Encryption system and method

By introducing shadow computers and invisible computers in IoT, using whitelists and authentication technologies to isolate encryption algorithms and keys, the security risks of existing encryption technologies in the face of artificial intelligence and quantum computing attacks are solved, and the data of IoT devices is realized Dynamic and at rest encryption protection ensures the security of data during transmission and storage.

CN118923082APending Publication Date: 2024-11-08保罗·韦斯特迈耶 +4
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202380022032.9
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Priority Date
2022-12-20
Filing Date
2023-02-15
Publication Date
2024-11-08

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing encryption technologies are difficult to effectively protect data when facing attacks from artificial intelligence and quantum computing, and the encryption keys of IoT devices are easily stolen, resulting in data being decrypted by unexpected users during transmission and storage, posing security risks.

Method used

Design an amplified protection and encryption system (APES) to isolate computers by introducing shadow computers (SCs) and stealth computers (ICs) into IoT, using whitelisting and authentication technologies to ensure that encryption algorithms and keys are only affected by Limited access to SCs, and define access rules on inaccessible ICs to prevent non-APES connections, and implement dynamic data encryption and data at rest protection.

Benefits of technology

Effectively prevents unintended users from decrypting data in Internet transmission systems, enhances the security of data during transmission and storage, and provides powerful encryption protection even in the face of quantum computing attacks, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the data. sex.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The augmentation provides a network of computers operating on connection channels including the Internet and within the intranet, specifically designed to host data and code without detection, and share encrypted messages, including messages embedded with encryption algorithms and keys, without worrying that transmissions are publicly intercepted. The user can generate new algorithms and keys at any time without worrying about detection or interception. Amplification includes computers in design, referred to as "shadow computers" known to access only from "whitelisted" companions paired with other authentication techniques.
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Description

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0002] This application is based upon and claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 311,023 filed on February 16, 2022 and U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 433,854 filed on December 20, 2022, which are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety. Technical Field

[0003] The present invention relates to systems and methods designed to protect encryption algorithms and associated keys and user data protected by these algorithms and keys. The systems and methods are also designed to provide augmentation or enhanced encryption when needed. The unique data encryption of dynamic data between nodes of the augmented protection and encryption system (APES) prevents data from being decrypted if collected from the Internet transmission system by unintended users, and the encrypted static data (DAR) within the node memory of the APES system is protected because some APES computers are inaccessible.

[0004] The Amplified Protection and Encryption System (APES) creates a network of computers operating on the Internet and within intranets, specifically designed to host data and code without detection, and to share encrypted messages, including messages embedded with encryption algorithms and keys, without fear of transmissions being openly intercepted. APES includes computers within the Internet of Things (IoT), called "Shadow Computers (SCs)" that are known but inaccessible except to fellow SCs defined by APES, with restrictions controlled by APES' "Invisible Computers" (ICs) creating companions for the SCs. These ICs are defined as "second devices" in U.S. Patent 10,419,131. The SCs are not "first devices" for purposes of U.S. Patent 10,419,131. APES' "Known Computers" (KCs) are first devices for purposes of U.S. Patent 10,419,131. The SCs' companions, pairs, or clusters are isolated between the APES's ICs, with access restrictions applied.

[0005] The IC creates accessibility restrictions for the SC from the IoT, creating an environment for deploying novel encryption / decryption capabilities. Peers ensure that their messages are controlled at the sender and receiver ends of the communication and are considered uncontrolled within the rest of the IoT domain, including the APES KC and all connections between the APES KC and the Internet Service Provider (ISP). Encryption and decryption are done inside the SC.

[0006] Supercomputers and quantum computers with artificial intelligence (AI) will be denied the constant connections typically associated with cyclical encryption using specific algorithms and keys, effectively denying malicious access and data collection that could enable decoding or learning.

[0007] Enables user-defined specific encryption algorithms or keys, the APES's SC hosts the algorithms and keys. The APES device is capable of hosting many discrete encryption policies or processes, and users can also define their private algorithms and / or keys (new algorithms and keys). Creative people can use existing schemes to generate single or multi-dimensional algorithms and keys, thereby adjusting existing schemes, combining new and old schemes, including one-off techniques (mostly ignored as too cumbersome, but enabled by database tools to create unique / personalized encryption policies and processes). The APES host of encryption tools, especially large database structures, is almost unlimited because the memory and processing power of computers have grown dramatically in the past few decades. The APES's SC can perform this as a single main function, i.e., encryption / decryption, and can be dedicated to only that set of operations, leaving all data operations related to files to other protected user systems, or the APES's SC can perform additional deep packet inspection. The APES's SC is a system of systems, so subcomponents of the APES's SC and IC can include additional IC protection for subcomponents such as media storage devices.

[0008] ISPs may provide additional independent security measures for files provided by APES. Legal requirements to remove ISP security measures (such as court orders) will not revoke APES' unique proprietary encryption. APES encryption occurs prior to contact with the ISP. Background Art

[0009] IoT has grown dramatically. Encryption has been touted as a means of protecting data. But encryption keys are being stolen. Compromising encryption / decryption algorithms is another concern; if a computer can be hacked, then all associated processing can be altered or controlled by a nefarious actor or organization. Stolen keys allow attackers to decrypt messages, and algorithm changes can potentially be used to deny users any encryption or decryption options. Exacerbating these issues is the fact that quantum computing with artificial intelligence is potentially able to break current encryption through brute force or more elegant knowledge-, rule-, or artificial intelligence-based attacks. Increasing key size is a successful strategy to defeat the ever-increasing performance of conventional computing, but creative uses of quantum computing are expected to overwhelm any key size increase. In addition to key size increases, a new strategy is being studied to address the risks that quantum computing poses to cryptographic processing.

[0010] Many specialized computer functions have become targets for criminals. Before addressing the purpose of the computer's behavior, protecting those computers must become a priority. U.S. Patent 10,419,131 teaches computer isolation and protection, isolating some computers to avoid discovery by eliminating those addresses from an easily accessible directory of known used Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. These discoverable computers ("ICs" in this application) become data flow managers for discoverable but limited-access SCs.

[0011] The world needs a new way to protect data, whether it is transmitted and / or stored on private networks or on public networks and systems. Many data-centric activities under computer control need to be protected, especially when the data can then be detected and collected on public infrastructure; public storage ("cloud"), communications, and routing are obvious places where data can be collected maliciously without the sender / receiver's knowledge. Cloud service providers can host individual or multiple IC-protected SCs as peers for specific users, where the IC can be controlled from on-site or through off-site (remote) special communication connections. Summary of the invention

[0012] The present invention relates to an encryption / decryption system and method for protecting dynamic data (data in motion) between two or more computer systems; an amplified protection and encryption system (APES). The degree to which the computer's IP address is known and accessible in the IoT defines which category each APES computer belongs to, KC or SC or IC. Implementation at different locations within the IoT will allow security for all APES-protected traffic on the IoT. The encryption / decryption algorithms and keys reside in the SC. Protection of IoT access to known limited access computers (SC) is defined by rules residing in adjacent unknown undiscoverable computers (IC). The IC at each location provides decisions on whether to allow or not allow connectivity between known limited access computers (SC) in different APES and prohibit all non-APES connectivity. These adjacent computers are unknown to the Internet and cannot be accessed from any node on the Internet, making these inaccessible computers effectively invisible. Secure data appears when cryptographic processing, algorithms and encryption keys are applied to dynamic data, and the cryptographic processing, algorithms and encryption keys are hosted on known computers within the APES.

[0013] In another embodiment, an encryption system and method includes at least two devices in communication with an infrastructure of an IoT, not all computers within the at least two devices are accessible from the IoT, a first device having some components within the IoT, communicating via the IoT infrastructure with a second device having some components within the IoT. The first and second devices each have at least one internal computer that is known and inaccessible to the IoT, and are only accessible to each other (whitelisting and other authentication techniques). Additional devices have computer definitions that are only accessible (whitelisting and other authentication techniques), and the other computers are not visible to the IoT.

[0014] If data is stored using APES encryption, then data at rest (DAR) is protected on any APES-protected computer. APES encryption can also be different from SC encryption. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0015] Figure 1 A 3-module block diagram of the system of the present invention is shown.

[0016] Figure 2 A 5-module block diagram of the system of the present invention is shown.

[0017] Figure 3 A 7-module block diagram of the system of the present invention is shown.

[0018] Figure 4 Shown in more detail Figure 2 The 5-module block diagram.

[0019] Figure 5 Shown in more detail Figure 4 The 5-module block diagram. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0020] Dynamic encryption can be achieved by expanding U.S. Patent 10,419,131. The expansion creates more isolable discoverable modules by expanding the 3-module design to a larger number of modules, where each newly added discoverable module is bracketed by an undiscoverable module (a second device from U.S. Patent 10,419,131). A module can be a single computer or a group of computers. This is achieved by adding two modules (one undiscoverable module and one discoverable module) to any configuration (3 to 5 or 5 to 7, etc.) as the starting configuration. Whitelist, restricted connectivity isolates computers within (one or more) discoverable modules (these modules are bracketed by undiscoverable modules) and greatly expands the rate of replacement of algorithms and keys for encryption hosted on computers isolated by whitelists (and other authentication technologies). Compared to the 3-module design of U.S. Patent 10,419,131, new descriptors are required for designs using 5 or more modules. In previous designs using two devices, as defined in U.S. Patent 10,419,131, user computers were protected from hacker attacks using a restrictive list. APES adds new functionality; encryption / decryption of data at rest and data in motion, even when the data is outside the user's domain, such as residing within the IoT domain.

[0021] Three descriptors are used in this application. The descriptor for IoT accessible computers is KC (previously defined as "first device" in U.S. Patent 10,419,131). The descriptor for computers known to IoT but with limited access is SC. The descriptor for computers unknown to IoT is IC (defined as "second device" in U.S. Patent 10,419,131). SCs will pair with other SCs (also called peers).

[0022] The invisible computer (or computers) defines a specific communication controller module, thereby establishing the division of the modules. Figure 2 and Figure 3 Linear transport using bidirectional arrows between odd-numbered modules is shown. Even-numbered modules are also shown, with data flow control arrows reflecting their control over the bidirectional transport arrows. The even-numbered modules operate on limited data (the header of the packet). If the header data matches the allowed / authorized IP address and the header authorization technique, then access is granted. Granted access is achieved by even-numbered modules gating data between adjacent odd-numbered modules.

[0023] For example: an IoT data packet arrives at module 1, the header is read by the KC in module 1, and the header data is securely shared with the IC in module 2. If the IC in module 2 defines the header IP address as an unwanted IP address, then module 2 denies the data packet for transport to module 3, and all packets associated with that IP address are filtered out by module 1. Conversely, if the IC in module 2 determines that the header data is from another APES system, then module 2 approves the data packet for transport to module 3, and all packets associated with that header authentication are approved for transport from module 1 to module 3. The APES data packet is encrypted and the inspection tools in module 1 will not be able to decode anything in the packet data field. After the data packet inspection is completed in module 1 (which may be done beyond encryption testing), a flag is enabled and sent to module 2, and module 2 activates the data transfer from module 1 to module 3. These packets flow into module 3, specifically into the SC peer of the source SC, where decryption occurs and the unencrypted data is inspected, and assuming no malicious behavior is detected, the data flows deeper into the system. A third scenario is also possible, where Module 2 determines that the unencrypted header is from a system in the IoT and not from an unwanted IP address. Module 1 will use tools (including any decryption via any public / private key) to check for malicious intent. Module 2 determines that the data can be safely transported to Module 3, however, there are additional conditions to be met. The first condition is that Module 3 has a non-shadow computer that is compatible with the IoT address. If the Module 3 non-shadow computer is selected, then a Module 3 data packet evaluation will be conducted (similar to the Module 1 evaluation). Deep packet inspection and other tools of the Module 3 non-shadow computer will be used to ensure that there is no malicious intent. If the Module 3 non-shadow computer is not available, then the APES Module 1 will not receive a valid transport authorization from the IC of Module 2, and the data file will be filtered out by Module 1. There is another scenario where the hacker deceives Module 2 with a stolen shadow computer header, and after the inspection is completed at Module 1, the data is transported to Module 3, to the SC, where decryption will fail. Module 3 will filter out the data and these packets will never reach the user system.

[0024] The distinct properties of any intermediate module are defined; either the intermediate module is unique to APES, or the intermediate module includes at least one computer that is not a SC. Figure 5 In module 3 there is a single computer labeled "A" which is different from the other computers which are all SCs. Figure 5 The module 3 computer marked as "A" in the example is not SC, reflecting the version of the middle module with a non-SC computer, then regular IoT communication is possible. Figure 5 The "A" computer in Module 3 is the APES computer, with Figure 5If the rest of the SC in module 3 of , then only peer "A" is authorized to communicate with "A". Figure 5 Module 3 has only SC, then Figure 5 Will reflect APES-only devices.

[0025] Figure 5 Additional data communication between odd-numbered modules and even-numbered modules is shown. For data flowing into APES from the Internet, the data flow is located at Figure 5 The data line item 110 of the binding item 108 is used to transmit the non-packetized data from KC "1" to IC "2". If the packetized data is transferred from module 1 to module 3, then the non-packetized data is shared between the computer in module 3 and IC "4" using the data line in the binding item 108.

[0026] There are two versions of APES, defined by odd-numbered intermediate modules; one version of APES has only shadow computers, so data from non-SC / non-peer sources of IoT is blocked. The other version of APES has (one or more) non-shadow computers and can process IoT data originating from sources other than peers. Figure 3 Reflects a 7-module configuration. It is possible that modules 3 and 5 are intentionally configured to block all IoT communications, and it is also possible that only one of the odd-numbered middle modules (3 or 5) is configured to block IoT communications. In either case, IoT will be blocked.

[0027] The practical purpose of configuring 7 modules as incompatible IoT modules (module 3 is IoT capable and module 5 is not IoT capable) is to notify the APES intranet that someone is trying to infiltrate the APES intranet configuration.

[0028] The APES augmentation will allow users to securely access new cryptographic processes, algorithms, and keys over the Internet as companion computers communicate using one-time scripts (multiple keys and algorithms applied to a single message) with unknown keys applied to equally unknown algorithms. Users can change processes, algorithms, and keys at any time as needed, making them nearly (if not completely) impossible for people outside the intended audience to decode. Processes, algorithms, and keys should use multiple keys and multiple algorithms to transmit messages, and this combination of algorithms and keys can be mixed and matched or discarded for future messages. Mathematically, there are an infinite number of multivariate polynomial expressions that can serve as algorithms, and the keys can be large or small or both. When user-defined processes require algorithms to be morphed within a single packet or message, and different keys are also applied, the overall potential for any random decoding is effectively zero.

[0029] Expanding the range of algorithms and varying the way they are used on the protected SC behind the IC coupled with an equally diverse key structure has a profound impact on decryption. When the receiving computer knows nothing about the encryption method (e.g., process, algorithm(s) and key(s)), the chances of being able to randomly decrypt any message or portion of a message are close to zero.

[0030] OVRWatch TM The system is a commercialization of U.S. Patent 10,419,131; a multi-module hardware-software design. OVRWatch TM The simplest version of the system has three modules. The hardware and software of module one is part of the internet, permanently connected to the internet, and module one hosts additional custom software. The "second device" of US Patent 10,419,131 is incorporated into the OVRWatch TM In module two, additional custom software is also hosted. OVRWatch TM Module three hosts the hardware and software functionality of the "first device" of US Patent 10,419,131, plus custom software. The custom software tools include but are not limited to the classic "firewall-like" and "intrusion detection-like" checks in modules one and three.

[0031] The proprietary software (including firewall) is OVRWatch TM system, but also applies to any user-defined firewall or other tools. These adaptabilities extend to NIST (or any other organization that develops guidance and / or standards) approved solutions that also target advances in encryption / decryption.

[0032] Amplification includes Figure 1 Configuration to add a discoverable module and a non-discoverable module will Figure 1 The 3 modules shown in OVRWatch TM Expand to Figure 2 The five modules shown in Figure 2 The configuration adds a discoverable module and a non-discoverable module extension Figure 3 The seven modules shown in . Due to the inherent complexity of composite devices, the practicality of building more than nine (9) or eleven (11) module versions is decreasing. However, for truly risk-adverse situations, higher module configurations (9, 11, 13, etc.) allow for complex internal data routing within the SC; branching operations can be deployed. Linear processing flows (such as Figure 2 and Figure 3 The non-linear loops may create multi-pass encryption and even transfer from one APES in one location to a second undisclosed APES in the same location for additional processing.

[0033] As mentioned previously, an APES can deny all non-APES connectivity, and cascading APES has far-reaching implications, an Internet-facing APES can accept IoT data, while a second APES closer to the user system can be configured to only accept APES peer data. In effect, the Internet source will have responses that appear to reflect access to the user system, while in reality the second APES blocks all data originating from the IoT except for known peers.

[0034] The encryption will reside on computers in odd-numbered modules surrounded by even-numbered modules, module three in a 5-module configuration, and modules three and five in a 7-module configuration.

[0035] Module numbers are defined by proximity to the protected computer, with lower numbers indicating greater distance from the protected computer. In a 5-module configuration, computers in the "middle" module (number three) are known to be potentially accessible, but potentially inaccessible due to connectivity restrictions imposed by modules two and four (whitelisting and other authentication techniques).

[0036] Figure 5 A single accessible computer in Module 3 is shown, lettered "A"; satisfying the "potentially accessible" version. In this version of APES, nominal IoT traffic moves through Module 3 computer "A".

[0037] Likewise, if no Module 3 computer is IoT accessible, then the user can only access peer connections through IoT.

[0038] All computers in even-numbered modules are non-discoverable, as defined in US Pat. No. 10,419,131.

[0039] Functional actions in computers embedded in odd-numbered modules include filtering and packet inspection and other techniques to detect malicious content.

[0040] The lowest numbered modules in any configuration (module one in 3-modules and module one in 5-modules, etc.) perform exactly the same functions. Likewise, the highest numbered modules in every configuration (module three in 3-modules and module five in 5-modules) perform exactly the same functions. The significant difference in modular functionality occurs in the odd-numbered, isolatable "middle" module(s); module three in 5-modules, and modules three and five in 7-modules, etc.

[0041] Computers in the middle module that perform encryption / decryption functions have highly restricted whitelist and authentication access. Excluding unwanted communication channel traffic (IP addresses and other protocol traffic) commonly referred to as "blacklisting" is OVRWatch TMThe core capabilities of the system. In contrast, "whitelisting and other authentication technologies" communication channel traffic (IP addresses and other channel traffic) comes from known, trusted sources. Other technologies include authenticated computers, IPs, and MAC devices.

[0042] Module one performs external interface functionality including, but not limited to, source and route inspection, packet inspection tools (always being updated), and any other tools deemed necessary or desired. Likewise, the highest numbered modules will perform similar functions as module one and protect the input / output ports of the protected system. These actions are the basic odd-numbered (e.g., 3, 5, 7, 9, ...) module system requirements when implementing. When deploying multiple OVRWatch TM In a layered defense, the input / output ports of the protected system should be controlled only by the OVRWatch closest to the protected system. TM Addressing.

[0043] Even-numbered modules are "gatekeepers" that control instantaneous connectivity between adjacent odd-numbered modules. IoT connectivity is continuous only to module 1, and when an adjacent even-numbered module authorizes a data connection, all higher-level odd-numbered modules enable connectivity to the nearest lower-numbered odd-numbered module; for example, module 5 connects to module 3 only when module 4 authorizes it.

[0044] The rules within even-numbered modules are simple compared to the data inspection rules for odd-numbered modules. Automated tools for high-throughput systems can have even-numbered modules inspect header data, but these are comparison checks with whitelist and authentication techniques, and can be blacklists, depending on customer-defined requirements.

[0045] In a simple strategy within an intermediate module (e.g., 3 of 5), a single SC is used for encryption-decryption actions, while a different SC is used to host the encryption algorithms and / or keys; an SC is always required for algorithm and / or key management. More complex strategies will use two SCs for actions, separating the paths for encryption and decryption. More complex strategies are possible, including separate SCs for different communities of users. For example, financial records are managed by a different shadow computer than medical records, while another shadow computer holds personnel files. Each community of users will define its unique subcommunities. Those skilled in computers and computing system architecture will find a variety of examples sufficient to create many architectures from any number of components. Although the terminology will vary, the framework is general enough to allow customization.

[0046] Another use for a shadow computer could be to separate file types; distinguishing voice from data, or filtering voice sources to a higher degree than one another using different encryption to prevent the entire conversation from being compromised if one end of the conversation is captured clear and encrypted.

[0047] Changable algorithms and keys can be installed on any shadow computer using the internet or in person by the system administrator to securely distribute previously installed algorithms and keys that should (for most risk avoidance "should") never be used again, since an unlimited number of algorithms and keys can now be shared. A new strategy for managing both keys (legacy actions) and algorithms will result.

[0048] These designated SCs are known to the Internet (IP addresses exist). But these SCs can only be accessed by other known SCs (aka peers), and their functionality can be highly specific to one or more purposes, such as encryption algorithms and key control; other purposes can be added. When any IP address (external or internal) attempts to connect to any shadow computer, the request will be filtered by controlling the inaccessible even-numbered computers to adjust the optical link. If the Internet or intranet node making the request is on the shadow computer's access list (whitelisting and other authorization techniques), then the even-numbered module will enable the optical link and data will be transmitted between the odd-numbered modules adjacent to the odd-numbered modules hosting the shadow computer. The whitelist and / or other authorization techniques reside in the even-numbered modules (OVRWatch TM Modules 2 and 4 of the 5-module version).

[0049] The third and fifth modules are OVRWatch TM The central module in the 7-module version of the system. Controlling the flow of data into and out of the 7-module SC are modules two, four, and six. Hosting the SC through multiple modules opens up a vast new range of strategies for the user. Complex encryption / decryption can be employed, and in fact multi-pass or multi-dimensional systems can be developed, where data can be processed in module three, then in module five, and even back to module three, and so on.

[0050] Since the even numbered modules control the communication channels (IP addresses and other) for the central module(s), there are simple techniques for authorization, including whitelisting, to prevent any unwanted access to these central module IP addresses. Because the IP addresses of the even numbered modules are inaccessible, they are immune to attack, alteration, etc., and are therefore the perfect guardians of the pairing protocol between central modules located in the vast Internet. For example, if two 5-module devices are a "central module pair" and are hundreds of miles apart and use communication paths including the Internet to carry messages, then the authenticated (including whitelisted) pairing partner located within their respective module 2 will allow them to accept messages from their pairing partner, but not from other (unauthenticated / paired) devices.

[0051] The algorithms and keys installed in any shadow computer are user defined. The system administrator should be the one controlling this process. Therefore, at least one of the SCs has additional interfaces to allow direct, discrete and well-defined human-computer interaction. Additional security measures may be applied to remove the risk of human safety being compromised. Those additional security features are also controlled by the user and are not part of this application, except to note that there are ways to provide security for human-computer interaction with the system hosting the SC.

[0052] There are autonomous versions of algorithm and key development that can rely on input from an individual's actions in response to a query of the system. Automated queries can seek input from the user, and the order and content of the responses in a pattern can become the seed generator. One seed generator scheme causes a series of files to have their contents shuffled, thereby generating a new polynomial for the algorithm definition, and similarly, a secondary seed can generate a new key, shuffling an array of random numbers generated in association with the algorithm. Algorithms and keys can be other constructions, the polynomial is just one approach.

[0053] In another autonomous version of algorithm and key development, resetting values ​​can reorder controlled files, large arrays of numbers. These large arrays are the seeds for algorithms and keys, similar to the "actions of individuals in response to queries" mentioned above. Hundreds to thousands or tens of thousands of values ​​can be shuffled in the memory of several SCs and shared using algorithms and keys that are still active.

[0054] Encrypted messages from seemingly authentic sources (including whitelisted IP addresses) will not have the characteristics needed to spoof packet headers and traffic that are unknown to malicious actors. Several operational controls can be added to subject critical messages (such as new encryption algorithm payloads) to internally known limits; a simple example is a timestamp window. In some domains, this is called a "command access period" (CAP). If the spoofing exceeds the acceptable assigned timestamp window, the entire message is deleted. Another operational control could be to require multiple messages from multiple IP addresses (similar to multi-factor authentication). Many more controls could be installed to protect the option of uploading new algorithms (or key systems). All of these concepts are common in conventional security systems.

[0055] An obvious solution to quantum computing and AI is to keep changing algorithms and keys, but this creates a new threat, namely, chaos when algorithms and key management fail. Balancing these competing challenges is a business decision, risk versus cost. Building processes into computers to generate cryptographic code is nothing new, as mentioned in U.S. patents 5,614,900 and 10,917,403. The Blowfish cipher was written in the 1990s. Other products and algorithms have also been announced, including the Skipjack algorithm used in U.S. chip manufacturing.

[0056] Without specific user requirements, it is impossible to define the exact encryption and key model that any user will deploy. It can be said that the "experts" in these problems will deploy the tools they believe are best suited to serve the user community based on a risk-reward analysis. The architecture of SC, coupled with whitelisting and other authentication protections, provides a wealth of opportunities for cryptographic experts.

[0057] Less obvious filtering will become commercially valuable as content can be filtered or prevented from being filtered by software. Content filtering may remove sales and / or advertisements that users want to ignore.

[0058] APES devices can be integrated into electronics or aftermarket amplification.

[0059] APES reflects a system that can accept existing and custom encryption tools, including the use of database concepts. An integral aspect of any database is a means of tracking changes and maintaining control over the database system, and enabling robust recovery in the event of a system failure.

[0060] For example, if we define a database of 10,000 × 3 elements in a two-dimensional array to support a one-variable polynomial expression hosting a second-order polynomial (Ax 2+Bx+C) and establish the database version as the number 628, the starting pointer position is 8,197, and the array transitions every 18,000 bits, so we can put these three values ​​(628, 8,197 and 18,000) into the header and provide all the necessary decryption parameters. Additional header data can include the date of parameter selection, the location of the parameter section, etc.

[0061] After 18,000 unencrypted bits, a change in encryption causes the pointer for the database to move from position 8,197 to 8,198, resulting in three new coefficients for the polynomial parameters "A", "B", and "C". This process continues, moving the pointer and acquiring new coefficients until no new unencrypted bits are available for encryption. Also interesting is the choice of the values ​​in the header (628, 8,197, and 18,000) and their own offsets; 628 could actually mean 286 or 826, and similarly, 8,197 could be 1,879, using numbers but in a slightly different order. The header bits may have flags set in them to help type in the correct meaning.

[0062] One packetization scheme for the encrypted bits is to keep the encrypted contents in a buffer and concatenate them to form new packets.

[0063] The version number 628 may be updated at some periodicity, thereby changing the database contents. When updated, the version shuffles the database contents of 10,000×3 elements. It may also include new data, replacing some old content with different content that was not used before.

[0064] Another version of the database could host different mathematical expressions, and instead of a database of 10,000×3 elements, the database could be 15,000×11 elements, allowing polynomials of greater complexity, including multiple variables, etc. With a few bytes of header data, the user could deploy many different encryption strategies. Likewise, the dimensional nature of the database could be much larger, three dimensions or even more than three. Which dimensions are used could be selectable. Database management tools allow for these and other constructions.

[0065] Another packetization scheme for the encrypted bits is to keep the encrypted contents in a temporary buffer, concatenate them to form a new packet. Another scheme is to encrypt the packet, fill the unused portion of the newly defined packet, assuming that the original single packet expanded to more than a single packet, and then concatenate the encrypted packets.

[0066] The version number may be updated with some periodicity which would coincide with a "shuffle" or "replacement" of the database contents.

[0067] In another configuration, the database for the algorithms is separate from the database for the keys and hosted on different shadow computers.

[0068] Another construction allows the algorithm and key transformations to be asynchronous, and can achieve higher complexity if the number of bits of the asynchronous transformations is unequal; the algorithm can be changed every 1000 bytes of unencrypted data, while the key is changed at intervals other than 1000 bytes.

[0069] The mathematics that powers encryption can come from a wide range of fields, including classical mathematics to linguistics to images to icons to music or anything that can include sets.

[0070] Algebra, trigonometry, topology, complex variables, and many other areas of mathematics may be considered. Other icons, colors, images, sounds, and languages ​​known or created may also be used. Large database management tools are often used to construct large arrays with multi-dimensional content. There are parameters in the encryption process that can be reset, reused, skipped, and / or moved around in the database, making it impractical to attempt to discover the means of encryption even if a copy of the data is captured by unauthorized collection while the data is transmitted over a public infrastructure communication system.

[0071] All of these strategies have limitations, but in reality, the options are limited only by the available bits in the message. Complex messages can be either expanded or compressed. Typically, encryption generates more bits than the original message (expansion), but complex symbols can host more data (compression). For example, classical fiber-optic carrier waves use many photons (thousands to millions) to transmit a single bit. However, in new carrier wave strategies that define the timing between any two photons as a data word, massive compression occurs. This is the NASA Interplanetary Communications Baseline. Similarly, language experts have many examples of pictures as words or stories (massive compression).

[0072] In a closed system SC, any number of advances in data compression are possible. Since the user community is restricted, completely new structures can be adopted.

[0073] File management is critical to all of these encryption strategies. When any message cannot be decrypted, the default file is a necessary reset. Building a strong file support system has been a mainstay of database design for decades. Tools to define and fix unexpected errors in the database are common. Somewhere in your SC domain, you will need to install your toolset.

[0074] Figure 3The intermediate modules (numbers 3 and 5) are linearly routed; this means that external data flows into the protected system in a series of steps, from module 1 to module 3 to module 5 and finally to module 7. The linearity is disrupted by special routes where the connectivity pattern resembles a classic hydrocarbon molecule chain, allowing branching from the main sequence. This branching creates complex pathways, especially when a large number of SCs are used.

[0075] Branching is particularly useful when the module is the last module in a series that allows IoT interfacing (non-SC present in the module). For the previous logic, where a mismatch of SC was intentionally installed, and non-SC data routing can move "out of linear processing" and into a processing system designed to analyze for potential malicious intent. In this scenario, where module 3 has an IoT accessible computer and module 5 does not, those data in module 3's IoT accessible computer can be routed from linear processing to a separate node.

[0076] In another mode, "out-of-line processing" can repeat the processing steps, such as double encryption.

[0077] Optical connectivity control can be used to selectively define unique routes based on header data and authentication techniques. This routing can create a means for a series of packets to enter a "dead end" when a malicious actor wants to perform a data exfiltration (steal data from a protected system). Likewise, external packets can be routed to a computer that acts as a "honeypot", either defensively not responding, or offensively responding to external sources.

[0078] Optical routing can also mean that the communication channel traffic, including the header, generates multiple receivers; just as the Internet can and does provide multiple routes for packets, APES can mimic this feature.

[0079] Layering these encryption-capable modules, such as cascading multiple 5-modules, results in complex encryption layers.

[0080] Users operating at different security levels can insert a unique SC for each unique security level. Consider a company where top management communicates with many subgroups with distinctly different purposes (accounting, legal, marketing, etc.). There may be reasons (e.g., company policy or government regulations) to segregate these subgroup interfaces at the top manager level.

[0081] Rather than creating security with a few complex algorithms, the complexity of the present application arises from the large number of algorithms, which can range from thousands to billions, depending on the user's requirements. Likewise, the key is expanded to huge numbers, rather than more digits in a single key. In a one-time pad (OTP) operation, these two large arrays in a database under the control of an encryption / decryption computer combine to be impossible or nearly impossible to crack. Unlike current encryption / decryption strategies where cracking opens the door to decoding many messages, successful cracking of a single OTP message or a portion of an OTP message does not reveal any information about other messages, in addition to the cracked code not being an option for decoding additional messages, if the user wants to split the message into smaller pieces.

[0082] Managing these arrays of algorithms and keys is also a more manageable task for modern computers and the associated messaging. Since memory on single board computers can scale to GB and database systems are prevalent, the concept of a large managed database is an obvious candidate for generating billions of algorithms and keys.

[0083] Advanced multidimensional mathematical systems can be different for different users, so malicious collectors have more to consider than simple prime factorization. How any particular user defines their database entries is a choice unique to that user. Multidimensional aspects can be applied to processing, algorithms, or keys in any combination.

[0084] The private processes, algorithms and keys of the managed client, as well as the process, algorithm and key management tools, as well as the means to facilitate the coordinated update of the processes, algorithms and keys and other related tools, are all included in the SC. The possibility of filtering out all executable code can be successfully completed through this process.

[0085] As connections are allowed or not allowed, patterns emerge between the Internet and intranets. The difference between the Internet and intranets lies in the rules for connections.

[0086] On the other hand there are 5 modular units within any mathematically protected message, which is useful in generating and distributing more algorithms and keys over the Internet (as an intranet).

[0087] Detailed description of the drawings

[0088] Figure 1 Shows a 3-module OVRWatch TM10, wherein module 1 1101 is the interface between the Internet or a local router, etc. and module 3 1103. Optical link 1104 is the physical conductor for data movement between module 1 1101 and module 3 1103. Module 3 1103 is the interface between a user device (not shown) and module 1 1101. Module 2 1102 controls optical link 104. Module 2 1102 is not discoverable, as defined in U.S. Patent 10,419,131. Modules 1 and 3 1101 and 1103, respectively, are discoverable, as defined in U.S. Patent 10,419,131.

[0089] Figure 2 Shows a 5-module OVRWatch TM , where module 1 201 is an interface between the Internet or a local router, etc. and module 3 203. Module 3 203 represents at least two computers (not explicitly shown), one of which is used to handle normal communications and the other is a shadow computer. Optical link 206 is a physical conductor for data movement between module 1 201 and module 3 203. Module 2 202 controls optical link 206. Module 2 202 is not discoverable, as defined in U.S. Patent 10,419,131. Module 4 204 controls optical link 207. Module 4 204 is not discoverable, as defined in U.S. Patent 10,419,131. Module 3 203 is an interface between module 1 201 and module 5 205. Optical link 207 is a physical conductor for data movement between module 3 203 and module 5 205.

[0090] In an alternative depiction of module 3 203, there are only SC devices, thus only peer connections are allowed.

[0091] Figure 3 Shows the 7-module OVRWatch TM, where module 1 301 is an interface between the Internet or a local router, etc. and module 3 303. Module 3 303 represents at least two computers (not explicitly shown), one of which is used to handle normal communications and the other is a shadow computer. Module 3 303 shares the function of hosting SC with module 5 305. Optical link 308 is a physical conductor for data movement between module 1 301 and module 3 303. Module 2 302 controls optical link 308. Module 2 302 is not discoverable, as defined in U.S. Patent 10,419,131. Module 4 304 controls optical link 308. Module 4 304 is not discoverable, as defined in U.S. Patent 10,419,131. Module 3 303 is an interface between module 1 301 and module 5 305. Optical link 309 is a physical conductor for data movement between module 3 303 and module 5 305. Module 6 306 controls the optical link 310. Module 6 306 is not discoverable, as defined in US Patent 10,419, 131. Module 5 305 is the interface between module 3 303 and module 7 307. Optical link 310 is the physical conductor for data movement between module 5 305 and module 7 307.

[0092] In an alternative depiction of module 3 303, there are only SC devices, thus only peer connections are allowed.

[0093] In an alternative depiction of module 5 305, there are only SC devices, thus only peer connections are allowed.

[0094] Figure 4 Shown in more detail Figure 2 5-module block diagram. The ovals are photonic transceivers, item 40, shown sixteen (16) times. Module 1 is "Internet-facing" and module 5 is "Protected system-facing", these module 1 and 5 computers are known, discoverable and accessible to the IoT. Modules 2 and 4 are "gatekeepers", they are "invisible" in that the IP addresses are not known, discoverable and accessible from any source. Module 3 has two classes of computers; the first class is 3Alpha, which is known, discoverable and accessible to the IoT, the second class has three computers in this diagram, 3Bravo, 3Charlie and 3Delta which are discoverable but not accessible from the IoT; the SC. The IP address of the SC is included in the header data field of the address associated with the packetized data.

[0095] 3Bravo, 3Charlie and 3Delta are discoverable and accessible from other SCs in other devices via modules 2 and 4 whitelist construction.

[0096] Figure 5 Shown in more detail Figure 4 The 5-module block diagram.

[0097] The diagram shows the types of computers within a system consisting of 5 modules; unknown hidden computers (#2 and #4), computers that are discoverable but only accessible by identified companion shadow processes (BF computers in module 3), and computers that are known and discoverable and accessible via the internet (#1, A, and #5).

[0098] If module 3 computer 3A is a SC, then the entire 5-module configuration is an intranet and can communicate normally with accessible computers.

[0099] No power isolation or port limiting or software is shown in the figure. However, the photon signals are represented by items 112, 113, 114 and 115.

[0100] Figure 5 is a high level block diagram. The additional data lines between the odd-even modules illustrate how the header data is used to determine authorization and data transport between the odd-odd modules.

[0101] Figure 5 Five modules are shown in FIG. 1 , 2, 3, 4 and 5, respectively, items 101, 102, 103, 104 and 105. Photon signals are defined by items 112, 113, 114 and 115. Control signals are defined by items 106, 107, 108, 109, 110 and 111.

[0102] Although the embodiments and applications of the present invention have been shown and described, it is possible for those skilled in the art who benefit from this disclosure to make more modifications than those mentioned above without departing from the inventive concepts herein. Therefore, the present invention is not limited except within the spirit of the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An encryption system for protecting dynamic data, comprising two or more computer systems, the computer systems having known and unknown undiscoverable Internet Protocol addresses for respective computers in the computer systems at different locations, wherein those known computers within the computer systems are protected from being addressed by computers other than each other, the protection of the known computers being defined by rules residing in adjacent unknown undiscoverable computers at each location, the rules providing decisions as to whether to allow or not allow connectivity between known computers in different computer systems, the adjacent computers being unknown to the Internet and not addressable from any node on the Internet, secure data emerging when an encryption algorithm and encryption key are applied to the dynamic data, the encryption algorithm and encryption key being escrowed to the known computers within the computer systems.

2. An encryption system according to claim 1, wherein the encryption algorithm is hosted on a single computer within the computer system, and keys associated with the encryption algorithm are hosted on different computers within the computer system, and different levels of security derived from different algorithms can be on additional algorithm-hosting computers within the computer system, and different levels of security derived from different keys can be on other key-hosting computers within the computer system.

3. An encryption system according to claim 2, which associates the relationship of the level of a computer at one location to the same level of a computer at a different location, wherein the locations are connected by routing through public optical fiber and the Internet, and only the associated levels can communicate with each other.

4. An encryption system comprising at least two devices communicating with an Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructure, not all computers within the at least two devices being addressable from the IoT; a first device having some components within the IoT, communicating via the IoT infrastructure with a second device having some components within the IoT, the first device and the second device each having at least one internal computer known and discoverable by the IoT and listed as whitelisted only to each other; and a computer-defined whitelist of additional devices, the additional computers being invisible to the IoT.

5. The encryption system of claim 4, wherein invisible is defined as unknown to the IoT, undiscoverable, and not addressable by the IoT.

6. The encryption system of claim 4, wherein two devices are shadow computers, which are known and discoverable whitelisted computers from IoT, which provide encryption and decryption services to intranet users via IoT infrastructure.

7. An encryption system according to claim 4, wherein a device is further defined as a series of modules; module 1 hosts at least one known, discoverable and addressable computer, representing the connectivity of the device to the IoT; module 2 hosts an invisible computer, which is unknown, undiscoverable and unaddressable, providing data flow control between the computer of module 1 and the computer of module 3; module 3 hosts at least one known, discoverable and addressable computer, and module 3 also hosts at least one shadow computer that is known, discoverable and inaccessible from the IoT computer, any module 3 shadow computer is able to address the module 3 shadow computer of other devices, and encryption and decryption occur in the shadow computer; module 4 hosts an unknown, undiscoverable and unaddressable invisible computer, providing data flow control between the computer of module 3 including the shadow computer and the computer of module 5; module 5 hosts at least one known, discoverable and addressable computer, representing the connectivity of the device to the user system.

8. The cryptographic system of claim 7, wherein the shadow computer's encryption / decryption processing is further defined as a database driven content for algorithm, key and pointer management to track the usage of algorithms and keys; users are able to define unique mathematical constructions based on any branch of mathematics with possible cryptographic value, including but not limited to algebra, geometry, calculus, topology, and multi-dimensional abstractions; the database is updated by previously sent data in messages between shadow computers within devices operating as an intranet using IoT infrastructure.

9. The encryption system of claim 8, wherein device-to-device addressability of computers that are not accessible from the IoT is whitelisted and / or authenticated by an additional computer in the device, wherein the additional computer is an unknown and undiscoverable and unaddressable computer, providing data flow control between known and discoverable and inaccessible computers in multiple devices, whitelisting Internet Protocol addresses.

10. The encryption system of claim 1, wherein the encryption system is configured with augmentations to allow users to securely access new encryption algorithms and keys over the Internet as whitelisted peer isolated computers communicate using a one-time script applied to an equally unknown key algorithm and an unknown key of the algorithm applied to a single message.

11. The encryption system of claim 1, wherein the even-numbered modules are gatekeepers that control instantaneous connectivity between adjacent odd-numbered modules, and wherein the even-numbered modules compare data inspection rules with the odd-numbered modules.

12. The encryption system of claim 1, wherein encryption occurs in module 3 (middle module) of a 5-module system.

13. The encryption system of claim 1, wherein encryption occurs in modules 3 and 5 (middle modules of a pair) of a 7-module system.

14. The encryption system of claim 1, wherein higher order systems (9 modules or higher) have more computers in the middle modules.

15. A method for protecting dynamic data, comprising the steps of: two or more computer systems having known and unknown undiscoverable Internet Protocol addresses for respective computers in the computer systems located at different locations, wherein those known computers within the computer systems are protected from being addressed by computers other than each other; Protection of known computers uses rules residing in adjacent unknown undiscoverable computers at each location that provide decisions on allowing or not allowing connectivity between known computers in different computer systems; Protecting the use of these adjacent computers, which are unknown to the Internet and cannot be addressed from any external node on the Internet; By applying the data in motion, the encryption algorithm and encryption key hosted on a known computer within the computer system, the secure data appears as an encryption algorithm and encryption key.

16. The method according to claim 15, comprising the steps of: Hosting the encryption algorithm on a single computer within the computer system; Hosting the cryptographic key associated with the encryption algorithm on another computer within the computer system; Different levels of security are derived from algorithms on computers hosting additional algorithms within the computer system; and Different levels of security are derived from different keys located on additional key escrow computers within the computer system.

17. The method according to claim 15, further comprising the steps of: Associating a relationship of a level of a computer at one location to a computer of the same level at a different location; Routed connections via public fiber and the Internet where only associated levels can communicate with each other.

18. The method of claim 15, further comprising the step of the even-numbered modules controlling the address of the central module.

19. The method of claim 18, wherein the even-numbered modules prevent unwanted access to the address of the center module.

20. The method of claim 15, wherein the step of placing the encryption / decryption computer among invisible computers that are unknown, undiscoverable, and unaddressable creates a basis for private intranet encryption / decryption.

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