Message sending method, apparatus and storage medium based on route security authentication

Abstract

This application provides a message sending method, apparatus, and storage medium based on route security verification, relating to the field of network technology. It solves the technical problem in related technologies where routing forwarding rules designed by routing devices based on a valleyless model may not provide comprehensive route security verification. Applied to a first routing device, the method includes: receiving a target message sent by a second routing device; the second routing device being the upstream device of the first routing device; the target message including: a network domain identifier of the second routing device; the network domain identifier indicating the network domain to which the routing device belongs; performing route security verification on the first routing device based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device; and, if the route security verification of the first routing device passes, sending the target message to a third routing device, the third routing device being the next-hop device of the first routing device.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of network technology, and in particular to a message sending method, apparatus and storage medium based on route security verification. Background Technology

[0002] In a communication network, a network message needs to travel through a transmission link to reach its destination. Numerous routing devices act as intermediate nodes in this transmission link, forwarding network messages to complete their transmission. However, the network messages forwarded by these routing devices may pose security risks. Therefore, routing devices need to perform routing security verification on the network messages before forwarding them. Only after the network message passes the routing security verification is it forwarded.

[0003] Currently, routing devices can perform routing security verification and forwarding of network messages based on routing and forwarding rules designed using a valley-free model.

[0004] However, in related technologies, the routing forwarding rules designed by routing devices based on the valleyless model may not provide comprehensive security verification for network messages, posing certain security risks and failing to guarantee the security and reliability of message transmission. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a message sending method, apparatus, and storage medium based on route security verification, which solves the technical problem in related technologies that the routing forwarding rules designed by routing devices based on the valleyless model may not be comprehensive enough for the route security verification of network messages.

[0006] In a first aspect, this application provides a message sending method based on route security verification, applied to a first routing device. The method includes: receiving a target message sent by a second routing device; the second routing device being the upstream device of the first routing device; the target message including: a network domain identifier of the second routing device; the network domain identifier indicating the network domain to which the routing device belongs; performing route security verification on the first routing device based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device; and, if the route security verification of the first routing device passes, sending the target message to a third routing device, the third routing device being the next-hop device of the first routing device.

[0007] In this application, the network domain identifier of the second routing device may be the same as or different from that of the first routing device, and the content verified during the routing security verification of the first routing device differs. Therefore, based on the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices, reliable and accurate routing security verification can be performed on the first routing device. If the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, it indicates that the target message will not pose a security risk to the next-hop routing device of the first routing device. At this point, the first routing device sends the target message to the third routing device. In this way, while ensuring device security, the transmission of the target message is completed, and the service corresponding to the target message is reliably and securely implemented. By verifying the routing security of the first routing device through the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices, and sending the target message to the third routing device only after the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, the security and reliability of the message transmission process are guaranteed.

[0008] Optionally, the routing security verification of the first routing device based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device includes: if the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device are the same, then intra-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device; if the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device are different, then cross-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device.

[0009] In this application, if the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as that of the first routing device, it indicates that the first and second routing devices belong to the same network domain. In this case, intra-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device. If the network domain identifier of the second routing device is different from that of the first routing device, it indicates that the first and second routing devices belong to different network domains. In this case, cross-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device.

[0010] Optionally, the target message also includes the network layer of the historical routing device, which is the routing device that the target message passed through before the first routing device, and the network layer is the layer in the network topology of the communication network. If the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as the network domain identifier of the first routing device, then intra-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device, including: if the second routing device is not the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices, and the network layer of the first routing device is lower than that of the second routing device, then the routing security verification of the first routing device is determined to be successful; or, if the second routing device is the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices, then the routing security verification of the first routing device is determined to be successful.

[0011] In this application, the second routing device is not the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices, and the network layer of the first routing device is lower than that of the second routing device. This indicates that the target message passed through the highest-level routing device in the transmission link during transmission, and that the target message was being transmitted downstream from the second routing device to the first routing device. In this case, the routing security verification of the first routing device is confirmed to be successful. This ensures that the target message will not be cyclically routed during transmission, i.e., the target message will not loop infinitely in the network, thus avoiding resource waste, infinite loops, and broadcast storms, ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of message transmission, and guaranteeing the stability of the communication network. The second routing device being the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices indicates that the target message is being transmitted upstream, has just begun to be transmitted downstream, or is currently being transmitted at the same level. In this case, it is not necessary to determine the hierarchical relationship between the first and second routing devices; the routing security verification of the first routing device is directly confirmed to be successful, thus ensuring the normal transmission of the target message.

[0012] Optionally, if the network domain identifier of the second routing device is different from the network domain identifier of the first routing device, then cross-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device, including: if the network domain identifier of the second routing device belongs to the trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device, then the routing security verification of the first routing device is determined to be successful.

[0013] In this application, the trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device includes all network domain identifiers trusted by the network domain to which the first routing device belongs. The network domain identifier of the second routing device is a trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device, indicating that the network domain to which the second routing device belongs is a trusted network domain of the network domain to which the first routing device belongs. In this case, the routing security verification of the target message is confirmed to be successful. Thus, the security and reliability of the target message during cross-network domain transmission can be guaranteed.

[0014] Optionally, the target message further includes a corresponding service security identifier; the service security identifier is used to indicate whether the service corresponding to the target message is a target service, and whether the security requirement level of the target service is higher than the preset security requirement level; sending the target message to the third routing device when the routing security verification of the first routing device is passed includes: obtaining the device identifier of the third routing device when the routing security verification of the target message is passed and the service security identifier is used to indicate that the service corresponding to the target message is the target service; if the device identifier of the third routing device belongs to the trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service, then sending the target message to the third routing device.

[0015] In this application, the routing security verification of the first routing device is successful, and the service security identifier is used to indicate that the service corresponding to the target message is the target service, indicating that the service corresponding to the target message has high security requirements. Therefore, it is necessary to verify the trustworthiness of the third routing device. If the device identifier of the third routing device belongs to the trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service, it indicates that the third routing device is a trusted device corresponding to the target service. At this point, the first routing device sends the target message to the third routing device. This ensures that the information contained in the target message will not be obtained by untrusted devices, thus guaranteeing the confidentiality of the target message.

[0016] Optionally, the target message also includes the source routing device corresponding to the target message; the source routing device is the first routing device in the transmission link of the target message; the method further includes: if the routing security verification of the first routing device fails, sending a routing error message to the second routing device, wherein the destination routing device of the routing error message is the source routing device.

[0017] In this application, if the routing security verification of the first routing device fails, it indicates that the target message poses a security risk. In this case, a routing alert message is sent to the second routing device. This allows the terminal or user that needs to send the target message to confirm that the target message was not successfully sent, thereby enabling them to take further actions to ensure the reliability of the service corresponding to the target message and the user's service experience.

[0018] Secondly, this application provides a message sending device for route security verification, applied to a first routing device. The device includes a receiving module, a processing module, and a sending module: the receiving module is used to receive a target message sent by a second routing device; the second routing device is the upstream device of the first routing device; the target message includes: a network domain identifier of the second routing device; the network domain identifier is used to indicate the network domain to which the routing device belongs; the processing module is used to perform route security verification on the first routing device based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device; the sending module is used to send the target message to a third routing device, the third routing device being the next-hop device of the first routing device, if the route security verification of the first routing device passes.

[0019] Optionally, the processing module is specifically configured to perform intra-domain routing security verification on the first routing device if the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as that of the first routing device; the processing module is also specifically configured to perform cross-domain routing security verification on the first routing device if the network domain identifier of the second routing device is different from that of the first routing device.

[0020] Optionally, the target message further includes the network layer of the historical routing device, where the historical routing device is the routing device that the target message passed through before the first routing device, and the network layer is the layer in which the routing device is located in the network topology of the communication network; the device further includes a determining module; the determining module is further configured to determine that the routing security verification of the first routing device is passed if the second routing device is not the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices and the network layer of the first routing device is lower than that of the second routing device; the determining module is further configured to determine that the routing security verification of the first routing device is passed if the second routing device is the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices.

[0021] Optionally, the determining module is further configured to determine that the routing security verification of the first routing device is successful if the network domain identifier of the second routing device belongs to the trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device.

[0022] Optionally, the target message further includes a corresponding service security identifier; the service security identifier is used to indicate whether the service corresponding to the target message is a target service, and whether the security requirement level of the target service is higher than that of a preset security requirement level; the device further includes an acquisition module; the acquisition module is used to acquire the device identifier of the third routing device when the routing security verification of the target message passes and the service security identifier indicates that the service corresponding to the target message is the target service; the sending module is further used to send the target message to the third routing device if the device identifier of the third routing device belongs to a trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service.

[0023] Optionally, the target message also includes the source routing device corresponding to the target message; the source routing device is the first routing device in the transmission link of the target message; the sending module is further configured to send a routing error message to the second routing device if the routing security verification of the first routing device fails, wherein the destination routing device of the routing error message is the source routing device.

[0024] Thirdly, this application provides a message sending apparatus based on route security verification, comprising: a processor and a memory configured to store processor-executable instructions; wherein the processor is configured to execute the instructions to implement any of the optional methods in the first aspect described above.

[0025] Fourthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing instructions that, when executed by a routing security authentication-based message sending device, enable the routing security authentication-based message sending device to perform any of the optional methods described in the first aspect.

[0026] Fifthly, this application provides a computer program product, which includes computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement any of the optional methods described in the first aspect above.

[0027] This application provides a message sending method, apparatus, and storage medium based on route security verification. The method includes: receiving a target message sent by a second routing device; the second routing device being the upstream device of a first routing device; the target message including: a network domain identifier of the second routing device; the network domain identifier indicating the network domain to which the routing device belongs; performing route security verification on the first routing device based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device; and, if the route security verification of the first routing device passes, sending the target message to a third routing device, the third routing device being the next-hop device of the first routing device. The network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device may be the same or different, and the content verified during the route security verification of the first routing device will differ. Therefore, based on the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices, reliable and accurate route security verification can be performed on the first routing device. If the route security verification of the first routing device passes, it indicates that the target message will not pose a security risk to the next-hop routing device of the first routing device, at which point the first routing device sends the target message to the third routing device. In this way, while ensuring device security, the transmission of the target message is completed, and the business service corresponding to the target message is reliably and securely realized. The first routing device is verified for routing security using the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices. If the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, the target message is sent to the third routing device, ensuring the security and reliability of the message transmission process. Attached Figure Description

[0028] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below.

[0029] Figure 1 This application provides a schematic diagram of the network architecture of a message sending system.

[0030] Figure 2 This application provides a schematic diagram of the structure of a routing device according to an embodiment of the present application.

[0031] Figure 3 A flowchart illustrating a message sending method based on route security verification provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0032] Figure 4A flowchart illustrating another message sending method based on route security verification provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0033] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of a message sending device based on route security verification provided in an embodiment of this application;

[0034] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of another message sending device based on route security verification provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0035] The message sending method, apparatus and storage medium based on route security verification provided in the embodiments of this application will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0036] The terms "first" and "second," etc., in the specification and drawings of this application are used to distinguish different objects, rather than to describe a specific order of objects. For example, "first routing device" and "second routing device," etc., are used to distinguish different routing devices, rather than to describe a specific order of routing devices.

[0037] Furthermore, the terms “comprising” and “having”, and any variations thereof, used in the description of this application are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion. For example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that includes a series of steps or units is not limited to the steps or units listed, but may optionally include other steps or units not listed, or may optionally include other steps or units inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0038] It should be noted that in the embodiments of this application, the words "exemplary" or "for example" are used to indicate examples, illustrations, or explanations. Any embodiment or design scheme described as "exemplary" or "for example" in the embodiments of this application should not be construed as being more preferred or advantageous than other embodiments or design schemes. Specifically, the use of the words "exemplary" or "for example" is intended to present the relevant concepts in a specific manner.

[0039] In the description of this application, unless otherwise stated, "a plurality of" means two or more.

[0040] In a communication network, a network message needs to travel through a transmission link to reach its destination. Numerous routing devices act as intermediate nodes in this transmission link, forwarding network messages to complete their transmission. However, the network messages forwarded by these routing devices may pose security risks. Therefore, routing devices need to perform routing security verification on the network messages before forwarding them. Only after the network message passes the routing security verification is it forwarded.

[0041] Currently, routing devices can perform routing security verification and forwarding of network messages based on routing and forwarding rules designed using the valleyless model.

[0042] However, in related technologies, the routing forwarding rules designed by routing devices based on the valleyless model may not provide comprehensive security verification for network messages, posing certain security risks and failing to guarantee the security and reliability of message transmission.

[0043] Based on this, embodiments of this application provide a message sending method, apparatus, device, storage medium, and program product based on routing security verification. The method involves receiving a target message sent by a second routing device, where the second routing device is the upstream device of the first routing device. The target message includes: a network domain identifier of the second routing device; the network domain identifier indicates the network domain to which the routing device belongs; routing security verification is performed on the first routing device based on the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices; and if the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, the target message is sent to a third routing device, where the third routing device is the next-hop device of the first routing device. The network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices may be the same or different, and the content verified during routing security verification of the first routing device differs. Therefore, based on the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices, reliable and accurate routing security verification can be performed on the first routing device. If the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, it indicates that the target message will not pose a security risk to the next-hop routing device of the first routing device; at this time, the first routing device sends the target message to the third routing device. In this way, while ensuring device security, the transmission of the target message is completed, and the business service corresponding to the target message is reliably and securely realized. The first routing device is verified for routing security using the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices. If the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, the target message is sent to the third routing device, ensuring the security and reliability of the message transmission process.

[0044] The message sending method, apparatus, and storage medium based on route security verification provided in this application can be applied to message sending systems, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the message sending system includes a terminal 101, a first routing device 102, a second routing device 103, a third routing device 104, and a target terminal 105. Typically, in practical applications, the connection between these devices can be wireless. To conveniently and intuitively illustrate the connection relationships between the devices, Figure 1 Solid lines are used to represent the meaning.

[0045] Terminal 101 is used to send a target message to the second routing device 102, and the target message includes the transmission link of the target message.

[0046] The first routing device 102 is used to receive the target message sent by the second routing device 103, and send the target message to the third routing device 104 if the target message meets the preset forwarding rules. The second routing device 103 is the upstream device of the first routing device 102, and the third routing device 104 is the next-hop device of the first routing device 102.

[0047] The second routing device 103 is used to receive the target message sent by the terminal 101 and send the target message to the first routing device.

[0048] The third routing device 104 is used to receive the target message sent by the third routing device 104 and send the target message to the target terminal 105.

[0049] The target terminal 105 is used to receive the target message sent by the third routing device 104. The target terminal 105 is the endpoint device of the transmission link in the target message.

[0050] For example, the aforementioned terminal 101 or target terminal 105 can be a mobile phone, tablet computer, desktop computer, laptop computer, handheld computer, notebook computer, ultra-mobile personal computer (UMPC), netbook, as well as cellular phone, personal digital assistant (PDA), augmented reality (AR) / virtual reality (VR) device. This application embodiment does not impose special limitations on the specific form of the electronic device. It can interact with the user through one or more methods such as a keyboard, touchpad, touchscreen, remote control, voice interaction, or handwriting device.

[0051] For example, the first routing device 102, the second routing device 103, or the third routing device 104 described in the embodiments of this application can be any network device capable of performing functions such as addressing, path selection, and flow control.

[0052] like Figure 2 As shown, the first routing device 102, the second routing device 103, or the third routing device 104 may include an intrinsic security identifier module, a security path database module, a pre-classification module, and a security verification module.

[0053] The intrinsic security identifier module stores the unique intrinsic security identifier of each routing device (or routing transmission node, router). This unique intrinsic security identifier includes: network domain identifier, network layer identifier, and device identifier.

[0054] In some embodiments, the network domain identifier can be referred to as the home security domain feature; the network hierarchy identifier can be referred to as the network hierarchy feature; and the device identifier can be referred to as the physical security feature. The home security domain feature characterizes the network domain to which the routing device belongs. The network hierarchy feature indicates the network hierarchy to which the routing device belongs. The physical security feature indicates the physical characteristics of the routing device.

[0055] For example, the unique intrinsic security identifier is I. SAFE_i =(A i ,L i ,S i ), A i To determine the characteristics of the security domain, L i For network hierarchical features, S i It is a physical security feature.

[0056] The secure path database module includes a routing secure path rule base, used to store and maintain secure path rules within and between domains. Intra-domain secure path rules are trusted transmission rules within the domain, while inter-domain secure path rules represent secure trust relationships between domains.

[0057] In some embodiments, trusted transmission rules are derived based on network topology and neighbor relationships between routing nodes. Trusted transmission rules include forwarding rules corresponding to the network layer of the routing device (for example, after a message passes through the highest network layer of the transmission link, the message is forwarded downstream and not upstream).

[0058] In some embodiments, the security trust relationship is obtained based on the business relationship and the trust access relationship between the routing devices.

[0059] Optionally, security trust relationships can be stored in an inter-domain security path database.

[0060] Optionally, the inter-domain secure path database can be deployed only on the global route security verification node. The global route security verification node is a boundary routing device between network domains.

[0061] The pre-classification module is used to classify routing paths based on security domain characteristics and network hierarchy characteristics, and to determine whether to perform intra-domain security path verification or cross-domain security path verification.

[0062] The security verification module at each routing transmission node verifies the security of routes within the domain, while the global routing security verification node verifies the security of routes between domains. It also calls the secure path rule database to verify the security of routing paths.

[0063] like Figure 3 As shown, the message sending method based on route security verification provided in this application embodiment may include S301-S303:

[0064] S301, Receive the target message sent by the second routing device.

[0065] The second routing device is the upstream device of the first routing device. The target message includes the network domain identifier of the second routing device. The network domain identifier indicates the network domain to which the routing device belongs.

[0066] Optionally, the network domain identifier can be in numerical format.

[0067] In one possible implementation, the second routing device can send a target message to the first routing device.

[0068] It should be understood that network domain identifiers can represent the lateral characteristics of routing devices in a communication network.

[0069] In some embodiments, the network domain identifier may be referred to as the home domain feature.

[0070] In some embodiments, a communication network may contain multiple network domains, which may be parallel or subordinate to each other.

[0071] For example, suppose there are a first network domain, a second network domain, a third network domain, and a fourth network domain. The second network domain is subordinate to the first network domain, the fourth network domain is subordinate to the third network domain, and the first network domain and the third network domain are in a parallel relationship.

[0072] S302. Based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device, the routing security verification of the first routing device is performed.

[0073] It should be understood that if the first routing device and the second routing device belong to different network domains, then the methods for performing routing security verification on the first routing device will be different.

[0074] In one possible implementation, the above message types are either intra-domain messages or cross-domain messages. (Combined) Figure 3 ,like Figure 4 As shown, S302 above, based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device, performs routing security verification on the first routing device, including S401-S402:

[0075] S401. If the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as that of the first routing device, then perform intra-domain routing security verification on the first routing device.

[0076] It should be understood that the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as that of the first routing device, indicating that the first and second routing devices belong to the same network domain. In this case, intra-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device.

[0077] In some embodiments, the target message may further include the network layer of a historical routing device, where the historical routing device is a routing device that the target message passed through before the first routing device, and the network layer is the layer in which the routing device is located in the network topology of the communication network.

[0078] In some embodiments, the network layer of a routing device can be used to indicate the role of the routing device in the network topology.

[0079] For example, the network hierarchy of a routing device may include: a first layer, a second layer, and a third layer. The first layer is higher than the second layer. The second layer is higher than the third layer.

[0080] For example, the network layers of a routing device may include at least one of the following: access layer, aggregation layer, core layer, boundary layer, and backbone layer. The network layers are progressively higher, from access layer to aggregation layer, core layer, boundary layer, and backbone layer.

[0081] In some embodiments, the network hierarchy of the routing device may include at least one of the following: a customer layer and a service provider layer. The customer layer is at a lower level than the service provider layer.

[0082] In some embodiments, the customer layer and / or service provider layer may also include multiple tiers.

[0083] For example, suppose the customer layer includes a first-level customer layer and a second-level customer layer; the first-level customer layer is higher than the second-level customer layer.

[0084] In one possible implementation, if the second routing device is not the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices, and the network layer of the first routing device is lower than that of the second routing device, then the routing security verification of the first routing device is determined to be successful. Alternatively, if the second routing device is the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices, then the routing security verification of the first routing device is determined to be successful.

[0085] It should be understood that the second routing device is not the highest-level routing device in the historical routing device hierarchy, and the network layer of the first routing device is lower than that of the second routing device. This indicates that the target message passed through the highest-level routing device in the transmission link during its transmission, and that the target message was transmitted downstream from the second routing device to the first routing device. At this point, the routing security verification of the first routing device is confirmed to be successful. This ensures that the target message will not be looped during transmission, meaning it will not endlessly loop through the network. This avoids resource waste, infinite loops, and broadcast storms, ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of message transmission and the stability of the communication network.

[0086] For example, assume the historical routing devices include device A, device B, device C, and a second routing device. The target message passes through device A, device B, and device C sequentially, arriving at the second routing device. Device B has the highest network layer. In this case, the target message's journey from device A to device B represents upstream transmission, while its journey through devices B and C to the second routing device represents downstream transmission. Therefore, the second routing device is not the highest-level routing device in the historical routing devices, indicating that the target message has already begun its downstream transmission during its journey through the historical routing devices. At this point, determining the network layer relationship between the second and first routing devices, and considering that the first routing device's network layer is lower than the second, indicates that the target message continues its downstream transmission through the first routing device, preventing an infinite loop in the network. Therefore, the routing security verification of the first routing device is confirmed to be successful.

[0087] It is understandable that the second routing device is the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices, indicating that the target message is being transmitted upstream, has just begun to be transmitted downstream, or is being transmitted at the same level. At this time, it is not necessary to determine the hierarchical relationship between the first and second routing devices. It is directly determined that the routing security verification of the first routing device has passed, thus ensuring the normal transmission of the target message.

[0088] For example, suppose the routing equipment includes device A, device B, device C, and a second routing device. The target message passes through device A, device B, and device C in sequence, arriving at the second routing device. The second routing device has the highest network layer. At this point, the target message has not yet started downstream transmission when it arrives at the second routing device. Therefore, regardless of whether the network layer of the first routing device is the same as, lower than, or higher than the second routing device, there is no issue of the target message being redirected downstream before being transmitted upstream. Therefore, if the second routing device is the highest-level routing device in the historical routing equipment, the routing security verification of the first routing device is directly confirmed to be successful.

[0089] S402. If the network domain identifier of the second routing device is different from that of the first routing device, then cross-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device.

[0090] It should be understood that if the network domain identifier of the second routing device is different from that of the first routing device, it means that the first routing device and the second routing device belong to different network domains. In this case, cross-domain routing security verification is performed on the first routing device.

[0091] In one possible implementation, if the network domain identifier of the second routing device belongs to the trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device, then the routing security verification of the first routing device is determined to be successful.

[0092] It should be understood that the trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device includes all network domain identifiers trusted by the network domain to which the first routing device belongs. The network domain identifier of the second routing device belongs to the trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device, indicating that the network domain to which the second routing device belongs is a trusted network domain of the network domain to which the first routing device belongs. In this case, the routing security verification of the target message is successful. This ensures the security and reliability of the target message when transmitted across network domains.

[0093] S303. If the routing security verification of the first routing device is successful, send the target message to the third routing device.

[0094] The third routing device is the next-hop device of the first routing device.

[0095] It should be understood that the network domain identifier of the second routing device may be the same as or different from that of the first routing device, and the content verified during the routing security verification of the first routing device will differ. Therefore, based on the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices, reliable and accurate routing security verification can be performed on the first routing device. If the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, it indicates that the target message will not pose a security risk to the next-hop routing device of the first routing device. At this point, the first routing device sends the target message to the third routing device. In this way, while ensuring device security, the transmission of the target message is completed, and the business service corresponding to the target message is reliably and securely implemented. By verifying the routing security of the first routing device through the network domain identifiers of the second and first routing devices, and sending the target message to the third routing device only after the routing security verification of the first routing device passes, the security and reliability of the message transmission process are guaranteed.

[0096] In some embodiments, the target message further includes a service security identifier corresponding to the target message. The service security identifier is used to indicate whether the service corresponding to the target message is a target service, and whether the security requirement level of the target service is higher than that of a preset security requirement level.

[0097] In one possible implementation, if the routing security verification of the first routing device passes and the service security identifier is used to indicate that the service corresponding to the target message is the target service, the device identifier of the third routing device is obtained. If the device identifier of the third routing device belongs to the trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service, the target message is sent to the third routing device.

[0098] It should be understood that if the routing security verification of the first routing device is passed, and the service security identifier is used to indicate that the service corresponding to the target message is the target service, it means that the security requirements of the service corresponding to the target message are high. At this time, it is necessary to verify whether the third routing device is trustworthy.

[0099] Understandably, if the device identifier of the third routing device belongs to the trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service, it indicates that the third routing device is a trusted device corresponding to the target service. In this case, the first routing device sends the target message to the third routing device. This ensures that the information contained in the target message will not be obtained by untrusted devices, thus guaranteeing the confidentiality of the target message.

[0100] In one possible implementation, if the device identifier of the third routing device does not belong to the trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service, the target message is deleted and a security prompt message is sent to the source device (such as the terminal that sent the target message) corresponding to the target message. The security prompt message is used to prompt the source device (or the user corresponding to the source device) that there are untrusted nodes in the transmission link of the target message and to please use a trusted transmission link.

[0101] In one possible implementation, the device identifier of the third-party routing device can be referred to as a business security feature or a domestic IT security capability.

[0102] In some embodiments, the target message further includes a source routing device corresponding to the target message. The source routing device is the first routing device in the transmission link of the target message.

[0103] In one possible implementation, if the routing security verification of the first routing device fails, a routing error message is sent to the second routing device, wherein the destination routing device of the routing error message is the source routing device.

[0104] It should be understood that if the routing security verification of the first routing device fails, it indicates a security risk on the first routing device. In this case, an error message is sent to the second routing device. This allows the terminal or user that needs to send the target message to confirm that the target message was not successfully sent, and thus take further action to ensure the reliability of the service corresponding to the target message and the user's service experience.

[0105] In one possible implementation, the target message received by the first routing device may carry the aforementioned unique intrinsic security identifier of the second routing device. The target message sent by the first routing device to the third routing device may include the displacement intrinsic security identifier of the first routing device.

[0106] This application embodiment can divide routing devices, terminals, and message sending devices based on routing security verification into functional modules according to the above method examples. For example, each function can be divided into its own functional module, or two or more functions can be integrated into one processing module. The integrated module can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional module. It should be noted that the module division in this application embodiment is illustrative and only represents one logical functional division; other division methods may be used in actual implementation.

[0107] When dividing each function into modules according to its corresponding function. Figure 5 This diagram illustrates a possible structure of the message sending device based on route security verification involved in the above embodiments, as shown below. Figure 5 As shown, the message sending device based on route security verification may include: a receiving module 501, a processing module 502, and a sending module 503.

[0108] The receiving module 501 is used to receive the target message sent by the second routing device.

[0109] The second routing device is the upstream device of the first routing device. The target message includes: the network domain identifier of the second routing device. The network domain identifier is used to indicate the network domain to which the routing device belongs.

[0110] The processing module 502 is used to perform routing security verification on the first routing device based on the network domain identifier of the second routing device and the network domain identifier of the first routing device.

[0111] The sending module 503 is used to send the target message to a third routing device, which is the next-hop device of the first routing device, after the routing security verification of the first routing device has passed.

[0112] Optionally, the processing module 502 is specifically used to perform intra-domain routing security verification on the first routing device if the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as the network domain identifier of the first routing device.

[0113] The processing module 502 is also specifically used to perform cross-domain routing security verification on the first routing device if the network domain identifier of the second routing device is different from the network domain identifier of the first routing device.

[0114] Optionally, the target message may also include the network layer of historical routing devices, which are the routing devices that the target message passed through before the first routing device, and the network layer is the layer in which the routing device is located in the network topology of the communication network. The device also includes a determination module 504.

[0115] The determining module 504 is further configured to determine that the routing security verification of the first routing device is successful if the second routing device is not the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices and the network level of the first routing device is lower than that of the second routing device.

[0116] The determining module 504 is further configured to determine that the routing security verification of the first routing device has passed if the second routing device is the highest-level routing device among the historical routing devices.

[0117] Optionally, the determining module 504 is further configured to determine that the routing security verification of the first routing device is successful if the network domain identifier of the second routing device belongs to the trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device.

[0118] Optionally, the target message also includes a corresponding service security identifier. This service security identifier indicates whether the service corresponding to the target message is a target service, and whether the security requirement level of the target service is higher than a preset security requirement level. The device also includes an acquisition module 505.

[0119] The acquisition module 505 is used to acquire the device identifier of the third routing device when the routing security verification of the target message passes and the service security identifier is used to indicate that the service corresponding to the target message is the target service.

[0120] The sending module 503 is further configured to send the target message to the third routing device if the device identifier of the third routing device belongs to the trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service.

[0121] Optionally, the target message may also include the source routing device corresponding to the target message. The source routing device is the first routing device in the transmission link of the target message.

[0122] The sending module 503 is also used to send a routing error message to the second routing device when the routing security verification of the first routing device fails, wherein the destination routing device of the routing error message is the source routing device.

[0123] When using integrated units, Figure 6 A possible structural diagram of the message sending device based on route security verification involved in the above embodiments is shown. Figure 6 As shown, the message sending device based on route security authentication may include a processing module 601 and a communication module 602. The processing module 601 can be used to control and manage the operation of the message sending device based on route security authentication. The communication module 602 can be used to support communication between the message sending device based on route security authentication and other entities. Optionally, as... Figure 6 As shown, the message sending device based on route security verification may also include a storage module 603 for storing the program code and data of the message sending device based on route security verification.

[0124] The processing module 601 can be a processor or a controller. The communication module 602 can be a transceiver, transceiver circuit, or communication interface, etc. The storage module 603 can be a memory.

[0125] In this configuration, when the processing module 601 is a processor, the communication module 602 is a transceiver, and the storage module 603 is a memory, the processor, transceiver, and memory can be connected via a bus. The bus can be a PCI bus or an EISA bus, etc. The bus can be categorized as an address bus, data bus, control bus, etc.

[0126] It should be understood that in the various embodiments of this application, the order of the above-mentioned processes does not imply the order of execution. The execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation on the implementation process of the embodiments of this application.

[0127] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0128] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0129] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0130] In the above embodiments, implementation can be achieved, in whole or in part, through software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software programs, implementation can be, in whole or in part, in the form of a computer program product. This computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of this application are generated. The computer can be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device. The computer instructions can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another. For example, the computer instructions can be transmitted from one website, computer, server, or data center to another website, computer, server, or data center via wired (e.g., coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (e.g., infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means. The computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium accessible to a computer or a data storage device containing one or more servers, data centers, etc., that can be integrated with the medium. The available media can be magnetic media (e.g., floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (e.g., DVDs), or semiconductor media (e.g., solid-state disks, SSDs), etc.

[0131] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A message sending method based on route security verification, characterized in that, Applied to a first routing device, the method comprises: receiving a target message sent by a second routing device; the second routing device is a previous hop device of the first routing device; the target message comprises a network domain identifier of the second routing device; the network domain identifier is used to indicate a network domain to which the routing device belongs; in the case of meeting a first condition, performing an intra-domain routing security verification on the first routing device; in the case of not meeting the first condition, performing a cross-domain routing security verification on the first routing device; wherein the first condition is that the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as a network domain identifier of the first routing device; in the case of passing the routing security verification of the first routing device, sending the target message to a third routing device, the third routing device being a next hop device of the first routing device.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The target message further comprises a network level of a historical routing device, the historical routing device being a routing device through which the target message passes before the first routing device, and the network level being a level of the routing device in a network topology of a communication network; if the first condition is met, performing the intra-domain routing security verification on the first routing device, comprising: if the second routing device is not a highest level routing device among the historical routing devices, and the network level of the first routing device is lower than that of the second routing device, determining that the routing security verification of the first routing device is passed; or, if the second routing device is the highest level routing device among the historical routing devices, determining that the routing security verification of the first routing device is passed.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, if the first condition is not met, performing the cross-domain routing security verification on the first routing device, comprising: if the network domain identifier of the second routing device belongs to a trusted network domain identifier of the first routing device, determining that the routing security verification of the first routing device is passed.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, The target message further comprises a service security identifier; the service security identifier is used to indicate whether a service corresponding to the target message is a target service, and a security requirement level of the target service is higher than a preset security requirement level of a service; In the case of passing the routing security verification of the first routing device, sending the target message to a third routing device, comprising: in the case of the service security identifier indicating that the service corresponding to the target message is the target service, obtaining a device identifier of the third routing device; if the device identifier of the third routing device belongs to a trusted device identifier corresponding to the target service, sending the target message to the third routing device.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The target message further comprises a source routing device corresponding to the target message; The source routing device is a first routing device in a transmission link of the target message; the method further comprises: in the case of not passing the routing security verification of the first routing device, sending a routing exception prompt message to the second routing device, the destination routing device of the routing exception prompt message being the source routing device.

6. A message sending device based on route security verification, characterized in that, comprising: a receiving module, a processing module and a sending module; The receiving module is configured to receive a target message sent by a first routing device; The target message comprises a network domain identifier of a second routing device, and the network domain identifier is used to indicate a network domain to which the routing device belongs; The processing module is configured to perform in-domain routing security verification on the first routing device when a first condition is met, and perform cross-domain routing security verification on the first routing device when the first condition is not met, wherein the first condition is that the network domain identifier of the second routing device is the same as a network domain identifier of the first routing device; The sending module is configured to send the target message to a third routing device when the in-domain routing security verification or the cross-domain routing security verification on the first routing device is passed, and the third routing device is a next-hop device of the first routing device.

7. A message sending device based on route security authentication, characterized in that, Comprise: a processor; a memory configured to store instructions executable by the processor; wherein the processor is configured to execute the instructions to implement the method of any one of claims 1-5.

8. A computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon instructions, the computer-readable storage medium comprising: When the instructions in the computer-readable storage medium are executed by the message sending device based on routing security verification, the message sending device based on routing security verification is enabled to perform the method of any one of claims 1-5.

9. A computer program product, characterised in that, The computer program product comprises computer program instructions, and the computer program instructions are executed by a processor to implement the method of any one of claims 1-5. The computer program product comprises computer program instructions, and the computer program instructions are executed by a processor to implement the method of any one of claims 1-5.

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