Source-load bilateral power system carbon emission allocation method based on incentive mechanism

Abstract

The invention discloses a source-load bilateral power system carbon emission allocation method based on an incentive mechanism. The method specifically comprises the following steps of: establishing a carbon emission allocation model by taking CO2 generated by a power system as an object, allocating carbon responsibility on source-load double sides according to a proportion, and determining marginal carbon intensity of each node in the system by combining with a carbon flow theory and the like; and on the basis, a function with the minimum expectation of the power generation cost, the generator set investment cost and the carbon excitation cost as the target at the source side and with the expectation of the power purchase cost and the expectation of the carbon transaction cost as the target at the load side is further constructed, so that the power system source-load double-side carbon emission allocation method based on the excitation mechanism is provided. The carbon emission allocation method provided by the invention can effectively provide theoretical support for carbon emission reduction of an electric power system and promote carbon emission reduction research under a carbon excitation mechanism.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to a carbon emission apportionment method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism, and belongs to the technical field of low-carbon emission analysis of power systems. Background Art

[0003] Regarding the issue of carbon emission responsibility allocation in the power system, current research mostly focuses on the direct carbon emission responsibility of fuel-based power sources, or directly allocates the carbon emission responsibility to the source side. With the gradual development of the power system, more researchers have shifted the allocation of carbon responsibility from the source side to the load side. However, there are still few studies that consider the proportional sharing of carbon responsibility between the source side and the load side.

[0004] Sharing carbon responsibility only on the source side or only on the load side has no incentive effect on the other side. It is particularly important to combine the source-load carbon emission sharing with the carbon flow tracking to obtain an effective carbon emission sharing model for the power system. The virtual carbon emission flow can be regarded as the power flow from the source side through the power grid to the consumer end. The carbon emissions of the entire system come from the net emissions on the source side and have no direct relationship with the load. However, in terms of carbon liabilities, the demand-side consumption of electric energy drives the generation of carbon emissions from power plants.

[0005] Source-load coordination can be achieved through power demand response, thereby adjusting and increasing the consumption rate of new energy and maximizing the benefits of market participants. For market carbon trading, the optimal scheduling method is often based on incentives, so the study of incentive mechanisms is also crucial to carbon sharing. The present invention uses the power system carbon emission flow theory and distribution calculation analysis model as calculation and analysis tools, considering carbon prices and related constraints and clarifying the marginal carbon intensity of the system, and proportionally sharing the carbon responsibility of the power system on the power generation side and the load side, thereby establishing a CO2 emission sharing method under an incentive mechanism based on source-load coordination. Summary of the invention

[0006] In view of the shortcomings of existing related research methods, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism.

[0007] A carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism comprises the following steps:

[0008] S1: Determine key indicators and methods for carbon emissions;

[0009] S2: Analyze the carbon emission allocation cost based on the indicator results obtained in S1;

[0010] S3: Based on S1 and S2, determine the carbon responsibility allocation mechanism and carbon flow tracking method;

[0011] S4: Based on the results obtained in S2 and S3, determine the carbon emission allocation and constraints on both the source and load sides, and introduce an incentive mechanism;

[0012] S5: Determine the carbon emission limits on the source and load sides of the power system based on the incentive mechanism;

[0013] S6: For the carbon emission limit method of S5, based on the incentive mechanism, economic optimization is carried out with total cost as the target, thus deriving the source-load side carbon emission allocation strategy.

[0014] Furthermore, the key indicators and methods for determining carbon emissions described in S1 are as follows:

[0015] The flow of electricity itself does not produce carbon emissions, but the process of generating electricity will produce CO2. The carbon emission flow in the power system is essentially a virtual network flow, which is attached to the power flow of the power system.

[0016] In traditional power system flow calculations, it is necessary to set a balance node to ensure the balance of system power during the calculation process, and the injection and outflow of carbon emission flows corresponding to the flow must also be balanced;

[0017] When all power generation output, carbon emission intensity, and power flow distribution information are known, the carbon emission flow distribution of the entire power system can be calculated, thereby shifting the carbon emission responsibility from the power generation side to the user side;

[0018] When calculating carbon flow, it is necessary to determine the power distribution in the power system, and the AC power flow model can be used to carry out the calculation;

[0019] For a power system with n nodes, the node active and reactive power flow balance equations are as follows, which can obtain the voltage amplitude and angle of each node. The active power and loss in each transmission process can also be obtained as follows:

[0020]

[0021]

[0022] P ij =V i V j (G ij cosδ ij +B ij sinδ ij )

[0023]

[0024] Where: P G,t , Q G,i are the active and reactive outputs of the generator at node i respectively; P L,t , QL,i are the active and reactive loads of the connection node i respectively; G ij , B ij are the negative values ​​of the conductance and susceptance of branch ij respectively; U i , U j are the voltage amplitudes of nodes i and j respectively; δ ij is the voltage angle difference between nodes i and j; P ij is the active power flowing through branch ij, and its positive direction is from node i to node j; is the active power loss of branch ij.

[0025] The marginal carbon intensity of a node in the power system is the degree to which electricity consumption at this node contributes to carbon emission reduction in the entire power system, as follows:

[0026]

[0027] Where: M is the carbon emissions in the power system; P Di is the load of the corresponding node; The marginal carbon intensity of nodes in the power system is constrained as shown:

[0028]

[0029]

[0030]

[0031]

[0032] Where: P G is the column vector of active output; is the bid column vector; K is the constraint vector in the system; e is the unit column vector; P D is the active power consumption column vector of the load; lose is the consumption in the system branch; R is the distribution matrix in the transmission; P G and are the minimum and maximum values ​​of active output respectively; λ is the Lagrange multiplier; μ is the multiplier of each constraint in the system; It is the multiplier of the maximum and minimum output values ​​in the unit;

[0033] LMP=λe+T T μ

[0034] The above formula is the calculation method of node marginal electricity price without considering line loss.

[0035] Furthermore, the analysis of carbon emission allocation costs described in S2 is as follows:

[0036] Since different types of generators have different carbon emission coefficients, the total carbon debt of the power system is as follows:

[0037]

[0038]

[0039] Where: n is the carbon emission rate of n-type power generation. are the carbon emission factors in the production, transportation and combustion of raw materials for n-type power generation; P n,t is the power generated by n at time t;

[0040] Different types of power plants have direct carbon costs. If the carbon emission responsibility factors required on the power generation side and the load side are C G and C U , the following formula should be satisfied:

[0041] C m =C G +C U

[0042] C G =C G C m

[0043] C U =C U C m

[0044]

[0045] C Gn =δ n λ G

[0046] In the formula: C Gn is the carbon tax rate for type n generators; G It is the tax rate per unit of carbon emissions on the power generation side, ensuring that the source side is only partially responsible for carbon emissions, and the load side is responsible for the remaining carbon emissions.

[0047] Furthermore, the carbon responsibility allocation mechanism and carbon flow tracking method described in S3 are specifically:

[0048] It is difficult to motivate consumers to achieve demand response by only considering carbon emission reduction from the source side. Therefore, the load side should also be the main body of carbon responsibility sharing.

[0049] The source side generates electricity to meet the load, the generator bears part of the carbon emission responsibility for economic dispatch, and the remaining carbon emissions are transferred to the consumer through carbon flow;

[0050] On the load side, due to different factors such as node location and power consumption, the carbon responsibility of each node is also different. The carbon emission responsibility sharing method of the present invention is fair to all load members. The shared carbon emission responsibility can be expressed as follows:

[0051] x i =∑x ij

[0052]

[0053]

[0053] Where: x i The carbon emission responsibility is shared by load i; x ij is the carbon emission responsibility of load i for the share of generation type j; S is the subset of other loads that are sorted before load i and do not contain load member i, P(S) is the probability of the subset S appearing; S∪{i} is to include load i in S to form a new set; c j (S∪{i}) represents the marginal effect of incorporating i into S; n N is the number of members in the full union n; n N ! is all possible permutations of fully loaded members N; n is the number of loads in it;

[0054] The carbon responsibility amount of different power generation types assigned to each load node together constitutes the total carbon responsibility of a load node;

[0055] The carbon liability of load node i is divided into j intervals according to the carbon liabilities of different power generation types, which is directly reflected in the electricity consumption;

[0056]

[0057] Where: P j,t is the power consumption of type j electricity by the user at time t, P t is the power consumption of the user at time t;

[0058] Since the delineation of carbon responsibility intervals is affected in real time by the output of power generation and the load of users, the delineation of carbon responsibility intervals can reflect the load size and temporal and spatial differences;

[0059] The carbon cost at the user end is:

[0060]

[0061] Where: j is the carbon tax rate for client type j electricity generation;

[0062] Carbon flow tracking to determine the node carbon emission data is the basis for realizing carbon emission allocation. Based on the parameters of each unit and the load data at each time point, the corresponding output, flow data, and carbon emission intensity can be obtained according to the low-carbon economy theory;

[0063] After obtaining the active flux matrix of the node and the corresponding distribution matrix, analyze whether the obtained active flux matrix is ​​reversible. If not, it is necessary to process the data and return to regenerate each matrix;

[0064] If the result is reversible, that is, the carbon phase transfer capacity at each time point can be calculated, and finally the carbon emission sharing responsibility that each point of the unit should bear can be obtained.

[0065] Furthermore, S4 determines the allocation and constraints of carbon emissions on both the source and load sides, and introduces an incentive mechanism, specifically:

[0066] The power system allocation model on both the source and load sides is as follows:

[0067]

[0068]

[0069]

[0070]

[0071]

[0072] Where: i is the system load, j is the system unit; h is the line in the system; their ranges are i=1,2,…,N D ; j = 1, 2, ..., N G ; l=1,2,…,N h ;P Di is the actual load of i; P Gi is the actual output of j; i is the output value of i; σ i is the output value of j; and are the storage and load requirements of j and i respectively; N G and N D are the number of j and i respectively; f h It is the trend of h; is the maximum constraint value of h; N h is the number of h;

[0073] In the power system, the source side and the load side are interrelated in terms of carbon emissions and the responsibilities they should bear. The power generation side and the load side should bear equal responsibilities for energy conservation and emission reduction.

[0074] The present invention adopts the principle that the power generation side and the load side each bear part of the system carbon responsibility, and on this basis, carbon responsibility is apportioned based on an incentive mechanism;

[0075] The incentive mechanism introduced is as follows:

[0076] The power contribution of any generator set to any load and the carbon incentive cost per unit load are as follows:

[0077] P D =B·(EA) -1 ·P G =T·P G

[0078]

[0079] Where: P G is the net power output of the generator set to the grid; B is the column vector of power demand; P D is the distribution matrix from generator to load; R i is the carbon emission responsibility of the generator set or load participating in the carbon trading market; λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4 are all tiered carbon trading prices; m is the order coefficient of carbon responsibility.

[0080] In order to encourage users to consume more low-carbon electricity, it is necessary to use the incentive mechanism of carbon price; The incentive mechanism should adopt different incentive coefficients in different periods, compare the historical load-side carbon responsibility with the benchmark, and form a carbon incentive price at the time of use;

[0081] If the carbon responsibility on the historical load side is higher than the baseline, a high incentive price is used; if the historical carbon responsibility is lower than the baseline, a low incentive price is used;

[0082] According to the incentive price and carbon emission intensity, the carbon incentive cost of each load can be obtained, and the total carbon incentive subsidy of load i can be expressed as:

[0083]

[0084] Where: p t P represents the carbon incentive price at time t. i,t is power, negative is charging power, positive is emission power; Δt is the time step;

[0085] The carbon incentive mechanism is two-way. Under the incentive mechanism, carbon emissions are reduced and carbon quotas are increased, thereby guiding power companies to independently improve operating efficiency and investment levels and increase the intensity of new energy consumption;

[0086] The carbon emission flow theory is used to share the carbon responsibility of users, and the allocated carbon responsibility is used as an incentive signal to guide users to actively choose clean energy consumption.

[0087] Furthermore, the incentive mechanism described in S5 determines the carbon emission limit on the source-load side of the power system, specifically:

[0088] According to the carbon emission flow theory, the carbon emissions X on the source side and the load side can be obtained. i, , X i It can be used as the carbon quota of the unit or load, and the carbon amount is as follows:

[0089]

[0090] Where: all is the carbon emission coefficient. After calculating the carbon emissions of each generating unit, the source side and the load side share the carbon emission responsibility in proportion;

[0091] Based on the carbon emission flow theory, the carbon emission responsibility of each load participating in the carbon trading market is obtained;

[0092] The greater the carbon emission responsibility, the higher the corresponding carbon incentive price. When the carbon emission responsibility is lower than the free carbon quota, the power plant can make a profit in the carbon trading market;

[0093] When the carbon emission liability is higher than the free carbon quota, the power plant will pay the carbon incentive cost.

[0094] Furthermore, S6 describes an incentive mechanism based on which economic optimization is performed with total cost as the goal, thereby obtaining a source-load carbon emission allocation strategy, specifically:

[0095] The optimization takes the total cost as the objective function, and sets the minimum power generation cost and carbon incentive cost as the expected value. After adding the carbon cost, the following constraints must be met at the same time:

[0096] P j,min ≤P j,t ≤P j,max

[0097] P l,min ≤P l,t ≤P l,max

[0098]

[0099] Where: and are the inflow and outflow power of the node at time t, P tol is the total load.

[0101] The cost of the power system consists of power generation cost and carbon emission cost, constrained by unit capacity limit and line flow limit;

[0102] With the goal of minimizing electricity costs and using electricity prices and carbon responsibility as incentives, a user electricity purchase decision-making model is established to guide users to actively choose green energy consumption;

[0103] Determine the market carbon price, electricity price and the winning bid power of each generator unit by minimizing costs;

[0104] The source side determines the price of both parties based on the user's power, calculates the carbon intensity of each user node using the carbon flow theory, and then sends the electricity price to the user;

[0105] The electricity purchasing strategy for each period can be determined based on the relevant prices and carbon responsibility allocation results;

[0106] Users need to consider their electricity purchase costs and carbon emission costs in the electricity market to formulate electricity purchase strategies. Therefore, the minimum cost for users is:

[0107]

[0108]

[0109] Where: C i is the total electricity cost of user i, The cost of purchasing electricity for users, Carbon responsibility cost for users; i represents the carbon intensity of user node i; is the market carbon price;

[0110] When carbon emissions are lower than carbon quotas, members participating in carbon trading will gain profits, and when carbon emissions increase, the price of purchasing carbon quotas will also rise;

[0111] For the power system, carbon quotas can be considered as a resource with a fixed total amount;

[0112] The carbon emission responsibility and carbon quota of power system member i are as follows:

[0113]

[0114]

[0115] Where: P is the power vector constructed on the source side or load side; P i represents the actual power of member i; c(P) is the calculation function of the total carbon emission responsibility of the system; M is the number of discretization segments; ∝all is the free carbon quota rate, R all,i is the carbon quota of i;

[0116] Calculation of carbon emission responsibility on both sides of source and load The power system CO2 is fully emitted during the power generation stage; Calculation of carbon emission responsibility on the source side According to the above assumptions of the present invention, the carbon emission responsibility on the source side is a part of its actual carbon emissions;

[0117] R G =xe G P G

[0118] Where: R G 、e G , P G They represent the vectors composed of the carbon emission responsibility, carbon intensity, and actual output power of the generator, respectively, and x is the proportional coefficient;

[0119] Based on the method proposed in the present invention, different source-load side apportionment ratio coefficients are set, and based on the results calculated in the previous article, the carbon emission reduction situation on the source-load side under different scenarios can be verified. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0120] Figure 1 Schematic diagram of electricity flow and carbon emission flow;

[0121] Figure 2 Flow chart for carbon flow tracking;

[0122] Figure 3 Incentive-based carbon emission allocation economic adjustment map;

[0123] Figure 4 The power sales situation at the source side under different allocation scenarios;

[0124] Figure 5 The load-side electricity purchase situation under different sharing scenarios;

[0125] Figure 6 For carbon emissions. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0126] In order to better understand the technical solution of the present invention, the present invention is further explained below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific embodiments:

[0127] A carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism, characterized in that the method includes the following steps:

[0128] S1: Determine key indicators and methods for carbon emissions;

[0129] S2: Analyze the carbon emission allocation cost based on the indicator results obtained in S1;

[0130] S3: Based on S1 and S2, determine the carbon responsibility allocation mechanism and carbon flow tracking method;

[0131] S4: Based on the results obtained in S2 and S3, determine the carbon emission allocation and constraints on both the source and load sides, and introduce an incentive mechanism;

[0132] S5: Determine the carbon emission limits on the source and load sides of the power system based on the incentive mechanism;

[0133] S6: For the carbon emission limit method of S5, based on the incentive mechanism, economic optimization is carried out with total cost as the target, thus deriving the source-load side carbon emission allocation strategy.

[0134] S1 When calculating carbon flow, it is necessary to determine the power distribution in the power system, and the AC power flow model can be used to carry out the calculation;

[0135] The carbon emission flow in the power system is essentially a virtual network flow. The carbon emission flow is attached to the power flow of the power system. In the traditional power system flow calculation, it is necessary to set the balance node to ensure the balance of the system power during the calculation process.

[0136] The injection and outflow of carbon emission flow corresponding to the tidal current must also maintain a balance. The relationship between the power flow and carbon emission flow on the power generation side and the load side is as follows: Figure 1 :

[0137] The specific calculation and constraints of the node marginal carbon intensity in the power system are as follows:

[0138]

[0139]

[0140]

[0141]

[0142]

[0143] Where: M is the carbon emissions in the power system; P Di is the load of the corresponding node. The marginal carbon intensity of the heavy nodes of the power system is constrained as follows: G is the column vector of active output; is the bid column vector; K is the constraint vector in the system; e is the unit column vector; P D is the active power consumption column vector of the load; lose is the consumption in the system branch; R is the distribution matrix in the transmission; P G and P G are the minimum and maximum values ​​of active output respectively; λ is the Lagrange multiplier; μ is the multiplier of each constraint in the system; It is the multiplier of the maximum and minimum output values ​​in the unit.

[0144] S2 considers the carbon emission coefficients of different types of generator sets when analyzing the carbon emission allocation costs;

[0145] Different types of power plants have direct carbon costs. If the carbon emission responsibility factors required on the power generation side and the load side are C G and CU ,but:

[0146] C m =C G +C U

[0147] C G =C G C m

[0148] C U =C U C m

[0149]

[0150] C Gn =δ n λ G

[0151] In the formula: C Gn is the carbon tax rate for type n generators; G It is the tax rate per unit of carbon emissions on the power generation side, ensuring that the source side is only partially responsible for carbon emissions, and the load side is responsible for the remaining carbon emissions.

[0152] S3 Determine the carbon responsibility allocation mechanism and carbon flow tracking method;

[0153] The present invention aims to study a carbon emission responsibility allocation method that is fair to all load members. Since the demarcation of carbon responsibility intervals is affected by the output of the power generation end and the load of the user end in real time, the demarcation of carbon responsibility intervals can reflect the differences in load size, time and space, etc. The carbon flow tracking process is as follows: Figure 2 , the shared carbon emission responsibility can be expressed as:

[0154] x i =∑x ij

[0155]

[0156]

[0157] Where: x i The carbon emission responsibility is shared by load i; x ij is the carbon emission responsibility of load i for the share of generation type j; S is the subset of other loads that are sorted before load i and do not contain load member i, P(S) is the probability of the subset S appearing; S∪{i} is to include load i in S to form a new set; c j (S∪{i}) represents the marginal effect of incorporating i into S; n N is the number of members in the full union n; n N! are all possible permutations of fully loaded members N; n is the number of loads in it.

[0158] The carbon liability of different types of power generation allocated to each load node together constitutes the total carbon liability of a load node. The carbon liability of load node i is divided into j intervals according to the carbon liability of different types of power generation, which is directly reflected in the electricity consumption;

[0159]

[0160] Where: P j,t is the power consumption of type j electricity by the user at time t, P t is the power consumption of the user at time t;

[0161] When j When is the carbon tax rate for client type j electricity generation, the carbon cost at the user end is:

[0162]

[0163] Incentive-based carbon emission allocation economic dispatch Figure 3 ;

[0164] Based on the improved IEEE9 node system, the system is set up to include three generators and three large users, including two coal-fired generators and one wind power generator. L1, L2 and L3 are three users on the load side. The annual carbon price is set to 125 yuan / tCO2, the optimization period is 1 day, and the time step is 1 hour.

[0165] Data table for each power load

[0166] Benchmark data for each power load

[0167]

[0168] Carbon table allocated to source side and load side

[0169] The amount of carbon allocated to the source side and the load side

[0170]

[0171] S4 determines the carbon emission allocation and constraints on both the source and load sides, and introduces an incentive mechanism;

[0172]

[0173]

[0174]

[0175]

[0176]

[0177] Where: i is the system load, j is the system unit; h is the line in the system; their ranges are i=1,2,…,N D ; j = 1, 2, ..., N G ; l=1,2,…,N h ;P Di is the actual load of i; P Gi is the actual output of j; i is the output value of i; σ i is the output value of j; and are the storage and load requirements of j and i respectively; N G and N D are the number of j and i respectively; f h It is the trend of h; is the maximum constraint value of h; N h is the number of h.

[0178] Use a carbon price incentive mechanism. The incentive mechanism should adopt different incentive coefficients in different periods, compare the historical load-side carbon responsibility with the benchmark, and form a carbon incentive price at the time of use. If the historical load-side carbon responsibility is higher than the benchmark, a high incentive price is used; if the historical carbon responsibility is lower than the benchmark, a low incentive price is used;

[0179] According to the incentive price and carbon emission intensity, the carbon incentive cost of each load can be obtained. The total amount of carbon incentive subsidy for load i can be expressed as:

[0180]

[0181] Where: p t represents the carbon incentive price at time t; P i,t is power, negative is charging power, positive is emission power; Δt is the time step, and the carbon incentive mechanism is bidirectional;

[0182] Under the incentive mechanism, carbon emissions are reduced and carbon quotas are increased;

[0083] In order to verify the advantages of source-load carbon responsibility sharing under the incentive mechanism of the present invention, three scenarios are set under the power market trading mechanism: (1) the carbon responsibility ratio on the load side is set to 0.7, and the carbon responsibility ratio on the source side is set to 0.3; (2) the carbon responsibility ratios on both the load side and the source side are set to 0.5; (3) the carbon responsibility ratio on the load side is set to 0.3, and the carbon responsibility ratio on the source side is set to 0.7;

[0184] Carbon incentive mechanism coefficient table

[0185] Carbon incentive coefficient

[0186]

[0187] S5 determines the carbon emission limits on the source and load sides of the power system based on the incentive mechanism;

[0188] According to the carbon emission flow theory, the carbon emissions X on the source side and the load side can be obtained. i, , X i It can be used as the carbon quota of the unit or load, and the carbon amount is as follows:

[0189]

[0190] Where: all is the carbon emission factor.

[0191] By using the example, it is found that the power sales of the generators in Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 are significantly higher than that in Scenario 1, indicating that the power sales in the power market are significantly increased under this scenario; under the premise of not changing the power demand on the load side, the incentive effect of Scenario 2 is the most significant, which has a direct incentive effect on users and prompts them to adjust their power purchasing strategies;

[0192] Under the incentive mechanism, in scenario 2, the load side reduces the carbon responsibility cost out of the motivation of carbon responsibility. In scenario 3, users consider trading with generators with lower bids. When the carbon responsibility constraint is small, the optimal purchase strategy on the load side cannot be guaranteed;

[0193] S6 uses the incentive mechanism to optimize the economy with total cost as the goal, thus deriving the carbon emission allocation strategy between the source and the load side;

[0194] The optimization takes the total cost as the objective function, and sets the minimum power generation cost and carbon incentive cost as the expected value, while meeting the following constraints:

[0195] P j,min ≤P j,t ≤P j,max

[0196] P l,min ≤P l,t ≤P l,max

[0197]

[0198] Where: and are the inflow and outflow power of the node at time t, P tol is the total load.

[0199] The market carbon price and electricity price and the winning bid power of each generator set are determined by minimizing the cost. The source side determines the quotations of both parties based on the user power, calculates the carbon intensity of each user node using the carbon flow theory, and then sends the electricity price to the user.

[0200] The user formulates a power purchasing strategy by comprehensively considering the power purchase cost and carbon emission cost in the power market. Therefore, the user's minimum cost is:

[0201]

[0202]

[0203] Where: C i is the total electricity cost of user i, The cost of purchasing electricity for users, The carbon responsibility cost for users. i represents the carbon intensity of user node i; is the market carbon price;

[0204] When carbon emissions are lower than carbon quotas, members participating in carbon trading will gain profits. As carbon emissions increase, the price of purchasing carbon quotas will also rise. The carbon emission responsibilities and carbon quotas of power system member i are as follows:

[0205]

[0206]

[0207] Where: P is the power vector constructed on the source side or load side; P i represents the actual power of member i; c(P) is the calculation function of the total carbon emission responsibility of the system; M is the number of discretization segments; ∝all is the free carbon quota rate, R all,i is the carbon quota of i. Calculation of carbon emission responsibility on both the source and load sides The power system emits all CO2 during the power generation stage. Figure 4 , Figure 5 The power sales situation on the source side and the power purchase situation on the load side under different allocation scenarios;

[0208] Source-side carbon emission responsibility is a portion of its actual carbon emissions;

[0209] R G =xe G P G

[0210] Where: R G 、e G , P G They represent the vectors composed of the carbon emission responsibility, carbon intensity, and actual output power of the generator, respectively, and x is the proportional coefficient;

[0211] Economic comparison table of different scenarios

[0212] Comparison of different scenarios of economy

[0213]

[0214] It can be concluded that the revenue of coal-fired units in scenarios 2 and 3 has decreased;

[0215] Carbon emissions in each scenario are as follows Figure 6 As shown; it shows that the incentive mechanism of the present invention makes the load side move closer to the direction of emission reduction. The amount of electricity sold by the coal-fired units in Scenario 2 is less than that in Scenario 3. However, since the coal-fired units consider less carbon responsibility costs, the final profit is greater than that in Scenario 3. It can be seen that under the incentive mechanism, the source-load sides share the carbon responsibility in equal proportion, which can effectively promote the reduction of system carbon emissions.

[0216] Obviously, after the source-load carbon responsibility is shared proportionally, the carbon emission cost of scenario 2 is the lowest, the electricity sales and purchases are larger, the comprehensive benefits are the largest, and the system carbon emissions are reduced by 5%. This proves that under the incentive mechanism, the proportional sharing of the source-load carbon responsibility can best promote the low-carbon development of both sides of the source and the load; the source-load dual-side power system carbon emission sharing method based on the incentive mechanism of the present invention belongs to the field of power system operation analysis and marketization research. The embodiments in the present invention are only examples for clearly illustrating the technical solution of the present invention, and are not limitations on the specific implementation methods of the present invention. The present invention can effectively stimulate the carbon emission reduction potential on the source-load side, thereby promoting the emission reduction and carbon reduction work of the power system.

Claims

1. Study a carbon emission allocation method for source-load dual-side power system based on incentive mechanism, Features: S1 Determine the key indicators and methods of carbon emissions, including: When all the information such as power generation output, carbon emission intensity and power flow distribution is known, the carbon emission flow distribution of the entire power system can be calculated; When calculating carbon flow, it is necessary to determine the power distribution in the power system and use the AC power flow model to carry out the calculation. For a power system with n nodes, the node active and reactive power flow balance equations are obtained, so that the voltage amplitude and angle of each node can be obtained; The marginal carbon intensity of a node can describe the impact of electricity consumption at that node on the carbon emissions of the entire system; The node marginal carbon intensity is carried out under the premise of economic dispatch, with the following constraints: Where: G is the quotation column vector of each unit; e is a column vector with all elements being 1: P G is the active output column vector of each generator set; P D is the active power consumption column vector of the load; loss is the system line loss; T is the transmission distribution matrix; F is the constraint column vector of each line; P G and are the lower and upper limits of the active output of each generator set respectively; λ is the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the equality constraint; μ is the multiplier corresponding to the line constraint; It is the multiplier corresponding to the upper and lower limits of the generator output.

2. A carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism as claimed in claim 1, Features: S2 obtains its key carbon emission indicators and then analyzes the carbon emission allocation cost; Different types of generators have different carbon emission coefficients. The total carbon debt of the power system and the carbon emission responsibility factors required on the generation side and the load side are C G and C U : C m =C G +C U C G =C G C m C U =C U C m C Gj =d j l G Where: j is the carbon emission rate of type j power generation, are the carbon emission factors of j-type power generation raw material production, transportation raw material transportation and power generation combustion; P j,t is the power generated by power plant j at time t. Different types of power plants have direct carbon costs; C Gj is the carbon tax rate for type j electricity generation; G It is the tax rate per unit of carbon emissions on the power generation side, ensuring that the source side is only responsible for part of the carbon emissions, and the load side is responsible for the remaining carbon emissions.

3. A carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism as claimed in claim 1, Features: S3 Determine the carbon responsibility allocation mechanism and carbon flow tracking method; Considering carbon emission reduction only from the source side is difficult to motivate consumers to achieve demand response. Therefore, the load side should also become the main body of carbon responsibility sharing. The source side generates electricity to meet the load. The power generation party bears part of the carbon emission responsibility for economic dispatch, and the remaining carbon emissions are transferred to the consumer through carbon flow. On the load side, due to different factors such as node location and power consumption, the carbon responsibility of each node is also different. The shared carbon emission responsibility can be expressed as: x i =∑x ij Where: x i The carbon emission responsibility is shared by load i; x ij is the carbon emission responsibility of load i for the share of generation type j; S is a subset of other loads that are sorted before load i and do not contain load member i. P(S) is the probability of the occurrence of this subset S. S∪{i} is to include load i in S to form a new set. j (S∪{i}) represents the marginal effect of incorporating i into S; n N is the number of members in the full union n; n N ! is all possible permutations of fully loaded members N; n is the number of loads; Carbon flow tracking to determine the node carbon emission data is the basis for realizing carbon emission allocation. Based on the parameters of each unit and the load data at each time point, the corresponding output, flow data, and carbon emission intensity can be obtained according to the low-carbon economy theory; Then the active flux matrix of the node and the corresponding distribution matrix are obtained; then it is determined whether the obtained active flux matrix is ​​reversible. If not, it is necessary to process the data and return to regenerate each matrix; If the result is reversible, the carbon phase transfer capacity at each node at each time can be calculated; finally, the carbon emission sharing responsibility that each point of the unit should bear can be obtained.

4. A carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism as claimed in claim 1, Features: S4 determines the carbon emission allocation and constraints on both the source and load sides, and introduces an incentive mechanism; The power system allocation model on both the source and load sides is as follows: Where: i is the system load, j is the system unit; h is the line in the system; their ranges are i=1,2,…,N D ; j = 1, 2, ..., N G ; l=1,2,…,N h ;P Di is the actual load of i; P Gi is the actual output of j; λ i is the output value of i; σ i is the output value of j; and are the storage and load requirements of j and i respectively; N G and N D are the number of j and i respectively; f h It is the trend of h; is the maximum constraint value of h; N h is the number of h; In the power system, the source side and the load side are interrelated in terms of carbon emissions and the responsibilities they should bear. The power generation side and the load side should bear equal responsibilities for energy conservation and emission reduction. The present invention adopts the principle that the power generation side and the load side each bear part of the system carbon responsibility, and on this basis, the carbon responsibility is apportioned based on the incentive mechanism. The power contribution of any generator set to any load and the carbon incentive cost per unit load are: P D =B·(E-A) -1 ·P G =T·P G Where: P G is the net power output of the generator set to the grid; B is the column vector of power demand; P D is the distribution matrix from generator to load; R i Carbon emission responsibility for generators or loads participating in the carbon trading market; 1 ,λ 2 ,λ 3 ,λ 4 All are tiered carbon trading prices; m is the tier coefficient of carbon responsibility.

5. A carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism as claimed in claim 1, Features: S5 determines the carbon emission limits on the source and load sides of the power system based on the incentive mechanism; In order to encourage users to consume more low-carbon electricity, it is necessary to use a carbon price incentive mechanism. The incentive mechanism should use different incentive coefficients in different periods, compare the historical load-side carbon responsibility with the benchmark, and form a carbon incentive price at the time of use. If the carbon responsibility of the historical load side is higher than the benchmark, a high incentive price is used. If the historical carbon responsibility is lower than the benchmark, a low incentive price is used. According to the incentive price and carbon emission intensity, the carbon incentive cost of each load can be obtained. The total carbon incentive subsidy for load i can be expressed as: Where: p t represents the carbon incentive price at time t, P i,t is power, negative is charging power, positive is emission power; Δt is the time step; The carbon incentive mechanism is two-way. Under the incentive mechanism, carbon emissions are reduced and carbon quotas are increased, thereby guiding power companies to independently improve their operating efficiency and investment levels and increase the intensity of new energy consumption. Using the carbon emission flow theory to share the carbon responsibility of users, the allocated carbon responsibility is used as an incentive signal to guide users to actively choose clean energy consumption. According to the carbon emission flow theory, the carbon emissions X on the source side and the load side can be obtained. i ,,X i It can be used as the carbon quota of the unit or load, and the carbon amount is: Where: all is the carbon emission coefficient. After calculating the carbon emissions of each generating unit, the source side and the load side share the carbon emission responsibility in proportion. Based on the carbon emission flow theory, the carbon emission responsibility of each load participating in the carbon trading market is obtained. The greater the carbon emission responsibility, the higher the corresponding carbon incentive price. When the carbon emission responsibility is lower than the free carbon quota, the power plant can make a profit in the carbon trading market; when the carbon emission responsibility is higher than the free carbon quota, the power plant will pay the carbon incentive cost.

6. A carbon emission allocation method for a source-load dual-side power system based on an incentive mechanism as claimed in claim 1, Features: S6 conducts economic optimization based on the incentive mechanism with the total cost as the target, thus deriving the carbon emission allocation strategy between the source and the load side; The cost of the power system consists of power generation cost and carbon emission cost. The minimum power generation cost and carbon incentive cost are set as the expected value, and constraints are added after the carbon cost is added. Determine the electricity purchasing strategy for each period based on the relevant prices and carbon responsibility allocation results. Users need to comprehensively consider their electricity purchasing costs and carbon emission costs in the electricity market to formulate electricity purchasing strategies and obtain the minimum cost for users; When carbon emissions are lower than carbon quotas, members participating in carbon trading will gain profits. When carbon emissions increase, the price of purchasing carbon quotas will also rise. For the power system, carbon quotas can be regarded as a resource with a fixed total amount. The carbon emission responsibility and carbon quota of power system member i can be obtained. The calculation of source-side carbon emission responsibility is based on the above assumptions of the present invention. The source-side carbon emission responsibility is a part of its actual carbon emissions. P j,min ≤P j,t ≤P j,max P l,min ≤P l,t ≤P l,max Where: and are the inflow and outflow power of the node at time t, P tol is the total load; C i is the total electricity cost of user i, The cost of purchasing electricity for users, The carbon responsibility cost for users. i represents the carbon intensity of user node i; is the market carbon price; The carbon emission responsibility and carbon quota allocation method of power system member i is as follows: R G =x G P G Where: P is the power vector constructed on the source side or load side; P i represents the actual power of member i; c(P) is the calculation function of the total carbon emission responsibility of the system; M is the number of discretization segments; ∝all is the free carbon quota rate, R all,i is the carbon quota of i. Calculation of carbon emission responsibility on both sides of source and load Power system CO 2 All emissions during the power generation stage; R G 、e G , P G They respectively represent the vectors composed of the generator's carbon emission responsibility, carbon intensity, and actual output power, and x is the proportional coefficient. This paper verifies the carbon emission reduction on the source-load side under different proportions based on different source-load side sharing proportional coefficients and the results calculated in the previous article.

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