A two-way authentication method and device based on R_LWE cryptographic system

Abstract

The present application relates to a two-way authentication method and device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, the method includes the following steps: a storage reader generates background query parameters, a first session message, and a second session message, and transmits them to a tag, initiating a first authentication request; the tag receives the first authentication request, and uses a cross-synthesis operation function to verify the first session message and the second session message; if the first authentication request is verified, the tag generates a third session message and a fourth session message, and transmits the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage reader, initiating a second authentication request; the storage reader receives the second authentication request, and uses the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message; if the second authentication request is verified, the shared key value is updated. The present application has the effect of reducing the amount of calculation to a certain extent and improving the authentication efficiency while ensuring the security of the privacy data information of the radio frequency system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of radio frequency identification technology, and in particular to a two-way authentication method and device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system. Background Art

[0002] Radio frequency identification technology has been rapidly developed and applied in industries such as the Internet of Things. A typical radio frequency identification system includes devices such as tags, readers, and servers. The channel through which tags send signals to readers is called the backward link. Because the tag itself does not carry a power supply device, the tag can only reflect the reader signal and send signals to the reader at the same time, making the backward link communication distance extremely short, while the forward link communication distance can be very long. Therefore, as long as the attacker is within a suitable distance range, he can eavesdrop on both the forward link and the backward link at the same time.

[0003] Inspired by the Ajtai-Dwork (AD) encryption scheme, REGEV proposed an algorithm design idea that combines lattice theory with learning theory, and introduced a new difficult problem in lattice theory, namely, the learning with errors (LWE) problem. However, the complexity of its algorithm can be reduced to the deterministic shortest vector problem and the shortest independent vector problem in lattice theory. The required key is large, and with the continuous increase of parameters, the amount of calculation of each entity also increases sharply, resulting in time-consuming authentication and cannot be widely promoted and applied. LYUBASHEVSKY et al. proposed the R_LWE (Learning with Errors over Ring) algorithm based on the algorithm idea proposed by REGEV. The key system based on the R_LWE algorithm has the following advantages: fast encryption and decryption speed, small required key length, and high computational efficiency. However, the key system based on the R_LWE algorithm lacks the authentication of the tag to the reader or server, so that the attacker can disguise as the reader, thereby stealing the interactive data information and further tampering with the data information such as random numbers.

[0004] With respect to the above-mentioned related technologies, the inventors have found that the existing authentication methods applied to radio frequency systems have a contradiction between authentication efficiency and authentication security. Summary of the invention

[0005] In order to solve the contradiction between authentication efficiency and authentication security of authentication methods applied to radio frequency systems, the present application provides a two-way authentication method and device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system.

[0007] This application is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0008] A two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system is applied to a radio frequency system including a tag, a reader and a server, wherein the reader and the server constitute a storage reading end, and the storage reading end is externally treated as a whole. The authentication includes at least the following steps:

[0009] The shared key value between the storage reading end and the tag end, the identifier corresponding to the tag end, the encryption function under the R_LWE cryptographic system and the cross synthesis operation function are preset at the storage reading end and the tag end respectively;

[0010] When the tag end sends a signal to the storage reader end, the storage reader end matches the background query parameters, generates a first session message and a second session message, transmits the background query parameters, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiates a first authentication request;

[0011] The tag end receives the first authentication request and verifies the first session message and the second session message by using the cross synthesis operation function;

[0012] If the first authentication request is verified, the tag end generates a third session message and a fourth session message, transmits the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage and reading end, and initiates a second authentication request;

[0013] The storage reading end receives the second authentication request, and uses the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message;

[0014] If the second authentication request is verified successfully, the shared key value is updated, and the two-way authentication of the storage reader and the tag is completed.

[0015] In a preferred example, the present application may be further configured as follows: after the second authentication request is verified, the following step may be further included:

[0016] The storage and reading end generates a fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function, sends the fifth session message to the tag end, and initiates a third authentication request;

[0017] The tag end receives the third authentication request and verifies the fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function;

[0018] When the third authentication request is verified to be successful, the tag end updates the shared key value, and at this time, the two-way authentication of the storage reading end and the tag end is completed.

[0019] In a preferred example, the present application may be further configured as follows: the steps of generating the first session message and the second session message include:

[0020] Obtaining a first random number generated by the storage reader;

[0021] A first session message and a second session message are obtained based on the first random number and the identifier.

[0022] In a preferred example, the present application may be further configured as follows: the steps of generating the third session message and the fourth session message include:

[0023] Obtaining a second random function generated by the tag end;

[0024] According to the second random function, the first random number, the identifier and the initial shared key value, combined with the encryption function under the R_LWE cryptographic system, a third session message and a fourth session message are obtained.

[0025] In a preferred example, the present application may be further configured as follows: the tag end receives the first authentication request, and the step of using the cross synthesis operation function to verify the first session message and the second session message includes:

[0026] The first session message In the formula, α is the first random number, ID tag is an identifier;

[0027] Let the second session message meg2 = Cro-Syn(a, a&ID tag ), where Cro-Syn(X,Y) represents the cross-synthesis operation function;

[0028] Based on the received first conversation message and the received second conversation message, a first verification value is calculated using the cross synthesis operation function, wherein the first verification value

[0029] When the second session message is equal to the first verification value, the first authentication request is verified successfully.

[0030] In a preferred example, the present application may be further configured as follows: the tag end receives the third authentication request, and the step of using the cross-synthesis operation function to verify the fifth session message includes:

[0031] The cross-synthesis operation function is used to calculate a second verification value, wherein the second verification value meg5=Cro-Syn(a,b), where Cro-Syn(X,Y) represents the cross-synthesis operation function, α is the first random number, and b is the second random number;

[0032] When the fifth session message is equal to the second verification value, the third authentication request is verified successfully.

[0033] In a preferred example, the present application can be further configured as follows: the design step of the cross synthesis operation function includes:

[0034] Get binary sequences X, Y of preset length L;

[0035] Calculate the Hamming weight of X and Y respectively;

[0036] When the Hamming weight of X is greater than or equal to the Hamming weight of Y, the last α bits of Y are sequentially placed on the first α bits of Z, and the first (L-α) bits of X are sequentially placed on the last (L-α) bits of Z, where: H(X) and H(Y) are the Hamming weights of X and Y respectively, and the result of α is rounded down to an integer;

[0037] Use Z as the target calculation value.

[0038] In a preferred example, the present application can be further configured as follows: it also includes the following steps:

[0039] When the Hamming weight of X is less than the Hamming weight of Y, the last α bits of X are placed on the last α bits of Z, and the first (L-α) bits of Y are placed on the first (L-α) bits of Z, where: H(X) and H(Y) are the Hamming weights of X and Y respectively, and the result of α is rounded down to an integer.

[0040] In a preferred example, the present application may be further configured as follows: the storage reading end receives the second authentication request, and the step of using the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message includes:

[0041] First, using the current shared key value to verify the third session message and the fourth session message;

[0042] When the current shared key value is used to verify the third session message and the fourth session message and the verification fails, the shared key value of the previous round is used to verify the third session message and the fourth session message;

[0043] When the third session message and the fourth session message are successfully verified by using the shared key value of the previous round, the second authentication request is successfully verified.

[0044] In a second aspect, the present application provides a two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system.

[0045] This application is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0046] A two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, comprising:

[0047] An initialization module, used for respectively presetting the shared key value between the storage reading end and the tag end, the identifier corresponding to the tag end, the encryption function under the R_LWE cryptographic system, and the cross synthesis operation function at the storage reading end and the tag end;

[0048] A first request module, configured to, when the tag end sends a signal to the storage reader end, cause the storage reader end to match a background query parameter, generate a first session message and a second session message, transmit the background query parameter, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiate a first authentication request;

[0049] A first authentication module, configured to verify the first session message and the second session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function when the tag end receives the first authentication request;

[0050] A second request module, configured to, when the first authentication request is verified to be successful, generate a third session message and a fourth session message at the tag end, transmit the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage and reading end, and initiate a second authentication request;

[0051] A second authentication module, configured to verify the third session message and the fourth session message by using a current shared key value or a previous shared key value when the storage reading end receives the second authentication request;

[0052] The first key updating module is used to update the shared key value when the second authentication request is verified successfully.

[0053] In summary, compared with the prior art, the technical solution provided by this application has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0054] When the tag end sends a signal to the storage reading end, the storage reading end matches the background query parameters and generates a first session message and a second session message, passes the background query parameters, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiates a first authentication request to achieve secure authentication of the tag to the server or the reader, thereby ensuring the security of privacy information; the tag end receives the first authentication request, verifies the first session message and the second session message using the cross-synthesis operation function, and encrypts the data information by using the cross-synthesis operation function algorithm, which has the advantages of fast encryption and decryption speed and small calculation amount, and can reduce the calculation amount to a certain extent while ensuring the security of privacy information; if the first authentication request is verified, the tag end generates a third session message and a fourth session message, and passes the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage reading end , initiate a second authentication request to realize the authentication of the tag by the server or reader; the storage reading end receives the second authentication request, and uses the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message; if the second authentication request is verified, the shared key value is updated to avoid the risk of successful replay attack by attackers due to the shared key value never being updated; the present application can further reduce the computational cost of one end of the tag, and the tag only uses the R_LWE cryptographic system for encryption, and the decryption process with a large amount of calculation is completed at the reader end. At the same time, a cross-synthesis operation function algorithm is introduced in the protocol encryption process, and the tag's verification of the reader can be realized based on the cross-synthesis operation, which ensures the security of the privacy data information of the radio frequency system, and can also reduce the amount of calculation to a certain extent, solving the contradiction between the authentication efficiency and the authentication security of the authentication method applied to the radio frequency system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0055] Figure 1 A simplified schematic diagram of a two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system is provided as an exemplary embodiment of the present application.

[0056] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the application of a cross-synthesis operation function algorithm for a two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system is provided as an exemplary embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0057] This specific embodiment is merely an explanation of the present application and is not a limitation of the present application. After reading this specification, those skilled in the art may make modifications to the present embodiment without any creative contribution as needed, but such modifications are protected by the patent law as long as they are within the scope of the claims of the present application.

[0058] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0059] In addition, the term "and / or" in this article is only a description of the association relationship of associated objects, indicating that there can be three relationships. For example, A and / or B can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. In addition, the character " / " in this article, unless otherwise specified, generally means that the associated objects before and after are in an "or" relationship.

[0060] Radio frequency identification technology is a technology that can read stored information without contacting specific objects. The technology originated in the last century. Due to the limitations of technology at the time, the technology was not widely developed. After entering the new century, with the rapid development of science and technology, radio frequency identification technology has been rapidly developed and applied in industries such as the Internet of Things. A typical radio frequency identification system includes but is not limited to equipment such as tags, readers, and servers. Compared with the channel (backward link) where the tag-reader sends signals, the tag itself does not carry a power supply device, so the tag can only reflect the reader signal and send a signal to the reader at the same time, making the backward link communication distance extremely short, while the forward link communication distance can be very long. Therefore, as long as the attacker is within a suitable distance range, he can eavesdrop on the forward link and the backward link at the same time.

[0061] Server encrypted message Y1 and Y2 , then the message Y1 and Y2 Sent to the reader / writer, the reader / writer passes the message Y2 Verify the authenticity of the server. After the verification is completed, the reader will send the message Y1 Sent to the tag. The tag receives the message Y1 The server is verified to be authentic, but the reader cannot be verified to be authentic. The main reason is that the reader is equivalent to indirectly forwarding the message. Y1 , that is, the reader does not respond to the message Y1 No processing is done and it is forwarded directly to the label.

[0062] The following impersonation attack method can be given: the attacker blocks the message sent by the server to the reader Y1 and Y2 , and also blocks the message sent by the reader to the tag Y1In these two steps, the attacker pretends to be a reader. When the attacker receives the message sent by the server Y1 and Y2 After that, the attacker directly sent the message Y1 Sent to the tag. According to the original protocol description, the tag will not be able to verify the authenticity of the reader, and thus determine that the server is authentic and the reader is also authentic, but this is not the case. An attacker can disguise himself as a reader to steal interactive data information and further tamper with data information such as random numbers.

[0063] Existing authentication methods applied to radio frequency systems have a contradiction between authentication efficiency and authentication security.

[0064] Furthermore, the existing authentication protocol designed by combining the R_LWE cryptographic system with modular operations has a certain degree of security, but during the protocol design process, the shared key value has never been updated, which will lead to the risk of successful replay attacks by attackers.

[0065] The existing R_LWE cryptographic authentication protocol can resist replay attacks, but the reader only stores the current shared key value and cannot resist asynchronous attacks launched by attackers.

[0066] The study also found that the existing authentication protocol using the R_LWE cryptographic system cannot achieve the final step of the tag verifying the server or the tag verifying the reader, which will allow attackers to conduct counterfeit attacks.

[0067] To this end, this application proposes an RFID two-way authentication protocol based on the R_LWE cryptographic system. The protocol uses the R_LWE cryptographic system to implement encryption and introduces a newly created cross-synthesis operation function to obtain an improved two-way authentication protocol based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, which can ensure the security of authentication and reduce the computational overhead, and has the advantages of high security level and small computational complexity. In the protocol, the tag end only uses the encryption algorithm in the R_LWE cryptographic system, and the decryption algorithm with a large computational complexity is placed on the reader or server end. This can ensure information security while keeping the computational complexity of the tag end within the acceptable range. At the same time, the server and the reader are regarded as a whole to reduce the complexity of the algorithm.

[0068] The embodiments of the present application are further described in detail below in conjunction with the drawings in the specification.

[0069] Reference Figure 1 The embodiment of the present application provides a two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, which is applied to a radio frequency system including a tag, a reader and a server, wherein the reader and the server constitute a storage reading end, and the storage reading end is externally treated as a whole. The main steps of the method are described as follows.

[0070] The shared key value between the storage reading end and the tag end, the identifier corresponding to the tag end, the encryption function under the R_LWE cryptographic system and the cross synthesis operation function are preset at the storage reading end and the tag end respectively;

[0071] When the tag end sends a signal to the storage reader end, the storage reader end matches the background query parameters, generates a first session message and a second session message, transmits the background query parameters, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiates a first authentication request;

[0072] The tag end receives the first authentication request and verifies the first session message and the second session message by using the cross synthesis operation function;

[0073] If the first authentication request is verified, the tag end generates a third session message and a fourth session message, transmits the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage and reading end, and initiates a second authentication request;

[0074] The storage reading end receives the second authentication request, and uses the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message;

[0075] If the second authentication request is verified successfully, the shared key value is updated, and the two-way authentication of the storage reader and the tag is completed.

[0076] In one embodiment, after the second authentication request is verified, the method further includes:

[0077] The storage and reading end generates a fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function, sends the fifth session message to the tag end, and initiates a third authentication request;

[0078] The tag end receives the third authentication request and verifies the fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function;

[0079] When the third authentication request is verified to be successful, the tag end updates the shared key value, and at this time, the two-way authentication of the storage reading end and the tag end is completed.

[0080] In one embodiment, when the two-way authentication of the storage reader and the tag is completed, the server initiates a query request based on the background query parameter and returns the query result to the tag via the reader.

[0081] Specifically, a two-way authentication protocol program based on the R_LWE cryptographic system is designed as follows:

[0082] (1) Meaning of predefined protocol symbols

[0083] Reader server and reader-writer constitute a whole;

[0084] Tag tag;

[0085] K is the shared key value between the Reader and the Tag;

[0086] K new It is the current shared key value between the Reader and the Tag;

[0087] K old It is the shared key value between the Reader and the Tag in the previous round;

[0088] ID tag It is the unique identifier of the Tag;

[0089] a is a random number generated by Reader;

[0090] b is a random number generated by Tag;

[0091] E h (x) is the encryption function under the R_LWE cryptosystem;

[0092] D y (x) is the decryption function under the R_LWE cryptosystem;

[0093] Cro-Syn(X,Y) is the cross synthesis operation function;

[0094] It is a bitwise XOR operation;

[0095] & is the bitwise AND operation;

[0096] meg i is the first conversation message, and other similar symbols can be deduced by analogy.

[0097] Among them, the cross synthesis operation is a custom operation, that is, a cross operation is performed bit by bit on two bytes of the same length. The specific calculation rules can be defined by yourself. The main function is to use the same rule for front and back verification.

[0098] (2) Protocol Implementation

[0099] Before the protocol starts, there is an initialization process. After the initialization process is completed, the information stored on the Reader side includes: K, ID tag 、E h (x), D y (x), Cro-Syn (X, Y); the information stored at one end of the tag includes: K, ID tag 、E h(x), Cro-Syn(X,Y). And K new =K old =K (that is, during initialization, the passwords of the reader and tag are the same).

[0100] The simplified process of the authentication protocol is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, specifically:

[0101] STEP 1: Reader → Tag

[0102] The reader generates a random number a and uses a and ID tag Calculated meg2=Cro-Syn(a,a&ID tag ), then meg2=Cro-Syn(a,a&ID tag Here, the reader passes three parameters, meg1, meg2, and Query, to the tag. Meg1 and meg2 are used for verification, and the Query parameter is used to query the background.

[0103] STEP 2: Tag → Reader

[0104] When the Tag receives the message, it first Processing to obtain Then Bring in Then we start to compare meg2 with meg`2. Using the characteristics of bitwise XOR operation, if the data has not been tampered with or forged, then after this step of operation, the transmitted meg2 and the calculated meg2 will be equal.

[0105] If meg2 is not equal to meg`2, it means that the Reader is forged and the protocol cannot continue.

[0106] The relationship between meg2 and meg`2 is equal, which means that the Reader is authentic and the protocol can continue. The Tag generates a random number b and uses a and ID tag , b, K are calculated in sequence meg4=E h (a&K,b&ID tag ), and finally meg4=E h (a&K,b&ID tag ) is sent to the Reader together. Two-way verification requires multiple verifications during use. By adding a random number b, it can be ensured that the verification character generated each time is non-fixed, reducing the probability of forgery.

[0107] STEP 3: Reader → Tag

[0108] When the reader receives the message, it first Processing to obtain Then use K new or K old Calculate meg`4, if K new If they are equal, K is not needed. old Otherwise, continue to use Kold to judge, and then compare the relationship between meg`4 and meg4.

[0109] When using K new When the calculated relationship is equal, it means that the tag is real. The reader calculates meg5 = Cro-Syn (a, b) and updates the shared key value K between the reader and the tag. old =K new , K new =E h (a,b&K new ), and finally send meg5=Cro-Syn(a,b) to Tag.

[0110] When using K new The calculated relationship is unequal, and K old When the calculated relationship is equal, it can also be said that the tag is real. The reader calculates meg5 = Cro-Syn (a, b) and updates the shared key value K between the reader and the tag. old =K old , K new =E h (a,b&K old ), and finally send meg5=Cro-Syn(a,b) to Tag.

[0111] When using K new The calculated relationship is unequal, and K old If the calculated relationship is also unequal, it indicates that the tag is forged and the protocol cannot proceed.

[0112] STEP 4: Tag

[0113] The Tag receives the message and uses the information calculated in the previous step to verify the authenticity of meg5 = Cro-Syn (a, b). The Tag first calculates meg5 = Cro-Syn (a, b) to get meg5, and compares it with the meg5 sent by the Reader in the previous step. If it is true, the shared key value K = E between the Tag and the Reader is updated. h(a,b&K); otherwise, the protocol cannot proceed.

[0114] In one embodiment, the cross synthesis operation function may be defined as follows:

[0115] (1) The symbol Cro-Syn(X,Y) is used to represent the cross synthesis operation.

[0116] (2) X, Y, Z represent a binary sequence of length L.

[0117] (3)H(X) and H(Y) are the Hamming weights of X and Y respectively.

[0118] (4) When H(X)≥H(Y), take the last α bits of Y and place them in the first α bits of Z; at the same time, take the first (L-α) bits of X and place them in the last (L-α) bits of Z. When H(X)<H(Y), take the last α bits of X and place them in the last α bits of Z; at the same time, take the first (L-α) bits of Y and place them in the first (L-α) bits of Z. And the result of the α operation is rounded down to an integer.

[0119] Reference Figure 2 For example, if L=12, X=001011000110, Y=101001011110, then we can get H(X)=5, H(Y)=7, and we can get Furthermore, we can obtain the condition that H(X)<H(Y), so we can conclude that Z=Cro-Syn(X,Y)=101001000110.

[0120] During the specific implementation, this application will use GNY logic formalization to conduct formal reasoning and analysis on this protocol. The specific steps are as follows.

[0121] (1) Formal description of the protocol

[0122] MSG1:Reader→Tag:meg1, meg2, Query

[0123] MSG2:Tag→Reader:meg3,meg4

[0124] MSG3:Reader→Tag:meg5

[0125] The above protocol can be described as follows using the GNY formal logic language:

[0126] MSG1:Tag<*{meg1、meg2、Query}

[0127] MSG2:Reader<*{meg3, meg4}

[0128] MSG3:Tag<*{meg5}

[0129] (2) Protocol initialization assumptions

[0130] SUP1:(ID tag , K)∈Tag

[0131] SUP2:(ID tag , K new , K old )∈Reader

[0132] SUP3:Tag|≡#(a,b)

[0133] SUP4:Reader|≡#(a, b)

[0134]

[0135]

[0136]

[0137]

[0138] (3) Protocol Proof Objective

[0139] GOAL1:Tag|≡Reader|:#{meg1, meg2}

[0140] GOAL2:Reader|≡Tag|:#{meg3, meg4}

[0141] GOAL3:Tag|≡Reader|:#{meg5}

[0142] (4) Protocol Proof Process

[0143] For example, take the first proof goal GOAL1:Tag|≡Reader|:#{meg1, meg2} as an example for proof.

[0144] ∵MSG1:Reader→Tag:meg1, meg2, Query and rules

[0145] ∴{meg1, meg2}∈Tag

[0146] ∵SUP4:Reader|≡#(a, b) and rules

[0147] ∴Tag=#{meg1、meg2}

[0148] ∵Rules SUP1:(ID tag , K)∈Tag, SUP2:(ID tag , K new , K old )∈Reader

[0149] ∴{meg1, meg2}∈Tag

[0150] ∵Rules And the derived Tag = #{meg1, meg2}, {meg1, meg2}∈Tag

[0151] ∴Tag|=#{meg1, meg2}

[0152] ∵Rules

[0153] Again∵ and MSG1:Reader→Tag:meg1, meg2, Query

[0154] ∴Tag|={meg1, meg2}

[0155] ∵Freshness definition and derived Tag = #{meg1, meg2}, Tag| = Reader:{meg1, meg2}

[0156] ∴GOAL1:Tag|≡Reader|:#{meg1, meg2} is proved.

[0157] The proof is complete.

[0158] Finally, the security of the authentication protocol of this application is analyzed, such as the security analysis of the authentication protocol of this application from the perspectives of common attack types: impersonation attack, positioning attack, asynchronous attack, two-way authentication, exhaustive attack, backward security and forward security and replay attack, as shown in Table 1 below.

[0159] Table 1 Security comparison between protocols

[0160]

[0161] In Table 1, √ indicates that the attack of this type can be resisted, and × indicates that the attack of this type cannot be resisted. Table 1 reflects the security of the authentication protocol of this application compared with other classic protocols.

[0162] Furthermore, the RFID system includes readers (card readers), servers, and tags. Card readers and servers have obvious advantages in computing speed and storage space. Therefore, only tags are selected as the performance analysis object. The analysis will be carried out from the perspectives of storage capacity at one end of the tag, computing capacity at one end of the tag, and the number of random numbers generated at one end of the tag. The specific analysis results can be seen in Table 2.

[0163] Table 2 Performance comparison between protocols

[0164]

[0165] The protocol of the present application in Table 2 has advantages over existing protocols in terms of the amount of storage on the tag side, the amount of computation on the tag side, and the number of random numbers generated on the tag side.

[0166] In Tables 1 and 2, the sources of the literature are as follows.

[0167]

[12] Jia-Qi Wang, Yun-Feng Zhang, and Dao-Wei Liu. Provable Secure for theUltra-lightweight RFID Tag Ownership Transfer Protocol in the Context of IoT Commerce[J]. International Journal of Network Security, 2020, 22(1):12-23.

[0168]

[13] ZHU F,LIP,XU H,et al.A lightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol with PUF[J].Sensors,2019,19(13):2957–2978.

[0169]

[14] LIANG W,XIE S,LONG J,et al.A double PUF-based RFIDidentityauthentication protocol in service-centric Internet of Thingsenvironments

[0170] [J].Information Sciences,2019,503:129–147.

[0171]

[15] Liu Tao, Jia Langfeng, Guo Ping. Research on RFID authentication protocol based on R_LWE cryptographic system[J]. Machine Tool & Hydraulics, 2021, 49(13): 13-18.

[0172] In addition to improving the defect of the original protocol that cannot resist counterfeit attacks, in the RFID system of this application, the server and the reader / writer exchange data through wired methods such as optical fiber and coaxial cable. By adopting a wired method, the system has higher security in hardware.

[0173] In this application, except for some particularly important data that is encrypted with a simple level encryption algorithm, other data with relatively lower security requirements are encrypted with an ultra-lightweight encryption algorithm, which will reduce the overall amount of calculation to a certain extent. It is a self-created ultra-lightweight encryption algorithm that can be promoted, developed and applied in electronic tags where low-cost computing is limited.

[0174] In summary, a two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system has the advantages of fast encryption and decryption speed and small amount of calculation. While ensuring the security of privacy information, it can also reduce the amount of calculation to a certain extent. In order to further reduce the computational cost of the tag, the tag only uses the R_LWE cryptographic system for encryption, and the decryption process with a large amount of calculation is completed at the reader. At the same time, cross-synthesis operations are introduced in the protocol encryption process, and the tag's verification of the reader can be realized based on cross-synthesis operations, which can ensure security. The amount of calculation required by R_LWE is very small. Compared with other improved protocols, the amount of calculation required by this protocol is smaller, as shown in Table 2. Therefore, the introduction of cross-synthesis operations in the protocol encryption process will not increase the amount of calculation and computational cost of the tag, and by introducing cross-synthesis operations, counterfeiting and replay attacks can be effectively prevented. The protocol in this paper is compared with other classic protocols from different attack types. The protocol in this paper has higher security. Comprehensive analysis of the calculation amount, storage amount and other indicators of the tag end of different protocols shows that the protocol in this paper is better than the comparison protocol in terms of calculation and has certain promotion value.

[0175] It should be understood that the size of the serial numbers of the steps in the above embodiments does not mean the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application.

[0176] The embodiment of the present application also provides a two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, which corresponds one-to-one to a two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system in the above embodiment. The two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system includes:

[0177] An initialization module, used for respectively presetting the shared key value between the storage reading end and the tag end, the identifier corresponding to the tag end, the encryption function under the R_LWE cryptographic system, and the cross synthesis operation function at the storage reading end and the tag end;

[0178] A first request module, configured to, when the tag end sends a signal to the storage reader end, cause the storage reader end to match a background query parameter, generate a first session message and a second session message, transmit the background query parameter, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiate a first authentication request;

[0179] A first authentication module, configured to verify the first session message and the second session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function when the tag end receives the first authentication request;

[0180] A second request module, configured to, when the first authentication request is verified to be successful, generate a third session message and a fourth session message at the tag end, transmit the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage and reading end, and initiate a second authentication request;

[0181] A second authentication module, configured to verify the third session message and the fourth session message by using a current shared key value or a previous shared key value when the storage reading end receives the second authentication request;

[0182] The first key updating module is used to update the shared key value when the second authentication request is verified successfully.

[0183] A two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system also includes:

[0184] A third request module, configured to generate a fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function at the storage and reading end, send the fifth session message to the tag end, and initiate a third authentication request;

[0185] A third authentication module, configured to verify the fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function when the tag end receives the third authentication request;

[0186] The second key updating module is used for the tag end to update the shared key value when the third authentication request is verified successfully, thereby completing the two-way authentication between the storage reading end and the tag end.

[0187] A two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system also includes:

[0188] The interactive module is used for, when the two-way authentication between the storage reader and the tag is completed, the server initiates a query request based on the background query parameter and returns the query result to the tag via the reader.

[0189] For the specific definition of a two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, please refer to the definition of a two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system in the above text, which will not be repeated here.

[0190] Each module in the above-mentioned two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system can be fully or partially implemented by software, hardware and a combination thereof.

[0191] The above modules may be embedded in or independent of a processor in a computer device in the form of hardware, or may be stored in a memory in a computer device in the form of software, so that the processor can call and execute operations corresponding to the above modules.

[0192] In one embodiment, a computer device is provided, which may be a server. The computer device includes a processor, a memory, a network interface and a database connected via a system bus. The processor of the computer device is used to provide computing and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and the computer program in the non-volatile storage medium. The network interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal via a network connection. When the computer program is executed by the processor, any one of the above-mentioned two-way authentication methods based on the R_LWE cryptographic system is implemented.

[0193] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are implemented:

[0194] The shared key value between the storage reading end and the tag end, the identifier corresponding to the tag end, the encryption function under the R_LWE cryptographic system and the cross synthesis operation function are preset at the storage reading end and the tag end respectively;

[0195] When the tag end sends a signal to the storage reader end, the storage reader end matches the background query parameters, generates a first session message and a second session message, transmits the background query parameters, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiates a first authentication request;

[0196] The tag end receives the first authentication request and verifies the first session message and the second session message by using the cross synthesis operation function;

[0197] If the first authentication request is verified, the tag end generates a third session message and a fourth session message, transmits the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage and reading end, and initiates a second authentication request;

[0198] The storage reading end receives the second authentication request, and uses the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message;

[0199] If the second authentication request is verified successfully, the shared key value is updated, and the two-way authentication of the storage reader and the tag is completed.

[0200] Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand that all or part of the processes in the above-mentioned embodiments can be completed by instructing the relevant hardware through a computer program, and the computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, including several instructions to enable a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the methods described in each embodiment of the present application. When the computer program is executed, it may include the processes of the embodiments of the above-mentioned methods. Among them, any reference to memory, storage, database or other media used in the embodiments provided in the present application may include non-volatile and / or volatile memory. Non-volatile memory may include read-only memory (ROM), programmable ROM (PROM), electrically programmable ROM (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable ROM (EEPROM) or flash memory. Volatile memory may include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM is available in many forms, such as static RAM (SRAM), dynamic RAM (DRAM), synchronous DRAM (SDRAM), double data rate SDRAM (DDRSDRAM), enhanced SDRAM (ESDRAM), synchronous link (Synchlink) DRAM (SLDRAM), memory bus (Rambus) direct RAM (RDRAM), direct memory bus dynamic RAM (DRDRAM), and memory bus dynamic RAM (RDRAM), etc.

[0201] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that for the sake of convenience and brevity of description, only the division of the above-mentioned functional units and modules is used as an example. In actual applications, the above-mentioned functions can be distributed and completed by different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the system can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

Claims

1. A two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, characterized in that: Applicable to a radio frequency system including a tag, a reader / writer and a server, wherein the reader / writer and the server constitute a storage reading end, and the storage reading end is externally treated as a whole, and the authentication includes at least the following steps: The storage reader and the tag are respectively preset with a shared key value between the storage reader and the tag. , the identifier corresponding to the tag end , encryption functions and cross-synthesis operation functions under the R_LWE cryptographic system; When the tag end sends a signal to the storage reader end, the storage reader end matches the background query parameter and generates a first random number ,use , Calculate the first conversation message , Second session message , represents a cross-synthesis operation function, which transmits the background query parameter, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiates a first authentication request; The tag end receives the first authentication request and verifies the first session message and the second session message using the cross-synthesis operation function; based on the received first session message and the second session message, the tag end calculates a first verification value using the cross-synthesis operation function, wherein the first verification value ; When the second session message is equal to the first verification value, the first authentication request is verified successfully; If the first authentication request is verified, the tag generates a second random number ,use , , , Calculate the third session message in sequence , the fourth conversation message , is an encryption function under the R_LWE cryptographic system, transmits the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage reading end, and initiates a second authentication request; The storage reading end receives the second authentication request, and uses the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message; If the second authentication request is verified successfully, updating the shared key value; The storage and reading end generates a fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function, sends the fifth session message to the tag end, and initiates a third authentication request; The tag end receives the third authentication request and verifies the fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function; When the third authentication request is verified to be successful, the tag end updates the shared key value, and at this time, the two-way authentication of the storage reading end and the tag end is completed.

2. The two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The step of the tag receiving the third authentication request and using the cross-synthesis operation function to verify the fifth session message includes: The cross-combination operation function is used to calculate a second verification value, wherein the second verification value , where represents the cross synthesis operation function, α is the first random number, is the second random number; When the fifth session message is equal to the second verification value, the third authentication request is verified successfully.

3. The two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The design steps of the cross synthesis operation function include: Get the preset length The binary sequence ; Calculate separately The Hamming weight of When the Hamming weight of X is greater than or equal to the Hamming weight of Y, take After The bit sequence is placed in Before Position, take Before The bit sequence is placed in After Among them, , , They are The Hamming weight of The result of the operation is rounded down to an integer; Will as the target calculation value.

4. The two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The following steps are also included: When the Hamming weight of X is less than the Hamming weight of Y, take After The bit sequence is placed in After Position, take Before The bit sequence is placed in Before Among them, , , They are The Hamming weight of The result of the operation is rounded down to an integer.

5. The two-way authentication method based on the R_LWE cryptographic system according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The storage reading end receives the second authentication request, and the step of using the current shared key value or the shared key value of the previous round to verify the third session message and the fourth session message includes: First, using the current shared key value to verify the third session message and the fourth session message; When the current shared key value is used to verify the third session message and the fourth session message and the verification fails, the shared key value of the previous round is used to verify the third session message and the fourth session message; When the third session message and the fourth session message are successfully verified by using the shared key value of the previous round, the second authentication request is successfully verified.

6. A two-way authentication device based on the R_LWE cryptographic system, characterized in that: include, Initialization module, used to preset the shared key value between the storage reader and the tag end at the storage reader and the tag end respectively , the identifier corresponding to the tag end , encryption functions and cross-synthesis operation functions under the R_LWE cryptographic system; The first request module is used for, when the tag end sends a signal to the storage reading end, the storage reading end matches the background query parameter and generates a first random number ,use , Calculate the first conversation message , Second session message , represents a cross-synthesis operation function, which transmits the background query parameter, the first session message and the second session message to the tag end, and initiates a first authentication request; A first authentication module, configured to verify the first session message and the second session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function when the tag end receives the first authentication request; Based on the received first conversation message and the received second conversation message, a first verification value is calculated using the cross synthesis operation function, wherein the first verification value ; When the second session message is equal to the first verification value, the first authentication request is verified successfully; The second request module is used to generate a second random number when the first authentication request is verified. ,use , , , Calculate the third session message in sequence , the fourth conversation message , passing the third session message and the fourth session message to the storage reading end, and initiating a second authentication request; A second authentication module, configured to verify the third session message and the fourth session message by using a current shared key value or a previous shared key value when the storage reading end receives the second authentication request; A first key updating module, configured to update the shared key value when the second authentication request is verified successfully; A third request module, configured to generate a fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function at the storage and reading end, send the fifth session message to the tag end, and initiate a third authentication request; A third authentication module, configured to verify the fifth session message by using the cross-synthesis operation function when the tag end receives the third authentication request; The second key updating module is used for the tag end to update the shared key value when the third authentication request is verified successfully, thereby completing the two-way authentication between the storage reading end and the tag end.

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