Method and apparatus for l1 security enhancement

Abstract

Communicating in a wireless communication system includes generating at least one of a time-varying radio network temporary identifier (RNTI) and a time-varying identifier (ID); setting a seed for a scrambling sequence with at least one of the time-varying RNTI and the time-varying ID; scrambling a physical channel or a reference signal using the scrambling sequence; and transmitting the physical channel or the reference signal. A public key between a base station and a user equipment (UE) may be derived. Generating the time-varying RNTI may include using a function based on the public key, the RNTI, and a time variable.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application generally relates to wireless communication systems, including physical layer (ie, L1) security. Background Art

[0002] Wireless mobile communication technologies use various standards and protocols to send data between base stations and wireless communication devices. Wireless communication system standards and protocols may include, for example, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution (LTE) (e.g., 4G), 3GPP New Radio (NR) (e.g., 5G), and the IEEE 802.11 standard for wireless local area networks (WLANs) (commonly referred to within industry organizations as WLANs). ).

[0003] As envisioned by 3GPP, different wireless communication system standards and protocols may use various radio access networks (RANs) to communicate between base stations of the RAN (which may also sometimes be referred to as RAN nodes, network nodes, or simply nodes) and wireless communication devices referred to as user equipment (UE). 3GPP RANs may include, for example, Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE) RAN (GERAN), Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (UTRAN), Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN), and / or Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN).

[0004] Each RAN may use one or more radio access technologies (RATs) for communication between base stations and UEs. For example, GERAN implements GSM and / or EDGE RAT, UTRAN implements Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) RAT or other 3GPP RAT, E-UTRAN implements LTE RAT (sometimes referred to as LTE), and NG-RAN implements NR RAT (sometimes referred to as 5G RAT, 5G NR RAT, or NR in this document). In some deployments, E-UTRAN may also implement NR RAT. In some deployments, NG-RAN may also implement LTE RAT.

[0005] The base stations used by the RAN may correspond to the RAN. An example of an E-UTRAN base station is an Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) Node B (also commonly denoted as an evolved Node B, enhanced Node B, eNodeB, or eNB). An example of an NG-RAN base station is a Next Generation Node B (also sometimes referred to as a gNodeB or gNB).

[0006] The RAN provides its communication services together with external entities through its connection with the Core Network (CN). For example, E-UTRAN may utilize the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) while NG-RAN may utilize the 5G Core Network (5GC). BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0007] To easily identify the discussion of any particular element or action, the most significant digit(s) in a reference number refers to the drawing number that first introduces the element.

[0008] Figure 1 is a table illustrating the states of access stratum (AS) security protection for certain wireless communication systems.

[0009] Figure 2 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of the PDCCH used by certain wireless systems.

[0010] Figure 3 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of the PDSCH used by certain wireless systems.

[0011] Figure 4 is a timing diagram illustrating a process for L1 (ie, physical layer) security according to certain embodiments.

[0012] Figure 5 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of a PDCCH according to certain embodiments.

[0013] Figure 6 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of PDSCH according to certain embodiments.

[0014] Figure 7 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of PUSCH according to certain embodiments.

[0015] Figure 8 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of PUCCH according to certain embodiments.

[0016] Fig. 9 An example architecture of a wireless communication system according to embodiments disclosed herein is illustrated.

[0017] Fig.10 A system for performing signaling between a wireless device and a network device according to embodiments disclosed herein is illustrated. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0018] Various embodiments are described with reference to UE. However, reference to UE is provided for illustrative purposes only. The example embodiments may be used with any electronic component that can establish a connection with a network and is configured with hardware, software and / or firmware for exchanging information and data with the network. Therefore, UE as described herein is used to represent any suitable electronic component.

[0019] Figure 1 It is a table illustrating the state of access layer (AS) security protection for some wireless communication systems. As shown in the figure, only unicast transmission after AS security activation is protected. Protected unicast messages may include, for example, dedicated control channels (DCCH) and dedicated traffic channels (DTCH). However, other message types may still be unprotected, including paging (e.g., paging control channel (PCCH)), system information (e.g., broadcast control channel)), initial access process (e.g., random access channel (RACH) process and / or common control channel (CCCH) message), radio resource control (RRC) unicast message (e.g., DCCH) before AS security activation, L1 message (e.g., physical downlink control channel (PDCCH), physical uplink control channel (PUCCH), physical radio access channel (PRACH), sounding reference signal (SRS), synchronization signal block (SSB), channel state information reference signal (CSI-RS), etc.), and L2 message (e.g., L2 control protocol data unit (PDU), L2 header, etc.).

[0020] The current AS security configuration may include integrity protection and encryption for RRC signaling (e.g., signaling radio bearers (SRBs)) and user data (e.g., data radio bearers (DRBs)). The AS Security Mode Command (SMC) procedure is used for RRC and User Plane (UP) security algorithm negotiation and RRC security activation. The security configuration is per DRB, but all DRBs belonging to the same PDU session may have the same configuration. The integrity protection algorithm and encryption algorithm are common to SRB1, SRB2, SRB3 (if configured), and DRBs configured with integrity protection, with the same keyToUse value.

[0021] Currently, an unlicensed downlink receiver with sufficient computing resources can identify the PDCCH resources used in a deployment and decode the PDCCH and Physical Downlink Shared Channel (PDSCH) for all users in the network. Even if the dedicated configuration is encrypted, the L2 header (below the Packet Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP) layer) can be fully parsed based on common deployments. In addition, the Medium Access Control (MAC) Control Element (CE) is not protected.

[0022] In some wireless communication systems, adding encryption and integrity protection to downlink control information (DCI) may not be feasible. For example, adding encryption and integrity protection to DCI may significantly increase the overhead of blind decoding, may cause additional latency for critical UE processing periods of N1 and N2, and / or may require additional bits for integrity checksums. Therefore, the inventors of the present application recognize the need to enhance physical layer security to significantly increase the computational complexity of unauthorized downlink receivers identifying and tracking individual users in the network.

[0023] Another security risk is that a fake base station can send fake L1 and / or L2 messages to perform a denial of service (DoS) attack on a UE. In addition, a fake UE can send fake L1 / L2 messages to perform a DoS attack on a base station (e.g., a gNB). Therefore, the inventors of the present application recognize the need to enhance physical layer security to significantly increase the computational complexity of a fake base station and / or fake UE performing a DoS attack.

[0024] In the downlink (DL), the L1 (i.e., physical layer) attack strategy may include occupying most or all PDCCH candidates in a time slot to prevent the reception of signals from the legitimate base station. Since the PDCCH is not protected, the attacker can first read the PDCCH sent to the UE of interest, and then forge PDCCH transmissions and / or PDSCH transmissions (e.g., using the same HARQ process number, correcting the demodulation reference signal (DMRS) generation, and also correcting the modulation constellation with junk signals) to corrupt the UE's soft buffer. As a result, either the signal from the base station is drowned out by the false signal (note that the signal strength of the false signal does not need to be at an elevated level), or the UE receives only the false signal.

[0025] L2 attacks can also occur in the DL. Since the L2 header and L2 control PDU are not protected, an attacker can masquerade as the serving cell of a UE of interest and send L2 messages to the UE to disrupt the UE's communication with the base station. For example, a "SCell activation / deactivation MAC CE" can be used to deactivate communication through the secondary cell (SCell), making the UE unable to receive data through the affected SCell. In another DL L2 attack, an erroneous "TCI state indication of UE-specific PDCCH MAC CE" and / or "TCI state activation / deactivation of UE-specific PDSCH MAC CE" can be used to require the UE to adjust the receive (Rx) beam to a direction that is not conducive to receiving signals from the gNB. In another exemplary DL L2 attack, a false "non-periodic CSI triggering state sub-selection MAC CE" can be used to select a code point that is not intended to be used by the base station in order to create an inconsistency between the base station and the UE in terms of CSI feedback.

[0026] For uplink (UL) L2 attacks, an attacker (e.g., a fake UE) can pretend to be a UE of interest and send a "BFR MAC CE" to a base station (e.g., a gNB), thereby pretending that the UE encounters a control beam failure. By sending a fake "BFR MAC CE", the base station can be tricked into initiating a beam failure recovery (BFR) procedure and interrupting ongoing communications.

[0027] Figure 2 200 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of a PDCCH used by certain wireless systems. The illustrated example may be performed by a base station (e.g., a gNB) on a DCI 202. The base station may perform DCI size alignment 204 by adding some zero padding bits until the payload reaches a predetermined size. The base station may also calculate a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) and perform a CRC attachment 206, which allows the UE to detect whether there are errors in the decoded DCI payload bits. After attaching the CRC, the base station may mask a certain number of CRC bits 214 with a radio network temporary identifier (RNTI). For example, using the RNTI mask, the UE may detect DCI for its unicast data and distinguish between sets of DCI with different purposes that have the same payload size. The base station may also perform polarization coding / rate matching 210 (e.g., encoding bits by a polarization encoder to protect the DCI from errors during transmission and then rate matching to fit the allocated payload resource elements (REs) of the DCI).

[0028] like Figure 2 As shown, the base station may also perform PDCCH scrambling 212, where each DCI payload bit is individually scrambled by a scrambling sequence generated from a Gold sequence. The scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDCCH coded bits may be composed of an RNTI 214 and a scrambling identifier N ID 216 sets the seed. In this example, RNTI 214 and N ID 216 each has 16 bits.

[0029] A Gold sequence can be defined by two polynomials, where the seed can be set only for the second polynomial. The seed setting for the first polynomial can be fixed. For example, a universal pseudo-random sequence can be defined by a Gold sequence of length 31. PN The output sequence c(n) (where n = 0, 1, ... M PN -1) is defined by the following formula:

[0030] c(n)=(x1(n+N C )+(x2(n+N C ))mod2

[0031] x1(n+31)=(x1(n+3)+x1(n))mod2

[0032] x2(n+31)=(x2(n+3)+x2(n+2)+x2(n+1)+x2(n))mod2

[0033] Where N C = 1600 and the first m-sequence x1(n) is initialized with x1(0) = 1, x1(n) = 0 (n = 1, 2, ..., 30). The second m-sequence x2(n) is initialized with indicates that its value depends on the application of the sequence.

[0034] Gold sequences can be widely used for scrambling in NR. The seed for PDCCH scrambling can be composed of n RNTI and n ID In some communication systems, the UE assumes that the bit blocks b(0),...,b(M) are modulated before modulation. bit -1) scramble, where M bit is the number of bits sent on the physical channel, so according to Generate a scrambled bit block The scrambling sequence generator is c init =(n RNTI 2 16 +n ID )mod2 31 For a UE-specific search space (e.g., as defined in clause 10 of 3GPP TS 38.213), if configured, n ID □{0,1,...,65535} is equal to the higher-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID, otherwise it is equal to In addition, if the higher-level parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID is configured, n RNTI Given by the UE-specific cell RNTI (C-RNTI) of the PDCCH in the UE-specific search space, otherwise n RNTI =0.

[0035] After PDCCH scrambling 212, the base station performs modulation 220 (eg, using quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) modulation) on the scrambled DCI bit sequence. The base station then performs mapping 222 to REs of control channel elements (CCEs).

[0036] like Figure 2 As shown, the base station also performs PDCCH DMRS scrambling 218. The Gold sequence used for PDCCH DMRS is composed of a slot index 224, a symbol index 226 and N ID216 Set the seed. N ID 216 can be 16 bits (e.g., configured to be the same as the C-RNTI) or can follow the size of the cell ID. In some embodiments, the UE assumes that the reference signal sequence r of the orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) symbol l is l (m), is defined by:

[0037]

[0038] The pseudo-random sequence generator is initialized by the following formula:

[0039]

[0040] Where l is the OFDM symbol number within the time slot, is the timeslot number within the frame, and N ID □{0,1,...,65535} is given by the higher layer parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID (if provided). Otherwise,

[0041] The UE can assume that the sequence r is converted according to the following formula l (m) maps to resource element (k,l) p,μ :

[0042]

[0043] k'=0,1,2

[0044] n=0,1,...

[0045] where the following conditions are met: if the higher layer parameter precoderGranularity is equal to AsREG bundle, then they are within the resource element group that constitutes the PDCCH that the UE is attempting to decode; and if the higher layer parameter precoderGranularity is equal to allContiguousRB, then they are within all resource element groups within the set of contiguous resource blocks in the CORESET that the UE is attempting to decode the PDCCH. The reference point for k is: if the CORESET is configured by the controlResourceSetZero field in the PBCH or PDCCH-ConfigCommon IE, then it is subcarrier 0 of the lowest numbered resource block in the CORESET; otherwise it is subcarrier 0 in common resource block 0.

[0046] Figure 330 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of a PDSCH used by certain wireless systems. The illustrated example may be performed by a base station (e.g., a gNB) on a DL transport block 302 (e.g., MAC CE and data). The base station may perform a CRC attachment 304 to provide error detection. The base station then performs LDPC coding / rate matching 306, where the base station performs low-density parity check (LDPC) coding and then rate matching.

[0047] Next, the base station performs PDSCH scrambling 308 using a scrambling sequence generated from the Gold sequence. The scrambling sequence may be composed of RNTI 310, codeword index 312, and scrambling identifier n ID 314 Set the seed. Scrambled ID n ID 314 may include, for example, a configuration index similar to a cell ID (whose range is slightly larger than that of a cell ID), or may include the cell ID itself.

[0048] For PDSCH scrambling 308, at most two codewords q□{0,1} may be sent. In the case of single codeword transmission, q=0. For each codeword q, the UE assumes that the bit block is scrambled before modulation. Scrambling is performed, where is the number of bits in the codeword q sent on the physical channel, resulting in a scrambled bit block according to

[0049]

[0050] The scrambling sequence generator is used

[0051] c RNTI =n RNTI 2 16 +q·2 14 +n ID To initialize, where: if configured, n ID □{0,1,...,1023} is equal to the higher layer parameter dataScramblingIdentityPDSCH, and RNTI is equal to C-RNTI, MCS-C-RNTI or CS-RNTI, and DCI format 1_0 is not used to schedule transmission in the common search space; if a CORESET with CORESETPoolIndex equal to 0 is used to schedule codewords, then n ID□{0,1,...,1023} is equal to the higher-level parameter dataScramblingIdentityPDSCH, or if the codeword is scheduled using a CORESET with CORESETPoolIndex equal to 1, it is equal to the higher-level parameter AdditionaldataScramblingPDSCH; if the higher-level parameters dataScramblingIdentityPDSCH and AdditionaldataScramblingIdentityPDSCH are configured together with the higher-level parameter CORESETPoolIndex containing two different values, and RNTI is equal to C_RNTI, MCS-C-RNTI or CS-RNTI, and DCI format 1_0 is not used to schedule transmission in the common search space; otherwise

[0052] After PDSCH scrambling 308, the base station performs modulation 316 to generate a complex-valued modulation symbol block. Then, the base station performs RE mapping 318.

[0053] like Figure 3 As shown, the base station also uses a symbol index 322, a time slot index 324 and a A group identifier 326 (which can be 16 bits or a number in the range [0,1007]) sets the seed Gold sequence to perform PDSCH DMRS scrambling 320. The group identifier 326 can be UE-specific, UE group-specific, or cell-specific. The pseudo-random sequence generator can be initialized with the following formula

[0054]

[0055] Where l is the OFDM symbol number within the time slot, is the timeslot number within the frame.

[0056] □{0,1,...,65535} is given by the higher layer parameters scramblingID0 and scramblingID1 in the DMRS-DownlinkConfig IE respectively (if provided), and PDSCH is scheduled by PDCCH using DCI format 1_1 or 1_2 with CRC scrambled by C-RNTI, MCS-C-RNTI or CS-RNTI.

[0057] □{0,1,...,65535} is given by the higher layer parameter scramblingID0 in the DMRS-DownlinkConfig IE (if provided), and the PDSCH is scheduled by the PDCCH using DCI format 1_0 with CRC scrambled by C-RNTI, MCS-C-RNTI or CS-RNTI; otherwise

[0058] and Given by the following formula: If the higher layer parameter dmrs-Downlink-r16 in the DMRS-DownlinkConfig IE is provided

[0059]

[0060] where λ is the CDM group;

[0061] Otherwise

[0062]

[0063] If DCI format 1_1 or 1_2 is used, the number n SCID □{0,1} is given by the DM-RS sequence initialization field in the DCI associated with the PDSCH transmission (if present), otherwise n SCID =0.

[0064] In certain embodiments disclosed herein, a time-varying RNTI is used to prevent an attacker from detecting the RNTI through multiple observations. Certain embodiments separate the scrambling of the DMRS and the payload (e.g., PDCCH, PDSCH, or physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH)). In addition, or in other embodiments, the scrambling of one physical channel is separate from the scrambling of another physical channel.

[0065] Figure 4 is a timing diagram illustrating a process for L1 (i.e., physical layer) security according to certain embodiments. As shown, the gNB 402 and the UE 404 derive 406 a common key "X" for L1 security. As described below, the common key X between the gNB 402 and the UE 404 may be one of the existing keys or a newly derived key. The common key X may be the same or may be different for different scrambling sequences (e.g., for PDCCH, PDSCH, PUSCH, etc.). The key update may be delivered, for example, via RRC reconfiguration or via a MAC CE.

[0066] The gNB 402 may send 408 a PDCCH scheduling a PDSCH or a PUSCH to the UE 404. As shown in block 410, for physical layer processing of the PDCCH, the gNB 402 generates a temporary RNTI (RNTI-1) using a first function F1 based on a public key X, an RNTI, and a time variable. The temporary RNTI may also be referred to herein as a first temporary ID or a time-varying RNTI-1. The gNB 402 also generates a first function F1 based on a public key X, a scrambling identity N ID and a second function F2 of the time variable to generate a second temporary ID (ID-2). Temporary IDs (e.g., ID-2, ID-3, etc.) may also be referred to herein as time-varying IDs. gNB 402 uses temporary RNTI-1 and / or temporary ID-2 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDCCH coded bits. Optionally, in some embodiments, gNB 402 uses temporary ID-2 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDCCH DMRS bits. In addition, or in other embodiments, the same temporary RNTI-1 is used for the PDCCH CRC mask.

[0067] The gNB 402 may send 412 a dynamic grant PDSCH or a semi-persistently scheduled (SPS) PDSCH to the UE 404. As shown in block 414, for physical layer processing of the PDSCH, the gNB 402 generates a temporary RNTI (RNTI-1) using a first function F1 based on a public key X, an RNTI, and a time variable. The gNB 402 generates a temporary RNTI (RNTI-1) using a first function F1 based on a public key X, a third scrambling identifier N ID-3 The gNB 402 also uses a second function F2 based on the public key X, the fourth scrambling identifier N ID-4 and a second function F2 of the time variable to generate a fourth temporary ID (ID-4). gNB 402 uses the temporary RNTI-1 and / or the third temporary ID-3 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDSCH coded bits. Optionally, in some embodiments, gNB 402 uses the fourth temporary ID-4 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDSCH DMRS bits and / or the PDSCH Phase Tracking Reference Signal (PTRS) bits.

[0068] UE 404 may send 416 a dynamic grant PUSCH or a configured grant PUSCH to gNB 402. As shown in block 418, for physical layer processing of the PUSCH, UE 404 generates a temporary RNTI (RNTI-1) using a first function F1 based on a public key X, RNTI, and a time variable. UE 404 generates a temporary RNTI (RNTI-1) using a first function F1 based on a public key X, a fifth scrambling identifier N ID-5The UE 404 also generates a fifth temporary ID-5 using a second function F2 based on the public key X, the sixth scrambled identity N ID-6 and a second function F2 of the time variable to generate a sixth temporary ID (ID-6). The UE uses the temporary RNTI-1 and / or the fifth temporary ID-5 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence for scrambling PUSCH coded bits. Optionally, in some embodiments, the UE 404 uses the sixth temporary identifier ID-6 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence for scrambling PUSCH DMRS and / or PUSCH PTRS.

[0069] UE 404 may send 420 PUCCH to gNB 402. As shown in block 422, for physical layer processing of PUCCH, UE 404 generates a temporary RNTI (RNTI-1) using a first function F1 based on a public key X, RNTI, and a time variable. UE 404 uses a first function F1 based on a public key X, a fifth scrambling identifier N ID-5 The UE 404 also generates a fifth temporary ID-5 using a second function F2 based on the public key X, the sixth scrambled identity N ID-6 and a second function F2 of the time variable to generate a sixth temporary ID (ID-6). The UE uses the temporary RNTI-1 and / or the fifth temporary ID-5 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence for scrambling PUCCH coded bits. Optionally, in some embodiments, the UE 404 uses the sixth temporary identifier ID-6 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence for scrambling PUCCH DMRS.

[0070] In some embodiments, the function "F" (ie, the first function F1 and / or the second function F2) is a hash function that generates a hash function from an input (eg, X, RNTI / N ID and time variables) and generates a hash value. In other embodiments, function "F" is an encryption function that takes inputs (e.g., X, RNTI / N ID The method further comprises: obtaining a concatenated sequence from some padding bits (e.g., a fixed pattern "FFFFFFF...") and a time variable) and optionally obtaining a concatenated sequence from some padding bits and generating an encrypted message. The selected fragment (e.g., the first 16 bits or the last 16 bits) is extracted from the encrypted message as the output of the encryption function.

[0071] Figure 5 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of a PDCCH according to certain embodiments. Figure 5 The elements shown in can be used with respect to Figure 2The elements shown and described are the same, except that, for PDCCH scrambling 212, the base station uses a time-varying RNTI-1 502 and / or a time-varying ID 504 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDCCH coded bits. Optionally, for PDCCH DMRS scrambling 218, the base station may also use a time-varying ID 504 to set a seed for a scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDCCH DMRS bits. In addition, or in other embodiments, the base station uses a time-varying RNTI-1 502 for an RNTI mask 208.

[0072] As mentioned above about Figure 4 As discussed, the base station generates a time-varying RNTI-1 502 using a first function F1 506 based on a public key X, RNTI, and a time variable. The base station also generates a time-varying RNTI-1 502 using a first function F1 506 based on a public key X, a scrambling identifier N ID The first function F1 506 and the second function F2 508 of the time variable are used to generate the time-varying ID 504. Preferably, the public key X and the RNTI are unknown to the attacker. However, due to the time variable, the RNTI may not need to be protected. Therefore, the first function F1 506 and the second function F2 508 can be seeded by the same function with different keys. Alternatively, the first functions F1 506 and 508 can be different functions.

[0073] Figure 6 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of PDSCH according to certain embodiments. Figure 6 The elements shown in can be used with respect to Figure 3 The elements shown and described are the same except that, for PDSCH scrambling 308, the base station uses a time-varying RNTI-1 602 and / or a time-varying ID 604 to seed the scrambling sequence used to scramble the PDSCH coded bits. Optionally, for PDSCH DMRS scrambling 320, the base station may use another time-varying ID 606 or a signaled n SCID To set the seed for the scrambling sequence used to scramble PDSCH DMRS bits and / or PDSCH PTRS.

[0074] As mentioned above about Figure 4 As discussed, the base station generates a time-varying RNTI-1 602 using a first function F1 608 based on a public key X, RNTI, and a time variable. The base station also generates a time-varying RNTI-1 602 using a first function F1 608 based on a public key X, a scrambling identifier n ID and a second function F2 610 of the time variable to generate a time-varying ID 604 for use with PDSCH scrambling 308. The base station may also use a scrambling identifier based on a public key X, and / or and a time-variant second function F2 612 to generate a time-varying ID 606 for use with PDSCH DMRS scrambling 320.

[0075] Figure 7 is a block diagram illustrating physical layer processing of PUSCH according to certain embodiments. The illustrated example may be performed by a UE for UL transport blocks 702 (e.g., MAC CE and data). The UE may perform CRC attachment 704 to provide error detection. The UE then performs LDPC coding / rate matching 706 and then performs PUSCH scrambling 708 using a scrambling sequence generated from a Gold sequence. The scrambling sequence may be seeded by a time-varying RNTI-1 710 and / or a time-varying ID 712. After PUSCH scrambling 708, the UE performs modulation 716 to generate a complex-valued modulation symbol block. The UE then performs RE mapping 718.

[0076] like Figure 7 As shown, the UE also performs PUSCH DMRS scrambling 720 using a Gold sequence seeded by a symbol index 722 and a slot index 724. Optionally, the UE may also use another time-varying ID 714 or a signaled n SCID To set the seed for the scrambling sequence used to scramble PUSCH DMRS bits and / or PUSCH PTRS.

[0077] As mentioned above about Figure 4 As discussed, the UE generates a time-varying RNTI-1 710 using a first function F1 726 based on a public key X, RNTI, and a time variable. The UE also generates a time-varying RNTI-1 710 using a first function F1 726 based on a public key X, a scrambled identity n ID and a second function F2 728 of the time variable to generate a time-varying ID 712 for use with PUSCH scrambling 708. The UE may also use a scrambling identity based on a public key X, and / or and a time-variant second function F2 730 to generate a time-varying ID 714 for use with PUSCH DMRS scrambling 720.

[0078] Figure 8806. It is a block diagram illustrating the physical layer processing of PUCCH according to certain embodiments. The illustrated example can be performed by the UE for UL transport blocks 802 (e.g., MAC CE and data). The UE can perform CRC attachment 804 to provide error detection. The UE then performs LDPC coding / rate matching 806 and then performs PUSCH PUCCH scrambling 808 using a scrambling sequence generated from a Gold sequence. The scrambling sequence can be seeded by a time-varying RNTI-1 810 and / or a time-varying ID 812. After PUSCH PUCCH scrambling 808, the UE performs modulation 814 to generate a complex-valued modulation symbol block. The UE then performs RE mapping 816.

[0079] like Figure 8 As shown, the UE also performs PUSCH PUCCH DMRS scrambling 820 using a Gold sequence seeded by a symbol index 822, a slot index 824. Optionally, the UE may also use another time-varying ID 818 to seed the scrambling sequence used to scramble the PUCCH DMRS bits.

[0080] As mentioned above about Figure 4 As discussed, the UE generates a time-varying RNTI-1 810 using a first function F1 based on a public key X, RNTI, and a time variable. The UE also generates a time-varying RNTI-1 810 using a first function F1 based on a public key X, a scrambled identity n ID and a second function F2 of the time variable to generate a time-varying ID 812 for use with PUCCH scrambling 808. The UE may also use a second function 828 based on the public key X, the scrambling identity n ID A second function 830 of the PUCCH DMRS scrambling 820 and a time variable is used to generate a time varying ID 818 for use with the PUCCH DMRS scrambling 820.

[0081] Therefore, if Figures 4 to 8 As shown, the base station may configure a time-varying RNTI and / or a time-varying identifier such as N ID The generation of a seed setting for at least one scrambling sequence of the UE. The generation of a time-varying RNTI and / or a time-varying ID in the seed setting process of the scrambling sequence can be applied to one or a combination of PDCCH coded bits, PDCCH DMRS, PDSCH coded bits, PDSCH DMRS, PUSCH coded bits, PUSCH DMRS, PUCCH coded bits and / or PUCCH DMRS. The time-varying RNTI / identifier can be generated using a hash function or an encryption function with a private key shared between the UE and the network, an RNTI / constant identifier and a time variable.

[0082] As described above, the public key X between the base station and the UE may be one of the existing keys or a newly derived key. For example, the public key X may be the same as 3GPP TS 33.501 Figure 6 .2.1-1 and / or Figure 6 .The key K shown in 2.2-2 RRCint , K RRCenc , K UPint and / or K UPenc the same, or generated and distributed in a similar manner.

[0083] For NG-RAN, K gNB For the mobile equipment (ME) and access management function (AMF) from K AMF Derived keys. When performing horizontal or vertical key derivation, K is further derived by the ME and the source gNB. gNB . K gNB Used as K between Me and ng-eNB eNB .

[0084] For user plane (UP) services, K UPenc It is from K gNB The derived key is only used to protect UP services using a specific encryption algorithm. UPing ME and gNB from K gNB The derived key is only used to protect UP services between ME and gNB using a specific integrity algorithm.

[0085] For RRC signaling, K RRCinc ME and gNB from K gNB The derived key is only used to protect RRC signaling using a specific encryption algorithm. RRCenc ME and gNB from K gNB The derived key is only used to protect RRC signaling using a specific integrity algorithm.

[0086] In some embodiments, the system can be kept secure by frequently changing the key. For example, since the 32-bit output byte is small, enough samples of valid RNTIs of known time variables may allow reverse engineering of the key. Therefore, in some embodiments, frequently changing the key may be beneficial.

[0087] In some embodiments, there may be different public keys X for different scrambling sequences (e.g., for PDCCH, PDSCH, PUSCH, etc.). The key update may be delivered through an RRC reconfiguration, where a new set of keys is provided along with the time (system frame number (SFN), subframe, time slot) at which the keys should be exchanged or take effect. In some such embodiments, the UE may continue to use the old set of keys in time slot N-1, and use the new keys starting from time slot N.

[0088] In another embodiment, the key update can be delivered via MAC CE. The key update CE can be encrypted and / or integrity protected individually. Alternatively, all MAC CEs can be protected.

[0089] In some embodiments, a time slot index or a symbol index within a time slot may be used for a time variable used as an input to function F (i.e., first function F1 and / or second function F2). To help reduce complexity, according to other embodiments, the time variable may include a radio frame index and / or a time slot index. In some embodiments, the time variable includes at least 24 bits.

[0090] In some communication systems, the scrambling sequence may be generated by a high order polynomial. Thus, in some embodiments, the function F (i.e., the first function F1 and / or the second function F2) may generate more than 16 bits. Additionally, or in other embodiments, L1 security scrambling may be applied in addition to or as an alternative to any scrambling used in the current L1 process.

[0091] The scrambling generation for a PDCCH with a UE-specific search space (USS) may be different from the scrambling generation for a PDCCH with a common search space (CSS). Therefore, certain embodiments disclosed herein may only be applied to PDCCH with USS. For example, if a cell ID is currently used in the NR specification for N_{ID}, the time-varying function is not applied.

[0092] In certain embodiments, the time-varying function may be applied to the following reference signals. For PDSCH DMRS, The scramblingID0 and scramblingID1 parameters in DMRS-DownlinkConfig are respectively given. For PUSCH DMRS, The scramblingID0 and scramblingID1 parameters in the DMRS-UplinkConfig IE are respectively given. For PDCCHDMRS, n ID∈{0, 1, ..., 65535} is given by the higher-layer parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID. For PUCCH DMRS, It is given by the higher-layer parameter scramblingID0 in the DMRS-UplinkConfig IE.

[0093] In certain embodiments, the time-varying function may be applied to the following physical channels. For PDSCH, n ID ∈{0, 1, ..., 1023} is equal to the higher-level parameter dataScramblingIdentityPDSCH. For PUSCH, n ID ∈{0, 1, ..., 1023} is equal to the higher-level parameter dataScramblingIdentityPUSCH. For PDCCH, if configured, n ID ∈{0, 1, ..., 1023} is equal to the higher-layer parameter pdcch-DMRS-ScramblingID. For PUCCH, n ID ∈{0, 1, ..., 1023} is equal to the higher layer parameter dataScramblingIdentityPUSCH.

[0094] Fig. 9 An example architecture of a wireless communication system 900 according to an embodiment disclosed herein is illustrated. The description provided below is for an example wireless communication system 900 operating in conjunction with the LTE system standard and / or the 5G or NR system standard provided in the 3GPP technical specifications.

[0095] like Fig. 9 As shown, wireless communication system 900 includes UE 902 and UE 904 (although any number of UEs may be used). In this example, UE 902 and UE 904 are illustrated as smartphones (e.g., handheld touch screen mobile computing devices capable of connecting to one or more cellular networks), but may also include any mobile or non-mobile computing device configured for wireless communication.

[0096] UE 902 and UE 904 may be configured to be communicatively coupled to RAN 906. In an embodiment, RAN 906 may be NG-RAN, E-UTRAN, etc. UE 902 and UE 904 utilize connections (or channels) (shown as connection 908 and connection 910, respectively) with RAN 906, where each connection (or channel) includes a physical communication interface. RAN 906 may include one or more base stations, such as base station 912 and base station 914, to implement connection 908 and connection 910.

[0097] In this example, connection 908 and connection 910 are air interfaces that enable such communicative coupling and may conform to the RAT used by the RAN 906 , such as, for example, LTE and / or NR.

[0098] In some embodiments, UE 902 and UE 904 may also communicate data directly via side link interface 916. UE 904 is shown as being configured to access an access point (shown as AP 918) via connection 920. As an example, connection 920 may include a local wireless connection, such as any connection that complies with the IEEE 802.11 protocol, wherein AP 918 may include In this example, AP 918 may be connected to another network (eg, the Internet) without going through CN 924.

[0099] In an embodiment, UE 902 and UE 904 may be configured to communicate with each other or with base station 912 and / or base station 914 over a multi-carrier communication channel using orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) communication signals according to various communication techniques, such as, but not limited to, orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) communication techniques (e.g., for downlink communication) or single carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) communication techniques (e.g., for uplink and ProSe or sidelink communication), although the scope of the embodiments is not limited in this respect. The OFDM signal may include multiple orthogonal subcarriers.

[0100] In some embodiments, all or part of the base station 912 or the base station 914 may be implemented as one or more software entities running on a server computer as part of a virtual network. In addition, or in other embodiments, the base station 912 or the base station 914 may be configured to communicate with each other via the interface 922. In an embodiment where the wireless communication system 900 is an LTE system (e.g., when the CN 924 is an EPC), the interface 922 may be an X2 interface. The X2 interface may be defined between two or more base stations (e.g., two or more eNBs, etc.) connected to the EPC and / or between two eNBs connected to the EPC. In an embodiment where the wireless communication system 900 is an NR system (e.g., when the CN 924 is a 5GC), the interface 922 may be an Xn interface. The Xn interface is defined between two or more base stations (e.g., two or more gNBs, etc.) connected to the 5GC, between the base station 912 (e.g., gNB) and the eNB connected to the 5GC, and / or between two eNBs connected to the 5GC (e.g., CN 924).

[0101] The RAN 906 is shown communicatively coupled to the CN 924. The CN 924 may include one or more network elements 926 configured to provide various data and telecommunication services to customers / subscribers (e.g., UE 902 and users of UE 904) connected to the CN 924 via the RAN 906. The components of the CN 924 may be implemented in one physical device or separate physical devices including components for reading and executing instructions from a machine-readable or computer-readable medium (e.g., a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium).

[0102] In an embodiment, CN 924 may be an EPC, and RAN 906 may be connected to CN 924 via an S1 interface 928. In an embodiment, S1 interface 928 may be divided into two parts: an S1 user plane (S1-U) interface, which carries traffic data between base station 912 or base station 914 and a serving gateway (S-GW); and an S1-MME interface, which is a signaling interface between base station 912 or base station 914 and a mobility management entity (MME).

[0103] In an embodiment, CN 924 may be a 5GC, and RAN 906 may be connected to CN 924 via an NG interface 928. In an embodiment, NG interface 928 may be divided into two parts: an NG user plane (NG-U) interface, which carries traffic data between base station 912 or base station 914 and a user plane function (UPF); and an S1 control plane (NG-C) interface, which is a signaling interface between base station 912 or base station 914 and an access and mobility management function (AMF).

[0104] Generally, the application server 930 may be an element that provides applications that use Internet Protocol (IP) bearer resources with the CN 924 (e.g., packet-switched data services). The application server 930 may also be configured to support one or more communication services (e.g., VoIP sessions, group communication sessions, etc.) for the UE 902 and UE 904 via the CN 924. The application server 930 may communicate with the CN 924 via an IP communication interface 932.

[0105] Fig.10 A system 1000 for performing signaling 1034 between a wireless device 1002 and a network device 1018 according to an embodiment disclosed herein is illustrated. The system 1000 may be part of a wireless communication system as described herein. The wireless device 1002 may be, for example, a UE of a wireless communication system. The network device 1018 may be, for example, a base station (e.g., an eNB or a gNB) of a wireless communication system.

[0106] The wireless device 1002 may include one or more processors 1004. The processor 1004 may execute instructions to perform various operations of the wireless device 1002 as described herein. The processor 1004 may include one or more baseband processors implemented using, for example, a central processing unit (CPU), a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a controller, a field programmable gate array (FPGA) device, another hardware device, a firmware device, or any combination thereof configured to perform the operations described herein.

[0107] The wireless device 1002 may include a memory 1006. The memory 1006 may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium that stores instructions 1008 (which may include, for example, instructions executed by the processor 1004). The instructions 1008 may also be referred to as program code or a computer program. The memory 1006 may also store data used by the processor 1004 and results computed by the processor.

[0108] The wireless device 1002 may include one or more transceivers 1010, which may include radio frequency (RF) transmitter and / or receiver circuitry that uses an antenna 1012 of the wireless device 1002 to facilitate signaling (e.g., signaling 1034) sent or received by the wireless device 1002 with other devices (e.g., network device 1018) according to a corresponding RAT.

[0109] The wireless device 1002 may include one or more antennas 1012 (e.g., one, two, four, or more). For implementations with multiple antennas 1012, the wireless device 1002 may take advantage of the spatial diversity of these multiple antennas 1012 to transmit and / or receive multiple different data streams on the same time-frequency resources. This behavior may be referred to as, for example, multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) behavior (referring to multiple antennas used at each of the transmitting device and the receiving device to implement this aspect). The MIMO transmission performed by the wireless device 1002 may be implemented based on precoding (or digital beamforming) applied to the wireless device 1002, and the wireless device multiplexes the data streams between the antennas 1012 based on known or assumed channel characteristics, so that each data stream is received with appropriate signal strength relative to the other streams and at a desired location in the spatial domain (e.g., the location of the receiver associated with the data stream). Certain embodiments may use a single-user MIMO (SU-MIMO) approach (where data streams are all directed to a single receiver) and / or a multi-user MIMO (MU-MIMO) approach (where separate data streams may be directed to separate (different) receivers in different locations in the spatial domain).

[0110] In certain embodiments with multiple antennas, the wireless device 1002 may implement analog beamforming techniques whereby the phases of signals transmitted by antennas 1012 are relatively adjusted such that the (joint) transmissions of antennas 1012 are directional (this is sometimes referred to as beam steering).

[0111] The wireless device 1002 may include one or more interfaces 1014. The interfaces 1014 may be used to provide input to or output from the wireless device 1002. For example, a wireless device 1002 that is a UE may include an interface 1014, such as a microphone, a speaker, a touch screen, buttons, etc., to allow a user of the UE to provide input and / or output to the UE. Other interfaces of such a UE may be composed of transmitters, receivers, and other circuits that allow the UE to communicate with other devices (e.g., in addition to the transceiver 1010 / antenna 1012 described above), and may communicate according to known protocols (e.g., etc.) to perform the operation.

[0112] The wireless device 1002 may include an L1 security module 1016. The L1 security module 1016 may be implemented by hardware, software, or a combination thereof. For example, the L1 security module 1016 may be implemented as a processor, circuit, and / or instructions 1008 stored in the memory 1006 and executed by the processor 1004. In some examples, the L1 security module 1016 may be integrated within the processor 1004 and / or the transceiver 1010. For example, the L1 security module 1016 may be implemented by a combination of software components (e.g., executed by a DSP or a general purpose processor) and hardware components (e.g., logic gates and circuits) within the processor 1004 or the transceiver 1010.

[0113] The L1 security module 1016 may be used in various aspects of the present disclosure, such as Figure 4 , Figure 7 and Figure 8 aspects.

[0114] The network device 1018 may include one or more processors 1020. The processor 1020 may execute instructions to perform various operations of the network device 1018 as described herein. The processor 1020 may include one or more baseband processors implemented using, for example, a CPU, a DSP, an ASIC, a controller, an FPGA device, another hardware device, a firmware device, or any combination thereof configured to perform the operations described herein.

[0115] The network device 1018 may include a memory 1022. The memory 1022 may be a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium that stores instructions 1024 (which may include, for example, instructions executed by the processor 1020). The instructions 1024 may also be referred to as program code or a computer program. The memory 1022 may also store data used by the processor 1020 and results calculated by the processor.

[0116] The network device 1018 may include one or more transceivers 1026, which may include RF transmitter and / or receiver circuits that use an antenna 1028 of the network device 1018 to facilitate signaling (e.g., signaling 1034) sent or received by the network device 1018 with other devices (e.g., wireless device 1002) according to the corresponding RAT.

[0117] The network device 1018 may include one or more antennas 1028 (e.g., one, two, four, or more). In embodiments with multiple antennas 1028, the network device 1018 may perform MIMO, digital beamforming, analog beamforming, beam steering, etc. as described above.

[0118] The network device 1018 may include one or more interfaces 1030. The interface 1030 may be used to provide input to or output from the network device 1018. For example, the network device 1018 as a base station may include an interface 1030 composed of a transmitter, a receiver and other circuits (e.g., in addition to the transceiver 1026 / antenna 1028 already described), which enables the base station to communicate with other equipment in the core network and / or enables the base station to communicate with external networks, computers, databases, etc., for the purpose of operating, managing and maintaining the base station or other equipment operably connected to the base station.

[0119] The network device 1018 may include an L1 security module 1032. The L1 security module 1032 may be implemented by hardware, software, or a combination thereof. For example, the L1 security module 1032 may be implemented as a processor, circuit, and / or instructions 1024 stored in the memory 1022 and executed by the processor 1020. In some examples, the L1 security module 1032 may be integrated within the processor 1020 and / or the transceiver 1026. For example, the L1 security module 1032 may be implemented by a combination of software components (e.g., executed by a DSP or general purpose processor) and hardware components (e.g., logic gates and circuits) within the processor 1020 or the transceiver 1026.

[0120] The L1 security module 1032 may be used in various aspects of the present disclosure, such as Figures 4 to 6 aspects.

[0121] Embodiments contemplated herein include an apparatus comprising a device for performing Figure 4 , Figure 7 and Figure 8 The apparatus may be, for example, an apparatus of a UE (such as the wireless device 1002 as a UE, as described herein).

[0122] Embodiments contemplated herein include one or more non-transitory computer-readable media containing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors of an electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform Figure 4 , Figure 7 and Figure 8 The non-transitory computer-readable medium may be, for example, a memory of a UE (such as the memory 1006 of the wireless device 1002 as a UE, as described herein).

[0123] Embodiments contemplated herein include an apparatus including logic, modules, or circuits for performing Figure 4 , Figure 7 and Figure 8 The apparatus may be, for example, an apparatus of a UE (such as the wireless device 1002 as a UE, as described herein).

[0124] Embodiments contemplated herein include an apparatus comprising: one or more processors and one or more computer-readable media comprising instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform Figure 4 , Figure 7 and Figure 8 The apparatus may be, for example, an apparatus of a UE (such as the wireless device 1002 as a UE, as described herein).

[0125] Embodiments contemplated herein include Figure 4 , Figure 7 and Figure 8 A signal described by or associated with one or more elements in a .

[0126] Embodiments contemplated herein include a computer program or computer program product comprising instructions, wherein execution of the program by a processor is to cause the processor to perform Figure 4 , Figure 7 and Figure 8The processor may be a processor of a UE (such as the processor 1004 of the wireless device 1002 as a UE, as described herein). These instructions may be located, for example, in a processor of a UE and / or on a memory (such as the memory 1006 of the wireless device 1002 as a UE, as described herein).

[0127] Embodiments contemplated herein include an apparatus comprising a device for performing Figures 4 to 6 For example, the device may be a device of a base station (such as the network device 1018 as a base station, as described herein).

[0128] Embodiments contemplated herein include one or more non-transitory computer-readable media containing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors of an electronic device, cause the electronic device to perform Figures 4 to 6 For example, the non-transitory computer-readable medium may be a memory of a base station (such as the memory 1022 of the network device 1018 as a base station, as described herein).

[0129] Embodiments contemplated herein include an apparatus including logic, modules, or circuits for performing Figures 4 to 6 For example, the device may be a device of a base station (such as the network device 1018 as a base station, as described herein).

[0130] Embodiments contemplated herein include an apparatus comprising: one or more processors and one or more computer-readable media containing instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform Figures 4 to 6 For example, the device may be a device of a base station (such as the network device 1018 as a base station, as described herein).

[0131] Embodiments contemplated herein include Figures 4 to 6 A signal described by or associated with one or more elements in a

[0132] Embodiments contemplated herein include a computer program or computer program product comprising instructions, wherein execution of the program by a processing element is to cause the processing element to perform Figures 4 to 6 The processor may be a processor of a base station (such as processor 1020 of network device 1018 as a base station, as described herein). For example, these instructions may be located in a processor and / or on a memory of a base station (such as memory 1022 of network device 1018 as a base station, as described herein).

[0133] For one or more embodiments, at least one of the components set forth in one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to perform one or more operations, techniques, processes, and / or methods as described herein. For example, a baseband processor as described herein in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples set forth herein. For another example, circuits associated with a UE, a base station, a network element, etc. as described above in conjunction with one or more of the foregoing figures may be configured to operate according to one or more of the examples set forth herein.

[0134] Unless otherwise expressly stated, any of the above embodiments may be combined with any other embodiment (or combination of embodiments). The foregoing description of one or more specific implementations provides illustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive or to limit the scope of the embodiments to the precise form disclosed. In view of the above teachings, modifications and variations are possible, or can be obtained from the practice of various embodiments.

[0135] Embodiments and implementations of the systems and methods described herein may include various operations that may be embodied in machine executable instructions to be executed by a computer system. A computer system may include one or more general or special purpose computers (or other electronic devices). A computer system may include hardware components that include specific logic components for performing operations; or may include a combination of hardware, software, and / or firmware.

[0136] It should be appreciated that the systems described herein include descriptions of specific embodiments. These embodiments may be combined into a single system, partially combined into other systems, separated into multiple systems, or otherwise divided or combined. In addition, it is contemplated that parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. of another embodiment may be used in one embodiment. For clarity, these parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. are described only in one or more embodiments, and it should be appreciated that these parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. may be combined with or substituted for parameters, attributes, aspects, etc. of another embodiment unless expressly stated herein.

[0137] It is understood that the use of personally identifiable information should be subject to privacy policies and practices that are generally recognized to meet or exceed industry or government requirements for maintaining user privacy. Specifically, personally identifiable information data should be managed and processed to minimize the risk of unintentional or unauthorized access or use, and the nature of the authorized use should be clearly stated to users.

[0138] Although the foregoing has been described in considerable detail for the sake of clarity, it will be apparent that certain changes and modifications may be made without departing from the principles of the invention. It should be noted that there are many alternative ways to implement both the processes and the apparatus described herein. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention should be regarded as illustrative rather than restrictive, and the specification is not limited to the details given herein, but may be modified within the scope and equivalents of the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for communication in a wireless communication system, the method comprising: generating at least one of a time varying radio network temporary identifier (RNTI) and a time varying identifier (ID); seeding a scrambling sequence with the at least one of the time-varying RNTI and the time-varying ID; Using the scrambling sequence to scramble a physical channel or a reference signal; as well as The physical channel or the reference signal is sent.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein generating the time-varying RNTI comprises: deriving a public key between a base station and a user equipment (UE); as well as The time-varying RNTI is generated using a first function based on the public key, the RNTI, and a time variable.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein the generation of the scrambling sequence for the physical channel or the reference signal is based at least in part on the public key.

4. The method of claim 2, further comprising delivering a key update of the public key in one of a radio resource control (RRC) reconfiguration and a medium access control (MAC) control element (CE).

5. The method of claim 2, wherein the time variable is selected from the group consisting of a slot index, a symbol index, and a radio frame index. The method of claim 2 , wherein the time variable comprises at least 24 bits. 7 . The method of claim 2 , wherein generating the time-varying ID comprises generating a first time-varying ID using a second function based on the public key, a first constant ID, and the time variable.

8. The method of claim 7, wherein at least one of the first function and the second function is selected from the group consisting of a hash function and an encryption function.

9. The method of claim 7, wherein the first constant ID comprises a UE-specific, UE group-specific, or cell-specific scrambling ID.

10. The method of claim 7, wherein the physical channel comprises a physical downlink control channel (PDCCH), and wherein scrambling the physical channel comprises scrambling PDCCH coded bits using at least one of the time-varying RNTI and the first time-varying ID.

11. The method of claim 10, wherein the reference signal comprises a demodulation reference signal (DMRS), and wherein the method further comprises scrambling PDCCH DMRS bits using the first time-varying ID.

12. The method of claim 10, further comprising using the time-varying RNTI to mask PDCCH cyclic redundancy check (CRC) bits.

13. The method of claim 7, wherein the physical channel comprises a physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH), and wherein scrambling the physical channel comprises scrambling PDSCH coded bits using at least one of the time-varying RNTI and the first time-varying ID.

14. The method of claim 13, wherein generating the time-varying ID further comprises generating a second time-varying ID using a second function based on the public key, one or more second constant IDs, and the time variable, wherein the reference signal comprises a demodulation reference signal (DMRS) or a phase tracking reference signal (PTRS), and wherein the method further comprises using the second time-varying ID to scramble PDSCH DMRS bits or PDSCH PTRS bits.

15. The method of claim 7, wherein the physical channel comprises a physical uplink shared channel (PUSCH), and wherein scrambling the physical channel comprises scrambling PUSCH coded bits using at least one of the time-varying RNTI and the first time-varying ID.

16. The method of claim 15, wherein generating the time-varying ID further comprises generating a second time-varying ID using a second function based on the public key, one or more second constant IDs, and the time variable, wherein the reference signal comprises a demodulation reference signal (DMRS) or a phase tracking reference signal (PTRS), and wherein the method further comprises using the second time-varying ID to scramble PUSCH DMRS bits or PUSCH PTRS bits.

17. The method of claim 7, wherein the physical channel comprises a physical uplink control channel (PUCCH), and wherein scrambling the physical channel comprises scrambling PUCCH coded bits using at least one of the time-varying RNTI and the first time-varying ID.

18. The method of claim 17, wherein generating the time-varying ID further comprises generating a second time-varying ID using a second function based on the public key, one or more second constant IDs, and the time variable, wherein the reference signal comprises a demodulation reference signal (DMRS), and wherein the method further comprises using the second time-varying ID to scramble PUCCH demodulation reference signal (DMRS) bits.

19. A computer program product comprising instructions which, when executed by a processor, implement the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 18.

20. A base station comprising means for implementing the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 14.

21. A user equipment (UE) comprising means for implementing the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 or 15 to 18.

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