Game-based railway data product pricing model and system
By adopting game pricing model in the railway industry, combining data integrity, accuracy and scalability factors, the complexity and uncertainty of railway data product pricing evaluation is solved, and more accurate pricing evaluation and data transactions are achieved. Validity.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411236272.1
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-09-04
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-08
AI Technical Summary
The existing data product pricing methods are not applicable in the railway industry and cannot accurately reflect the value of railway data products. There are problems such as complexity and uncertainty in pricing evaluation.
Using the game-based railway data product pricing model, through the game strategy between data owners and data buyers, the data cost function and personal expected benefit function are constructed, and the optimal pricing strategy of data products is determined, taking into account the completeness and accuracy of data. factors such as sex and scalability.
It realizes a more accurate and concise pricing evaluation of railway data products, avoids the problem of low accuracy of pricing methods caused by different industry attributes, and ensures the effectiveness and accuracy of data transactions.
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Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present invention relates to the fields of computer technology and railway data transaction technology, and in particular to a railway data product pricing model and system based on game theory. Background Art
[0002] With the development of the Internet and the continuous expansion of the railway data market, the railway industry has accumulated a large amount of railway data. Railway system data covers many aspects, from train operation, track maintenance to passenger flow, etc. The quantity is huge and the structure is complex, including different data types and formats, involving a large amount of real-time and historical data. These railway data products not only reflect the operating status of the railway system, but also contain a lot of potential commercial value and management value. The value of railway data products continues to increase, which is of great significance for promoting the development of railways into a new stage. However, the business systems such as passenger and freight, dispatching, infrastructure (industrial and power supply), mobile equipment (mobile passenger and freight), engineering construction (line, bridge, tunnel and rail) on which railway data products rely have problems such as high cycle cumulative cost, significant differences in professional connotations, and complex professional interfaces, which lead to problems such as difficulty in identifying and quantifying influencing factors, difficulty in valuation, and difficulty in deriving in the process of railway data product value assessment. Pricing and evaluating railway data products can more accurately reflect the value and importance of data, and provide reasonable price references and economic benefit evaluations for railway data product users such as government agencies and regulatory units, transportation service providers, and academic research institutions. This is of great significance for improving the efficiency and service level of railway transportation and promoting the development of the railway industry.
[0003] At present, the existing data product pricing methods include cost method, income method and computer algorithm based on data. The cost method is to evaluate the cost of forming data products, calculate the replacement cost of data products, and deduct various depreciation factors to value them. Railway data products involve many types of business, complex application scenarios, and diverse data formats. Their value is related to the quality, content, reproducibility and operability of data, rather than simple visible costs. Therefore, the use of cost method to value railway data products often cannot reflect value factors such as data accuracy. The income method is to value by estimating the income brought by data products, but in railway data products, their value may be reflected in many aspects, including operational efficiency, customer service, safety management, business decision-making, etc. Computer algorithms based on deep learning, machine learning, etc. need to be trained and analyzed through a large amount of data. A large amount of data analysis leads to increased complexity of data transactions and lacks simplicity and flexibility. Wang Jinchao et al. (2023) discussed the limitations of traditional market methods and cost methods for data transaction pricing. Jiang et al. (2023) constructed an outsourced data classification platform model for data classification service transactions, and determined the transaction price through an online pricing mechanism to dynamically learn the buyer's valuation of data. However, the above scheme does not take into account the attribute characteristics of the specific field of railways. The data products under the circulation of railway data elements have data characteristics such as multi-factor influence, cross-professional and multi-dimensional data. The existing methods have high uncertainty in their applicability to railway data transaction scenarios and cannot be quickly evaluated. Summary of the invention
[0004] The present invention provides a railway data product pricing model based on game theory to overcome the problems of inapplicability of existing data pricing evaluation methods in the railway industry and inaccurate data pricing models.
[0005] According to one aspect of the present invention, a railway data product pricing model based on game theory is provided, comprising: The data owner constructs a data cost function including fixed costs and transaction costs of railway data products according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and constructs the personal expected profit function of the data owner according to the market sales price of the railway data products, the railway data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; The data buyer evaluates the data quality of the railway data product based on the completeness, accuracy and scalability factors of the railway data product; and constructs the personal expected profit function of the data buyer based on the data quality and expected income of the railway data product; The data buyer determines the purchasing strategy of the railway data product based on the pricing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected benefit function; the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing his / her personal expected benefit and the railway data product based on the purchasing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected benefit function.
[0006] In an optional manner, the calculation formula of the railway data cost function is: in, Fixed costs for railway data products; is the transaction cost of railway data products, ; , , are the fitting parameters related to the transaction costs of railway data products; , is the k types of data integrity of railway data products; , is the data accuracy of the railway data products, , which is the data scalability of railway data products.
[0007] In an optional manner, the calculation formula of the personal expected benefit function of the data owner is: in, is the market selling price of railway data products; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer.
[0008] In an optional manner, the market sales price of the railway data product is less than or equal to the maximum market sales price of the railway data product guided by the government department; The personal expected benefit function of the data owner is expressed as: Constrained by in, It is the highest market price of railway data products guided by relevant government departments.
[0009] In an optional manner, the calculation formula for the data quality of the railway data product is: in, , , , are fitting parameters related to the quality of railway data; , is the k types of data integrity of railway data products; , is the data accuracy of the railway data products, , which is the data scalability of railway data products.
[0010] In an optional manner, the calculation formula of the personal expected return function of the data buyer is: in, Data quality for railway data products; Buy for data buyers Expected revenue generated by railway data products, is the collection of data buyers, , Represents the number of data buyers in the market; ; is the fitting parameter of the expected income of the railway data product; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer; It is the market selling price of railway data products.
[0011] In an optional manner, the data buyer determines the purchase strategy of the railway data product according to the pricing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected return function, further comprising: Given the market selling price of railway data products , data buyers Maximize personal gains by determining their optimal purchasing strategy; Calculate the expected return of individual data buyers to the number of railway data products purchased The first and second derivatives of : By solving Get the optimal purchasing strategy for data buyers: in, .
[0012] In an optional manner, the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing personal expected benefits and railway data products based on the purchase strategy of the railway data products and the personal expected benefit function, further comprising: The data owner uses the data buyer's optimal purchasing strategy , give a pricing strategy to maximize personal benefits, and update the personal expected benefit function of the data owner according to the buyer's optimal purchasing strategy: Calculate the first-order and second-order derivatives of the data owner's personal expected return on the market pricing of railway data products respectively: By solving The optimal pricing strategy is obtained, that is, the optimal pricing of railway data products is: .
[0013] According to another aspect of the present invention, a railway data product pricing system based on the expected benefit balance between two parties in the game is provided, comprising: The data owner's income module is used for the data owner to construct a data cost function including fixed costs and transaction costs of railway data products according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and to construct the data owner's personal expected income function according to the market sales price of the railway data product, the railway data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; The data buyer's income module is used for data buyers to evaluate the data quality of railway data products based on the completeness, accuracy and scalability factors of railway data products; and to construct the personal expected income function of data buyers based on the data quality and expected income of the railway data products; The game and pricing module is used for data buyers to determine the purchasing strategy of railway data products based on the pricing strategy of railway data products and their personal expected benefit function; data owners to determine their optimal pricing strategy for maximizing their personal expected benefits and railway data products based on the purchasing strategy of railway data products and their personal expected benefit function.
[0014] According to yet another aspect of the present invention, there is provided a computer program product, comprising at least one executable instruction, wherein the executable instruction enables the processor to execute operations corresponding to the above-mentioned game-based railway data product pricing model.
[0015] According to the scheme provided by the present invention, the data owner constructs a data cost function including fixed costs and transaction costs of railway data products according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and constructs a personal expected profit function of the data owner according to the market sales price of the railway data products, the railway data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; the data buyer evaluates the data quality of the railway data products according to the integrity, accuracy and scalability factors of the railway data products; constructs a personal expected profit function of the data buyer according to the data quality and expected income of the railway data products; the data buyer determines the purchase strategy of the railway data products according to the pricing strategy of the railway data products and its personal expected profit function; the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing its personal expected profit and the railway data products according to the purchase strategy of the railway data products and its personal expected profit function.
[0016] The present invention solves the pricing problem of railway data products, provides a more accurate and concise solution for the circulation of railway industry data and product value assessment, and avoids the problem of low accuracy of existing data product pricing methods due to different industry attributes. Combined with the characteristics of railway industry data, the problem of difficult identification and characterization of railway data pricing elements is considered, as well as the integrity and accuracy of railway data, low interference, low coupling and refined railway data pricing influencing factors are considered, providing accurate dimensional expression and effective support for railway data product pricing assessment. In the construction of the data buyer's data expected income function, the function is not directly constructed, but the characteristics of data reproducibility and flexibility are taken into account. It is believed that the value of railway data products does not increase linearly or exponentially with the increase in the amount of purchased data, but with the increase in the amount of purchased data, the value of a single railway data product gradually decreases. The optimal pricing strategy for railway data products is verified and derived from the mathematical theory level, and the optimal purchasing strategy corresponding to the data buyer after the data owner performs market pricing on the railway data product is simultaneously given, ensuring the effectiveness and accuracy of data transactions.
[0017] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of the present invention. In order to more clearly understand the technical means of the present invention, it can be implemented according to the contents of the specification. In order to make the above and other purposes, features and advantages of the present invention more obvious and easy to understand, the specific implementation methods of the present invention are listed below. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0018] Various other advantages and benefits will become apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art by reading the detailed description of the preferred embodiments below. The accompanying drawings are only for the purpose of illustrating the preferred embodiments and are not to be considered as limiting the present invention. Moreover, the same reference symbols are used throughout the accompanying drawings to represent the same components. In the accompanying drawings: Figure 1 A schematic diagram showing a process flow of a railway data product pricing model based on game theory according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 A schematic diagram of a railway data product pricing method process according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of the pricing game process of railway data products according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown; Figure 4 A flow chart of a railway data product pricing method according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown; Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the framework of a railway data product system based on game theory according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0019] The exemplary embodiments of the present invention will be described in more detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Although the exemplary embodiments of the present invention are shown in the accompanying drawings, it should be understood that the present invention can be implemented in various forms and should not be limited by the embodiments set forth herein. On the contrary, these embodiments are provided in order to enable a more thorough understanding of the present invention and to enable the scope of the present invention to be fully communicated to those skilled in the art.
[0020] With the development of informatization and the rise of the digital economy, the assetization of data has also attracted much attention. In the process of data participating in economic activities as a production factor, data pricing is an indispensable link in the data factor market. In the railway transportation industry, the accumulation and application of various data have become an important driving force for the development of the industry. These data cover aspects such as train operation, passenger flow statistics, and freight transportation information, and contain rich information and value, which are of great reference and decision-making significance.
[0021] Railway data relies on passenger and freight, dispatching, infrastructure (power supply), mobile equipment (mobile passenger and freight), engineering construction (line, bridge, tunnel and rail) and other business systems, which have problems such as high cycle cumulative cost, significant differences in professional connotations, and complex professional interfaces, which make it difficult to identify and characterize the factors that affect railway data pricing. As one of the core products of the railway transportation industry, the pricing of railway data is directly related to the value realization and utilization efficiency of data. There are many influencing factors in the pricing of railway data products from the perspective of data element circulation. Establishing pricing issues that meet the characteristics of railway data products from the perspective of data value can not only stimulate the vitality of data application and improve railway transportation efficiency and service level, but also provide reasonable price references and economic benefit evaluation of data use for railway data product users such as government agencies and regulatory units, transportation service providers, and academic research institutions, effectively promoting the sustainable development of the railway industry. Therefore, in-depth discussion of the methods and mechanisms for pricing railway data products can maximize the role of railway data in transportation management and service improvement, and promote the sustainable development of the railway transportation industry.
[0022] Existing research on railway data product pricing is mainly based on management and computer science, and applies theories such as cost method, income method, and data-based computer algorithm to the railway data product pricing model. Although these models can provide a reference for railway data product pricing, they do not have personalized advantages, and the data product pricing methods of other industries cannot accurately evaluate railway data products. Regarding the pricing research of railway data products, most domestic and foreign scholars have conducted macro-level analysis, and have not accurately and objectively given the potential influencing factors of the value of railway data products. The present invention studies a generation model and method of a railway data product pricing model, which can accurately evaluate the pricing of railway data products and better play the role of railway data elements.
[0023] Figure 1 FIG. 1 is a flow chart of a railway data product pricing model based on game theory according to an embodiment of the present invention. Specifically, Figures 1 to 4 As shown, the following steps are included: Step S101, the data owner constructs a data cost function including fixed costs and transaction costs of railway data products according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and constructs the data owner's personal expected profit function according to the market sales price of the railway data products, the data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer.
[0024] The data owner collects, stores, and transmits data to build a railway data cost function. Consider a market with a single data owner and multiple data buyers, and define the only data owner in the market. The data owner has the right to sell the railway data products. The data owner will incur fixed costs and transaction costs in the process of data collection, storage, update, and transmission. The data owner identifies potential factors affecting the pricing of railway data products from the perspectives of data application, professional connotation, and real-time performance, covering the integrity, accuracy, and scalability of the data. The integrity of railway data products is defined as , data owners provide railway data products The accuracy of railway data products is defined as , data owners provide railway data products The scalability of railway data products is defined as ,The transaction cost of railway data products is affected by completeness, accuracy and scalability, so the transaction cost calculation formula of railway data products is: in, , , is the cost ratio parameter of data integrity, accuracy and scalability in the transaction cost of railway data products, w, s, l is any value of W, S, and L mentioned above.
[0025] The data cost of the data owner consists of the fixed cost of railway data products and transaction costs. The cost function can be constructed as follows: in, represents the fixed cost of railway data products, Represents the transaction cost of railway data products.
[0026] The data owner has the pricing power for railway data products and sets the market price of railway data products as , data buyers decide the quantity of railway data products to be purchased based on the data market price and their expected income. The set of data buyers is defined as , , represents the number of data buyers in the market, Indicates Data buyers, Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer, According to the market pricing of railway data products, the cost of railway data products and the number of railway data products purchased by data buyers, the personal expected profit function of the data owner can be constructed. The specific calculation formula is as follows: in, is the market selling price of railway data products; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer.
[0027] As a leader, the data owner independently sets the market price of railway data products, with the goal of maximizing personal benefits. The mathematical programming model can be expressed as follows: Constrained by ; in, It is the highest market price of railway data products guided by relevant government departments.
[0028] Step S102: The data buyer evaluates the data quality of the railway data product based on the completeness, accuracy and scalability factors of the railway data product; and constructs the personal expected profit function of the data buyer based on the data quality and expected income of the railway data product.
[0029] The integrity, accuracy, and scalability of railway data have a certain impact on data quality. The higher the integrity, accuracy, and scalability of the data, the better the data quality. The specific calculation formula for data quality is as follows: in, , , The parameters affecting data quality are data integrity, accuracy, and scalability. These are potential factors affecting the data quality in the railway industry.
[0030] The market price of a given railway data product , data buyers act as followers and decide the quantity of railway data products to be purchased. The expected personal benefit is related to the expected income and the cost of purchasing data. The specific calculation formula is as follows: in, Data quality for railway data products; Buy for data buyers Expected revenue generated by railway data products, is the collection of data buyers, , Represents the number of data buyers in the market; ; is the fitting parameter of the expected income of the railway data product; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer; It is the market selling price of railway data products.
[0031] Data Buyers The goal is to maximize personal benefits, and its mathematical programming model can be expressed as follows: st .
[0032] Step S103, the data buyer determines the purchasing strategy of the railway data product according to the pricing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected benefit function; the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing his / her personal expected benefit and the railway data product according to the purchasing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected benefit function.
[0033] The mathematical programming models of data owners and data buyers together constitute the Stackelberg game pricing problem. The reverse induction method can be used to solve the model results to determine the final data pricing. The goal of this problem is to find the Stackelberg game equilibrium. When this equilibrium is reached, the game strategy combination between the data owner and the buyer can maximize the benefits of the data owner under the prior decision, and the data buyer can also achieve the optimal reflection decision.
[0034] This problem can be divided into a series of sub-games between the data owner and each data buyer. The data owner needs to set the market sales price of the railway data product according to market conditions. For the data owner, the data owner and each data buyer conduct sub-games independently. Therefore, the pricing problem can be solved by deriving the equilibrium of each sub-game.
[0035] Purchasing strategy of data buyers: Given the market sales price of railway data products, data buyers maximize their personal benefits by determining their optimal purchasing strategy.
[0036] Calculate the expected return of individual data buyers to the number of railway data products purchased The first and second derivatives of are as follows: These derivatives show that is a strictly concave function, by solving Get the optimal purchasing strategy for data buyers: in, = .
[0037] Data owner’s pricing strategy: Based on the optimal purchasing strategy of data buyers, data owners give their pricing strategies to maximize their personal benefits. Substitution , the personal expected profit function of the data owner can be updated as: Calculate the expected returns of individual data owners and the market pricing of railway data products The first and second derivatives of : therefore, about is strictly concave, by solving The optimal pricing strategy is obtained, that is, the optimal pricing of railway data products is: .
[0038] In this embodiment, a pricing method is studied for railway data products in a specific railway field, which have the industry attributes of railway data products. A game pricing model for a single data owner and multiple data buyers is constructed. Taking into account the integrity, accuracy and scalability of the data, a comprehensive and detailed accurate evaluation of the pricing of railway data products is carried out. The interaction of multiple parties in the market is explained from a mathematical theoretical level, and the strategy for data owners to optimally price railway data is given. Taking into account the reproducibility of the data itself and the circulation attributes of the data market, the expected income function of data buyers for purchasing railway data products is constructed.
[0039] This embodiment verifies the effectiveness of the proposed method through experimental simulation analysis. Considering the situation where there is a single data owner and multiple data buyers in the market, it should be noted that each data buyer may have different requirements for data quality, so the railway data products purchased will also be different. In this embodiment, the number of data buyers is set to 5, so the data owner needs to sell 5 railway data products, and the values of each parameter are shown in Table 1.
[0040] Table 1 Parameter values This example uses Matlab to randomly generate five data buyers' values for data integrity, accuracy, and scalability. The specific values are as follows: Table 2 Data buyer parameter values Step A: Calculate the railway data cost for the data owner The transaction cost of railway data products is affected by completeness, accuracy and scalability. Therefore, the transaction cost calculation formula of railway data products is: The railway data cost of the data owner consists of the fixed cost of railway data products and transaction costs. The cost function can be constructed as follows: According to the above calculation formula, the value parameters in Table 1 and Table 2, the transaction cost of railway data products for different data buyers is calculated as follows: Table 3 Railway data product transaction costs for data buyers The railway data costs for data owners are shown in the following table: Table 4 Railway data costs for data owners Step B: Construct the expected return function of the data owner The data owner has the pricing power for different railway data products and sets the market sales price vector of railway data products as . Define the number of data buyers as 5, that is , Indicates Data buyers, Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by a data buyer. According to the market pricing of railway data products, the cost of railway data products and the number of railway data products purchased by data buyers, the personal expected profit function of the data owner can be constructed. The specific calculation formula is as follows: As a leader, the data owner independently sets the market price of railway data products, with the goal of maximizing personal benefits. The mathematical programming model can be expressed as follows: Constrained by The data cost The value range of is shown in Table 4. The value is 4.
[0041] Step C: Data buyers construct data expected income function based on data quality, data accuracy, etc. The integrity, accuracy, and scalability of railway data have a certain impact on data quality. The higher the integrity, accuracy, and scalability of the data, the better the data quality. The specific calculation formula for data quality is as follows: According to the above formula, the parameter values in Table 1 and Table 2, the calculated data quality is shown in the following table: Table 5 Data quality calculation results Each time a data buyer purchases a railway data product, the railway data product generates an expected income. As more railway data products are purchased, the overall expected income of the data buyer increases. The expected revenue generated by the railway data products is as follows: Combined with the parameter values in Table 1, the above formula can be updated as follows: Step D: Data buyers construct their own expected return function The market price of a given railway data product , data buyers act as followers and decide the quantity of railway data products to be purchased. The expected personal benefit is related to the expected income and the cost of purchasing data. The specific calculation formula is as follows: Among them, data quality Please refer to Table 5 for the value of .
[0042] Data Buyers The goal is to maximize personal benefits, and its mathematical programming model can be expressed as follows: Constrained by Step E: Apply the reverse induction method to solve the model results and determine the final pricing of the railway data product.
[0043] The mathematical programming models of data owners and data buyers together constitute the Stackelberg game pricing problem. The goal of this problem is to find the Stackelberg game equilibrium. When this equilibrium is reached, the combination of game strategies between data owners and buyers can maximize the benefits of data owners under prior decision-making, and at the same time, data buyers can also achieve the optimal reflection decision.
[0044] This problem can be divided into a series of sub-games between the data owner and each data buyer. The data owner needs to set the market sales price of the railway data product according to market conditions. For the data owner, the data owner and each data buyer conduct sub-games independently. Therefore, the pricing problem can be solved by deriving the equilibrium of each sub-game.
[0045] Purchasing strategy of data buyers: Selling price in the market of given railway data products , data buyers By determining its optimal purchasing strategy To maximize personal benefits.
[0046] Calculate the expected return of individual data buyers to the number of railway data products purchased The first and second derivatives of are as follows: These derivatives show that is a strictly concave function, by solving The optimal purchasing strategy for the data owner can be obtained as follows: Data owner’s pricing strategy: Based on the optimal purchasing strategy of data buyers, data owners give their pricing strategies to maximize their personal benefits. Substitution , the personal expected profit function of the data owner can be updated as: Calculate the expected returns of individual data owners and the market pricing of railway data products The first and second derivatives of are as follows: therefore, about is strictly concave, by solving , we can get the optimal pricing strategy. The optimal pricing of railway data products is as follows: According to the above calculation formula and Table 5 The values of The values of The optimal pricing of railway data products for data buyers is obtained by taking the values of , as shown in the following table.
[0047] Table 6 Pricing results In order to further verify the effectiveness of the method proposed in the present invention, considering the situation where there is a single data owner and a single data buyer in the market, the number of data buyers in this embodiment is set to 1, and the data owner sells one railway data product. The values of various parameters are shown in Table 7.
[0048] Table 7 Parameter values According to the parameter values in Table 7, the requirements of a single data purchaser for the integrity, accuracy, and scalability of the railway data product are 0.8, 0.9, and 0.2, respectively. Applying the above-mentioned inventive method to calculate and solve the model, the optimal pricing of the railway data product is 31,800 yuan.
[0049] The above embodiments of the present invention respectively calculate the optimal pricing strategy for the corresponding railway data products for the cases where the number of data buyers is 5 and 1. These two embodiments effectively prove the correctness and practicality of the proposed invention method. It should be noted that each data buyer may have different requirements for data quality, so the purchased railway data products will also be different. Therefore, for the five different data buyers in the embodiment, the five optimal prices calculated are also different, corresponding to the railway data products required by each buyer. The method of the present invention has multiple factors that affect the pricing of railway data products that are not considered in the existing methods, including data integrity, accuracy, scalability, and data quality. For example, the cost method is a unilateral valuation of railway data products based on the visible cost of the data, which is not comprehensive and accurate compared to the method of the present invention.
[0050] According to the scheme provided by the present invention, the data owner constructs a data cost function including the fixed cost and transaction cost of the railway data product according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and, constructs the personal expected benefit function of the data owner according to the market sales price of the railway data product, the data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; the data buyer evaluates the data quality of the railway data product according to the integrity, accuracy and scalability factors of the railway data product; constructs the personal expected benefit function of the data buyer according to the data quality and expected income of the railway data product; the data buyer determines the purchase strategy of the railway data product according to the pricing strategy of the railway data product and its personal expected benefit function; the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing personal expected benefits and the railway data product according to the purchase strategy of the railway data product and its personal expected benefit function. The present invention solves the pricing problem of railway data products, provides a more accurate and concise solution for the circulation and asset value evaluation of railway industry data, and avoids the problem of low accuracy of the existing data product pricing method due to different industry attributes. Combined with the characteristics of railway industry data, the difficulty in identifying and characterizing railway data pricing elements is taken into account, as well as the factors affecting railway data integrity and accuracy, low interference, low coupling, and refined railway relationship data pricing, providing accurate dimensional expression and effective support for railway data product pricing evaluation. In the construction of the data buyer's expected data income function, the function is not directly constructed, but the characteristics of data reproducibility and flexibility are taken into account. It is believed that the value of railway data products does not increase linearly or exponentially with the increase in the amount of purchased data, but with the increase in the amount of purchased data, the value of a single railway data product gradually decreases. The optimal pricing strategy for railway data products is verified and derived from the mathematical theory level, and the optimal purchasing strategy corresponding to the data buyer after the data owner has market-priced the railway data product is given, ensuring the effectiveness and accuracy of data transactions.
[0051] Figure 5 The schematic diagram of the railway data product pricing model based on the expected benefit balance of both parties in the game is shown in the embodiment of the present invention. The railway data product pricing model based on the expected benefit balance of both parties in the game includes: a data owner benefit module 510, a data buyer benefit module 520 and a game and pricing module 530.
[0052] The data owner benefit module 510 is used for the data owner to construct a data cost function including fixed costs and transaction costs of railway data products according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and to construct a personal expected benefit function of the data owner according to the market sales price of the railway data products, the data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; The data buyer's profit module 520 is used for the data buyer to evaluate the data quality of the railway data product according to the completeness, accuracy and scalability factors of the railway data product; and to construct the personal expected profit function of the data buyer according to the data quality and expected income of the railway data product; The game and pricing module 530 is used for data buyers to determine the purchasing strategy of railway data products based on the pricing strategy of railway data products and their personal expected benefit function; data owners to determine their optimal pricing strategy for maximizing their personal expected benefits and railway data products based on the purchasing strategy of railway data products and their personal expected benefit function.
[0053] In an optional manner, the calculation formula of the data cost function is: in, Fixed costs for railway data products; is the transaction cost of railway data products, ; , , are the fitting parameters related to the transaction costs of railway data products; , is the k types of data integrity of railway data products; , is the data accuracy of the railway data products, , which is the data scalability of railway data products.
[0054] In an optional manner, the calculation formula of the data owner's personal expected benefit function is: in, is the market selling price of railway data products; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer.
[0055] In an optional manner, the market sales price of the railway data product is less than or equal to the maximum market sales price of the railway data product guided by the government department; The personal expected benefit function of the data owner is expressed as: Constrained by in, It is the highest market price of railway data products guided by relevant government departments.
[0056] In an optional manner, the calculation formula for the data quality of the railway data product is: in, , , , is the fitting parameter related to data quality; , is the k types of data integrity of railway data products; , is the data accuracy of the railway data products, , which is the data scalability of railway data products.
[0057] In an optional manner, the calculation formula of the personal expected return function of the data buyer is: in, Data quality for railway data products; Buy for data buyers Expected revenue generated by railway data products, is the collection of data buyers, , Represents the number of data buyers in the market; ; is the fitting parameter of the expected income of the railway data product; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer; It is the market selling price of railway data products.
[0058] In an optional manner, the data buyer determines the purchasing strategy of the railway data product according to the pricing strategy of the railway data product and the personal expected return function, further comprising: Given the market selling price of railway data products , data buyers Maximize personal gains by determining their optimal purchasing strategy; Calculate the expected return of individual data buyers to the number of railway data products purchased The first and second derivatives of : By solving Get the optimal purchasing strategy for data buyers: in, = .
[0059] In an optional manner, the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing personal expected benefits and railway data products based on the purchase strategy of the railway data products and the personal expected benefit function, further comprising: The data owner uses the data buyer's optimal purchasing strategy , give a pricing strategy to maximize personal benefits, and update the personal expected benefit function of the data owner according to the buyer's optimal purchasing strategy: Calculate the first-order and second-order derivatives of the data owner's personal expected return on the market pricing of railway data products respectively: By solving The optimal pricing strategy is obtained, that is, the optimal pricing of railway data products is: .
[0060] According to the scheme provided by the present invention, the data owner constructs a data cost function including the fixed cost and transaction cost of the railway data product according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and, constructs the personal expected benefit function of the data owner according to the market sales price of the railway data product, the data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; the data buyer evaluates the data quality of the railway data product according to the integrity, accuracy and scalability factors of the railway data product; constructs the personal expected benefit function of the data buyer according to the data quality and expected income of the railway data product; the data buyer determines the purchase strategy of the railway data product according to the pricing strategy of the railway data product and its personal expected benefit function; the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing personal expected benefits and the railway data product according to the purchase strategy of the railway data product and its personal expected benefit function. The present invention solves the pricing problem of railway data products, provides a more accurate and concise solution for the circulation of railway industry data and product value evaluation, and avoids the problem of low accuracy of existing data product pricing methods due to different industry attributes. Combined with the characteristics of railway industry data, the difficulty in identifying and characterizing railway data pricing elements is taken into account, as well as the factors affecting railway data integrity and accuracy, low interference, low coupling, and refined railway relationship data pricing, providing accurate dimensional expression and effective support for railway data product pricing evaluation. In the construction of the data buyer's expected data income function, the function is not directly constructed, but the characteristics of data reproducibility and flexibility are taken into account. It is believed that the value of railway data products does not increase linearly or exponentially with the increase in the amount of purchased data, but with the increase in the amount of purchased data, the value of a single railway data product gradually decreases. The optimal pricing strategy for railway data products is verified and derived from the mathematical theory level, and the optimal purchasing strategy corresponding to the data buyer after the data owner has market-priced the railway data product is given, ensuring the effectiveness and accuracy of data transactions.
[0061] It will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that the modules in the devices in the embodiments may be adaptively changed and arranged in one or more devices different from the embodiments. The modules or units or components in the embodiments may be combined into one module or unit or component, and further may be divided into a plurality of submodules or subunits or subcomponents. All features disclosed in this specification (including the accompanying claims, abstracts and drawings) and all processes or units of any method or device disclosed in this manner may be combined in any combination, except that at least some of such features and / or processes or units are mutually exclusive. Unless otherwise expressly stated, each feature disclosed in this specification (including the accompanying claims, abstracts and drawings) may be replaced by an alternative feature providing the same, equivalent or similar purpose. In addition, it will be appreciated by those skilled in the art that, although some embodiments herein include certain features included in other embodiments but not other features, the combination of features of different embodiments is meant to be within the scope of the present invention and to form different embodiments. For example, in the claims below, any one of the claimed embodiments may be used in any combination. The present invention may be implemented by means of hardware including several different elements and by means of a suitably programmed computer. In a unit claim that lists several means, several of these means may be embodied by the same hardware item. The steps in the above embodiments should not be understood as limiting the execution order unless otherwise specified.
Claims
1. A pricing model for railway data products based on game theory, It is characterized in that include: The data owner constructs a data cost function that includes the fixed cost and transaction cost of railway data products based on the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and, constructing a personal expected profit function of the data owner according to the market sales price of the railway data product, the data cost function and the quantity of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; The data buyer evaluates the data quality of the railway data product based on the completeness, accuracy and scalability factors of the railway data product; and constructs the personal expected profit function of the data buyer based on the data quality and expected income of the railway data product; The data buyer determines the purchasing strategy of the railway data product based on the pricing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected benefit function; the data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing his / her personal expected benefit and the railway data product based on the purchasing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected benefit function.
2. The game-based railway data product pricing model according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The calculation formula of the data cost function is: in, Fixed costs for railway data products; is the transaction cost of railway data products, ; , , are the fitting parameters related to the transaction costs of railway data products; , is the k types of data integrity of railway data products; , is the data accuracy of the railway data products, , which is the data scalability of railway data products.
3. The game-based railway data product pricing model according to claim 2, It is characterized in that The calculation formula of the personal expected return function of the data owner is: in, is the market selling price of railway data products; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer.
4. The game-based railway data product pricing model according to claim 3, It is characterized in that The market sales price of the railway data product is less than or equal to the highest market sales price of railway data products guided by government departments; The personal expected benefit function of the data owner is expressed as: Constrained by in, It is the highest market price of railway data products guided by relevant government departments.
5. The game-based railway data product pricing model according to claim 1, It is characterized in that The calculation formula for the data quality of the railway data product is: in, , , , is the fitting parameter related to data quality; , is the k types of data integrity of railway data products; , is the data accuracy of the railway data products, , which is the data scalability of railway data products.
6. The game-based railway data product pricing model according to claim 4, It is characterized in that The calculation formula of the personal expected return function of the data buyer is: in, Data quality for railway data products; Buy for data buyers Expected revenue generated by railway data products, is the collection of data buyers, , Represents the number of data buyers in the market; ; is the fitting parameter of the expected income of the railway data product; Indicates The number of railway data products purchased by each data buyer; It is the market selling price of railway data products.
7. The game-based railway data product pricing model according to claim 6, It is characterized in that The data buyer determines the purchasing strategy of the railway data product according to the pricing strategy of the railway data product and his / her personal expected return function, further comprising: Given the market selling price of railway data products , data buyers Maximize personal gains by determining their optimal purchasing strategy; Calculate the expected return of individual data buyers to the number of railway data products purchased The first and second derivatives of : By solving Get the optimal purchasing strategy for data buyers: in, = .
8. The game-based railway data product pricing model according to claim 7, It is characterized in that The data owner determines the optimal pricing strategy for maximizing personal expected benefits and railway data products based on the purchase strategy of the railway data products and the personal expected benefit function, further comprising: The data owner uses the data buyer's optimal purchasing strategy , give a pricing strategy to maximize personal benefits, and update the personal expected benefit function of the data owner according to the buyer's optimal purchasing strategy: Calculate the first-order and second-order derivatives of the data owner's personal expected return on the market pricing of railway data products respectively: By solving The optimal pricing strategy is obtained, that is, the optimal pricing of railway data products is: 。 9. A game-based pricing system for railway data products. It is characterized in that Implementing the railway data product pricing model based on game theory as described in any one of claims 1 to 8, comprising: The data owner's income module is used for the data owner to construct a data cost function including fixed costs and transaction costs of railway data products according to the railway data collection, storage and transmission process; and to construct the data owner's personal expected income function according to the market sales price of the railway data products, the data cost function and the number of railway data products purchased by the data buyer; The data buyer's income module is used for data buyers to evaluate the data quality of railway data products based on the completeness, accuracy and scalability factors of railway data products; and to construct the personal expected income function of data buyers based on the data quality and expected income of the railway data products; The game and pricing module is used for data buyers to determine the purchasing strategy of railway data products based on the pricing strategy of railway data products and their personal expected benefit function; data owners to determine their optimal pricing strategy for maximizing their personal expected benefits and railway data products based on the purchasing strategy of railway data products and their personal expected benefit function.
10. A computer program product, comprising at least one executable instruction, wherein the executable instruction enables a processor to execute operations corresponding to the game-based railway data product pricing model according to any one of claims 1 to 8.
