Anti-tamper authentication methods, devices, vehicles, and storage media for non-stop toll collection systems

Abstract

This application relates to the field of vehicle technology, and in particular to an anti-tamper authentication method, device, vehicle, and storage medium for a non-stop toll collection (ETC) system. The method includes: obtaining the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit (OBU) assembly of the current vehicle's ETC system; calculating a first key based on the vehicle identification code and a target algorithm, and sending the first key to the vehicle controller; wherein the vehicle controller parses the first key to obtain the vehicle identification code, and verifies the vehicle identification code based on the stored identification code, wherein the stored identification code in the vehicle controller is identical to the current vehicle's identification code; if the verification passes, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed successful; otherwise, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed unsuccessful. This solves the problem of poor security in the ETC system due to the loss of the OBU, which causes inconvenience to users and manufacturers.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of vehicle technology, and in particular to an anti-tamper authentication method, device, vehicle, and storage medium for a non-stop toll collection system. Background Technology

[0002] Currently, the country is promoting the pre-installation development of ETC (Electronic Toll Collection System), deepening the application of ETC, building a smart road network cloud control platform integrating monitoring, dispatching, management, emergency response, and services, and promoting the construction of smart highway service areas. As a result, various car manufacturers have begun to designate ETC pre-installation points, and are currently transitioning from optional pre-installation to standard pre-installation. More and more models are adopting ETC as a standard feature. As more and more models adopt it as a standard feature, the functions of the ETC module assembly OBU (On-Board Unit) are also increasing, and the application scenarios are gradually becoming richer, gradually being promoted to scenarios such as parking, refueling, charging, car washing, traffic violation payment, and public transportation.

[0003] However, with the increasing number of application scenarios, numerous payment transactions are involved, which also increases the risk of theft. Once a vehicle is stolen, the OBU can be removed and freely sold, causing significant inconvenience and incalculable losses to the vehicle owner. Currently, most ETC OBU anti-tamper solutions are mechanical, i.e., physical anti-tamper, with the casing and chip forming an integrated anti-tamper design. This type of anti-tamper function is not conducive to user repairs and also requires high-quality manufacturing processes and materials, resulting in a higher price. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a method, device, vehicle, and storage medium for tamper-proof authentication of a non-stop toll collection system, in order to solve the problems of poor security of the non-stop toll collection system caused by the loss of the ETC OBU, which causes trouble for users and manufacturers.

[0005] The first aspect of this application provides an anti-tamper authentication method for a non-stop toll collection system, comprising the following steps: obtaining the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the non-stop toll collection system of the current vehicle; calculating a first key based on the vehicle identification code and a target algorithm, and sending the first key to the vehicle controller, wherein the vehicle controller parses the first key to obtain the vehicle identification code, and verifies the vehicle identification code based on the stored identification code, wherein the identification code stored by the vehicle controller is the same as the identification code of the current vehicle; if the verification passes, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is determined to be successful; otherwise, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is determined to be unsuccessful.

[0006] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, before determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed, the method further includes: after the verification is passed, the vehicle controller generates a second key and sends the second key to the vehicle unit, wherein the vehicle unit parses the second key to obtain the vehicle's identification code and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the current vehicle's identification code; if the verification is passed, the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be passed.

[0007] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, after obtaining the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system, the method further includes: if the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly is all zeros, then the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is set to fail; otherwise, a first key is calculated based on the vehicle identification code and the target algorithm.

[0008] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed includes: obtaining the number of verifications within a target time period; if the number of verifications is less than or equal to a preset number and any one of the verifications passes, then the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be passed.

[0009] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails includes: if the number of verifications is greater than a preset number and each verification fails, then the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails.

[0010] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, after determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails, the method further includes: restarting the current vehicle to perform the anti-tamper authentication method.

[0011] A second aspect of this application provides an anti-tamper authentication device for a non-stop toll collection system, comprising: an acquisition module for acquiring a vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the non-stop toll collection system of the current vehicle; a calculation module for calculating a first key based on the vehicle identification code and a target algorithm, and sending the first key to a vehicle controller, wherein the vehicle controller parses the first key to obtain the vehicle identification code, and verifies the vehicle identification code based on the stored identification code, wherein the identification code stored by the vehicle controller is the same as the identification code of the current vehicle; and a determination module for determining that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is successful if the verification is successful, otherwise determining that the anti-tamper authentication of the previous vehicle is unsuccessful.

[0012] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, it further includes: a generation module, used to generate a second key after verification before determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed, and send the second key to the vehicle's system, wherein the vehicle's system parses the second key to obtain the vehicle's identification code, and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the current vehicle's identification code; if the verification passes, it is determined that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed.

[0013] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, it further includes: a setting module, configured to, after obtaining the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system, if the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly is all zeros, set the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle to fail; otherwise, calculate the first key based on the vehicle identification code and the target algorithm.

[0014] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, the determination module is further configured to: obtain the number of verifications within the target duration; if the number of verifications is less than or equal to the preset number and any one of the verifications passes, then the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be successful.

[0015] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, the determination module is further configured to: if the number of verifications is greater than a preset number and each verification fails, then determine that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails.

[0016] Optionally, in one embodiment of this application, it further includes: a restart module, used to restart the current vehicle to perform the anti-tamper authentication method after determining that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has failed.

[0017] A third aspect of this application provides a vehicle, including: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. The processor executes the program to perform the tamper-proof authentication method of the non-stop toll collection system as described above.

[0018] The fourth aspect of this application provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program or instructions stored thereon, which are executed by a processor to perform the tamper-proof authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system as described above.

[0019] The fifth aspect of this application provides a computer program product, including a computer program or instructions, which, when executed, implement the tamper-proof authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system as described in the above embodiments.

[0020] Therefore, this application has at least the following beneficial effects:

[0021] Since the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the on-board unit (OBU) of the non-stop toll collection (ETC) system is uniquely associated with the vehicle's identification number (VIN), if the OBU is removed and installed in another vehicle, it may store the original vehicle's VIN, but the vehicle's controller stores the VIN based on the current vehicle's VIN. Therefore, this embodiment of the application can verify the VIN of the current vehicle's OBU against the VIN stored in the current vehicle's controller. Upon successful verification, the vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is deemed successful, thus avoiding the inconvenience caused to users and manufacturers by the loss of the OBU. This addresses, to some extent, the inconvenience caused by the loss of the ETC product and the potential economic losses from theft, improving the security of the ETC system. Therefore, it solves the technical problem of poor security in the ETC system due to the loss of the OBU, which causes inconvenience to users and manufacturers.

[0022] Additional aspects and advantages of this application will be set forth in part in the description which follows, and in part will be obvious from the description, or may be learned by practice of this application. Attached Figure Description

[0023] The above and / or additional aspects and advantages of this application will become apparent and readily understood from the following description of the embodiments taken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, wherein:

[0024] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the anti-tamper authentication method for a non-stop toll collection system provided in the embodiments of this application;

[0025] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a tamper-proof authentication process provided according to an embodiment of this application;

[0026] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of multiple tamper authentication provided according to an embodiment of this application;

[0027] Figure 4 This is an example diagram of an anti-tamper authentication device for a non-stop toll collection system provided according to an embodiment of this application;

[0028] Figure 5 This is a structural schematic diagram of a vehicle provided according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0029] The embodiments of this application are described in detail below. Examples of these embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions throughout. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and intended to explain this application, and should not be construed as limiting this application.

[0030] The following description, with reference to the accompanying drawings, outlines an anti-tamper authentication method, apparatus, vehicle, and storage medium for a non-stop toll collection system according to embodiments of this application. Addressing the issue mentioned in the background section where the On-Board Unit (OBU) of ETC (Electronic Toll Collection) can be removed for arbitrary purchase and sale, causing significant inconvenience and incalculable losses to stolen vehicle owners, this application provides an anti-tamper authentication method for a non-stop toll collection system. This method verifies the vehicle identification number (VIN) of the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system against the VIN stored in the vehicle's overall controller. Upon successful verification, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed successful, thereby preventing the inconvenience caused to users and manufacturers by the loss of the on-board unit assembly. This method, to a certain extent, solves the inconvenience caused to users after the loss of their non-stop toll collection system products and the potential economic losses from theft, thus improving the security of the non-stop toll collection system. Therefore, it resolves the problems of poor security in non-stop toll collection systems due to the loss of the ETC OBU, and the resulting inconvenience to users and manufacturers.

[0031] Before describing the solution of this application, let me first introduce some of the equipment involved in the solution of this application.

[0032] BDM (Body Domain Manager): The BDM can control power-related controllers such as the engine and transmission, and can also input and output CAN signals. It is the execution controller of the anti-tamper system. After receiving the signal from the vehicle terminal, the BDM can perform anti-tamper authentication on the ETC module assembly OBU unit after the vehicle is powered on.

[0033] The in-vehicle infotainment system displays the vehicle's operational status, such as speed and mileage. It can exchange information and perform diagnostics / writing with the On-Board Unit (OBU) in the ETC system before the vehicle rolls off the production line. Furthermore, once the vehicle reaches the user, the in-vehicle display screen allows users to check the OBU status and transaction records.

[0034] The On-Board Unit (OBU) module in ETC is mainly used for delivery work at highway intersections. At the same time, its application scenarios are gradually expanding to parking, refueling, charging, car washing, traffic violation payment, public transportation and other scenarios. The anti-tampering work is mainly based on the vehicle controller or host and the OBU module to perform bidirectional authentication anti-tampering control through CAN / Ethernet based on the VIN number.

[0035] Specifically, Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an anti-tamper authentication method for a non-stop toll collection system provided in an embodiment of this application.

[0036] like Figure 1 As shown, the tamper-proof authentication method of this non-stop toll collection system includes the following steps:

[0037] In step S101, the vehicle identification code stored in the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system is obtained.

[0038] The OBU stores the same Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) as the actual vehicle, which is the vehicle's chassis number.

[0039] It should be noted that when the OBU is installed on a vehicle, the OBU stores the vehicle's VIN code. For example, if the OBU is for vehicle A during the vehicle's production process, then the OBU stores the VIN code of vehicle A. Even if it is removed and installed on another vehicle, such as vehicle B, it still stores the VIN code of vehicle A.

[0040] Furthermore, the anti-tampering certification method in this application targets models that are equipped with ETC as standard by the vehicle manufacturer, and specifically models that use pre-installed ETC products.

[0041] In this embodiment of the application, after obtaining the vehicle identification code stored in the vehicle unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system, the method further includes: if the vehicle identification code stored in the vehicle unit assembly is all zeros, then the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is set to fail; otherwise, a first key is calculated based on the vehicle identification code and the target algorithm.

[0042] It is understood that in this embodiment of the application, if the VIN code stored in the OBU is all zeros, it indicates that the OBU has not yet established a valid binding relationship with the vehicle. In this case, the anti-tamper function may not work properly because it relies on a valid VIN code to verify whether the OBU is correctly bound to a specific vehicle. In order to avoid unnecessary anti-tamper alarms or false judgments, when the VIN code is all zeros, the system will set the anti-tamper function to an invalid state.

[0043] In step S102, a first key is calculated based on the vehicle's identification code and the target algorithm, and the first key is sent to the vehicle controller. The vehicle controller parses the first key to obtain the vehicle's identification code, and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the stored identification code. The identification code stored by the vehicle controller is the same as the current vehicle's identification code.

[0044] The target algorithm can be set according to specific circumstances, such as the AES128 encryption algorithm.

[0045] It is understood that, in the embodiments of this application, a first key can be calculated based on the VIN code in the OBU and the target algorithm, and the first key can be sent to the BDM. The BDM parses the first key to obtain the VIN code, and verifies the VIN code sent by the OBU based on the VIN code stored in its own memory. The identification code stored in the BDM is the same as the VIN code of the current vehicle.

[0046] For example, if the OBU originally belonged to vehicle A, the OBU stores the VIN code of vehicle A. If the current vehicle is not vehicle A but vehicle B, and the OBU was removed from vehicle A and installed on vehicle B, the OBU stores the VIN code of vehicle A, while the BDM stores the VIN code of the current vehicle, vehicle B.

[0047] In step S103, if the verification passes, the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is deemed to have passed; otherwise, the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is deemed to have failed.

[0048] It is understood that in this application embodiment, if the VIN code in the OBU and the VIN code in the BDM are the same, i.e. the verification is successful, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is determined to be successful and the anti-tamper function is activated; otherwise, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is determined to be unsuccessful. This avoids the trouble caused to users and manufacturers by the loss of the OBU and, to a certain extent, solves the inconvenience caused by the loss of the user's ETC product and the economic loss that may be caused by theft.

[0049] In this embodiment of the application, before determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed, the method further includes: after the verification is passed, the vehicle controller generates a second key and sends the second key to the vehicle unit, wherein the vehicle unit parses the second key to obtain the vehicle's identification code and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the current vehicle's identification code; if the verification is passed, the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be passed.

[0050] It is understood that in this embodiment of the application, after the BDM verifies the VIN code in the OBU, the BDM generates a second key and sends the second key to the vehicle's infotainment system. The vehicle's infotainment system parses the second key to obtain the VIN code sent by the BDM, and verifies the VIN code sent by the BDM based on the current vehicle's VIN code. If the verification passes, it is determined that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed. The dual verification mechanism can significantly enhance the security of the system. Even if the first layer is breached, the second layer can still prevent unauthorized access.

[0051] In this embodiment of the application, determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed includes: obtaining the number of verifications within a target time period; if the number of verifications is less than or equal to a preset number and any one of the verifications passes, then the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be passed.

[0052] The target duration and preset number of times can be set according to specific circumstances. For example, the target duration can be set to 1 second or 2 seconds, and the preset number of times can be set to 3 or 4 times.

[0053] It is understood that the embodiments of this application can obtain the number of verifications within the target time period. If the number of verifications is less than or equal to the preset number and any one verification passes, the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be successful. This prevents malicious users from breaking through the authentication system by making frequent attempts. If the verification fails within the limited time, even if the number of attempts is less than the preset number, it will be regarded as a verification failure, which helps to prevent brute-force attacks.

[0054] In this embodiment of the application, determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails includes: if the number of verifications is greater than a preset number and each verification fails, then the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails.

[0055] It is understood that, in the embodiments of this application, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle can be determined to be unsuccessful when the number of verifications exceeds the preset number and each verification fails.

[0056] In this embodiment of the application, after determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails, the method further includes: restarting the current vehicle to perform the anti-tamper authentication method.

[0057] It is understood that, in the embodiments of this application, after determining that the current vehicle’s anti-tamper authentication has failed, the current vehicle can be restarted to execute the anti-tamper authentication process of this application, so as to avoid multiple verification failures caused by problems with the current vehicle and to re-perform the verification.

[0058] The tamper-proof authentication method of this application is illustrated below through a specific embodiment, including the following steps:

[0059] 1. Firstly, a prerequisite for tamper protection certification is that, when a vehicle rolls off the assembly line, tamper protection certification is processed via the VIN code. The BDM or main unit and OBU need to be programmed with the same VIN code as the actual vehicle for verification.

[0060] 2. Upon each power-on, the system checks if the vehicle's local VIN is all zeros. If it is, the tamper protection is immediately disabled. If the local VIN is not all zeros, the OBU will request tamper verification at fixed intervals (10-second intervals). If tamper verification fails within three consecutive intervals, the tamper protection operation is triggered. The OBU module calculates and sends the relevant key to the BDM using the VIN. The BDM or vehicle infotainment system and the OBU perform bidirectional tamper authentication verification using the AES128 key algorithm and the large screen. If the verification is successful, the tamper authentication is considered successful, and tamper protection is activated. Additionally, if parts need to be replaced after the vehicle is decommissioned, a new key needs to be written to the ETC system to calculate the verification code and send it to the OBU. The OBU receives the verification code and performs tamper verification to determine if the tamper authentication is successful. A single tamper authentication process is as follows: Figure 2As shown.

[0061] 3. If the BDM or vehicle infotainment system does not respond during the anti-tamper authentication, the two controllers will repeat the anti-tamper verification authentication according to the above authentication process (generally, three anti-tamper authentication requests will be sent within one cycle, with an interval of approximately 300ms between each anti-tamper authentication).

[0062] 4. If the anti-tamper authentication passes after the above steps, no further authentication will be performed during the current power-on cycle. If authentication fails, repeat the above steps to re-authenticate. If the number of authentication attempts is less than three, the anti-tamper authentication is successful. If it exceeds three attempts, the vehicle must be restarted to restart the anti-tamper authentication process until successful. Simultaneously, the vehicle will enable functions such as OBU module interaction with the vehicle's infotainment system, information display, and ETC switch operation. The vehicle will also use a buzzer to indicate whether the anti-tamper authentication was successful. Multiple anti-tamper authentication attempts... Figure 3 As shown.

[0063] In addition, if the vehicle's infotainment system or other components have been replaced, the ETC module assembly needs to be rewritten with the key following the steps described above to perform anti-tamper authentication.

[0064] According to the anti-tamper authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system proposed in this application embodiment, since the vehicle identification code of the on-board unit assembly of the non-stop toll collection system corresponds one-to-one with the vehicle identification code, if the on-board unit assembly is disassembled and installed on another vehicle, but the original vehicle's identification code is stored, and the vehicle identification code stored in the vehicle's whole vehicle controller is based on the current vehicle's identification code, this application embodiment can verify the vehicle identification code of the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system and the vehicle identification code stored in the current vehicle's whole vehicle controller. After the verification is successful, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is determined to be successful, thereby avoiding the trouble caused to users and manufacturers by the loss of the on-board unit assembly, and to a certain extent solving the inconvenience caused to users after the loss of the non-stop toll collection system product and the economic loss that may be caused by theft, thus improving the security of the non-stop toll collection system.

[0065] Next, referring to the accompanying drawings, we describe the tamper-proof authentication device for a non-stop toll collection system proposed according to an embodiment of this application.

[0066] Figure 4 This is a block diagram of the anti-tamper authentication device of the non-stop toll collection system according to an embodiment of this application.

[0067] like Figure 4 As shown, the anti-tamper authentication device 10 of the non-stop toll collection system includes: an acquisition module 100, a calculation module 200, and a judgment module 300.

[0068] The acquisition module 100 is used to acquire the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the non-stop toll collection system of the current vehicle; the calculation module 200 calculates a first key based on the vehicle identification code and the target algorithm, and sends the first key to the vehicle controller. The vehicle controller parses the first key to obtain the vehicle identification code, and verifies the vehicle identification code based on the stored identification code. The identification code stored by the vehicle controller is the same as the identification code of the current vehicle; if the verification is successful, the judgment module 300 determines that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is successful; otherwise, it determines that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is unsuccessful.

[0069] In this embodiment of the application, the apparatus 10 further includes a generation module.

[0070] The generation module is used to generate a second key before determining that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication has passed. After the verification is passed, the vehicle controller generates the second key and sends the second key to the vehicle's system. The vehicle's system parses the second key to obtain the vehicle's identification code and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the current vehicle's identification code. If the verification is passed, the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be passed.

[0071] In this embodiment of the application, the device 10 further includes a setting module.

[0072] The setting module is used to, after obtaining the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system, if the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly is all zeros, then set the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle to be invalid; otherwise, it calculates the first key based on the vehicle identification code and the target algorithm.

[0073] In this embodiment of the application, the determination module 300 is further used to: obtain the number of verifications within the target time period; if the number of verifications is less than or equal to the preset number and any one of the verifications passes, then the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication is determined to be successful.

[0074] In this embodiment of the application, the determination module 300 is further configured to: if the number of verifications is greater than the preset number and each verification fails, then determine that the current vehicle's anti-tamper authentication fails.

[0075] In this embodiment of the application, the device 10 further includes a restart module.

[0076] The restart module is used to restart the current vehicle to perform the anti-tamper authentication method after determining that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has failed.

[0077] It should be noted that the foregoing explanation of the anti-tamper authentication method embodiment for the non-stop toll collection system also applies to the anti-tamper authentication device of the non-stop toll collection system in this embodiment, and will not be repeated here.

[0078] According to the anti-tamper authentication device for the non-stop toll collection system proposed in this application embodiment, since the vehicle identification code of the on-board unit assembly of the non-stop toll collection system corresponds one-to-one with the vehicle identification code, if the on-board unit assembly is disassembled and installed on another vehicle, but the original vehicle's identification code is stored, and the vehicle identification code stored in the vehicle's whole vehicle controller is based on the current vehicle's identification code, this application embodiment can verify the vehicle identification code of the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system and the vehicle identification code stored in the current vehicle's whole vehicle controller. After the verification is successful, it is determined that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is successful, thereby avoiding the trouble caused to users and manufacturers by the loss of the on-board unit assembly, and to a certain extent solving the inconvenience caused to users after the loss of the non-stop toll collection system product and the economic loss that may be caused by theft, thus improving the security of the non-stop toll collection system.

[0079] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the structure of a vehicle provided in an embodiment of this application. The vehicle may include:

[0080] The memory 501, the processor 502, and the computer program stored on the memory 501 and capable of running on the processor 502.

[0081] When the processor 502 executes the program, it implements the anti-tamper authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system provided in the above embodiments.

[0082] Furthermore, the vehicle also includes:

[0083] Communication interface 503 is used for communication between memory 501 and processor 502.

[0084] The memory 501 is used to store computer programs that can run on the processor 502.

[0085] The memory 501 may include high-speed RAM memory, and may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device.

[0086] If the memory 501, processor 502, and communication interface 503 are implemented independently, then the communication interface 503, memory 501, and processor 502 can be interconnected via a bus to complete communication between them. The bus can be an Industry Standard Architecture (ISA) bus, a Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus, or an Extended Industry Standard Architecture (EISA) bus, etc. The bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of representation, Figure 5 The bus is represented by a single thick line, but this does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.

[0087] Optionally, in a specific implementation, if the memory 501, processor 502, and communication interface 503 are integrated on a single chip, then the memory 501, processor 502, and communication interface 503 can communicate with each other through an internal interface.

[0088] Processor 502 may be a central processing unit (CPU), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits configured to implement the embodiments of this application.

[0089] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program or instructions thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the above-described anti-tamper authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system.

[0090] This application also provides a computer program product, including a computer program or instructions, which, when executed, implement the above-described anti-tamper authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system.

[0091] In the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "one embodiment," "some embodiments," "example," "specific example," or "some examples," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of this application. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples. Moreover, without contradiction, those skilled in the art can combine and integrate the different embodiments or examples described in this specification, as well as the features of different embodiments or examples.

[0092] Furthermore, the terms "first" and "second" are used for descriptive purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the number of technical features indicated. Thus, a feature defined as "first" or "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of that feature. In the description of this application, "N" means at least two, such as two, three, etc., unless otherwise explicitly specified.

[0093] Any process or method described in the flowchart or otherwise herein can be understood as representing a module, segment, or portion of code comprising one or N executable instructions for implementing custom logic functions or processes, and the scope of the preferred embodiments of this application includes additional implementations in which functions may be performed not in the order shown or discussed, including substantially simultaneously or in reverse order depending on the functions involved, as should be understood by those skilled in the art to which embodiments of this application pertain.

[0094] It should be understood that the various parts of this application can be implemented using hardware, software, firmware, or a combination thereof. In the above embodiments, the N steps or methods can be implemented using software or firmware stored in memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system. For example, if implemented in hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented using any one or more of the following techniques known in the art: discrete logic circuits having logic gates for implementing logical functions on data signals, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs) having suitable combinational logic gates, programmable gate arrays (PGAs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc.

[0095] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps of the methods in the above embodiments can be implemented by a program instructing related hardware. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, the program includes one or a combination of the steps of the method embodiments.

Claims

1. A method for tamper-proof authentication of a non-stop toll collection system, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Obtain the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system; A first key is calculated based on the vehicle's identification code and the target algorithm, and the first key is sent to the vehicle controller. The vehicle controller parses the first key to obtain the vehicle's identification code, and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the stored identification code. The identification code stored by the vehicle controller is the same as the identification code of the current vehicle. If the verification passes, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed successful; otherwise, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed unsuccessful. Before determining whether the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has passed, the method further includes: after the verification passes, the vehicle controller generates a second key and sends the second key to the vehicle's infotainment system, wherein the vehicle's infotainment system parses the second key to obtain the vehicle's identification code and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the current vehicle's identification code; if the verification passes, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed successful; determining whether the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has passed includes: obtaining the number of verifications within a target time period; if the number of verifications is less than or equal to a preset number and any one verification passes, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed successful; determining whether the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has failed includes: if the number of verifications is greater than the preset number and every verification fails, the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is deemed unsuccessful.

2. The anti-tamper authentication method for a non-stop toll collection system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before obtaining the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the current vehicle's non-stop toll collection system, the following steps are also included: If the vehicle identification code stored in the vehicle unit assembly is all zeros, then the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle is set to fail; otherwise, the first key is calculated based on the vehicle identification code and the target algorithm.

3. The anti-tamper authentication method for a non-stop toll collection system according to claim 1, characterized in that, After determining that the current vehicle's tamper protection authentication has failed, the process also includes: Then restart the current vehicle to execute the tamper authentication method.

4. A tamper-proof authentication device for a non-stop toll collection system, characterized in that, include: The acquisition module is used to acquire the vehicle identification code stored in the on-board unit assembly of the non-stop toll collection system of the current vehicle. The calculation module calculates a first key based on the vehicle's identification code and the target algorithm, and sends the first key to the vehicle controller. The vehicle controller parses the first key to obtain the vehicle's identification code, and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the stored identification code. The identification code stored by the vehicle controller is the same as the identification code of the current vehicle. The determination module, if the verification passes, determines that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has passed; otherwise, it determines that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has failed. Before determining that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has passed, the module further includes: after the verification passes, the vehicle controller generates a second key and sends the second key to the vehicle's infotainment system, wherein the vehicle's infotainment system parses the second key to obtain the vehicle's identification code and verifies the vehicle's identification code based on the current vehicle's identification code; if the verification passes, it determines that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has passed; determining that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has passed includes: obtaining the number of verifications within a target time period; if the number of verifications is less than or equal to a preset number and any one verification passes, it determines that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has passed; determining that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has failed includes: if the number of verifications is greater than the preset number and every verification fails, it determines that the anti-tamper authentication of the current vehicle has failed.

5. A vehicle, characterized in that, include: A memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, the processor executing the program to implement the tamper-proof authentication method for a non-stop toll collection system as described in any one of claims 1-3.

6. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program or instructions stored thereon, characterized in that, The computer program or instructions are executed by a processor to implement the anti-tamper authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system as described in any one of claims 1-3.

7. A computer program product, comprising a computer program or instructions, characterized in that, When the computer program or instructions are executed, they implement the anti-tamper authentication method for the non-stop toll collection system as described in any one of claims 1-3.

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