A trusted execution environment measurement method and system based on local trusted proof
By building a prover model and a trusted channel generation model, using the hardware trusted root to measure the trusted execution environment step by step, the problem of the inapplicable proof mechanism in scenarios with high privacy requirements is solved, and local trusted proof is realized Trusted execution environment metrics expand applications and ensure security verification.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411142512.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-20
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-19
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-08-20
AI Technical Summary
In scenarios where privacy requirements are high, the trusted proof mechanism of the existing trusted execution environment is not applicable, which affects its scope of application, especially when it does not rely on external communications and trusted third parties.
By building a prover model, a trusted channel generation model and a verifier model, the trusted execution environment is measured step by step by step by step, and evidence information is formed, and submitted to the verifier model through a trusted channel for verification, so as to achieve the realization based on A step by step measurement of a trusted execution environment with local trusted proofs, avoiding external communications and trusted third-party dependencies.
It realizes the wide application of trusted execution environments in scenarios with high privacy requirements, ensures the self-evidential evaluation and security verification of the execution environment, and expands the application scope of trusted execution environments.
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Figure CN118656842B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to a trusted execution environment measurement method and system based on local trusted proof, belonging to the technical field of trusted execution environment measurement. Background Art
[0002] A Chinese patent (publication number: CN114499895B) discloses a data trust processing method and system that integrates trusted computing and blockchain, which is mainly used to solve the energy data trust problem before energy data is uploaded to the chain and the environmental trust problem of business computing in the current blockchain application process. In order to solve the trust problem of energy data uploaded to the chain, starting from the two aspects of the IoT collection end or the IoT energy data collection platform, a method of integrating trusted computing technology with blockchain technology is adopted. Through trusted computing, the IoT collection equipment, oracle, and on-chain and off-chain energy data trusted verification models are embedded to realize the trust of energy data collection, transmission, and storage processes. Combined with the security monitoring of trusted computing, the energy data collection is ensured to be trustworthy. In response to the business computing environment problem, the above invention proposes a computing architecture that combines trusted computing and state channels to realize business computing of energy data.
[0003] Furthermore, although the above solution can solve the trust problem of the trusted execution environment TEE, in scenarios with high privacy requirements, users often have the need to refuse external communications, not rely on trusted third parties, and need to conduct evidence evaluation on their own. Therefore, in such scenarios, the above trusted proof mechanism is not applicable, and it also affects the application of the trusted execution environment TEE, which is not conducive to the promotion and use of the trusted execution environment.
[0004] The information disclosed in this Background Art is only for understanding the background of the inventive concept and therefore it may include information that does not constitute the prior art. Summary of the invention
[0005] In response to the above problem or one of the above problems, an object of the present invention is to provide a trusted execution environment measurement method and system based on local trusted proof. By constructing a prover model, a trusted channel generation model, a verifier model, and a relying party model, trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment is obtained, and step-by-step measurement of the trusted execution environment based on local trusted proof is achieved. Therefore, the present invention does not need to communicate with the outside world and does not rely on a trusted third party to achieve self-evidence evaluation of the execution environment, which makes the application scope of the trusted execution environment wider, facilitates the promotion and use of the trusted execution environment, and is particularly suitable for scenarios with high privacy requirements.
[0006] In response to the above problem or one of the above problems, the second purpose of the present invention is to provide a trusted execution environment measurement method and system based on local trusted proof, which uses hardware trusted roots to measure the trusted execution environment step by step, realizes the verification of the integrity of the trusted execution environment, forms evidence, and submits it to the relying party who needs to verify the identity and security of the trusted execution environment; the relying party itself can also be a verifier, evaluates the evidence to obtain the authentication result, and further draws a judgment on whether to trust the trusted execution environment based on the authentication result, thereby effectively measuring the security of the trusted execution environment itself.
[0007] To achieve one of the above purposes, the first technical solution of the present invention is:
[0008] A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof includes the following steps:
[0009] The first step is to use the pre-built prover model to measure the trusted execution environment level by level based on the hardware trusted root to verify the integrity of the trusted execution environment and form evidence information;
[0010] The second step is to build a trusted channel through a pre-built trusted channel generation model, and submit the evidence information to the pre-built verifier model through the trusted channel;
[0011] In the third step, the verifier model verifies the identity of the trusted execution environment based on the evidence information and obtains the authentication result;
[0012] The fourth step is to use the pre-built relying party model to measure the authentication results, obtain the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment, and realize the trusted execution environment measurement based on local trusted proof.
[0013] After continuous exploration and experiments, the present invention obtains trusted authentication information of a trusted execution environment by constructing a prover model, a trusted channel generation model, a verifier model, and a relying party model, and realizes step-by-step measurement of a trusted execution environment based on local trusted proof. Therefore, the present invention does not need to communicate with the outside world and does not rely on a trusted third party to realize self-evidence evaluation of the execution environment, which makes the application scope of the trusted execution environment wider, is conducive to the promotion and use of the trusted execution environment, and is particularly suitable for scenarios with high privacy requirements.
[0014] As the preferred technical measures:
[0015] In the first step, the method of forming evidence information using the prover model is as follows:
[0016] Step 11, obtaining the hardware module of the system and using the hardware module as the hardware trusted root;
[0017] Step 12, for the running system, using the hardware trusted root to continuously measure the hash values of multiple components in the system, generate multiple measurement values, and store these measurement values in an internal trusted storage area;
[0018] Multiple components include the operating system kernel, drivers, and hardware configuration information;
[0019] Step 13, connecting multiple measurement values to form a trusted measurement chain arranged in the order of events, which is used to record measurement information during system operation;
[0020] Step 14, comparing whether the stored measurement chain and the actually generated measurement chain are consistent, and generating a credible report;
[0021] The trust report includes at least the measurement chain, measurement value, verification result and trustworthiness assessment information, which is used to verify the trustworthiness of the trusted execution environment;
[0022] Step 15: Encrypt the trusted report using a signature or cryptographic algorithm to obtain evidence information.
[0023] As the preferred technical measures:
[0024] The method of forming a trustworthy chain of measurement is as follows:
[0025] The hardware root of trust is used as the starting point of the measurement point, and the system kernel, driver and hardware configuration information are sorted in sequence. The operating system is then used as the end point of the measurement point to obtain data arranged in the order of events, which is used to describe the startup and operation process of the trusted execution environment.
[0026] Couple the data of the order in which events occur and the corresponding measurement values to form a complete chain of trusted measurements;
[0027] The trusted measurement chain is used to verify the integrity of multiple components step by step during the boot process to ensure that the software and data within the trusted execution environment have not been tampered with.
[0028] As the preferred technical measures:
[0029] In the second step, the method of establishing a trusted channel through a trusted channel generation model is as follows:
[0030] Step 21, obtaining certificate 1 of the prover model and certificate 2 of the verifier model;
[0031] Step 22, send the certificate 1 to the verifier model, and obtain the verification information 1 of the verifier model;
[0032] Send the certificate 2 to the prover model, and obtain the verification information 2 of the prover model;
[0033] Verification information 1 and verification information 2 include task uniqueness confirmation data and certificate integrity data respectively;
[0034] Step 23, performing access control and identity authentication on the trusted execution environment according to the verification information 1 and the verification information 2. If the verification fails, execute step 21;
[0035] When the verification passes, execute step 24;
[0036] In step 24, the prover model and the verifier model perform a handshake operation and establish a session key for encrypting or decrypting evidence information, thereby completing the establishment of a trusted channel.
[0037] The certificate exchange process is protected by this key negotiation technology. The entire process cannot be eavesdropped or tampered with by malicious parties, thus ensuring the integrity and validity of the evidence.
[0038] As the preferred technical measures:
[0039] In the third step, the method of obtaining the authentication result using the verifier model is as follows:
[0040] Step 31, obtaining evidence information and evaluation standard information;
[0041] Step 32, based on the evaluation standard information, performing constraint check on the evidence information to obtain check data for determining whether the evidence information matches the standard specified by the evaluation standard information;
[0042] Step 33: perform a credibility assessment on the evidence information based on the inspection data to obtain an authentication result of the evidence information.
[0043] As the preferred technical measures:
[0044] Constraint checking includes at least the following:
[0045] (1) Check whether the value in the evidence information is equal to the reference value, (2) Check whether the value in the evidence information is within the reference value range, (3) Check the membership of the reference value, and (4) Check whether the reference value is reasonable.
[0046] As the preferred technical measures:
[0047] In the fourth step, the method of obtaining the trusted authentication information using the relying party model is as follows:
[0048] Step 41, obtaining the certification result and certification evaluation standard information;
[0049] Step 42, based on the requirements and provisions of the certification evaluation standard information for the certification result, determine whether the certification result meets the relevant requirements stipulated in the certification evaluation standard information, and obtain evaluation data 1; the relevant requirements at least include format requirements, content requirements, information consistency requirements and usage requirements;
[0050] Step 43, measuring the relevant factors of the authentication result to obtain evaluation data 2, wherein the relevant factors include the applicability and integrity of the authentication result and the rigor of the authentication process, to ensure that the authentication result has not been forged or tampered with and can truly reflect the situation of the authenticated object;
[0051] Step 44: Based on the evaluation data 1 and the evaluation data 2, the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment is provided.
[0052] As the preferred technical measures:
[0053] Trusted authentication information is authentication failure or authentication passing;
[0054] When the trusted authentication information indicates that the authentication fails, it indicates that the local authentication has failed.
[0055] When the trusted authentication information is authentication passed, it indicates that the local attestation is successful, and the relying party model interacts with the trusted execution environment through a trusted channel.
[0056] To achieve one of the above purposes, the second technical solution of the present invention is:
[0057] A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof includes the following contents:
[0058] Based on the hardware root of trust, the trusted execution environment is measured step by step to verify the integrity of the trusted execution environment and form evidence information; and the evidence information is submitted to the verifier through a trusted channel;
[0059] The verifier verifies the identity of the trusted execution environment based on the evidence information, obtains the authentication result, and transmits the authentication result to the relying party;
[0060] The relying party measures the authentication result, obtains the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment, and implements the trusted execution environment measurement based on local trusted proof.
[0061] After continuous exploration and experimentation, the present invention uses a hardware root of trust to measure the trusted execution environment step by step, realizes the verification of the integrity of the trusted execution environment, forms evidence, and submits it to the relying party that needs to verify the identity and security of the trusted execution environment; the relying party itself can also be a verifier, evaluates the evidence to obtain a certification result, and further draws a judgment on whether to trust the trusted execution environment based on the certification result, thereby effectively measuring the security of the trusted execution environment itself and the integrity of the trusted application running in the trusted execution environment. Therefore, the present invention does not need to communicate with the outside world and does not rely on a trusted third party, and can realize self-evidence evaluation of the execution environment, so that the trusted execution environment has a wider application range, which is conducive to the promotion and use of the trusted execution environment, and is particularly suitable for scenarios with high privacy requirements.
[0062] To achieve one of the above purposes, the third technical solution of the present invention is:
[0063] A trusted execution environment measurement system based on local trusted proof, comprising:
[0064] one or more processors;
[0065] A storage device for storing one or more programs;
[0066] When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the above-mentioned trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted certification.
[0067] Compared with the prior art solutions, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:
[0068] After continuous exploration and experiments, the present invention obtains trusted authentication information of a trusted execution environment by constructing a prover model, a trusted channel generation model, a verifier model, and a relying party model, and realizes step-by-step measurement of a trusted execution environment based on local trusted proof. Therefore, the present invention does not need to communicate with the outside world and does not rely on a trusted third party to realize self-evidence evaluation of the execution environment, which makes the application scope of the trusted execution environment wider, is conducive to the promotion and use of the trusted execution environment, and is particularly suitable for scenarios with high privacy requirements.
[0069] Furthermore, the present invention utilizes a hardware root of trust to measure the trusted execution environment step by step, thereby verifying the integrity of the trusted execution environment, forming evidence, and submitting it to a relying party that needs to verify the identity and security of the trusted execution environment; the relying party itself can also be a verifier, evaluating the evidence to obtain a certification result, and further deriving a judgment on whether to trust the trusted execution environment based on the certification result, thereby effectively measuring the security of the trusted execution environment itself. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0070] Figure 1 A flow chart of the trusted execution environment measurement method of the present invention;
[0071] Figure 2 Another flow chart of the trusted execution environment measurement method of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0072] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the present invention more clearly understood, the present invention is further described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are only used to explain the present invention and are not intended to limit the present invention.
[0073] On the contrary, the present invention covers any substitution, modification, equivalent method and scheme made on the essence and scope of the present invention as defined by the claims. Further, in order to make the public have a better understanding of the present invention, some specific details are described in detail in the detailed description of the present invention below. Those skilled in the art can fully understand the present invention without the description of these details.
[0074] Unless otherwise defined, all technical and scientific terms used herein have the same meaning as those commonly understood by those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains. The terms used herein are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments and are not intended to limit the present invention. The term "or / and" as used herein includes any and all combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.
[0075] like Figure 1 As shown, the first specific embodiment of the trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof of the present invention is:
[0076] A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof includes the following steps:
[0077] The first step is to use the pre-built prover model to measure the trusted execution environment TEE level by level based on the hardware trusted root, verify the integrity of the trusted execution environment TEE, and form evidence information;
[0078] The second step is to build a trusted channel through a pre-built trusted channel generation model, and submit the evidence information to the pre-built verifier model through the trusted channel;
[0079] In the third step, the verifier model verifies the identity of the trusted execution environment TEE based on the evidence information and obtains the authentication result;
[0080] The fourth step is to use the pre-built relying party model to measure the authentication results, obtain the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment, and realize the trusted execution environment measurement based on local trusted proof.
[0081] A second specific embodiment of the trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof of the present invention:
[0082] A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted attestation is a remote attestation architecture of a trusted execution environment TEE, which is used to verify the internal status and operations of the trusted execution environment TEE. External entities ensure the security and integrity of data and operations by verifying the security and credibility of the trusted execution environment TEE.
[0083] In the remote attestation architecture, three entities are usually involved: the prover, the verifier, and the relying party.
[0084] The prover is the party that needs to provide proof or evidence, who proves his or her identity, behavior or rights by submitting relevant information or data;
[0085] The verifier is the party responsible for verifying the information or data provided by the prover, and confirms the authenticity and validity of the information or data by verifying and reviewing the submitted evidence;
[0086] A relying party is a party that supervises and manages the remote attestation process and determines whether to trust the authentication result based on the authentication result and the authentication result evaluation criteria.
[0087] Remote attestation is a necessary step in the privacy computing process, which includes the following:
[0088] When a computing task involves multiple parties collaborating, and subject A wants to pass data to subject B, the first thing to do is to verify whether subject B's program is running in the trusted execution environment TEE. If the running conditions are met, subject B needs to be able to provide "proof" to prove that it meets subject A's requirements. At the same time, in addition to the trusted execution environment TEE information, the relevant information of the running program code will also be further verified when verifying this running status.
[0089] The trusted execution environment TEE needs to provide a remote attestation process to prove the security of the trusted execution environment TEE itself and the integrity of the trusted applications running in the trusted execution environment TEE.
[0090] Therefore, the present invention combines the trusted execution environment TEE with the trusted measurement technology, and uses the hardware trusted root to measure the trusted execution environment TEE step by step, to verify the integrity of the trusted execution environment TEE, form evidence, and submit it to the relying party who needs to verify the identity and security of the trusted execution environment TEE; the relying party itself is also the verifier, evaluates the evidence to obtain the authentication result, and further draws a judgment on whether to trust the trusted execution environment TEE based on the authentication result.
[0091] The application of the present invention can provide an effective alternative when the remote attestation mechanism of the trusted execution environment TEE is restricted; when using a foreign trusted execution environment TEE chip, it can avoid cross-border data and meet the requirements of information innovation.
[0092] In this embodiment, the hardware trusted root is used as the starting point, and trusted measurements are performed step by step from the system startup measurement point upward to form a trusted measurement chain and generate evidence. All evidence will be submitted to the relying party (also the verifier), and the relying party will evaluate the evidence to obtain the authentication result, and then evaluate the authentication result.
[0093] like Figure 2 As shown, the third specific embodiment of the trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof of the present invention is:
[0094] A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof includes the following steps:
[0095] Step 1: Conduct trust measurement, which specifically includes the following:
[0096] In a trusted execution environment, trusted measurement technology is a key technology used to verify the integrity of software and data within a trusted execution environment (TEE). Trusted measurement can be used to evaluate the trustworthiness or security of a computer system, application, service, or component. It involves collecting and analyzing information about the behavior, performance, and configuration of a system or component to determine whether it meets certain trustworthiness standards or requirements. Trusted measurement helps assess whether a system is threatened, whether it meets security standards, and provides information about the overall status of the system. Through trusted measurement technology, a trusted execution environment (TEE) can provide a secure and trusted execution environment that protects users' sensitive data and applications from the threat of malware and attacks.
[0097] The present invention takes the hardware trusted root as the starting point, and performs trusted measurement on the trusted execution environment TEE step by step from the system startup measurement point until the container where the trusted execution environment TEE performs calculations is measured, finally forming a trusted measurement chain and generating evidence.
[0098] Among them, the hardware module TPM is used as the trusted root to calculate and store the measurement values of the measurement points, and the generated measurement values are combined into a measurement chain according to the order of event occurrence. The specific generation process is as follows:
[0099] The hardware root of trust will record the measurement values during the system startup process when the system starts. These measurement values are usually generated by measuring the hash values of the software and firmware loaded at startup. During the operation of the system, the root of trust will continue to measure the hash values of various components in the system, such as the operating system kernel, drivers, hardware configuration information, etc., and store these measurement values in the internal trusted storage area. Each time a measurement event occurs, the hardware module TPM will connect the new measurement value with the previous measurement value to form a measurement chain arranged in the order of event occurrence, which is used to record the measurement information during the system operation process.
[0100] Trusted measurement chain is a technology based on hardware root trust. It ensures that the software and data inside the trusted execution environment TEE have not been tampered with by verifying the integrity of components such as firmware, bootloader, trusted execution environment TEE runtime environment and application level by level during the startup process. The measurement chain describes the startup and running process of the trusted execution environment TEE container, starting from the earliest measurement point until the container is fully started.
[0101] In the present invention, the hardware trusted root is the starting point of the trusted measurement chain. From it, it passes through the BIOS system, hardware configuration information and other links, and finally enters the trusted execution environment TEE through the operating system OS. This process forms a complete trusted measurement chain. When it is necessary to verify the credibility of the trusted execution environment TEE container, compare whether the stored measurement chain and the actually generated measurement chain are consistent, and generate a trusted report. The trusted report is generated by other components of the system requesting the hardware trusted root. In order to prove the integrity and credibility of the system, the hardware trusted root will generate a trusted report based on the measurement values and measurement chain information stored inside it. The report contains the measurement chain, measurement values, verification results and credibility assessment, which is the evidence in the present invention. The evidence is then encrypted using a key algorithm and an encryption function (such as a signature or cryptographic algorithm) to obtain evidence information.
[0102] After the evidence information is generated, the verifier can use it to evaluate the trustworthiness of the trusted execution environment TEE and decide whether to interact with the trusted execution environment TEE.
[0103] In this embodiment, the measurement points include firmware, boot loader, kernel, and driver.
[0104] Step 2: After the evidence information is generated, the trusted execution environment TEE and the relying party / verifier interact with each other through a trusted channel. The trusted channel of the present invention is a proxy secure channel based on the secure transport layer protocol TLS, which can provide security guarantees such as data confidentiality, integrity and identity authentication.
[0105] When the channel is established: the relying party / verifier will verify whether the trusted execution environment TEE certificate corresponds to the trusted execution environment TEE public key in the task parameters, which is used to control the access and identity of the trusted execution environment TEE; the trusted execution environment TEE will verify whether the relying party / verifier certificate corresponds to the task public key in the task information, which is used to confirm the uniqueness of the task, and also verify the integrity of the remote proof information in the certificate. The evidence information will be sent to the relying party / verifier in this safe and appropriate way, waiting for evidence evaluation.
[0106] In the present invention, the trusted execution environment TEE and the relying party / verifier perform identity verification through a handshake based on the secure transport layer protocol TLS, and establish a secure communication channel. The trusted channel plays an important role in proving the credibility of the trusted execution environment TEE in the trusted execution environment measurement, and is used to help the relying party / verifier establish trust and secure connection with the trusted execution environment TEE. The trusted execution environment TEE uses the trusted channel mechanism to store public key information and the unique hash value of the trusted execution environment TEE end, so as to store the evidence in the digital certificate of the trusted execution environment TEE and send it to the relying party / verifier.
[0107] At the beginning of a TLS connection, the TEE and the relying party / verifier perform a handshake to establish a connection. As part of the handshake, the two parties agree on the specific contents of the cipher suite, and the relying party / verifier authenticates itself to the TEE by sending a certificate. When the relying party / verifier initially encrypts information using the public key obtained from the certificate, the two parties establish a mutual session key to use after the handshake.
[0108] After the handshake is successfully completed, the two parties will establish a session key to authenticate and encrypt / decrypt future messages. The certificate exchange process is protected by this key negotiation technology, making the entire process impossible to be eavesdropped or tampered with by malicious parties, thus ensuring the integrity and validity of the evidence.
[0109] Step 3: In the present invention, after receiving the evidence information, the relying party / verifier will evaluate the evidence information according to the evidence evaluation standard and obtain the authentication result. The process is as follows:
[0110] First, the relying party / verifier will carefully review the standard information to understand what provisions and requirements the standard information provides for a specific type of evidence, and then check whether the content of the evidence matches the parameters specified in the standard information. The relying party / verifier will also evaluate the credibility and authenticity of the evidence, check whether the evidence is complete, and whether sufficient information is provided for evaluation. Finally, the relying party / verifier will determine whether the evidence meets the requirements specified in the standard information.
[0111] When evaluating evidence, the verifier / relying party checks the value in the evidence information according to the constraints specified in its evaluation standard information. Such constraint checks mainly include the following:
[0112] (1) Check whether the value in the evidence information is equal to the reference value.
[0113] (2) Check whether the value in the evidence information is within the reference value range.
[0114] (3) Check the membership of the reference value.
[0115] (4) Check against values in other declarations.
[0116] Once all evaluation criteria information checks have been completed, the remaining statements will be accepted as input to determine the certification outcome (when evaluating the evidence).
[0117] The evidence assessment standard information mainly guides how to conduct a trustworthy assessment based on evidence, i.e., a trustworthy report. In the trustworthy report, the trustworthiness of the trusted execution environment TEE has been assessed, and the evidence assessment standard information will give the certification result based on the assessment result of the trustworthy report; the standard information will also guide the relying party / verifier to compare the value of the measurement chain in the trusted state (i.e., the trustworthy baseline value) with the value in the actual measurement chain in the trustworthy report.
[0118] If the evidence fails the evaluation, the relying party / verifier will not issue a positive proof result, and the local proof fails.
[0119] If the evidence passes the assessment, the fourth step will be carried out.
[0120] The evidence evaluation criteria information will be configured to the relying party / verifier through programmatic means.
[0121] Step 4: After obtaining the certification results, the relying party / verifier will compare the certification results based on the certification evaluation standard information, which specifically includes the following:
[0122] First, the relying party / verifier will review the certification assessment standard information to understand the requirements and regulations of the standard information for the certification results, so as to check whether the certification results meet the relevant requirements of the standard information, whether they are consistent with the relevant information required by the standard information, and whether they can meet the use requirements. The relevant requirements include the format requirements and content requirements of the certification results.
[0123] Then the relying party / verifier will check the factors related to the certification results, including the applicability, integrity and rigor of the certification process, to ensure that the certification results have not been forged or tampered with and can truly reflect the situation of the certified object. Finally, the relying party / verifier will confirm whether the certification results meet the relevant requirements specified in the standard information and give an evaluation result. The method for evaluating the certification results based on the certification result evaluation standard information is as follows:
[0124] The verifier / relying party checks the values in the authentication result according to the constraints specified in the authentication result evaluation standard information. This type of constraint check mainly includes the following:
[0125] (1) Check whether the value in the certification result is equal to the reference value;
[0126] (2) Check whether the value in the certification result is within the reference value range;
[0127] (3) Check the membership of the reference value;
[0128] (4) Check against values in other declarations.
[0129] Once all evaluation criteria information checks are complete, the remaining claims are accepted as input to the verifier / relying party when evaluating the attestation results.
[0130] In this embodiment, the authentication result evaluation standard information is used to guide the relying party / verifier to evaluate the authentication result obtained in the third step to obtain the final trusted authentication information.
[0131] If the authentication result does not meet the authentication result evaluation standard information, it indicates that the local authentication has failed.
[0132] The authentication result evaluation standard information is configured to the relying party / verifier through programming.
[0133] If the authentication result meets the authentication result evaluation standard information, it indicates that the local attestation is successful. At the same time, based on the secure encryption channel of the secure transport layer protocol TLS, the relying party / verifier can interact with the trusted execution environment TEE.
[0134] A specific embodiment of applying the present invention in the field of risk control and credit investigation:
[0135] In the field of risk control and credit investigation, the trusted execution environment measurement method of the present invention is applied to build a joint credit investigation computing platform. The platform can perform distributed model inference and training without leaking the original data of each party, realize joint data analysis of multiple parties, and effectively protect the privacy and security of data and model algorithms.
[0136] Furthermore, accurate risk control and credit assessment can be performed through the trusted execution environment measurement method of the present invention, which includes the following contents:
[0137] First, through privacy computing technology, the original data of all parties is encrypted to ensure data privacy and security.
[0138] Secondly, based on the joint credit calculation platform, the credit risk of enterprises can be accurately assessed, so as to achieve precise risk control and credit reporting services, and provide data support for further financial services.
[0139] An embodiment of a device applying the method of the present invention:
[0140] An electronic device comprising:
[0141] one or more processors;
[0142] A storage device for storing one or more programs;
[0143] When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the above-mentioned trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted certification.
[0144] A computer medium embodiment of the method of the present invention is applied:
[0145] A computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the above-mentioned trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof.
[0146] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, and computer program products. Therefore, the present application may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Furthermore, the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes.
[0147] The present application is described by flowcharts or / and block diagrams of the methods, devices (systems), and computer program products of the embodiments of the present application. It should be understood that each process or / and block in the flowchart or / and block diagram and the combination of the processes or / and blocks in the flowchart or / and block diagram can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to generate a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart or / and block diagram. Figure 1Process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0148] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 Process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.
[0149] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process in the computer or other programmable device. Figure 1 Process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A step that specifies a function in one or more boxes.
[0150] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention rather than to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the above embodiments, ordinary technicians in the relevant field can still modify or replace the specific implementation methods of the present invention with equivalents. Any modification or equivalent replacement that does not depart from the spirit and scope of the present invention should be included in the scope of protection of the claims of the present invention.
Claims
1. A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof, characterized in that: The following steps are involved: The first step is to use the pre-built prover model to measure the trusted execution environment level by level based on the hardware trusted root to verify the integrity of the trusted execution environment and form evidence information; The method of forming evidence information using the prover model is as follows: Step 11, obtaining the hardware module of the system and using the hardware module as the hardware trusted root; Step 12, for the running system, using the hardware trusted root to continuously measure the hash values of multiple components in the system, generate multiple measurement values, and store these measurement values in an internal trusted storage area; Multiple components include the operating system kernel, drivers, and hardware configuration information; Step 13, connecting multiple measurement values to form a trusted measurement chain arranged in the order of events, which is used to record measurement information during system operation; Step 14, comparing whether the stored measurement chain and the actually generated measurement chain are consistent, and generating a credible report; The trusted report includes at least the measurement chain, measurement value, verification result and credibility assessment information, which is used to verify the credibility of the trusted execution environment; Step 15, encrypt the trusted report using a signature or cryptographic algorithm to obtain evidence information; The second step is to build a trusted channel through a pre-built trusted channel generation model, and submit the evidence information to the pre-built verifier model through the trusted channel; In the third step, the verifier model verifies the identity of the trusted execution environment based on the evidence information and obtains the authentication result; The fourth step is to measure the authentication results using the pre-built relying party model to obtain the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment and realize the trusted execution environment measurement based on the local trusted proof. The method of obtaining trusted authentication information using the relying party model is as follows: Step 41, obtaining the certification result and certification evaluation standard information; Step 42, based on the certification evaluation standard information, determine whether the certification result meets the relevant requirements specified in the certification evaluation standard information, and obtain evaluation data 1; the relevant requirements at least include format requirements, content requirements, information consistency requirements and usage requirements; Step 43, measuring the relevant factors of the authentication result to obtain evaluation data 2, the relevant factors including the applicability and completeness of the authentication result and the rigor of the authentication process; Step 44: Based on the evaluation data 1 and the evaluation data 2, the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment is provided.
2. A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof as claimed in claim 1, characterized in that: The method of forming a trustworthy chain of measurement is as follows: The hardware root of trust is used as the starting point of the measurement point, and the system kernel, driver and hardware configuration information are sorted in sequence. The operating system is then used as the end point of the measurement point to obtain data arranged in the order of events, which is used to describe the startup and operation process of the trusted execution environment. Couple the data of the order in which events occur and the corresponding measurement values to form a complete chain of trusted measurements; A chain of trust to verify the integrity of multiple components at each stage of the boot process.
3. The method for measuring a trusted execution environment based on local trusted proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the second step, the method of establishing a trusted channel through a trusted channel generation model is as follows: Step 21, obtaining certificate 1 of the prover model and certificate 2 of the verifier model; Step 22, send the certificate 1 to the verifier model, and obtain the verification information 1 of the verifier model; Send the certificate 2 to the prover model, and obtain the verification information 2 of the prover model; Verification information 1 and verification information 2 include task uniqueness confirmation data and certificate integrity data respectively; Step 23, performing access control and identity authentication on the trusted execution environment according to the verification information 1 and the verification information 2. If the verification fails, execute step 21; When the verification passes, execute step 24; In step 24, the prover model and the verifier model perform a handshake operation and establish a session key for encrypting or decrypting evidence information, thereby completing the establishment of a trusted channel.
4. The method for measuring a trusted execution environment based on local trusted proof according to claim 1, characterized in that: In the third step, the method of obtaining the authentication result using the verifier model is as follows: Step 31, obtaining evidence information and evaluation standard information; Step 32, based on the evaluation standard information, performing constraint check on the evidence information to obtain check data for determining whether the evidence information matches the standard specified by the evaluation standard information; Step 33: perform a credibility assessment on the evidence information based on the inspection data to obtain an authentication result of the evidence information.
5. A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof as claimed in claim 4, characterized in that: Constraint checking includes at least the following: (1) Check whether the value in the evidence information is equal to the reference value, (2) Check whether the value in the evidence information is within the reference value range, (3) Check the membership of the reference value, and (4) Check whether the reference value is reasonable.
6. A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof as claimed in claim 5, characterized in that: Trusted authentication information is authentication failure or authentication passing; When the trusted authentication information indicates that the authentication fails, it indicates that the local authentication has failed. When the trusted authentication information is authentication passed, it indicates that the local attestation is successful, and the relying party model interacts with the trusted execution environment through a trusted channel.
7. A trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof, characterized in that: Includes the following: Based on the hardware root of trust, the trusted execution environment is measured step by step to verify the integrity of the trusted execution environment and form evidence information; and the evidence information is submitted to the verifier through a trusted channel; The method of forming evidence information using the prover model is as follows: Step 11, obtaining the hardware module of the system and using the hardware module as the hardware trusted root; Step 12, for the running system, using the hardware trusted root to continuously measure the hash values of multiple components in the system, generate multiple measurement values, and store these measurement values in an internal trusted storage area; Multiple components include the operating system kernel, drivers, and hardware configuration information; Step 13, connecting multiple measurement values to form a trusted measurement chain arranged in the order of events, which is used to record measurement information during system operation; Step 14, comparing whether the stored measurement chain and the actually generated measurement chain are consistent, and generating a credible report; The trusted report includes at least the measurement chain, measurement value, verification result and credibility assessment information, which is used to verify the credibility of the trusted execution environment; Step 15, encrypt the trusted report using a signature or cryptographic algorithm to obtain evidence information; The verifier verifies the identity of the trusted execution environment based on the evidence information, obtains the authentication result, and transmits the authentication result to the relying party; The relying party measures the authentication result, obtains the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment, and implements the trusted execution environment measurement based on the local trusted proof; The method of obtaining trusted authentication information using the relying party model is as follows: Step 41, obtaining the certification result and certification evaluation standard information; Step 42, based on the certification evaluation standard information, determine whether the certification result meets the relevant requirements specified in the certification evaluation standard information, and obtain evaluation data 1; the relevant requirements at least include format requirements, content requirements, information consistency requirements and usage requirements; Step 43, measuring the relevant factors of the authentication result to obtain evaluation data 2, the relevant factors including the applicability and completeness of the authentication result and the rigor of the authentication process; Step 44: Based on the evaluation data 1 and the evaluation data 2, the trusted authentication information of the trusted execution environment is provided.
8. A trusted execution environment measurement system based on local trusted proof, characterized in that: include: one or more processors; A storage device for storing one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement a trusted execution environment measurement method based on local trusted proof as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.
