Security authentication method based on physical unclonable function

By using PUF to generate physical signatures and transparent mechanisms in the PKI system to verify certificate signatures, the problems of CA private key leakage and unauthorized operations are solved, the system security and computing efficiency are improved, the certificate storage space is reduced, and PUF calls are provided behavior supervision mechanism.

CN118890159APending Publication Date: 2024-11-01SHANGHAI JIAOTONG UNIV
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202410916647.2
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2024-07-09
Publication Date
2024-11-01

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

The leakage of the certificate signature private key of CA in the existing PKI system leads to security breach, and there is a lack of a mechanism to verify whether the PUF call behavior is legal, so it is impossible to promptly detect the security risks of CA's abuse or unauthorized operations.

Method used

Using a secure authentication method based on physical non-clone function (PUF), a physical signature is generated for the certificate field to be signed through PUF, combined with the transparent mechanism of PUF calling and the tuple of call information for auxiliary client certificate verification, avoiding the use of traditional signature private keys, and Construct multi-level CA trust endorsement levels through a hash chain to generate entity certificate signature field.

Benefits of technology

It effectively ends the security risks brought by CA private key leakage, improves the security and computing efficiency of the PKI system, reduces the certificate storage space, and provides a verifiability and supervision mechanism for PUF calling behavior to prevent potential abuse attacks.

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Abstract

According to the security authentication method based on the physical unclonable function, a trusted endorsement of an entity public key certificate is directly generated by using the PUF through the CA, a traditional signature private key is not needed, the private key is not needed to be generated by using the PUF, the signature private key is removed for the CA through physical trusted binding provided by the PUF, and the security authentication efficiency is improved. The possibility that an attacker obtains the secret key by implementing different attacks is fundamentally avoided; secondly, on the basis of not influencing the original certificate transparent service in the PKI system through the PUF calling transparent mechanism, the calling behavior of the PUF instance is described through the calling description group, the verifiability of the behavior of calling the PUF by the CA is realized, and the potential unauthorized PUF calling behavior can be identified in time.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a technology in the field of information security, specifically a certificate issuance and verification method based on a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF). Background Art

[0002] Traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) technology relies on the certificate authority (CA) to issue a certificate for the entity's public key. CA uses a long-term stored fixed private key to generate a corresponding signature for the entity's public key certificate field using cryptographic signature schemes such as RSA and ECDSA, indicating a trust endorsement of the entity's public key. In practice, major security incidents or vulnerabilities such as CA signature private key leakage occur from time to time, seriously endangering the basic authentication function of the network. Human operation errors or external attacks can lead to the leakage of private keys, and with the evolution of the network attack and defense environment, it is difficult to fundamentally defend against various types of remote attacks, side channel attacks, key enumeration attacks, and hybrid attacks on CA private keys. At the same time, the attacker only needs to succeed once, that is, to obtain the CA's signature private key value, and then he can issue any number of malicious certificates almost without restriction. Therefore, in response to the key security issue of CA signature private key leakage, a security enhancement method for public key certificate issuance and verification is needed to improve the security and trust foundation of the PKI system. Summary of the invention

[0003] The present invention aims at the problem of CA certificate signing private key leakage in the existing PKI system, that is, once the private key in the key pair generated by PUF is leaked during use due to external attack or human operation error, the security of the PKI system will still be destroyed and in the absence of a mechanism to verify whether the calling behavior of PUF is legal, it is impossible to timely discover the security risks of CA's abuse of PUF or other unauthorized operations. A security authentication method based on a physical unclonable function is proposed. PUF is used to generate a physical signature for the certificate field to be signed to achieve secure issuance. At the same time, the PUF calls a transparent mechanism and a call information tuple to assist the client certificate verification. This method can not only completely solve the security risk of CA private key leakage for the PKI system, but also bring it higher computing efficiency and less certificate storage space.

[0004] The present invention is achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0005] The present invention relates to a security authentication method based on a physical unclonable function, comprising: a certificate issuance phase and a verification phase based on a PUF, wherein:

[0006] The certificate issuance mentioned above refers to: generating a certificate summary to be signed for the certificate subject based on the identity information and public key data of the certificate subject, and the root CA and the intermediate CA use their own installed PUF hardware instances to generate a certificate signature response for the certificate summary to be signed; the root CA generates a trust endorsement intermediate value, and generates the signature field of the certificate in combination with the certificate signature response; the intermediate CA generates the entity certificate signature field for the certificate subject through PUF calls and forms a complete certificate while generating and uploading the corresponding call information tuple.

[0007] The trust endorsement intermediate value is calculated by the upper-level CA, i.e., the higher-level CA that issues the certificate to the CA currently executing the certificate issuance algorithm, based on the certificate signature response generated by the current CA, the certificate summary to be signed generated by the current CA for the certificate subject, and the trust endorsement intermediate value and certificate signature response of the upper-level CA, and is specifically: ht=H(R C (-1) ||hc||ht (-1) ), where: H is the hash function, R C (-1) This is the certificate signature response generated when the previous CA issues a certificate for the current CA. (-1) is the intermediate value of the trust endorsement of the previous level CA itself, and hc is the summary of the certificate to be signed generated in the previous step.

[0008] The certificate digest to be signed is calculated by a hash function H, specifically: hc = H(crt||ts||N CA ), where: crt is the certificate content field, including the certificate entity identity, certificate entity public key, algorithm identifier, and extended information, ts is the timestamp of certificate issuance, N CA is the identity string of the CA currently executing the certificate issuance algorithm, and || is the bit string concatenation operation;

[0009] The certificate signature response R is calculated by installing the PUF instance puf C =puf(hc), that is, the physical authentication inherent in the PUF itself is given to the certificate issuance process, so that the generated certificate signature response has the randomness, uniqueness and distinctiveness provided by the PUF instance, which is equivalent to using the physical trust capability provided by the PUF to bind the public key and other information of the certificate entity with the CA's certificate issuance behavior; this operation avoids the use of traditional signature algorithms, thereby avoiding the use of CA signature private keys.

[0010] The entity certificate signature field is obtained by performing a bitwise XOR operation on the physical authentication of the PUF. Integrate into the certificate signing process, and construct a multi-level CA trust endorsement hierarchy through the hash chain method, specifically: the signature field in the certificate Cert finally issued to the certificate entity

[0011] The call information tuple is generated in the following way:

[0012] a) Generate call description information Z = {N CA ,N P ,ts}, where: N CA N is the identity string of the CA currently executing the certificate issuance algorithm. P The PUF manufacturer identification string called by the current CA, ts is the timestamp of certificate issuance. The call description information Z defines the basic information of the calling entity and the called PUF instance.

[0013] b) Generate a call authentication code T = H (R C ||Z||Cert||T (-1) ), where: T (-1) It is the calling authentication code generated when the upper-level CA issues a certificate for the current CA.

[0014] c) Obtain the call information tuple W = (Z, T) when the current CA issues the certificate to the entity.

[0015] The uploading refers to uploading the generated call information tuple to a certificate transparency (CT) server of the PKI system through an offline channel.

[0016] The verification phase refers to: the verification client receives the certificate issued based on the PUF and the corresponding call information tuple, restores the summary of the certificate to be signed, and verifies the signature field of the certificate in combination with the call information tuple, specifically including:

[0017] i) Parse the call description information Z from the call information tuple W to obtain the certificate issuance timestamp ts; parse the identity string N of the certificate issuing CA from the certificate Cert CA , certificate content field crt and signature field sig.

[0018] ii) Recalculate the certificate digest to be signed hc = H(crt||ts||N CA ), in the process of solving the certificate chain, the certificate signature response R generated by the previous CA is restored C (-1) and its trust endorsement intermediate value ht (-1) , and then restore the trust endorsement intermediate value ht.

[0019] iii) Calculate the certificate signature response R generated by the current CA through XOR operationC , and in the process of solving the certificate chain and the call information chain, restore the call authentication code T generated by the previous level CA (-1) .

[0020] iv) Recalculate the call authentication code T'=H(R) corresponding to the current CA according to the call description information Z and the certificate Cert C ||Z||Cert||T (-1) ), compare T' and T to see if they are equal. If they are equal, the certificate verification succeeds, otherwise the verification fails. Technical Effects

[0021] Compared with traditional PKI schemes based on key sealing or secret sharing, the present invention uses PUF to directly generate trust endorsement of entity public key certificates through CA, without using traditional signature private keys or using PUF to generate private keys. At the same time, the physical trusted binding provided by PUF removes the signature private key for CA, fundamentally avoiding the possibility of attackers obtaining keys by implementing different attacks. Secondly, the present invention uses the PUF call transparency mechanism to characterize the calling behavior of the PUF instance through the call description group without affecting the original certificate transparency service in the PKI system, thereby realizing the verifiability of CA calling PUF behavior and timely identifying potential unauthorized PUF calling behavior.

[0022] Compared with the prior art, the present invention can effectively end the attack and defense cycle of "leakage-protection-re-leakage" in real applications. Even if the attacker can manage to call the CA's certificate issuance function interface, since the certificate function is limited by the PUF hardware, it must rely on the CA server itself to complete the attack and exploitation; compared with the prior art, after obtaining the key literal value, a large number of certificates can be forged without time and place restrictions. The present invention can effectively reduce the harm caused by the attacker's function abuse attack; compared with other PUF-based security solutions, the present invention provides an open supervision mechanism for the calling status of PUF, a key security component, to ensure the credibility of PUF calling behavior and the authenticity of corresponding CRP data; compared with traditional cryptographic signature algorithms, the certificate generation calculation process based on PUF in the present invention is lighter, takes less time, and the length of the signature field formed is also shorter than the signature field output by the traditional public key algorithm. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0023] Figure 1 It is a flow chart of the present invention;

[0024] Figure 2 is a flow chart of an embodiment of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the module structure of the certificate issuance and verification device based on PUF of the present invention;

[0026] Figure 4 Schematic diagram of the effect of an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0027] like Figure 2 As shown, this embodiment relates to a security authentication method based on a physical unclonable function, comprising the following steps:

[0028] S1. The PKI system initializes and generates two levels of CA: root CA N CA0 , intermediate CA N CA1 , the two CAs each have callable PUF instances puf0 and puf1;

[0029] S2, root CA N CA0 Generate a root certificate Cert in a similar way to self-signing CA0 , that is, first generate the summary of the root certificate to be signed hc0 = H (crt0 || ts0 || N CA0 ), where crt0 is the root certificate content field, ts0 is the timestamp of the root certificate issuance; the root CA uses its own PUF instance puf0 to generate the root certificate signature response R C0 =puf0(hc0), then N CA0 Generate the root CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht0=H(~||hc0||~), where: ~ is an empty bit string; finally, the root CA calculates the root certificate signature field And form a Cert CA0 ;

[0030] S3, root CA N CA0 For the intermediate CA N CA1 Issue PUF-based certificate Cert CA1 First, generate the intermediate certificate summary to be signed hc1 = H(crt1||ts1||N CA0 ), where: crt1 is the intermediate certificate content field, ts1 is the timestamp of the intermediate certificate issuance; the root CA uses the PUF instance puf0 to generate the intermediate certificate signature response R C1 =puf0(hc1), then N CA0 Generate intermediate CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht1 = H(R C0 ||hc1||ht0); Finally, the root CA calculates the intermediate certificate signature field And form a Cert CA1 ;

[0031] S4, root CA is used to issue Cert CA0 , Cert CA1The two PUF call behaviors at the time of gen- erate call information tuples respectively. The root CA generates the root certificate PUF call description information Z0={N CA0 ,N P0 ,ts0}, where: N P0 is the manufacturer identification string of the PUF instance puf0; then the root certificate PUF call authentication code T0=H(R C0 ||Z0||Cert CA0 ||~) and forms the root certificate PUF call information tuple W0=(Z0,T0). Afterwards, the root CA generates the intermediate certificate PUF call description information Z1={N CA0 ,N P0 ,ts1}, then generate the intermediate certificate PUF call authentication code T1 = H(R C1 ||Z1||Cert CA1 || T0) and form the intermediate certificate PUF call information tuple W1 = (Z1, T1); the root CA serializes W0 and W1 and uploads them to the certificate transparency server;

[0032] S5, intermediate CA N CA1 For any certificate entity N D Issue PUF-based certificate Cert D , first generate the entity certificate summary hc to be signed D =H(crt D ||ts D ||N CA1 ), where: crt D It is the content field of the entity certificate, ts D Timestamp for the entity certificate; the intermediate CA uses puf1 to generate a certificate signature response R CD =puf1(hc D ), then N CA1 Generate entity trust endorsement intermediate value ht D =H(R C1 ||hc D ||ht1); Finally, the intermediate CA calculates the entity certificate signature field And form a Cert D ;

[0033] S6. Intermediate CA generates entity certificate PUF call description information Z D = {N CA1 ,N P1 ,ts}, where: N P1 It is the manufacturer identification string of the PUF instance puf1; then the entity certificate PUF call authentication code T is generated D =H(R CD ||Z D||Cert D ||T1) and form the entity certificate PUF call information tuple W D =(Z D ,T D ); the intermediate CA will W D After serialization, upload it to the Certificate Transparency server.

[0034] S7. Any client verifies the certificate entity N D For example, in order to verify the legitimacy of the public key held by the server in a TLS / SSL connection, the client obtains the certificate chain Cert CA0 , Cert CA1 , Cert D And call the information tuple chain W0, W1, W D ;

[0035] S8. Client parses Z0 from the root certificate PUF call information tuple W0 to obtain the root certificate issuance timestamp ts0; CA0 Parse the root CA identity string N CA0 , root certificate content field crt0; thereby regenerating the root certificate summary hc0 to be signed and the root CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht0, and solving the root certificate signature response R C0 ; The client recalculates the root certificate PUF to call the authentication code and confirms whether T0 is correct. If not, the verification is terminated;

[0036] S9, Client parses Z1 from the intermediate certificate PUF call information tuple W1, thereby obtaining the intermediate certificate issuance timestamp ts1, regenerates the intermediate certificate digest hc1 to be signed, and uses the root certificate signature response R calculated by S8 C0 And the root CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht0, regenerate the intermediate CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht1, and then solve the intermediate certificate signature response R C1 ; Client uses T0 and R C1 Recalculate the intermediate certificate PUF call authentication code to confirm whether T1 is correct. If not, terminate the verification;

[0037] S10, Client calls information tuple W from entity certificate PUF D Analyze Z D , thereby obtaining the entity certificate issuance timestamp ts D Regenerate hc D , using the intermediate certificate signature response R calculated by S9 C1 And the intermediate CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht1, regenerate the entity trust endorsement intermediate value ht D, and then solve the entity certificate signature response R CD ; Client uses T1 and R CD Recalculate the entity certificate PUF call authentication code and confirm T D Is it correct? If not, terminate the verification;

[0038] S11. If S8, S9, and S10 are all executed correctly, the Client verifies the entity certificate and the corresponding certificate chain and the call information tuple. Finally, the Client believes that the certificate entity N D The legitimacy of the certificate held can then complete the operations of other subsequent protocols (such as key negotiation in TLS / SSL protocols).

[0039] like Figure 3 As shown, the security authentication system for implementing the above method in this embodiment includes: a certificate issuing device for generating a certificate signature based on the submitted entity certificate information, and outputting a complete entity certificate and a certificate signature response based on the certificate summary using its own physical mapping structure, and a certificate verification device for verifying the legitimacy of the certificate.

[0040] The certificate issuing device comprises: a communication module, a certificate issuing module, a certificate storage module and a PUF module, wherein: the certificate issuing module generates a certificate signature according to the submitted entity certificate information and outputs a complete entity certificate; the PUF module receives the certificate summary and uses its own physical mapping structure to output a certificate signature response for the certificate issuing module; the communication module calls the transmission of the information tuple; and the certificate storage module stores the generated certificate.

[0041] The certificate verification device includes: a communication module, a certificate verification module and a certificate storage module, wherein: the communication module receives the certificate and the call information tuple, and passes them to the certificate verification module; the certificate verification module receives the passed certificate and the call information tuple and verifies the legitimacy of the certificate; the certificate storage module stores the confirmed legal certificate in the device.

[0042] After specific practical experiments, the above CA certificate issuance method was performed in an environment with an Intel Core i7-10700 CPU and Ubuntu LTS20.04 system to generate a complete certificate chain (including Cert CA0 , Cert CA1 and Cert D ) takes about 200 to 370 milliseconds to generate the Cert CA0 The size is 883 bytes, Cert CA1 950 bytes, Cert DThe size is 688 bytes; generate a complete PUF call information chain (including W0, W1 and W D ) takes about 1 millisecond, and the size of the generated W0 is 21 bytes, W1 is 36 bytes, and W D It is 36 bytes.

[0043] In an environment with an Intel Core i5-8279U CPU, the client certificate verification method described above takes about 3 to 7 milliseconds to parse the PUF call description information from the PUF call information tuple; the client verifies the complete certificate chain for about 2 to 4 milliseconds.

[0044] In an environment with an Intel Xeon Gold 6330 CPU, the confirmation time of the PUF call information tuple is about 3 to 5 milliseconds when performing the above complete security authentication method.

[0045] Compared with the existing technology, this method can effectively remove the CA private key through PUF, greatly improving the security and credibility of the PKI system. While achieving this effect, this method does not introduce additional computing overhead, but instead improves the computing efficiency of the original system. The performance indicators are improved in that the certificate issuance method implemented using the traditional cryptographic signature algorithm takes about 405 milliseconds in the same experimental host, and the certificate issuance method based on PUF only takes about 359 milliseconds on average; at the same time, the size of the complete certificate chain generated by the traditional method is 4552 bytes, while the size of the complete certificate chain generated by this method based on PUF is 3471 bytes, reducing the storage space occupancy by about 31%. Therefore, the above specific actual experiments show that compared with the existing technology, this method can simultaneously improve the security and efficiency of the system.

[0046] The above embodiments show that the present invention has a complete certificate issuance and verification process and is compatible with the certificate issuance and verification workflows of different PKI systems. Figure 4 As shown, compared with the prior art, the present invention uses the true randomness and uniqueness of the PUF's own physical structure to provide CA with a certificate issuance method that is different from the traditional cryptographic signature algorithm. CA can use the unique physical binding feature provided by PUF to provide a more credible trust endorsement for the entity applying for the certificate. At the same time, compared with the prior art, the present invention provides a PUF call transparency mechanism, which characterizes the call behavior of a PUF instance by calling an information tuple, thereby effectively constraining and recording the CA's use of PUF, and providing a supervision and review mechanism for potential abuse of PUF-based certificate issuance. The PUF call transparency mechanism is compatible with the certificate transparency service in modern PKI systems,

[0047] Compared with the prior art, since the response length of PUF is usually 128 or 256 bits, and the signature length of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms such as RSA is usually greater than the response length of PUF, and these algorithms consume more clock cycles when applied than PUF. The PKI system after applying the present invention has improved the computational efficiency of certificate issuance and certificate storage efficiency. Therefore, the present invention can provide a more reliable and secure PKI certificate issuance and verification function through PUF without introducing additional overhead, has good innovation and practicality, and can achieve the technical effects of lightweight calculation, small storage occupancy, and strong security.

[0048] The above-mentioned specific implementation can be partially adjusted in different ways by those skilled in the art without departing from the principle and purpose of the present invention. The protection scope of the present invention shall be based on the claims and shall not be limited by the above-mentioned specific implementation. Each implementation scheme within its scope shall be subject to the constraints of the present invention.

Claims

1. A security authentication method based on a physical unclonable function, comprising: The PUF-based certificate issuance and verification phases are characterized by: The certificate issuance mentioned above refers to: generating a certificate summary to be signed for the certificate subject based on the identity information and public key data of the certificate subject, and the root CA and the intermediate CA use their own installed PUF hardware instances to generate a certificate signature response for the certificate summary to be signed; the root CA generates a trust endorsement intermediate value, and generates the signature field of the certificate in combination with the certificate signature response; the intermediate CA generates the entity certificate signature field for the certificate subject through PUF calls and forms a complete certificate while generating and uploading the corresponding call information tuple.

2. The security authentication method based on physical unclonable function according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The trust endorsement intermediate value is calculated by the upper-level CA, i.e., the higher-level CA that issues the certificate to the CA currently executing the certificate issuance algorithm, based on the certificate signature response generated by the current CA, the certificate summary to be signed generated by the current CA for the certificate subject, and the trust endorsement intermediate value and certificate signature response of the upper-level CA, and is specifically: ht=H(R C (-1) ||hc||ht (-1) ), where: H is the hash function, R C (-1) This is the certificate signature response generated when the previous CA issues a certificate for the current CA. (-1) is the intermediate value of the trust endorsement of the previous level CA itself, and hc is the summary of the certificate to be signed generated in the previous step.

3. The security authentication method based on physical unclonable function according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The certificate digest to be signed is calculated by a hash function H, specifically: hc = H(crt||ts||N CA ), where: crt is the certificate content field, including the certificate entity identity, certificate entity public key, algorithm identifier, and extended information, ts is the timestamp of certificate issuance, N CA is the identity string of the CA currently executing the certificate issuance algorithm, and || is a bit string concatenation operation.

4. The security authentication method based on physical unclonable function according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The certificate signature response R is calculated by installing the PUF instance puf C =puf(hc), that is, the physical authentication inherent in the PUF itself is given to the certificate issuance process, so that the generated certificate signature response has the randomness, uniqueness and distinctiveness provided by the PUF instance, which is equivalent to using the physical trust capability provided by the PUF to bind the public key and other information of the certificate entity with the CA's certificate issuance behavior; this operation avoids the use of traditional signature algorithms, thereby avoiding the use of CA signature private keys.

5. The security authentication method based on physical unclonable function according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The entity certificate signature field is obtained by performing a bitwise XOR operation on the physical authentication of the PUF. Integrate into the certificate signing process, and construct a multi-level CA trust endorsement hierarchy through the hash chain method, specifically: the signature field in the certificate Cert finally issued to the certificate entity 6. The security authentication method based on physical unclonable function according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The call information tuple is generated in the following way: a) Generate call description information Z = {N CA ,N P ,ts}, where: N CA N is the identity string of the CA currently executing the certificate issuance algorithm. P The PUF manufacturer identification string called by the current CA, ts is the timestamp of certificate issuance, and the call description information Z defines the basic information of the calling entity and the called PUF instance; b) Generate a call authentication code T = H (R C ||Z||Cert||T (-1) ), where: T (-1) It is the call authentication code generated when the previous CA issues a certificate for the current CA; c) Obtain the call information tuple W = (Z, T) when the current CA issues the certificate to the entity.

7. The security authentication method based on physical unclonable function according to claim 1 is characterized in that: The verification phase refers to: the verification client receives the certificate issued based on the PUF and the corresponding call information tuple, restores the summary of the certificate to be signed, and verifies the signature field of the certificate in combination with the call information tuple, specifically including: i) Parse the call description information Z from the call information tuple W to obtain the certificate issuance timestamp ts; parse the identity string N of the certificate issuing CA from the certificate Cert CA , certificate content field crt and signature field sig; ii) Recalculate the certificate digest to be signed hc = H(crt||ts||N CA ), in the process of solving the certificate chain, the certificate signature response R generated by the previous CA is restored C (-1) and its trust endorsement intermediate value ht (-1) , and then restore the trust endorsement intermediate value ht; iii) Calculate the certificate signature response R generated by the current CA based on the XOR operation C , and in the process of solving the certificate chain and the call information chain, restore the call authentication code T generated by the previous level CA (-1) ; iv) Recalculate the call authentication code T'=H(R) corresponding to the current CA according to the call description information Z and the certificate Cert C ||Z||Cert||T (-1) ), compare T' and T to see if they are equal. If they are equal, the certificate verification succeeds, otherwise the verification fails.

8. The security authentication method based on a physical unclonable function according to any one of claims 1 to 7, characterized in that: include: S1. The PKI system initializes and generates two levels of CA: root CA N CA0 , intermediate CA N CA1 , the two CAs each have callable PUF instances puf0 and puf1; S2, root CA N CA0 Generate a root certificate Cert in a similar way to self-signing CA0 , that is, first generate the summary of the root certificate to be signed hc0 = H (crt0 || ts0 || N CA0 ), where crt0 is the root certificate content field, ts0 is the timestamp of the root certificate issuance; the root CA uses its own PUF instance puf0 to generate the root certificate signature response R C0 =puf0(hc0), then N CA0 Generate the root CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht0=H(~||hc0||~), where: ~ is an empty bit string; finally, the root CA calculates the root certificate signature field And form a Cert CA0 ; S3, root CA N CA0 For the intermediate CA N CA1 Issue PUF-based certificate Cert CA1 First, generate the intermediate certificate summary to be signed hc1 = H(crt1||ts1||N CA0 ), where: crt1 is the intermediate certificate content field, ts1 is the timestamp of the intermediate certificate issuance; the root CA uses the PUF instance puf0 to generate the intermediate certificate signature response R C1 =puf0(hc1), then N CA0 Generate intermediate CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht1 = H(R C0 ||hc1||ht0); Finally, the root CA calculates the intermediate certificate signature field And form a Cert CA1 ; S4, root CA is used to issue Cert CA0 , Cert CA1 The two PUF call behaviors at the time of the root CA generate call information tuples respectively, and the root CA generates the root certificate PUF call description information Z0 = {N CA0 ,N P0 ,ts0}, where: N P0 is the manufacturer identification string of the PUF instance puf0; then the root certificate PUF call authentication code T0=H(R C0 ||Z0||Cert CA0 ||~) and form the root certificate PUF call information tuple W0=(Z0,T0), then the root CA generates the intermediate certificate PUF call description information Z1={N CA0 ,N P0 ,ts1}, then generate the intermediate certificate PUF call authentication code T1 = H(R C1 ||Z1||Cert CA1 || T0) and form the intermediate certificate PUF call information tuple W1 = (Z1, T1); the root CA serializes W0 and W1 and uploads them to the certificate transparency server; S5, intermediate CA N CA1 For any certificate entity N D Issue PUF-based certificate Cert D , first generate the entity certificate summary hc to be signed D =H(crt D ||ts D ||N CA1 ), where: crt D It is the content field of the entity certificate, ts D Timestamp for the entity certificate; the intermediate CA uses puf1 to generate a certificate signature response R CD =puf1(hc D ), then N CA1 Generate entity trust endorsement intermediate value ht D =H(R C1 ||hc D ||ht1); Finally, the intermediate CA calculates the entity certificate signature field And form a Cert D ; S6. Intermediate CA generates entity certificate PUF call description information Z D = {N CA1 ,N P1 ,ts}, where: N P1 It is the manufacturer identification string of the PUF instance puf1; then the entity certificate PUF call authentication code T is generated D =H(R CD ||Z D ||Cert D ||T1) and form the entity certificate PUF call information tuple W D =(Z D ,T D ); the intermediate CA will W D After serialization, upload to the certificate transparency server; S7. Any client verifies the certificate entity N D For example, in order to verify the legitimacy of the public key held by the server in a TLS / SSL connection, the client obtains the certificate chain Cert CA0 , Cert CA1 , Cert D And call the information tuple chain W0, W1, W D ; S8. Client parses Z0 from the root certificate PUF call information tuple W0 to obtain the root certificate issuance timestamp ts0; CA0 Parse the root CA identity string N CA0 , root certificate content field crt0; thereby regenerating the root certificate summary hc0 to be signed and the root CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht0, and solving the root certificate signature response R C0 ; The client recalculates the root certificate PUF to call the authentication code and confirms whether T0 is correct. If not, the verification is terminated; S9, Client parses Z1 from the intermediate certificate PUF call information tuple W1, thereby obtaining the intermediate certificate issuance timestamp ts1, regenerates the intermediate certificate digest hc1 to be signed, and uses the root certificate signature response R calculated by S8 C0 And the root CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht0, regenerate the intermediate CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht1, and then solve the intermediate certificate signature response R C1 ; Client uses T0 and R C1 Recalculate the intermediate certificate PUF call authentication code to confirm whether T1 is correct. If not, terminate the verification; S10, Client calls information tuple W from entity certificate PUF D Analyze Z D , thereby obtaining the entity certificate issuance timestamp ts D Regenerate hc D , using the intermediate certificate signature response R calculated by S9 C1 And the intermediate CA trust endorsement intermediate value ht1, regenerate the entity trust endorsement intermediate value ht D , and then solve the entity certificate signature response R CD ; Client uses T1 and R CD Recalculate the entity certificate PUF call authentication code and confirm T D Is it correct? If not, terminate the verification; S11. If S8, S9, and S10 are all executed correctly, the Client verifies the entity certificate and the corresponding certificate chain and the call information tuple. Finally, the Client believes that the certificate entity N D The legitimacy of the certificate held can then be used to complete the operations of other subsequent protocols.

9. A security authentication system for implementing the method described in any one of claims 1 to 8, characterized in that: include: A certificate issuing device used to generate a certificate signature based on the submitted entity certificate information, and output a complete entity certificate and a certificate signature response based on the certificate summary using its own physical mapping structure, and a certificate verification device used to verify the legitimacy of the certificate; The certificate issuing device comprises: a communication module, a certificate issuing module, a certificate storage module and a PUF module, wherein: the certificate issuing module generates a certificate signature according to the submitted entity certificate information and outputs a complete entity certificate; the PUF module receives the certificate summary and uses its own physical mapping structure to output a certificate signature response for the certificate issuing module; the communication module calls the transmission of the information tuple; the certificate storage module stores the generated certificate; The certificate verification device includes: a communication module, a certificate verification module and a certificate storage module, wherein: the communication module receives the certificate and the call information tuple, and passes them to the certificate verification module; the certificate verification module receives the passed certificate and the call information tuple and verifies the legitimacy of the certificate; the certificate storage module stores the confirmed legal certificate in the device.