .like Figure 8 As shown, the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S801-S805, wherein S801-S804 and Figure 5B Similar to S501-S504, S805 is shown below:

[0240] S805: The Serving-gNB sends a broadcast message, and the corresponding UE receives the broadcast message from the Serving-gNB. The broadcast message carries security parameters for the Serving-gNB and / or the Anchor-gNB.

[0241] For example, the Serving-gNB can send broadcast messages to all UEs residing in the cell where the Serving-gNB is located.

[0242] For example, broadcast messages such as SIB messages.

[0243] The security parameters of Serving-gNB (i.e., the first node) and / or Anchor-gNB (i.e., the second node) carried in the broadcast message are used by the UE to know the security protection capabilities supported by the first node and / or the second node when needed, so as to enable the matching encryption and integrity protection capabilities.

[0244] As an example, a network node can update its supported security capabilities to the multicast domain when those capabilities become available. Taking a Serving-gNB where the first node is the UE as an example... Figure 9 The network node broadcasts its security protection capabilities to the UE in the embodiments of this application. Figure 1 .like Figure 9 As shown in S901, when the UE's Serving-gNB has updated security protection capabilities, it broadcasts its latest security parameters to the UE via a broadcast message. For example, the first node can also... Figure 6B Based on the method shown, the system updates the supported security protection capabilities of user equipment within the multicast domain. Taking a Serving-gNB where the first node is the UE and the Anchor-gNB where the second node is the UE as an example... Figure 10 The network node broadcasts its security protection capabilities to the UE in the embodiments of this application. Figure 2 .like Figure 10 As shown, the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1001-S1004, wherein S1001-S1003 and Figure 6B Similar to S601-S603, S1004 is shown below:

[0245] S1004: The Serving-gNB of the UE sends a broadcast message to the UE. The broadcast message carries the latest security parameters of the Serving-gNB.

[0246] It is understood that, based on the method provided in the embodiments of this application, when a network node has updated security protection capabilities it supports, it broadcasts its latest supported security protection capabilities to ensure that the UE side updates the network node's security protection capabilities in real time, thereby selecting an appropriate security algorithm to protect data / signaling when there is a need for data / information transmission.

[0247] In some embodiments, network nodes (such as the first node) may also share their own supported security protection capabilities and / or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes with other network nodes (such as the third node).

[0248] For example, when sharing its own supported security protection capabilities with other network nodes (such as the third node), a network node (such as the second node) may send one or more security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes (such as the first node) stored locally to that network node (such as the third node).

[0249] For example, the first node and / or the second node can be Figure 5ABased on the method shown in the figure, the third node is taken as an example, the third node is a Serving-gNB of the UE, and the security protection capabilities supported by the first node and / or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes are shared with the third node through a configuration update message, Figure 11 As shown in the figure, the synchronization interaction method of the security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application is as follows: Figure 11 As shown in the figure, the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can also be implemented based on S1101-S1104, S1105 and / or S1106, and S1107 shown in the figure, wherein S1101-S1104 are similar to S501-S504 in Figure 5A , S1105-S1107 are as follows:

[0250] S1105: The first node sends a configuration update message to the Serving-gNB. The configuration update message carries the security parameters of the first node and / or the second node.

[0251] S1106: The second node sends a configuration update message to the Serving-gNB. The configuration update message carries the security parameters of the first node and / or the second node.

[0252] S1107: The Serving-gNB saves the security parameters of the first node and / or the second node.

[0253] It can be understood that based on the method provided by the embodiment of the present application, the security protection capabilities supported by the network nodes themselves or other network nodes are shared between the network nodes to ensure the synchronization of the security protection capabilities between the network nodes. Based on this, a more convenient and accurate decryption and integrity verification process can be provided in the data or signaling transmission process.

[0254] Further, as shown in S1108 in Figure 11 , the Serving-gNB can further send a broadcast message to the UE residing in the cell of the Serving-gNB, wherein the broadcast message carries one or more of the following: the security parameters of the first node, the security parameters of the second node, or the security parameters of the Serving-gNB.

[0255] It can be understood that in the embodiment of the present application, the UE can select a suitable security algorithm to perform security protection on data / signaling when there is a data / information transmission demand. In particular, in some important messages for resuming connection, such as the RRCResumeRequest message for resuming RRC connection, a more perfect mechanism is required to ensure the secure and reliable transmission of the message.

[0256] Taking the resume RRC connection procedure in 5G NR as an example, assuming that the first node is a serving base station of the UE and the second node is an anchor base station of the UE, as shown in Figure 12 FIG. 1, the UE in an inactive (INACTIVE) state can perform the following S1201-S1204 when having a resume RRC connection requirement:

[0257] S1201: The UE performs encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.

[0258] In some embodiments, the UE can perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the AS encryption algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm in the AS security context saved by the UE. The encryption algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm in the AS security context can be determined after the UE establishes AS security with a network node (e.g., the anchor base station of the UE, i.e., the second node).

[0259] In some embodiments, if the UE obtains the security parameters of the second node by reading a broadcast message (e.g., an SIB message), the UE can select a security protection algorithm according to the security parameters of the second node to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.

[0260] It can be understood that even if the AS security context saved by the UE includes a security parameter selection security protection algorithm determined by the UE and the second node, the security protection capability supported by the network node can change, and therefore, if the UE obtains the security parameters of the second node through a broadcast message, the UE can select a security protection algorithm according to the security parameters carried in the broadcast message.

[0261] For example, if the UE has configured an integrity protection parameter (including an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter) in the RRC_Release message, and the integrity protection parameter is consistent with the integrity protection parameter in the security parameters carried in the received broadcast message, for this case, the UE can perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message using the integrity protection parameter configured in the RRC_Release message.

[0262] If the UE has been configured with integrity protection parameters (including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters) in the RRC_Release message, but the integrity protection parameters are inconsistent with the integrity protection parameters in the security parameters carried in the received broadcast message, for this case, if the UE can support the security protection capability indicated by the broadcast message, the UE can use the integrity protection parameters in the security parameters carried in the broadcast message to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.

[0263] If the UE has not been configured with integrity protection parameters (including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters) in the RRC_Release message, but the UE can support the security protection capability indicated by the broadcast message, the UE can use the integrity protection parameters in the security parameters carried in the broadcast message to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.

[0264] If the UE has not been configured with integrity protection parameters (including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters) in the RRC_Release message, and the UE does not support the security protection capability indicated by the broadcast message, the UE can use the default integrity protection parameters to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message. The default integrity protection parameters are, for example, the last used integrity protection parameters of the UE, and the embodiments of the present application are not limited thereto.

[0265] The RRC_Release message is sent by the anchor base station of the UE when the UE enters the INACTIVE state from the CONNECTED state.

[0266] In some other embodiments, if the UE does not know the security protection capability supported by the second node, but the UE has been configured with integrity protection parameters (including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters) in the RRC_Release message, the UE can use the integrity protection parameters configured in the RRC_Release message to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.

[0267] In some other embodiments, if the UE does not know the security protection capability supported by the second node, and the UE has not been configured with integrity protection parameters in the RRC_Release message, the UE can use the default integrity protection parameters to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.

[0268] S1202: The UE sends an RRCResumeRequset message to the Serving-gNB (i.e., the first node).

[0269] The RRCResumeRequset message is ciphered and integrity protected by the UE. The information carried in the RRCResumeRequset message includes: Resume Identity (e.g., I-RNTI), MAC-I and ResumeCause.

[0270] In some embodiments of the present application, in order to prevent the Resume Cause carried in the RRCResumeRequset message from being tampered, the MAC-I carried in the RRCResumeRequset message can be an enhanced MAC-I. The enhanced MAC-I is used for the network side device to perform message legitimacy verification and message integrity verification. The enhanced MAC-I is related to the Resume Cause.

[0271] As an example, in the embodiments of the present application, the enhanced MAC-I can be calculated based on the following parameters: KRRCint, KEY, BEARER, DIRECTION, COUNT and enhanced MESSAGE. KRRCint is the integrity protection key. KEY can be set as the value of KRRCint. BEARER, DIRECTIO and COUNT can all be set as 1. The enhanced MESSAGE is, for example, enhanced VarResumeMAC-Input. The enhanced VarResumeMAC-Input can be calculated based on the following parameters: source PCI, target cell-ID, source cell C-RNTI and Resume Cause value. By taking the ResumeCause value as a parameter for calculating the MAC-I, the Resume Cause can be effectively protected to prevent the ResumeCause from being maliciously tampered.

[0272] In some embodiments of the present application, the Resume Cause value can be defined in an explicit form.

[0273] For example, in some embodiments, the Resume Cause value can be indicated by the reserved bits of the Resume Cause (for example, the current ResumeCause includes 5 bits of reserved bits).

[0274] For another example, in some embodiments, a new parameter can be extended to indicate the Resume Cause value. For example, the message format after extending the new parameter can be as follows:

[0275] ResumeCause ::= ENUMERATED { emergency, highPriorityAccess, mt-Access, mo-Signalling, mo-Data, mo-VoiceCall, mo-VideoCall, mo-SMS, MO-SDT, rna-Update, mps-PriorityAccess, mcs-PriorityAccess, sparel, spare2, spare3, spare4, spare5}.

[0276] In the above example, MO-SDT (Mobile Originating-Small Data Transmission) means that the Resume Cause is small data transmission.

[0277] In another example, the format of the message after extending the new parameter can be as follows:

[0278] ResumeCause ::= ENUMERATED { emergency, highPriorityAccess, mt-Access, mo-Signalling, mo-Data, mo-VoiceCall, mo-VideoCall, mo-SMS, Slicing, rna-Update, mps-PriorityAccess, mcs-PriorityAccess, sparel, spare2, spare3, spare4, spare5}.

[0279] In the above example, Slicing means that the Resume Cause is a slicing service.

[0280] In some embodiments, the value of the Resume Cause can be indicated by extending the message body. For example, the format of the extended message body can be as follows: carrying the indication information that the UE has completed measurement, etc., and reserving the extension space message body for subsequent extension.

[0281] For example, the extended message body can be as follows:

[0282]

[0283] In the above message body, the nonCriticalExtension uses the reserved bit (such as Figure 4 (a) orFigure 4 The spare bits (as shown in (b)) carry the indication information that the UE has completed the measurement.

[0284] In some embodiments of the present application, the Resume Cause value can be defined in an implicit form.

[0285] For example, for some services, such as RAN slice services, small data transmission services, etc., the Resume Cause value can be implicitly indicated by the division of the random access channel (RACH) resource. For example, the Resume Cause value is “0001” to indicate that the small data transmission service is initiated.

[0286] It should be noted that in the embodiments of the present application, the above-mentioned enhanced MAC-I, enhanced MESSAGE and enhanced VarResumeMAC-Input are only for distinguishing from the conventional MAC-I, MESSAGE and VarResumeMAC-Input, and the present application does not limit the specific name, which can be determined according to the specific naming rules.

[0287] If the Serving-gNB determines that the anchor base station of the UE is different from the serving base station according to the Resume Identity (such as I-RNTI) carried in the RRCResumeRequset message, the anchor base station of the UE can be determined by the Resume Identity. Assuming that the anchor base station of the UE is the second node, the Serving-gNB performs the following S1203.

[0288] S1203: The Serving-gNB (i.e. the first node) sends a Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message to the Anchor-gNB (i.e. the second node).

[0289] The Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is used to request the RRC context of the UE. The Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the target cell ID (cell-ID) and the Resume Identity (such as I-RNTI), MAC-I and Resume Cause from the UE.

[0290] In some embodiments, if the Serving-gNB receives the index indicating the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE in the RRCResumeRequset message, the Serving-gNB can send the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE to the Anchor-gNB, so that the Anchor-gNB performs integrity verification based on the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE.

[0291] For example, the Serving-gNB can carry the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message. For another example, the Serving-gNB can carry the index in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.

[0292] In some embodiments, the MAC-I carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is an enhanced MAC-I.

[0293] In some embodiments, in order to further protect the security of the information such as the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message, a message body container (Container) or similar security transmission mechanism can be used to encapsulate the information to be carried and send it to the Anchor-gNB through the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.

[0294] In the message body container (Container), one or more of the following parameters can be encapsulated, but not limited to: Resume Identity (such as I-RNTI), MAC-I, Resume Cause, integrity protection algorithm used by the UE, and integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE.

[0295] S1204: The Anchor-gNB (i.e. the second node) decrypts and performs integrity verification on the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.

[0296] In some embodiments, if the enhanced MAC-I is carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message, the Anchor-gNB can calculate the MAC-I based on the source PCI, target cell-ID, source cell C-RNTI and Resume Cause value when performing the integrity verification, to verify whether the MAC-I is consistent with the enhanced MAC-I carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message. For example, if consistent, the integrity verification is passed; if inconsistent, the integrity verification is not passed.

[0297] In some embodiments, if the Anchor-gNB obtains the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the UE from the Serving-gNB, for example, if the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message received by the Anchor-gNB from the Serving-gNB carries the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters (such as index identification) adopted by the UE, the Anchor-gNB can use the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters matched with the UE to perform the integrity verification on the information carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.

[0298] If the integrity verification of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message by the Anchor-gNB is passed, the Anchor-gNB performs S1205, the Serving-gNB performs S1206, and the UE performs S1207.

[0299] S1205: The Anchor-gNB (i.e. the second node) sends a Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message to the Serving-gNB (i.e. the first node).

[0300] In the Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message, the RRC context of the UE is carried.

[0301] S1206: The Serving-gNB (i.e. the first node) sends an RRCResume message to the UE.

[0302] The RRCResume message is used to indicate the RRC connection (CONNECTED) state of the UE.

[0303] S1207: The UE resumes the connection (CONNECTED) state.

[0304] Further, as Figure 12As shown in S1208, after the UE restores the connection (CONNECTED) state, the UE can also send an RRRCResumeComplete message to the Serving-gNB to notify the Serving-gNB that the UE has restored the connection (CONNECTED) state.

[0305] Furthermore, after the UE regains connectivity, network nodes (such as the Serving-gNB, Anchor-gNB, or AMF unit) can continue processing subsequent workflows. For example, the Serving-gNB can provide an interface address indication (Xn-U address indication) to the Anchor-gNB, the AMF unit can switch downlink routes based on a request from the Serving-gNB, and the Anchor-gNB can release the UE's RRC context.

[0306] Figure 13 Schematic diagram of the data transmission protection method provided in the embodiments of this application Figure 2 .like Figure 13 As shown, the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1301-S1308. Wherein, S1301-S1308 and Figure 12 Similar to S1201-S1208. For example... Figure 13 As shown, the RRCResumeRequset message sent by the Serving-gNB to the Anchor-gNB also carries an index identifier. The index identifier is used to characterize the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters used in the RRCResumeRequset message sent by the UE.

[0307] For example, if the UE uses the Encryption Integrity Algorithm (EIA) to perform integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequset message, the security key calculation parameter includes the reason why the UE requests to resume the RRC connection, the UE can carry Index 1 in the RRCResumeRequset message to inform the Serving-gNB of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE. For another example, if the UE uses the Integrity Algorithm for NR (NIA) to perform integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequset message, the security key calculation parameter includes the new service type that the UE is about to initiate, the UE can carry Index 2 in the RRCResumeRequset message to inform the Serving-gNB of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE.

[0308] As an example, the UE can carry the above index identifier in the reserved bit of the RRCResumeRequset message.

[0309] As another example, the UE can carry the above index identifier in the RRCResumeRequset extended message body.

[0310] For example, when the UE carries the above index identifier in the RRCResumeRequset extended message body, the format of the RRCResumeRequset extended message body can be as follows:

[0311] RRCResumeRequest-RelX::=SEQUENCE{

[0312] ResumeIKArithmetic-capability—Index IT STRING(SIZE(8))

[0313] }.

[0314] Among them, ResumeIKArithmetic-capability—Index is an index identifier used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE to send the RRCResumeRequset message.

[0315] In some embodiments of the application, the UE can define a Medium Access Control Control Element (MAC CE) to carry the index identification.

[0316] As an example, the MAC CE can include a first field and a second field. Wherein, as shown in (a) of Figure 14 , the first field is used to carry a Logical Channel Identification (LCID), and the second field is used to carry the index identification. Wherein, the LCID is used to indicate logical channel data. In embodiments of the application, the LCID is used to indicate that the index identification is carried in the MAC CE. As an example, the index identification can be 8 bits.

[0317] It can be understood that the 8-bit LCID has 2 8 (ie 64) possible values, such as 00-63. Among the 64 values of the LCID, some can be used to indicate logical channel data. For example, LCID 64 can be used to indicate a Timing Advance Command, LCID 60 can be used to indicate a Discontinuous Reception (DRX) command, etc. Of course, some of the values of the LCID can also be reserved bits. Taking a 16-bit LCID as an example, among the 2 16 (ie 256) possible values of the LCID, 000-244 are usually reserved bits. For details, please refer to the introduction in the conventional technology.

[0318] In some examples, the MAC CE also includes a reserved bit, as shown in (a) of Figure 14 , R is a reserved bit.

[0319] As another example, in order to save the encoding overhead of the MAC CE, the index identification can also be carried by the reserved bit of the MAC CE. As shown in (b) of Figure 14 , the MAC CE includes a 2-bit reserved bit. The 2-bit reserved bit can carry 4 index identifications, for example, when the 2-bit reserved bit is "00", "01", "10" and "11", it respectively indicates different index identifications.

[0320] It can be understood that in some cases, for example, when the UE in the inactive state moves from the area covered by the base station 1 (i.e., the anchor base station) to the area covered by the base station 2, and camps on the cell under the jurisdiction of the base station 2, the base station 2 does not know the security protection algorithm negotiated by the UE and the base station 1 (i.e., the anchor base station), and when the base station 1 requests the RRC context of the UE to the base station 2, there is a problem of security protection capability out of synchronization. In the embodiment of the application, the UE carries the index identifier in the RRCResumeRequset message to inform the Serving-gNB of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter adopted by the UE.

[0321] Further, in some embodiments of the application, in order to further ensure the integrity of the MAC layer message multiplexed with the RRCResumeRequset message, prevent the MAC message from being tampered to cause the network node to misunderstand the request of the UE, and cause problems such as request failure, low data transmission efficiency, and even failure, the method provided in the embodiment of the application can also perform integrity protection on the MAC layer message.

[0322] For example, the UE can carry the MAC-I derivation calculation input parameter through the MAC_CE, as shown in Figure 15A . The MAC-I derivation calculation input parameter includes the MAC layer message multiplexed with the RRCResumeRequest message and other messages in the MAC layer.

[0323] In some cases, if there are multiple MAC layer messages multiplexed with the RRCResumeRequest message and other messages in the MAC layer, the MAC_CE can carry multiple MAC-I derivation calculation input parameters, as shown in Figure 15B . The MAC-I derivation calculation input parameter 1 and the MAC-I derivation calculation input parameter 2 are shown in Figure 15B . As shown in

[0324] In some embodiments, if the Anchor-gNB passes the integrity verification of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message, but the Anchor-gNB determines that the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter adopted by the UE do not match the latest supported security protection capability of the Anchor-gNB, the Anchor-gNB can also initiate a re-authentication indication. Figure 16 The data transmission protection method interaction process provided in the embodiment of the application is shown in Figure 3 . As shown in Figure 16 , the data transmission protection method provided in the embodiment of the application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1601-S1608, wherein S1601-S1604 andFigure 13 S1301-S1304, S1605-S1608 are as follows:

[0325] S1605: The Anchor-gNB (i.e., the second node) sends a RetrieveContext failure message to the Serving-gNB (i.e., the first node).

[0326] The Retrieve Context failure message (i.e., the recovery context failure message) is used to indicate that the RRC context request fails.

[0327] In some embodiments, as shown in Figure 16 , the index of the Anchor-gNB can be carried in the Retrieve Context failure message. The index of the Anchor-gNB is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameter that the Anchor-gNB supports at the latest.

[0328] S1606: The Serving-gNB (i.e., the first node) sends an RRCRelease message to the UE.

[0329] As shown in Figure 16 , the index of the Anchor-gNB is carried in the RRCRelease message.

[0330] Further, the UE can re-encrypt and re-integrity protect the RRCResumeRequest message according to the index of the Anchor-gNB carried in the RRCRelease message (as shown in S1607 of Figure 16 ), and re-initiate the request to resume the RRC connection (as shown in S1608 of Figure 16 ).

[0331] If the Anchor-gNB fails the integrity verification of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST, as a possible implementation manner, the Anchor-gNB can also feed back a failure cause value to the Serving-gNB. Figure 17 The data transmission protection method interaction flow provided by the embodiments of the present application is shown in Figure 4 . As shown in Figure 17 , the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiments of the present application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1701-S1706, wherein S1701-S1704 are the same as Figure 13S1705-S1706 are as shown below:

[0332] S1705: The Anchor-gNB (i.e., the second node) sends a Retrieve Context failure message to the Serving-gNB (i.e., the first node).

[0333] The Retrieve Context failure message is used to indicate that the RRC context request fails.

[0334] In some embodiments, as shown in Figure 16 The failure cause value can be carried in the Retrieve Context failure message. The failure cause can be, for example, that the security protection algorithm does not match or the integrity verification fails.

[0335] By sending the failure cause value to the Serving-gNB, the Anchor-gNB can make the Serving-gNB aware of the specific reason so that the Serving-gNB can respond accordingly. For example, if the failure cause is that the integrity verification fails, it is presumed that there is a high possibility that the message is tampered. For such a request, in order to ensure that the network node responds to the tampered message incorrectly, the Serving-gNB can refuse the request when the UE initiates the same request again frequently. Alternatively, the Serving-gNB can refuse to respond to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period.

[0336] S1706: The Serving-gNB (i.e., the first node) sends an RRCReject message to the UE.

[0337] The RRCReject message is used to indicate that the RRC context request fails.

[0338] In some embodiments, as shown in Figure 17 The wait time can be carried in the RRCReject message, which is used to indicate that the UE does not initiate the same request within the wait time.

[0339] If the Anchor-gNB fails to verify the integrity of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST, as a possible implementation manner, the Anchor-gNB can also feed back the failure cause value to the UE through the Serving-gNB. Figure 18The fifth diagram illustrates the interactive flow of the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment. Figure 18 As shown, the data transmission protection method provided in this application embodiment can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1801-S1806, wherein S1801-S1804 and Figure 13 Similar to S1301-S1304, S1805 is similar to... Figure 17 Similar to S1705, S1806 is shown below:

[0340] S1806: The Serving-gNB (i.e., the first node) sends an RRRCRelease message to the UE.

[0341] The RRCRelease message is used to indicate that the request to obtain the RRC context failed.

[0342] In some embodiments, such as Figure 18 As shown, the RRC Release message can carry a failure cause value to inform the UE of the specific reason for the RRC context request failure, so that the UE can respond accordingly. Failure causes include things like security protection algorithm mismatch or integrity verification failure. For example, if the failure cause is integrity verification failure, the UE suspects that the message has been tampered with. For such requests, to prevent the message from being tampered with again when the request is initiated, the UE can refrain from initiating the same request for a preset period of time.

[0343] In the embodiments of this application, Figure 12 , Figure 13 , Figure 16 , Figure 17 The data transmission protection method shown can be based on similar Figure 5A , Figure 5B , Figure 6A , Figure 6B , Figure 7 or Figure 8 The synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes can also be based on conventional data transmission mechanisms, and this application does not limit this.

[0344] It should be noted that the above embodiments of this application are only examples of integrity protection and integrity verification of the RRCResumeRequest message used to restore RRC connections. The data transmission protection method provided in this application can also be applied to other data / signaling transmission processes.

[0345] The data transmission protection method provided in the embodiments of the present application can simplify the processing procedure and computing power of integrity verification while ensuring the privacy and integrity of data in the transmission process by providing a unified solution in the case of communication technology upgrade, introduction of new communication mechanism, different UE security protection capabilities, different network node security protection capabilities, and the like.

[0346] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, only the division of the above functional modules is taken as an example for illustration, and in actual application, the above functions can be completed by different functional modules according to needs, that is, the internal structure of the device is divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. The specific working process of the system, device and unit described above can refer to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, which will not be repeated here.

[0347] In several embodiments provided in the present embodiment, it should be understood that the disclosed system, device and method can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are only schematic, for example, the division of the modules or units is only a logical function division, and actual implementation can have another division manner, for example, a plurality of units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. In addition, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between the units shown or discussed can be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, device or unit, and can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.

[0348] The units described as separate components can or can not be physically separated, and the components shown as units can or can not be physical units, that is, they can be located in one place, or can be distributed on a plurality of network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the present embodiment scheme.

[0349] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present embodiment can be integrated in one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated in one unit. The integrated unit can be realized in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.

[0350] The integrated unit, if implemented in the form of a software function unit and sold or used as an independent product, can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the embodiments can be embodied in the form of a software product in essence or in the form of a whole or part of the technical solutions that contribute to the prior art, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including a plurality of instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) or a processor to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in the embodiments. The aforementioned storage medium includes: a flash memory, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory, a random access memory, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and various media that can store program codes.

[0351] The above is merely specific implementations of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto, any changes or replacements within the technical scope disclosed in the present application should be covered within the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method of data transmission protection, characterized by, The method comprises: The first node establishes a request message through a communication interface, and sends security parameters of the first node to a second node; The security parameters of the first node are used to represent information of security protection capabilities supported by the first node, and the information of security protection capabilities supported by the first node is used for the second node to perform integrity verification on data from the first node; The first node receives a radio resource control resume request message from a user equipment (UE), and the radio resource control resume request message comprises: an inactive radio network temporary identifier (I-RNTI), a message integrity authentication code (MAC-I), and a request reason; The first node determines that an anchor base station of the UE is the second node; The first node sends a resume UE context request message to the second node, and the resume UE context request message carries a cell identifier of a target cell, the I-RNTI, the MAC-I, and the request reason.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The communication interface establishment request message is an Xn interface establishment request message.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The first node sends the security parameters of the first node to the second node through a configuration update message; The security parameters of the first node are used to represent information of security protection capabilities supported by the first node.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, The configuration update message is a next generation radio access network node configuration update message; and the method further comprises: The first node receives a next generation radio access network node configuration update confirmation message from the second node.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, The method further comprises: When the security protection capabilities supported by the first node are updated, the first node sends information representing the latest security protection capabilities supported by the first node to the second node.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, The method further comprises: The first node sends a broadcast message; The broadcast message carries information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capabilities supported by the second node.

7. The method of any one of claims 1-4, wherein: The security parameters of the first node comprise a first index identifier, and the first index identifier is used to represent an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter supported by the first node.

8. The method of any one of claims 1-4, wherein: The radio resource control resume request message and the resume UE context request message further carry a second index identifier, and the second index identifier is used to represent an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE when the radio resource control resume request message is protected.

9. The method of claim 8, wherein: The resume UE context request message comprises a message body container (Container), and the Container encapsulates one or more of the following information: the I-RNTI, the MAC-I, the request reason, the cell identifier, and the second index identifier.

10. The method of any one of claims 1-4, wherein, The method further comprises: The first node receives a resume context failure message from the second node, the resume context failure message carrying information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node; The first node sends a radio resource control release message to the UE, the radio resource control release message carrying information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, for the UE to re-secure the radio resource control resume request message according to the information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node.

11. A first node, characterized by The first node comprises: A communication unit configured to send a communication interface establishment request message to a second node, the communication interface establishment request message comprising security parameters of the first node; The security parameters of the first node represent information of security protection capability supported by the first node, and the information of security protection capability supported by the first node is used for the second node to perform integrity verification on data from the first node; The first node further comprises a processing unit, and the communication unit is further configured to receive a radio resource control resume request message from a user equipment (UE) and send a resume UE context request message to the second node when the processing unit determines that an anchor base station of the UE is the second node; The radio resource control resume request message comprises an inactive radio network temporary identifier (I-RNTI), a message integrity authentication code (MAC-I) and a request reason, and the resume UE context request message carries a cell identifier of a target cell, the I-RNTI, the MAC-I and the request reason.

12. The first node of claim 11, wherein, The communication interface establishment request message is an Xn interface establishment request message.

13. The first node of claim 12, wherein, The communication unit is specifically configured to: Send a configuration update message to the second node, the configuration update message comprising security parameters of the first node; The security parameters of the first node represent information of security protection capability supported by the first node.

14. The first node of claim 13, wherein, The configuration update message is a next generation radio access network node configuration update message, and the communication unit is further configured to: Receive a next generation radio access network node configuration update confirmation message from the second node.

15. The first node of any of claims 11-14, wherein, The communication unit is further configured to: When the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated, send information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the first node to the second node.

16. The first node of any of claims 11-14, wherein, The communication unit is further configured to send a broadcast message; The broadcast message carries information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and / or information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node.

17. The first node of any one of claims 11-14, wherein The security parameters of the first node comprise a first index identifier representing an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter supported by the first node.

18. The first node of any one of claims 11-14, wherein The radio resource control resume request message and the resume UE context request message further carry a second index identifier, which is used to represent an integrity protection algorithm and an integrity key calculation parameter used by the UE to perform security protection on the radio resource control resume request message.

19. The first node of claim 18, wherein, The resume UE context request message includes a message body container Container, and the Container encapsulates one or more of the following information: I-RNTI, MAC-I, request cause, cell identity, and the second index identifier.

20. The first node of any of claims 11-14, wherein, The communication unit is further configured to: receive a resume context failure message from the second node, the resume context failure message carrying information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node; and, send a radio resource control release message to the UE, the radio resource control release message carrying information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, for the UE to perform security protection on the radio resource control resume request message again according to the information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node.

21. A first node, the first node comprising: The first node comprises: a memory configured to store a computer program; a transceiver configured to receive or send radio signals; a processor configured to execute the computer program, so that the first node implements the method of any one of claims 1-10.

22. A communication system, characterized by The communication system comprises: a user equipment (UE), a second node, and the first node of any one of claims 11-20 or 21.

23. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer readable storage medium stores computer program code, which, when executed by a processing circuit, implements the method of any one of claims 1-10.

24. A chip system, characterized by The chip system comprises a processing circuit and a storage medium, and the storage medium stores computer program code; the computer program code, when executed by the processing circuit, implements the method of any one of claims 1-10.

25. A computer program product, characterised in that, The computer program product is used to run on a computer to implement the method of any one of claims 1-10. The computer program product is used to run on a computer to implement the method of any one of claims 1-10.

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