Research on the influence of safety atmosphere on the unsafe behavior regulation decision-making process in the construction of civil-military airport

Abstract

The application discloses a research method for the influence of a safe atmosphere on an unsafe behavior supervision decision-making process in a military-civil airport construction, and comprises the following steps: S1, model assumption: determining a game group, a strategy set and a safe and stable strategy; S2, establishing a behavior game value perception matrix; S3, using a replication dynamic equation to perform numerical solution on the model and performing evolution equilibrium point analysis to obtain conditions required to be met by the model stability; and S4, parameter simulation and analysis.The application uses the prospect theory and the psychological account theory to establish the value perception matrix, determines the non-rational and risk preference factors of the safety behavior decision-making of the supervision and construction personnel, simulates the safety behavior decision-making evolution process of the construction related persons through the establishment of an evolution game model conforming to the safety management characteristics of the airport non-stop construction, and according to the simulation experiment result, the unsafe behavior in the construction process can be effectively controlled through the single factor control of the safety supervision.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of airport engineering construction safety technology, specifically involving a research method on the impact of safety atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behaviors during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport. Background Technology

[0002] Civil-military joint-use airports are crucial facilities that simultaneously provide takeoff and landing sites, training and maintenance facilities, transit and resupply services, and routine flight training for various types of military or civilian aircraft. With the development of aircraft manufacturing technology and the optimization and adjustment of national defense strategies, more and more new types of aircraft are being deployed, placing higher demands on the quality standards of airport infrastructure and flight sites. Regarding the development of civilian airports, the government will fully consider existing military airport resources and enhance military-civilian cooperation in airport construction and maintenance. Since 1985, the military has systematically opened more than 60 airports for civil-military joint use. Therefore, civil-military joint-use airports face increasingly heavy tasks of expansion and renovation, including runway repair, runway widening and lengthening, airport area expansion and renovation, and other routine maintenance projects.

[0003] Because my country's joint military-civilian airports are primarily "one airport per location," and each typically has only one runway, and are constrained by factors such as the availability of parking spaces and support equipment at surrounding airports, as well as the daily support and national defense missions required at the airport itself, many renovation and expansion projects must be carried out while the airport remains operational. Ensuring the smooth, safe, and timely completion of these projects is a pressing issue. The basic requirement for airport construction without interrupting operations is to ensure the safety of aircraft operations and to implement airport civil engineering, equipment, and facility upgrades and renovations with high quality and quantity, without affecting aircraft takeoffs or recovery missions. The biggest challenge facing airport construction without interrupting operations is the high safety risk. Any safety accident during construction can range from affecting the construction progress and damaging machinery to potentially destroying aircraft and even causing greater casualties and economic losses.

[0004] Compared to general construction projects and civilian airport construction projects, the construction of joint military-civilian airports, especially those with combat readiness missions, involves non-stop operation. Firstly, military aircraft have higher requirements for site cleanliness; secondly, access control for construction personnel and machinery is more stringent; thirdly, greater emphasis is placed on construction quality standards and safety management; and fourthly, tight schedules and low tolerance for errors mean that significant safety risks and losses cannot be tolerated. Currently, non-stop operation construction projects for joint military-civilian airports are mostly implemented by local construction and construction units, and jointly supervised by local supervision units, airport management agencies, and military barracks construction and management units. Due to varying capabilities and qualifications among supervisory and construction personnel, as well as loopholes in information exchange and safety management between military and civilian aviation operations, safety risks frequently arise during on-site construction, creating significant safety hazards. Non-stop operation construction of joint military-civilian airports is a complex systemic project, with a safety management complexity and danger level far exceeding that of general construction projects. Current research and data show that unsafe human behavior accounts for at least 80% of all accidents, and organizational behavior determines an organization's safety performance by 80%.

[0005] Organizational safety atmosphere is the most core part of organizational behavior. Therefore, in order to effectively improve the safety management level of non-stop construction of joint military-civilian airports, optimize safety supervision strategies, and reduce construction safety risks, it is necessary to further study the role mechanism of organizational safety atmosphere in the construction safety management process. Research on the influence mechanism between safety atmosphere and unsafe behaviors of project-related personnel has both theoretical and practical significance. Summary of the Invention

[0006] The purpose of this invention is to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art and provide an analytical method for the impact of the safety atmosphere on unsafe behaviors during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0008] A research method for studying the impact of safety atmosphere on the decision-making process for monitoring unsafe behaviors during the construction of joint military-civilian airports includes the following steps:

[0009] S1. Model Assumptions: Determine the game population, strategy set, and safe and stable strategies;

[0010] S2. Establish a behavioral game value perception matrix;

[0011] S3. Use the replicated dynamic equations to numerically solve the model and perform evolutionary equilibrium point analysis to obtain the conditions that the model must meet to be stable.

[0012] S4. Parameter simulation analysis.

[0013] Preferably, in step S1, the game group consists of safety supervisors and front-line construction workers.

[0014] Preferably, in step S1, the strategy set is as follows: during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport without interruption of operations, safety supervisors have two strategies: active supervision and passive supervision, and front-line construction workers have two strategies: safe operation and unsafe operation.

[0015] Preferably, in step S1, the safety and stability strategy is: safety supervisors select an active supervision strategy and front-line construction workers select a safe operation strategy.

[0016] Preferably, step S2 includes the following steps:

[0017] S21. According to mental accounting theory, the judgment value function Classified as a profit account and payment accounts Each of them has a corresponding sensory reference point. and To simplify the subsequent calculation process, and They are respectively denoted as and ,but and The functional relationships are shown below:

[0018]

[0019]

[0020] In the formula, and These are the sensitivity coefficients for avoiding revenue and payment losses, respectively. and These are the corresponding risk preference coefficients;

[0021] S22, The profit account obtained from step S21 and payment accounts Based on the model assumptions in step S1, a behavioral game value perception matrix is ​​established.

[0022] Preferably, step S3 includes the following steps:

[0023] S31. Based on the behavioral game value perception matrix obtained in step S2, obtain the expected payoff perception of safety supervisors when choosing between the two strategies of "active supervision" and "passive supervision". , and the average perceived benefit of the entire group of safety regulators The study also obtained the expected benefits perceived by frontline construction workers when choosing between "safe operation" and "unsafe operation" strategies. , and the average perceived benefit of the entire frontline construction worker group As shown in the following formula:

[0024]

[0025]

[0026] In the formula, and These are the fixed wages for safety supervisors and frontline construction workers, respectively. and The perceived costs of active and passive oversight by safety supervisors, respectively. and The perceived costs incurred by frontline construction workers for safe and unsafe operations, respectively. This refers to the perceived costs incurred by construction workers when unsafe practices are discovered, or by supervisors when reported for ineffective oversight. This refers to the perceived safety risk costs that the responsible party needs to bear after a safety accident occurs. The proportion of fines imposed on frontline construction workers and safety supervisors that are converted into safety production rewards for them is [not specified]. When safety supervisors actively monitor operations, but frontline construction workers engage in unsafe practices, a safety risk cost discount factor needs to be paid by both parties involved in the decision-making process. When frontline construction workers operate safely, but safety supervisors provide passive oversight, both parties involved in the decision-making process need to pay a discount factor for the safety risk costs. The risk transmission coefficient between the two decision-making parties. The proportion of safety supervisors who actively oversee safety matters. The proportion of frontline construction workers who are committed to safe operation. This represents the probability of safety accidents caused by unsafe operations by frontline construction workers. The probability of unsafe operations or passive resistance being discovered and reported by both parties involved in the decision-making process;

[0027] S32. Based on the dynamic replication formula in evolutionary game theory, we obtain the result in step S31. and The replication dynamic equations for the proportions of these two types of personnel are shown in the following equations:

[0028]

[0029]

[0030] In the formula, The perceived benefits of safety regulators choosing proactive regulatory strategies. The perceived benefits of safety regulators choosing a passive regulatory strategy. For the average perceived benefit of the entire regulatory staff group, The proportion of safety supervisors who actively oversee safety matters. The proportion of frontline construction workers who are committed to safe operation. The perceived benefits of choosing safe operating strategies for frontline construction workers. The perceived benefits of choosing unsafe operating strategies for frontline construction workers. The average perceived benefit for the entire frontline construction workforce;

[0031] S33. Based on the replicated dynamic equations obtained in step S32, five local equilibrium points are obtained;

[0032] S34. Perform stability analysis on the local equilibrium points obtained in step S33 to obtain the conditions that the model stability must meet.

[0033] Preferably, step S4 includes the following steps:

[0034] S41. Based on the conditions for model stability obtained in step S3, the influencing factors of the model's stable state include the costs of active supervision, safe operation costs, the probability of unsafe operation behaviors being discovered, the perception of safety accident losses, and the initial proportion of safe behavior strategies.

[0035] S42. Combining the influencing factors obtained in step S41, the impact of the safe atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behavior is simulated and analyzed using Matlab software.

[0036] Compared with the prior art, the advantages of this invention are as follows:

[0037] This invention utilizes prospect theory and mental accounting theory to establish a value perception matrix, identifying irrational and risk-preference factors in the safety behavior decisions of supervisors and construction personnel. By establishing an evolutionary game model consistent with the characteristics of airport non-stop construction safety management, the evolutionary process of safety behavior decisions by construction-related actors was simulated. Simulation experiments show that factors such as the initial safety capabilities of the safety supervisors and construction personnel, underestimation of accident losses, safety supervision and construction costs, and the probability of unsafe behavior being detected have a significant impact on the choice of safety construction and supervision strategies. The initial safety capabilities of the group mainly change the rate at which the model reaches an evolutionary stable state, while the other factors directly affect whether the model can reach evolutionary equilibrium. Based on the correlation between each factor and the safety atmosphere dimension, it can be seen that a good safety atmosphere level can enable safety supervisors and construction personnel to quickly reach a safe evolutionary stable state by influencing factors such as the perception of accident losses, the probability of unsafe behavior being detected, and safety supervision and construction costs. Attached Figure Description

[0038] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the research method for studying the impact of safety atmosphere on the decision-making process for monitoring unsafe behaviors during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport, as provided in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0039] Figure 2 The simulation results show the impact of the initial decision ratio of the group on the evolution.

[0040] in, Figure 2 (a) in the figure represents the initial proportion. Simulation results of the impact on evolution; Figure 2 (b) in the figure represents the initial proportion. Simulation results of the impact on evolution;

[0041] Figure 3 The simulation results show the impact of accident losses on evolution.

[0042] in, Figure 3 Figure (a) shows the simulation results of the impact of accident losses on the evolution of safety supervision personnel's strategies; Figure 3 Figure (b) shows the simulation results of the impact of accident losses on the evolution of construction personnel's strategies;

[0043] Figure 4 Simulation results of the impact of active regulatory costs on evolution;

[0044] Figure 5 Simulation results of the impact of safe operating costs on evolution;

[0045] Figure 6 Simulation results showing the impact of the probability of unsafe behavior being detected on evolution;

[0046] in, Figure 6 Figure (a) shows the simulation results of the impact of the probability of unsafe behavior being detected on the evolution of safety supervisors' strategies. Figure 6 Figure (b) shows the simulation results of the impact of the probability of unsafe behavior being detected on the evolution of construction workers' strategies. Detailed Implementation

[0047] Exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure will now be described in more detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. While exemplary embodiments of the present disclosure are shown in the drawings, it should be understood that the present disclosure may be implemented in various forms and should not be limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Rather, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the disclosure to those skilled in the art.

[0048] Prospect theory, a branch of decision theory, identifies the expectation theory that, through experimental observation, reveals that individuals' decision-making choices often depend on the gap between the event's outcome and the anticipated outcome (i.e., expectations or assumptions). Furthermore, different reference points pre-set by individuals before making decisions reflect varying risk attitudes. Analysis of preliminary survey data on the management of a non-stop construction project at an airport in eastern Zhejiang reveals that the expected values ​​of relevant individuals regarding their behavioral decisions align with several basic conclusions of prospect theory: First, most people are risk-averse when faced with potential gains; that is, given sufficient benefits, they tend to maintain the status quo and are unwilling to invest additional costs for higher safety standards (certainty effect). Second, most people are risk-seeking when faced with potential losses; that is, to avoid the risk of loss, individuals may adopt behavioral decisions with higher safety risks to mitigate loss (reflection effect). Third, most people's judgments of gains and losses are often determined by reference points, and there is a certain degree of competitive psychology among relevant groups (reference dependence). Fourth, most people are more sensitive to losses than gains; for example, they often disregard bonuses but are very concerned about fines (loss effect). A key feature of prospect theory is that it replaces the traditional utility function with a value function and objective probability with a decision weight function, effectively reflecting the bounded rationality characteristics of stakeholders involved in airport construction projects that do not require uninterrupted operation. Its mathematical expression is shown below:

[0049]

[0050] In the formula: It indicates the decision-maker's perception of the overall value; Represents the decision weight function; This represents the value function by which the two players in the game assess their gains and losses. The decision weight function is also included. As shown in the following formula:

[0051]

[0052] In the formula: These are the coefficients of the weighting function; Indicates an event The probability of occurrence, when When approaching 0, ;when When it approaches 1, Because low-probability events are usually overestimated in real life, while high-probability events are usually underestimated, therefore... , .

[0053] The value function for each player's assessment of profit and loss. As shown in the following formula:

[0054]

[0055] In the formula: For the event The difference between the actual benefit received by the decision-maker after the event and the reference point. ;in The risk preference attitude coefficient represents the degree of diminishing marginal returns of decision-makers' perceived value of gains and losses; The loss aversion coefficient represents the sensitivity of a decision-maker to the losses they will face.

[0056] Mental accounting theory posits that people typically manage their acquired wealth and their expenditures in separate mental accounts, applying different accounting methods and mental operational rules. This allows individuals to move beyond basic rational economic principles in their decision-making. For example, in a joint military-civilian airport construction project, individuals may exhibit different psychological states when faced with safe outcomes obtained through hard work or opportunistic behavior: they tend to cherish hard-won gains, leading to a more sustained state of security and stability; while they often disregard unexpected rewards, making it difficult to maintain a consistent and stable behavioral strategy. This subconscious distinction between gains obtained through different behavioral methods constitutes the essence of mental accounting.

[0057] In conclusion, combining prospect theory with mental accounting to replace the traditional value function can better describe the bounded rationality and psychological effects on supervisors and construction workers in non-stop construction projects, making the game simulation model more consistent with real-world case scenarios.

[0058] like Figure 1 As shown, this invention provides a research method for studying the impact of safety atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behaviors during the construction of joint military-civilian airports, specifically including the following steps:

[0059] S1. Model Assumptions: Determine the game population, strategy set, and safe and stable strategies;

[0060] Ignoring the impact of the external environment on construction, whether unsafe behaviors and accidents will occur during the non-stop construction of a joint military-civilian airport can be viewed as the result of behavioral decisions made by supervisors and construction workers through a game theory approach under a specific safety atmosphere. Therefore, the following hypothesis is established:

[0061] (1) The stakeholders in the game model are safety supervisors and front-line construction workers. Both sides make strategy choices based on their own perception of the value of the strategy, and they are a game group with bounded rationality. Among them, safety supervisors include construction units, airport operations departments, and relevant military safety officials; front-line construction workers refer to on-site construction workers of construction units and drivers of engineering vehicles, etc.

[0062] (2) Current regulations and systems related to safe construction can meet the project's construction safety requirements. That is, whether there are safety risks or accidents at the construction site depends on whether construction workers take safe operating procedures, ignoring other interfering factors and possibilities. Whether construction workers take safe operating procedures is determined by the outcome of a game between the construction workers and safety supervisors regarding their active supervision. Therefore, in the process of non-stop construction at a joint military-civilian airport, construction workers have two strategies: {safe operation, unsafe operation}; safety supervisors have two strategies: {active supervision, passive supervision}. During the game, decision-makers choose strategies based on perceived value.

[0063] (3) The safe and smooth progress of airport construction without interruption of operations is achieved through the joint efforts of construction personnel and safety supervisors. Only when both parties simultaneously focus on safe construction, i.e., when the chosen strategy is {safe operation, active supervision}, can the overall safety and stability be ensured, and the safety risk cost to both parties in this decision-making process be set to 0. When either the safety supervisor or the construction personnel fails to comply with safety regulations, considering the limited personal capabilities of the other party, safety risks will arise and risk transfer will occur. The risk coefficient will change depending on the different parties involved.

[0064] S2. Establish a behavioral game value perception matrix, which includes the following steps:

[0065] S21. According to mental accounting theory, the judgment value function Classified as a profit account and payment accounts Each of them has a corresponding sensory reference point. and To simplify the subsequent calculation process, and They are respectively denoted as and ,but and The functional relationships are shown below:

[0066]

[0067]

[0068] In the formula, and These are the sensitivity coefficients for avoiding revenue and payment losses, respectively. and These are the corresponding risk preference coefficients;

[0069] S22, The profit account obtained from step S21 and payment accounts Based on the model assumptions in step S1, a behavioral game value perception matrix is ​​established.

[0070] Based on the model assumptions in step S1 and the characteristics of airport construction without interrupting operations, the payoff and perceived accounts of the two decision-makers will change as follows during the game:

[0071] (1) When the decision-making parties choose the strategy of {safe operation, active supervision}, since they are in a safe and stable state, both parties will receive the predetermined work remuneration, and each party will pay a certain labor perception cost (including physical strength, time and mental effort).

[0072] (2) When one of the decision-makers chooses an unsafe behavior, on the one hand, the work remuneration received by both parties remains unchanged, the construction workers receive the reward for reporting the supervisors’ passive resistance, and the supervisors receive the reward for strict law enforcement; on the other hand, the perceived labor costs paid by both parties decrease, but they have to bear the risk transfer caused by the other party’s unsafe behavior, and pay fines according to their own violations.

[0073] (3) When neither party to the decision-making process chooses safe production operation, both parties will need to bear the safety costs in the later stages of the accident based on the probability of the accident occurring.

[0074] Based on the above analysis and considering the characteristics of non-stop construction at joint military-civilian airports, the payoff perception matrix of the construction safety management behavior game can be obtained as shown in Table 1 below.

[0075] Table 1. Value Perception Matrix of Behavioral Game Theory

[0076]

[0077] In Table 1, the meanings of each parameter are as follows: ① and These are the fixed wages for supervisors and construction workers, respectively. ② and The perceived costs of active and passive supervision by safety supervisors, including the effort and funds spent on implementing supervisory work, are clearly different. Among these, when the safety pressure level in the safety atmosphere dimension is high, safety supervisors need to invest more energy, physical strength, and material resources to ensure the effective implementation of their supervisory responsibilities, thus increasing their perceived cost difference. Conversely, when the levels of safety training, safety supervision, organizational support, and worker behavior are high, it indicates that the current construction project is in a good safety atmosphere, with relevant personnel possessing a high degree of self-discipline and safety responsibility. Consequently, safety supervisors can achieve safety management goals with minimal investment in supervision costs, thus reducing their perceived cost difference. ③ and The perceived costs of safe and unsafe operations by construction workers include the effort and money spent on performing construction tasks, implementing airport safety regulations, participating in safety training, and repeated entry and exit due to flight activities. Clearly, these costs exist. Similarly, when the safety pressure level in the safety atmosphere dimension is high, construction workers often need multiple rounds of re-inspection and confirmation, or even overtime work, to ensure that their work is of high quality and meets project safety requirements, thus requiring a greater investment in safety labor costs. However, when the levels in other dimensions are high, whether it's their own strong skills and qualifications, technical and equipment support from the organization, or mutual assistance and warnings among organization members, all can effectively reduce the individual safety investment costs for construction workers, thus reducing the perceived difference in behavioral costs. ④ This refers to the perceived costs incurred by construction workers for unsafe practices or by supervisors for ineffective oversight, including fines and emotional distress. ⑤ This refers to the perceived safety risk costs that the responsible party will have to bear after a safety accident, including work-related personal injury, economic losses during construction, and schedule delays. ⑥ The percentage of fines levied on construction workers and supervisors that are converted into safety production rewards for the other party; When regulators actively supervise but construction workers operate unsafely, a safety risk cost discount factor needs to be paid by both parties involved in the decision-making process. When construction workers operate safely, but supervisors provide passive oversight, both parties involved in the decision-making process need to pay a discount factor for the safety risk costs. This represents the risk transmission coefficient between the two decision-making parties. ⑦ The proportion of safety supervisors who actively oversee operations; The percentage of airport construction workers performing safe operations. ⑧ The probability of a safety accident caused by unsafe operation by construction workers; This measures the probability of unsafe operations or passive resistance by both decision-makers being discovered and reported.

[0078] S3. Numerically solve the model using the replicated dynamic equations and perform evolutionary equilibrium point analysis to obtain the conditions that the model must satisfy for stability. This includes the following steps:

[0079] S31. Based on the behavioral game value perception matrix obtained in step S2, obtain the expected payoff perception of safety supervisors when choosing between the two strategies of "active supervision" and "passive supervision". , and the average perceived benefit of the entire group of safety regulators The study also obtained the expected benefits perceived by frontline construction workers when choosing between "safe operation" and "unsafe operation" strategies. , and the average perceived benefit of the entire frontline construction worker group As shown in the following formula:

[0080]

[0081]

[0082] In the formula, and These are the fixed wages for safety supervisors and frontline construction workers, respectively. and The perceived costs of active and passive oversight by safety supervisors, respectively. and The perceived costs incurred by frontline construction workers for safe and unsafe operations, respectively. This refers to the perceived costs incurred by construction workers when unsafe practices are discovered, or by supervisors when reported for ineffective oversight. This refers to the perceived safety risk costs that the responsible party needs to bear after a safety accident occurs. The proportion of fines imposed on frontline construction workers and safety supervisors that are converted into safety production rewards for them is [not specified]. When safety supervisors actively monitor operations, but frontline construction workers engage in unsafe practices, a safety risk cost discount factor needs to be paid by both parties involved in the decision-making process. When frontline construction workers operate safely, but safety supervisors provide passive oversight, both parties involved in the decision-making process need to pay a discount factor for the safety risk costs. The risk transmission coefficient between the two decision-making parties. The proportion of safety supervisors who actively oversee safety matters. The proportion of frontline construction workers who are committed to safe operation. This represents the probability of safety accidents caused by unsafe operations by frontline construction workers. The probability of unsafe operations or passive resistance being discovered and reported by both parties involved in the decision-making process;

[0083] S32. Based on the dynamic replication formula in evolutionary game theory, we obtain the result in step S31. and The replication dynamic equations for the proportions of these two types of personnel are shown in the following equations:

[0084]

[0085]

[0086] In the formula, The perceived benefits of safety regulators choosing proactive regulatory strategies. The perceived benefits of safety regulators choosing a passive regulatory strategy. For the average perceived benefit of the entire regulatory staff group, The proportion of safety supervisors who actively oversee safety matters. The proportion of frontline construction workers who are committed to safe operation. The perceived benefits of choosing safe operating strategies for frontline construction workers. The perceived benefits of choosing unsafe operating strategies for frontline construction workers. The average perceived benefit for the entire frontline construction workforce;

[0087] S33. Based on the replicated dynamic equations obtained in step S32, five local equilibrium points are obtained;

[0088] To simplify the calculation, let Let be the difference in perceived value between proactive and reactive oversight decisions made by supervisors during safe operation by construction workers; This represents the difference in perceived value between proactive and reactive oversight decisions by supervisors when construction workers engage in unsafe practices. The replication dynamic equation for the proportion of personnel can be simplified as follows:

[0089]

[0090] Therefore, it can be concluded that only when or At that time, the proportion of regulators choosing the "proactive regulation" strategy was locally stable.

[0091] Similarly, let Let be the difference in perceived value of construction workers' decisions regarding safe and unsafe operations when supervisors are actively monitoring; This represents the difference in perceived value of safe versus unsafe operational decisions made by construction workers when supervisors exercise passive oversight. The replication dynamic equation for the proportion of personnel can be simplified as follows:

[0092]

[0093] Therefore, it can be concluded that only when or At that time, the proportion of airport construction workers choosing the "safe operation" strategy was locally stable. Therefore, five local equilibrium points can be obtained, namely: , , , and .

[0094] S34. Perform stability analysis on the local equilibrium points obtained in step S33 to obtain the conditions that the model stability must meet.

[0095] Following Friedman's method, the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of a differential equation system can be obtained from the local stability analysis of the system's Jacobian matrix, as described above. Personnel and The simplified equations for the replication dynamics of the personnel ratio constitute a system of equations, and its Jacobian matrix is ​​shown below:

[0096]

[0097] Therefore, its matrix determinant can be obtained as shown in the following equation:

[0098]

[0099] Therefore, the trace of its matrix can be obtained as shown in the following equation:

[0100]

[0101] Considering that the losses caused by safety accidents during airport construction without interrupting operations often far outweigh the unsafe actions and oversight costs incurred by construction workers and supervisors, and that any unsafe behavior by one party will inevitably transfer safety risks to the other, and that if one decision-maker benefits from unsafe actions, it will encourage others to follow suit, jeopardizing the safety of the construction project, the greatest possible safety can only be achieved by minimizing the risk of accidents. It should become a stable equilibrium point of the system. That is, after substituting the equilibrium points into Equations 5.2.7 and 5.2.8, it should satisfy... and ,Right now , , , The stability of the four equilibrium points at this time is shown in Table 2 below.

[0102] Table 24 Stability of Equilibrium Points

[0103]

[0104] At this point, the equilibrium point Meaningless. If required... If a point is meaningful, then it has... and At this point It is also the system's stable equilibrium point, which does not meet the goal of safe and stable construction of airport non-stop operation projects, so it is not considered.

[0105] The above solution process shows that the model stability must satisfy the following conditions:

[0106] (1) This means that when airport construction workers operate safely, the perceived cost of active supervision by safety supervisors should be less than the sum of the costs of passive supervision, the costs of safety risks faced, and the perceived cost of being reported and punished.

[0107] (2) This means that when airport construction workers operate unsafely, the perceived safety supervision bonus for safety supervisors should be greater than the perceived cost difference between active and passive supervision.

[0108] (3) This means that when safety management personnel actively supervise, the perceived cost of safe operations paid by airport construction workers should be less than the sum of the costs of unsafe operations, the costs of safety risks faced, and the perceived penalties imposed by regulators.

[0109] (4) This means that when safety management personnel are passively supervising, the perceived reward for reporting violations by airport construction workers should be greater than the difference between the perceived cost of safe operation and the cost of violating regulations.

[0110] S4. Parameter simulation analysis, which includes the following steps:

[0111] S41. Based on the conditions for model stability obtained in step S3, the influencing factors of the model's stable state evolution include the costs of proactive supervision, safe operation costs, the probability of unsafe operation behaviors being detected, the perceived losses from safety accidents, and the initial proportion of safe behavior strategies, as shown in Table 3 below:

[0112] Table 3. Major influencing factors and related factors of evolutionary stability

[0113]

[0114] Furthermore, because both sides in a real-world game possess only bounded rationality, their decision-making process relies heavily on self-awareness and intuition, making it difficult to maximize the acquisition and utilization of effective and accurate safety information. Ignoring these influencing factors and the characteristics of bounded rationality could lead to systemic biases in the behavior of construction and regulatory personnel, making it difficult for the system to reach its optimal point. To more intuitively analyze the impact of the discrepancy between safety supervision and construction workers' value perception, and to explore the mechanism by which the safety atmosphere influences unsafe behavior decisions, we will use Matlab software for simulation.

[0115] S42. Combining the influencing factors obtained in step S41, the impact of the safe atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behavior is simulated and analyzed using Matlab software.

[0116] The following simulation analysis is based on the actual situation of the non-stop expansion and renovation project of a military-civilian airport in eastern Zhejiang. This airport was converted from military to civilian use in 1987. Currently, due to the development needs of both the military and civilian sides stationed there, the airport is simultaneously carrying out two construction projects: airfield leveling and expansion. The airfield leveling project mainly involves the modification of the emergency landing area lines on both sides of the runway, drainage dredging, and backfilling of depressions. The project cost is approximately 20 million yuan, covering a work area of ​​approximately 750 acres, with a construction period of about one year. The contractor is a certain bureau of China Construction. The airport expansion includes both military and civilian components. The military component mainly involves the expansion of the apron, which is relatively small. The civilian component involves the construction of a new parallel taxiway, a new terminal building, an apron, and three connecting taxiways, etc. The project covers 1,100 acres, with an investment of over 3 billion yuan, a construction period of two years, and is jointly undertaken by three construction companies. According to the relevant provisions on joint maintenance in the "Interim Regulations on Operation and Support of Air Force Civil Aviation Joint Military-Civilian Airports," military airfields and civil aviation airport management agencies should jointly formulate maintenance plans and related safety management measures, and strictly implement the formulated plans and measures in accordance with the principle of organization by the property owner and cooperation from the other party. Based on on-site investigations of relevant construction projects at this airport, the safety management characteristics and existing problems reflected are summarized as follows:

[0117] (1) On-site safety supervision. All related projects were carried out without interrupting operations, meaning that both military and civilian aircraft maintained normal operations during the construction process. The construction site was large, with a large number of workers, equipment, and engineering materials. As a result, the safety awareness of the construction personnel of each contractor and the full-time supervisors of the military site management department and the civilian site affairs department varied, which led to certain difficulties and blind spots in supervision.

[0118] (2) Construction site environment. Because construction is conducted without interrupting flight operations, the timeframe is tight and the workload is heavy. Work within the flight protection zone must cease during flight takeoffs and landings, requiring personnel to frequently interrupt their work or squeeze in various construction tasks. Furthermore, due to fewer nighttime flights and military training missions, many construction tasks requiring continuous time periods necessitate working overtime overnight. In summary, personnel at the construction site are typically affected by aircraft noise, poor nighttime visibility, and various other work-related stressors.

[0119] (3) Organization and safety coordination. Since the construction is carried out by multiple units at the same time, and some outsourced transportation, water and electricity, and communication units will join in from time to time, the organization and safety coordination is more difficult. The safety training and on-the-job assessment standards are not the same, and safety accidents or warning notices are easy to be missed. As a result, some supervisors and construction personnel are not clear about the relevant regulations for airport safety operation during the construction period and underestimate the safety risks.

[0120] 1. Simulation parameter settings

[0121] Based on the actual situation of the non-stop expansion and renovation project of an airport in eastern Zhejiang, safety supervisors and construction personnel often perceive the value of safety benefits as less than the value of benefits from unsafe behaviors, and the perceived value of payments for safe behaviors is often greater than the perceived value of payments for unsafe behaviors. To simplify calculations, we can assume... , Based on experimental measurements by Tversky et al., a risk preference coefficient was set, assuming... , , Establish reference points for both decision-makers' perceptions of wages and compensation. Set the weight function coefficients .

[0122] (2) The probability of safety risks arising from construction workers being forced to perform safe operations due to supervision should be greater than the probability of safety risks arising from construction workers actively performing safe operations. Therefore, it can be set that... , Considering that relevant regulations on the safety management of joint-use military-civilian airport construction without interruption of operations clearly stipulate the joint liability of supervisory personnel in the event of a safety accident, a risk transmission coefficient between the decision-making parties is set. .

[0123] (3) Based on the relationship between fines, bonuses and wages in reality, let... , According to Heinrich's theory Principle, setting Given the characteristics of airport construction without interrupting operations, a system can be established to determine the probability of unsafe acts by safety supervisors and construction workers being discovered and punished. Furthermore, the initial value for the proportion of supervisors and construction workers implementing safety behavior strategies can be set to... .

[0124] 2. Simulation Results and Analysis of Safety Supervision for Non-Stop Navigation Construction

[0125] Based on the initial values ​​above, the safety management issues of the non-stop construction project at an airport in eastern Zhejiang can be simulated by adjusting the relevant parameters as follows:

[0126] (1) The initial safety capabilities and competence levels of safety supervisors and construction personnel vary, and their understanding of safety management information and requirements for non-stop construction projects at joint military-civilian airports is incomplete. Often, they need to go through trial and error to discover more suitable behavioral strategies. Adjusting the initial proportion of decision-makers implementing safety behavioral strategies... and The impact on evolutionary outcomes, such as Figure 2 As shown. (Through) Figure 2 It can be seen that as the initial proportion of decision-makers choosing safe behavioral strategies increases, the convergence trend of the evolutionary system becomes more gradual; the higher the initial proportion of safe behavioral choices by both groups of decision-makers, the faster the game model evolves towards the optimal ideal state of safety management. Meanwhile, regardless of the initial behavioral decision-making proportions of construction workers and supervisors, the system can always reach a stable state through a certain evolutionary process, indicating that the overall safety management atmosphere of the system is in a good state. Therefore, when the safety management level of non-stop construction projects at joint military-civilian airports is high, military station departments and civil aviation airport management departments can still improve the initial safety attitudes and capabilities of relevant personnel by strengthening supervision, safety capability assessments of construction workers, safety knowledge briefings, and initial on-the-job training and assessments, enabling the project organization to reach a safe and stable state more quickly and form a good foundation for a good safety atmosphere.

[0127] (2) Safety accident losses are easily underestimated. Due to a lack of safety education and training and a lack of understanding of the safety operation and management regulations for joint military-civilian airports, construction or supervision personnel sometimes exhibit overconfidence. For example, common occurrences during airport construction include leaving tools behind, unauthorized approach to the runway, and entering or exiting without following designated routes. Construction and supervision personnel often believe that these behaviors do not pose a significant threat to aircraft. Therefore, they often underestimate safety risks and accident losses, i.e., they underestimate the potential risks. Underestimating. Adjusting decision-makers' perception of the losses from safety incidents. The impact on evolutionary outcomes, such as Figure 3 As shown. By Figure 3It is evident that decision-makers' perception of the severity and potential losses from safety incidents significantly influences their willingness to take safe actions. Therefore, in the initial stages of uninterrupted construction projects at joint military-civilian airports, it is particularly important to conduct training, disseminate airport safety operation management regulations, and provide relevant safety warnings to safety supervisors and construction personnel. In particular, military airfield management departments should place greater emphasis on this work, ensuring that supervisors and construction personnel thoroughly understand the safety regulations for both military and civilian aircraft operations and fully grasp the implications.

[0128] (3) Multiple constraints on regulatory costs. Given the severe safety management risks faced by joint military-civilian airport construction without interruption of operations, regulatory personnel need comprehensive knowledge of airport safety operations, flight protection zones, and safety production. They also need to inspect numerous safety risk points. Furthermore, limitations imposed by factors such as access routes, timing, and communication methods significantly restrict their ability to grasp safety information and control the site. Therefore, ensuring the achievement of predetermined safety goals inevitably leads to increased regulatory costs. Increase. Adjust the costs of decision-makers' safety behaviors. The impact on evolutionary outcomes, such as Figure 4 As shown. By Figure 4 It is evident that as regulatory costs increase, the evolution of proactive safety strategies adopted by regulatory groups slows significantly. Furthermore, when regulatory costs exceed a certain level, the willingness of regulatory personnel to choose proactive safety strategies drops to zero. Therefore, military base departments, civil aviation airport management units, and construction supervision departments should research and develop more reasonable, efficient, and feasible safety supervision and inspection plans, strengthen investment in regulatory technology and equipment and safety training for relevant personnel, and guide construction workers to actively participate in safety management work, thereby reducing the safety pressure on regulatory personnel and unnecessary regulatory costs.

[0129] (4) Safety operation costs are difficult to reduce. Because some projects at the airport need to avoid civil aircraft operations during non-stop construction, daytime construction is not continuous and is often carried out at night. Both the continuous deployment, dismantling, and cleanup work, as well as the continuous effort required at night, increase the cost of safe operation. Similar investments are also reflected in complex and impractical safety regulations and ineffective safety training. Adjusting the costs of safety behavior by decision-makers is crucial. The impact on evolutionary outcomes, such as Figure 5 As shown. By Figure 5It is evident that the changing trend is similar to the impact of changes in regulatory costs, meaning that safe operating costs have a significant influence on the evolution of construction workers' safe behavior. Therefore, military bases, civil aviation airport management units, and construction units need to comprehensively consider factors that can easily interfere with the construction process, such as flight operations, the storage of construction materials, and the entry and exit of engineering equipment, when planning construction processes and daily work. They should provide sufficient safety-related technologies and equipment, improve the efficiency and quality of safety training, and significantly reduce the safety pressure and additional investment of employees, enabling them to fully devote themselves to safe production and construction.

[0130] (5) Unsafe acts by supervisors and construction personnel are not easily detected. Due to limitations of construction site conditions and airport safety operation management systems, supervisors from airport management and construction companies often find it difficult to achieve comprehensive, continuous, and thorough monitoring. For example, instances of air traffic controllers and construction management personnel failing to transmit flight information frequently occur, which can reduce the likelihood of unsafe operating behaviors being detected. Reduced. However, when non-stop construction projects are conducted in a safe environment, relevant personnel are highly aware of the potential losses from safety accidents and will typically take proactive safety precautions. In this case, adjusting the probability of being detected is less necessary. The effect on evolution is not significant. To observe the probability more clearly... The impact of the evolution of unsafe behaviors on the perception of safety accident losses. Adjust to Figure 3 The critical value of 40 is shown, and the simulation results are as follows. Figure 6 As shown. By Figure 6 It is evident that as the probability of unsafe behavior being detected increases, i.e., when the level of safety supervision improves to a certain level, group behavior will gradually reach a state of safe evolution. Therefore, military base departments, civil aviation airport management units, and construction unit supervision departments should formulate effective and highly operable operating procedures and information transmission and exchange systems. At the same time, they can utilize information technology (such as monitoring, drones, and GIS technology) to reduce blind spots in supervision and improve the efficiency of supervision.

[0131] In summary, the method provided in this invention, from the perspective of behavioral supervision game between safety supervisors and construction workers, establishes a value perception matrix based on prospect theory and mental accounting theory. Combining this with the characteristics of non-stop construction safety management at a military-civilian joint-use airport in eastern Zhejiang, it constructs an evolutionary game model of safety supervision strategies to study the impact of safety atmosphere on the safety behavior decision-making process of supervisors and construction workers at the construction site. The results show that a good safety atmosphere can rapidly lead both supervisors and construction workers to a stable safety evolutionary state by influencing factors such as the perception of safety accident losses, the probability of discovering unsafe behaviors, safety supervision, and construction costs. Based on simulation results, military base departments can effectively control unsafe behaviors during construction through single-factor control of safety supervision.

[0132] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to this invention without departing from its spirit and scope. Therefore, if these modifications and variations fall within the scope of the claims of this invention and their equivalents, this invention also intends to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A research method for studying the impact of safety atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behaviors during the construction of joint military-civilian airports, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. Model Assumptions: Determine the game population, strategy set, and safe and stable strategies; S2. Establish a behavioral game value perception matrix; Step S2 includes the following steps: S21. According to mental accounting theory, the judgment value function Classified as a profit account and payment accounts Each of them has a corresponding sensory reference point. and To simplify the subsequent calculation process, and They are respectively denoted as and ,but and The functional relationships are shown below: ； ； In the formula, and These are the sensitivity coefficients for avoiding revenue and payment losses, respectively. and These are the corresponding risk preference coefficients; S22, The profit account obtained from step S21 and payment accounts Based on the model assumptions in step S1, a behavioral game value perception matrix is ​​established. S3. Use the replicated dynamic equations to numerically solve the model and perform evolutionary equilibrium point analysis to obtain the conditions that the model must meet to be stable. Step S3 includes the following steps: S31. Based on the behavioral game value perception matrix obtained in step S2, obtain the expected payoff perception of safety supervisors when choosing between two strategies: active and passive supervision. , and the average perceived benefit of the entire group of safety regulators It also obtained the expected benefits perceived by frontline construction workers when choosing between safe and unsafe operating strategies. , and the average perceived benefit of the entire frontline construction worker group As shown in the following formula: ； ； In the formula, and These are the fixed wages for safety supervisors and frontline construction workers, respectively. and The perceived costs of active and passive oversight by safety supervisors, respectively. and The perceived costs incurred by frontline construction workers for safe and unsafe operations, respectively. This refers to the perceived costs incurred by construction workers when unsafe practices are discovered, or by supervisors when reported for ineffective oversight. This refers to the perceived safety risk costs that the responsible party needs to bear after a safety accident occurs. The proportion of fines imposed on frontline construction workers and safety supervisors that are converted into safety production rewards for them is [not specified]. When safety supervisors actively monitor operations, but frontline construction workers engage in unsafe practices, a safety risk cost discount factor needs to be paid by both parties involved in the decision-making process. When frontline construction workers operate safely, but safety supervisors provide passive oversight, both parties involved in the decision-making process need to pay a discount factor for the safety risk costs. The risk transmission coefficient between the two decision-making parties. The proportion of safety supervisors who actively oversee safety matters. The proportion of frontline construction workers who are committed to safe operation. This represents the probability of safety accidents caused by unsafe operations by frontline construction workers. The probability of unsafe operations or passive resistance being discovered and reported by both parties involved in the decision-making process; S32. Based on the dynamic replication formula in evolutionary game theory, we obtain the result in step S31. and The replication dynamic equations for the proportions of these two types of personnel are shown in the following equations: ； ； In the formula, The perceived benefits of safety regulators choosing proactive regulatory strategies. The perceived benefits of safety regulators choosing a passive regulatory strategy. For the average perceived benefit of the entire regulatory staff group, The proportion of safety supervisors who actively oversee safety matters. The proportion of frontline construction workers who are committed to safe operation. The perceived benefits of choosing safe operating strategies for frontline construction workers. The perceived benefits of choosing unsafe operating strategies for frontline construction workers. The average perceived benefit for the entire frontline construction workforce; S33. Based on the replicated dynamic equations obtained in step S32, five local equilibrium points are obtained; S34. Perform stability analysis on the local equilibrium points obtained in step S33 to obtain the conditions that the model stability must meet. S4. Parameter simulation analysis.

2. The research method for the impact of safety atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behaviors during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S1, the game group consists of safety supervisors and front-line construction workers.

3. The research method for the impact of safety atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behaviors during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport as described in claim 2, is characterized in that... In step S1, the strategy set is as follows: during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport without interruption of operations, safety supervisors have two strategies: active supervision and passive supervision, and front-line construction workers have two strategies: safe operation and unsafe operation.

4. The research method for the impact of safety atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behaviors during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport as described in claim 3, is characterized in that... In step S1, the safety and stability strategy is as follows: safety supervisors select an active supervision strategy and front-line construction workers select a safe operation strategy.

5. The research method for the impact of safety atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behaviors during the construction of a joint military-civilian airport as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Step S4 includes the following steps: S41. Based on the conditions for model stability obtained in step S3, the influencing factors of the model's stable state include the costs of active supervision, safe operation costs, the probability of unsafe operation behaviors being discovered, the perception of safety accident losses, and the initial proportion of safe behavior strategies. S42. Combining the influencing factors obtained in step S41, the impact of the safe atmosphere on the regulatory decision-making process for unsafe behavior is simulated and analyzed using Matlab software.

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