Security implementation method and device, equipment and network element
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202280093865.X
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2022-03-25
- Publication Date
- 2024-11-22
AI Technical Summary
Due to limited computing power, zero-power devices cannot support complex security functions and 3GPP device authentication mechanisms, making it difficult to ensure data transmission security.
By transmitting device binding verification code (DAC) and service verification code (SAC) between devices, devices that support the device authentication mechanism are used for security verification and authorization credential generation to ensure the security of data transmission.
It realizes safe computing of zero-power devices, improves data transmission security and authorization efficiency, and avoids the risk of attacks and malicious triggering of pseudo base stations.
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Figure CN119014023A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Security implementation method, device, equipment, and network element Technical Field
[0001] The embodiments of the present application relate to the field of mobile communication technology, and specifically to a security implementation method and apparatus, equipment, and network element. Background Art
[0002] The three main application scenarios for fifth-generation mobile communication technology (5G) include enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive machine-type communications (mMTC), and ultra-reliable low-latency communications (uRLLC). With the evolution of communication technology, IoT applications such as industrial wireless sensors, video surveillance, and wearable devices are placing new demands on 5G devices, including reduced complexity and cost, smaller size, and lower energy consumption. Zero-power communication technology offers significant advantages in terms of device power consumption, size, and cost, making it a hot topic of research.
[0003] However, due to the limited computing power of zero-power devices and other low-capability devices, these devices cannot support complex security functions and, therefore, cannot support the device authentication mechanism of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Therefore, there is currently no clear solution for how zero-power devices and other low-capability devices can perform secure operations to ensure the security of data transmission.
[0004] Summary of the Invention
[0005] The embodiments of the present application provide a security implementation method, apparatus, device, and network element.
[0006] This embodiment of the present application provides a security implementation method, including:
[0007] The first network element receives first information; the first information includes a device binding verification code (Device Authentication Code, DAC) and / or a service authentication code (Service Authentication Code, SAC); the DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and the SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0008] Another embodiment of the present application provides a security implementation method, including:
[0009] A first device sends first information; the first device is associated with at least one second device; the first information includes DAC and / or SAC; the DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device, and the SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0010] An embodiment of the present application provides a security implementation device, applied to a first network element, including:
[0011] A first receiving unit is configured to receive first information; the first information includes DAC and / or SAC; the DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and the SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0012] This embodiment of the present application provides a security implementation apparatus, applied to a first device, where the first device is associated with at least one second device; and includes:
[0013] The second sending unit is configured to send first information; the first information includes DAC and / or SAC; DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0014] The first network element provided in an embodiment of the present application includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute the above-mentioned security implementation method.
[0015] The first device provided in an embodiment of the present application includes a processor and a memory. The memory is used to store a computer program, and the processor is used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to perform the above-mentioned security implementation method.
[0016] The chip provided in the embodiment of the present application is used to implement the above-mentioned security implementation method.
[0017] Specifically, the chip includes: a processor, which is used to call and run a computer program from a memory, so that a device equipped with the chip executes the above-mentioned security implementation method.
[0018] The computer-readable storage medium provided in an embodiment of the present application is used to store a computer program, which enables a computer to execute the above-mentioned security implementation method.
[0019] The computer program product provided in the embodiments of the present application includes computer program instructions, which enable a computer to execute the above-mentioned security implementation method.
[0020] The computer program provided in the embodiment of the present application, when run on a computer, enables the computer to execute the above-mentioned security implementation method.
[0021] The embodiment of the present application provides a security implementation method, wherein a first device can send a first message; the first device is associated with at least one second device; the first message includes a device binding verification code DAC, and / or a service verification code SAC; DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information. In other words, the second device can use the operation and / or communication mechanism of the first device to implement secure operations and improve data transmission security. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0022] The drawings described herein are used to provide a further understanding of the present application and constitute a part of the present application. The illustrative embodiments of the present application and their descriptions are used to explain the present application and do not constitute an improper limitation on the present application. In the drawings:
[0023] FIG1 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture of an exemplary communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0024] FIG2 is a flowchart of a security implementation method according to an embodiment of the present application;
[0025] FIG3 is a second flow chart of a security implementation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0026] FIG4 is a third flow chart of a security implementation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0027] FIG5 is a fourth flow chart of a security implementation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0028] FIG6 is a fifth flow chart of a security implementation method provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0029] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a security implementation device 700 provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0030] FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a security implementation device 800 provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0031] FIG9 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0032] FIG10 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip according to an embodiment of the present application;
[0033] FIG11 is a schematic block diagram of a communication system provided in an embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0034] The following will describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of this application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of this application, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of this application.
[0035] FIG1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario of an embodiment of the present application.
[0036] As shown in Figure 1, a communication system 100 may include a terminal device 110 and a network device 120. The network device 120 may communicate with the terminal device 110 via an air interface. The terminal device 110 and the network device 120 support multi-service transmission.
[0037] It should be understood that the embodiments of the present application are only illustrative of the communication system 100, but the embodiments of the present application are not limited thereto. That is, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as: Long Term Evolution (LTE) system, LTE Time Division Duplex (TDD), Universal Mobile Telecommunication System (UMTS), Internet of Things (IoT) system, Narrow Band Internet of Things (NB-IoT) system, enhanced Machine-Type Communications (eMTC) system, 5G communication system (also known as New Radio (NR) communication system), or future communication systems.
[0038] In the communication system 100 shown in Figure 1, the network device 120 may be an access network device that communicates with the terminal device 110. The access network device may provide communication coverage for a specific geographical area and may communicate with the terminal device 110 (eg, UE) located within the coverage area.
[0039] The network device 120 can be an evolved base station (eNB or eNodeB) in a Long Term Evolution (LTE) system, or a Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG RAN) device, or a base station (gNB) in an NR system, or a wireless controller in a Cloud Radio Access Network (CRAN), or the network device 120 can be a relay station, an access point, a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable device, a hub, a switch, a bridge, a router, or a network device in a future evolved Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN), etc.
[0040] The terminal device 110 may be any terminal device, including but not limited to a terminal device connected to the network device 120 or other terminal devices by wire or wireless connection.
[0041] For example, the terminal device 110 may refer to an access terminal, user equipment (UE), a subscriber unit, a subscriber station, a mobile station, a mobile station, a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile device, a user terminal, a terminal, a wireless communication device, a user agent, or a user apparatus. An access terminal may be a cellular phone, a cordless phone, a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phone, an IoT device, a satellite handheld terminal, a Wireless Local Loop (WLL) station, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a handheld device with wireless communication capabilities, a computing device or other processing device connected to a wireless modem, an in-vehicle device, a wearable device, a terminal device in a 5G network, or a terminal device in a future evolution network, etc.
[0042] The terminal device 110 can be used for device-to-device (D2D) communication.
[0043] The wireless communication system 100 may further include a core network device 130 for communicating with the base station. The core network device 130 may be a 5G core network (5G Core, 5GC) device, such as an Access and Mobility Management Function (AMF), an Authentication Server Function (AUSF), a User Plane Function (UPF), or a Session Management Function (SMF). Optionally, the core network device 130 may also be an Evolved Packet Core (EPC) device of an LTE network, such as a Session Management Function + Core Packet Gateway (SMF+PGW-C) device. It should be understood that SMF+PGW-C can simultaneously implement the functions that can be implemented by SMF and PGW-C. During the network evolution process, the above-mentioned core network device may also be called other names, or a new network entity may be formed by dividing the functions of the core network, which is not limited in the embodiments of the present application.
[0044] The functional units in the communication system 100 may also establish connections and implement communication via next generation (NG) network interfaces.
[0045] For example, the terminal device establishes an air interface connection with the access network device through the NR interface for transmitting user plane data and control plane signaling; the terminal device can establish a control plane signaling connection with the AMF through the NG interface 1 (referred to as N1); the access network device, such as the next generation wireless access base station (gNB), can establish a user plane data connection with the UPF through the NG interface 3 (referred to as N3); the access network device can establish a control plane signaling connection with the AMF through the NG interface 2 (referred to as N2); the UPF can establish a control plane signaling connection with the SMF through the NG interface 4 (referred to as N4); the UPF can exchange user plane data with the data network through the NG interface 6 (referred to as N6); the AMF can establish a control plane signaling connection with the SMF through the NG interface 11 (referred to as N11); the SMF can establish a control plane signaling connection with the PCF through the NG interface 7 (referred to as N7).
[0046] Figure 1 exemplarily shows an access network device, a core network device and two terminal devices. Optionally, the wireless communication system 100 may include multiple base station devices and each base station may include other numbers of terminal devices within its coverage area, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
[0047] It should be noted that Figure 1 is merely an example of a system applicable to this application. Of course, the methods described in the embodiments of this application can also be applied to other systems. Furthermore, the terms "system" and "network" are often used interchangeably herein. The term "and / or" herein simply describes an association relationship between associated objects, indicating that three possible relationships exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, or B exists alone. Furthermore, the character " / " generally indicates that the associated objects are in an "or" relationship. It should also be understood that the "indication" mentioned in the embodiments of this application can be a direct indication, an indirect indication, or an indication of an association relationship. For example, "A indicates B" can mean that A directly indicates B, for example, B can obtain information through A; it can also mean that A indirectly indicates B, for example, A indicates C, and B can obtain information through C; or it can mean that A and B have an association relationship. It should also be understood that the "correspondence" mentioned in the embodiments of this application can mean that there is a direct or indirect correspondence between two objects, or that there is an association relationship between the two objects, or a relationship between an indicator and the indicated, a configuration and the configured, and so on. It should also be understood that the “predefined” or “predefined rules” mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented by pre-saving corresponding codes, tables or other methods that can be used to indicate relevant information in devices (for example, including terminal devices and network devices), and the present application does not limit its specific implementation method. For example, predefined can refer to what is defined in the protocol. It should also be understood that in the embodiments of the present application, the “protocol” may refer to a standard protocol in the field of communications, such as LTE protocols, NR protocols, and related protocols used in future communication systems, and the present application does not limit this.
[0048] To facilitate understanding of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the technical solutions of the present application are described in detail below through specific embodiments. The above related technologies can be combined arbitrarily with the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application as optional solutions, and all of them fall within the scope of protection of the embodiments of the present application. The embodiments of the present application include at least part of the following contents.
[0049] Zero-power communication technology offers significant advantages in terms of device power consumption, size, and cost. For example, it has the potential to reduce device power consumption from tens of milliwatts in narrowband Internet of Things (NB-IoT) devices to tens of microwatts or even several microwatts. Furthermore, it has the potential to reduce device costs from just over a dozen yuan for the cheapest NB-IoT devices to just one yuan or even less. The key feature of zero-power communication technology is backscatter communication through modulation of incoming signals. It can also harvest energy to drive digital logic circuits or chips (such as microcontrollers or sensor chips), enabling functions such as signal encoding, encryption, and simple calculations.
[0050] However, the conversion efficiency of RF energy in zero-power communication technology is often less than 10%, necessitating a relatively low power consumption requirement for driving digital logic circuits or chips for computation. While improvements in process technology and design optimization have resulted in an increase in the number of computations per microjoule of energy, it still cannot meet the requirements for complex calculations. Zero-power terminal devices have very limited computing capabilities and cannot support security functions such as those defined by SHA-256, let alone 3GPP authentication mechanisms. Therefore, a lightweight group certificate mechanism is needed for zero-power devices to authorize uplink data transmission. This prevents attackers or rogue base stations from maliciously triggering uplink data transmission on zero-power devices, ensures the security of uplink data transmission on zero-power devices, and improves the efficiency of zero-power device authorization.
[0051] Based on this, an embodiment of the present application provides a security implementation method, as shown in Reference 2, which includes but is not limited to the following steps:
[0052] Step 210, the first device sends the first information; the first information may include a device binding verification code DAC, and / or a service verification code SAC; wherein, DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0053] Step 220: The first network element receives the first information.
[0054] In an embodiment of the present application, the first device may be a device that supports a device authentication mechanism algorithm. For example, the first device may be a UE, a base station, or other device that can support complex operations. This embodiment of the present application does not impose any restrictions on this.
[0055] The second device may be a low-computing-power device that does not support the device authentication mechanism algorithm, that is, the second device is a device that cannot perform secure operations alone. For example, the second device may be a zero-power device (Zero Power Device, ZPD), or a low-capacity device with weak computing power, or a device with less remaining power. The embodiments of the present application do not impose any restrictions on this.
[0056] The first network element may be a device located in the network. For example, the first network element may be an application server or device ID management server provided by the manufacturer of at least one second device, or an access network device (e.g., a base station) or core network device provided by an operator, or a server or device ID management server provided by a service provider (SP). This embodiment of the present application does not impose any restrictions on this.
[0057] Optionally, the second device may communicate with the first device by using a technique of modulating an incoming wave signal to implement backscattering.
[0058] In the embodiments of the present application, a first device may be associated with one or more second devices. It should be understood that the first device is a device that supports a device authentication mechanism, and at least one second device associated with the first device may utilize the computing and / or communication mechanisms of the first device to implement secure computing.
[0059] Specifically, in an embodiment of the present application, a first device may send a first message to a first network element, with the first message carrying a DAC and / or a SAC. In this way, the first network element may verify at least one second device associated with the first device based on the DAC and / or SAC in the first message to facilitate data interaction with the at least one second device, or the first network element may generate an authorization credential for the at least one second device based on the DAC and / or SAC to ensure secure data transmission by the second device.
[0060] It should be noted that the first information can be sent directly by the first device to the first network element, or the first device can forward it to the first network element through other intermediate devices. This embodiment of the present application does not limit this. For example, when the first network element is an access network device or a core network device, the first device can send the first information directly to the first network element. When the first network element is an application server or a device ID management server, the first device can forward the above-mentioned first information to the first network element through the access network device and / or core network device provided by the operator.
[0061] Optionally, after receiving the first information, the first network element may verify whether there is a real association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device based on DAC, thereby determining whether the at least one second device can be trusted.
[0062] Optionally, the first network element can verify based on SAC whether the service type supported by the first device and / or the second device is the service type indicated by the service identification information, thereby determining whether the first device and / or at least one second device has the authority to transmit data corresponding to the service type.
[0063] Optionally, the first network element can also verify based on SAC whether the data type supported by the first device and / or the second device is the data type indicated by the data identification information, thereby determining whether the first device and / or at least one second device has the authority to transmit data corresponding to the data type.
[0064] In an embodiment of the present application, the first device and / or the at least one second device may provide one or more services, such as a positioning service, a speed measurement service, a health call service, an environmental monitoring service, etc. In an embodiment of the present application, the service type provided by the first device and / or the at least one second device may be indicated by service identification information.
[0065] Optionally, the service identification information may be an ID of the service type, or an ID of an application server provided by the manufacturer of the first device and / or at least one second device, or an ID of an application server provided by a service provider. Exemplarily, when the first network element is an application server provided by a service provider (SP), the ID of the first network element is the same as the service identification information.
[0066] In an embodiment of the present application, the data identification information may indicate the data type supported by the first device and / or at least one second device, and the data type may include one or more types. Typically, the data type supported by a device is generally related to the service supported by the device. For example, if the service is a health call service, then the data type may include heart rate data, body temperature data, respiratory rate data, exercise data, blood pressure data, etc. If the sensing service is an environmental monitoring service, then the data type may include location data, wind speed data, temperature data, sunlight data, altitude data, etc. The embodiment of the present application does not limit the data type.
[0067] Optionally, the service identification information and data identification information may be carried by the first information. The service identification information and data identification information may also be pre-stored by the first network element, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.
[0068] It can be seen that in the security implementation method provided in the embodiment of the present application, the first device can act as an intermediate agent for the second device, and implement secure operations for the second device through the complete operation and / or communication mechanism of the first device, thereby improving data transmission security.
[0069] Optionally, the first information may be credential request information, that is, the first information may be used to request an authorization credential of at least one second device associated with the first device.
[0070] It is understandable that the first device may utilize its own computing and / or communication mechanism to request the network element on the network side for the authorization credential of at least one second device associated therewith.
[0071] Correspondingly, as shown in FIG3 , the security implementation method provided in the embodiment of the present application may further include the following steps:
[0072] Step 230: When the first network element successfully verifies the DAC and / or SAC, the first network element generates an authorization credential for at least one second device.
[0073] In an embodiment of the present application, after the first network element receives the first information, it can use DAC to determine whether there is a real association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and use SAC to verify whether the service type supported by the first device and / or at least one second device is the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the data type supported by the first device and / or at least one second device is the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0074] It should be understood that the first network element generates an authorization certificate for at least one second device only when it determines that the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device is correct, and the service type supported by the first device and / or at least one second device is the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or the data type supported by the first device and / or at least one second device is the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0075] Optionally, if the first information is forwarded by the first device to the first network element via an access network device and / or a core network device, the forwarding device (i.e., the access network device and / or the core network device) may verify the DAC in the first information. Furthermore, after successfully verifying the DAC, the forwarding device may send the first information to the first network element based on the service identification information. Furthermore, the first network element may continue to verify the SAC and, after successfully verifying the SAC, generate an authorization credential for at least one second device.
[0076] In summary, in the security implementation method provided in the embodiments of the present application, a first device can act as an intermediate proxy device to perform security operations for at least one second device associated with the first device, thereby obtaining authorization credentials for the at least one second device. In other words, the first device can be used to interact with a first network element, enabling the first network element to generate a lightweight authorization credential for the at least one second device, enabling the device to obtain service authorization and improving service and data transmission security.
[0077] Optionally, as shown in FIG3 , in the security implementation method provided in the embodiment of the present application, before step 210, the following contents may also be included:
[0078] Step 240: The first device generates a device binding verification code DAC based on the device secret key Secret;
[0079] and / or,
[0080] The first device generates a service authentication code SAC based on at least one of the identification information of the first device, identification information of each second device, service identification information, data identification information, a random number NONCE, and a counter parameter COUNT.
[0081] Optionally, the first device may calculate the device binding verification code DAC based on the following formula (1).
[0082] DAC=H(Secret,ID UE , ID ZP , S) (1);
[0083] Wherein, H() is a hash function, a verification function, or a key generation function. For example, H() can be HMAC-SHA-256, or it can be a security function f1, a security function f2, a security function f3, a security function f4, or a security function or f5. The embodiment of the present application does not limit this.
[0084] ID UE The identification information of the first device, ID ZP It should be understood that when the number of second devices includes multiple, ID ZP The S may include identification information of each second device in the plurality of second devices. The S may include at least one of the following: the certificate information Cert of the first device UE , random number NONCE, and counter parameter COUNT.
[0085] Optionally, S may also include one or more of the following information: ID SP , ID DATA Among them, ID SP Refers to business identification information, ID DATA Refers to data identification information.
[0086] Optionally, the device secret key Secret can be generated based on the service shared secret key Kservice and / or the initial secret key of each second device. Here, the service shared secret key Kservice is a symmetric key obtained after the first network element and the first device perform security negotiation.eNB , K RRCint ,K RRCenc ,K NASenc ,K NASint ,K AF , or K s_NAF Any one of the embodiments of the present application is not limited to this.
[0087] It should be noted that the method for generating the device secret key Secret in step 240 is described in detail in the following embodiment and will not be repeated here.
[0088] Optionally, in some embodiments, the first device may use the private key of the first device to sign at least one of the identification information of the first device, identification information of at least one second device, service identification information, data identification information, NONCE, and COUNT to obtain a service verification code SAC.
[0089] Exemplarily, the first device may use the following formula (2) to generate the service authentication code SAC:
[0090] SAC=Sig UE (S) (2);
[0091] Among them, Sig UE Refers to the process of signing using the UE's private key. S is an input parameter, which contains at least one or more of the following: ID ZP , ID UE , ID SP , ID DATA , NONCE, and COUNT. Here ID SP 、ID DATA 、ID ZP and ID UE As mentioned above, no further details are given here.
[0092] Optionally, in other embodiments, the first device may perform a security operation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, NONCE, and COUNT based on the service shared key Kservice to generate a SAC.
[0093] Exemplarily, the first device may use the following formula (3) to generate the service authentication code SAC:
[0094] SAC = H(Kservice, S) (3);
[0095] Among them, S is an input parameter, which can include one or more of the following information: ID ZP , IDUE , ID SP , ID DATA , NONCE, COUNT. Among them, ID ZP , ID UE , ID SP , and ID DATA As mentioned above, no further details are given here.
[0096] Furthermore, the first device sends the DAC and / or SAC obtained by calculation to the first network element through the first information, so that the first network element generates an authorization credential for at least one second device associated with the first device.
[0097] In the embodiment of the present application, after receiving the first information, the first network element may verify the DAC and / or SAC. The following details the verification process of the first network element for the DAC and SAC.
[0098] In an embodiment of the present application, after the first network element receives the first information, it can use DAC to verify whether there is a real association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and use SAC to verify whether the service type supported by the first device and / or at least one second device is the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the data type supported by the first device and / or at least one second device is the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0099] The verification process of the DAC by the first network element is as follows:
[0100] The first network element may generate first verification information based on the device secret key Secret. The first network element may refer to the above formula (1) to generate the first verification information. If the first verification information is consistent with the DAC carried in the first information, it can be considered that there is a real association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device, and the first device determines that the DAC verification is successful. If the first verification information is inconsistent with the DAC carried in the first information, it is considered that the association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device is incorrect or does not exist, and the first network element determines that the DAC verification is unsuccessful.
[0101] Optionally, the first network element may obtain the device key Secret from the first device, or may obtain the device key Secret from other trusted devices (e.g., base stations, UDM network elements, application servers, etc.). The first network element may also generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key and / or the initial key of each second device, wherein the first network element generates the device key Secret in the same manner as the first device generates the device key Secret. The embodiment of the present application does not impose any restrictions on the manner in which the device key Secret is determined.
[0102] In addition, the verification process of the first network element to the SAC is as follows:
[0103] Optionally, in some embodiments, if the SAC is obtained by signing at least one item of information including the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, and the data identification information, NONCE, and COUNT using the private key of the first device, the first network element can use the public key of the first device to verify the SAC.
[0104] Specifically, the first network element can verify the SAC using the public key of the first device to obtain second verification information. If the second verification information is consistent with at least one of the information included in the first information, including the identification information of the first device, the identification information of at least one second device, the service identification information, the data type identification information, the NONCE, and the COUNT, then it is considered that the service type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device is the same as the service type indicated by the service identification information, and the data type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device is the data type indicated by the data identification information, and the first network element determines that the SAC verification is successful. Otherwise, it is determined that the SAC verification has failed.
[0105] Optionally, in other embodiments, if the SAC is obtained by performing a secure operation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the NONCE, and the COUNT using the service shared key Kservice, the first network element may use the service shared key Kservice to verify the SAC.
[0106] Specifically, the first network element may first perform a security operation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the NONCE, and the COUNT based on the service shared key Kservice to obtain third verification information; wherein, the first network element may refer to the above formula (3) to generate the third verification information. If the third verification information is consistent with the SAC, the first network element determines that the SAC verification has passed. Otherwise, it determines that the SAC verification has failed.
[0107] Optionally, if the first information is forwarded by the first device to the first network element via an access network device and / or a core network device, the forwarding device (i.e., the access network device and / or the core network device) may also verify the DAC in the first information. Furthermore, after successfully verifying the DAC, the forwarding device may send the first information to the first network element based on the service identification information. Furthermore, the first network element may continue to verify the SAC and, after successfully verifying the SAC, generate an authorization credential for at least one second device.
[0108] It should be noted that the way in which the access network device and / or the core network device verifies the DAC is the same as that described above. For the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
[0109] In addition, if the first network element is an access network device and / or a core network device, the DAC and / or SAC carried in the first information can be directly verified.
[0110] Optionally, considering that the verification process of DAC and / or SAC requires complex security calculations, in an embodiment of the present application, before DAC and / or SAC are verified, some preliminary verifications can also be performed based on the content in the first information to avoid unnecessary DAC and / or SAC verifications.
[0111] Exemplarily, the first network element may maintain a device list that stores identification information of all devices supported by the first network element. When the first information includes identification information of the first device and / or identification information of at least one second device, the first network element may determine whether the device list includes the identification information of the first device and / or identification information of at least one second device in the first information. If the identification information of the first device and the identification information of at least one second device are not in the device list, it can be determined that the first network element does not support data transmission with the first device and / or the second device, then the first network element may not perform further operations, that is, not perform complex DAC and / or SAC verification. Otherwise, the first network element needs to continue to perform DAC and / or SAC verification.
[0112] The first network element may also maintain a service type list for storing the service types supported by the first network element. When the first information includes service identification information, the first network element may search the service type list to determine whether the service type corresponding to the service identification information is included. If the service type list does not include the service type, it indicates that the first network element does not support the service type. In this way, the first network element can avoid performing DAC and / or SAC verification.
[0113] In addition, the first network element may further maintain a data type list, which is used to store data types supported by the first network element. When the first information includes data identification information, the first network element may search the data type list to see whether the data type corresponding to the data identification information is included. If the data type list does not include the data type, it indicates that the first network element does not support the data type. In this way, the first network element can avoid performing DAC and / or SAC verification.
[0114] Optionally, the information in the above-mentioned device list, service type list, and data type list may be obtained by the first network element by calling information stored in other database devices.
[0115] To sum up, the first network element can determine that the first device and at least one second device have a binding relationship based on DAC and / or SAC, and that the first device and / or the second device are bound to the service type indicated by the service identification information, and the first device and / or the second device are bound to the data type indicated by the data identification information; only when at least one of the above binding relationships is established, the first network element can generate an authorization certificate for at least one second device, thereby ensuring the security of the generated authorization certificate.
[0116] Optionally, in addition to the DAC and / or SAC, the first information further includes at least one of the following:
[0117] Business identification information;
[0118] Data identification information;
[0119] identification information of the first device;
[0120] identification information of each second device in the at least one second device;
[0121] Device secret key Secret;
[0122] A first information verification code MAC corresponding to the first information; the first MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the first information is a legitimate device.
[0123] Optionally, before verifying the DAC and / or SAC, the first network element may further authenticate the first device that sent the first information. Only after the first device's identity is successfully authenticated is the DAC and / or SAC further verified. Otherwise, if the first device's identity is unauthenticated, the first network element may deem the device that sent the first information untrustworthy and not respond to the first information.
[0124] Optionally, when the first information includes a first MAC, the first network element may authenticate the first device according to the first MAC.
[0125] In one possible implementation, if the first MAC is generated by the first device based on the service shared key Kservice between it and the first network element, the first network element can use the service shared key Kservice to generate verification information. If the verification information is consistent with the first MAC, it is determined that the identity authentication of the first device is successful.
[0126] Optionally, the service shared key Kservice pre-negotiated between the first device and the first network element may be the key K eNB , K RRCint , K RRCenc ,KNASenc ,K NASint ,K AF , K s_NAF The embodiments of the present application do not limit this.
[0127] In another possible implementation, if the first MAC is obtained by the first device using its private key to sign other information in the first message, the first network element may use the public key of the first device to verify the first MAC. If the verification result is consistent with the other information in the first message, it is determined that the identity authentication of the first device is successful. If the identity authentication of the first device is successful, the first network element further verifies the DAC and / or SAC to determine whether to generate an authorization credential for at least one second device.
[0128] In an embodiment of the present application, after the first network element verifies the DAC and / or SAC, it can generate an authorization credential for at least one second device. The at least one second device can share one authorization credential.
[0129] Optionally, before the first network element generates the authorization credential, an RSA accumulator parameter α may be generated for each second device. ZP , the RSA accumulator parameter α of each second device ZP It can be used to prove whether the second device is revoked.
[0130] Optionally, the authorization ticket generated by the first network element may include at least one of the following information:
[0131] identification information of the first device;
[0132] a public key of the first device;
[0133] identification information of each second device in the at least one second device;
[0134] an RSA accumulator parameter for each of the at least one second device;
[0135] identification information of the first network element;
[0136] The public key of the first network element;
[0137] Business identification information;
[0138] Data identification information;
[0139] Device binding verification code DAC;
[0140] Digital signature of the first network element.
[0141] The digital signature can be obtained by the first network element using its own private key to sign other information in the authorization certificate. It should be understood that the digital signature can be used to verify the legitimacy of the authorization certificate.
[0142] In one example, when the number of the second device is 1, the authorization certificate of the second device ZP1 may be: Cert IS->ZP ([ID ZP1 ,DAC],α ZP1 , ID UE , ID IS , ID SP , Sig skIS ). Among them, IS refers to the first network element, Cert IS->ZP It can be understood as the authorization certificate generated by the first network element for the second device. ZP1 is the RSA accumulator parameter of the second device ZP1, ID IS is the identification information of the first network element, sk IS is the private key of the first network element, Sig skIS This is the digital signature of the first network element.
[0143] In another example, when the number of second devices is n, where n is an integer greater than 1, the authorization credentials of the n second devices may be: Cert IS->ZPg ([ID ZP1 ,…,ID ZPn ,DAC],α ZP1 ,…,α ZPn , ID UE , ID IS , ID SP , Sig skIS ). Among them, α ZP1 ,…,α ZPn They are respectively RSA accumulator parameters corresponding to n second devices.
[0144] It should be noted that when the business identification information ID SP If the first network element is the application server, the first network element's identification information ID IS Business identification information ID SP Similarly, the first network element may use only one of them to generate the authorization credential.
[0145] It should be understood that when the number of the second devices includes multiple, the first network element can generate an authorization credential for the multiple second devices. The authorization credential can be a group certificate, that is, the multiple second devices can share one authorization credential.
[0146] Optionally, referring to the flowchart shown in FIG4 , in an embodiment of the present application, the first network element may further execute steps 250 and 260 after generating an authorization credential for at least one second device.
[0147] Step 250: The first network element sends the authorization certificate to the blockchain node.
[0148] Step 260: The first network element obtains the storage location information of the authorization certificate.
[0149] It is understood that the first network element may send the generated authorization credential of at least one second device to the blockchain node, and perform an on-chain operation on the authorization credential of at least one second device to achieve distributed storage of the authorization credential. Furthermore, after receiving the authorization credential, the blockchain node may store the authorization credential in a storage block of the blockchain and feedback the storage location information to the first network element.
[0150] Optionally, as shown in FIG4 , step 260 may further include the following steps:
[0151] Step 270: The first network element sends the authorization credential to the first device, and / or stores the location information.
[0152] It is understood that after generating the authorization credential, the first network element may send the generated authorization credential to the credential requester, i.e., the first device. The first network element may also send the storage location information of the authorization credential in the storage block to the first device, and the first device and / or at least one second device may request the authorization credential from the blockchain node based on the storage location information when needed.
[0153] The following describes in detail how the device secret key Secret is generated in step 240.
[0154] In the embodiment of the present application, the device secret key Secret in step 240 may be calculated by the first device based on the service shared secret key Kservice and / or the initial secret key corresponding to each second device.
[0155] Optionally, as shown in FIG5 , the following contents may be further included before step 240:
[0156] Step 510: The first device generates a device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device in at least one second device.
[0157] Optionally, the first device may generate a device key Secret directly based on the initial key corresponding to each second device.
[0158] For example, if the number of second devices is one, the device key Secret is the initial key of the second device. If there are multiple second devices, the first device can aggregate the initial keys of each second device to obtain the device key Secret. Aggregation can be performed by directly connecting multiple keys.
[0159] Optionally, the first device may also generate a device secret key Secret based on the initial secret key of each second device in the at least one second device and the service shared secret key Kservice. The service shared secret key Kservice may be K eNB , K RRCint , K RRCenc , K NASenc , K NASint , K AF , K s_NAF The embodiments of the present application do not limit this.
[0160] For example, if the number of second devices is one, the first device can directly connect the initial key and service shared key Kservice of the second device to obtain the device key Secret. If the number of second devices includes multiple, the first device can directly connect the initial key and service shared key Kservice of each second device to obtain the device key Secret.
[0161] Optionally, in step 510, the first device generates a device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device in the at least one second device, which can also be implemented in the following manner:
[0162] The first device generates an intermediate key for each second device based on the initial key of each second device;
[0163] The first device generates a device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the intermediate key of each second device.
[0164] The intermediate key may be a symmetric key obtained after the first device and the second device perform physical layer security negotiation and can be shared between the two devices.
[0165] Optionally, the first device may first generate an intermediate key for each second device based on the initial key of each second device; then, the first device may generate a device key Secret based on the intermediate key of each second device in at least one second device.
[0166] That is, the first device can negotiate the physical layer security mechanism with each second device based on the initial key of each second device to generate an intermediate key corresponding to each second device. Furthermore, the first device can generate a device key Secret based on the intermediate key of each second device.
[0167] For example, if the number of second devices is one, the device key Secret is the intermediate key of the second device. If there are multiple second devices, the first device can aggregate the intermediate keys of each second device to obtain the device key Secret. The aggregation process can be directly connecting multiple keys.
[0168] Optionally, the first device may first generate an intermediate key for each second device based on the initial key of each second device; then, the first device may generate a device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and the intermediate key of each second device.
[0169] For example, if the number of second devices is 1, the device key Secret is the intermediate key of the second device. If the number of second devices includes multiple, the first device can aggregate the service shared key Kservice and the intermediate key of each second device to obtain the above device key Secret.
[0170] It should be noted that the first network element may also determine the device key Secret using the above method before verifying the DAC. That is, the first network element may generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device. Alternatively, the first network element may calculate the intermediate key of each second device based on the initial key of each second device; further, the first network element may generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the intermediate key of each second device. The calculation method is the same as that described in step 510 and will not be repeated here for the sake of brevity.
[0171] Optionally, referring to FIG5 , before step 510, the following steps may be performed:
[0172] Step 520: The first device sends a key request message to the second network element; the key request message is used to request an initial key of at least one second device associated with the first device.
[0173] Step 530: The second network element sends initial key information to the first device, where the initial key information includes the initial key of each second device in the at least one second device.
[0174] The second network element may be a device trusted by the at least one second device, and is configured to manage the initial key of each of the at least one second device. For example, the second network element may be a server or device ID management server provided by the manufacturer of the second device, an access network device or core network device provided by an operator, or a server or device ID management server provided by a service provider (SP), and this embodiment of the present application does not impose any restrictions on this.
[0175] It should be noted that the second network element and the first network element in the above embodiment can be the same device or different devices, and the embodiment of the present application does not limit this.
[0176] Optionally, the key request information may include at least one of the following information:
[0177] identification information of the first device;
[0178] identification information of each second device in the at least one second device;
[0179] Business identification information;
[0180] Data identification information;
[0181] The second MAC corresponding to the key request information.
[0182] In an embodiment of the present application, upon receiving the key request information, the second network element may feedback initial key information to the first device. The initial key information may include the initial key of at least one second device. Specifically, the initial key information may include identification information of at least one second device and the initial key corresponding to each second device.
[0183] For example, if the number of the second device is only one, the initial key information may include an identification information-initial key pair, namely (ID ZP1 , K ZP1 If there are multiple second devices (for example, n), the initial key information may include n identification information-initial key pairs: (ID ZP1 , K ZP1 ), (ID ZP2 , K ZP2 ), (ID ZP3 ,K ZP3 ),……,(ID ZPn , K ZPn ). Among them, ID ZP1 That is, the identification information of zero-power device 1, K ZP1 That is the initial secret key of zero-power device 1, and so on, ID ZPn That is, the identification information of the zero-power device n, K ZPnThat is, the initial secret key of the zero-power device n.
[0184] Optionally, the initial key may be a symmetric key, and the second device may also store its own initial key in a local storage space.
[0185] Optionally, when the key request information includes service identification information and / or data identification information, the second network element may verify the at least one second device based on the service identification information and / or data identification information to determine whether the at least one second device has permission to use the service corresponding to the service identification information and / or data identification information. Furthermore, the second network element sends the initial key information to the first device only after the at least one second device passes the verification.
[0186] Among them, the second network element can determine whether the locally stored service identification information is consistent with the service identification information carried in the key request information, and / or whether the locally stored data identification information is consistent with the data identification information in the key request information. If they are consistent, the second network element determines that at least one second device has passed the verification, that is, at least one second device has the authority to use the service type corresponding to the service identification information, and / or the data type corresponding to the data identification information. If they are inconsistent, the second network element determines that at least one second device has failed the verification, and at least one second device does not have the authority to use the service type corresponding to the service identification information, and / or the data type corresponding to the data identification information.
[0187] For example, when the second network element is an application server and the service identification information is the ID of the application server, the second network element may compare its own ID with the service identification information carried in the key request information. If the two are the same, it is determined that the at least one second device has passed authentication; otherwise, it is determined that the at least one second device has failed authentication.
[0188] In this embodiment of the present application, the key request information may include a second MAC. After receiving the key request information sent by the first device, the second network element may first authenticate the identity of the first device based on the second MAC to determine whether the first device sending the key request information is a trustworthy device.
[0189] Optionally, in some embodiments, the first device may use a key pre-negotiated with the second network element to encrypt or complete the key request information to obtain the second MAC. For example, the key pre-negotiated between the first device and the second network element may be the key K eNB , K RRCint ,K RRCenc ,K NASenc ,K NASint ,K AF , K s_NAF The embodiments of the present application do not limit this.
[0190] Correspondingly, after receiving the key request information, the second network element can use the key negotiated with the first device to verify the second MAC. For example, if the second network element is a base station, the second network element can use K eNB or K RRCint Verify the second MAC. If the second network element is an application server, the second network element can use K AF or K s_NAF Verify the second MAC. If the second network element is a core network element, the second network element can use K NASint , verify the second MAC.
[0191] Alternatively, in other embodiments, the first device may use the private key of the first device to sign the content or part of the content of the key request information to obtain the second MAC. Correspondingly, after receiving the key request information, the second network element may verify the second MAC using the certificate of the first device or the public key of the first device.
[0192] It should be understood that the second network element sends the initial key information to the first device only after the identity authentication of the first device is successful.
[0193] The following describes the embodiments of the present application in detail in conjunction with specific application scenarios.
[0194] In this application scenario, the first device may be a UE, the second device may be a ZPD, the first network element may be an application server provided by a service provider, and the second network element may be a base station. In addition, the first information may be credential request information. Referring to the flowchart shown in FIG6 , the security implementation method provided in the embodiment of the present application may include the following steps:
[0195] Step 601: The UE sends a key request message to a base station. The key request message is used to request the initial keys of n zero power devices (ZPDs) associated with the UE, where n is an integer greater than or equal to 1.
[0196] Optionally, the key request information may include an ID UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA , and at least one of the first MAC.
[0197] Among them, ID UE UE identification information, ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn ID is the identification information corresponding to the n zero-power devices ZP1 to ZPn bound to the UE. SPBusiness identification information, ID DATA Identifies information for the data.
[0198] In addition, the first MAC is the message verification code of the key request message.
[0199] Optionally, the UE can use the key K agreed upon with the base station. AF or K s_NAF , encrypt or complete the key request information to obtain the first MAC.
[0200] Optionally, the UE may use its own private key to sign the content or part of the content of the key request information to obtain the first MAC.
[0201] Step 602: The base station sends initial key information to the UE. The initial key information includes n zero power consumption device (ZPD) initial keys associated with the UE.
[0202] If the number of ZPDs is only one (i.e. n is 1), the initial key information may include an identification information-initial key pair, i.e. (ID ZP1 , K ZP1 If there are multiple ZPDs (i.e. n is greater than 1), the initial key information may include n identification information-initial key pairs: (ID ZP1 , K ZP1 ), (ID ZP2 , K ZP2 ), (ID ZP3 ,K ZP3 ),……,(ID ZPn , K ZPn ). Among them, ID ZP1 That is, the identification information of zero-power device 1, K ZP1 That is the initial secret key of zero-power device 1, and so on, ID ZPn That is, the identification information of the zero-power device n, K ZPn That is, the initial secret key of the zero-power device n.
[0203] Optionally, the initial key may be a symmetric key, and the second device may also store its own initial key in a local storage space.
[0204] Optionally, when the key request information includes service identification information and / or data identification information, the base station may verify n ZPDs based on the service identification information and / or data identification information to determine whether the n ZPDs have permission to use the service corresponding to the service identification information and / or data identification information. Furthermore, the base station sends the initial key information to the UE only after the n ZPDs have passed verification.
[0205] Among them, the base station can determine the service identification information stored locally and the ID carried in the key request information SP Whether they are consistent, and / or determine whether the locally stored data identification information is consistent with the ID carried in the key request information DATA If they are consistent, the base station determines that at least one second device has passed the verification and at least one second device has the authority to use the service identification information and / or data identification information corresponding to the service; if they are inconsistent, the base station determines that at least one second device has failed the verification.
[0206] Optionally, after receiving the key request information sent by the first device, the base station may first authenticate the identity of the UE to determine whether the UE sending the key request information is a trustworthy device. Further, after the identity of the UE is authenticated, the base station sends the initial key information to the UE.
[0207] Optionally, the base station may authenticate the identity of the UE based on the first MAC.
[0208] In a possible implementation, if the first MAC is a key K negotiated between the UE and the base station AF or K s_NAF The base station can use the secret key K AF or K s_NAF The first MAC is verified.
[0209] In another possible implementation, if the first MAC is generated according to the private key of the UE, the base station may verify the first MAC using the certificate of the UE or the public key of the UE.
[0210] Step 603: The UE performs initial authentication with n ZPDs respectively.
[0211] It should be understood that after the UE determines the initial keys of n ZPDs, it can perform initial authentication with each ZPD based on the initial key of each ZPD to determine that each is a trusted device and prevent data leakage and theft.
[0212] It should be noted that the authentication process between the UE and each ZPD may refer to the authentication process in the related art, and for the sake of brevity, it will not be described here.
[0213] Step 604: The UE generates a device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and the initial key corresponding to each ZPD.
[0214] Optionally, the UE may directly generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and the initial key corresponding to each ZPD.
[0215] For example, if the number of ZPDs is 1, the device key Secret is the result of converging Kservice and the initial key of the ZPD. If there are multiple ZPDs, the UE can aggregate Kservice and the initial key of each ZPD to obtain the device key Secret. The aggregation process can be directly connected to multiple keys.
[0216] Optionally, the UE can negotiate the physical layer security mechanism with each ZPD based on the initial key of the ZPD to generate an intermediate key corresponding to each ZPD. Furthermore, the UE can generate a device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and the intermediate key of each ZPD.
[0217] For example, if the number of ZPDs is 1, the device key Secret is the result of converging the service shared key Kservice and the intermediate key of the ZPD. If there are multiple ZPDs, the UE can aggregate the service shared key Kservice and the intermediate keys of each ZPD to obtain the device key Secret. The aggregation process can be directly connected to multiple keys.
[0218] Step 605: The UE generates a device binding verification code DAC and / or a service verification code SAC. DAC is used to verify the association between the UE and n ZPDs; SAC is used to verify whether the UE and / or n ZPDs support ID verification. SP Indicates the service type and / or whether the UE and / or n ZPDs support ID DATA Indicates the data type.
[0219] In the embodiment of the present application, the UE may generate a device binding verification code DAC based on the device secret key Secret. For example, the UE may calculate the DAC with reference to formula (1).
[0220] In the embodiment of the present application, the UE can UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA At least one of , NONCE, and COUNT generates a service verification code SAC.
[0221] Optionally, the UE can use its private key to UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA, NONCE, COUNT, etc. to sign and obtain SAC. The specific calculation method can be referred to formula (2) and will not be described here.
[0222] Optionally, the UE can use the service shared key Kservice to UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA At least one of , NONCE, and COUNT is encrypted and integrity protected to obtain SAC. The specific calculation method can be referred to formula (3) and will not be described here.
[0223] Step 606: The UE sends a credential request message to the base station, where the credential request message is used to request authorization credentials of n ZPDs.
[0224] In this embodiment of the present application, the credential request information may include DAC and / or SAC, as well as ID UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA , and at least one of the second MAC.
[0225] The second MAC may be obtained by the UE using its own private key to sign all or part of the other information in the credential request information. The second MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the credential request information is a legitimate device.
[0226] Optionally, the UE may directly send credential request information to the application server.
[0227] Step 607: The base station verifies the DAC in the credential request information.
[0228] In the embodiment of the present application, the base station can determine whether the UE has a real association relationship with n ZPDs through DAC.
[0229] Specifically, the base station may generate first verification information based on the device secret key Secret. The base station may refer to the above formula (1) to generate the first verification information. If the first verification information is consistent with the DAC in the credential request information, it can be considered that there is a real association relationship between the UE and the n ZPDs, and the base station determines that the DAC verification is successful. If the first verification information is inconsistent with the DAC, it is considered that the association relationship between the UE and the n ZPDs is incorrect or does not exist, and the base station determines that the DAC verification is unsuccessful.
[0230] The base station can obtain the device key Secret from the UE, or from other trusted devices (such as UDM network elements, application servers, etc.). The base station can also generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and the initial key of each second device. This embodiment of the present application does not limit this.
[0231] Step 608: When the DAC is successfully verified, the base station sends a credential request message to the application server.
[0232] Optionally, after determining that there is a real association relationship between the UE and n ZPDs, the base station can forward the credential request information to the ID SP and / or ID DATA The corresponding application server.
[0233] Step 609: When the SAC is verified successfully, the application server generates authorization credentials for n ZPDs.
[0234] It is understood that after receiving the credential request information, the application server verifies through the SAC whether the service type supported by the UE and / or n ZPDs is ID SP Indicates the service type and / or whether the data type supported by the UE and / or n ZPDs is ID DATA Indicates the data type.
[0235] Optionally, if SAC uses the UE's private key to ID UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA , NONCE, COUNT, the application server can use the UE's public key to verify the SAC.
[0236] Specifically, the application server can verify the SAC through the public key of the UE to obtain the second verification information. UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA If at least one of the information in , NONCE, and COUNT is consistent, the SAC verification is determined to be successful. Otherwise, the SAC verification is determined to be unsuccessful.
[0237] Optionally, in some other embodiments, if SAC uses the service shared key Kservice, UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、IDZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA , NONCE, COUNT, etc., the application server can use the service shared key Kservice to verify SAC.
[0238] Specifically, the application server can first use the service shared key Kservice to UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、ID SP 、ID DATA The application server performs a security operation on at least one of the pieces of information, including NONCE, COUNT, to obtain third verification information. The application server may refer to the above formula (3) to generate the third verification information. If the third verification information is consistent with the SAC, the application server determines that the SAC verification has passed. Otherwise, the application server determines that the SAC verification has failed.
[0239] In the embodiment of the present application, after the application server verifies the SAC, it can generate authorization credentials for n ZPDs.
[0240] Optionally, the application server may generate an RSA accumulator parameter α for each ZPD before generating the authorization credential. ZP . Among them, the RSA accumulator parameter α of each ZPD ZP It can be used to prove whether the ZPD has been revoked.
[0241] Optionally, the authorization credential may include: ID UE 、pk UE 、{ID ZP1 、…、ID ZPn}、DAC、α ZP1 ,…,α ZPn 、ID SP 、ID IS 、ID DATA 、Sig skIS At least one of the .
[0242] Among them, pk UE is the UE's public key, ID IS Is the identification information of the application server IS, Sig skIS The application server uses its own private key to sign other information in the above authorization certificate.
[0243] For example, when the number of ZPDs is 1, the authorization certificate of the ZPD can be: Cert IS->ZP ([ID ZP1 ,DAC],α ZP1, ID UE , ID IS , ID SP , Sig skIS ). When the number of ZPDs is greater than 1, the ZPD authorization certificate can be: Cert IS->ZPg ([ID ZP1 ,…,ID ZPn ,DAC],α ZP1 ,…,α ZPn , ID UE , ID IS , ID SP , Sig skIS ). Among them, α ZP1 ,…,α ZPn They are respectively RSA accumulator parameters corresponding to n second devices.
[0244] It should be noted that when the business identification information ID SP When it is the ID of the application server, SP and ID IS If the two protocols are the same, the application server can use only one of them to generate the authorization credential.
[0245] Step 610: The application server uploads the authorization certificate to the storage block of the blockchain node.
[0246] Step 611: The application server obtains the storage location information of the authorization credential, and sends the authorization credential and / or the storage location information of the authorization credential to the UE.
[0247] In summary, in the security implementation method provided in the embodiment of the present application, the UE can act as an intermediate proxy device to implement security operations for multiple zero-power devices associated with it to obtain authorization credentials for multiple zero-power devices. In other words, the UE can be used to interact with the application server so that the application server generates lightweight group authorization credentials for multiple zero-power devices, so as to authorize the uplink data transmission of the zero-power devices, avoid attackers or pseudo base stations maliciously triggering the uplink data transmission of the zero-power devices, ensure the security of the uplink transmission data of the zero-power devices, and improve the efficiency of the authorization of the zero-power devices.
[0248] The preferred embodiments of the present application are described in detail above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings. However, the present application is not limited to the specific details in the above embodiments. Within the technical concept of the present application, the technical solution of the present application can be subjected to a variety of simple modifications, and these simple modifications all fall within the scope of protection of the present application. For example, the various specific technical features described in the above specific embodiments can be combined in any suitable manner without contradiction. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, the present application will no longer describe the various possible combinations separately. For another example, the various different embodiments of the present application can also be arbitrarily combined, as long as they do not violate the idea of the present application, they should also be regarded as the contents disclosed in the present application. For another example, under the premise of no conflict, the various embodiments and / or the technical features in each embodiment described in the present application can be arbitrarily combined with the prior art, and the technical solution obtained after the combination should also fall within the scope of protection of the present application.
[0249] It should also be understood that in the various method embodiments of the present application, the sequence numbers of the above-mentioned processes do not imply a precedence in the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application. In addition, in the embodiments of the present application, the terms "downlink," "uplink," and "sidelink" are used to indicate the transmission direction of signals or data, where "downlink" is used to indicate the first direction of transmission of signals or data from a site to a user equipment in a cell, "uplink" is used to indicate the second direction of transmission of signals or data from a user equipment in a cell to a site, and "sidelink" is used to indicate the third direction of transmission of signals or data from user equipment 1 to user equipment 2. For example, "downlink signal" indicates that the transmission direction of the signal is the first direction. In addition, in the embodiments of the present application, the term "and / or" is merely a description of the association relationship between associated objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. Specifically, A and / or B can represent three situations: A exists alone, A and B exist simultaneously, and B exists alone. In addition, the character " / " in this document generally indicates that the associated objects are in an "or" relationship.
[0250] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a security implementation device 700 provided in an embodiment of the present application, which is applied to a first network element. As shown in FIG7 , the security implementation device 700 includes:
[0251] The first receiving unit 701 is configured to receive first information; the first information includes a device binding verification code DAC and / or a service verification code SAC; DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0252] Optionally, the first information further includes at least one of the following:
[0253] Service identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the service type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device;
[0254] Data identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the data type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device;
[0255] identification information of the first device;
[0256] identification information of each second device in the at least one second device;
[0257] Device secret key Secret;
[0258] The first information verification code MAC corresponding to the first information; the first MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the first information is a legitimate device.
[0259] Optionally, the first information is used to request the at least one second device associated with the first device to issue an authorization credential; the security implementation apparatus 700 further includes:
[0260] The credential generation unit is configured to generate an authorization credential for the at least one second device when the DAC and / or the SAC are verified successfully.
[0261] Optionally, the security implementation apparatus 700 further includes a verification unit configured to: generate first verification information based on a device secret key Secret; and determine that the DAC verification is successful if the first verification information is consistent with the DAC.
[0262] Optionally, the verification unit is also configured to generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device in the at least one second device, wherein the service shared key Kservice is a shared key between the first network element and the first device.
[0263] Optionally, the verification unit is further configured to calculate the intermediate key of each second device based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device; and generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the intermediate key of each second device in the at least one second device.
[0264] Optionally, the SAC is obtained by signing at least one piece of information including identification information of the first device, identification information of each second device, service identification information, and data identification information, a random number NONCE, and a counter parameter COUNT using the private key of the first device;
[0265] Correspondingly, the verification unit is also configured to use the public key of the first device to verify the SAC to obtain second verification information; if the second verification information is consistent with the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT carried in the first information, it is determined that the SAC verification is successful.
[0266] Optionally, the SAC is obtained by performing a secure calculation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each of the at least one second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, a random number NONCE, and a counter parameter COUNT using a service shared key Kservice;
[0267] Correspondingly, the verification unit is also configured to perform a security operation on the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and at least one of the counter parameters COUNT based on the service shared key Kservice to obtain third verification information; if the third verification information is consistent with the SAC, it is determined that the SAC verification is successful.
[0268] Optionally, the authorization credential includes at least one of the following:
[0269] identification information of the first device;
[0270] a public key of the first device;
[0271] identification information of each second device in the at least one second device;
[0272] an RSA accumulator parameter for each second device in the at least one second device;
[0273] identification information of the first network element;
[0274] a public key of the first network element;
[0275] Business identification information;
[0276] Data identification information;
[0277] Device binding verification code DAC;
[0278] The digital signature of the first network element; the digital signature is obtained by signing other information in the authorization certificate based on the private key of the first network element.
[0279] Optionally, the security implementation device 700 further includes a first sending unit configured to send the authorization certificate to the blockchain node; the first receiving unit 701 is further configured to obtain storage location information of the authorization certificate.
[0280] Optionally, the first sending unit is further configured to send the authorization credential and / or the storage location information to the first device.
[0281] FIG8 is a schematic diagram of the structure of a security implementation apparatus 800 provided in an embodiment of the present application, which is applied to a first device. As shown in FIG8 , the security implementation apparatus 800 includes:
[0282] The second sending unit 801 is configured to send first information; the first device is associated with at least one second device; the first information includes a device binding verification code DAC, and / or a service verification code SAC; DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
[0283] Optionally, the first information further includes at least one of the following:
[0284] Service identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the service type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device;
[0285] Data identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the data type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device;
[0286] identification information of the first device;
[0287] identification information of each second device in the at least one second device;
[0288] Device secret key Secret;
[0289] The first information verification code MAC corresponding to the first information; the first MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the first information is a legitimate device.
[0290] Optionally, the security implementation device 800 also includes a processing unit configured to generate the device binding verification code DAC based on the device key Secret; and / or generate a service verification code SAC based on at least one item including the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, and the data identification information.
[0291] Optionally, the processing unit is also configured to generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device in the at least one second device; wherein the service shared key Kservice is a shared key between the first network element and the first device.
[0292] Optionally, the processing unit is further configured to generate an intermediate key for each second device based on the initial key of each second device; and generate the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the intermediate key of each second device in the at least one second device.
[0293] Optionally, the second sending unit 801 is further configured to send key request information to the second network element; the key request information is used to request an initial key of at least one second device associated with the first device.
[0294] Optionally, the security implementation apparatus 800 further includes a second receiving unit configured to receive initial key information sent by the second network element; the initial key information includes an initial key of each second device.
[0295] Optionally, the key request information further includes at least one of the following:
[0296] identification information of the first device;
[0297] identification information of each second device in the at least one second device;
[0298] Business identification information;
[0299] Data identification information;
[0300] The second MAC corresponding to the key request information; the second MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the key request information is a legitimate device.
[0301] Optionally, the processing unit is further configured to use the private key of the first device to sign at least one item of information including the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT to obtain the SAC.
[0302] Optionally, the processing unit is also configured to perform a security operation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT based on the service shared key Kservice to generate the SAC.
[0303] Optionally, the first information is used to request authorization credentials of at least one second device associated with the first device.
[0304] Those skilled in the art should understand that the relevant description of the above-mentioned security implementation device in the embodiment of the present application can be understood with reference to the relevant description of the security implementation method in the embodiment of the present application.
[0305] Figure 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 900 provided in an embodiment of the present application. The communication device can be a first network element or a first device. The communication device 900 shown in Figure 9 includes a processor 910, which can call and execute a computer program from a memory to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
[0306] Optionally, as shown in Figure 9, the communication device 900 may further include a memory 920. The processor 910 may call and execute a computer program from the memory 920 to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
[0307] The memory 920 may be a separate device independent of the processor 910 , or may be integrated into the processor 910 .
[0308] Optionally, as shown in FIG9 , the communication device 900 may further include a transceiver 930 , and the processor 910 may control the transceiver 930 to communicate with other devices, specifically, to send information or data to other devices, or to receive information or data sent by other devices.
[0309] The transceiver 930 may include a transmitter and a receiver. The transceiver 930 may further include an antenna, and the number of antennas may be one or more.
[0310] Optionally, the communication device 900 may specifically be the first network element of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 900 may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the first network element in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.
[0311] Optionally, the communication device 900 may specifically be the first device of the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 1800 may implement the corresponding processes implemented by the first device in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.
[0312] Figure 10 is a schematic structural diagram of a chip according to an embodiment of the present application. The chip 1000 shown in Figure 10 includes a processor 1010, which can call and run a computer program from a memory to implement the method according to the embodiment of the present application.
[0313] Optionally, as shown in FIG10 , the chip 1900 may further include a memory 1020. The processor 1010 may call and execute a computer program from the memory 1020 to implement the method in the embodiment of the present application.
[0314] The memory 1020 may be a separate device independent of the processor 1010 , or may be integrated into the processor 100 .
[0315] Optionally, the chip 1000 may further include an input interface 1030. The processor 1010 may control the input interface 1030 to communicate with other devices or chips, and specifically, may obtain information or data sent by other devices or chips.
[0316] Optionally, the chip 1000 may further include an output interface 1040. The processor 1010 may control the output interface 1040 to communicate with other devices or chips, and specifically, may output information or data to other devices or chips.
[0317] Optionally, the chip can be applied to the first network element in the embodiment of the present application, and the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the first network element in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.
[0318] Optionally, the chip can be applied to the first device in the embodiment of the present application, and the chip can implement the corresponding processes implemented by the first device in each method of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
[0319] It should be understood that the chip mentioned in the embodiments of the present application can also be called a system-level chip, a system chip, a chip system or a system-on-chip chip, etc.
[0320] FIG11 is a schematic block diagram of a communication system 1100 provided in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG11 , the communication system 1100 includes a first device 1110 and a first network element 1120 .
[0321] Among them, the first device 1110 can be used to implement the corresponding functions implemented by the first device in the above method, and the first network element 1120 can be used to implement the corresponding functions implemented by the first network element in the above method. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.
[0322] It should be understood that the processor of the embodiments of the present application may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. During implementation, each step of the above method embodiment can be completed by hardware integrated logic circuits in the processor or software instructions. The above processor can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, or discrete hardware components. The various methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented or executed. The general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be directly embodied as being executed by a hardware decoding processor, or can be executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor. The software module can be located in a storage medium mature in the art, such as random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory, electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, etc. The storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory and completes the steps of the above method in combination with its hardware.
[0323] It is understood that the memory in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memories. Among them, the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), or a flash memory. The volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache. By way of example and not limitation, many forms of RAM are available, such as static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous link dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct RAM bus random access memory (DR RAM). It should be noted that the memory of the systems and methods described herein is intended to include, but is not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memory.
[0324] It should be understood that the above-mentioned memories are exemplary but not restrictive. For example, the memories in the embodiments of the present application may also be static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), synchronous dynamic random access memory (SDRAM), double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory (DDR SDRAM), enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory (ESDRAM), synchronous link dynamic random access memory (SLDRAM), and direct RAM RAM (DR RAM), etc. In other words, the memories in the embodiments of the present application are intended to include, but are not limited to, these and any other suitable types of memories.
[0325] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program.
[0326] Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium can be applied to the first network element in the embodiment of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the first network element in the various methods of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.
[0327] Optionally, the computer-readable storage medium can be applied to the first device in the embodiment of the present application, and the computer program enables the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the first device in the various methods of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.
[0328] An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product, including computer program instructions.
[0329] Optionally, the computer program product can be applied to the first network element in the embodiment of the present application, and the computer program instructions enable the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the first network element in the various methods of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they will not be repeated here.
[0330] Optionally, the computer program product can be applied to the first device in the embodiment of the present application, and the computer program instructions enable the computer to execute the corresponding processes implemented by the first device in the various methods of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.
[0331] The embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program.
[0332] Optionally, the computer program can be applied to the first network element in the embodiment of the present application. When the computer program runs on a computer, the computer executes the corresponding processes implemented by the first network element in the various methods of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.
[0333] Optionally, the computer program can be applied to the first device in the embodiment of the present application. When the computer program runs on a computer, the computer executes the corresponding processes implemented by the first device in the various methods of the embodiment of the present application. For the sake of brevity, they are not repeated here.
[0334] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are performed in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Professional and technical personnel can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
[0335] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the convenience and brevity of description, the specific working processes of the systems, devices and units described above can refer to the corresponding processes in the aforementioned method embodiments and will not be repeated here.
[0336] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device embodiments described above are merely schematic. For example, the division of the units is merely a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods, such as multiple units or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not executed. Another point is that the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed can be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, which can be electrical, mechanical or other forms.
[0337] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of these units may be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.
[0338] In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
[0339] If the functions are implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, they can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. The computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for enabling a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.
[0340] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of the present application, but the scope of protection of the present application is not limited thereto. Any changes or substitutions that can be easily conceived by a person skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in the present application should be included in the scope of protection of the present application. Therefore, the scope of protection of the present application should be based on the scope of protection of the claims.
Claims
1. A security implementation method, comprising: The first network element receives the first information; The first information includes a device binding verification code DAC and / or a service verification code SAC; wherein DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein The first information also includes at least one of the following: Service identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the service type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device; Data identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the data type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device; identification information of the first device; identification information of each second device in the at least one second device; Device secret key Secret; A first information verification code MAC corresponding to the first information; The first MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the first information is a legitimate device.
3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, wherein: The first information is used to request the at least one second device associated with the first device to issue an authorization credential; The method further comprises: When the DAC and / or the SAC are verified successfully, the first network element generates an authorization credential for the at least one second device.
4. The method according to claim 3, wherein: Also includes: The first network element generates first verification information based on the device secret key Secret; If the first verification information is consistent with the DAC, the first network element determines that the DAC verification is successful.
5. The method according to claim 4, wherein Before the first network element generates the first verification information based on the device secret key Secret, the method further includes: The first network element generates the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device in the at least one second device; The service shared key Kservice is a shared key between the first network element and the first device.
6. The method according to claim 5, wherein: The first network element calculates the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device, including: The first network element calculates an intermediate key for each second device based on an initial key for each second device; The first network element generates the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the intermediate key of each second device in the at least one second device.
7. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 6, wherein: The SAC signs at least one piece of information including the identification information of the first device, identification information of each second device, service identification information, data identification information, a random number NONCE, and a counter parameter COUNT based on the private key of the first device; Correspondingly, the method further includes: The first network element verifies the SAC using the public key of the first device to obtain second verification information; If the second verification information is consistent with the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT carried in the first information, the first network element determines that the SAC verification is successful.
8. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 6, wherein: The SAC is obtained by performing a secure calculation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each of the at least one second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT based on the service shared key Kservice; Correspondingly, the method further includes: The first network element performs a security operation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT based on the service shared key Kservice to obtain third verification information; If the third verification information is consistent with the SAC, the first network element determines that the SAC verification is successful.
9. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 8, wherein: The authorization credential includes at least one of the following: identification information of the first device; a public key of the first device; identification information of each second device in the at least one second device; an RSA accumulator parameter for each second device in the at least one second device; identification information of the first network element; a public key of the first network element; Business identification information; Data identification information; Device binding verification code DAC; The digital signature of the first network element; the digital signature is obtained by signing other information in the authorization certificate based on the private key of the first network element.
10. The method according to any one of claims 3 to 9, wherein: Also includes: The first network element sends the authorization certificate to the blockchain node; The first network element obtains the storage location information of the authorization certificate.
11. The method according to claim 10, wherein: Also includes: The first network element sends the authorization credential and / or the storage location information to the first device.
12. A security implementation method, the method comprising: The first device sends the first information; The first device is associated with at least one second device; the first information includes a device binding verification code DAC and / or a service verification code SAC; DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
13. The method according to claim 12, wherein: The first information further includes at least one of the following: Service identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the service type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device; Data identification information; the service identification information is used to indicate the data type supported by the first device and / or the at least one second device; identification information of the first device; identification information of each second device in the at least one second device; Device secret key Secret; A first information verification code MAC corresponding to the first information; The first MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the first information is a legitimate device.
14. The method according to claim 12 or 13, wherein: Before the first device sends the first information, the method further includes: The first device generates a DAC based on the device secret key Secret; and / or, The first device generates a SAC based on at least one of the identification information of the first device, identification information of each second device, service identification information, data identification information, a random number NONCE, and a counter parameter COUNT.
15. The method according to claim 14, wherein Before the first device generates the DAC based on the device secret key Secret, the following steps are further included: The first device calculates the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the initial key of each second device in the at least one second device; The service shared key Kservice is a shared key between the first network element and the first device.
16. The method according to claim 14, wherein The first device generates the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the identification information of each second device in the at least one second device, including: The first device generates an intermediate key for each second device based on the initial key of each second device; The first device generates the device key Secret based on the service shared key Kservice and / or the intermediate key of each second device in the at least one second device.
17. The method according to claim 15 or 16, wherein Before the first device generates the device secret key Secret based on the identification information of each second device in the at least one second device, the method further includes: The first device sends a key request message to the second network element; the key request message is used to request an initial key of at least one second device associated with the first device.
18. The method according to claim 17, wherein Also includes: The first device receives the initial key information sent by the second network element; The initial key information includes the initial key of each second device.
19. The method according to claim 17 or 18, wherein The key request information also includes at least one of the following: identification information of the first device; identification information of each second device in the at least one second device; Business identification information; Data identification information; A second MAC corresponding to the key request information; The second MAC is used to verify whether the sender of the key request information is a legitimate device.
20. The method according to any one of claims 14 to 19, wherein: The first device generates a SAC based on at least one of the identification information of the first device, identification information of each second device, service identification information, data identification information, a random number NONCE, and a counter parameter COUNT, including: The first device uses its private key to sign at least one item of information including the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT to obtain the SAC.
21. The method according to any one of claims 14 to 19, wherein: The first device generates a SAC based on at least one of the identification information of the first device, identification information of each second device, service identification information, data identification information, a random number NONCE, and a counter parameter COUNT, including: The first device performs a security operation on at least one of the identification information of the first device, the identification information of each second device, the service identification information, the data identification information, the random number NONCE, and the counter parameter COUNT based on the service shared key Kservice to generate the SAC.
22. The method according to any one of claims 12 to 21, wherein: The first information is used to request authorization credentials of at least one second device associated with the first device.
23. A security implementation device, applied to a first network element, comprising: A first receiving unit is configured to receive first information; The first information includes a device binding verification code DAC and / or a service verification code SAC; DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
24. A security implementation apparatus, applied to a first device, wherein the first device is associated with at least one second device; comprising: A second sending unit is configured to send the first information; The first information includes a device binding verification code DAC and / or a service verification code SAC; DAC is used to verify the association relationship between the first device and the at least one second device, and SAC is used to verify whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the service type indicated by the service identification information, and / or whether the first device and / or the at least one second device supports the data type indicated by the data identification information.
25. A first network element, comprising: A processor and a memory, the memory being used to store a computer program, the processor being used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 11.
26. A first device, comprising: A processor and a memory, the memory being used to store a computer program, the processor being used to call and run the computer program stored in the memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 12 to 22.
27. A chip comprising: A processor, configured to call and run a computer program from a memory, so that a device equipped with the chip executes the method according to any one of claims 1 to 11.
28. A chip, comprising: A processor, configured to call and execute a computer program from a memory, so that a device equipped with the chip executes the method according to any one of claims 12 to 22.
29. A computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program causes a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 11.
30. A computer-readable storage medium for storing a computer program, wherein the computer program causes a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 12 to 22.
31. A computer program product comprising computer program instructions for causing a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 11.
32. A computer program product comprising computer program instructions for causing a computer to perform the method according to any one of claims 12 to 22.
33. A computer program causing a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 11.
34. A computer program causing a computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 12 to 22.
