Anchor key generation method, device and system
By generating an intermediate key and using a formula to generate an anchor key, the problem of unifying the key negotiation process for different access methods in 5G systems is solved, and the generation of the anchor key is isolated from the lower-level key, adapting to the needs of various access methods.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202410910227.3
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2017-05-05
- Filing Date
- 2017-09-29
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-01
AI Technical Summary
In 5G systems, how to generate a unified anchor key to be compatible with key negotiation processes for different access methods, especially to isolate between 3GPP and non-3GPP access methods.
By receiving the indication flag, an intermediate key is generated and an anchor key is generated according to the access method. The anchor key is generated and the lower-level key is deduced using formulas such as anchor key=KDF(IK1'||CK1') or anchor key=KDF(EMSK', SNT/ANT), thus isolating the keys of different access methods.
It achieves a unified key negotiation process for different access methods in 5G systems, ensuring the isolation between the generation of anchor keys and lower-layer keys, and adapting to the needs of various access methods.
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Figure CN118890146A_ABST
Abstract
Description
[0001] This application is a divisional application. The application number of the original application is 201710908017.0, and the original application date is September 29, 2017. The entire contents of the original application are incorporated into this application by reference. Technical Field
[0002] The present invention relates to the field of communications, and in particular to an anchor key generation method, device and system. Background Art
[0003] The key is the key to encryption and decryption operations, and is also the key to the cryptographic system. Therefore, in the information security system, key negotiation is an important part of the authentication process. In the existing 4G system, the key negotiation process is as follows: Figure 1 As shown, the network elements required for the execution of this process include user equipment (UE), base station (eNodeB), mobility management entity (MME), home subscriber server (HSS) and authentication center (AuC), etc. The execution process is roughly as follows:
[0004] Step 1: AuC generates an integrity key IK and a confidentiality key CK based on the root key K, and sends the integrity key IK and the confidentiality key CK to HSS. Correspondingly, HSS receives the integrity key IK and the confidentiality key CK sent by AuC.
[0005] Step 2: HSS generates the intermediate key K based on the integrity key IK and the confidentiality key CK ASME , and the intermediate key K ASME Send to MME. Correspondingly, MME receives the intermediate key K sent by HSS ASME .
[0006] Step 3: MME uses the intermediate key K ASME Generate the NAS integrity key K for confidentiality protection of Non Access Stratum (NAS) messages NASenc , and the NAS integrity protection key K for integrity protection NASint .
[0007] Step 4: MME uses the intermediate key K ASME Generate base station key K eNB , and the base station key K eNB Send to eNodeB. Correspondingly, eNodeB receives the base station key K sent by MME eNB .
[0008] Step 5: eNodeB uses the base station key K eNB Generate a user plane confidentiality key K for protecting the confidentiality of user plane data UPenc , the user plane integrity key K used to protect the integrity of user plane data UPint , the control plane confidentiality key K used to protect the confidentiality of the control plane data RRCenc , the control plane integrity key K used to protect the integrity of the control plane data RRCint .
[0009] Step 6: UE generates integrity key IK, confidentiality key CK, and intermediate key K based on root key K ASME , user plane confidentiality key K UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint .
[0010] go through Figure 1 After the key negotiation process described above, the 4G system will generate Figure 2 The key architecture shown.
[0011] Understandably, Figure 1 It is the key negotiation process in the process of the terminal accessing the core network through the access method of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) in the 4G application scenario. In order to adapt to the requirements of various application scenarios, the terminal can access the core network through various access methods, such as 3GPP access method, reliable non-3GPP access method, unreliable 3GPP access method, etc. In different access methods, the key negotiation process is also different. In order to be compatible with various access methods, the 5G standard clearly stipulates that a unified anchor key needs to be generated in the key negotiation process of different access methods. However, how to generate a unified anchor key is a problem that technicians in this field need to solve. Summary of the invention
[0012] The embodiments of the present application provide an anchor key generation method, device, and system, which can generate a unified anchor key for different access modes, and isolate the anchor keys of different access modes and the lower-layer keys generated based on the anchor keys.
[0013] In a first aspect, a method for generating an anchor key is provided, comprising: a first communication device receives an indication identifier sent by a second communication device, wherein the indication identifier is used to indicate an access mode of a terminal; the first communication device sends the indication identifier to a third communication device; the first communication device receives an intermediate key returned by the third communication device, wherein the intermediate key is generated based on the indication identifier; the first communication device generates an anchor key based on the intermediate key, wherein the anchor key corresponds to the access mode of the terminal; the first communication device sends the anchor key to the second communication device, so that the second communication device can derive a lower-layer key for the access mode based on the anchor key.
[0014] In some possible implementations, the access mode is differentiated according to at least one of an access type and an operator type.
[0015] In some possible implementations, the first communication device generates an anchor key according to the intermediate key by:
[0016] The first communication device generates an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0017] anchor key = KDF(IK1'||CK1')
[0018] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, (IK1', CK1') is the intermediate key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means cascade, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol.
[0019] The first communication device can generate the intermediate key in at least two ways:
[0020] When the indication identifier includes an access type identifier and an operator type identifier, the intermediate key is generated according to the following formula:
[0021]
[0022] Among them, the access type identifier is used to indicate the access type, and the operator type identifier is used to indicate the operator type; (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, ANT is the access type identifier, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0023] When the indication identifier is NAI, the intermediate key is generated according to the following formula:
[0024]
[0025] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, NAI is the indication identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0026] In some possible implementations, the first communication device generates the intermediate key according to the following formula:
[0027] Wherein, (CK2', IK2') is the intermediate key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, ANT is the access type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0028] The first communication device generates EMSK' according to the following formula,
[0029] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0030] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0031] The first communication device generates an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0032] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',SNT);
[0033] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and SNT is the operator type identifier.
[0034] In some possible implementations, the first communication device generates the intermediate key according to the following formula:
[0035]
[0036] Wherein, (CK2', IK2') is the intermediate key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0037] The first communication device generates EMSK' according to the following formula,
[0038] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0039] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0040] The first communication device generates an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0041] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',ANT);
[0042] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and ANT is the access type identifier.
[0043] In a second aspect, a communication device is provided, including: a receiving module, a sending module and a generating module, the receiving module is used to receive an indication identifier sent by a second communication device, wherein the indication identifier is used to indicate an access method of a terminal; the sending module is used to send the indication identifier to a third communication device; the receiving module is used to receive an intermediate key returned by the third communication device, wherein the intermediate key is generated based on the indication identifier; the generating module is used to generate an anchor key based on the intermediate key, wherein the anchor key corresponds to the access method of the terminal; the sending module is used to send the anchor key to the second communication device, so that the second communication device can derive a lower-layer key for the access method based on the anchor key.
[0044] In some possible implementations, the access mode is differentiated according to at least one of an access type and an operator type.
[0045] In some possible implementations, the generating module is used to generate an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0046] anchor key = KDF(IK1'||CK1')
[0047] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, (IK1', CK1') is the intermediate key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means cascade, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol.
[0048] The first communication device can generate the intermediate key in at least two ways:
[0049] When the indication identifier includes an access type identifier and an operator type identifier, the generating module is used to generate according to the following formula:
[0050]
[0051] Among them, the access type identifier is used to indicate the access type, the operator type identifier is used to indicate the operator type, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, ANT is the access type identifier, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0052] When the indication identifier is NAI, the generating module is used to generate according to the following formula:
[0053]
[0054] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, NAI is the indication identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0055] In some possible implementations, the generation module is used to generate according to the following formula:
[0056]
[0057] Wherein, (CK2', IK2') is the intermediate key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, ANT is the access type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0058] The generating module is used to generate EMSK' according to the following formula,
[0059] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0060] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0061] The generating module is used to generate an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0062] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',SNT);
[0063] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and SNT is the operator type identifier.
[0064] In some possible implementations, the generating module is used to generate according to the following formula:
[0065]
[0066] Wherein, (CK2', IK2') is the intermediate key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0067] The generating module is used to generate EMSK' according to the following formula,
[0068] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0069] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0070] The generating module is used to generate an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0071] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',ANT);
[0072] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and ANT is the access type identifier.
[0073] In a third aspect, a communication device is provided, comprising: a memory and a processor coupled to the memory, and a communication module, wherein: the communication module is used to send or receive data sent externally, the memory is used to store an implementation code of the method described in the first aspect, and the processor is used to execute the program code stored in the memory, that is, to execute the first aspect.
[0074] Aspects of the method described.
[0075] In a fourth aspect, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein instructions are stored in the computer-readable storage medium, and when the computer-readable storage medium is run on a computer, the computer executes the method described in the first aspect.
[0076] In a fifth aspect, a computer program product comprising instructions is provided, which, when executed on a computer, enables the computer to execute the method described in the first aspect.
[0077] In a sixth aspect, a communication system is provided, comprising interconnected access and mobility control function network elements, session management network elements, authentication servers and unified data management network elements, wherein the authentication server is an authentication server as described in any one of the second aspect or the third aspect of claim. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0078] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the background technology, the drawings required for use in the embodiments of the present invention or the background technology will be described below.
[0079] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of a key negotiation process in a 3GPP access method in a 4G application scenario provided by the prior art;
[0080] Figure 2 yes Figure 1 The key architecture diagram of the key negotiation process shown;
[0081] Figure 3 This is a network architecture diagram for accessing a 5G core network through a 3GPP access method involved in an embodiment of the present application;
[0082] Figure 4 This is a network architecture diagram for accessing a 5G core network through a non-3GPP access method involved in an embodiment of the present application;
[0083] Figure 5 is an interaction diagram of the first anchor key generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0084] Figures 6A to 6B They are Figure 5 Specific interaction diagrams when using 3GPP access and non-3GPP access in the anchor key generation method shown;
[0085] Figure 7 is used Figure 5 The key architecture diagram obtained by the anchor key generation method shown;
[0086] Figure 8 is an interaction diagram of a second anchor key generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0087] Fig. 9 is an interaction diagram of a third anchor key generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0088] Fig.10 is used Fig. 9 The key architecture diagram obtained by the anchor key generation method shown;
[0089] Fig.11 is an interaction diagram of the fourth anchor key generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0090] Fig.12 is used Fig.11 The key architecture diagram obtained by the anchor key generation method shown;
[0091] Fig.13 is an interaction diagram of the fifth anchor key generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0092] Figures 14A to 14B They are Fig.13 Specific interaction diagrams when using 3GPP access and non-3GPP access in the anchor key generation method shown;
[0093] Fig.15 is used Fig.13 The key architecture diagram obtained by the anchor key generation method shown;
[0094] Fig.16 is an interaction diagram of a sixth anchor key generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0095] Figures 17A to 17B They are Fig.16 Specific interaction diagrams when using 3GPP access and non-3GPP access in the anchor key generation method shown;
[0096] Fig.18 is used Fig.16 The key architecture diagram obtained by the anchor key generation method shown;
[0097] Fig.19 is an interaction diagram of the seventh anchor key generation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0098] Fig. 20 is used Fig.19 The key architecture diagram obtained by the anchor key generation method shown;
[0099] Fig.21 It is a structural schematic diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0100] Fig. 22 It is a structural diagram of another communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0101] The following describes several embodiments of the present application in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments.
[0102] Figure 3 This is a network architecture diagram involved in an embodiment of the present application, wherein this network architecture is mainly suitable for scenarios where a 5G core network is accessed via 3GPP. Figure 4This is another network architecture diagram involved in an embodiment of the present application, wherein this network architecture is mainly suitable for scenarios where a 5G core network is accessed via a non-3GPP method. Figure 3 and Figure 4 The network architecture shown includes network elements related to key negotiation: terminal, access node (AN) (i.e. Figure 2 N3IWF in it), access and mobility function network element (Access and Mobility Function, AMF), session management network element (Session Management Function, SMF), authentication server (Authentication Server Function, AUSF) and unified data management network element (Unified Data Management, UDM).
[0103] It should be noted that the Security Anchor Function (SEAF) can be deployed in AMF, and the Authentication Credential Repository and Processing Function (ARPF) can be deployed in UDM. Of course, SEAF can also be deployed separately from AMF. Similarly, ARPF can also be deployed separately from UDM.
[0104] The following is a brief introduction to the network elements related to key negotiation (terminal, AN, AMF, SMF, AUSF and UDM).
[0105] Terminals can be any of UE (User Equipment), Communication Device, and Internet of Things (IoT) devices. User equipment can be a smartphone, smart watch, smart tablet, etc. Communication equipment can be a server, gateway (GW), base station, controller, etc. IoT devices can be sensors, electric meters, water meters, etc.
[0106] AN can be a wireless access point, such as a base station, a Wi-Fi access point (Wireless Fidelity) access point, a Bluetooth access point, etc., or a wired access point, such as a gateway, a modem, a fiber optic access point, an IP access point, etc.
[0107] AMF is responsible for access control and mobility management, and is also the forwarding and processing node for non-access stratum (NAS) signaling.
[0108] SMF is used to establish and manage sessions, slices, flows or bearers. The physical entity that performs the functions of the session management network element may be referred to as a session management device or SM. The establishment and management of slices, flows or bearers are the responsibility of the mobility management network element.
[0109] AUSF is responsible for key generation, management and negotiation. AUSF can be deployed as an independent logical functional entity or integrated into the mobility management network element, that is, AMF, session management network element SMF and other devices. It may be an authentication node of EPS AKA or EAP AKA', or a node of other authentication protocols.
[0110] UDM, unified data management, mainly consists of two parts, one is the front end of the business or application, and the other is the user database. Specifically, it includes the processing of credentials, location management, contract data management, policy control, etc., as well as the information storage of these related processes.
[0111] SEAF, as a node of security authentication function, may be an authentication node of EPS AKA or EAP AKA', or a node of other authentication protocols; for example, when the authentication process is EPS AKA, SEAF will receive the intermediate key Kasme.
[0112] ARPF stores security credentials and uses them to perform security-related operations, such as generating keys and storing secure files. ARPF should be deployed in a physically secure location and can interact with AUSF. In actual deployment, ARPF may be a module of UDM or deployed as a separate network entity together with UDM.
[0113] It should be noted that Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 It reflects the logical relationship between various network elements. In practice, some network elements can be deployed separately, or two or more network elements can be integrated and deployed in one entity.
[0114] In order to generate a unified anchor key for different access modes, an embodiment of the present application provides an anchor key generation method. In addition to being able to generate a unified anchor key, the above method can also isolate the anchor keys of different access modes and the lower-layer keys generated based on the anchor key.
[0115] like Figure 5 As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a first anchor key generation method. In this embodiment, AUSF is the first communication device in the claim, AMF or SEAF is the second communication device in the claim, and ARPF is the third communication device in the claim. The method can be based on Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The method is implemented by the network architecture shown in the figure, and includes but is not limited to the following steps.
[0116] 101: UE sends a terminal identifier to AN. Correspondingly, AN receives the terminal identifier sent by UE.
[0117] In an embodiment of the present application, the terminal identifier can be a fixed identifier, such as a media access control (Media Access Control, MAC) address, an Internet Protocol (Internet Protocol, IP) address, a mobile phone number, an international mobile equipment identity (International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI), an international mobile user identity (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI), an IP Multimedia Private Identity (IP Multimedia Private Identity, IMPI), an IP Multimedia Public Identity (IP Multimedia Public Identity, IMPU), etc., or it can be a temporarily assigned identifier, such as a temporary mobile user identifier (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity, TMSI), a globally unique temporary UE identifier (Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity, GUTI), etc.
[0118] It can be understood that in addition to the terminal identification, the UE can also send at least one of the access network parameters, registration type, security parameters, UE's 5G network capabilities, PDU session status, etc. to the AN. Among them, the access network parameters may be the frequency of the access network, temporary user identification, NSSAI and other parameters related to the service network. The registration type can indicate that the user is registering for the first time, registration due to mobility, periodic registration update, etc. to distinguish user registration behaviors. Security parameters are parameters related to authentication and integrity protection. NSSAI is auxiliary information for network slicing selection. The UE's 5G network capabilities may include configuration capabilities to support access to the network. PDU session is a service connection for PDU between the UE and the data network, and the type may be an IP or Ethernet service connection.
[0119] 102: AN sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AN.
[0120] In an embodiment of the present application, the indicator is used to indicate the access mode of the terminal. In the 5G standard, the access mode of the terminal can be divided according to different classification criteria. For example, the classification basis of the access mode may include access type and operator type. Among them, the access type can be specifically divided into 3GPP access type, trusted non-3GPP access type and untrusted non-3GPP access type. The operator type can be specifically divided into A operator type or B operator type. It can be understood that there can be more types of operator types, which are only used as examples here and are not specifically limited.
[0121] Taking the classification basis including access type and operator type as an example, the classification of the access mode can be shown in Table 1:
[0122] Table 1 Access method table
[0123]
[0124] It should be noted that the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the above two classification bases, and the classification basis of the access mode can also be other types of classification bases, such as medium type (wired access or wireless access), etc., which are not specifically limited here. In addition, the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the two classification bases of access type and operator type. The classification basis of the access mode can also be one, three, four or more, that is, the access mode can be classified from more dimensions or fewer dimensions. For example, only the 3GPP access type and non-3GPP access type are distinguished.
[0125] The indicator identifier may be carried in the above-mentioned access network parameters. The indicator identifier may be any of the following modes: The indicator identifier may be a network access identifier (NAI), which is used to indicate both the access type and the operator type. Alternatively, the indicator identifier may include an access type identifier and an operator type identifier, wherein the access type identifier is used to indicate the access type, and the operator type identifier is used to indicate the operator type. It can be understood that the above examples are only for illustrative purposes and do not constitute specific limitations.
[0126] In some possible implementations, the network access identifier can be SN Identity|Access Network Identity, which can specifically represent a certain access under a certain operator, such as China Unicom's WLAN access, etc. Here, SNIdentity is defined in the 4G network, and Access Network Identity is defined in the non-3GPP network when 4G. It is also possible to upgrade the SN Identity or Access Network Identity to enable it to represent a certain access type of a certain operator.
[0127] In some possible implementations, the access type identifier specifically indicates that the access type is a 3GPP access type, a trusted non-3GPP access type, and an untrusted non-3GPP access type. For example, the access type identifier AccessNetwork Type (ANT) can be directly a string of "3GPP network", "Trusted Non-3GPP network", "Untrusted Non-3GPP network", or only a string of "3GPP network" and "Non-3GPP network", etc.
[0128] In some possible implementations, the operator type identifier may include two parts, one part is used to indicate the operator, and the other part is used to indicate the specific access type. For example, the operator type identifier may indicate LTE access of China Mobile or WLAN access of China Unicom. In specific applications, the combination of SN Identity and Access Network Identity may be used as the operator type identifier. It is also possible to include only the distinction of operators, such as China Mobile, China Unicom, China Telecom, etc.
[0129] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indicator identifier is only an operator type identifier.
[0130] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indication identifier is only an access type identifier.
[0131] 103: AMF (or SEAF) sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AMF (or SEAF).
[0132] 104: AUSF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to ARPF. Correspondingly, ARPF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AUSF.
[0133] 105: ARPF generates an intermediate key according to the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and the indication identifier.
[0134] In the embodiment of the present application, the ARPF may generate the intermediate key according to the key generation algorithm in the following ways:
[0135] In the first mode, when the indicator identifier is NAI, ARPF generates the intermediate key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0136]
[0137] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, NAI is the indication identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0138] In the second mode, when the indication identifier includes the access type identifier and the operator type identifier, the ARPF generates the intermediate key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0139]
[0140] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, ANT is the access type identifier, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0141] In some possible implementations, SQN may be the latest serial number generated by AuC, and after generating SQN, AuC sends SQN to the ARPF. Similarly, RAND may be a random number generated by AuC, and after generating RAND, AuC sends RAND to the ARPF. In addition to the above-mentioned methods, SQN and RAND may also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, or even SQN and RAND may be generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0142] In some possible implementations, CK may be generated by AuC according to the formula CK=f3(RAND), IK may be generated by AuC according to the formula IK=f4(RAND), and AK may be generated by AuC according to the formula AK=f5(RAND). In addition to the above-mentioned methods, CK, IK and AK may also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, and even CK, IK and AK may be generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0143] 106: ARPF sends the intermediate key to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the intermediate key sent by ARPF.
[0144] 107: AUSF generates an anchor key based on the intermediate key.
[0145] In the embodiment of the present application, AUSF generates the anchor key according to the following formula:
[0146] anchor key = KDF(IK1'||CK1')
[0147] Wherein, anchor key is the anchor key, (IK1', CK1') is the intermediate key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the strings on both sides of the symbol. AUSF may also generate the anchor key according to the following formula: anchor key = KDF (IK1', CK1')
[0148] 108: AUSF sends the anchor key to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the anchor key sent by AUSF.
[0149] 109: AMF (or SEAF) generates a lower-layer key based on the anchor key, wherein the lower-layer key is a key derived from the anchor key once or multiple times.
[0150] In the embodiment of the present application, the anchor key is generated according to the intermediate key, and the intermediate key is generated according to the indicator, so the relationship between the anchor key and the indicator can be expressed as anchor key = f (ANT, SNT) or anchorkey = f (NAI). Wherein, f represents the mapping function between the indicator and the anchor key, NAI is the network access identifier, ANT is the access type identifier, and SNT is the operator type identifier. According to the mapping relationship between the anchor key and the indicator, when the indicator is different, the value of the anchor key is naturally different. In other words, when the access mode is different, the value of the anchor key is also different, that is, the anchor keys of different access modes are isolated. In addition, AMF (or SEAF) derives the lower-layer keys of different access modes based on the anchor keys of different access modes, thereby realizing the isolation of the lower-layer keys. That is, assuming that the access mode is A access mode, the calculated anchor key is anchor key a, and when the access mode is B access mode, the calculated anchor key is anchor key b, then the lower-layer key of A access mode can be derived according to anchor key a, and the lower-layer key of B access mode can be derived according to anchor key b.
[0151] 110: AMF (or SEAF) sends the lower layer key to AN.
[0152] 111: The UE generates an anchor key based on the root key, and then derives a lower-layer key based on the anchor key. It can be understood that the process of the UE deriving the lower-layer key is generally similar to the above process, and will not be described in detail here.
[0153] It is understood that in step 108, AUSF can also generate K according to the anchor key. AMF Key or K SEAF The key is then sent to AMF or SEAF, instead of sending the anchor key to AMF or SEAF. Therefore, in step 109, AMF or SEAF sends the anchor key based on K AMF Key or K SEAF The key generates the underlying key.
[0154] It should be noted that when the access mode is different, steps 109 to 111 are different. The following is a detailed description taking the access mode being a 3GPP access mode and a non-3GPP access mode as examples.
[0155] like Fig. 6A As shown, assuming that the access mode is the 3GPP access mode and the anchor key is anchor key 1, steps 109 to 111 can be replaced by the following steps 1111 to 1117.
[0156] 1111: AMF (or SEAF) generates the lower key K according to the following formula amf1Key and / or K seaf1 Key:
[0157] K amf1 =KDF(anchor key1,AMF ID);
[0158] K seaf1 =KDF(anchor key1,SEAF ID);
[0159] Among them, anchor key1 is the anchor key under the 3GPP access mode, KDF is the key generation algorithm, AMF ID is the identifier of AMF, and SEAF ID is the identifier of SEAF. The identifier of AMF can be the MAC address or IP address of AMF, etc., and the identifier of SEAF can be the MAC address or IP address of SEAF, etc.
[0160] 1113: AMF (or SEAF) generates the base station key K under the 3GPP access mode according to the following formula gNB 、3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPP NASenc , and 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPP NASint :
[0161] K gNB =KDF(K amf1 and / or Kseaf1, NAS Count1);
[0162] K-3GPP NASint =KDF(K amf1 and / or Kseaf1, NAS-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0163] K-3GPP NASenc =KDF(K amf1 and / or Kseaf1, NAS-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0164] Among them, NAS Count1 is the count value of the NAS message via the access point gNB of 3GPP, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. NAS-int-alg is the integrity algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW3G', 'ZUC', etc., alg-ID is the identifier of the algorithm, and NAS-enc-alg is the confidentiality algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc.
[0165] 1115: AMF (or SEAF) sends the base station key K gNBAt this time, AN receives the base station key K sent by AMF (or SEAF) gNB .
[0166] 1117: AN uses the base station key K gNB Generate user plane confidentiality key K UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint .
[0167] In the embodiment of the present application, AN generates the user plane confidentiality key K according to the following formulas: UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint :
[0168] K UPenc =KDF(K gNB , UP-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0169] K UPin =KDF(K gNB , UP-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0170] K RRCenc =KDFK gNB ,RRC-enc-alg,alg-ID);
[0171] K RRCint =KDF(K gNB ,RRC-int-alg,alg-ID);
[0172] Among them, KDF is the key generation algorithm, K gNB is the base station key, alg-ID is the algorithm identifier, and the definitions of NAS-int-alg, NAS-enc-alg, UP-enc-alg, UP-int-alg, RRC-enc-alg and RRC-int-alg can refer to the algorithm identifier definition table in 4G shown in Table 2, as follows:
[0173] Table 2 Algorithm identification definition table
[0174] Algorithm distinguisher Value NAS-enc-alg 0x01 NAS-int-alg 0x02 RRC-enc-alg 0x03 RRC-int-alg 0x04 UP-enc-alg 0x05 UP-int-alg 0x06
[0175] 1119: UE generates an anchor key based on the root key, and then derives the user plane confidentiality key K based on the anchor key UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint, control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint .
[0176] It is understandable that after receiving the anchor key, AMF (or SEAF) may not derive K based on the anchor key. amf1 Key and / or K seaf1 Key, then according to K amf1 Key and / or K seaf1 Key derivation base station key K gNB 、3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPPNAS enc , and 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPPNAS int Instead, the base station key K is directly derived from the anchor key gNB 、3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPPNAS enc , and 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPPNAS int .
[0177] like Figure 6B As shown, assuming that the access mode is a non-3GPP access mode and the anchor key is anchor key 2, steps 110 to 112 can be replaced by the following steps 1112 to 1116.
[0178] 1112: AMF (or SEAF) generates K according to the following formula amf2 Key and / or K seaf2 Key:
[0179] K amf2 =KDF(anchor key2,AMF ID);
[0180] K seaf2 =KDF(anchor key2,SEAF ID);
[0181] Among them, anchor key2 is the anchor key under the non-3GPP access mode, KDF is the key generation algorithm, AMFID is the identifier of AMF, and SEAF ID is the identifier of SEAF.
[0182] 1114: AMF (or SEAF) generates the access point key K for non-3GPP access mode according to the following formula: N3IWF , Non-3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-N3GPP NASenc , and the non-3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-N3GPP NASint :
[0183] KN3IWF =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS Count2);
[0184] K-N3GPP NASint =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0185] K-N3GPP NASenc =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0186] Among them, NAS Count2 is the count value of the NAS message via the non-3GPP access point N3IWF, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. The integrity algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc., alg-ID is the identifier of the algorithm, and NAS-enc-alg is the confidentiality algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW3G', 'ZUC', etc.
[0187] 1116: AMF (or SEAF) sends the access point key K N3IWF At this time, AN receives the access point key K sent by AMF (or SEAF) N3IWF .
[0188] 1118: UE generates an anchor key based on the root key, and then derives the access point key K based on the anchor key N3IWF .
[0189] Similarly, it can be understood that in step 1114, AMF (or SEAF) does not receive the anchor key sent by AUSF, but the K generated by AUSF based on the anchor key. AMF Key or K SEAF Key.
[0190] Understandably, Figure 5The key generation algorithm in the illustrated embodiment is not limited to the KDF algorithm. In practical applications, the key generation algorithm may also be other algorithms, such as the Trunc algorithm: the low-order screenshot algorithm; other HASH algorithms, etc., which are not specifically limited in this application. Moreover, the independent variables of the key generation algorithm may also include other parameters, for example, including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Association Information), random number (Random number), random number (Number used once, Nonce), sequence number (Sequence Number), registration type (registrationtype), access layer message number (NAS Count), security algorithm identifier, security identifier, The length of the key and the length corresponding to the parameters used to generate the key, etc. In practical applications, one or more parameters can be selected as needed as the independent variables of the key generation algorithm.
[0191] It is understandable that after receiving the anchor key, AMF (or SEAF) may not derive K based on the anchor key. amf1 Key and / or K seaf1 Key, then according to K amf1 Key and / or K seaf1 Key derivation access point key K N3IWF , Non-3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-N3GPP NASenc , and the non-3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-N3GPP NASint Instead, the access point key K is derived directly from the anchor key N3IWF , Non-3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-N3GPP NASenc , and the non-3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-N3GPP NASint .
[0192] implement Figure 5 Following the anchor key generation method shown in Figure 7 The key architecture shown in Figure 1 is: Figure 7 The left side of the middle isolation line is the specific implementation Fig. 6A The key structure generated by the process shown is Figure 7 The specific implementation is on the right side of the isolation line in the figure Figure 6B The key architecture generated by the process shown can well isolate the two.
[0193] like Figure 8As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a second anchor key generation method. In this embodiment, AUSF is the first communication device in the claim, AMF or SEAF is the second communication device in the claim, and ARPF is the third communication device in the claim. The method can be based on Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The method is implemented by the network architecture shown in the figure, and includes but is not limited to the following steps.
[0194] 201: The UE sends a terminal identifier to the AN. Correspondingly, the AN receives the terminal identifier sent by the UE.
[0195] 202: AN sends a terminal identifier and an indication identifier to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AN. The indication identifier includes ANT and SNT.
[0196] 203: AMF (or SEAF) sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AMF (or SEAF).
[0197] 204: AUSF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to ARPF. Correspondingly, ARPF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AUSF.
[0198] 205: ARPF generates an intermediate key based on the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and ANT.
[0199] In the embodiment of the present application, the ARPF may generate the intermediate key according to the key generation algorithm in the following ways:
[0200] In the first method, ARPF generates an intermediate key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0201]
[0202] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, ANT is the access type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0203] In the second method, ARPF generates the intermediate key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0204]
[0205] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0206] 206: ARPF sends the intermediate key to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the intermediate key sent by ARPF.
[0207] 207: AUSF generates an anchor key based on the intermediate key.
[0208] With respect to the first method of generating the intermediate key in step 205, the method in which the AUSF generates the anchor key based on the intermediate key is:
[0209] First, AUSF generates EMSK' based on the intermediate key.
[0210] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0211] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0212] Then, AUSF generates the anchor key according to the following formula,
[0213] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',SNT);
[0214] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and SNT is the operator type identifier.
[0215] With respect to the second method of generating the intermediate key in step 205, the method in which the AUSF generates the anchor key based on the intermediate key is:
[0216] First, AUSF generates EMSK' based on the intermediate key.
[0217] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0218] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0219] Then, AUSF generates the anchor key according to the following formula,
[0220] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',ANT);
[0221] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and ANT is the access type identifier.
[0222] You can also use EMSK' and other parameters to generate anchor keys, not limited to indicator identifiers.
[0223] It can be understood that the anchor key can also be generated by MSK'. Here, only EMSK' is used as an example to generate the anchor key.
[0224] 208: AUSF sends the anchor key to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the anchor key sent by AUSF.
[0225] 209: AMF (or SEAF) generates a lower-layer key based on the anchor key, wherein the lower-layer key is a key derived from the anchor key once or multiple times.
[0226] 210: AMF (or SEAF) sends the lower layer key to AN.
[0227] 211: The UE generates an anchor key based on the root key, and then derives the lower-layer key based on the anchor key.
[0228] like Fig. 9 As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a third anchor key generation method. In this embodiment, AUSF is the first communication device in the claim, AMF or SEAF is the second communication device in the claim, and ARPF is the third communication device in the claim. The method can be based on Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The method is implemented by the network architecture shown in the figure, and includes but is not limited to the following steps.
[0229] 221: The UE sends a terminal identifier to the AN. Correspondingly, the AN receives the terminal identifier sent by the UE.
[0230] 222: AN sends a terminal identifier and an indication identifier to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AN. The indication identifier includes ANT and SNT.
[0231] 223: AMF (or SEAF) sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AMF (or SEAF).
[0232] 224: AUSF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to ARPF. Correspondingly, ARPF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AUSF.
[0233] 225: ARPF generates an intermediate key based on the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and ANT.
[0234] In the embodiment of the present application, the ARPF may generate the intermediate key according to the key generation algorithm in the following ways:
[0235] In the first method, ARPF generates an intermediate key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0236]
[0237] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, ANT is the access type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0238] In the second method, ARPF generates the intermediate key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0239]
[0240] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0241] 226: ARPF sends the intermediate key to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the intermediate key sent by ARPF.
[0242] 227: AUSF generates an anchor key based on the intermediate key.
[0243] With respect to the first method of generating the intermediate key in step 225, the method in which the AUSF generates the anchor key based on the intermediate key is:
[0244] First, AUSF generates EMSK' based on the intermediate key.
[0245] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0246] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0247] Then, AUSF generates the anchor key according to the following formula,
[0248] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',SNT);
[0249] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and SNT is the operator type identifier.
[0250] With respect to the second method of generating the intermediate key in step 225, the method in which the AUSF generates the anchor key based on the intermediate key is:
[0251] First, AUSF generates EMSK' based on the intermediate key.
[0252] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0253] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0254] Then, AUSF generates the anchor key according to the following formula,
[0255] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',ANT);
[0256] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and ANT is the access type identifier.
[0257] It is understandable that EMSK' and other parameters may also be used to generate an anchor key, which is not limited to the indicator mark.
[0258] It can be understood that the anchor key can also be generated by MSK'. Here, only EMSK' is used as an example to generate the anchor key.
[0259] 228: AUSF generates K based on the anchor key AMF Key and / or K SEAF Key.
[0260] In the embodiment of the present application, AUSF generates K according to the following key generation algorithm: AMF Key or K SEAF Key,
[0261] K AMF =KDF(anchor key, AMF ID);
[0262] K SEAF =KDF(anchor key,SEAF ID);
[0263] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, AMF ID is the identifier of AMF, and SEAFID is the identifier of SEAF.
[0264] 229: AUSF will K AMF Key and / or K SEAF The key is sent to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the K sent by AUSF AMF Key and / or K SEAF Key.
[0265] 230: AMF (or SEAF) based on K AMF Key or K SEAFThe key generates the lower key. The lower key is based on K AMF Key or K SEAF A key is derived from a key once or multiple times.
[0266] 231: AMF (or SEAF) sends the lower layer key to AN.
[0267] 232: The UE generates an anchor key based on the root key, and then derives the lower-layer key based on the anchor key.
[0268] It can be understood that after generating the anchor key, AUSF can also directly send the anchor key to AMF, and then AMF generates the lower-layer key based on the anchor key and sends it to AN.
[0269] implement Fig. 9 Following the anchor key generation method shown in Fig.10 The key architecture shown in Figure 1 is: Fig. 9 The left side of the middle isolation line is the key architecture corresponding to the UE and 3GPP network. Fig. 9 The key architecture corresponding to the UE and the non-3GPP network is on the right side of the isolation line in the figure, and the two can be well isolated.
[0270] It can be understood that for step 227, AUSF can also generate two keys based on the intermediate key, namely MSK' and EMSK'. MSK' and EMSK' respectively take different parts of the key generated by PRF'(IK2'||CK2'), such as MSK' takes the first 512 bits and EMSK' takes the last 512 bits.
[0271] Then, an anchor key is generated based on MSK', that is, anchor key = KDF (MSK', ANT), which is the same as the above description.
[0272] EMSK' is retained or derived by AUSF for subsequent expansion.
[0273] like Fig.11 As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a fourth anchor key generation method. In this embodiment, AUSF is the first communication device in the claim, SEAF is the second communication device in claim 2, and ARPF is the third communication device in claim 3. The method can be based on Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The network architecture shown in the figure is used for implementation, and in this embodiment, the number of AMFs is m, which are named AMF_1 to AMF_m respectively. The method includes but is not limited to the following steps.
[0274] 301: The UE sends a terminal identifier to the AN. Correspondingly, the AN receives the terminal identifier sent by the UE.
[0275] 302: AN sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AMF_1 to AMF_m. Correspondingly, AMF_1 to AMF_m receive the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AN.
[0276] 303: AMF_1 to AMF_m send the terminal identifier and indication identifier to SEAF. Correspondingly, SEAF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AMF_m.
[0277] 304: SEAF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by SEAF.
[0278] 305: AUSF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to ARPF. Correspondingly, ARPF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AUSF.
[0279] 306: ARPF generates an intermediate key according to the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and ANT.
[0280] 307: ARPF sends the intermediate key to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the intermediate key sent by ARPF.
[0281] 308: AUSF generates an anchor key based on the intermediate key.
[0282] 309: AUSF sends the anchor key to SEAF. Correspondingly, SEAF receives the anchor key sent by AUSF.
[0283] 310: SEAF generates K based on the anchor key and the identifiers of AMF_1 to AMF_2. AMF_1 To K AMF_m .
[0284] In the embodiment of the present application, SEAF generates K according to the following formulas: AMF_1 To K AMF_m ,
[0285] K AMF_1 =KDF(anchor key, AMF_1ID);
[0286] K AMF_2 =KDF(anchor key, AMF_2ID);
[0287] …
[0288] K AMF_m=KDF(anchor key, AMF_m ID);
[0289] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and AMF_1ID to AMF_m ID are the identifiers of AMF_1 to AMF_m respectively.
[0290] 311: SEAF sends K to AMF_1 to AMF_m respectively AMF_1 To K AMF_m Accordingly, AMF_1 to AMF_2 receive the K sent by SEAF respectively. AMF_1 To K AMF_m .
[0291] 312: AMF_1 to AMF_m are based on K AMF_1 To K AMF_m Generate the underlying key.
[0292] In the embodiment of the present application, AMF_1 is based on K AMF_1 Generate lower key 1; AMF_2 is based on K AMF_2 Generate lower key 2; ...; AMF_m is based on K AMF_m Generate the lower-level key m.
[0293] Next, we will use AMF_1 based on K AMF_1 The generation of lower-layer key 1 is used as an example for explanation.
[0294] AMF_1 generates the base station key K under the 3GPP access mode according to the following formula gNB1 、3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPP NASenc1 , and 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPP NASint1 :
[0295] K gNB1 =KDF(K AMF_1 , NAS Count1);
[0296] K-3GPP NASint =KDF(K AMF_1 , NAS-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0297] K-3GPP NASenc =KDF(K AMF_1 , NAS-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0298] Among them, NAS Count1 is the count value of the NAS message via the access point gNB of 3GPP, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. NAS-int-alg is the integrity algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW3G', 'ZUC', etc., alg-ID is the identifier of the algorithm, and NAS-enc-alg is the confidentiality algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc.
[0299] 313: AMF sends the lower layer key to AN.
[0300] 314: The UE generates an anchor key based on the root key, and then derives the lower-layer key based on the anchor key.
[0301] implement Fig.11 Following the anchor key generation method shown in Fig.12 The key architecture shown in Figure 1 is: Fig.12 The left side of the middle isolation line is the key architecture corresponding to the UE and 3GPP network. Fig.12 The key architecture corresponding to the UE and the non-3GPP network is on the right side of the isolation line in the figure, and the two can be well isolated.
[0302] Understandably, Figure 8 , Fig. 9 as well as Fig.11 The embodiment shown is based on Figure 5 The embodiment shown has evolved, for the sake of simplicity, Figure 8 , Fig. 9 as well as Fig.11 In the embodiment shown, only Figure 5 The embodiments shown do not have the same parts, but Figure 8 , Fig. 9 as well as Fig.11 In the embodiment shown, Figure 5 For the same parts of the embodiments shown in FIG. Figure 5 And related content will not be repeated here.
[0303] like Fig.13 As shown, the present application embodiment provides a fifth anchor key generation method. This method can be based on Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The method is implemented by the network architecture shown in the figure, and includes but is not limited to the following steps.
[0304] 401: UE sends a terminal identifier to AN. Correspondingly, AN receives the terminal identifier sent by UE.
[0305] In an embodiment of the present application, the terminal identifier can be a fixed identifier, such as a media access control (Media Access Control, MAC) address, an Internet Protocol (Internet Protocol, IP) address, a mobile phone number, an international mobile equipment identity (International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI), an international mobile user identity (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI), an IP Multimedia Private Identity (IP Multimedia Private Identity, IMPI), an IP Multimedia Public Identity (IP Multimedia Public Identity, IMPU), etc., or it can be a temporarily assigned identifier, such as a temporary mobile user identifier (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity, TMSI), a globally unique temporary UE identifier (Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity, GUTI), etc.
[0306] It can be understood that in addition to the terminal identification, the UE can also send at least one of the access network parameters, registration type, security parameters, UE's 5G network capabilities, PDU session status, etc. to the AN. Among them, the access network parameters may be the frequency of the access network, temporary user identification, NSSAI and other parameters related to the service network. The registration type can indicate that the user is registering for the first time, registration due to mobility, periodic registration update, etc. to distinguish user registration behaviors. Security parameters are parameters related to authentication and integrity protection. NSSAI is auxiliary information for network slicing selection. The UE's 5G network capabilities may include configuration capabilities to support access to the network. PDU session is a service connection for PDU between the UE and the data network, and the type may be an IP or Ethernet service connection.
[0307] 402: AN sends a terminal identifier and an indication identifier to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AN.
[0308] In an embodiment of the present application, the indicator is used to indicate the access mode of the terminal. In the 5G standard, the access mode of the terminal can be divided according to different classification criteria. For example, the classification basis of the access mode may include access type and operator type. Among them, the access type can be specifically divided into 3GPP access type, trusted non-3GPP access type and untrusted non-3GPP access type. The operator type can be specifically divided into A operator type or B operator type. It can be understood that there can be more types of operator types, which are only used as examples here and are not specifically limited.
[0309] Taking the classification basis including access type and operator type as an example, the classification of the access mode can be shown in Table 1. It should be noted that the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the above two classification bases, and the classification basis of the access mode can also be other types of classification bases, such as medium type (wired access or wireless access), etc., which are not specifically limited here. Moreover, the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the two classification bases of access type and operator type, and the classification basis of the access mode can also be one, three, four or more, that is, the access mode can be classified from more dimensions or fewer dimensions.
[0310] The indicator identifier may be carried in the above-mentioned access network parameters. The indicator identifier may be any of the following modes: The indicator identifier may be a network access identifier (NAI), which is used to indicate both the access type and the operator type. Alternatively, the indicator identifier may include an access type identifier and an operator type identifier, wherein the access type identifier is used to indicate the access type, and the operator type identifier is used to indicate the operator type. It can be understood that the above examples are only for illustrative purposes and do not constitute specific limitations.
[0311] In some possible implementations, the network access identifier can be SN Identity|Access Network Identity, which can specifically represent a certain access under a certain operator, such as China Unicom's WLAN access, etc. Here, SNIdentity is defined in the 4G network, and Access Network Identity is defined in the non-3GPP network when 4G. It is also possible to upgrade the SN Identity or Access Network Identity to enable it to represent a certain access type of a certain operator.
[0312] In some possible implementations, the access type identifier specifically indicates that the access type is a 3GPP access type, a trusted non-3GPP access type, and an untrusted non-3GPP access type. For example, the access type identifier AccessNetwork Type (ANT) can be directly a string of "3GPP network", "Trusted Non-3GPP network", "Untrusted Non-3GPP network", or only a string of "3GPP network" and "Non-3GPP network", etc.
[0313] In some possible implementations, the operator type identifier may include two parts, one part is used to indicate the operator, and the other part is used to indicate the specific access type. For example, the operator type identifier may indicate China Mobile's LTE access or China Unicom's WLAN access. In specific applications, the combination of SN Identity and Access Network Identity may be used as the operator type identifier; it may also include only the distinction of operators, such as China Mobile, China Unicom, China Telecom, etc.
[0314] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indicator identifier is only an operator type identifier.
[0315] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indication identifier is only an access type identifier.
[0316] 403: AMF (or SEAF) sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AMF (or SEAF).
[0317] 404: AUSF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to ARPF. Correspondingly, ARPF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AUSF.
[0318] 405: ARPF generates an anchor key according to the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and the indication identifier.
[0319] In the embodiment of the present application, the ARPF may include the following methods according to the method of generating the anchor key:
[0320] In the first method, ARPF generates the anchor key according to the following formula:
[0321]
[0322] Wherein, anchor key is the anchor key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, NAI is the indication identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymity key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0323] In the second method, ARPF generates the anchor key according to the following formula:
[0324]
[0325] Wherein, anchor key is the anchor key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, ANT is the access type identifier, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymity key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0326] In some possible implementations, SQN may be the latest serial number generated by AuC, and after generating SQN, AuC sends SQN to the ARPF. Similarly, RAND may be a random number generated by AuC, and after generating RAND, AuC sends RAND to the ARPF. In addition to the above-mentioned methods, SQN and RAND may also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, or even SQN and RAND may be generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0327] In some possible implementations, CK may be generated by AuC according to the formula CK=f3(RAND), IK may be generated by AuC according to the formula IK=f4(RAND), and AK may be generated by AuC according to the formula AK=f5(RAND). In addition to the above-mentioned methods, CK, IK and AK may also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, and even CK, IK and AK may be generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0328] 406: ARPF sends the anchor key to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the anchor key sent by ARPF.
[0329] 407: AUSF generates K based on the anchor key amf / Kseaf .
[0330] In the embodiment of the present application, AUSF generates K according to the following formula: amf / K seaf :
[0331] K amf =KDF(anchor key, AMF ID);
[0332] K seaf =KDF(anchor key,SEAF ID);
[0333] Wherein, anchor key is the anchor key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, AMF ID is the identifier of AMF, and SEAFID is the identifier of SEAF. The identifier of AMF can be the MAC address or IP address of AMF, etc., and the identifier of SEAF can be the MAC address or IP address of SEAF, etc.
[0334] 408: AUSF will K amf / K seaf Send to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives K sent by AUSF amf / K seaf .
[0335] 409: AMF (or SEAF) based on K amf / K seaf Generate a lower-layer key, where the lower-layer key is a key derived one or more times based on the anchor key.
[0336] 410: AMF (or SEAF) sends the lower layer key to AN.
[0337] 411: The UE derives the lower-layer key by itself according to the CK, IK and the indicator. It can be understood that the process of the UE deriving the lower-layer key is generally similar to the above process, and will not be described in detail here.
[0338] It can be understood that after generating the anchor key, AUSF can also directly send the anchor key to AMF, and then AMF will generate the lower-layer key based on the anchor key and send it to AN.
[0339] It should be noted that when the access mode is different, steps 409 to 411 are different. The following is a detailed description taking the access mode being a 3GPP access mode and a non-3GPP access mode as examples.
[0340] like Fig.14AAs shown, assuming that the access mode is the 3GPP access mode and the anchor key is anchor key 1, steps 409 to 411 can be replaced by the following steps 4111 to 4117.
[0341] 4111: AMF (or SEAF) according to K amf1 / K seaf1 Generate base station key K gNB , 3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPP NASenc , 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPP NASint .
[0342] Specifically, AMF (or SEAF) generates the base station key K under the 3GPP access mode according to the following formula: gNB 、3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPP NASenc , and 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPP NASint :
[0343] K gNB =KDF(K amf1 and / or K seaf1 , NAS Count1);
[0344] K-3GPP NASint =KDF(K amf1 and / or K seaf1 , NAS-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0345] K-3GPP NASenc =KDF(K amf1 and / or K seaf1 , NAS-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0346] Among them, NAS Count1 is the count value of the NAS message via the access point gNB of 3GPP, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. NAS-int-alg is the integrity algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW3G', 'ZUC', etc., alg-ID is the identifier of the algorithm, and NAS-enc-alg is the confidentiality algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc.
[0347] 4113: AMF (or SEAF) sends the base station key K gNB At this time, AN receives the base station key K sent by AMF (or SEAF) gNB .
[0348] 4115: AN uses the base station key K gNB Generate user plane confidentiality key K UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint .
[0349] In the embodiment of the present application, AN generates the user plane confidentiality key K according to the following formulas: UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint :
[0350] K UPenc =KDF(K gNB , UP-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0351] K UPin =KDF(K gNB , UP-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0352] K RRCenc =KDFK gNB ,RRC-enc-alg,alg-ID);
[0353] K RRCint =KDF(K gNB ,RRC-int-alg,alg-ID);
[0354] Among them, KDF is the key generation algorithm, K gNB is the base station key, alg-ID is the algorithm identifier, and the definitions of UP-enc-alg, UP-int-alg, RRC-enc-alg and RRC-int-alg can refer to the algorithm identifier definition table in 4G shown in Table 2.
[0355] 4117: The UE derives the anchor key based on CK, IK and the indicator, and then derives the user plane confidentiality key K based on the anchor key. UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint .
[0356] like Fig. 14B As shown, assuming that the access mode is a non-3GPP access mode and the anchor key is anchor key 2, steps 409 to 411 can be replaced by the following steps 4112 to 4116.
[0357] 4112: AMF (or SEAF) generates access point key K based on anchor key 2 N3IWF , Non-3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-N3GPP NASenc , and the non-3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-N3GPP NASint .
[0358] Specifically, AMF (or SEAF) generates the access point key K for non-3GPP access mode according to the following formula: N3IWF , Non-3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-N3GPP NASenc , and the non-3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-N3GPP NASint :
[0359] K N3IWF =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS Count2);
[0360] K-N3GPP NASint =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0361] K-N3GPP NASenc =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0362] Among them, NAS Count2 is the count value of the NAS message via the non-3GPP access point N3IWF, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. NAS-int-alg is the integrity algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc., alg-ID is the identifier of the algorithm, and NAS-enc-alg is the confidentiality algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc.
[0363] 4114: AMF (or SEAF) sends the access point key K N3IWF At this time, AN receives the access point key K sent by AMF (or SEAF) N3IWF .
[0364] 4116. The UE derives the anchor key based on the CK, IK and the indicator, and then derives the access point key K based on the anchor key. N3IWF.
[0365] Understandably, Fig.13 The key generation algorithm in the illustrated embodiment is not limited to the KDF algorithm. In practical applications, the key generation algorithm may also be other algorithms, such as the Trunc algorithm: the low-order screenshot algorithm; other HASH algorithms, etc., which are not specifically limited in this application. Moreover, the independent variables of the key generation algorithm may also include other parameters, for example, including NSSAI, random number, random value, sequence code, registration type, number of access layer messages, security algorithm identifier, security identifier, and The length of the key and the length corresponding to the parameters used to generate the key, etc. In practical applications, one or more parameters can be selected as needed as the independent variables of the key generation algorithm.
[0366] implement Fig.13 Following the anchor key generation method shown in Fig.15 The key architecture shown in Figure 1 is: Fig.15 The left side of the middle isolation line is the specific implementation Fig.14A The key structure generated by the process shown is Fig.15 The specific implementation is on the right side of the isolation line in the figure Fig. 14B The key architecture generated by the process shown can well isolate the two.
[0367] like Fig.16 As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a sixth anchor key generation method. This method can be based on Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The method is implemented by the network architecture shown in the figure, and includes but is not limited to the following steps.
[0368] 501: UE sends a terminal identifier to AN. Correspondingly, AN receives the terminal identifier sent by UE.
[0369] In an embodiment of the present application, the terminal identifier can be a fixed identifier, such as a media access control (Media Access Control, MAC) address, an Internet Protocol (Internet Protocol, IP) address, a mobile phone number, an international mobile equipment identity (International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI), an international mobile user identity (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI), an IP Multimedia Private Identity (IP Multimedia Private Identity, IMPI), an IP Multimedia Public Identity (IP Multimedia Public Identity, IMPU), etc., or it can be a temporarily assigned identifier, such as a temporary mobile user identifier (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity, TMSI), a globally unique temporary UE identifier (Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity, GUTI), etc.
[0370] It can be understood that in addition to the terminal identification, the UE can also send at least one of the access network parameters, registration type, security parameters, UE's 5G network capabilities, PDU session status, etc. to the AN. Among them, the access network parameters may be the frequency of the access network, temporary user identification, NSSAI and other parameters related to the service network. The registration type can indicate that the user is registering for the first time, registration due to mobility, periodic registration update, etc. to distinguish user registration behaviors. Security parameters are parameters related to authentication and integrity protection. NSSAI is auxiliary information for network slicing selection. The UE's 5G network capabilities may include configuration capabilities to support access to the network. PDU session is a service connection for PDU between the UE and the data network, and the type may be an IP or Ethernet service connection.
[0371] 502: AN sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AN.
[0372] In an embodiment of the present application, the indicator is used to indicate the access mode of the terminal. In the 5G standard, the access mode of the terminal can be divided according to different classification criteria. For example, the classification basis of the access mode may include access type and operator type. Among them, the access type can be specifically divided into 3GPP access type, trusted non-3GPP access type and untrusted non-3GPP access type. The operator type can be specifically divided into A operator type or B operator type. It can be understood that there can be more types of operator types, which are only used as examples here and are not specifically limited.
[0373] Taking the classification basis including access type and operator type as an example, the classification of the access mode can be shown in Table 1. It should be noted that the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the above two classification bases, and the classification basis of the access mode can also be other types of classification bases, such as medium type (wired access or wireless access), etc., which are not specifically limited here. Moreover, the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the two classification bases of access type and operator type, and the classification basis of the access mode can also be one, three, four or more, that is, the access mode can be classified from more dimensions or fewer dimensions.
[0374] The indicator identifier may be carried in the above-mentioned access network parameter. The indicator identifier may include an access type identifier and an operator type identifier, wherein the access type identifier is used to indicate the access type, and the operator type identifier is used to indicate the operator type. It can be understood that the above examples are only for example and do not constitute a specific limitation.
[0375] In some possible implementations, the access type identifier specifically indicates that the access type is a 3GPP access type, a trusted non-3GPP access type, and an untrusted non-3GPP access type. For example, the access type identifier AccessNetwork Type (ANT) can be directly a string of "3GPP network", "Trusted Non-3GPP network", "Untrusted Non-3GPP network", or only a string of "3GPP network" and "Non-3GPP network", etc.
[0376] In some possible implementations, the operator type identifier may include two parts, one part is used to indicate the operator, and the other part is used to indicate the specific access type. For example, the operator type identifier may indicate China Mobile's LTE access or China Unicom's WLAN access. In specific applications, the combination of SN Identity and Access Network Identity may be used as the operator type identifier; it may also include only the distinction of operators, such as China Mobile, China Unicom, China Telecom, etc.
[0377] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indicator identifier is only an operator type identifier.
[0378] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indication identifier is only an access type identifier.
[0379] 503: AMF (or SEAF) sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AMF (or SEAF).
[0380] 504: AUSF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to ARPF. Correspondingly, ARPF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AUSF.
[0381] 505: ARPF generates a shared key according to the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and the indicator.
[0382] In the embodiment of the present application, the ARPF may generate a shared key in the following ways:
[0383] In the first method, ARPF generates a shared key according to the following formula:
[0384]
[0385] Wherein, KDF is a key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, ANT is the access type identifier, CK is an initial confidentiality key, IK is an initial integrity key, AK is an anonymity key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0386] In the second method, ARPF generates a shared key according to the following formula:
[0387]
[0388] Wherein, KDF is a key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is an initial confidentiality key, IK is an initial integrity key, AK is an anonymity key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0389] In some possible implementations, SQN may be the latest serial number generated by AuC, and after generating SQN, AuC sends SQN to the ARPF. Similarly, RAND may be a random number generated by AuC, and after generating RAND, AuC sends RAND to the ARPF. In addition to the above-mentioned methods, SQN and RAND may also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, or even SQN and RAND may be generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0390] In some possible implementations, CK may be generated by AuC according to the formula CK=f3(RAND), IK may be generated by AuC according to the formula IK=f4(RAND), and AK may be generated by AuC according to the formula AK=f5(RAND). In addition to the above-mentioned methods, CK, IK and AK may also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, and even CK, IK and AK may be generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0391] 506: ARPF sends the shared key to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the shared key sent by ARPF.
[0392] 507: AUSF sends the shared key to AMF. Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the shared key sent by AUSF.
[0393] 508: AMF (or SEAF) generates an anchor key based on the shared key.
[0394] With respect to the first method of generating a shared key in step 505, the method in which the AMF generates an anchor key based on the shared key is:
[0395] anchor key=KDF (shared key, SNT);
[0396] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, and SNT is the operator type identifier.
[0397] With respect to the second method of generating a shared key in step 505, the method in which the AMF generates an anchor key based on the shared key is:
[0398] anchor key=KDF (shared key, ANT);
[0399] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, and ANT is the access type identifier.
[0400] 509: AMF (or SEAF) generates a lower-layer key based on the anchor key, wherein the lower-layer key is a key derived from the anchor key once or multiple times.
[0401] It can be understood that AMF (or SEAF) is based on K amf Key / K seaf The process of key generation of lower-level keys is similar to Fig. 6A as well as Figure 6B The process shown is basically the same, see Fig. 6A as well as Figure 6B And related content will not be repeated here.
[0402] 510: AMF (or SEAF) sends the lower layer key to AN.
[0403] 511: UE generates a lower-layer key according to AK, IK, SNT and ANT. It can be understood that the process of UE deriving the lower-layer key is generally similar to the above process, and will not be described in detail here.
[0404] It should be noted that when the access mode is different, steps 509 to 511 are different. The following is a detailed description taking the access mode being a 3GPP access mode and a non-3GPP access mode as examples.
[0405] like Fig.17A As shown, assuming that the access mode is the 3GPP access mode and the anchor key is anchor key 1, steps 509 to 511 can be replaced by the following steps 5111 to 5117.
[0406] 5111: AMF (or SEAF) generates the base station key K based on anchor key1 gNB , 3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPP NASenc , 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPP NASint .
[0407] Specifically, AMF (or SEAF) generates the base station key K under the 3GPP access mode according to the following formula: gNB、3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-3GPP NASenc , and 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-3GPP NASint :
[0408] K gNB =KDF(anchor key 1, NAS Count1);
[0409] K-3GPP NASint =KDF(anchor key 1, NAS-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0410] K-3GPP NASenc =KDF(anchor key 1, NAS-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0411] Among them, NAS Count1 is the count value of the NAS message via the access point gNB of 3GPP, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. NAS-int-alg is the integrity algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW3G', 'ZUC', etc., alg-ID is the identifier of the algorithm, and NAS-enc-alg is the confidentiality algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc.
[0412] 5113: AMF (or SEAF) sends the base station key K gNB At this time, AN receives the base station key K sent by AMF (or SEAF) gNB .
[0413] 5115: AN uses the base station key K gNB Generate user plane confidentiality key K UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint .
[0414] In the embodiment of the present application, AN generates the user plane confidentiality key K according to the following formulas: UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint :
[0415] K UPenc =KDF(K gNB , UP-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0416] K UPin =KDF(K gNB , UP-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0417] K RRCenc =KDFK gNB ,RRC-enc-alg,alg-ID);
[0418] K RRCint =KDF(K gNB ,RRC-int-alg,alg-ID);
[0419] Among them, KDF is the key generation algorithm, K gNB is the base station key, alg-ID is the algorithm identifier, and the definitions of UP-enc-alg, UP-int-alg, RRC-enc-alg and RRC-int-alg can refer to the algorithm identifier definition table in 4G shown in Table 2.
[0420] 5117: UE generates an anchor key based on AK, IK, SNT and ANT, and then derives the user plane confidentiality key K based on the anchor key. UPenc , user plane integrity key K UPint , control plane confidentiality key K RRCenc , control plane integrity key K RRCint .
[0421] like Fig. 17B As shown, assuming that the access mode is a non-3GPP access mode and the anchor key is anchor key 2, steps 509 to 511 can be replaced by the following steps 5112 to 5116.
[0422] 5112: AMF (or SEAF) generates access point key K based on anchor key 2 N3IWF , Non-3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-N3GPP NASenc , and the non-3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-N3GPP NASint .
[0423] Specifically, AMF (or SEAF) generates the access point key K for non-3GPP access mode according to the following formula: N3IWF , Non-3GPP-NAS confidentiality key K-N3GPP NASenc , and the non-3GPP-NAS integrity protection key K-N3GPP NASint :
[0424] K N3IWF=KDF(anchor key 2, NAS Count2);
[0425] K-N3GPP NASint =KDF(anchor key 2, NAS-int-alg, alg-ID);
[0426] K-N3GPP NASenc =KDF(anchor key 2, NAS-enc-alg, alg-ID);
[0427] Among them, NAS Count2 is the count value of the NAS message via the non-3GPP access point N3IWF, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. NAS-int-alg is the integrity algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc., alg-ID is the identifier of the algorithm, and NAS-enc-alg is the confidentiality algorithm corresponding to the NAS message, such as 'AES', 'SNOW 3G', 'ZUC', etc.
[0428] 5114: AMF (or SEAF) sends the access point key K N3IWF At this time, AN receives the access point key K sent by AMF (or SEAF) N3IWF .
[0429] 5116: UE generates an anchor key based on AK, IK, SNT and ANT, and then derives the access point key K based on the anchor key. N3IWF .
[0430] Understandably, Fig.16 The key generation algorithm in the illustrated embodiment is not limited to the KDF algorithm. In practical applications, the key generation algorithm may also be other algorithms, such as the Trunc algorithm: the low-order screenshot algorithm; other HASH algorithms, etc., which are not specifically limited in this application. Moreover, the independent variables of the key generation algorithm may also include other parameters, for example, including NSSAI, random number, random value, sequence code, registration type, number of access layer messages, security algorithm identifier, security identifier, The length of the key and the length corresponding to the parameters used to generate the key, etc. In practical applications, one or more parameters can be selected as needed as the independent variables of the key generation algorithm.
[0431] implement Fig.16 Following the anchor key generation method shown in Fig.18 The key architecture shown in Figure 1 is: Fig.18 The left side of the middle isolation line is the specific implementation Fig.17AThe key structure generated by the process shown is Fig.18 The specific implementation is on the right side of the isolation line in the figure Fig. 17B The key architecture generated by the process shown can well isolate the two.
[0432] like Fig.19 As shown, the embodiment of the present application provides a seventh anchor key generation method. This method can be based on Figure 3 as well as Figure 4 The method is implemented by the network architecture shown in the figure, and includes but is not limited to the following steps.
[0433] 601: UE sends a terminal identifier to AN. Correspondingly, AN receives the terminal identifier sent by UE.
[0434] In an embodiment of the present application, the terminal identifier can be a fixed identifier, such as a media access control (Media Access Control, MAC) address, an Internet Protocol (Internet Protocol, IP) address, a mobile phone number, an international mobile equipment identity (International Mobile Equipment Identity, IMEI), an international mobile user identity (International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI), an IP Multimedia Private Identity (IP Multimedia Private Identity, IMPI), an IP Multimedia Public Identity (IP Multimedia Public Identity, IMPU), etc., or it can be a temporarily assigned identifier, such as a temporary mobile user identifier (Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity, TMSI), a globally unique temporary UE identifier (Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity, GUTI), etc.
[0435] It can be understood that in addition to the terminal identification, the UE can also send at least one of the access network parameters, registration type, security parameters, UE's 5G network capabilities, PDU session status, etc. to the AN. Among them, the access network parameters may be the frequency of the access network, temporary user identification, NSSAI and other parameters related to the service network. The registration type can indicate that the user is registering for the first time, registration due to mobility, periodic registration update, etc. to distinguish user registration behaviors. Security parameters are parameters related to authentication and integrity protection. NSSAI is auxiliary information for network slicing selection. The UE's 5G network capabilities may include configuration capabilities to support access to the network. PDU session is a service connection for PDU between the UE and the data network, and the type may be an IP or Ethernet service connection.
[0436] 602: AN sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AMF (or SEAF). Correspondingly, AMF (or SEAF) receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AN.
[0437] In an embodiment of the present application, the indicator is used to indicate the access mode of the terminal. In the 5G standard, the access mode of the terminal can be divided according to different classification criteria. For example, the classification basis of the access mode may include access type and operator type. Among them, the access type can be specifically divided into 3GPP access type, trusted non-3GPP access type and untrusted non-3GPP access type. The operator type can be specifically divided into A operator type or B operator type. It can be understood that there can be more types of operator types, which are only used as examples here and are not specifically limited.
[0438] Taking the classification basis including access type and operator type as an example, the classification of the access mode can be shown in Table 1. It should be noted that the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the above two classification bases, and the classification basis of the access mode can also be other types of classification bases, such as medium type (wired access or wireless access), etc., which are not specifically limited here. Moreover, the classification basis of the access mode is not limited to the two classification bases of access type and operator type, and the classification basis of the access mode can also be one, three, four or more, that is, the access mode can be classified from more dimensions or fewer dimensions.
[0439] The indicator identifier may be carried in the above-mentioned access network parameter. The indicator identifier may include an access type identifier and an operator type identifier, wherein the access type identifier is used to indicate the access type, and the operator type identifier is used to indicate the operator type. It can be understood that the above examples are only for example and do not constitute a specific limitation.
[0440] In some possible implementations, the access type identifier specifically indicates that the access type is a 3GPP access type, a trusted non-3GPP access type, and an untrusted non-3GPP access type. For example, the access type identifier AccessNetwork Type (ANT) can be directly a string of "3GPP network", "Trusted Non-3GPP network", "Untrusted Non-3GPP network", or only a string of "3GPP network" and "Non-3GPP network", etc.
[0441] In some possible implementations, the operator type identifier may include two parts, one part is used to indicate the operator, and the other part is used to indicate the specific access type. For example, the operator type identifier may indicate China Mobile's LTE access or China Unicom's WLAN access. In specific applications, the combination of SN Identity and Access Network Identity may be used as the operator type identifier; it may also include only the distinction of operators, such as China Mobile, China Unicom, China Telecom, etc.
[0442] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indicator identifier is only an operator type identifier.
[0443] In some possible implementations, it is possible that the indication identifier is only an access type identifier.
[0444] 603: AMF (or SEAF) sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AMF (or SEAF).
[0445] 604: AUSF sends the terminal identifier and indication identifier to ARPF. Correspondingly, ARPF receives the terminal identifier and indication identifier sent by AUSF.
[0446] 605: ARPF generates an anchor key according to the root key K and the indication identifier.
[0447] In the embodiment of the present application, the ARPF may generate an anchor key according to the key generation algorithm in the following ways:
[0448] In the first mode, when the indication identifier is NAI, ARPF generates the anchor key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0449]
[0450] Wherein, KDF is a key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, NAI is the indication identifier, K is a root key, AK is an anonymous key AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3 is a generation algorithm, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0451] In the second mode, when the indication identifier includes the access type identifier and the operator type identifier, the ARPF generates the anchor key according to the following key generation algorithm:
[0452]
[0453] Wherein, KDF is a key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, ANT is the access type identifier, SNT is the operator type identifier, AK is an anonymous key, AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f5 is a generation algorithm, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0454] In some possible implementations, SQN may be the latest serial number generated by AuC, and after generating SQN, AuC sends SQN to the ARPF. Similarly, RAND may be a random number generated by AuC, and after generating RAND, AuC sends RAND to the ARPF. In addition to the above-mentioned methods, SQN and RAND may also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, or even SQN and RAND may be generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0455] In some possible implementations, AK can be generated by AuC according to the formula AK=f5(RAND). In addition to the above methods, AK can also be generated by other communication devices in the network architecture and sent to ARPF, or even generated by the ARPF itself, which is not specifically limited here.
[0456] 606: ARPF sends the anchor key to AUSF. Correspondingly, AUSF receives the anchor key sent by ARPF.
[0457] 607: AUSF generates K based on the anchor key amf Key and / or K seaf Key.
[0458] In the embodiment of the present application, AUSF generates K according to the following formula: amf Key and / or K seaf Key:
[0459] K amf =KDF(anchor key, AMF ID);
[0460] K seaf =KDF(anchor key,SEAF ID);
[0461] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, AMF ID is the identifier of AMF, and SEAFID is the identifier of SEAF.
[0462] 608: AUSF will K amf Key / K seaf The key is sent to AMF / SEAF. Correspondingly, AMF / SEAF receives the K sent by AUSF amf Key / K seaf Key.
[0463] 609: AMF (or SEAF) according to K amf Key / K seaf The key generates a lower-layer key, where the lower-layer key is a key derived once or multiple times based on the anchor key.
[0464] It can be understood that AMF (or SEAF) is based on K amf Key / K seaf The process of key generation of lower-level keys is similar to Fig.14A as well as Fig. 14B The process shown is basically the same, see Fig.14A as well as Fig. 14B And related content will not be repeated here.
[0465] 610: AMF (or SEAF) sends the lower layer key to AN.
[0466] 611: UE generates a lower-layer key according to K, SNT and ANT. It can be understood that the process of UE deriving the lower-layer key is generally similar to the above process, and will not be described in detail here.
[0467] It can be understood that after generating the anchor key, AUSF can also directly send the anchor key to AMF, and then AMF generates the lower-layer key based on the anchor key and sends it to AN.
[0468] Understandably, Fig.19 The key generation algorithm in the illustrated embodiment is not limited to the KDF algorithm. In practical applications, the key generation algorithm may also be other algorithms, such as the Trunc algorithm: the low-order screenshot algorithm; other HASH algorithms, etc., which are not specifically limited in this application. Moreover, the independent variables of the key generation algorithm may also include other parameters, for example, including NSSAI, random number, random value, sequence code, registration type, number of access layer messages, security algorithm identifier, security identifier, The length of the key and the length corresponding to the parameters used to generate the key, etc. In practical applications, one or more parameters can be selected as needed as the independent variables of the key generation algorithm.
[0469] implement Fig.19 Following the anchor key generation method shown in Fig. 20 The key architecture shown in Figure 1 is: Fig. 20 The left side of the middle isolation line is the key architecture generated by the process of executing the 3GPP access method. Fig. 20 The key architecture generated by the process of executing the non-3GPP access method is on the right side of the isolation line in the figure, and the two can be well isolated.
[0470] In another embodiment of the present invention, a method for retaining a key in AUSF is disclosed. The retained key can be abbreviated as K left .
[0471] Specifically, it should be pointed out that since AUSF will send an anchor key to the second communication device SEAF, and in possible scenario deployment, SEAF belongs to the security network element of the service network, and AUSF belongs to the security network element of the home network, especially in the roaming scenario, if authentication occurs between the UE and the security network element of the home network, the UE and AUSF can generate the final protection key based on the retained key after the authentication, thereby achieving end-to-end security protection or higher security protection between the UE and the home network.
[0472] It should be noted that the reserved key can be generated by the ARPF and then sent to the AUSF, or the reserved key can be generated directly by the AUSF.
[0473] Method 1: ARPF can generate the reserved key K based on IK, CK, SQN, AK, service network identifier, key feature identifier, RAND or nonce and other parameters. left .
[0474] Among them, SQN is the latest serial number, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, RAND and Nonce can both be considered as random numbers; the key feature identifier can be: KEYLEFT, AUSFKEY, KEYAUSF, KEYSEAF, SEAFKEY and other similar strings.
[0475] The subsequent generation function KDF may also be a pseudo random function (PRF), etc. For details, please refer to the definition in section 3.4.1 of RFC5448.
[0476] For example, K left =KDF(IK,CK, Optional parameter); KDF is the key generation algorithm.
[0477] The optional parameters include one or more of the authentication method name, service network identifier, key feature identifier, RAND, and nonce.
[0478] Among them, authentication method name: can be 'EAP-AKA', '5G-EAP', 'EPS-AKA*', etc., which are identifiers of the authentication method;
[0479] For EPS-AKA*, ARPF can be calculated based on K asme* , authentication method name, service network identifier, network type identifier, key feature identifier, RAND, nonce and other parameters generate K left .
[0480] Among them, K asme* Similar to K in 4G LTE asme The key.
[0481] For example, K left =KDF(K asme* , first parameter group);
[0482] The first parameter group includes one or more of authentication method name, service network identifier, network type identifier, key feature identifier, RAND, and nonce.
[0483] It should be noted that the process of generating the reserved key described in method 1 can be respectively Figure 5 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 , Fig.11 , Fig.13 as well as Fig.16 Combined with the methods described.
[0484] Method 2: For EAP-AKA', ARPF can generate K based on one or more parameters including IK', CK', authentication method name, service network identifier, key feature identifier, AUSF ID, RAND, nonce, etc. left .
[0485] For example, K left =KDF(IK', CK', service network identifier, key characteristic identifier, second parameter group).
[0486] The second parameter group includes one or more of authentication method name, AUSF ID, RAND, nonce, etc.
[0487] It should be noted that ARPF can also send IK'CK' to AUSF, and AUSF can execute K left Generation of.
[0488] It should be noted that the process of generating the reserved key described in method 2 can be respectively Figure 5 , Figure 8 , Fig. 9 as well as Fig.11 Combined with the methods described.
[0489] Method 3: AUSF can generate K based on EMSK, MSK and other parameters left EMSK: Extended Master Session Key. See RFC5448. MSK: Master Session Key. See RFC5448.
[0490] For example, K left =trunc(EMSK or MSK), which means directly taking some bits of EMSK or MSK as K left , where trunc is used to truncate a value. For example, trunc(number) means truncating a number; trunc(date) means truncating a date. Format: TRUNC(n1, n2), n1 indicates the number to be truncated, and n2 indicates the digit to be truncated. n2 can be a negative number, which means truncating before the decimal point. Note that TRUNC truncation is not rounding.
[0491] For example, K left =KDF(EMSK or MSK, key feature identifier, third parameter group)
[0492] The third parameter group includes one or more of a service network identifier, an authentication method name, a random number, and the like.
[0493] For example, K left It can also be understood as EMSK.
[0494] It should be noted that the process of generating the reserved key described in method 3 can be respectively Figure 8 , Fig. 9 as well as Fig.11 Combined with the methods described.
[0495] It is understandable that when there is Kleft When the anchor key is K-based left The generated key.
[0496] Specifically, the anchor key can be based on K left , service network identifier, key feature identifier, RAND or nonce and other parameters are generated.
[0497] In addition, in another embodiment of the present invention, Figure 6B Step 1114, Fig. 14B Step 4112, Fig. 17B The refinement of step 5112 can be replaced by:
[0498] AMF (or SEAF) according to K amf2 , K seaf2 , NAS Count2, NAS connection distinguishing identifier, N3IWF identifier and other parameters generate the access point key K under non-3GPP access mode N3IWF .
[0499] For example,
[0500] K N3IWF =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS Count2);
[0501] NAS Count2 is a count value of NAS messages sent via the non-3GPP access point N3IWF, which may be an uplink count value or a downlink count value. A and / or B represent three possibilities: A, B or (A and B).
[0502] The formula: K N3IWF =KDF(K amf2 and / or K seaf2 , NAS Count2) includes three possibilities:
[0503] The first type: K N3IWF =KDF(K amf2 , NAS Count2);
[0504] The second type: K N3IWF =KDF(K seaf2 , NAS Count2);
[0505] The third type: K N3IWF =KDF(K amf2 , K seaf2 , NAS Count2).
[0506] Fig.21A schematic diagram of the structure of a communication device is shown. In this embodiment, the communication device includes: a receiving module 710, a sending module 720 and a generating module 730. The following is a detailed description.
[0507] The receiving module 710 is used to receive an indication mark sent by a second communication device, wherein the indication mark is used to indicate an access mode of the terminal.
[0508] The sending module 720 is used to send the indication mark to the third communication device;
[0509] The receiving module 710 is used to receive the intermediate key returned by the third communication device, wherein the intermediate key is generated according to the indication identifier;
[0510] The generating module 730 is used to generate an anchor key according to the intermediate key, wherein the anchor key corresponds to the access mode of the terminal;
[0511] The sending module 720 is used to send the anchor key to the second communication device, so that the second communication device can derive a lower-layer key for the access method according to the anchor key.
[0512] Need to explain, Fig.21 For details not mentioned in the examples and the specific implementation of each functional unit, please refer to Figures 5 to 10 And related content will not be repeated here.
[0513] Based on the same inventive concept, the embodiment of the present invention further provides a device (such as Fig. 22 As shown), the device is used to achieve the above Figures 5 to 12 The method described in the embodiment. Fig. 22 As shown, the apparatus 800 includes: a transmitter 803, a receiver 804, a memory 802, and a processor 801 coupled to the memory 802 (the number of the processor 801 may be one or more, Fig. 20 The transmitter 803, the receiver 804, the memory 802 and the processor 801 may be connected via a bus or other means ( Fig. 20 The example of the embodiment is that the connection is made through the bus 805. The transmitter 803 is used to send data to the outside, and the receiver 804 is used to receive data from the outside. The memory 802 is used to store program codes, and the processor 801 is used to call and run the program codes stored in the memory 802.
[0514] Receiving, through the receiver 804, an indication identifier sent by the second communication device, wherein the indication identifier is used to indicate an access mode of the terminal;
[0515] The indicator is sent to the third communication device through the transmitter 803; the first communication device receives the intermediate key returned by the third communication device, wherein the intermediate key is generated according to the indicator;
[0516] The processor 801 generates an anchor key according to the intermediate key, wherein the anchor key corresponds to the access mode of the terminal;
[0517] The anchor key is sent to the second communication device via the transmitter 803, so that the second communication device can derive a lower-layer key for the access method according to the anchor key.
[0518] In some possible implementations, the access mode is differentiated according to at least one of an access type and an operator type.
[0519] In some possible implementations, the processor 801 generates an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0520] anchor key = KDF(IK1'||CK1')
[0521] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, (IK1', CK1') is the intermediate key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means cascade, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol.
[0522] The processor 801 can generate the intermediate key in at least the following two ways:
[0523] When the indication identifier includes an access type identifier and an operator type identifier, the intermediate key is generated by the processor 801 according to the following formula:
[0524]
[0525] Among them, the access type identifier is used to indicate the access type, and the operator type identifier is used to indicate the operator type; (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, ANT is the access type identifier, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0526] When the indication identifier is NAI, the intermediate key is generated by the processor 801 according to the following formula:
[0527]
[0528] Wherein, (CK1', IK1') is the intermediate key, CK1' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK1' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, NAI is the indication identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0529] In some possible implementations, the processor 801 generates the intermediate key according to the following formula:
[0530]
[0531] Wherein, (CK2', IK2') is the intermediate key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest sequence number, ANT is the access type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0532] Processor 801 generates EMSK' according to the following formula,
[0533] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0534] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0535] The processor 801 generates an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0536] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',SNT);
[0537] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and SNT is the operator type identifier.
[0538] In some possible implementations, the processor 801 generates the intermediate key according to the following formula:
[0539]
[0540] Wherein, (CK2', IK2') is the intermediate key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, KDF is the key generation algorithm, SQN is the latest serial number, SNT is the operator type identifier, CK is the initial confidentiality key, IK is the initial integrity key, AK is the anonymous key, CK=f3(RAND), IK=f4(RAND), AK=f5(RAND), RAND is a random number, f3, f4 and f5 are all generation algorithms, The meaning is exclusive OR operation.
[0541] Processor 801 generates EMSK' according to the following formula,
[0542] EMSK'=PRF'(IK2'||CK2');
[0543] Wherein, EMSK' is the extended master session key, (IK2', CK2') is the intermediate key, IK2' is the intermediate integrity key, CK2' is the intermediate confidentiality key, and || means concatenation, which means connecting the character strings on both sides of the symbol;
[0544] The processor 801 generates an anchor key according to the following formula:
[0545] anchor key=KDF(EMSK',ANT);
[0546] Among them, anchor key is the anchor key, and ANT is the access type identifier.
[0547] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that embodiments of the present invention may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the present invention may take the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the present invention may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage and optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.
[0548] The present invention is described with reference to flowcharts and / or block diagrams of methods, devices (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the present invention. It should be understood that each process and / or block in the flowchart and / or block diagram, as well as the combination of processes and / or blocks in the flowchart and / or block diagram, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, an embedded processor, or other programmable data processing device to produce a machine, so that the instructions executed by the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing device generate instructions for implementing the processes in the flowchart and / or block diagram. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in a block or multiple blocks.
[0549] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising an instruction device, which implements the process Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A function specified in one or more boxes.
[0550] These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device so that a series of operating steps are executed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions for implementing the process. Figure 1 A process or multiple processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps for the functions specified in one or more boxes.
[0551] Obviously, those skilled in the art can make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.
Claims
1. A method for generating a key, characterized in that: include: Generate an intermediate key based on the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and the operator type identifier; generating an anchor key according to the intermediate key; Generate a key Kamf according to the anchor key; Generate a base station key according to the Kamf; According to the base station key, a user plane confidentiality key for protecting the confidentiality of user plane data, a user plane integrity key for protecting the integrity of user plane data, a control plane confidentiality key for protecting the confidentiality of control plane data, and a control plane integrity key for protecting the integrity of control plane data are generated.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The method further comprises: According to the Kamf, a 3GPP-NAS confidentiality key and a 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key are generated.
3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The generating an anchor key according to the intermediate key comprises: An extended master session key EMSK' is generated according to the intermediate key, and the anchor key is obtained according to the EMSK'.
4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that: Before generating the intermediate key according to the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and the operator type identifier, the method further includes: The CK and the IK are generated based on the root key.
5. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 4, characterized in that: The step of generating a base station key according to the Kamf includes: According to the uplink count value of the non-access layer message and the K amf Obtain the base station key.
6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The operator type identifier includes a part for indicating an operator and a part for indicating an access type.
7. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The operator type identifier includes the distinction of operators.
8. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5 is characterized in that: The operator type identifier includes a serving network identifier.
9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 8 is characterized in that: The method is executed by a user equipment.
10. A method for generating a key, characterized in that: include: The authentication credential storage and operation function network element generates the confidentiality key CK and integrity key IK based on the root key; The authentication credential storage and operation function network element generates an intermediate key according to the CK, the IK and the operator type identifier; The authentication credentials storage and operation function network element sends the intermediate key to the authentication server; The authentication server receives the intermediate key; The authentication server generates an anchor key according to the intermediate key; The authentication server sends the anchor key to an access and mobility control function network element; The access and mobility control function network element generates a key Kamf according to the anchor key; The access and mobility control function network element generates a base station key according to the Kamf; The access and mobility control function network element sends the base station key to the base station; According to the base station key, the base station generates a user plane confidentiality key for protecting the confidentiality of user plane data, a user plane integrity key for protecting the integrity of user plane data, a control plane confidentiality key for protecting the confidentiality of control plane data, and a control plane integrity key for protecting the integrity of control plane data.
11. The method according to claim 10, characterized in that The method further comprises: According to the Kamf, the access and mobility control function network element generates a 3GPP-NAS confidentiality key and a 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key.
12. The method according to claim 10 or 11, characterized in that: The generating an anchor key according to the intermediate key comprises: The authentication server generates an extended master session key EMSK' according to the intermediate key, and obtains the anchor key according to the EMSK'.
13. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 12, characterized in that: Before generating the intermediate key according to the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and the operator type identifier, the method further includes: The authentication credential storage and operation functional network element generates the CK and the IK according to the root key.
14. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 13, characterized in that: The step of generating a base station key according to the Kamf includes: The access and mobility control function network element receives the uplink count value of the non-access layer message and the K amf Obtain the base station key.
15. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 14, characterized in that: The operator type identifier includes a part for indicating an operator and a part for indicating an access type.
16. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 14, characterized in that: The operator type identifier includes the distinction of operators.
17. The method according to any one of claims 10 to 14 is characterized in that: The operator type identifier includes a serving network identifier.
18. A key generation method, characterized in that: include: The authentication server receives a terminal identifier and an operator type identifier sent by a communication device; wherein the communication device is a security anchor function or an access and mobility control function network element deployed with a security anchor function; The authentication server sends the terminal identifier and the operator type identifier to the authentication credentials storage and operation function network element; The authentication server receives the intermediate key returned by the authentication credential storage and operation function network element, wherein the intermediate key is generated according to the confidentiality key CK, the integrity key IK and the operator type identifier; The authentication server generates an anchor key according to the intermediate key; The authentication server sends the anchor key to the communication device, and the anchor key is used by the communication device to derive a Kamf key; wherein the Kamf key is used to derive a base station key, and the base station key is used to derive a user plane confidentiality key for protecting the confidentiality of user plane data, a user plane integrity key for protecting the integrity of user plane data, a control plane confidentiality key for protecting the confidentiality of control plane data, and a control plane integrity key for protecting the integrity of control plane data.
19. The method according to claim 18, characterized in that The Kamf key is also used to derive the 3GPP-NAS confidentiality key and the 3GPP-NAS integrity protection key.
20. The method according to claim 18 or 19, characterized in that The operator type identifier includes a part for indicating an operator and a part for indicating an access type.
21. The method according to claim 18 or 19, characterized in that The operator type identifier includes the distinction of operators.
22. The method according to claim 18 or 19, characterized in that The operator type identifier includes a serving network identifier.
23. A communication device, characterized in that: The invention comprises a module for executing the key generation method described in any one of claims 1 to 9.
24. An authentication server, characterized in that: The method comprises a module for executing the key generation method according to any one of claims 18 to 22.
25. A communication device, characterized in that: The device comprises a processor and a memory; The memory is used to store computer-executable instructions. When the device is running, the processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory, so that the communication device, as a first communication device, executes the key generation method as described in any one of claims 1-9.
26. An authentication server, characterized in that: The device comprises a processor and a memory; The memory is used to store computer-executable instructions. When the device is running, the processor executes the computer-executable instructions stored in the memory, so that the communication device, as a first communication device, executes the key generation method as described in any one of claims 18-22.
27. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions are executed on a computer, the computer executes the key generation method described in any one of claims 1 to 9.
28. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that: The computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, and when the instructions are executed on a computer, the computer acts as an authentication server to execute the key generation method described in any one of claims 18 to 22.
29. A computer program product, characterized in that The computer program product includes instructions, and when the instructions are executed on a computer, the computer is caused to perform the key generation method described in any one of claims 18 to 22 as an authentication server.
