Audit method and device for weak password

Abstract

The embodiment of the present application discloses a kind of audit methods and devices for weak password, it can be used in financial field or other technical fields, the method comprises: using homomorphic encryption algorithm to process each password in weak password set, generate the first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set;The first encryption parameter is sent to the audited party, so that the audited party carries out processing to each password in the password database of itself for each first encryption parameter, generate the second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database on each first encryption parameter;The weak password in the password database is determined by carrying out decryption operation to the second encryption parameter.The present application realizes weak password audit under the condition that password is not exposed, can consider the privacy and auditability of password, effectively support the development of information security work, reduce security risk.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, and more specifically, to an auditing method and apparatus for weak passwords. Background Technology

[0002] Weak passwords are passwords that are easily guessed and cracked. Weak passwords have long been a problem plaguing information security efforts and represent a significant information security risk, with few effective solutions available. The essence of the weak password problem lies in the inconvenience and difficulty in remembering complex passwords, which goes against natural human habits. Solving the weak password problem requires new verification technologies, such as multi-factor authentication, biometric recognition, and centralized verification platforms. It is also necessary to conduct weak password screening from an auditing perspective.

[0003] Data auditing is a demand arising from the digital and networked transformation of various industries, and it represents an extension of traditional auditing work in the information age. Under current technological systems, passwords are data stored in server-side databases. Auditing methods can be used to examine whether passwords are weak, allowing for better identification and rectification of problems. However, password data itself is highly private and sensitive risk data; direct access poses serious information security risks. How to conduct weak password auditing without obtaining the specific password value is a pressing technical problem that needs to be solved in this field. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In order to solve at least one of the technical problems in the background art, the present invention proposes an auditing method and apparatus for weak passwords.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, according to one aspect of the present invention, an auditing method for weak passwords is provided, the method comprising:

[0006] Homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to process each password in the weak password set to generate a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set.

[0007] The first encryption parameter is sent to the auditee so that the auditee processes each password in its own password database for each first encryption parameter to generate a second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database for each first encryption parameter.

[0008] Weak passwords in the password database are determined by decrypting the second encryption parameter.

[0009] Optionally, the passwords in the password database are obtained by the auditee encrypting the original passwords using a target hash algorithm.

[0010] Optionally, before processing each password in the weak password set using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, the method further includes:

[0011] The target hash algorithm is used to encrypt each password in the weak password set.

[0012] Optionally, the step of determining the weak password in the password database by performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter specifically includes:

[0013] By performing decryption operations on the second encryption parameters, the operation results corresponding to each of the second encryption parameters are obtained;

[0014] Generate a result matrix based on the calculation results;

[0015] Weak passwords in the password database are determined based on the result matrix.

[0016] Optionally, a homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to process each password in the weak password set to generate a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set, specifically including:

[0017] Generate encryption parameters, a first positive integer x, and a second positive integer i, wherein the encryption parameters include: a public key n, the first positive integer x is the product of a and the second positive integer i, and a is a password in the weak password set;

[0018] The Paillier encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the first positive integer x and ni to obtain the first ciphertext C. x Second ciphertext C i ;

[0019] Public key n, first ciphertext C x Second ciphertext C i It is determined to be the first encryption parameter.

[0020] Optionally, the auditee first generates a third positive integer y and a fourth positive integer j, wherein the third positive integer y is the product of b and the fourth positive integer j, and b is a password in the password database, and then generates the second encryption parameter based on the third positive integer y, the fourth positive integer j, and the first encryption parameter.

[0021] Optionally, the homomorphic encryption algorithm is specifically the Paillier encryption algorithm.

[0022] To achieve the above objectives, according to another aspect of the present invention, an auditing apparatus for weak passwords is provided, the apparatus comprising:

[0023] The first encryption parameter generation unit is used to process each password in the weak password set using a homomorphic encryption algorithm to generate a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set.

[0024] The sending unit is configured to send the first encryption parameter to the auditee, so that the auditee processes each password in its own password database for each of the first encryption parameters, and generates a second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database for each of the first encryption parameters.

[0025] The weak password identification unit is used to determine the weak passwords in the password database by performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter.

[0026] To achieve the above objectives, according to another aspect of the present invention, a computer device is also provided, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the above-described auditing method for weak passwords.

[0027] To achieve the above objectives, according to another aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, on which a computer program / instructions are stored, which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the above-described auditing method for weak passwords.

[0028] To achieve the above objectives, according to another aspect of the present invention, a computer program product is also provided, comprising a computer program / instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the above-described auditing method for weak passwords.

[0029] The beneficial effects of this invention are as follows:

[0030] This invention employs a homomorphic encryption algorithm to process each password in a weak password set, generating a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set. This first encryption parameter is then sent to the auditee, enabling the auditee to process each password in its own password database for each of the first encryption parameters, generating a second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database for each of the first encryption parameters. Finally, the weak passwords in the password database are determined by decrypting the second encryption parameters. This achieves weak password auditing without exposing the passwords, balancing password privacy and auditability, effectively supporting information security work, and reducing security risks. Attached Figure Description

[0031] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort. In the drawings:

[0032] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an auditing method for weak passwords according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0033] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of determining weak passwords according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0034] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the application scenario of the present invention;

[0035] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the overall process of weak password auditing in this invention;

[0036] Figure 5 This is a structural block diagram of an auditing device for weak passwords according to an embodiment of the present invention;

[0037] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a computer device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0038] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0039] Those skilled in the art will understand that embodiments of the present invention can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0040] It should be noted that the terms "comprising" and "having" in the description, claims and above-mentioned drawings of the present invention, and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product or device comprising a series of steps or units does not necessarily limit to those clearly listed steps or units, but may include other steps or units not clearly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products or devices.

[0041] It should be noted that, without conflict, the embodiments in the present invention and the features in the embodiments may be combined with each other. The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the drawings and in combination with the embodiments.

[0042] It should be noted that the acquisition, storage, use, processing, etc. of data in the technical solution of this application all comply with the relevant regulations of national laws and regulations.

[0043] It should be noted that the auditing method and device for weak passwords of the present invention can be used in the financial field and can also be used in any field other than the financial field. The application field of the auditing method and device for weak passwords of the present invention is not limited.

[0044] Paillier is an asymmetric homomorphic encryption algorithm, which has additive homomorphic property and multiplicative homomorphic property. A homomorphic encryption algorithm means that the ciphertext after being calculated by the encryption algorithm is calculated and then decrypted, and the result is the same as directly performing the same calculation on the plaintext. For example, if the plaintexts m1 and m2 are encrypted to obtain ciphertexts C1 and C2 respectively, that is: C1 = E(m1), C2 = E(m2), if E(m1 + m2) can be obtained through the calculation of C1 and C2, it means that the algorithm has additive homomorphic property; similarly, if E(m1 * m2) can be obtained through the calculation of C1 and C2, it means that the algorithm has multiplicative homomorphic property.

[0045] Given a positive integer plaintext m, select positive prime numbers p and q, and the public key n = p * q and the private key s = lcm(p - 1, q - 1) can be calculated. Here, lcm represents the least common multiple, and m < n, max(s) = (p - 1) * (q - 1) < n.

[0046] Take a random positive integer r, let r < n and r be relatively prime to n, and calculate the public key g = a * n + 1, where a is a positive integer.

[0047] Let the encryption process be c = E(m), encrypt the plaintext m using n and g, and calculate the ciphertext c = E(m) = (g m * r n ) % n 2 .

[0048] [[ID = 30]]Let the decryption process be m = D(c), and decrypt c using s. First, calculate u, and assume that u is L(gs %n 2 The inverse modulus of n is obtained by taking (u*L(g)). s %n 2 Let n = 1, and let L(u) = (u-1) / n. Finally, calculate m = D(c) = (L(c) / n). s %n 2 )*u)%n.

[0049] The Paillier algorithm uses g and n for encryption and s for decryption. Its security principle comes from the problem of prime factorization of large numbers n. In practical applications, it is generally necessary to ensure that the lengths of p and q are greater than or equal to 256 bits.

[0050] Suppose we have two plaintexts m1 and m2, which are encrypted using the same key to obtain C1 and C2 respectively:

[0051] C1=E(m1=(g m1 *r1 n )%n 2

[0052] C2=E(m2=(g m2 *r2 n )%n 2

[0053] According to the definition of additive homomorphism, C1*C2 is calculated as follows:

[0054] C1*C2=(g m1 *r1 n )%n 2 *(g m2 *r2 n )%n 2

[0055] =(g m1 *r1 n *g m2 *r2 n )%n 2

[0056] =(g m1+m2 *(r1*r 2) n )%n 2

[0057] =E(m1+m2)

[0058] According to the definition of multiplicative homomorphism, calculate C1. m2 for:

[0059] C1 m2 =((g) m1 *r1 n )%n2 ) m2

[0060] =((g) m1 *r1 n )) m2 %n 2

[0061] =(g (m1*m2) *r1 (n*m2) )%n 2

[0062] =E(m1*m2)

[0063] Homomorphic encryption is a feasible solution for secure multi-party computation and can solve certain scenarios. For example, it can be used to compare whether the values ​​of two parties are equal without revealing their specific data.

[0064] Suppose A knows the value 'a' and B knows the value 'b'. A and B need to compare whether 'a' and 'b' are equal without revealing 'a' and 'b' to each other.

[0065] A prepares the encryption parameters n, g, and s for the Paillier algorithm, and calculates positive integers x and i such that x = a*i. A calculates the ciphertext C obtained by Paillier encryption of x and ni. x C i That is: C x =E(x), C i =E(ni), then n and C x C i Send it to B. B only has n from the public key, therefore B cannot access C. x C i Decryption is not possible. B cannot decrypt based on the known values ​​of n and C. x C i Calculate a, that is, a of A is safe.

[0066] B calculates positive integers y and j such that y = b * j, and B receives n and C. x C i Then t = (C) can be calculated. x i C i y)%n2. B sends the obtained t to A. Since there are infinitely many combinations of y and j corresponding to a unique t, A cannot use the known n and C. x C i b can be deduced from t, meaning that b of B is safe.

[0067] A performs a decryption operation on t and takes the remainder with respect to n to find f, i.e., f = D(t) % n. If f = 0, then a = b; otherwise, a ≠ b.

[0068] Using homomorphic encryption algorithms, subtraction can be performed on ciphertext with the same result as subtraction on plaintext. Therefore:

[0069] ab = x / iy / j = (x*jy*i) / i*j

[0070] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the application scenario of the present invention, such as... Figure 3 As shown, weak password auditing is a secure multi-party computation scenario that requires computation between auditor A and auditee B. This invention provides a weak password auditing method based on homomorphic encryption algorithms, which neither exposes passwords nor provides a fast, batch auditing method, helping to optimize and improve related work.

[0071] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an auditing method for weak passwords according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 1 As shown, in one embodiment of the present invention, the auditing method for weak passwords of the present invention includes steps S101 to S103.

[0072] Step S101: The homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to process each password in the weak password set to generate the first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set.

[0073] In one embodiment of the present invention, the homomorphic encryption algorithm is specifically the Paillier encryption algorithm.

[0074] Step S102: The first encryption parameter is sent to the auditee so that the auditee processes each password in its own password database for each of the first encryption parameters to generate a second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database for each of the first encryption parameters.

[0075] Step S103: Determine the weak password in the password database by performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter.

[0076] The present invention determines the comparison result of each password in the weak password set with each password in the password database by performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter. If there are passwords that match the comparison, then the passwords that match the comparison in the password database are weak passwords.

[0077] In one embodiment of the present invention, the passwords in the password database are obtained by the auditee encrypting the original passwords using a target hash algorithm.

[0078] In one embodiment of the present invention, before processing each password in the weak password set using a homomorphic encryption algorithm in step S101, the method further includes:

[0079] The target hash algorithm is used to encrypt each password in the weak password set.

[0080] To avoid exposure by administrators, the audited party typically stores the hash value of the password. Therefore, parties A and B first need to negotiate the hash algorithm used by B to store the password, and then A preprocesses password a using the same hash algorithm. Since the same string has the same hash value, it will not affect the weak password check.

[0081] This invention utilizes a secure multi-party computation scheme based on the Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm, enabling two parties to determine numerical equality without exposing their data. The weak password auditing process is as follows: Figure 4 As shown:

[0082] Assume that there are two parties involved: the auditor A and the auditee B. A has a set of weak passwords a, and B has a database of user accounts and passwords, which includes a password list b.

[0083] Suppose that a has u values ​​and b has w values, then a = (a1, a2, a3, ..., a...). u b = (b1, b2, b3, ..., b) w ).

[0084] To avoid being viewed by the administrator and thus exposed, passwords are typically stored using their hash values. Therefore, A and B first need to negotiate the hash algorithm that B will use to store the password, and then A will preprocess password a using the same hash algorithm. Since the same string will have the same hash value, this will not affect the weak password check.

[0085] Referring to the comparison method described earlier, A and B are cross-compared ciphertexts one by one. Comparing all values ​​in b1 with a yields result f1, comparing b2 with all values ​​in a yields result f2, and so on. w The result f is obtained by combining all values ​​in a. w This forms the resulting matrix f:

[0086] f = |f1,f2,...,f w |

[0087] |f 11 ,f 21 ,...,f w1 |

[0088] |...........|

[0089] |f 1u ,f 2u ,...,f wu |

[0090] In the result matrix, if there is an item with a value of 0, it means that there is a weak password in this review. The password in the database corresponding to the column vector with the value of 0 is the weak password.

[0091] like Figure 2 As shown, in one embodiment of the present invention, the above step S103, which determines the weak password in the password database by performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter, specifically includes steps S201 to S203.

[0092] Step S201: By performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter, the operation result corresponding to each of the second encryption parameters is obtained.

[0093] In one embodiment of the present invention, the auditor A performs a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter t and takes the remainder of the public key n to calculate f, i.e., f = D(t)%n. If f = 0, it means a = b; otherwise, a ≠ b.

[0094] Step S202: Generate a result matrix based on the calculation result.

[0095] Step S203: Determine the weak passwords in the password database based on the result matrix.

[0096] In one embodiment of the present invention, step S101, which involves processing each password in the weak password set using a homomorphic encryption algorithm to generate a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set, specifically includes:

[0097] Generate encryption parameters, a first positive integer x, and a second positive integer i, wherein the encryption parameters include: a public key n, the first positive integer x is the product of a and the second positive integer i, and a is a password in the weak password set;

[0098] The Paillier encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the first positive integer x and ni to obtain the first ciphertext C. x Second ciphertext C i ;

[0099] Public key n, first ciphertext C x Second ciphertext C i It is determined to be the first encryption parameter.

[0100] In one embodiment of the present invention, auditor A prepares the encryption parameters n, g, and s of the Paillier algorithm, and simultaneously calculates positive integers x and i such that x = a*i. A calculates the ciphertext C after Paillier encryption of x and ni. x C i That is: C x =E(x), C i =E(ni), then n and Cx C i Send it to B. B only has n from the public key, therefore B cannot access C. x C i Decryption is not possible. B cannot decrypt based on the known values ​​of n and C. x C i Calculate a, that is, a of A is safe.

[0101] In one embodiment of the present invention, the auditee first generates a third positive integer y and a fourth positive integer j, wherein the third positive integer y is the product of b and the fourth positive integer j, and b is a password in the password database, and then generates the second encryption parameter based on the third positive integer y, the fourth positive integer j and the first encryption parameter.

[0102] In one embodiment of the present invention, the auditee B calculates positive integers y and j such that y = b * j, and B receives n and C. x C i Then t = (C) can be calculated. x iC i y)%n2. B sends the obtained t to A. Since there are infinitely many combinations of y and j corresponding to a unique t, A cannot use the known n and C. x C i b can be deduced from t, meaning that b of B is safe.

[0103] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, there is a weak password set table x and a password hash value table b; it is necessary to determine whether the password corresponding to the hash value in table b is a weak password in table x, and the hash value in table b is assumed to use the SHA 256 hash algorithm.

[0104]

[0105] Table x - Weak Password List

[0106]

[0107] Table b_List of Password Hash Values

[0108] Both parties agree to use SHA 256 as the hash algorithm. A performs SHA 256 operations on x to obtain the following table a:

[0109]

[0110] The hash value of table a_weak password obtained by SHA256 operation

[0111] After cross-comparing the ciphertexts of a and b, the resulting matrix f is as follows:

[0112] 1.357E76 3.539E76 5.036E76 3.960E76 1.834E76 4.785E76 0 1.333E76 1.798E76 7.099E76 3.087E76 6.685E75

[0113] Table_Result Matrix f

[0114] The result shows that the second row and third column of the matrix are 0, indicating that b3 is a weak password and its value is the same as a2, which is 123456.

[0115] As can be seen from the above embodiments, this invention, based on the Paillier encryption-based secure multi-party computation method, proposes a method for auditing weak passwords without exposing ciphertext data. Experiments have verified the reliability of this method, providing a secure auditing approach for privacy and confidential data. By employing the ciphertext auditing method based on secure multi-party computation, the privacy and auditability of ciphertext data can be balanced, enabling the discovery of weak passwords in the system, effectively supporting information security work, and reducing security risks.

[0116] It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions, and although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases the steps shown or described may be executed in a different order than that shown here.

[0117] Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of the present invention also provide an auditing device for weak passwords, which can be used to implement the auditing method for weak passwords described in the above embodiments, as described in the following embodiments. Since the principle of the auditing device for weak passwords is similar to that of the auditing method for weak passwords, embodiments of the auditing device for weak passwords can be found in embodiments of the auditing method for weak passwords, and repeated details will not be described again. As used below, the terms "unit" or "module" can refer to a combination of software and / or hardware that performs a predetermined function. Although the device described in the following embodiments is preferably implemented in software, hardware implementation, or a combination of software and hardware, is also possible and contemplated.

[0118] Figure 5 This is a first structural block diagram of an auditing device for weak passwords according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 5 As shown, in one embodiment of the present invention, the auditing device for weak passwords of the present invention includes:

[0119] The first encryption parameter generation unit 1 is used to process each password in the weak password set using a homomorphic encryption algorithm to generate the first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set.

[0120] Sending unit 2 is used to send the first encryption parameter to the auditee, so that the auditee processes each password in its own password database for each of the first encryption parameters and generates a second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database for each of the first encryption parameters.

[0121] The weak password identification unit 3 is used to determine the weak password in the password database by performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter.

[0122] In one embodiment of the present invention, the passwords in the password database are obtained by the auditee encrypting the original passwords using a target hash algorithm.

[0123] In one embodiment of the present invention, the auditing device for weak passwords of the present invention further includes:

[0124] An encryption unit is used to encrypt each password in the weak password set using the target hash algorithm.

[0125] In one embodiment of the present invention, the weak password identification unit 3 specifically includes:

[0126] The decryption operation module is used to perform decryption operations on the second encryption parameters to obtain the operation result corresponding to each of the second encryption parameters.

[0127] The result matrix generation module is used to generate a result matrix based on the calculation result.

[0128] The weak password determination module is used to determine weak passwords in the password database based on the result matrix.

[0129] In one embodiment of the present invention, the first encryption parameter generation unit 1 specifically includes:

[0130] The parameter generation module is used to generate encryption parameters, a first positive integer x, and a second positive integer i, wherein the encryption parameters include: a public key n, the first positive integer x is the product of a and the second positive integer i, and a is a password in the weak password set;

[0131] The encryption module is used to encrypt the first positive integer x and ni using the Paillier encryption algorithm to obtain the first ciphertext C. x Second ciphertext C i ;

[0132] The encryption parameter determination module is used to determine the public key n and the first ciphertext C. x Second ciphertext C i It is determined to be the first encryption parameter.

[0133] To achieve the above objectives, according to another aspect of this application, a computer device is also provided. For example... Figure 6 As shown, the computer device includes a memory, a processor, a communication interface, and a communication bus. The memory stores a computer program that can run on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps in the method of the above embodiments.

[0134] The processor can be a central processing unit (CPU). The processor can also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, or combinations of the above types of chips.

[0135] Memory, as a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium, can be used to store non-transitory software programs, non-transitory computer-executable programs, and units, such as the program units corresponding to the above-described method embodiments of the present invention. The processor executes various functional applications and data processing of the processor by running the non-transitory software programs, instructions, and modules stored in the memory, thereby implementing the methods described in the above-described method embodiments.

[0136] The memory may include a program storage area and a data storage area. The program storage area may store the operating system and applications required for at least one function; the data storage area may store data created by the processor, etc. Furthermore, the memory may include high-speed random access memory and non-transitory memory, such as at least one disk storage device, flash memory device, or other non-transitory solid-state storage device. In some embodiments, the memory may optionally include memory remotely located relative to the processor, which can be connected to the processor via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, corporate intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.

[0137] The one or more units are stored in the memory and, when executed by the processor, perform the methods described in the above embodiments.

[0138] The specific details of the aforementioned computer equipment can be understood by referring to the relevant descriptions and effects in the above embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0139] To achieve the above objectives, according to another aspect of this application, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, which stores a computer program that, when executed in a computer processor, implements the steps in the above-described auditing method for weak passwords. Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, optical disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), flash memory, hard disk drive (HDD), or solid-state drive (SSD), etc.; the storage medium may also include combinations of the above types of memory.

[0140] To achieve the above objectives, according to another aspect of this application, a computer program product is also provided, including a computer program / instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the above-described auditing method for weak passwords.

[0141] Obviously, those skilled in the art will understand that the modules or steps of the present invention described above can be implemented using general-purpose computing devices. They can be centralized on a single computing device or distributed across a network of multiple computing devices. Optionally, they can be implemented using computer-executable program code, thereby storing them in a storage device for execution by a computing device, or fabricating them separately as individual integrated circuit modules, or fabricating multiple modules or steps as a single integrated circuit module. Thus, the present invention is not limited to any particular hardware and software combination.

[0142] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. An auditing method for weak passwords, characterized in that, Applied to the auditor, including: A target hash algorithm is used to encrypt each password in the weak password set; the target hash algorithm is agreed upon in advance by the auditor and the auditee. Homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to process each password in the weak password set to generate a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set. The first encryption parameter is sent to the auditee, so that the auditee processes each password in its own password database for each of the first encryption parameters to generate a second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database for each of the first encryption parameters; the passwords in the password database are obtained by the auditee encrypting the original passwords using a target hash algorithm; Determining weak passwords in the password database by performing decryption operations on the second encryption parameters includes: performing decryption operations on the second encryption parameters to obtain the operation result corresponding to each of the second encryption parameters; generating a result matrix based on the operation results; and determining weak passwords in the password database based on the result matrix.

2. The auditing method for weak passwords according to claim 1, characterized in that, A homomorphic encryption algorithm is used to process each password in the weak password set to generate a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set, specifically including: Generate encryption parameters, a first positive integer x, and a second positive integer i, wherein the encryption parameters include: a public key n, the first positive integer x is the product of a and the second positive integer i, and a is a password in the weak password set; The Paillier encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the first positive integer x and ni to obtain the first ciphertext C. x Second ciphertext C i ; Public key n, first ciphertext C x Second ciphertext C i It is determined to be the first encryption parameter.

3. The auditing method for weak passwords according to claim 2, characterized in that, The auditee first generates a third positive integer y and a fourth positive integer j, wherein the third positive integer y is the product of b and the fourth positive integer j, and b is a password in the password database. Then, the second encryption parameter is generated based on the third positive integer y, the fourth positive integer j, and the first encryption parameter.

4. The auditing method for weak passwords according to claim 1, characterized in that, The homomorphic encryption algorithm is specifically the Paillier encryption algorithm.

5. An auditing device for weak passwords, characterized in that, include: The encryption unit is used to encrypt each password in the weak password set using a target hash algorithm; the target hash algorithm is obtained in advance through negotiation between the auditor and the auditee. The first encryption parameter generation unit is used to process each password in the weak password set using a homomorphic encryption algorithm to generate a first encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the weak password set. The sending unit is configured to send the first encryption parameter to the auditee, so that the auditee processes each password in its own password database for each of the first encryption parameters to generate a second encryption parameter corresponding to each password in the password database for each of the first encryption parameters; the passwords in the password database are obtained by the auditee encrypting the original passwords using a target hash algorithm; A weak password identification unit is used to determine weak passwords in the password database by performing a decryption operation on the second encryption parameter. The weak password identification unit is specifically used to perform decryption operations on the second encryption parameters to obtain the operation results corresponding to each of the second encryption parameters; generate a result matrix based on the operation results; and determine the weak passwords in the password database based on the result matrix.

6. A computer device, comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

7. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program / instructions stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program / instructions are executed by the processor, they implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

8. A computer program product comprising a computer program / instructions, characterized in that, When the computer program / instructions are executed by the processor, they implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4.

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