Smart contract-driven unmanned aerial vehicle operation data sharing method and related device
Through a smart contract-driven method, the identity information of drone subscribers is converted into anonymous identifiers and generated symmetric keys, solving the problem of large calculation overhead and privacy leakage of drone data sharing technology, realizing dynamic subscription and efficient privacy Protect.
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202411070706.5
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2024-08-06
- Publication Date
- 2024-12-03
- Estimated Expiration
- 2044-08-06
AI Technical Summary
Due to the high computing overhead, existing drone data sharing technology is difficult to effectively implement in dynamic networks, and identity-based broadcast encryption schemes have capacity limitations and privacy risks.
Using a smart contract-driven method, the subscriber identity information of the drone is converted into anonymous identifiers, and a symmetric key is generated through the bilinear mapping of large prime integer groups and base groups, encrypted and decrypted, and on the private chain. Deploy accountability smart contracts to achieve lightweight accountability mechanisms.
Support dynamic subscriptions, hide the identity information of subscribers, reduce computing overhead, and improve privacy protection through accountability mechanisms, which is better than traditional solutions for efficiency and security.
Smart Images

Figure CN119068720A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] The present application relates to the field of drones, and more specifically, to a smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method and related devices. Background Art
[0002] At present, most data sharing technologies use cryptography-based and blockchain-based technologies for data sharing. However, these sharing methods often require drones to perform too many computing operations, such as consensus and homomorphic encryption, which will bring huge computing overhead to drones. However, due to the limitations of drones' endurance and computing power, drones often cannot afford the overhead of large computing during data sharing. In addition, these existing schemes use algorithms such as attribute-based encryption or identity-based broadcast encryption to achieve point-to-multipoint ciphertext sharing. However, when the attributes of the access policy change, attribute-based encryption schemes will generate a lot of key management overhead, which is not suitable for dynamic drone networks.
[0003] Therefore, identity-based broadcast encryption technology is proposed in related technologies. This technology allows data to be encrypted and decrypted based on the user's identity, rather than based on the traditional public key infrastructure, thereby simplifying key management and being more suitable for multi-user scenarios. However, in practice, it is found that although the identity-based broadcast encryption scheme supports stateless reception, allowing drones to directly build a sharing group based on the recipient's identity, the sharing group has capacity limitations, and the identity information contained in the sharing group is prone to the risk of privacy leakage of the recipient. Summary of the invention
[0004] In order to overcome at least one of the shortcomings of the prior art, the present application provides a smart contract driven drone operation data sharing method and related devices, specifically including:
[0005] In a first aspect, the present application provides a method for sharing drone operation data driven by a smart contract, the method comprising:
[0006] Convert the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generate a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, wherein the identity information and identity key of each subscriber are pre-generated by an identity-based broadcast encryption method, and the identity-based broadcast encryption method relies on a bilinear mapping between a large prime-order integer group and a base group;
[0007] Selecting a key generation element from the large prime order integer group, and generating a symmetric key for the shared data according to the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value, wherein the bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping the elements selected from the base group;
[0008] Converting the shared data into encrypted ciphertext by using the symmetric key, and generating signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header;
[0009] The signature information, the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header are encapsulated into a broadcast ciphertext, and the broadcast ciphertext is broadcast to the terminal device of each of the subscribed users, so that each of the terminal devices uses the identity key of the corresponding subscribed user to restore the symmetric key from the broadcast header for decrypting the encrypted ciphertext.
[0010] In combination with the optional implementation manner of the first aspect, the converting the identity information of each subscribed user of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscribed user includes:
[0011] For each of the subscribing users, bilinearly map the identity information of the subscribing user with a preset master public key to obtain identification parameters of the identity information of the subscribing user, wherein the master public key is obtained by mapping an element selected from the base group with a master private key selected from the large prime order integer group;
[0012] Generate an anonymous identifier of the subscriber according to the identifier parameter, the key generation element, and an anonymous generation element selected from the preset large prime order integer group, wherein the relationship between the identifier parameter, the key generation element, the anonymous generation element and the anonymous identifier is:
[0013]
[0014] In the formula, k represents the key generation element, θ represents the anonymous generation element, represents the preset large prime order integer group, represents the θth power of the identification parameter, Indicates that through the hash function Mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in Indicates that through the hash function is mapped to a binary string of fixed length, g represents the element selected from the base group, Represents the anonymous identifier.
[0015] In combination with the optional implementation manner of the first aspect, the broadcast header further includes a timestamp;
[0016] The identity information of the drone that generated the shared data;
[0017] The restoration identifier of the symmetric key, wherein the expression of the restoration identifier is:
[0018] h3=g θ
[0019] In the formula, h3 represents the restoration identifier, g represents the element selected from the base group, and θ represents the anonymous generated element.
[0020] In conjunction with the optional implementation manner of the first aspect, the relationship between the key generation element, the bilinear mapping value and the symmetric key is:
[0021] K=L k
[0022] In the formula, K represents the symmetric key, L represents the bilinear mapping value, and k represents the key generation element.
[0023] In combination with the optional implementation manner of the first aspect, the method further includes a decryption method for the broadcast ciphertext, and the decryption method includes:
[0024] Receiving the broadcast ciphertext sent by the drone;
[0025] Determining whether the broadcast ciphertext satisfies a preset verification condition;
[0026] If the preset verification condition is met, obtaining a restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext;
[0027] Obtaining a symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext according to the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext and the identity key of the drone;
[0028] The shared data is decrypted from the broadcast ciphertext using the symmetric key.
[0029] In combination with the optional implementation manner of the first aspect, obtaining the symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext according to the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext and the identity key of the drone includes:
[0030] The anonymous auxiliary information is obtained according to the restoration identifier and the identity key of the subscriber, wherein the relationship between the restoration identifier, the identity key of the subscriber and the anonymous auxiliary information is:
[0031]
[0032] In the formula, represents the anonymous auxiliary information, represents the identity key of the subscriber, h3 represents the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext, Represents the bilinear mapping through the hash function The result is mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in ;
[0033] Acquire the anonymous identifier of the subscribing user from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext;
[0034] Obtaining a key generation element required to generate the symmetric key according to the anonymous auxiliary information of the drone and the anonymous identifier of the subscriber;
[0035] The symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext is obtained according to the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key and the anonymous auxiliary information, wherein the relationship between the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key, the anonymous auxiliary information and the symmetric key is:
[0036]
[0037] Wherein, K represents the symmetric key, represents the anonymous auxiliary information, k represents the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key, and g represents an element selected from the base group obtained from the broadcast ciphertext.
[0038] In combination with an optional implementation manner of the first aspect, the drone also pays a deposit through an accountability smart contract deployed in a private chain, and the accountability smart contract is deployed by a management device. The method further includes:
[0039] If the preset verification conditions are not met, a report message is sent to the management device so that the management device rewards the deposit to the subscriber who initiated the report through the accountability smart contract.
[0040] In a second aspect, the present application also provides a smart contract driven drone operation data sharing device, the device comprising:
[0041] A broadcast header module, which converts the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generates a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, wherein the identity information and identity key of each subscriber are pre-generated by an identity-based broadcast encryption method, and the identity-based broadcast encryption method relies on a bilinear mapping between a large prime-order integer group and a base group;
[0042] A key generation module, used for selecting a key generation element from the large prime order integer group, and generating a symmetric key for the shared data according to the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value, wherein the bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping an element selected from the base group;
[0043] A ciphertext signature module, used to convert the shared data into encrypted ciphertext by using the symmetric key, and generate signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header;
[0044] The ciphertext broadcast module is used to encapsulate the signature information, the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header into a broadcast ciphertext, and broadcast the broadcast ciphertext to the terminal device of each of the subscribed users, so that each of the terminal devices can use the identity key of the corresponding subscribed user to restore the symmetric key from the broadcast header for decrypting the encrypted ciphertext.
[0045] In conjunction with the optional implementation manner of the second aspect, the broadcast header module is further specifically used for:
[0046] For each of the subscribing users, bilinearly map the identity information of the subscribing user with a preset master public key to obtain identification parameters of the identity information of the subscribing user, wherein the master public key is obtained by mapping an element selected from the base group with a master private key selected from the large prime order integer group;
[0047] Generate an anonymous identifier of the subscriber according to the identifier parameter, the key generation element, and an anonymous generation element selected from the preset large prime order integer group, wherein the relationship between the identifier parameter, the key generation element, the anonymous generation element and the anonymous identifier is:
[0048]
[0049] In the formula, k represents the key generation element, θ represents the anonymous generation element, represents the preset large prime order integer group, represents the θth power of the identification parameter, Indicates that through the hash function Mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in Indicates that through the hash function is mapped to a binary string of fixed length, g represents the element selected from the base group, Represents the anonymous identifier.
[0050] In combination with the optional implementation manner of the second aspect, the broadcast header further includes a timestamp;
[0051] The identity information of the drone that generated the shared data;
[0052] The restoration identifier of the symmetric key, wherein the expression of the restoration identifier is:
[0053] h3=g θ
[0054] In the formula, h3 represents the restoration identifier, g represents the element selected from the base group, and θ represents the anonymous generated element.
[0055] In conjunction with the optional implementation manner of the second aspect, the relationship between the key generation element, the bilinear mapping value and the symmetric key is:
[0056]
[0057] In the formula, K represents the symmetric key, L represents the bilinear mapping value, and k represents the key generation element.
[0058] In combination with the optional implementation manner of the second aspect, the device further includes:
[0059] A ciphertext receiving module, used for receiving the broadcast ciphertext sent by the drone;
[0060] A ciphertext verification module, used to determine whether the broadcast ciphertext meets a preset verification condition;
[0061] If the preset verification conditions are met, the ciphertext decryption module is used to obtain the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext; obtain the symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext based on the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext and the identity key of the drone; and decrypt the shared data from the broadcast ciphertext using the symmetric key.
[0062] In conjunction with the optional implementation manner of the second aspect, the ciphertext decryption module is further specifically used for:
[0063] The anonymous auxiliary information is obtained according to the restoration identifier and the identity key of the subscriber, wherein the relationship between the restoration identifier, the identity key of the subscriber and the anonymous auxiliary information is:
[0064]
[0065] In the formula, represents the anonymous auxiliary information, represents the identity key of the subscriber, h3 represents the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext, Represents the bilinear mapping through the hash function The result is mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in ;
[0066] Acquire the anonymous identifier of the subscribing user from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext;
[0067] Obtaining a key generation element required to generate the symmetric key according to the anonymous auxiliary information of the drone and the anonymous identifier of the subscriber;
[0068] The symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext is obtained according to the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key and the anonymous auxiliary information, wherein the relationship between the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key, the anonymous auxiliary information and the symmetric key is:
[0069]
[0070] Wherein, K represents the symmetric key, represents the anonymous auxiliary information, k represents the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key, and g represents an element selected from the base group obtained from the broadcast ciphertext.
[0071] In combination with the optional implementation manner of the second aspect, the drone also pays a deposit through an accountability smart contract deployed in a private chain, the accountability smart contract is deployed by a management device, and the ciphertext verification module is also used to:
[0072] If the preset verification conditions are not met, a report message is sent to the management device so that the management device rewards the deposit to the subscriber who initiated the report through the accountability smart contract.
[0073] In a third aspect, the present application also provides a storage medium, which stores a computer program. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method.
[0074] In a fourth aspect, the present application also provides an electronic device, comprising a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method is implemented.
[0075] Compared with the prior art, this application has the following beneficial effects:
[0076] The present application provides a method and related device for sharing drone operation data driven by a smart contract. The drone converts the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generates a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, wherein the identity information and identity key of each subscriber are pre-generated by an identity-based broadcast encryption method, and the identity-based broadcast encryption method relies on the bilinear mapping of a large prime-order integer group and a base group; a key generation element is selected from the large prime-order integer group, and a symmetric key of the shared data is generated according to the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value, wherein the bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping of the elements selected from the base group; the shared data is converted into an encrypted ciphertext by a symmetric key, and the signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header is generated; the signature information, the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header are encapsulated into a broadcast ciphertext, and the broadcast ciphertext is broadcast to the terminal device of each subscriber. In this way, the drone supports dynamic subscription and hides the identity information of the subscriber through a one-way anonymous key protocol. In addition, a lightweight accountability mechanism is implemented through an accountability smart contract and a short signature deployed on a private chain. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0077] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application, the drawings required for use in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. It should be understood that the following drawings only show certain embodiments of the present application and therefore should not be regarded as limiting the scope. For ordinary technicians in this field, other related drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.
[0078] Figure 1 A flow chart of the method provided in the embodiment of the present application;
[0079] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the interaction during the initialization phase provided by an embodiment of the present application;
[0080] Figure 3 A schematic diagram of interaction in the sharing phase provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0081] Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the structure of a virtual device provided in an embodiment of the present application;
[0082] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of the present application.
[0083] Icons: 11-broadcast header module; 12-key generation module; 13-ciphertext signature module; 14-ciphertext broadcast module; 21-memory; 22-processor; 23-communication unit; 24-system bus. DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0084] In order to make the purpose, technical solution and advantages of the embodiments of the present application clearer, the technical solution in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the drawings in the embodiments of the present application. Obviously, the described embodiments are part of the embodiments of the present application, rather than all the embodiments. The components of the embodiments of the present application described and shown in the drawings here can be arranged and designed in various different configurations.
[0085] Therefore, the following detailed description of the embodiments of the present application provided in the accompanying drawings is not intended to limit the scope of the present application for which protection is sought, but merely represents selected embodiments of the present application. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in the field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present application.
[0086] It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters denote similar items in the following drawings, and therefore, once an item is defined in one drawing, further definition and explanation thereof is not required in subsequent drawings.
[0087] In the description of the present application, it should be noted that the terms "first", "second", "third", etc. are only used to distinguish the description and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance. In addition, the terms "comprise", "include" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, method, article or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also includes other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such process, method, article or device. In the absence of further restrictions, an element defined by the sentence "comprises a ..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article or device including the element.
[0088] Based on the above statement, as introduced in the background technology, although the identity-based broadcast encryption scheme supports stateless reception, allowing drones to directly build a sharing group based on the identity of the receiver, the sharing group has capacity limitations, and the identity information contained in the sharing group is prone to the risk of privacy leakage of the receiver.
[0089] To make the implementation methods described below in this embodiment easier to understand, the Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (IBBE) scheme involved in this embodiment is first described. This encryption method includes the following steps:
[0090] 1. Key generation: The key generator generates a basic key pair for the entire system, including a master private key and a master public key. The master private key is kept confidential and strictly kept, while the master public key is published publicly as a key parameter in the encryption process for use when encrypting messages.
[0091] 2. User registration: In order to obtain encryption services, users need to register with the key generator through their terminal devices and provide their unique identity, such as an email address. The user's unique identity will be used to generate the corresponding identity key, so that the terminal device can use the user's identity key to decrypt the received encrypted data.
[0092] 3. Key extraction: After the user successfully registers, the key generator uses the identity identifier and master private key provided by the user to generate the user's identity key through a specific private key extraction algorithm. This identity key will then be issued to the user's terminal device in a secure manner to ensure that the identity key is not leaked during the entire process.
[0093] 4. Encryption: When an encrypted message needs to be sent, the sender will use the receiver's identity identifier and the system's master public key to encrypt the message. In this way, the encrypted message can only be decrypted by the receiver who has the corresponding identity key, ensuring the confidentiality of the message.
[0094] 5. Decryption: After receiving the encrypted message, the terminal device uses the corresponding user's identity key to decrypt the message. This process ensures that only the user holding the correct identity key can decrypt and read the message content, thereby maintaining the security and privacy of information transmission.
[0095] In this way, through the above identity-based broadcast encryption scheme, when the drone needs to send a message to the receiver in the system, it only needs to use the unique identity of the receiver to complete the encryption of the data. Therefore, the drone can directly build a sharing group based on the identity of the receiver, but the sharing group has a capacity limit. In addition, the identity information contained in the sharing group directly with the user receiver is prone to the risk of privacy leakage of the receiver.
[0096] It should be noted that, based on the discovery of the above technical problems, the inventors have proposed the following technical solutions to solve or improve the above problems through creative work. It should be noted that the defects in the solutions in the above prior art are the results obtained by the inventors after practice and careful research. Therefore, the discovery process of the above problems and the solutions proposed in the embodiments of the present application for the above problems below should all be the contributions made by the inventors to the present application in the process of invention and creation, and should not be understood as technical contents known to those skilled in the art.
[0097] In view of the above problems, this embodiment improves the traditional identity-based broadcast encryption method and proposes a smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method. In this method, the drone converts the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generates a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, wherein the identity information and identity key of each subscriber are pre-generated by an identity-based broadcast encryption method, and the identity-based broadcast encryption method depends on the bilinear mapping of a large prime-order integer group and a base group; a key generation element is selected from the large prime-order integer group, and a symmetric key of the shared data is generated according to the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value, wherein the bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping of the elements selected from the base group; the shared data is converted into an encrypted ciphertext by a symmetric key, and the signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header is generated; the signature information, the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header are encapsulated as a broadcast ciphertext, and the broadcast ciphertext is broadcast to the terminal device of each subscriber. In this way, the drone supports dynamic subscription and hides the identity information of the subscriber through a one-way anonymous key protocol.
[0098] It should be noted that the Internet in this embodiment refers to a system composed of multiple drones, ground control stations, drone traffic management systems, cloud storage servers, multiple subscribers' terminal devices and other entity objects through the network. In order to have a clearer understanding of the Internet in this embodiment, the following describes each of the above-mentioned entity objects in detail:
[0099] Drones: Drones are operated by ground control stations via wireless communications and are usually equipped with an array of sensors such as cameras to collect a variety of data. Drones are usually weak in terms of endurance and computing capabilities.
[0100] Ground Control Stations (GCS), GCS has sufficient communication and computing capabilities to control the operation of the UAV, and can be a large workstation. Usually, it supports one-to-one or one-to-many control modes for real-time monitoring, path planning, mission setting, operation playback, etc.
[0101] Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management (UTM), which is managed by the government and is responsible for authenticating and distributing keys to new system users. At the same time, UTM provides air services such as weather data, intelligence and restriction information through network infrastructure such as cell sites.
[0102] Cloud Storage Server (CSS), CSS integrates a large number of storage devices into the network through technologies such as cluster applications and distributed file systems. Therefore, system entities can store or access data anytime and anywhere using any networked device.
[0103] Subscribers refer to users who register with UTM. For example, users of entity objects such as drones, information service providers, data companies, ground vehicles, and terminal devices register with UTM and use the identity information obtained through registration to subscribe to drones in order to obtain access rights to drone operation data.
[0104] In addition, a private chain (PBC) is also provided in this embodiment. PBC is operated by multiple enterprises or organizations (i.e., nodes that reach consensus), thereby achieving fast and cost-effective transactions, and non-majority consensus nodes cannot arbitrarily tamper with blockchain data. In this embodiment, all physical devices are nodes in PBC.
[0105] In the above Internet, UTM initializes the entire system, and all system users must register their identities in UTM, which are called registered users. Registered users send subscription requests to GCS to obtain drone operation data, including flight data, sensor data, control data, fault data, etc. GCS can verify the legitimacy of the user's identity through the on-chain smart contract. After successful verification, GCS will add the user's identity to the drone sharing group. During the mission, the drone encrypts the operation data using all identities in the sharing group. The drone then broadcasts the encrypted text and uploads it synchronously to the CSS, so that users can receive the encrypted text through the wireless channel or download the encrypted text from the CSS on demand.
[0106] To make the solution provided by this embodiment clearer, Figure 1 Each step of the method is described in detail. However, it should be understood that the operations of the flowchart may not be implemented in order, and steps without logical contextual relationships may be reversed in order or implemented simultaneously. In addition, those skilled in the art may add one or more other operations to the flowchart, or remove one or more operations from the flowchart under the guidance of the content of this application. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes:
[0107] S1, converts the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generates a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber.
[0108] The identity information and identity key of each subscribed user are pre-generated through an identity-based broadcast encryption method, which relies on a bilinear mapping between a large prime integer group and a base group. It can be understood that this embodiment includes an initialization phase in which the identity information and identity key of the subscribed user are pre-generated, and a sharing phase in which the drone broadcasts the shared data.
[0109] like Figure 2 As shown in Figure 1, during the initialization phase, UTM initializes the system by generating a set of public system parameters and a pair of master key pairs. In addition, UTM also deploys an accountability smart contract SC on the private chain. acc , which is used to provide an accountability mechanism. All users of physical objects on the Internet need to report to the SC acc Register your identity and pay a deposit. After successful verification, UTM will distribute the identity key to the user who initiated the registration and record their identity on the private chain. In this way, a lightweight accountability mechanism is built through short signatures. In addition, when the registered entity object is a drone, its flight smart contract SC needs to be deployed and published in the private chain. uav , to record flight data. As shown in the following table, the above two smart contracts provide the following functions that can be called, as well as the objects that call the functions:
[0110]
[0111] The above implementation introduces the entire Internet. The following is a detailed description of the initialization phase of the system:
[0112] Similar to the traditional identity-based broadcast encryption method, in order to initialize the entire sharing system, this embodiment provides four deterministic algorithms: parameter generation (ParamsGen), master generation (MasterGen), identity generation (IdentityGen) and registration (Register). The following describes in detail the above four algorithms involved in initializing the entire sharing system:
[0113] ParamsGen(κ) → Params, given a security parameter κ that characterizes the strength of the encryption (for example, indicating that the strength of the key is 256 bits), the algorithm selects a prime number p and selects an integer group of order p In addition, a bilinear map e is initialized: And three hash functions and It should be understood that in certain areas of cryptography and mathematics, e represents a bilinear mapping, which is used to transform the basis group The elements in are mapped to the multiplicative cyclic group An element in . The first hash function is used to map a binary string of arbitrary length into a base group The second hash function is used to convert An element in the group is mapped to an integer group of order p containing non-negative integers Hereinafter, they are collectively referred to as large prime integer groups; the third hash function is used to map a binary string of arbitrary length to a fixed-length 256-bit binary string. Finally, the algorithm also uses the element g selected from the base group to perform a bilinear mapping to obtain the bilinear mapping value L = e(g,g), and outputs a set of public system parameters
[0114] MasterGen(Params)→(MSK,MPK), which is an algorithm for generating integer groups from large prime order Randomly select an integer As the master private key, then use the master private key to calculate the master public key MPK = g MSK , thus obtaining the master key pair (MSK, MPK) as output.
[0115] IdentityGen(Params)→(sig,id), for each registered entity object, the algorithm generates a large prime integer group A short signature BLS (Boneh-Lynn-Shacham) is randomly selected as
[0116] For the signature private key And use the signature private key to calculate the signature public key As the identity information id of the entity object, the algorithm outputs the signature key pair (sk sig ,id=pk sig ).
[0117] Register(MSK,id)→sk id , given the master private key MSK and identity information id, the algorithm will calculate the corresponding identity key. The calculation expression is as follows:
[0118]
[0119] The algorithm outputs sk id As the identity key. It should be noted that the identity key and the signature private key are different keys and have different functions. In this way, the master public key and master private key of the entire system are generated in the initialization phase, and the corresponding identity information id and identity key sk are assigned to each registered entity object. id , signature key pair (sk sig ,id=pk sig ).
[0120] Based on the introduction of the initialization phase of the entire Internet in the above embodiment, the sharing phase is described in detail below:
[0121] The sharing phase is divided into the drone’s pre-flight, in-flight, and post-flight stages. Figure 3 As shown in the figure, before the flight, the subscriber can send a subscription request to the GCS through the terminal device to obtain the drone operation data. The ground control station uses the accountability smart contract SC acc After verifying that the subscriber's identity information is legitimate, GCS will add the subscriber to the drone's sharing group. Therefore, GCS can dynamically update the sharing group. In addition, the address of CSS is returned to the subscriber's terminal device. During the flight, the drone uses the encrypted sharing method provided in this embodiment to encrypt the generated shared data, broadcast it, and synchronously upload the broadcast ciphertext to CSS. Therefore, all users can verify the broadcast ciphertext. After the flight, the drone is still in the flight smart contract SC deployed for itself. uav The task number and data summary are recorded in.
[0122] The encrypted sharing method provided in this embodiment is described in detail below. Unlike the traditional identity-based broadcast encryption method, this embodiment does not directly use the identity information of the subscribed user to encrypt the shared data of the drone, but further converts the identity information into an anonymous identifier to enhance the privacy when sharing data.
[0123] In a specific implementation, for each subscribed user, the drone performs a bilinear mapping between the identity information of the subscribed user and the preset master public key to obtain the identification parameter of the identity information of the subscribed user. The corresponding expression is:
[0124]
[0125] In the formula, the identity information of each subscribing user is distinguished by the identifier i, id i Represents the identity information of the i-th subscriber, MPK represents the master public key, which is obtained by mapping the element g selected from the base group with the master private key MSK selected from the large prime integer group, MPK = g MSK . Indicates that the id is converted through a hash function i Mapping to the base group An element in , e represents a bilinear map, Indicates identity information id i Therefore, if there are multiple subscribed users, this embodiment regards these subscribed users as a sharing group, which can be expressed as S = {id1, id2, ..., id n}, the corresponding identification parameters of multiple subscribing users can be expressed as
[0126] Then, the drone generates an anonymous identifier of the subscriber based on the identifier parameter, the key generation element, and the anonymous generation element selected from the large prime integer group, where the relationship between the identifier parameter, the key generation element, the anonymous generation element, and the anonymous identifier is:
[0127]
[0128] In the formula, k represents the key generation element, θ represents the anonymous generation element, represents a group of integers of a preset large prime order, represents the theta power of the identification parameter, Indicates that through the hash function Mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in Indicates that through the hash function Mapped to a fixed-length binary string, g represents an element selected from the base group, represents an anonymous identifier, and || in this embodiment represents a connection operation, which is used to connect the previous and next two data into one data.
[0129] In addition, the broadcast header also includes a timestamp; the identity information of the drone that generates the shared data; and a restoration identifier of the symmetric key, where the restoration identifier is expressed as:
[0130] h3=g θ
[0131] In the formula, h3 represents the restoration label, g represents the element selected from the base group, and θ represents the anonymous generated element.
[0132] Exemplarily, in this embodiment, the broadcast header is represented as hdr, hdr = (h1, h2, h3, h4), where h1 = id i Indicates the identity information of the drone, h2=timestamp indicates the timestamp, h3=g θ Represents the restore flag of the symmetric key. Contains the anonymous identifiers of n subscribers.
[0133] Based on the introduction of the broadcast header in the above embodiment, continue to refer to Figure 1 The smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method provided in this embodiment also includes:
[0134] S2, selects a key generation element from a large prime order integer group, and generates a symmetric key for the shared data based on the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value.
[0135] The bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping the elements selected from the base group. Specifically, the relationship between the key generation element, the bilinear mapping value and the symmetric key is:
[0136]
[0137] Where K represents the symmetric key, L represents the bilinear mapping value, and k represents the key generation element selected from a large prime order integer group.
[0138] S3, converts the shared data into encrypted ciphertext through the symmetric key, and generates signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header.
[0139] For example, assuming that the shared data is represented by m, it is encrypted using the symmetric encryption algorithm ε(-), which can resist the chosen ciphertext attack to obtain the broadcast text. The expression is as follows:
[0140] ctt=ε(K,m)
[0141] In the formula, K represents the calculated symmetric key, and ctt represents the encrypted ciphertext.
[0142] In addition, in order to verify whether the data has been tampered with during the transmission process, this embodiment also uses the signature private key sk sig The encrypted ciphertext and broadcast header are signed. The specific expression is as follows:
[0143]
[0144] In the formula, vin represents the signature information, hdr represents the broadcast header, ctt represents the encrypted ciphertext, and sk sig Represents the drone's signature private key, Indicates mapping hdr||ctt to a base group through a hash function An element in .
[0145] S4, encapsulates the signature information, encrypted ciphertext and broadcast header into broadcast ciphertext, and broadcasts the broadcast ciphertext to the terminal device of each subscribing user.
[0146] Continuing with the example of the signature information vin, encrypted ciphertext ctt and broadcast header hdr in the above example, the above broadcast ciphertext can be expressed as c = (hdr, ctt, vin).
[0147] In this way, each terminal device can use the identity key of the corresponding subscriber to restore the symmetric key from the broadcast header for decrypting the encrypted ciphertext. It should be noted that in this embodiment, the drone uses the identity information of all subscribers in the sharing group to encrypt the data. The number of subscribers in the sharing group can be increased or decreased at will. When the number of subscribers changes, the newly added subscribers cannot decrypt the historical broadcast ciphertext sent by the drone before the subscription.
[0148] Continue to see Figure 2 , because when registering, the drone also deployed the flight smart contract SC on the private chain uav , which is used to record flight data. For this purpose, it is assumed that the broadcast ciphertext sequence generated by the drone in a flight is represented by C = {c1, c2, …, c l}. For c i Each encrypted ciphertext vin in (1≤i≤l) i , UAV Computing Abstract Then, based on the task number taskno (a 256-bit bit string) and the hash value Drone calls SC uav The WriteHash function records the flight process. Any user can read it by calling the ReadHash function. This function is used to verify the integrity of the data.
[0149] The above embodiment introduces the encryption method of the broadcast ciphertext. This embodiment also provides a decryption method of the broadcast ciphertext. The method is applied to a subscription device, where the subscription device refers to a terminal device used by a subscription user. The method specifically includes:
[0150] S5, receiving the broadcast ciphertext sent by the drone.
[0151] S6, determining whether the broadcast ciphertext satisfies a preset verification condition.
[0152] The verification in this embodiment involves two aspects, including the identity of the sender and the integrity of the broadcast ciphertext. For example, it is assumed that the function Verify(id, c)→(true / false) is used to determine whether the broadcast ciphertext meets the preset verification conditions. In this function, an identity identifier id and a broadcast ciphertext c=(h1,h2,h3,h4),ctt,vin) consisting of signature information vin, broadcast header hdr and encrypted ciphertext ctt are given. First, determine whether id=h1 is true. If so, continue to verify the integrity of the broadcast ciphertext. The expression of the verification algorithm is:
[0153]
[0154] Wherein, e represents a bilinear mapping. If the expression of the above verification algorithm is established, the output is a mark true indicating that the preset verification condition is met; otherwise, the output is a mark false indicating that the preset verification condition is not met.
[0155] As described in the above embodiment, this embodiment also provides a private chain, and the drone that sends the broadcast ciphertext is used as one of the nodes. The user of the drone pays a deposit to the accountability smart contract deployed in the private chain when registering. Therefore, if the subscription device detects that the broadcast ciphertext does not meet the preset verification conditions, it sends a report information to the management device, so that the management device rewards the deposit to the subscriber who initiated the report through the accountability smart contract. Figure 2 , the management device can be Figure 2 The UTM in the report calls the deployed accountability smart contract and rewards the deposit paid when the drone is registered to the subscriber who initiated the report.
[0156] The above embodiment introduces the processing method when the preset verification conditions are not met. When the preset verification conditions are met, it is necessary to further decrypt the shared data from the broadcast ciphertext. Therefore, the decryption method of this embodiment also includes:
[0157] S7: If the preset verification condition is met, a restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext is obtained from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext.
[0158] S8, obtaining the symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext according to the restored identifier of the broadcast ciphertext and the identity key of the drone.
[0159] In a specific implementation, the subscription device obtains anonymous auxiliary information according to the restoration identifier and the identity key of the subscription user, wherein the relationship between the restoration identifier, the identity key of the subscription user and the anonymous auxiliary information of the drone is:
[0160]
[0161] In the formula, represents anonymous auxiliary information, represents the identity key of the subscriber, h3 represents the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext, Represents the bilinear mapping through the hash function The result is mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in ;
[0162] Then, the subscribing device obtains the anonymous identifier of the subscribing user from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext; and obtains the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key based on the anonymous auxiliary information of the drone and the anonymous identifier of the subscribing user.
[0163] For example, continue with the above anonymous auxiliary information For example, since the corresponding element is found from the h4 component in the broadcast header hdr of the broadcast ciphertext satisfy Therefore, the key generation element k can be decrypted.
[0164] Finally, the subscriber device obtains the symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext based on the key generation elements and anonymous auxiliary information required to generate the symmetric key. The relationship between the key generation elements required to generate the symmetric key, the anonymous auxiliary information of the drone and the symmetric key is:
[0165]
[0166] In the formula, K represents the symmetric key, represents the anonymous auxiliary information of the drone, k represents the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key, and g represents the element selected from the basis group obtained from the broadcast ciphertext.
[0167] S9, decrypts the shared data from the broadcast ciphertext using the symmetric key.
[0168] Continuing with the broadcast ciphertext in the above embodiment as an example c=(h1,h2,h3,h4),ctt,vin), after obtaining the symmetric key K through the above embodiment, the encrypted ciphertext ctt is decrypted using the symmetric decryption algorithm D(-) to obtain the shared data m=D(K,ctt) in plain text.
[0169] For the above-mentioned embodiment, after actual testing, it was found that for a shared group of 100 subscribed users, drone encryption only takes 120 milliseconds, which is better than the existing solution, and the computational overhead of decryption for each subscribed device is only about 2 milliseconds. Therefore, the key calculation and communication overhead of the drone can be ignored and is a fixed value. In addition, the test further found that there is a low computational cost when verifying the legitimacy of the identity on the chain, which only costs 4304 gas (in comparison, a basic transaction on a private chain requires about 21,000 gas).
[0170] Based on the same inventive concept as the smart contract driven drone operation data sharing method provided in this embodiment, this embodiment also provides a smart contract driven drone operation data sharing device. The device includes at least one executable module that can be stored in the memory 21 or solidified in the electronic device in the form of software. The processor 22 in the electronic device is used to execute the executable module stored in the memory 21. For example, the software function module and computer program included in the device. Please refer to Figure 4 , functionally speaking, the device may include:
[0171] The broadcast header module 11 converts the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generates a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, wherein the identity information and identity key of each subscriber are pre-generated by an identity-based broadcast encryption method, and the identity-based broadcast encryption method relies on a bilinear mapping between a large prime-order integer group and a base group;
[0172] A key generation module 12 is used to select a key generation element from a large prime order integer group, and generate a symmetric key for the shared data according to the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value, wherein the bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping the elements selected from the base group;
[0173] The ciphertext signature module 13 is used to convert the shared data into encrypted ciphertext by using a symmetric key, and generate signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header;
[0174] The ciphertext broadcast module 14 is used to encapsulate the signature information, encrypted ciphertext and broadcast header into broadcast ciphertext, and broadcast the broadcast ciphertext to the terminal device of each subscribing user, so that each terminal device can use the identity key of the corresponding subscribing user to restore the symmetric key from the broadcast header for decrypting the encrypted ciphertext.
[0175] In this embodiment, the broadcast header module 11 is used to implement Figure 1 In step S1, the key generation module 12 is used to implement Figure 1 In step S2, the ciphertext signature module 13 is used to generate Figure 1 In step S3, the ciphertext broadcast module 14 is used to implement Figure 1 Therefore, the detailed description of each module can refer to the specific implementation of the corresponding step. Of course, in some implementations, the device may also include other modules, and the above modules may also be used to implement other steps or sub-steps of the method.
[0176] In addition, the functional modules in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated together to form an independent part, or each module may exist separately, or two or more modules may be integrated to form an independent part.
[0177] It should also be understood that if the above implementation is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or the part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions for a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment of the present application.
[0178] Therefore, this embodiment also provides a storage medium, which is a computer-readable storage medium. The storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method provided in this embodiment is implemented. Among them, the storage medium can be a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a disk or an optical disk, etc., which can store program codes.
[0179] Please refer to Figure 5 This embodiment also provides an electronic device for implementing the above method. The electronic device may be a drone or a subscription device. The electronic device may include a processor 22 and a memory 21. In addition, the memory 21 stores a computer program, and the processor implements the smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method provided in this embodiment by reading and executing the computer program corresponding to the above implementation in the memory 21.
[0180] Continue to see Figure 5 The electronic device further includes a communication unit 23. The memory 21, the processor 22 and the communication unit 23 are electrically connected to each other directly or indirectly through a system bus 24 to achieve data transmission or interaction.
[0181] The memory 21 may be an information recording device based on any electronic, magnetic, optical or other physical principle, used to record execution instructions, data, etc. In some embodiments, the memory 21 may be, but is not limited to, a volatile memory, a non-volatile memory, a storage drive, etc.
[0182] In some embodiments, the volatile memory may be a random access memory (RAM); in some embodiments, the non-volatile memory may be a read-only memory (ROM), a programmable read-only memory (PROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), an electrically erasable read-only memory (EEPROM), a flash memory, etc.; in some embodiments, the storage drive may be a disk drive, a solid-state drive, any type of storage disk (such as a CD, a DVD, etc.), or a similar storage medium, or a combination thereof, etc.
[0183] The communication unit 23 is used to send and receive data through a network. In some embodiments, the network may include a wired network, a wireless network, a fiber optic network, a telecommunication network, an intranet, the Internet, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), a wireless local area network (WLAN), a metropolitan area network (MAN), a wide area network (WAN), a public switched telephone network (PSTN), a Bluetooth network, a ZigBee network, or a near field communication (NFC) network, or any combination thereof. In some embodiments, the network may include one or more network access points. For example, the network may include a wired or wireless network access point, such as a base station and / or a network switching node, through which one or more components of the service request processing system may be connected to the network to exchange data and / or information.
[0184] The processor 22 may be an integrated circuit chip having a signal processing capability, and the processor may include one or more processing cores (e.g., a single-core processor or a multi-core processor). By way of example only, the processor may include a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an application specific instruction set processor (ASIP), a graphics processing unit (GPU), a physical processing unit (PPU), a digital signal processor (DSP), a field programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmable logic device (PLD), a controller, a microcontroller unit, a reduced instruction set computer (RISC), or a microprocessor, or any combination thereof.
[0185] Understandably, Figure 5 The structure shown is for illustration only. The electronic device may also have Figure 5 More or fewer components than shown, or with Figure 5 Different configurations shown. Figure 5 The components shown may be implemented in hardware, software or a combination thereof.
[0186] It should be understood that the apparatus and method disclosed in the above-mentioned embodiments can also be implemented in other ways. The apparatus embodiments described above are merely schematic. For example, the flowcharts and block diagrams in the accompanying drawings show the possible architecture, functions and operations of the apparatus, methods and computer program products according to the multiple embodiments of the present application. In this regard, each box in the flowchart or block diagram can represent a module, a program segment or a part of a code, and the module, a program segment or a part of a code contains one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function. It should also be noted that in some alternative implementations, the functions marked in the box can also occur in a different order from the order marked in the accompanying drawings. For example, two consecutive boxes can actually be executed substantially in parallel, and they can sometimes be executed in the opposite order, depending on the functions involved. It should also be noted that each box in the block diagram and / or the flowchart, and the combination of boxes in the block diagram and / or the flowchart can be implemented with a dedicated hardware-based system that performs a specified function or action, or can be implemented with a combination of dedicated hardware and computer instructions.
[0187] The above are only various implementations of the present application, but the protection scope of the present application is not limited thereto. Any person skilled in the art who is familiar with the present technical field can easily think of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in the present application, which should be included in the protection scope of the present application. Therefore, the protection scope of the present application should be based on the protection scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A smart contract driven drone operation data sharing method, characterized in that: The method comprises: Convert the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generate a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, wherein the identity information and identity key of each subscriber are pre-generated by an identity-based broadcast encryption method, and the identity-based broadcast encryption method relies on a bilinear mapping between a large prime-order integer group and a base group; Selecting a key generation element from the large prime order integer group, and generating a symmetric key for the shared data according to the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value, wherein the bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping the elements selected from the base group; Converting the shared data into encrypted ciphertext by using the symmetric key, and generating signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header; The signature information, the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header are encapsulated into a broadcast ciphertext, and the broadcast ciphertext is broadcast to the terminal device of each of the subscribed users, so that each of the terminal devices uses the identity key of the corresponding subscribed user to restore the symmetric key from the broadcast header for decrypting the encrypted ciphertext.
2. The method for sharing drone operation data driven by smart contracts according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step of converting the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber comprises: For each of the subscribing users, bilinearly map the identity information of the subscribing user with a preset master public key to obtain identification parameters of the identity information of the subscribing user, wherein the master public key is obtained by mapping an element selected from the base group with a master private key selected from the large prime order integer group; Generate an anonymous identifier of the subscriber according to the identifier parameter, the key generation element, and an anonymous generation element selected from the large prime order integer group, wherein the relationship between the identifier parameter, the key generation element, the anonymous generation element and the anonymous identifier is: In the formula, k represents the key generation element, θ represents the anonymous generation element, represents the large prime order integer group, represents the θth power of the identification parameter, Indicates that through the hash function Mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in Indicates that through the hash function is mapped to a binary string of fixed length, g represents the element selected from the base group, Represents the anonymous identifier.
3. The method for sharing drone operation data driven by smart contracts according to claim 2, characterized in that: The broadcast header also includes a timestamp; The identity information of the drone that generated the shared data; The restoration identifier of the symmetric key, wherein the expression of the restoration identifier is: h3=g θ In the formula, h3 represents the restoration identifier, g represents the element selected from the base group, and θ represents the anonymous generated element.
4. The method for sharing drone operation data driven by smart contracts according to claim 1, characterized in that: The relationship between the key generation element, the bilinear mapping value and the symmetric key is: In the formula, K represents the symmetric key, L represents the bilinear mapping value, and k represents the key generation element.
5. The method for sharing drone operation data driven by smart contracts according to claim 1, characterized in that: The method further includes a decryption method for the broadcast ciphertext, the decryption method comprising: Receiving the broadcast ciphertext sent by the drone; Determining whether the broadcast ciphertext satisfies a preset verification condition; If the preset verification condition is met, obtaining a restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext; Obtaining a symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext according to the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext and the identity key of the drone; The shared data is decrypted from the broadcast ciphertext using the symmetric key.
6. The method for sharing drone operation data driven by smart contracts according to claim 5, characterized in that: The obtaining the symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext according to the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext and the identity key of the drone includes: According to the restoration identifier and the identity key of the subscriber, anonymous auxiliary information is obtained, wherein the relationship between the restoration identifier, the identity key of the subscriber and the anonymous auxiliary information is: In the formula, represents the anonymous auxiliary information, represents the identity key of the subscriber, h3 represents the restoration identifier of the broadcast ciphertext, Represents the bilinear mapping through the hash function The result is mapped to Anonymous auxiliary information in ; Acquire the anonymous identifier of the subscribing user from the broadcast header of the broadcast ciphertext; Obtaining a key generation element required to generate the symmetric key according to the anonymous auxiliary information of the drone and the anonymous identifier of the subscriber; The symmetric key of the broadcast ciphertext is obtained according to the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key and the anonymous auxiliary information, wherein the relationship between the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key, the anonymous auxiliary information and the symmetric key is: Wherein, K represents the symmetric key, represents the anonymous auxiliary information, k represents the key generation element required to generate the symmetric key, and g represents the element selected from the base group obtained from the broadcast ciphertext.
7. The method for sharing drone operation data driven by smart contracts according to claim 5, characterized in that: The drone also pays a deposit through an accountability smart contract deployed in a private chain, the accountability smart contract is deployed by a management device, and the method further includes: If the preset verification conditions are not met, a report message is sent to the management device so that the management device rewards the deposit to the subscriber who initiated the report through the accountability smart contract.
8. A smart contract driven drone operation data sharing device, characterized in that: The device comprises: A broadcast header module, which converts the identity information of each subscriber of the drone into an anonymous identifier of each subscriber, and generates a broadcast header including the anonymous identifier of each subscriber, wherein the identity information and identity key of each subscriber are pre-generated by an identity-based broadcast encryption method, and the identity-based broadcast encryption method relies on a bilinear mapping between a large prime-order integer group and a base group; A key generation module, used to select a key generation element from the large prime order integer group, and generate a symmetric key for the shared data according to the key generation element and a preset bilinear mapping value, wherein the bilinear mapping value is obtained by bilinear mapping the elements selected from the base group; A ciphertext signature module, used to convert the shared data into encrypted ciphertext by using the symmetric key, and generate signature information of the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header; The ciphertext broadcast module is used to encapsulate the signature information, the encrypted ciphertext and the broadcast header into a broadcast ciphertext, and broadcast the broadcast ciphertext to the terminal device of each of the subscribed users, so that each of the terminal devices can use the identity key of the corresponding subscribed user to restore the symmetric key from the broadcast header for decrypting the encrypted ciphertext.
9. A storage medium, characterized in that: The storage medium stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method described in any one of claims 1 to 7 is implemented.
10. An electronic device, characterized in that: The electronic device includes a processor and a memory, the memory stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by the processor, the smart contract-driven drone operation data sharing method described in any one of claims 1-7 is implemented.
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