Trust evaluation method and system for collaborative authentication between drones and vehicles in Internet of Vehicles

Through the trust evaluation method of collaborative authentication of drones and vehicles, the complexity of base station deployment of Internet of Vehicles technology and the threat of malicious vehicle information in mountainous road traffic management is solved, real-time and accurate road condition judgment and information security are achieved.

CN118612243BActive Publication Date: 2024-11-22ANQING NORMAL UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410656628.0
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-05-24
Publication Date
2024-11-22
Estimated Expiration
2044-05-24

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In mountainous road traffic management, Internet of Vehicles technology faces the complexity and cost limitations of base station deployment, and the problem that malicious vehicles may send misinformation, which threatens the accuracy and credibility of traffic information.

Method used

Using the trust evaluation method of collaborative authentication between drones and vehicles, through system initialization, registration of vehicles and drones with authoritative centers, collaborative verification and trust updates during information interaction, malicious vehicles are identified and punished to ensure the accuracy of information and System security.

Benefits of technology

Real-time and accurate judgment of mountain road conditions has been achieved, the reliability of traffic safety management and system safety has been improved, the accuracy and credibility of information have been ensured, and the risk of malicious information has been reduced.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The trust evaluation method and system for cooperative authentication of unmanned aerial vehicles and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles of the present invention include: system initialization generates system public parameters; vehicle registers with a trusted authoritative center; unmanned aerial vehicles register with a trusted authoritative center; successfully registered vehicle users and unmanned aerial vehicle system nodes obtain parameter information based on public system parameters; when vehicles exchange information, if the information is found to be inconsistent, collaborative verification can be performed through other vehicles; after multiple vehicle users send user names and passwords to the authoritative center for successful login, the cluster head vehicle sends the controversial information exchanged between vehicles to the authoritative center, and the authoritative center uses the unmanned aerial vehicle resource scheduling algorithm to select a suitable unmanned aerial vehicle node, judge the controversial information, and send the judgment result to the authoritative center; the authoritative center updates the trust score of the target vehicle that generates the controversial information based on the judgment result. The present invention can maintain the security and reliability of the entire system.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the field of vehicle network security communication technology, and in particular to a trust assessment method and system for collaborative authentication of unmanned aerial vehicles and vehicles in an Internet of Vehicles. Background Art

[0002] Mountain road traffic management has always faced many challenges, including complex terrain, changeable weather conditions and traffic safety hazards. Traditional traffic management methods are often ineffective in mountainous areas due to the lack of real-time road condition information and vehicle dynamic monitoring. With the development and application of vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology, new solutions have been brought to mountain traffic management. Vehicle-to-vehicle communication technology uses advanced wireless communication technology to enable vehicles to exchange information in real time, including vehicle location, speed, driving route, etc. This technology can not only improve the efficiency of traffic management, but also greatly improve the level of traffic safety, and help reduce energy consumption and environmental pollution.

[0003] Although the Internet of Vehicles technology has brought many advantages to mountain road traffic management, its application also faces a series of challenges. First, the deployment complexity and cost of base stations have limited the coverage of the Internet of Vehicles, and the maintenance of base stations also faces a series of challenges. Second, malicious vehicles may send wrong information, which threatens the accuracy and credibility of traffic information, so effective security mechanisms are urgently needed to deal with such problems. For example, in emergency situations such as disaster relief, it is crucial to ensure the accuracy of information from Internet of Vehicles technology. However, there is a risk that malicious vehicles send false information, which may lead to misleading and confusion, seriously affecting the efficiency and success of rescue operations. Therefore, effective security mechanisms are needed to prevent the spread of malicious information and ensure the credibility and stability of the Internet of Vehicles system.

[0004] In order to solve the information communication in vehicle networks, some scholars use self-organizing network technology, which allows vehicles to form networks autonomously without central control and dynamically adjust the network topology to adapt to the complex terrain environment in mountainous areas. However, the lack of central control nodes in self-organizing networks may be vulnerable to malicious attacks and network security threats, such as data theft and malicious tampering, and effective security measures need to be taken to protect the security and privacy of communication data. Summary of the invention

[0005] The trust assessment method and system for collaborative authentication of drones and vehicles in a connected vehicle network proposed in the present invention can at least solve one of the technical problems in the background technology.

[0006] To achieve the above object, the present invention adopts the following technical solutions:

[0007] The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles includes the following steps:

[0008] System initialization generates system common parameters;

[0009] The vehicle user and the UAV system node register with the authority center respectively, and the successfully registered vehicle user and the UAV system node obtain the parameters and information of successful registration based on the system public parameters;

[0010] When two vehicles interact on a mountain road, they usually transmit and interact information according to consistent rules and protocols. These rules may include traffic signals, traffic regulations, and agreements based on vehicle-to-vehicle communication protocols. Under normal circumstances, the interaction between vehicles should follow these agreements and rules to ensure safe and orderly road traffic. However, if the interactive information between two vehicles is inconsistent, it means that one of them has sent wrong information or there is a fault. In this case, the vehicle that did not send the wrong information is the reporting vehicle. The reporting vehicle will identify the other vehicle as a malicious vehicle and directly report the malicious vehicle identity information and the malicious information it spreads to the drone. At this time, the malicious vehicle is the reported vehicle. Subsequently, the drone will detect the road scene and reward and punish the two vehicles based on the on-site detection results to update the trust points.

[0011] If more than two vehicles send interactive information and the information is inconsistent, two or more vehicles will collaboratively verify the disputed information. If multiple vehicles believe that a vehicle sends malicious information based on the collaborative verification results, these vehicles will send a request to the cluster head vehicle to report the malicious vehicle. If the reported vehicle actively admits to sending malicious information at this time, the cluster head vehicle will punish it by reducing its trust score. If the reported vehicle does not admit the malicious behavior, the cluster head vehicle will send the disputed behavior to the authority center. The authority center selects a drone node to judge the identity information of the reporting vehicle and the reported vehicle and the disputed information, and finally the drone sends the judgment result to the authority center.

[0012] According to the judgment result of the drone, the authoritative center will update the trust score of the reporting and reported vehicles as a reward or punishment. For the reported vehicle that sent wrong information, its trust score will be reduced; for the reporting vehicle that sent malicious information to the cluster head vehicle, its trust score will be increased.

[0013] Optionally, the process of vehicle user registration includes:

[0014] The vehicle user sends a unique username and password parameter to a trusted authority center;

[0015] The authoritative center determines whether the current vehicle user is an unregistered new user based on the parameters. If the authoritative center fails to query the same parameters from the backend database, the vehicle is an unregistered new user. The authoritative center generates a random secret key and calculates the anti-attack parameters based on the parameters sent by the vehicle user and sends them to the vehicle user.

[0016] The vehicle user calculates and generates A i ;

[0017] The authoritative center calculates and generates B i .

[0018] Optionally, an A is generated based on the vehicle user's unique username and password. i and B i The calculation formula is:

[0019]

[0020]

[0021] In the formula, H1 and H represent one-way irreversible hash functions, UID i Indicates the user's unique identity, UPW i Indicates password, PID i represents the pseudo-identity of the vehicle user, and s is a random number generated by the authority center. || represents the string concatenation operation, Represents the exclusive OR operation.

[0022] Optionally, the process of drone system node registration includes:

[0023] The drone system node generates a unique random number u and a unique identity DID i , and calculate C i and C i * , the calculation formula is:

[0024]

[0025]

[0026] Then, in the UAV system, each node sends its identity information C i Sent to the authority center, the authority center generates a unique random number w and uses this random number to calculate C i * and D i , where C i * =C i T pri , After the calculation is completed, the authority center sends the results back to the drone node to complete the registration process.

[0027] Where H and is a one-way irreversible hash function generated by an authoritative center. pub and T pri It is a public-private key pair generated by an authority center. T is another public key generated by the authority center, belonging to a prime number additive cyclic group.

[0028] Optionally, the process of a vehicle user logging into a vehicle system includes:

[0029] The user enters the vehicle's unique identification UID i and password UPW i , then the system automatically calculates A i and s', and generate a timestamp CT i .in Where PID i is the pseudo identity of the vehicle user, B i is the calculated information sent by the authority center to the vehicle user during the above vehicle user registration process; then, the vehicle user will convert s' and CT i It is sent to the authoritative center, and the authoritative center uses the formula ΔCT<|ΔCT-CT i |Judge the validity of the time; where ΔCT is the shortest time that the vehicle can delay sending information, and ΔCT is the current timestamp. If the formula is true, the authoritative center rejects its request and the vehicle user fails to log in. On the contrary, if the formula is not true, the authoritative center will continue to judge whether the equation s'=s is true, where s is the random secret key sent by the authoritative center during the vehicle registration phase. If the equation s'=s is true, if the equation is true, the vehicle user logs in successfully; where s is the random secret key sent by the authoritative center during the vehicle registration phase. If the vehicle user logs in successfully, the vehicle can interact with the authoritative center. Subsequently, the vehicle enters its unique identity identification UID i and password UPW i , and then calculated by the formula:

[0030]

[0031]

[0032]

[0033] In the formula, PID i is the pseudo identity of the vehicle, P and P i are the generating point of the elliptic curve and the public key generated by TCA; f is the unique random number generated by the vehicle; B i For useri After sending a registration request to TCA, TCA encrypts the user's request information and calculates it before returning it to the user. i The value of; Finally, the vehicle user will {m i ,CT i ,G i} is sent to TCA via a secure channel; where m i When multiple vehicles communicate with each other, the malicious vehicle sends the wrong information; when multiple vehicles report the malicious vehicle, the cluster head vehicle with a higher trust score will send the report information to TCA; CT i The timestamp when the message was sent to the vehicle; || and They represent string concatenation and XOR operations respectively.

[0034] Optionally, the authoritative center selects appropriate drone nodes through resource scheduling algorithms to achieve effective resource allocation and task dispatching.

[0035] Optionally, when establishing a session between vehicles, identity is verified and security is ensured by using a session key and timestamp between the two entities. During the session, information is exchanged between the two parties and the received information is verified to determine its integrity and accuracy.

[0036] On the other hand, the present invention also provides a trust evaluation method and system for cooperative authentication of UAVs and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles, which respectively provide a UAV node for monitoring road conditions, a trusted authority center, namely, a TCA, and a vehicle system, namely, a V;

[0037] The vehicle system is composed of many vehicles, each of which has interactive functions and can communicate with each other to share mountain road condition information in real time;

[0038] A trusted authority center is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and verifying road condition information transmitted by the vehicle layer;

[0039] The drone nodes are equipped with advanced monitoring equipment to patrol mountain roads in real time, collect road condition information and conduct supervision. In vehicle communication, if the interactive information between two vehicles is inconsistent, it is considered that one of them has sent wrong information or there is a fault. In this case, the sender of the wrong information is a malicious vehicle. Subsequently, the drone will detect the on-site situation and update the trust scores of the two vehicles based on the detection results. If more than two vehicles send interactive information and the information is inconsistent, two or more vehicles will collaboratively verify the disputed information. If multiple vehicles believe that a certain vehicle has sent malicious information based on the collaborative verification results, these vehicles will send a request to the cluster head vehicle to report the malicious vehicle. If it is If the reported vehicle actively admits to sending malicious information, the cluster head vehicle will punish it by reducing its trust score; if the reported vehicle does not admit the malicious behavior, the cluster head vehicle will send the disputed behavior to the authoritative center; the authoritative center selects a drone node to judge the identity information and disputed information of the reporting vehicle and the reported vehicle, and finally the drone sends the judgment result to the authoritative center; based on the drone's judgment result, the authoritative center will update the trust score of the reporting and reported vehicles as a reward or punishment; for the reported vehicle that sends wrong information, its trust score will be reduced; for the reporting vehicle that sends malicious behavior to the cluster head vehicle, its trust score will be increased.

[0040] It can be seen from the above technical scheme that the purpose of the present invention is to provide a trust assessment method and system for collaborative authentication of drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles, including: system initialization generates system public parameters; vehicle registration with a trusted authoritative center; drone registration with a trusted authoritative center; successfully registered vehicle users and drone system nodes obtain parameter information based on public system parameters; when vehicles exchange information, if inconsistent information is found, collaborative verification can be performed through other vehicles; after multiple vehicle users send their user names and passwords to the authoritative center and log in successfully, the cluster head vehicle sends the controversial information exchanged between vehicles to the authoritative center, and the authoritative center uses the drone resource scheduling algorithm to select a suitable drone node, judges the controversial information, and sends the judgment result to the authoritative center; the authoritative center updates the trust score of the target vehicle that generated the controversial information based on the judgment result.

[0041] The present invention uses drone technology to monitor road environments, such as complex road conditions in mountainous areas, to achieve accurate judgment and support of real-time road conditions. Vehicles collaborate to verify whether the information sent by the vehicle contains malicious behavior. In order to ensure the effective use of resources, the authoritative center uses a resource scheduling algorithm to select suitable and idle drones to provide services. The authoritative center uses trust scores to calculate the trustworthiness of vehicles. Finally, for vehicles that send malicious information, the authoritative center will take corresponding punishment measures to maintain the safety and reliability of the entire system.

[0042] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following technical effects:

[0043] The present invention uses advanced drone technology to conduct all-round monitoring and analysis of complex road environments, such as mountainous areas, to achieve real-time, accurate judgment and support of road conditions. Through various sensor devices carried by drones, such as high-resolution cameras and laser radars, efficient data collection and processing of roads and their surrounding environments can be carried out, providing important information support for road safety management.

[0044] The present invention introduces a cooperation mechanism based on message verification in terms of communication and cooperation between vehicles. Specifically, when a vehicle needs to send information, the system will select multiple vehicles to send the same message at the same time, and other vehicles will verify the received messages to determine whether there is malicious information. According to the verification results, the trust level of the vehicle sending the malicious information is adjusted to establish a trust relationship between vehicles, thereby improving the safety and reliability of the system.

[0045] In order to make full use of resources and improve monitoring efficiency, the present invention adopts an intelligent resource scheduling algorithm. The algorithm selects suitable and idle UAV resources for the execution of road monitoring tasks through real-time status monitoring and analysis of UAVs, so as to ensure the effective utilization of resources and the timely completion of monitoring tasks.

[0046] The present invention introduces a trust scoring mechanism. The scoring mechanism comprehensively considers the response trust and direct trust evaluation indicators of the vehicle to calculate the trust of the vehicle. By dynamically adjusting the trust of the vehicle, the system can more accurately identify malicious vehicles and punish them, thereby maintaining the safe and stable operation of the entire system. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0047] Figure 1 is a flow chart in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0048] Figure 2 A diagram of a vehicle registration process in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0049] Figure 3 2 is a diagram of the drone registration process in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0050] Figure 4 A diagram of a process of three-party interactive login and vehicle trust update in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0051] Figure 5 A diagram of the information interaction process between vehicles in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0052] Figure 6 This is a diagram of the vehicle password change process in an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0053] In order to make the purpose, technical solutions and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments.

[0054] like Figure 1 As shown, the embodiment of the present invention provides a trust assessment method and system for cooperative authentication of drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles, which includes the initialization of the system to generate common system parameters, vehicle registration with a trusted authority center, drone registration with a trusted authority center, successful registration of vehicle users and drone system nodes obtaining parameter information based on common system parameters, mutual judgment between vehicle entities through each other's behavior, and the behavior of malicious vehicles being cooperatively authenticated by other vehicles. The present invention uses drone technology to achieve accurate judgment and support for disaster relief and real-time road conditions in harsh mountainous environments, and it is necessary to judge whether malicious vehicles send erroneous information. In this process, by analyzing and verifying the information sent by malicious vehicles through drones, accurate road condition data can be ensured, thereby providing reliable support for disaster relief work.

[0055] The present invention consists of three layers, namely, an unmanned aerial vehicle node (UAV) that provides road condition supervision, a trusted authority center (TCA), and a vehicle system (V). The first layer is composed of many vehicles, each of which has an interactive function, can communicate with each other, and share mountain road condition information in real time. Through the information exchange between vehicles, the driver can timely understand the situation on the road, so as to make corresponding driving decisions and effectively deal with complex and changeable road conditions. The second layer is the trusted authority layer. These authorities play an important role in the system. They are responsible for collecting, analyzing and verifying the road condition information transmitted by the vehicle layer. Through the trust and professionalism of the authority, the vehicle can obtain more reliable road condition data, which improves the credibility and accuracy of the entire system. At the same time, the authority can also formulate relevant policies and regulations to guide vehicle driving, and intervene and regulate when necessary to ensure the normal operation of the transportation system. The third layer is the unmanned aerial vehicle system layer. The unmanned aerial vehicle plays a supervisory and auxiliary role in the system. By carrying advanced monitoring equipment, it patrols mountain roads in real time, collects road condition information and supervises. In vehicle communication, if the interactive information of two vehicles is inconsistent, it is considered that one of them has sent an erroneous message or there is a fault. At this time, the sender of the erroneous message is a malicious vehicle. Subsequently, the drone will detect the situation on site and update the trust scores of the two vehicles based on the detection results. If more than two vehicles send interactive information and the information is inconsistent, two or more vehicles will collaboratively verify the disputed information. If multiple vehicles believe that a vehicle sends malicious information based on the collaborative verification results, these vehicles will send a request to the cluster head vehicle to report the malicious vehicle. If the reported vehicle actively admits to sending malicious information at this time, the cluster head vehicle will punish it by reducing its trust score. If the reported vehicle does not admit the malicious behavior, the cluster head vehicle will send the disputed behavior to the authority center. The authority center selects a drone node to judge the identity information and disputed information of the reporting vehicle and the reported vehicle, and finally the drone sends the judgment result to the authority center. According to the judgment result of the drone, the authority center will update the trust score of the reporting and reported vehicles as a reward or punishment. For vehicles that send wrong information, their trust score will be reduced; conversely, the trust score of the reporting vehicle will be increased.

[0056] The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles of this embodiment includes the following steps:

[0057] S1, system initialization phase, generating system public parameters. First, the Trusted Center of Authority (TCA) is composed of government transportation departments and is responsible for the registration of vehicles and drones. TCA generates attack-resistant hash functions and public-private key pairs, and broadcasts them to the vehicle and drone systems. In this invention, TCA is constructed as a very authoritative system with a high degree of attack resistance and absolute trust. The TCA system uses a series of advanced security technologies and encryption mechanisms to ensure that communications and information transmission between vehicles are not subject to unauthorized interference or tampering. This strong anti-attack capability enables the TCA system to operate normally even in harsh mountainous conditions, providing reliable services for vehicles.

[0058] S2, the vehicle and UAV send registration requests to TCA respectively and obtain parameter information. Specifically, the vehicle user enters his unique identity and password, and this information is encrypted and sent to the TCA system. After receiving the request, the TCA system queries whether the corresponding vehicle identity information exists from the back-end database. If the identity information does not exist in the database, the TCA system writes the received data into the back-end database, and encrypts the successful registration message and sends it to the vehicle. Similarly, the UAV calculates the information and encrypts it with the public key of TCA and sends it to TCA. After receiving the information, TCA decrypts and calculates the information with the private key. Then TCA queries the back-end system for the corresponding UAV based on the calculated information. If it exists, it means that the user has registered and the registration fails; otherwise, the UAV is successfully registered.

[0059] S3. When the vehicle sends a login request to the TCA, it first enters its unique user name and password, and encrypts it using the key issued by the TCA. The vehicle then sends the encrypted information to the TCA. After receiving the information, the TCA verifies the user's identity. The verification process includes checking whether the user name and password sent by the user match those stored in the backend database. If the match is successful, the user logs in successfully; otherwise, the user logs in unsuccessfully.

[0060] S4, trust score update stage. If the interactive information of two vehicles is inconsistent, it means that one of them has sent wrong information or there is a fault. In this case, the vehicle that did not send the wrong information is the reporting vehicle. The reporting vehicle will identify the other vehicle that sent the wrong information as a malicious vehicle, and directly report the malicious vehicle identity information and the malicious information it spread to the drone. Subsequently, the drone will detect the road site and reward and punish the two vehicles for trust score update based on the on-site detection results. If more than two vehicles send interactive information and the information is inconsistent, two or more vehicles will collaboratively verify the disputed information. If multiple vehicles believe that a certain vehicle sends malicious information based on the collaborative verification results, these vehicles will send a request to report the malicious vehicle to the cluster head vehicle. If the reported vehicle actively admits to sending malicious information at this time, the cluster head vehicle will punish it by reducing its trust score. If the reported vehicle does not admit the malicious behavior, the cluster head vehicle will send the disputed behavior to the authoritative center. The authoritative center selects a drone node to judge the identity information and disputed information of the reporting vehicle and the reported vehicle, and finally the drone sends the judgment result to the authoritative center. According to the judgment results of the drone, the authoritative center will update the trust points of the reporting and reported vehicles as a reward or punishment. For vehicles that send wrong information, their trust points will be reduced; conversely, the trust points of the reporting vehicles will be increased.

[0061] S5, User password change stage. In the user password change stage, the user first enters his user name and password. Then, the vehicle will calculate the user identity and password to verify their accuracy. If the calculation result is consistent with the information in the vehicle's onboard system, the password can be changed.

[0062] The specific contents of S1 are:

[0063] S1-1 TCA generates an additive cyclic group G over a finite field, and G×G=G v , the order is P. Then TCA generates a public-private key pair and calculates P i =T pri P, where T pri is the private key generated by TCA, P belongs to a large prime number. TCA generates three one-way attack-resistant hash functions, H1: {0, 1} * →{0, 1} v , H: {0, 1} * →G v , h: {0, 1} * →G v The TCA then sends these parameters to the vehicle and UAV nodes through a secure channel.

[0064] The vehicle and UAV send the registration initialization steps to the TCA. First, the vehicle and UAV generate their unique identity and password respectively and encrypt them using a secure hash algorithm. Then, they send a registration request to the TCA system, transmitting the encrypted identity and password and other relevant information to the TCA. After receiving the registration request, the TCA system authenticates and verifies the identity of the vehicle and UAV. This includes verifying the uniqueness of their identity and the correctness of the password. The TCA system verifies the legitimacy of the entity by querying the backend database. Once the identity of the entity is confirmed, the TCA system establishes a secure communication channel with the vehicle and UAV.

[0065] like Figure 2 As shown, the process of vehicle registration is:

[0066] S2-1 User i Enter a unique identity UID i , and the password UPW i Then User i calculate And User i Generates a unique and non-repeatable random number v. Then User i Set parameter A i , v, PID i Sent to a trusted authority TCA. v is a random key generated by the user, PID i is the pseudo-identity of the vehicle user. The calculated A i As part of the authentication, the User i At the same time, the introduction of the random number v increases the security of the system and prevents malicious behaviors such as replay attacks.

[0067] S2-2TCA receives User i After sending the message, a unique random number s is generated. Then, TCA calculates And store v in the database. Then, TCA will i Send to User i ,User i After receiving B i Stored in the vehicle system. i What is sent is the pseudo identity PID of the vehicle user i , so that TCA can identify and track the vehicle sending the information, and prevent the real identity information of the vehicle user from being leaked. In addition, v is a key randomly generated by the user, which is sent to TCA, and TCA calculates it to ensure secure communication between vehicles. This method can ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the communication, while protecting the privacy and identity information of the vehicle user.

[0068] like Figure 3 As shown, the process of drone registration is:

[0069] S2-3 UAV Node i Choose to generate a unique random number u and calculate

[0070]

[0071]

[0072] Where DIDi is the unique identification of the drone, T pub is the public key generated by TCA, H represents the hash function, and T is the system parameter generated by TCA, which is a large prime number. Represents XOR operation, C i and C i * The result calculated by the formula.

[0073] like Figure 4 As shown, the process of user logging into the vehicle system is:

[0074] S3-1 User i Enter a uniquely identifiable identity authentication UID i and password UPW i , calculated by the formula Then, the vehicle will {s′, CT i} is sent to TCA. Where H1 and H are one-way irreversible hash functions generated by TCA. i For pseudo-identification of vehicle users, B i For user i After sending a registration request to TCA, TCA encrypts the user's request information and calculates it before returning it to the user. i The value of CT i The current timestamp can help TCA track and record the exact time of each communication, thereby maintaining the security of the system and preventing replay attacks. They represent string concatenation and XOR operations respectively.

[0075] After S3-2TCA receives the information sent by the vehicle, it first uses the formula ΔCT<|CT r -CT i|Judge whether the timestamp sent by the vehicle is valid. If the inequality holds, it means that the current time delay has exceeded the specified threshold ΔCT, TCA rejects the vehicle's request, and the vehicle needs to resend the login request. If the inequality does not hold, it means that the request delay sent by the current vehicle is within the specified time. In the formula CT r Indicates the current time, CT i is the time when the vehicle sends the request information. Then, TCA determines whether the equation s′=s is established. If the equation is established, the vehicle login is successful, otherwise the vehicle login fails. Then, TCA sends the login information m i and timestamp CT i Sent to the vehicle user via a secure channel.

[0076] like Figure 4 As shown in the figure, the conversation process of the vehicle sending interactive information to TCA is as follows: the vehicle enters the unique identity UID i and password UPW i , and then calculated by the formula:

[0077]

[0078]

[0079]

[0080] In the formula, PID i is the pseudo identity of the vehicle, P and P i are the generating point of the elliptic curve and the public key generated by TCA; f is the unique random number generated by the vehicle; B i For user i After sending a registration request to TCA, TCA encrypts the user's request information and calculates it before returning it to the user. i The value of; Finally, the vehicle user will {m i , CT i , G i} is sent to TCA via a secure channel; where m i When multiple vehicles communicate with each other, malicious vehicles send wrong information; when multiple vehicles report malicious vehicles, the cluster head vehicle with a higher trust score will send the report information to TCA; CT i The timestamp when the message was sent to the vehicle; || and They represent string concatenation and XOR operations respectively.

[0081] like Figure 4 As shown in the figure, the process of establishing a secure session between the drone and TCA is as follows: UAV node i Calculate by formula Then w' is sent to TCA, and TCA verifies whether w'=w is correct. If the equation holds, the drone node and TCA can communicate securely. Otherwise, the drone and TCA cannot establish communication. i * , C i and D i For UAV i When registering with TCA, TCA calculates the information sent. i * =C i T pri , Where T pri and T pub Public-private key pair generated for TCA, DID i It is the unique identification of the UAV. i The irreversible random number generated. w is a random number generated by TCA. || and They represent string concatenation and XOR operations respectively.

[0082] like Figure 4 As shown in Figure 2, the trust update process between vehicles is:

[0083] S4-1 When two vehicles interact on a mountain road, they usually transmit and interact with each other according to consistent rules and protocols. These rules may include traffic signals, traffic regulations, and agreements based on vehicle-to-vehicle communication protocols. Under normal circumstances, the interaction between vehicles should follow these agreements and rules to ensure the safety and order of road traffic. However, if the interactive information between two vehicles is inconsistent, it means that one of them has sent wrong information or there is a fault. In this case, the vehicle that did not send the wrong information is the reporting vehicle. The reporting vehicle will identify the other vehicle as a malicious vehicle and directly report the malicious vehicle identity information and the malicious information it spreads to the drone. At this time, the malicious vehicle is the reported vehicle. Subsequently, the drone detects the road scene and rewards and punishes the two vehicles for trust score updates based on the on-site detection results. If more than two vehicles send interactive information and the information is inconsistent, two or more vehicles will collaboratively verify the disputed information. If multiple vehicles believe that a vehicle sends malicious information based on the collaborative verification results, these vehicles will send a request to the cluster head vehicle to report the malicious vehicle. If the reported vehicle actively admits to sending malicious information, the cluster head vehicle will punish it by reducing its trust score. If the reported vehicle does not admit the malicious behavior, the cluster head vehicle sends the disputed behavior and parameters to the authoritative center.

[0084] S4-2 When TCA receives the parameters sent by the vehicle, in order to prevent replay attacks, it first uses the formula ΔCT<|CT r -CTi |Judge whether the received information delay time is within the threshold ΔCT of the allowable range. CT r is the current timestamp, CT i is the timestamp when the vehicle sends the request information. If the inequality holds, the information delay sent by the vehicle is within the specified threshold, and then the calculation C i * , messageD i :

[0085]

[0086] C i * =C i T pri

[0087]

[0088] In the formula, S i and C i The public key generated for TCA, G i is the generator point of the elliptic curve. pri The private key generated for TCA, m i Message sent to the vehicle. i is the result of the formula calculation. Then TCA will use the current timestamp CT i and messageD i Sent to an idle UAV node via a secure channel i .

[0089] S4-3 TCA can use the UAV resource scheduling algorithm to intelligently select the most suitable UAV for the current mission requirements. First, in step 1, the UAVs are sorted according to different mission levels and the unused UAVs are filtered out. In step 2, a comprehensive evaluation is performed based on multiple factors, including but not limited to the UAV's flight capability, payload capacity, flight path planning, mission execution efficiency, and environmental conditions. For these evaluation index attributes, their importance in the UAV performance can be defined separately, and then the percentage is calculated based on the proportion of each attribute in the total performance. In different scenarios, according to UAVs with different computing power, the addition method of these evaluation indicators can be flexibly adjusted. In step 3, by comprehensively analyzing and optimizing these factors, TCA can effectively assign UAVs to maximize the efficiency and success rate of mission execution.

[0090]

[0091] S4-4 UAV Nodei Receive the parameter {CT sent by TCA i , messageD i}, first verify the timestamp and judge whether ΔCT<|CT r -CT i |Is it true? If the inequality is true, it means that the delay time of the request information sent by TCA exceeds the specified threshold, and the information sent by TCA is invalid. i calculate C i * =C i T pri , Where S i and C i The public key generated for TCA, G i is the generator point of the elliptic curve. pri The private key generated for TCA, m i Information sent to vehicles. UAV i It uses a variety of sensors to determine whether the information sent by the vehicle is correct, and then converts the judgment result information into characters and sends them to m i Then, UAV i calculate

[0092] S4-5TCA receives UAV i The information sent j , and the timestamp CT i After that, TCA first checks whether the timestamp is valid. If the time is valid, it passes the UAV i The returned information determines whether the vehicle sending the interactive information is a malicious vehicle. If the vehicle is a malicious vehicle, the Tscore is calculated. i - = PENALTY, the malicious vehicle will be punished by reducing the trust score. Otherwise, the Tscore i + = REWORD rewards for increasing the vehicle's trust score. Tscore i is the trust score of the vehicle, REWORD and PENALTY are the reward and penalty thresholds for the trust score of the vehicle, respectively. Before rewarding and punishing the vehicle, the basic trust between the vehicle entities will be calculated first, namely: response trust and direct score. Response trust is the vehicle entity V i For vehicle entity V j The probability of sending interactive information in a timely manner as required: Where m j For vehicle V j Receive V i The number of messages sent to it, mCountij is the total number of requests for interaction between vehicles. Then the direct trust between vehicles is calculated, namely: ij =Interact ij *HisTrust ij Due to the historical behavior score HisTrust between the response trust and vehicle entity ij is positively correlated, so we need to calculate the product of the two to get the direct trust score Direct ij .

[0093] S4-6 Subsequent TCA calculation Where MessageV i A is the trust score of TCA on the vehicle. i and B i This is the encrypted information calculated by the vehicle and the authority when the vehicle registers with the TCA. i ,messageV i}Sent to the cluster head vehicle with higher trust score.

[0094] S4-7 Cluster head vehicle receives {CT i ,messageV i}, first determine whether the timestamp is valid. If the timestamp is valid, calculate Then, the cluster head vehicle transmits the information m sent by the malicious vehicle i Broadcast to other vehicles in the finite domain. i and B i The encrypted information calculated by the vehicle and the authority when the vehicle registers with the TCA. || and They represent string concatenation and XOR operations respectively.

[0095] like Figure 5 As shown in the figure, the information interaction and collaborative verification process between vehicles is as follows:

[0096] S5-1 Vehicle V i and vehicle V j The public keys sent by each other and Encrypt the information of both parties and then calculate and Then both parties will timestamp CT i and CT j , and the behavior judgment information m of the other entity i and m j Sent to both vehicles. i , UPW i} and {PID j, UPW j} are V i and V j The unique authentication and password of the vehicle. The information between vehicles is verified through three indicators: information consistency function f(info1, info2), information difference function: g(info1, info2) and information consistency score function: h(f, g). The calculation formulas of these three functions are:

[0097]

[0098] Where, e is the natural logarithm, k is a constant, and adjusting k can better view the shape trend of the function in the image. info1 and info2 represent the consistency of the information of the two disputed vehicles.

[0099] g(info1, info2)=|info1-info2|

[0100] In the formula, info1-info2 is the information of the vehicle, and the keywords are extracted through feature extraction for comparison. The larger the comparison difference, the greater the information difference between the two vehicles.

[0101] h(f,g)=α*f+(1-α)*(1-g)

[0102] Where α is a weight parameter used to adjust the relative importance of f and g. f and g are the results of the above two equations. The larger the output value of the function, the higher the consistency.

[0103] like Figure 6 As shown, the vehicle password change process is:

[0104] S6-1 The user first enters the user name UID i and password UPW i The vehicle will then be based on the user identity UID i and password UID i Perform calculations To verify its accuracy. If the equation is established, the calculation result is consistent with the information in the vehicle onboard system, and the password can be changed. i is the pseudo-identity of the vehicle, B i For user i After sending a registration request to TCA, TCA encrypts the user's request information and calculates it before returning it to the user. i The value of .

[0105] Compared with other solutions, the present invention takes less time to calculate the overhead. This embodiment compares the computational overhead of the present invention with three other existing solutions for vehicle networking applications that support message authentication and key negotiation, as shown in Table I, showing the significant advantages of the present invention in this regard.

[0106] Some symbolic execution times defined in this embodiment are as follows, where the unit of execution time is milliseconds.

[0107] T uh =0.0012: is the execution time of a one-way hash function operation.

[0108] T msm =1.1154: is a ratio based on the elliptic curve multiplied by the execution time.

[0109] T sed =0.0212: is the execution time of a symmetric encryption and decryption.

[0110] T pao =0.0380: is the execution time of a point addition operation based on elliptic curve.

[0111] T bp =7.2720: is a two-line pairing execution time.

[0112] T bpm =1.1410: is the multiplication operation time based on double-line matching.

[0113] T e =2.6844: is a modular exponential operation time.

[0114] Since the present invention and other solutions adopt the same three-layer architecture, for the convenience of representation, Vehicle represents a vehicle, Drone / RSU / TCA represents a drone, a roadside unit or an authority center, respectively. CC / CSP / UAV represents a control center, a cloud service provider or a drone, respectively.

[0115] In the above embodiment, it can be seen from the following Table I that in the three-party authentication and key negotiation process of the vehicle, the authority center TCA and the unmanned aerial vehicle UAV, the vehicle in the present invention needs to perform two times the proportional multiplication of the elliptic curve T msm , 5 one-way hash function operations T uh , the total computational cost is: 2T msm +5T uh = 2.2368ms. The authoritative center TCA in the present invention needs to perform two times the proportional multiplication of the elliptic curve T msm , a one-way hash function operation T uh , the total computational cost is: 2Tmsm +T uh = 2.232ms. The UAV in the present invention needs to calculate the ratio of the elliptic curve twice and multiply T msm , 2 one-way hash function operations T uh , the total computational overhead is 2T msm +2T uh =2.2332ms.

[0116] In addition, compared with relevant literature, in Table I, we can see the comparison results of the computational overhead of the three parties of the IDAA scheme in the three-party authentication process of the vehicle, the drone, and the control center CC with other schemes. In Table I, we can see the computational overhead of the RcoM scheme in the three-party authentication process of the vehicle, the root authority node RA, and the cloud service provider CSP. Similarly, in Table I, we can see the computational overhead of the PPVF scheme in the three-party authentication process of the vehicle, the RSU roadside unit, and the cloud service provider CSP.

[0117] Table I

[0118]

[0119] In the above embodiments, it can be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, it can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product. The computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the process or function described in the embodiment of the present application is generated in whole or in part. The computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website site, computer, server or data center by wired (e.g., coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) mode to another website site, computer, server or data center. The computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that a computer can access or a data storage device such as a server or data center that includes one or more available media integrated. The available medium may be a magnetic medium, (e.g., a floppy disk, a hard disk, a tape), an optical medium (e.g., a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (e.g., a solid-state drive Solid State Disk (SSD)), etc.

[0120] It should be noted that, in this article, relational terms such as first and second, etc. are only used to distinguish one entity or operation from another entity or operation, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Moreover, the terms "include", "comprise" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprise a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the elements.

[0121] Each embodiment in this specification is described in a related manner, and the same or similar parts between the embodiments can be referred to each other, and each embodiment focuses on the differences from other embodiments. In particular, for the system embodiment, since it is basically similar to the method embodiment, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the partial description of the method embodiment.

[0122] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, rather than to limit the same. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the aforementioned embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that the technical solutions described in the aforementioned embodiments may still be modified, or some of the technical features may be replaced by equivalents. However, these modifications or replacements do not deviate the essence of the corresponding technical solutions from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A trust evaluation method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles is based on a drone node that provides road condition supervision, namely, a UAV, a trusted authority center, namely, a TCA, and a vehicle system, namely, V, and is characterized by: The following steps are included: System initialization generates system common parameters; The vehicle user and the UAV system node register with the authority center respectively, and the successfully registered vehicle user and the UAV system node obtain the parameters and information of successful registration based on the system public parameters; When two vehicles interact on a mountain road, they communicate and interact according to consistent rules and protocols; these rules include traffic signals, traffic regulations, and agreements based on vehicle-to-vehicle communication protocols; under normal circumstances, the interaction between vehicles should follow these agreements and rules to ensure safe and orderly road traffic; However, if the interactive information between the two vehicles is inconsistent, it means that one of them has sent wrong information or has a fault. In this case, the vehicle that did not send the wrong information is the reporting vehicle. The reporting vehicle will identify the other vehicle as a malicious vehicle and directly report the malicious vehicle's identity information and the malicious information it spreads to the drone. At this time, the malicious vehicle is the reported vehicle. Subsequently, the drone will detect the road site and reward and punish the two vehicles by updating their trust scores based on the on-site detection results. If more than two vehicles send interactive information and the information is inconsistent, two or more vehicles will collaboratively verify the disputed information; If multiple vehicles believe that a certain vehicle has sent malicious information based on the collaborative verification results, these vehicles will send a request to the cluster head vehicle to report the malicious vehicle; if the reported vehicle actively admits to sending malicious information at this time, the cluster head vehicle will punish it by reducing its trust score; if the reported vehicle does not admit the malicious behavior, the cluster head vehicle will send the disputed behavior to the authority center; the authority center uses the drone node to judge the identity information of the reporting vehicle and the reported vehicle and the disputed information, and sends the judgment result to the authority center; According to the judgment results, the authoritative center will update the trust points of the reporting and reported vehicles as a reward or punishment; the trust points of reported vehicles that send false information will be reduced; the trust points of reporting vehicles that send malicious information to the cluster head vehicle about other vehicles will be increased.

2. The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The process of vehicle user registration includes: The vehicle user sends a unique username and password parameter to a trusted authority center; The authority center determines whether the current vehicle user is an unregistered new user based on the parameters; if the authority center fails to query the same parameters from the backend database, the vehicle is an unregistered new user; the authority center generates a random secret key and calculates the anti-attack parameters based on the parameters sent by the vehicle user and sends them to the vehicle user; The vehicle user calculates and generates ; The authoritative center generates ; The vehicle user's unique username and password is used to generate and The calculation formula is: In the formula, and represents a one-way irreversible hash function, Indicates the unique identity of the user. Indicates the password. It represents the pseudo identity of the vehicle user; It is a random number generated by the authoritative center. Represents a string concatenation operation. Represents the exclusive OR operation.

3. The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The process of drone system node registration includes: The drone system node generates a unique random number and unique identification , and calculate and , the calculation formula is: Then, in the UAV system, each node sends its identity information Sent to the authority center, which generates a unique random number , and use this random number to calculate and ,in , ;After the calculation is completed, the authority center sends the results back to the drone node to complete the registration process; In the formula, and It is a one-way irreversible hash function generated by an authoritative center; and It is a public-private key pair generated by an authoritative center; It is another public key generated by the authority center and belongs to a prime number additive cyclic group.

4. The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 2 is characterized in that: The process of a vehicle user logging into the vehicle system includes: Based on the unique identity of the vehicle user and password , the system will automatically calculate and , and generate a timestamp ;in , ; In the formula A pseudo-identity for the vehicle user; The calculated information sent by the authority center to the vehicle user during the above vehicle user registration process; the vehicle user will and Sent to the authority center, the authority center uses the formula The validity of the judgment time; The shortest delay in sending a message to a vehicle. is the current timestamp; If the formula is established, the authority center rejects the request and the vehicle user fails to log in. Otherwise, the authority center continues to judge the equation. Is it true? If the equation is true, the vehicle user logs in successfully. This is the random key sent by the authority during the vehicle registration phase. If the vehicle user logs in successfully, the vehicle can interact with the authority. Subsequently, the vehicle enters its unique identity. and password , and then calculated by the formula: In the formula, is the pseudo-identity of the vehicle, and They are the generator point of the elliptic curve and the public key generated by TCA; A unique random number generated for the vehicle; For users After sending a registration request to TCA, TCA encrypts the user's request information and calculates it before returning it to Finally, the vehicle user will Sent to TCA via a secure channel; When multiple vehicles communicate with each other, the malicious vehicle sends the wrong information; when multiple vehicles report the malicious vehicle, the cluster head vehicle with a higher trust score will send the report information to TCA; The timestamp when the message was sent to the vehicle; and They represent string concatenation and XOR operations respectively.

5. The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 3 is characterized in that: The process of establishing a secure session between the drone and TCA is as follows: Drone Node Calculate by formula ; Then the drone node Will Send to TCA, TCA verification Is it correct? If the equation holds, the drone node and TCA can communicate securely; Otherwise, the drone and TCA cannot establish communication; , as well as for When registering with TCA, TCA calculates the information sent;in , ; In the formula and The public-private key pair generated for TCA, It is the unique identification of the drone; for Irreversible random numbers are generated; A random number generated for TCA.

6. The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 5 is characterized in that: It also includes information interaction between vehicles and the collaborative verification process is: vehicle and vehicles The public keys sent by each other and Encrypt the information of both parties and then calculate and ; Then both parties will timestamp and , and information about the behavior of the other entity and Send to both vehicles; , They are and Unique authentication and password; the verification of information between vehicles is through three indicators, namely: information consistency function , information difference function: And the information consistency scoring function: ; The calculation formulas of these three functions are: In the formula, is the natural logarithm, is a constant, adjust The shape trend of the function can be better viewed in the graph; Indicates the consistency of information of two disputed vehicles; In the formula, The information of the vehicles is extracted by feature extraction to obtain keywords for comparison. The greater the comparison difference, the greater the information difference between the two vehicles. In the formula is a weight parameter used to adjust the relative importance of It is the result obtained from the above two equations; when the output value of the function is larger, it means that the consistency is higher.

7. The trust assessment method for cooperative authentication between drones and vehicles in the Internet of Vehicles according to claim 2, characterized in that: Also includes the vehicle change password process as: Based on the unique username of the vehicle user and password ; Then, the vehicle and password calculate , , to verify its accuracy; If the equation is established, the calculation result is consistent with the information in the vehicle onboard system, and the password change operation is performed; is the pseudo-identity of the vehicle, For users After sending a registration request to TCA, TCA encrypts the user's request information and calculates it before returning it to The value of .

8. A trust assessment method for cooperative authentication of drones and vehicles in an Internet of Vehicles, used to implement the trust assessment method and system for cooperative authentication of drones and vehicles in an Internet of Vehicles as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that: It includes UAV nodes that provide road condition supervision, TCA, a trusted authority center, and V, a vehicle system. The vehicle system is composed of many vehicles, each of which has interactive functions and can communicate with each other to share mountain road condition information in real time; A trusted authority center is responsible for collecting, analyzing, and verifying road condition information transmitted by the vehicle layer; Drone nodes are equipped with advanced monitoring equipment to patrol mountain roads in real time, collect road condition information and conduct supervision. In vehicle communication, if the interactive information between two vehicles is inconsistent, it is considered that one of them has sent wrong information or there is a fault. In this case, the sender of the wrong information is a malicious vehicle. Subsequently, the drone will detect the on-site situation and update the trust scores of the two vehicles based on the detection results. If more than two vehicles send interactive information and the information is inconsistent, two or more vehicles will collaborate to verify the disputed information. If multiple vehicles believe that a certain vehicle sends malicious information based on the collaborative verification results, these vehicles will send a request to the cluster head vehicle to report the malicious vehicle; if the reported vehicle actively admits to sending malicious information at this time, the cluster head vehicle will punish it by reducing its trust score; if the reported vehicle does not admit the malicious behavior, the cluster head vehicle will send the disputed behavior to the authoritative center; the authoritative center selects a drone node to judge the identity information and disputed information of the reporting vehicle and the reported vehicle, and finally the drone sends the judgment result to the authoritative center; based on the drone's judgment result, the authoritative center will update the trust score of the reporting and reported vehicles as a reward or punishment; for vehicles that send wrong information, their trust score will be reduced; On the contrary, the trust score of the reported vehicle will be increased.