Internet of vehicles V2I authentication key exchange protocol and fast switching authentication method thereof

Abstract

The invention discloses an Internet of Vehicles V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a rapid switching authentication method thereof. The method comprises the following steps: step 1, a system selects and sets elliptic curve parameters for authentication and encryption, and configures a hardware security module of each node and a trusted platform module of a vehicle; 2, information of the vehicle and the driver is safely registered into the system, the vehicle generates a unique public and private key pair and registers the real identity of the vehicle to a trusted authorization center, and the TA generates the false identity of the vehicle after verification and sends the false identity back to the vehicle through a secure channel; 3, the RSU generates and registers a unique identity identifier of the RSU to the TA, and related authentication information of the RSU is generated and stored in the block chain after the TA verifies the unique identity identifier; step 4, completing primary authentication and key exchange between the vehicle and the RSU; and 5, completing the switching authentication with the new RSU. The method has the characteristics of high efficiency, low calculation cost and communication overhead, high security and privacy protection.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of authentication and key exchange, and in particular to a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2I) authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method thereof. Background Art

[0002] With the surge in global transportation demand and the acceleration of urbanization, traditional transportation systems are facing challenges such as traffic congestion, frequent traffic accidents and environmental pollution. To address these problems, intelligent transportation systems (ITS) have emerged. ITS uses information and communication technologies to enhance road safety, optimize traffic flow and alleviate congestion. As an important component of ITS, vehicle-to-vehicle ad hoc networks (VANETs) excel in acquiring and processing large amounts of real-time data. Through vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communications, these networks establish an efficient and reliable data sharing platform to support various ITS applications.

[0003] VANETs not only improve road safety and optimize traffic flow through V2V and V2I communications, but also effectively address the growing traffic demand and complex problems brought about by urbanization. With the rapid development of autonomous driving technology, ITS faces new opportunities and challenges. Autonomous vehicles rely on a large amount of sensor data to perceive the surrounding environment and make driving decisions. However, the data collected by on-board sensors may not be comprehensive enough in complex traffic scenarios. VANETs make up for this deficiency through real-time V2V and V2I communications, providing autonomous vehicles with a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of the environment.

[0004] Through V2I communication, autonomous vehicles can obtain information such as traffic signal status, road construction information, and current traffic flow, thereby optimizing driving routes and improving safety and operating efficiency. These communication mechanisms not only enhance the safety and efficiency of autonomous driving, but also support the overall effectiveness of intelligent transportation systems. VANETs play an indispensable role in contemporary ITS, promoting smoother and safer traffic management.

[0005] Son et al. proposed a blockchain-based lightweight VANET vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) handover authentication protocol design, which cannot resist internal authorization attacks, impersonation attacks, and RSU capture attacks, which may lead to privacy leakage and identity impersonation attacks. It also has high computational cost and large communication overhead.

[0006] Wang et al. proposed a lightweight authentication protocol in which fixed parameters were used for vehicle authentication, which may lead to tracking attacks and cannot defend against internal authorization attacks, impersonation attacks, and RSU capture attacks, and may be tracked maliciously.

[0007] Wang et al. proposed a blockchain-based trust-based scalable computing system for V2I authentication. The system uses bilinear pairing. Although it achieves fast authentication, it results in high computational overhead and cannot resist internal authorization attacks, impersonation attacks, middle attacks, and RSU capture attacks, and may be tracked maliciously.

[0008] In summary, the defects of the existing technologies are as follows: In terms of security, many protocols are insufficient in preventing internal authorization attacks. When an internal node is controlled by an attacker, the attacker can use the legitimate identity to perform malicious operations, threatening the security of the system. In addition, the protocol fails to effectively resist impersonation attacks. Attackers can impersonate legitimate nodes to obtain system resources or manipulate network communications, affecting the normal operation of the network. For roadside unit (RSU) capture attacks, the existing protocols appear vulnerable. Once the RSU is controlled by an attacker, the attacker may use its resources to spread false information or tamper with data, endangering the security of the Internet of Vehicles. At the same time, privacy protection is also a weak link. Some protocols fail to effectively prevent identity leakage during the identity authentication process, resulting in the possibility of vehicle identity being tracked and user privacy being at risk. In terms of overhead, the computational cost and communication overhead of the protocols are high, which limits their efficiency and scalability in practical applications. In particular, those protocols that use fixed parameters for authentication are prone to exposing the identity or location of the vehicle, increasing the possibility of malicious tracking. Summary of the invention

[0009] In order to overcome the above technical problems, the purpose of the present invention is to provide a vehicle network V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method thereof, which has the characteristics of high efficiency, low computing cost and communication overhead, strong security and privacy protection.

[0010] By using blockchain technology to ensure data transparency and non-tamperability, combining it with the Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) to provide unique hardware security features, and introducing a fast switching authentication mechanism, it can effectively resist various security threats such as internal authorization attacks, impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, and tracking attacks, thereby improving the overall security and communication efficiency in the Internet of Vehicles environment.

[0011] The technical solution adopted by the present invention is:

[0012] A vehicle-to-vehicle (V2I) authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method thereof, comprising the following steps;

[0013] Step 1: System initialization phase, which is used to lay the foundation for the normal operation of the entire Internet of Vehicles system. The system selects and sets the elliptic curve parameters for authentication and encryption, and configures the hardware security module (HSM) of each node and the trusted platform module (TPM) of the vehicle;

[0014] The settings at this stage provide the necessary encryption and security support for the subsequent registration and authentication processes, and lay the foundation for the registration and authentication of vehicles and RSUs.

[0015] Step 2: Vehicle registration phase, which is used to securely register the vehicle and driver information into the system. The vehicle generates a unique public-private key pair and registers its real identity with a trusted authority (TA). After verification, the TA generates a pseudo-identity for the vehicle and sends it back to the vehicle through a secure channel.

[0016] This step ensures the legitimacy and privacy protection of the vehicle's identity and lays the foundation for secure communication between the vehicle and the RSU.

[0017] Step 3: RSU registration phase, used to register and authenticate the roadside unit (RSU). The RSU generates and registers its unique identity with the TA. After verification, the TA generates the relevant authentication information of the RSU and stores it in the blockchain.

[0018] This step not only ensures the legitimacy of the RSU's identity, but also prepares for its subsequent secure communication with the vehicle.

[0019] Step 4: V2I initial authentication phase, used to complete the initial authentication and key exchange between the vehicle and the RSU after the vehicle is started or loses the RSU connection for a certain period of time;

[0020] The vehicle and RSU authenticate each other based on their pseudo-identities, generate a shared session key through negotiation, and update the vehicle’s pseudo-identity;

[0021] Through this stage, the vehicle can securely establish a communication connection with the RSU, ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the communication.

[0022] Step 5: The fast switching authentication phase is used to quickly complete the switching authentication with the new RSU when the vehicle moves out of the communication range of the current RSU and enters the range of the next RSU.

[0023] Through this stage, the vehicle can quickly verify the identity of the new RSU and establish a new session key to ensure the continuity and security of communication during the switching process.

[0024] The step 1 is specifically as follows:

[0025] In the system initialization phase, TA selects an elliptic curve E defined in a finite field F p The equation expression is:

[0026] y 2 =x 3 +ax+b(modp)

[0027] Where p is a prime number, a and b are in the finite field F p constants on the , and a, b satisfy 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0(modp); select base point G, G=(G x ,G y ), where G x ,G y is a finite field F p The elements of , the generator G satisfies the elliptic curve equation:

[0028]

[0029] TA selects SHA2 as the one-way hash function h(·) used by the system and publishes the parameters {E, h(·), p, G}.

[0030] The step 2 is specifically as follows:

[0031] Step 1: Vehicle i Select your real ID_Vehicle i , use the random number generator to generate a random number ri, and use the private key to calculate the public key Pub_Vehicle i , change ID_Vehicle i ,ri,Pub_Vehicle i Send to TA via secure channel;

[0032] Step 2: After receiving the message, TA first verifies ID_Vehicle i If the legitimacy of the i =ri·G,R j = rj·G, generating a pseudo identity of the vehicle Calculate verification message and temporary key Finally, PID i ,rj,Vt is sent to Vehicle via a secure channel i ;

[0033] Step 3:

[0034] In Vehicle i Calculate after receiving the message from TA Verify that the received Vt is equal to the calculated Vt'. If they are equal, the user enters his / her biometric information BIO on the vehicle. i-x , and generate Where vx is the total number of generated challenges, based on the vehicle’s own PUF i(·) function generates the corresponding vx Use the fuzzy extractor to extract these vx Process and obtain and P i vx ;

[0035] Use the fuzzy extractor to process the biological information input by the user and obtain (F i-x ,P BIOi-x )=Gen(BIO i-x ), generate a secret Calculate verification message And calculate the temporary encryption key Use symmetric encryption, key RSec' for data BIO i-x ,P i vx , Sec, Encrypt and get MTi, and then use ID_Vehicle i ,PID i ,P i vx , Sec is stored in the vehicle's TPM and the PID is sent to TA via a secure channel i ,Vv,MTi;

[0036] Step 4: After receiving the message, TA calculates Then verify whether Vv is equal to Vv'. If so, use the key RSec to decrypt the message MTi. Then use ID_Vehicle i ,PID i ,P i vx , Sec,BIO i-x , Stored in TA's HSM.

[0037] The step three is specifically as follows:

[0038] Step 1: RSU j Set your ID_RSU j and the random number r r Send to TA via secure channel;

[0039] Step 2: After receiving the message, TA first checks ID_RSU j The uniqueness and legitimacy of the random number r t ,ChallengeCha j , then calculate the verification message and temporary keys for symmetric encryption And use the temporary key TSec to j Encrypt and get MTj1, and then use ID_RSU j ,MTj1,r t ,Vtr is sent to RSU through a secure channel j ;

[0040] Step 3: RSU j After receiving the message, first check the ID_RSU sent by TA j Is it consistent with itself? If it is consistent, calculate Check if Vtr is equal to Vtr', if so calculate the temporary key Then use the temporary key to decrypt the message MTj1, and use its own PUF(·) function to decrypt the decrypted Cha j Process and get Res j And use the fuzzy extractor to get K j and P RSUj , use the temporary key TSec' to the data P RSUj ,Res j ,K j Perform symmetric encryption and then convert ID_RSU j ,MTj2 sends back to TA;

[0041] Step 4: After receiving the message, TA uses the temporary key TSec to decrypt MTj2, and then TA reads the Vehicle stored in the HSM i Data PID i ,P i vx ,Sec, BIO i-x , and symmetric encryption is performed on these data using the key TSec to obtain MTj3. TA sends ID_RSU through a secure channel j ,MTj3 to RSU j , and set the parameter ID_RSU j ,P RSUj ,(Cha j ,Res j ),K j , saved in HSM;

[0042] Step 5: RSU j After receiving the message, MTj3 is decrypted using the temporary key TSec', and then the data PID i ,Sec,P i vx , BIOi-x Upload to the blockchain.

[0043] The step 4 is specifically as follows:

[0044] Step 1: User enters his / her biometric information i-x ', Vehicle i Generate timestamp T 1 , select the sequence number Seq, and select the corresponding and P i Seq ,calculate

[0045] Calculate verification message PID i ,S i ,No i ,V,T 1 Send to RSU j .

[0046] Step 2: RSU j Receive Vehicle i After the message is received, the timestamp T is first generated. 2 , check ||T 2 -T 1 ||≤ΔT If true, then use PID i Query its relevant information on the blockchain;

[0047] calculate Check whether Seq' is legal, if so, find the corresponding Seq' P i Seq' ,calculate (F i-x ”,P BIOi-x ” ) =Gen(BIO i-x ”) and verification message Verify whether V'=V is true, if so, calculate the verification message Val ij =h(PID i ||P i Seq' PF i-x ”PSec||T 2 ), and the session key Calculating new identities Send message ID_RSU j ,T 2 ,Val ij To Vehicle i ; and update the pseudo identity, the data PID i ,Val ij ,SKi j ,BIO i-x , P i Seq' ,S i ,F i-x ',V,T 1 ,T 2 Stored in the blockchain, use Replace the original PID i ;

[0048] Step 3: Vehicle i After receiving the message, generate a timestamp T 3 And verify whether the freshness is met, if so, calculate Val ij '=h(PID i ||P i Seq PF i-x 'PSec||T 2 ), check Val ij 'Is it with Val ij If they are equal, calculate the session key as well as use Replace the original PID i .

[0049] The step five is specifically as follows:

[0050] Step 1: Vehicle i Generate current timestamp T 4 and random number R1 i ,calculate and PID i ,R1 i ,Vv i ,T 4 Send to RSU j ;

[0051] Step 2: RSU j After receiving the message, generate a timestamp T 5 And check ||T 5 -T 4 ||≤ΔT, if true, calculate Check Vv i 'With Vv i Are they equal? ​​If they are equal, generate a new random number R2 i , calculate the verification message Send message ID_RSUj ,Vr i ,R2 i ,T 5 To Vehicle i , then the data PID i ,SID,Vr i ,T 4 ,T 5 Save to blockchain;

[0052] Step 3: Vehicle i After receiving the message, generate a timestamp T 6 And check ||T 6 -T 5 ||≤ΔT, if the condition is met, the verification message is calculated Verify Vr i 'With VR i Are they equal? ​​If they are equal, the verification is completed.

[0053] Beneficial effects of the present invention:

[0054] Through improved authentication and key exchange protocols, the present invention significantly improves the security of VANETs systems, especially in resisting common network attacks (such as man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks), thereby ensuring user privacy and the security of communication data.

[0055] The present invention optimizes the authentication protocol so that it can still run efficiently under limited computing resources and bandwidth. This is especially important for vehicle-mounted devices, which usually have limited computing power and energy consumption. Compared with the existing technology, the present invention significantly reduces the computing cost and communication overhead while maintaining high security.

[0056] By improving the message integrity verification mechanism, the present invention ensures the integrity and accuracy of all communication messages during the vehicle switching process, thereby improving the reliability of the system and avoiding potential safety risks caused by incomplete or tampered messages.

[0057] The lightweight security protocol designed by the present invention performs well in terms of resource utilization. Through effective resource allocation and optimization, the present invention can still provide efficient authentication and communication functions in an environment with limited bandwidth and computing resources, thereby improving the overall performance of the system.

[0058] The present invention is particularly suitable for large-scale vehicle network environments. Through blockchain technology and optimized protocol design, it effectively reduces the occupation of system resources, ensures that the system can still operate stably under high load, and supports the expansion needs of future intelligent transportation systems.

[0059] With the continuous development of intelligent transportation systems, the requirements for VANETs systems are also increasing. The present invention provides higher scalability through technical improvements and can adapt to the requirements of future complex traffic environments and autonomous driving technologies. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0060] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the vehicle registration stages.

[0061] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the RSU registration phase.

[0062] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the initial authentication stage of V2I.

[0063] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the rapid switching authentication phase.

[0064] Figure 5 This is a flow chart of the vehicle registration phase.

[0065] Figure 6 This is a flowchart of the RSU registration phase.

[0066] Figure 7 This is a flow chart of the initial authentication phase of V2I.

[0067] Figure 8 This is a flowchart of the rapid switching authentication phase. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0068] The following will be combined with the drawings in the embodiments of the present invention to clearly and completely describe the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0069] Symbol Table

[0070]

[0071]

[0072] A vehicle-to-vehicle (V2I) authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method thereof, comprising the following steps;

[0073] Step 1: System initialization phase;

[0074] In this phase, the system selects and configures the elliptic curve parameters for encryption and authentication, and configures the hardware security module (HSM) and trusted platform module (TPM) for each vehicle and roadside unit (RSU). In addition, the hash function and encryption algorithm used by the system are selected to ensure that the subsequent communication between each node has consistent security standards. Through the configuration of the system initialization phase, the entire system can operate in a unified and secure environment, and the registration, authentication and subsequent communication of vehicles and RSUs can be carried out under strong security guarantees. The settings at this stage effectively reduce the security risks of the system in actual applications, ensure the security and consistency of communication between nodes, and lay a solid foundation for the efficient and safe operation of the Internet of Vehicles system.

[0075] In the system initialization phase, TA selects an elliptic curve E defined in a finite field F p The equation is expressed as: 2 =x 3 +ax+b(modp) where p is a prime number, a and b are in the finite field F p constants on the , and a, b satisfy 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0(modp). Select the base point G, G=(G x ,G y ), where G x ,G y is a finite field F p The elements of , the generator G satisfies the elliptic curve equation: TA selects SHA2 as the one-way hash function h(·) used by the system and publishes the parameters {E, h(·), p, G}.

[0076] In this system, the TA and each RSU are equipped with a hardware security module (HSM), which is a dedicated hardware device used to protect and manage digital keys, perform encryption and decryption operations, and ensure data security. In addition, each Vehicle is equipped with a trusted platform module (TPM). The TPM chip is integrated into the motherboard or attached to the device as an independent module to provide hardware-based security functions for the system.

[0077] Step 2 Vehicle Registration Stage:

[0078] The vehicle and driver information is securely registered into the system to ensure the legitimacy and privacy protection of the vehicle identity. At this stage, the vehicle generates a public-private key pair and registers its real identity with the Trusted Authorization Center (TA). After verification, the TA generates a pseudo-identity for the vehicle and securely transmits it to the vehicle. Through this registration process, the vehicle obtains an identity and pseudo-identity recognized by the system, ensuring effective privacy protection in subsequent V2I authentication and communication, preventing identity leakage and tracking, and laying the foundation for secure communication with the RSU.

[0079] The flowchart of the vehicle registration phase is attached. Figure 1 shown.

[0080] During the Vehicle registration phase, if it is the first time to purchase a vehicle, you need to initiate a registration application to the car manufacturer, and the salesperson will assist the buyer to complete the vehicle registration. When the ownership of the vehicle changes, the new owner must apply to the traffic management department for re-registration of the vehicle. When you need to add or delete a driver, you must also submit an application to the traffic management department. After the traffic management department sends a request to TA and obtains its consent, the staff will assist in completing the operation.

[0081] like Figure 5 As shown, Step 1: Vehicle i Select your real ID_Vehicle i , use the random number generator to generate a random number ri, and use the private key to calculate the public key Pub_Vehicle i , change ID_Vehicle i ,ri,Pub_Vehicle i Sent to TA via secure channel.

[0082] Step 2: After receiving the message, TA first verifies ID_Vehicle i If the legitimacy of the i =ri·G,R j = rj·G, generating a pseudo identity of the vehicle Calculate verification message and temporary key Finally, PID i ,rj,Vt is sent to Vehicle via a secure channel i

[0083] Step 3:

[0084] In Vehicle i Calculate after receiving the message from TA Verify that the received Vt is equal to the calculated Vt'. If they are equal, the user enters his / her biometric information BIO on the vehicle. i-x , and generate vx is the total number of generated challenges. At least 100 challenges can be generated based on the difference in the vehicle's own computing power. Then, based on the vehicle's own PUF i (·) function generates the corresponding vx Use the fuzzy extractor to extract these vx Process and obtain and P i vx . Use the fuzzy extractor to process the biological information input by the user and obtain (F i-x ,P BIOi-x )=Gen(BIO i-x ), generate a secret Calculate verification message And calculate the temporary encryption key Use symmetric encryption, key RSec' for data BIO i-x ,P i vx , Sec, Encrypt and get MTi, and then use ID_Vehicle i ,PID i ,P i vx , Sec is stored in the vehicle's TPM. PID is sent to TA via a secure channel i ,Vv,MTi.

[0085] Step 4: After receiving the message, TA calculates Then verify whether Vv is equal to Vv'. If so, use the key RSec to decrypt the message MTi. Then use ID_Vehicle i ,PID i ,P i vx , Sec,BIO i-x , Stored in TA's HSM.

[0086] Step 3: RSU registration phase:

[0087] The roadside unit (RSU) is securely registered into the system to ensure its legitimacy and prepare for subsequent secure communication with the vehicle. In this phase, the RSU generates a unique identity and registers with the Trusted Authorization Center (TA). After verification by the TA, the relevant authentication information is generated and stored in the blockchain. Through this registration process, the RSU obtains an identity recognized by the system, ensuring its legitimacy and credibility when communicating with the vehicle, providing security for subsequent V2I communications, preventing malicious RSU access, and enhancing the overall security and reliability of the system. The flowchart of the RSU registration phase is attached. Figure 2 shown.

[0088] During the RSU registration phase, the RSU manufacturer should submit an application to the transportation management department, and the staff will assist in the RSU registration.

[0089] like Figure 6 As shown, step 1: RSU j Set your ID_RSU j and the random number r r Sent to TA via secure channel.

[0090] Step 2: After receiving the message, TA first checks ID_RSU j The uniqueness and legitimacy of the random number r t ,ChallengeCha j , then calculate the verification message and temporary keys for symmetric encryption And use the temporary key TSec to j Encrypt and get MTj1. j ,MTj1,r t ,Vtr is sent to RSU through a secure channel j .

[0091] Step 3: RSU j After receiving the message, first check the ID_RSU sent by TA j Is it consistent with itself? If it is consistent, calculate Check if Vtr is equal to Vtr', if so calculate the temporary key Then use the temporary key to decrypt the message MTj1. Use its own PUF(·) function to decrypt the decrypted Cha j Process and get Res j And use the fuzzy extractor to get K j and P RSUj . Use the temporary key TSec' to RSUj ,Res j ,Kj Perform symmetric encryption. Then use ID_RSU j ,MTj2 sends it back to TA.

[0092] Step 4: After receiving the message, TA uses the temporary key TSec to decrypt MTj2. Then TA reads the Vehicle stored in the HSM. i Data PID i ,P i vx ,Sec, BIO i-x , and symmetric encryption is performed on these data using the key TSec to obtain MTj3. TA sends ID_RSU through a secure channel j ,MTj3 to RSU j , and set the parameter ID_RSU j ,P RSUj ,(Cha j ,Res j ),K j , and save it in HSM.

[0093] Step 5: RSU j After receiving the message, MTj3 is decrypted using the temporary key TSec', and then the data PID i ,Sec,P i vx , BIO i-x Upload to the blockchain.

[0094] Step 4: V2I initial authentication stage:

[0095] After the vehicle is started or has not been connected to the RSU for a long time, the initial authentication and key exchange between the vehicle and the RSU are completed to ensure the security and effectiveness of the communication. In this stage, the vehicle and the RSU authenticate each other through their respective pseudo-identities, negotiate to generate a shared session key, and update the vehicle's pseudo-identity. Through this authentication process, the vehicle and the RSU establish a secure communication channel, ensure the confidentiality and integrity of subsequent communications, prevent unauthorized devices from accessing the network, and lay a secure foundation for subsequent V2I communications. The flowchart of the V2I initial authentication stage is attached. Figure 3 shown.

[0096] Whenever the Vehicle starts or has not been connected to the RSU for more than 20 minutes, the InitialV2Iauthentication key exchange phase needs to be executed to complete the authentication of the Vehicle and the RSU.

[0097] like Figure 7As shown, step 1: the user enters his or her biometric information BIO i-x ', Vehicle i Generate timestamp T 1 , select the sequence number Seq, and select the corresponding and P i Seq .calculate Calculate verification message PID i ,S i ,No i ,V,T 1 Send to RSU j .

[0098] Step 2: RSU j Receive Vehicle i After the message is received, the timestamp T is first generated. 2 , check ||T 2 -T 1 ||≤ΔT If true, then use PID i Query its related information on the blockchain. Check whether Seq' is legal, if so, find the corresponding Seq' P i Seq' ,calculate (F i-x ”,P BIOi-x ” ) =Gen(BIO i-x ”) and verification message Verify whether V'=V is true, if so, calculate the verification message Val ij =h(PID i ||P i Seq' PF i-x ”PSec||T 2 ), and the session key Calculating new identities Send message ID_RSU j ,T 2 ,Val ij To Vehicle i . And update the pseudo identity, the data PID i ,Val ij ,SKi j ,BIO i-x , P i Seq' ,S i ,Fi-x ',V,T 1 ,T 2 Stored in the blockchain, use Replace the original PID i .

[0099] Step 3: Vehicle i After receiving the message, generate a timestamp T 3 And verify whether the freshness is met, if so, calculate Val ij '=h(PID i ||P i Seq PF i-x 'PSec||T 2 ), check Val ij 'Is it with Val ij If they are equal, calculate the session key as well as use Replace the original PID i .

[0100] Step 5: Quickly switch to the authentication stage:

[0101] When the vehicle moves out of the communication range of the current RSU and enters the range of the next RSU, it quickly completes the authentication and key exchange with the new RSU to ensure the continuity and security of communication. In this stage, the vehicle and the new RSU verify each other's identity through a fast authentication mechanism and generate a new session key to ensure uninterrupted communication. Through this process, the vehicle can seamlessly switch to the new RSU during movement, maintain a stable communication connection, avoid communication interruptions or security vulnerabilities caused by switching, and thus improve the overall communication stability and security of the Internet of Vehicles system in a dynamic environment. The flowchart of the fast switching authentication stage is attached. Figure 4 shown.

[0102] When the vehicle leaves the communication range of the previous RSU and communicates with the current RSU, it needs to perform the fast handover authentication phase. This phase is to enable the vehicle to quickly complete the handover authentication with the target RSU and confirm each other's identities while driving.

[0103] like Figure 8 As shown, Step 1: Vehicle i Generate current timestamp T 4 and random number R1 i ,calculate and PID i ,R1 i ,Vvi ,T 4 Send to RSU j .

[0104] Step 2: RSU j After receiving the message, generate a timestamp T 5 And check ||T 5 -T 4 ||≤ΔT, if true, calculate Check Vv i 'With Vv i Are they equal? ​​If they are equal, generate a new random number R2 i , calculate the verification message Send message ID_RSU j ,Vr i ,R2 i ,T 5 To Vehicle i , then the data PID i ,SID,Vr i ,T 4 ,T 5 Save to the blockchain.

[0105] Step 3: Vehicle i After receiving the message, generate a timestamp T 6 And check ||T 6 -T 5 ||≤ΔT, if the condition is met, the verification message is calculated Verify Vr i 'With VR i Are they equal? ​​If they are equal, the verification is completed.

[0106] Lightweight authentication and key exchange protocol: This paper proposes a lightweight authentication and key exchange protocol for VANETs (vehicle-mounted ad hoc networks), which can still run efficiently in an environment with limited computing resources, and is particularly suitable for vehicle-mounted devices and bandwidth-constrained communication environments. By optimizing the protocol design, this paper significantly reduces the computing and communication overhead.

[0107] Improved message integrity verification mechanism: In order to enhance the security of the system, the present invention improves the handover authentication mechanism in V2I (vehicle-to-infrastructure) communication to ensure that the integrity of all messages is fully verified during the communication between the vehicle and the infrastructure, thereby improving the overall reliability and security of the system.

[0108] Resource optimization and utilization: This paper designs a lightweight security protocol based on blockchain, which optimizes the utilization of bandwidth and computing resources to ensure efficient and secure communication in resource-constrained environments. Especially in large-scale vehicle network environments, the design of this paper can effectively reduce the occupation of system resources and improve overall performance.

[0109] Enhanced security protection measures: In response to the security risks in the prior art, the present invention enhances the system's ability to resist various network attacks (such as man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, etc.) by designing a more secure protocol structure, further ensuring user privacy and the security of communication data.

Claims

1. A vehicle network V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method thereof, characterized in that: The steps include: Step 1: During the system initialization phase, the system selects and sets the elliptic curve parameters for authentication and encryption, and configures the hardware security module (HSM) of each node and the trusted platform module (TPM) of the vehicle; Step 2: Vehicle registration phase, which is used to securely register the vehicle and driver information into the system. The vehicle generates a unique public-private key pair and registers its real identity with a trusted authority (TA). After verification, the TA generates a pseudo-identity for the vehicle and sends it back to the vehicle through a secure channel. Step 3: RSU registration phase, used to register and authenticate the roadside unit (RSU). The RSU generates and registers its unique identity with the TA. After verification, the TA generates the relevant authentication information of the RSU and stores it in the blockchain. Step 4: V2I initial authentication phase, used to complete the initial authentication and key exchange between the vehicle and the RSU after the vehicle is started or loses the RSU connection for a certain period of time; The vehicle and RSU authenticate each other based on their pseudo-identities, generate a shared session key through negotiation, and update the vehicle’s pseudo-identity; Step 5: The fast switching authentication phase is used to quickly complete the switching authentication with the new RSU when the vehicle moves out of the communication range of the current RSU and enters the range of the next RSU.

2. A vehicle network V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that: The step 1 is specifically as follows: In the system initialization phase, TA selects an elliptic curve E defined in a finite field F p The equation expression is: and 2 =x 3 +ax+b(modp) Where p is a prime number, a and b are in the finite field F p constants on the , and a, b satisfy 4a 3 +27b 2 ≠0(modp); select base point G, G=(G x ,G y ), where G x ,G y is a finite field F p The elements of , the generator G satisfies the elliptic curve equation: TA selects SHA2 as the one-way hash function h(·) used by the system and publishes the parameters {E, h(·), p, G}.

3. A vehicle network V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that: The step 2 is specifically as follows: Step 1: Vehicle i Select your real ID_Vehicle i , use the random number generator to generate a random number ri, and use the private key to calculate the public key Pub_Vehicle i , change ID_Vehicle i ,ri,Pub_Vehicle i Send to TA via secure channel; Step 2: After receiving the message, TA first verifies ID_Vehicle i If the legitimacy of the i =ri·G,R j = rj·G, generating a pseudo identity of the vehicle Calculate verification message and temporary key Finally, PID i ,rj,Vt is sent to Vehicle via a secure channel i ; Step 3: In Vehicle i Calculate after receiving the message from TA Verify whether the received Vt is equal to the calculated Vt'. If they are equal, the user enters his / her biometric information BIOi on the vehicle. -x , and generate Where vx is the total number of generated challenges, based on the vehicle’s own PUF i (·) function generates the corresponding vx Use the fuzzy extractor to extract these vx Process and obtain and Use the fuzzy extractor to process the biological information input by the user and obtain (F i-x ,P BIOi-x )=Gen(BIO i-x ), generate a secret Calculate verification message And calculate the temporary encryption key Use symmetric encryption, the key is RSec' to encrypt the data Encrypt and get MTi, Sec is stored in the vehicle's TPM and the PID is sent to TA via a secure channel i ,Vv,MTi; Step 4: After receiving the message, TA calculates Then verify whether Vv is equal to Vv'. If they are equal, use the key RSec to decrypt the message MTi. Stored in TA's HSM.

4. A vehicle network V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method according to claim 3, characterized in that: The step three is specifically as follows: Step 1: RSU j Set your ID_RSU j and the random number r r Send to TA via secure channel; Step 2: After receiving the message, TA first checks ID_RSU j The uniqueness and legitimacy of the random number r t ,ChallengeCha j , then calculate the verification message and temporary keys for symmetric encryption And use the temporary key TSec to j Encrypt and get MTj1, and then use ID_RSU j ,MTj1,r t ,Vtr is sent to RSU through a secure channel j ; Step 3; RSU j After receiving the message, first check the ID_RSU sent by TA j Is it consistent with itself? If it is consistent, calculate Check if Vtr is equal to Vtr', if so calculate the temporary key Then use the temporary key to decrypt the message MTj1, and use its own PUF(·) function to decrypt the decrypted Cha j Process and get Res j And use the fuzzy extractor to get K j and P RSUj , use the temporary key TSec' to the data P RSUj ,Res j ,K j Perform symmetric encryption and then convert ID_RSU j ,MTj2 sends back to TA; Step 4: After receiving the message, TA uses the temporary key TSec to decrypt MTj2, and then TA reads the Vehicle stored in the HSM i data The data are symmetrically encrypted using the key TSec to obtain MTj3. TA sends ID_RSU through a secure channel. j ,MTj3 to RSU j , and set the parameter ID_RSU j ,P RSUj ,(Cha j ,Res j ),K j , saved in HSM; Step 5: RSU j After receiving the message, MTj3 is decrypted using the temporary key TSec', and then the data Upload to the blockchain.

5. A vehicle network V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method according to claim 4, characterized in that: The step 4 is specifically as follows: Step 1: User enters his / her biometric information i-x ', Vehicle i Generate timestamp T1, select sequence number Seq, and select the corresponding and calculate Calculate verification message PID i ,S i ,No i ,V,T1 sent to RSU j ; Step 2: RSU j Receive Vehicle i After the message is received, first generate timestamp T2, check ||T2-T1||≤ΔT. If it holds, then use PID i Query its relevant information on the blockchain; calculate Check whether Seq' is legal, if so, find the corresponding Seq' calculate (F i-x ”,P BIOi-x ” ) =Gen(BIO i-x ”) and verification message Verify whether V'=V is true, if so, calculate the verification message and the session key Calculating new identities Send message ID_RSU j ,T2,Val ij To Vehicle i ; and update the pseudo identity, the data Stored in the blockchain, use Replace the original PID i ; Step 3: Vehicle i After receiving the message, generate timestamp T3 and verify whether it meets the freshness requirement. If so, calculate Check Val ij 'Is it with Val ij If they are equal, calculate the session key as well as use Replace the original PID i .

6. A vehicle network V2I authentication key exchange protocol and a fast switching authentication method according to claim 5, characterized in that: The step five is specifically as follows: Step 1: Vehicle i Generate current timestamp T4 and random number R1 i ,calculate PID i ,R1 i ,Vv i , T4 sends to RSU j ; Step 2: RSU j After receiving the message, generate timestamp T5 and check ||T5-T4||≤ΔT. If it is true, calculate Check Vv i 'With Vv i Are they equal? ​​If they are equal, generate a new random number R2 i , calculate the verification message Send message ID_RSU j ,Vr i ,R2 i ,T5 to Vehicle i , then the data PID i ,SID,Vr i ,T4,T5 are saved on the blockchain; Step 3: Vehicle i After receiving the message, generate timestamp T6 and check ||T6-T5||≤ΔT. If the condition is met, calculate the verification message Verify Vr i 'With VR i Are they equal? ​​If they are equal, the verification is completed.

Images