Enhanced integrity protection for wireless networking systems

Abstract

An enhanced integrity protection for a wireless networking system is provided. Methods, systems, and apparatus are described for performing enhanced integrity protection techniques by an access point (AP) and a non-AP. A station (STA) may receive an integrity protection (IP) capability request from an access point (AP) and transmit an IP capability response to the AP. The STA may receive one or more downlink (DL) frames from the AP, the one or more DL frames including at least one adjusted parameter field of a plurality of parameter fields. The STA may verify that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP based on the adjusted parameter field or at least one value of one or more of the plurality of parameter fields.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to wireless communications, including techniques for wireless communications between wireless stations and / or access points in a wireless networking system. Background Art

[0002] The use of wireless communication systems is growing rapidly. In addition, wireless communication technology has evolved from voice communications only to also include the transmission of data such as the Internet and multimedia content. A common short-range / medium-range wireless communication standard is the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN). Most modern WLANs are based on the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard (and / or 802.11 for short) and are sold under the Wi-Fi brand name. A WLAN network links one or more devices to a wireless access point, which in turn provides a connection to the wider area Internet.

[0003] In an 802.11 system, devices that are wirelessly connected to each other are referred to as "stations," "mobile stations," "user devices," "user equipment," or STAs or UEs for short. A wireless station may be a wireless access point or a wireless client (and / or a mobile station). An access point (AP), also known as a wireless router, acts as a base station for a wireless network. The AP transmits and receives radio frequency signals for communicating with wireless client devices. The AP may also be coupled to the Internet by wire and / or wireless means. A wireless client operating on an 802.11 network may be any of a variety of devices, such as a laptop computer, a tablet device, a smart phone, a smart watch, or a fixed device such as a desktop computer. Wireless client devices are referred to herein as user equipment (and / or UE for short). Some wireless client devices are also collectively referred to herein as mobile devices or mobile stations (but as mentioned above, wireless client devices may also be stationary devices as a whole).

[0004] Mobile electronic devices may take the form of smartphones or tablets that are commonly carried by users. Wearable devices (also known as accessory devices) are a newer form of mobile electronic device, an example being a smartwatch. In addition, low-cost, low-complexity wireless devices intended for static or dynamic deployment are also increasing rapidly as part of the development of the "Internet of Things". In other words, the complexity, capabilities, traffic patterns and other characteristics of the devices required are becoming increasingly broad.

[0005] Some WLANs may utilize multi-link operation (MLO), for example, to use multiple channels (e.g., links) concurrently. APs and / or STAs with MLO capabilities may be referred to as multi-link devices (MLDs). For example, an AP with MLO capabilities may be referred to as an AP-MLD, and an MLO-capable STA that does not act as an AP may be referred to as a non-AP MLD. Improvements in the art are desired. Summary of the invention

[0006]

[0013] Embodiments described herein relate to systems, methods, apparatus, and mechanisms for enhanced integrity protection in wireless networking systems.

[0007] In some embodiments, a station (STA) may receive an integrity protection (IP) capability request from an access point (AP) and transmit an IP capability response to the AP. The STA may receive one or more downlink (DL) frames from the AP, the one or more DL frames including at least one adjusted parameter field of a plurality of parameter fields. The STA may verify that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP based on at least one value of the adjusted parameter field or one or more parameter fields of the plurality of parameter fields.

[0008] According to some embodiments, the one or more DL frames may include a header message integrity check (MIC) field and a frame number (FN) field. Additionally or alternatively, as part of verifying that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP, the method may also include performing an integrity check and calculation using the header MIC field.

[0009] In some embodiments, the one or more DL frames may be associated with a group address, and the method may further include receiving a header MIC value associated with a group key from the AP. Additionally, the method may include determining that the header MIC value associated with the group key matches a value of the header MIC field as part of verifying that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP.

[0010] According to some embodiments, the multiple parameter fields may include at least one address, and the method may also include determining whether the STA is the intended recipient of the one or more DL frames or whether the AP is the correct transmitter of the one or more DL frames based on a comparison of the at least one address with the address of the STA.

[0011] In some instances, the one or more DL frames may be trigger frames or block acknowledgement (BA) frames. In some embodiments, at least one parameter field in the plurality of parameter fields may be adjusted to a zero value. Additionally or alternatively, a value of a parameter field in the plurality of parameter fields may be increased by one.

[0012] In other embodiments, an apparatus may include at least one processor configured to cause an access point (AP) to receive an integrity protection (IP) capability request from a station (STA). The at least one processor may also be configured to cause the AP to transmit an IP capability response to the STA indicating that the AP supports one or more IP capabilities. The at least one processor may also be configured to cause the AP to receive one or more uplink (UL) frames from the STA, wherein the one or more UL frames include at least one adjusted parameter field among a plurality of parameter fields. Additionally or alternatively, the at least one processor may also be configured to cause the AP to verify that the one or more UL frames have been correctly received from the STA based on at least one value of the adjusted parameter field or one or more parameter fields among the plurality of parameter fields.

[0013] In some embodiments, as part of verifying that the one or more UL frames have been correctly received from the STA, the at least one processor may also be configured to cause the AP to determine that the AP is an intended recipient of the one or more UL frames transmitted from the STA based on a value of a power management (PM) field of the one or more UL frames. In addition, the at least one adjusted parameter field of the plurality of parameter fields may be adjusted to a zero value or a value increased by one.

[0014] In some embodiments, the one or more UL frames may be quality of service (QoS) null frames, which may include a protected medium access control (MAC) header field and a high throughput (HT) control field. Additionally or alternatively, the one or more QoS null frames may also include a header message integrity check (MIC) field and a frame number (FN) field. In addition, the header MIC field may allow the AP to calculate an integrity checksum to verify that the STA has correctly received the one or more QoS null frames.

[0015] In some embodiments, an access point (non-AP) may include a radio component and a processor, the processor being operably coupled to the radio component and configured to cause the AP to transmit an integrity protection (IP) capability request to a non-access point (non-AP). The processor may also be configured to cause the AP to: receive an IP capability response from the non-AP; and adjust a value of at least one parameter field of one or more downlink (DL) frames based at least in part on the non-AP supporting one or more IP capabilities. The processor may also be configured to cause the AP to transmit the one or more DL frames to the non-AP, wherein the at least one parameter field is adjusted to provide IP to the one or more DL frames.

[0016] According to some embodiments, the one or more DL frames may be beacons transmitted during one or more beacon periods. Additionally or alternatively, the beacon may include one or more beacon integrity protection numbers (BIPNs), and for beacons transmitted after the first beacon period, the values ​​of the one or more BIPNs may be increased by one, respectively. In addition, the one or more BIPNs and one or more corresponding frame numbers (FNs) may be included in one or more corresponding physical packet data units (PPDUs), wherein the one or more BIPNs may be six octets in length, and wherein the one or more corresponding FNs may be one, two, or three octets in length.

[0017] This disclosure is intended to provide a brief overview of some of the topics described in this document. Therefore, it should be understood that the above features are only examples and should not be construed as narrowing the scope or essence of the topics described herein in any way. Other features, aspects, and advantages of the topics described herein will become apparent through the following detailed description, drawings, and claims. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0018] A better understanding of the present subject matter may be obtained when the following detailed description of the embodiments is considered in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0019] Figure 1 An exemplary wireless communication system is shown in accordance with some embodiments.

[0020] Figure 2 An exemplary simplified block diagram of a wireless device according to some embodiments is shown.

[0021] Figure 3 An exemplary WLAN communication system is shown in accordance with some embodiments.

[0022] Figure 4 An exemplary simplified block diagram of a WLAN access point (AP) is shown in accordance with some embodiments.

[0023] Figure 5 An exemplary simplified block diagram of a wireless station (STA) is shown in accordance with some embodiments.

[0024] Figure 6 An exemplary simplified block diagram of a wireless node according to some embodiments is shown.

[0025] Figures 7 and 8 An example of an MLD according to some embodiments is shown.

[0026] Fig. 9 An example structure of a physical layer protocol data unit (PPDU) according to some embodiments is illustrated.

[0027] FIG. 10A to FIG. 10B An example structure of a data medium access control (MAC) protocol data unit (MPDU), example control fields, and associated integrity protection (IP) schemes according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0028] Fig.11 An example integrity protection scheme for each PPDU according to some embodiments is illustrated.

[0029] Fig.12 is a communication flow diagram illustrating an example method for integrity protection techniques for MPDUs according to some embodiments.

[0030] FIG. 13A to FIG. 13C Example aspects of integrity protection techniques for MPDUs according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0031] Fig.14 Example aspects of integrity protection techniques involving access points (APs) and non-AP multi-link devices (MLDs) according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0032] FIG. 15A to FIG. 15B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques related to beacon signaling according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0033] FIG. 16A to FIG. 16C Example aspects of integrity protection techniques associated with Quality of Service (QoS) null frames in accordance with some embodiments are illustrated.

[0034] FIG. 17A to FIG. 17B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques associated with control frames according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0035] FIG. 18A to FIG. 18B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques for multi-site (multi-STA) block acknowledgement (ACK) frames according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0036] FIG. 19A to FIG. 19B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques associated with trigger frames according to some embodiments are illustrated.

[0037] Although the features described herein are susceptible to various modifications and alternative forms, specific embodiments thereof are shown by way of example in the drawings and described in detail herein. However, it should be understood that the drawings and detailed description thereof are not intended to be limited to the specific forms disclosed, but on the contrary, are intended to cover all modifications, equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of the subject matter as defined by the appended claims. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0038] Acronyms

[0039] Various acronyms are used throughout this patent application. The definitions of the most prominent acronyms used that may appear throughout this patent application are as follows:

[0040] UE: User Equipment

[0041] AP: Access Point

[0042] STA: Wireless Station

[0043] TX: Transmit / Transmit

[0044] RX: Receive / Receive

[0045] DL: Downlink

[0046] UL: Uplink

[0047] MLD: Multi-Link Device

[0048] LAN: Local Area Network

[0049] WLAN: Wireless Local Area Network

[0050] RAT: Radio Access Technology

[0051] ACK: Acknowledgement

[0052] BA: Block Acknowledgement

[0053] QoS: Quality of Service

[0054] OTA: Over the air

[0055] SU: Single User

[0056] MU: Multi-User

[0057] MAC: Media Access Control

[0058] OMA: MAC in the air

[0059] CPE: Enhanced client privacy

[0060] BSS: Basic Service Set

[0061] BSSID: Basic Service Set Identifier

[0062] SN: Serial number

[0063] PN: Group Number

[0064] FN: frame number

[0065] TID: Traffic Identifier

[0066] AID: Association Identifier

[0067] SSID: Service Set Identifier

[0068] SAP: Service Access Point

[0069] MPDU: MAC level protocol data unit

[0070] A-MPDU: Aggregate MPDU

[0071] MSDU: MAC Service Data Unit

[0072] SA: Sender address

[0073] DA: Destination Address

[0074] PS: Save power

[0075] PM: Power Management

[0076] PPDU: Physical Protocol Data Unit

[0077] BA: Block Acknowledgement

[0078] TXOP: Transmission Opportunity

[0079] TWT: Target Wake Time

[0080] HT: High Throughput

[0081] EHT: Extremely High Throughput

[0082] ID: Identifier

[0083] HTC: High Throughput Control

[0084] MIC: Message Integrity Check

[0085] CRC: Cyclic Redundancy Check

[0086] FCS: Frame Checksum

[0087] DS: Distribution System

[0088] EOSP: End of Service Period

[0089] OMI: Operation Mode Indicator

[0090] NSS: Number of spatial streams

[0091] BW: Bandwidth

[0092] CCMP: Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol

[0093] EOF: End of Frame

[0094] BIGTK: Beacon Integrity Group Temporal Key

[0095] BIPN: Beacon Integrity Packet Number

[0096] TBTT: Target Beacon Transmission Time

[0097] ICF: Initial Control Frame

[0098] CTS: Clear to Send

[0099] EMSLR: Enhanced Multi-Link Single Radio

[0100] RU: Resource Unit

[0101] SS: Synchronous signal

[0102] GCMP: Galois / Counter Mode Protection

[0103] HDR: High Data Rate

[0104] MHP: Modulated Hermitian Pulse

[0105] BAN: Body Area Network

[0106] UWB: Ultra Wideband

[0107] the term

[0108] The following is a glossary of terms used in this disclosure:

[0109] Memory medium—any of various types of non-transitory memory devices or storage devices. The term "memory medium" is intended to include installation media, such as CD-ROM, floppy disk, or tape devices; computer system memory or random access memory such as DRAM, DDR RAM, SRAM, EDO RAM, Rambus RAM, etc.; non-volatile memory, such as flash memory, magnetic media, for example, hard disk drives or optical storage devices; registers or other similar types of memory elements, etc. The memory medium may also include other types of non-transitory memory or combinations thereof. In addition, the memory medium may be located in a first computer system executing a program, or may be located in a different second computer system connected to the first computer system via a network such as the Internet. In the latter case, the second computer system may provide program instructions to the first computer for execution. The term "memory medium" may include two or more memory media that may reside in different locations in different computer systems connected, for example, via a network. The memory medium may store program instructions (e.g., embodied as a computer program) that may be executed by one or more processors.

[0110] Carrier Media—Memory media as described above, as well as physical transmission media such as a bus, network, and / or other physical transmission media that convey signals such as electrical, electromagnetic, or digital signals.

[0111] Computer System—Any of various types of computing or processing systems, including a personal computer system (PC), a mainframe computer system, a workstation, a network appliance, an Internet appliance, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a television system, a grid computing system, or other devices or combinations of devices. In general, the term "computer system" may be broadly defined to encompass any device (and / or combination of devices) having at least one processor that executes instructions from a memory medium.

[0112] Mobile Device (and / or Mobile Station)—Any of various types of computer system devices that are mobile or portable and that perform wireless communications using WLAN communications. Examples of mobile devices include mobile phones or smart phones (e.g., iPhone TM , based on Android TM phones), and tablets such as iPads TM 、Samsung Galaxy TM etc. Various other types of devices would fall into this category if they include Wi-Fi or both cellular and Wi-Fi communication capabilities, such as laptop computers (e.g., MacBooks TM ), portable gaming devices (e.g., Nintendo DS TM , PlayStation Portable TM 、Gameboy Advance TM , iPhone TM ), portable Internet devices and other handheld devices, and wearable devices such as smart watches, smart glasses, headphones, pendants, earbuds, etc. In general, the term "mobile device" can be broadly defined to include any electronic, computing and / or communication device (and / or combination of devices) that a user can easily transport and that is capable of wireless communication using WLAN or Wi-Fi.

[0113] Wireless device (and / or wireless station) - any of various types of computer system devices that perform wireless communications using WLAN communications. As used herein, the term "wireless device" may refer to a mobile device as defined above or a fixed device such as a fixed wireless client or wireless base station. For example, a wireless device may be any type of wireless station for an 802.11 system, such as an access point (AP) or a client station (STA or UE). Other examples include televisions, media players (e.g., AppleTV TM,Roku TM , Amazon FireTV TM , Google Chromecast TM etc.), refrigerators, washing machines, thermostats, etc.

[0114] WLAN—The term "WLAN" has the full scope of its ordinary meaning and includes at least a wireless communication network or RAT that is served by WLAN access points and provides connectivity to the Internet through these access points. Most modern WLANs are based on the IEEE 802.11 standard and are marketed under the name "Wi-Fi". WLAN networks are distinct from cellular networks.

[0115] Processing Element - refers to various specific implementations of digital circuits that perform functions in a computer system. Additionally, a processing element may refer to various specific implementations of analog or mixed-signal (a combination of analog and digital) circuits that perform functions (and / or multiple functions) in a computer or computer system. Processing elements include, for example, circuits such as integrated circuits (ICs), ASICs (application specific integrated circuits), portions or circuits of individual processor cores, entire processor cores, individual processors, programmable hardware devices such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), and / or larger portions of systems including multiple processors.

[0116] Automatic—refers to an action or operation being performed by a computer system (e.g., software executed by a computer system) or a device (e.g., a circuit, a programmable hardware element, an ASIC, etc.) without the action or operation being directly specified or performed by a user input. Thus, the term "automatically" is in contrast to an operation being manually performed or specified by a user, where the user provides input to directly perform the operation. An automatic process may be initiated by input provided by a user, but the subsequent "automatically" performed actions are not specified by the user, such as not being "manually" performed, where the user specifies each action to be performed. For example, a user filling out an electronic form by selecting each field and providing input specifying information (e.g., by typing in information, selecting checkboxes, radio selections, etc.) is not manually filling out the form, even though the computer system must update the form in response to the user action. The form may be automatically filled out by a computer system, where the computer system (e.g., software executed on the computer system) analyzes the fields of the form and fills out the form without any user input specifying the answers to the fields. As indicated above, a user may invoke automatic filling out of a form, but not participate in the actual filling out of the form (e.g., the user does not manually specify the answers to the fields but rather they are automatically completed). This specification provides various examples of operations that are automatically performed in response to actions that a user has taken.

[0117] Concurrency - refers to parallel execution or implementation, where tasks, processes, signaling, messages, or programs are executed in a manner that at least partially overlaps. For example, concurrency can be achieved using "strong" or strict parallelism, where tasks are executed (at least partially) in parallel on respective computing elements, or using "weak parallelism", where tasks are executed in an interleaved manner (e.g., by time multiplexing of execution threads).

[0118] Configured to - Various components may be described as being "configured to" perform one or more tasks. In such contexts, "configured to" is a broad statement that generally means "having a structure" that performs one or more tasks during operation. Thus, a component can be configured to perform a task even when the component is not currently performing the task (e.g., a set of electrical conductors can be configured to electrically connect a module to another module even when the two modules are not connected). In some contexts, "configured to" can be a broad statement that generally means "having a structure" that performs one or more tasks during operation. Thus, the component can be configured to perform a task even when the component is not currently turned on. Typically, the circuitry that forms the structure corresponding to "configured to" may include hardware circuitry.

[0119] For ease of description, various components may be described as performing one or more tasks. Such descriptions should be interpreted as including the phrase "configured to". The statement that a component is configured to perform one or more tasks is expressly intended not to invoke the interpretation of 35 U.S.C. §112(f) for that component.

[0120] Figure 1 to Figure 2 —Wireless communication system

[0121] Figure 1 An exemplary (and simplified) wireless communication system is shown in which aspects of the present disclosure may be implemented. Figure 1 The system is only one example of possible systems, and embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented in any of a variety of systems as desired.

[0122] As shown, the exemplary wireless communication system includes a ("first") wireless device 102 communicating with another ("second") wireless device. The first wireless device 102 and the second wireless device 104 may communicate wirelessly using any of a variety of wireless communication techniques, including possibly ranging wireless communication techniques.

[0123] As one possibility, the first wireless device 102 and the second wireless device 104 may perform ranging using a wireless local area network (WLAN) communication technology (e.g., communication based on IEEE 802.11 / Wi-Fi) and / or a technology based on WLAN wireless communication. One or both of the wireless device 102 and the wireless device 104 may also be able to communicate via one or more additional wireless communication protocols, such as any of Bluetooth (BT), Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), Near Field Communication (NFC), LTE, Advanced LTE (LTE-A), NR, GPS, Ultra Wideband (UWB), etc.

[0124] Wireless device 102 and wireless device 104 may be any of various types of wireless devices. As one possibility, one or more of wireless devices 102 and / or 104 may be substantially portable wireless user equipment (UE) devices, such as a smartphone, a handheld device, a wearable device (such as a smart watch), a tablet, a motor vehicle, or virtually any type of wireless device. As another possibility, one or more of wireless device 102 and / or wireless device 104 may be substantially stationary devices, such as a set-top box, a media player (e.g., an audio or audio-visual device), a game console, a desktop computer, an appliance, a door, an access point, a base station, or any of various other types of devices.

[0125] Each of the wireless device 102 and the wireless device 104 may include wireless communication circuitry configured to facilitate the performance of wireless communications, which may include various digital and / or analog radio frequency (RF) components, a processor configured to execute program instructions stored in a memory, a programmable hardware element such as a field programmable gate array (FPGA), and / or any of various other components. The wireless device 102 and / or the wireless device 104 may use any or all of such components to perform any method implementation described herein, or any portion of any method implementation described herein.

[0126] Each of the wireless devices 102 and 104 may include one or more antennas for communicating using one or more wireless communication protocols. In some cases, one or more portions of a receive chain and / or transmit chain may be shared between multiple wireless communication standards; for example, a device may be configured to communicate using either Bluetooth or Wi-Fi using a partially or fully shared wireless communication circuit (e.g., using a shared radio component or at least a shared radio component). The shared communication circuit may include a single antenna, or may include multiple antennas for performing wireless communication (e.g., for MIMO). Alternatively, the device may include an independent transmit chain and / or receive chain (e.g., including independent antennas and other radio components) for each wireless communication protocol configured to communicate with it. As another possibility, the device may include one or more radios or radio components shared between multiple wireless communication protocols, and one or more radios or radio components used exclusively by a single wireless communication protocol. For example, a device may include a shared radio component for communicating using one or more of LTE and / or 5G NR, and a separate radio component for communicating using each of Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. Other configurations are also possible.

[0127] As mentioned above, it can be combined with Figure 1 A wireless communication system of the present disclosure may be implemented to implement aspects of the present disclosure. For example, a wireless device (e.g., either of the wireless devices 102 or 104) may be configured to perform methods for robust discovery of new APs in an access point (AP) MLD, robust link addition to AP MLD association, AP beacon mode when adding an AP to or deleting an AP from an AP MLD, and robust BSS transition management (BTM) signaling for directing non-AP MLDs to the best AP MLD and the most suitable AP, and privacy improvement for associated non-AP MLDs.

[0128] Figure 6 An exemplary wireless device 100 (e.g., corresponding to wireless device 102 and / or wireless device 104) that may be configured for use in conjunction with various aspects of the present disclosure is shown. Device 100 may be any of a variety of types of devices and may be configured to perform any of a variety of types of functions. Device 100 may be a substantially portable device, or may be a substantially fixed device, possibly including any of a variety of types of devices. Device 100 may be configured to perform one or more ranging wireless communication techniques or features, such as any of the techniques or features subsequently shown and / or described herein with respect to any or all of the figures.

[0129] As shown, device 100 may include processing element 101. Processing element may include or be coupled to one or more memory elements. For example, device 100 may include one or more storage media (e.g., memory 105), which may include any of various types of memory and may be used for any of various functions. For example, memory 105 may be RAM used as system memory for processing element 101. Other types and functions are also possible.

[0130] Additionally, device 100 may include wireless communication circuitry 130. The wireless communication circuitry may include any of a variety of communication elements (e.g., an antenna for wireless communication, analog and / or digital communication circuitry / controllers, etc.), and may enable the device to communicate wirelessly using one or more wireless communication protocols.

[0131] Note that in some cases, wireless communication circuitry 130 may include its own processing element (e.g., a baseband processor) in addition to processing element 101, for example. For example, processing element 101 may be an "application processor" whose primary function may be to support application layer operations in device 100, while wireless communication circuitry 130 may be a "baseband processor" whose primary function may be to support baseband layer operations in device 100 (e.g., to facilitate wireless communications between device 100 and other devices). In other words, in some cases, device 100 may include multiple processing elements (e.g., may be a multi-processor device). Other configurations utilizing a multi-processor architecture (e.g., instead of or in addition to an application processor / baseband processor configuration) are also possible.

[0132] Depending on the intended functionality of device 100, device 100 may additionally include any of a variety of other components (not shown) for implementing device functionality, which may also include processing elements and / or memory elements (e.g., audio processing circuitry), one or more power elements (which may rely on battery power and / or an external power source), user interface elements (e.g., a display, a speaker, a microphone, a camera, a keyboard, a mouse, a touch screen, etc.), and / or any of a variety of other components.

[0133] Components of device 100, such as processing element 101, memory 105 and wireless communication circuit 130, can be operably coupled via one or more interconnect interfaces, and the interconnect interface may include any of various types of interfaces, and may include a combination of multiple types of interfaces. As an example, a USB high-speed chip-to-chip (HSIC) interface can be provided for chip-to-chip communication between processing elements. Alternatively (and / or in addition), any of a universal asynchronous receiver-transmitter (UART) interface, a serial peripheral interface (SPI), an internal integrated circuit (I2C), a system management bus (SMBus) and / or various other communication interfaces can be used for communication between various device components. Other types of interfaces (e.g., an intra-chip interface for communication within processing element 101, a peripheral device interface for communicating with peripheral components inside or outside device 100, etc.) can also be provided as part of device 100.

[0134] Figure 3 —WLAN system

[0135] Figure 3 An exemplary WLAN system according to some embodiments is shown. As shown, the exemplary WLAN system includes multiple wireless client sites or devices (e.g., STA or user equipment (UE)) 106, which are configured to communicate with access point (AP) 112 via wireless communication channel 142. AP 112 can be a Wi-Fi access point. AP 112 can communicate with one or more other electronic devices (not shown) and / or another network 152 (such as the Internet) via wired and / or wireless communication channels 150. Additional electronic devices (such as remote devices 154) can communicate with components of the WLAN system via network 152. For example, remote device 154 can be another wireless client site, a server associated with an application executed on one of STAs in STA 106, etc. The WLAN system can be configured to operate according to any of various communication standards such as various IEEE 802.11 standards. In some embodiments, at least one wireless device 106 is configured to communicate directly with one or more neighboring mobile devices without using access point 112.

[0136] Additionally, in some embodiments, the wireless device 106 (which may be an exemplary implementation of the device 100) may be configured to perform methods for robust discovery of new access point (AP) MLDs, robust link addition to AP MLD associations, AP beacon mode when an AP is added to or deleted from an AP MLD, and robust BSS transition management (BTM) signaling for directing non-AP MLDs to the best AP MLD and the most suitable AP, and privacy improvements for associated non-AP MLDs.

[0137] Figure 4 —Access Point Block Diagram

[0138] Figure 4 An exemplary block diagram of an access point (AP) 112 is shown, which may be Figure 4 A possible exemplary implementation of the device 100 is shown. Note that Figure 4 The block diagram of the AP 112 is only one example of a possible system. As shown, the AP 112 may include one or more processors 204 that may execute program instructions for the AP 112. The processor 204 may also be coupled (directly or indirectly) to a memory management unit (MMU) 240 or other circuit or device, which may be configured to receive addresses from the processor 204 and convert these addresses to locations in memory (e.g., memory 260 and read-only memory (ROM) 250).

[0139] AP 112 may include at least one network port 270. Network port 270 may be configured to couple to a wired network and provide access to the Internet for multiple devices, such as mobile device 106. For example, network port 270 (and / or additional network ports) may be configured to couple to a local network, such as a home network or an enterprise network. For example, port 270 may be an Ethernet port. The local network may provide a connection to an additional network, such as the Internet.

[0140] The AP 112 may include at least one antenna 234, which may be configured to operate as a wireless transceiver and may also be configured to communicate with the mobile device 106 via wireless communication circuitry 230. The antenna 234 communicates with the wireless communication circuitry 230 via a communication chain 232. The communication chain 232 may include one or more receive chains, one or more transmit chains, or both. The wireless communication circuitry 230 may be configured to communicate via Wi-Fi or WLAN (e.g., 802.11). For example, when the AP is co-located with a base station in the case of a small cell, or in other situations where it may be desirable for the AP 112 to communicate via a variety of different wireless communication technologies, the wireless communication circuitry 230 may also or alternatively be configured to communicate via various other wireless communication technologies, including, but not limited to, Long Term Evolution (LTE), Advanced LTE (LTE-A), UWB, etc.

[0141] In addition, in some embodiments, as further described below, AP 112 may be configured to perform methods for performing the following operations: robust discovery of new APs in access point (AP) MLDs, robust link addition to AP MLD associations, AP beacon mode when APs are added to or deleted from AP MLDs, and robust BSS transition management (BTM) signaling for directing non-AP MLDs to the best APMLD and most suitable AP, and privacy improvements for associated non-AP MLDs.

[0142] Figure 5 —Client site diagram

[0143] Figure 5 An exemplary simplified block diagram of a client site 106 is shown, which may be Figure 4 A possible exemplary implementation of the device 100 shown. According to various embodiments, the client site 106 may be a user equipment (UE) device, a mobile device or mobile station and / or a wireless device or wireless station. As shown, the client site 106 may include a system on a chip (SOC) 300, which may include parts for various purposes. The SOC 300 may be coupled to various other circuits of the client site 106. For example, the client site 106 may include various types of memory (e.g., including NAND flash memory 310), a connector interface (I / F) (and / or docking station) 320 (e.g., for coupling to a computer system, a docking station, a charging station, etc.), a display 360, cellular communication circuits (e.g., cellular radio components) 330 (such as for 5G NR, LTE, UWB, etc.), and medium- and short-range wireless communication circuits (e.g., Bluetooth TM and WLAN radio components) 329 (e.g., Bluetooth TMThe client site 106 may also include one or more smart cards 315 incorporating SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) functionality, such as one or more UICCs (one or more Universal Integrated Circuit Cards). The cellular communication circuit 330 may be coupled to one or more antennas, such as antennas 335 and 336 as shown. The short-range to medium-range wireless communication circuit 329 may also be coupled to one or more antennas, such as antennas 337 and 338 as shown. Alternatively, in addition to or in lieu of being coupled to antennas 337 and 338, the short-range to medium-range wireless communication circuit 329 may be coupled to antennas 335 and 336. The short-range to medium-range wireless communication circuit 329 may include multiple receive chains and / or multiple transmit chains for receiving and / or transmitting multiple spatial streams in a configuration such as multiple input multiple output (MIMO). Some or all of the components of the short- and medium-range wireless communication circuit 329 and / or the cellular communication circuit 330 may be used for ranging communication, for example, ranging communication using WLAN communication, Bluetooth communication, and / or cellular communication.

[0144] As shown, the SOC 300 may include a processor 302 that may execute program instructions for the client station 106 and a display circuit 304 that may perform graphics processing and provide display signals to a display 360. The SOC 300 may also include a motion sensing circuit 370 that may detect motion of the client station 106, for example, using any of a gyroscope, an accelerometer, and / or various other motion sensing components. The one or more processors 302 may also be coupled to a memory management unit (MMU) 340 and / or other circuits or devices (such as the display circuit 304, the cellular communication circuit 330, the short-range wireless communication circuit 329, the connector interface (I / F) 320, and / or the display 360), which may be configured to receive addresses from the one or more processors 302 and translate those addresses into locations in a memory (e.g., the memory 306, the read-only memory (ROM) 350, the NAND flash memory 310). The MMU 340 may be configured to perform memory protection and page table translation or setup. In some embodiments, MMU 340 may be included as part of processor 302 .

[0145] As described above, the client station 106 may be configured to communicate directly with one or more neighboring client stations wirelessly. The client station 106 may be configured to communicate according to the WLAN RAT to enable communication in environments such as Figure 3 WLAN network communication as shown in Figure 1 The ranging shown in .

[0146] As described herein, the client site 106 may include hardware and software components for implementing the features described herein. For example, the processor 302 of the client site 106 may be configured to implement some or all of the features described herein, for example by executing program instructions stored on a memory medium (e.g., a non-transitory computer-readable memory medium). Alternatively (and / or in addition), the processor 302 may be configured as a programmable hardware element, such as an FPGA (field programmable gate array) or an ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit). Alternatively (and / or in addition), in combination with one or more of the other components 300, 304, 306, 310, 315, 320, 329, 330, 335, 336, 337, 338, 340, 350, 360, 370, the processor 302 of the UE 106 may be configured to implement some or all of the features described herein.

[0147] Furthermore, as described herein, processor 302 may include one or more processing elements. Thus, processor 302 may include one or more integrated circuits (ICs) configured to perform the functions of processor 302. Furthermore, each integrated circuit may include circuits (e.g., a first circuit, a second circuit, etc.) configured to perform the functions of processor 204.

[0148] In addition, as described herein, the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range wireless communication circuit 329 may each include one or more processing elements. In other words, one or more processing elements may be included in the cellular communication circuit 330 and may also be included in the short-range wireless communication circuit 329. Therefore, each of the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range wireless communication circuit 329 may include one or more integrated circuits (ICs) configured to perform the functions of the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range wireless communication circuit 329, respectively. In addition, each integrated circuit may include circuits (e.g., first circuits, second circuits, etc.) configured to perform the functions of the cellular communication circuit 330 and the short-range wireless communication circuit 329.

[0149] Figure 6 —Wireless Node Block Diagram

[0150] Figure 6 A possible block diagram of a wireless node 107 is shown. The wireless node may be Figure 6. As shown, the wireless node 107 may include a system on a chip (SOC) 400, which may include parts for various purposes. For example, as shown, the SOC 400 may include one or more processors 402 that may execute program instructions for the wireless node 107 and a display circuit 404 that may perform graphics processing and provide display signals to a display 460. The SOC 400 may also include a motion sensing circuit 470, which may detect the motion of the wireless node 107, for example, using any of a gyroscope, an accelerometer, and / or various other motion sensing components. The one or more processors 402 may also be coupled to a memory management unit (MMU) 440, which may be configured to receive addresses from the one or more processors 402 and convert these addresses to locations in a memory (e.g., a memory 406 and a read-only memory (ROM) 450, a flash memory 410). The MMU 440 may be configured to perform memory protection and page table translation or setup. In some embodiments, MMU 440 may be included as part of processor 402 .

[0151] As shown, the SOC 400 may be coupled to various other circuits of the wireless node 107. For example, the wireless node 107 may include various types of memory (e.g., including NAND flash memory 410), a connector interface 420 (e.g., for coupling to a computer system, a docking station, a charging station, etc.), a display 460, and wireless communication circuitry 430 (e.g., for 5G NR, LTE, LTE-A, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, NFC, UWB, GPS, etc.).

[0152] The wireless node 107 may include at least one antenna, and in some embodiments, may include multiple antennas 435 and 436 for performing wireless communications with base stations and / or other devices. For example, the wireless node 107 may perform wireless communications using antennas 435 and 436. As described above, the wireless node 107 may be configured in some embodiments to perform wireless communications using multiple wireless communication standards or radio access technologies (RATs).

[0153] Wireless communication circuitry 430 may include Wi-Fi logic 432, cellular modem 434, and Bluetooth logic 439. Wi-Fi logic 432 is used to enable wireless node 107 to perform Wi-Fi communications over, for example, an 802.11 network. Bluetooth logic 439 is used to enable wireless node 107 to perform Bluetooth communications. Cellular modem 434 may be capable of performing cellular communications according to one or more cellular communication technologies. Some or all of wireless communication circuitry 430 may be used for ranging communications, for example, using WLAN communications, Bluetooth communications, and / or cellular communications.

[0154] As described herein, the wireless node 107 may include hardware components and software components for implementing embodiments of the present disclosure. For example, one or more components of the wireless communication circuitry 430 (e.g., Wi-Fi logic component 432) of the wireless node 107 may be configured to implement part or all of the methods described herein, for example, by executing program instructions stored on a memory medium (e.g., a non-transitory computer-readable memory medium), a processor configured as an FPGA (field programmable gate array), and / or using dedicated hardware components that may include an ASIC (application-specific integrated circuit).

[0155] Figures 7 and 8 —Multi-Link Device (MLD) Operation

[0156] IEEE and / or 802.11 (e.g., 802.11bn) may include MLD capabilities. In the current implementation, an access point (AP) MLD node may manage its subordinate APs. Thus, an AP MLD node may modify, add, and / or subtract subordinate APs to increase capacity, manage basic service set (BSS) interference and coverage, including switching an AP to operate in a channel with less interference, and / or manipulate associated non-AP MLD nodes to operate on better performing APs and / or AP MLD nodes.

[0157] Figure 7 An AP MLD 112 is shown according to some embodiments. The AP MLD may operate any number of subordinate APs, such as APs 712a, 712b, 712c, and 712d in the illustrated example. The subordinate APs may operate on any of a variety of frequency bands. The subordinate APs may operate on different frequency ranges (e.g., channels) of the same frequency band or on different frequency bands.

[0158] The AP MLD may provide accessory APs from a single physical device (e.g., a single shared housing, and potentially using the same antennas). In some embodiments, the AP MLD may provide APs from multiple different devices (e.g., a first device may provide one or more APs, and a second device may provide one or more different APs, etc.). In some embodiments, the various accessory APs may be spatially separated (e.g., using beams in different directions, using different antennas with a shared housing (e.g., antennas of the same physical device) and / or different antennas for different devices, etc.). In some embodiments, the spatially separated accessory APs may operate on the same (or overlapping) channels.

[0159] Figure 8An AP MLD 112 is shown communicating with a non-AP MLD 106 according to some embodiments. As illustrated, the AP MLD 112 may operate three subordinate APs. For example, AP 812a may operate in a 2.4 GHz band, AP 812b may operate in a 5 GHz band, and AP 812c may operate in a 6 GHz band. In addition, any number of subordinate APs may be used in any combination of frequency bands. For example, the AP MLD may operate multiple subordinate APs in one frequency band and / or may not operate any subordinate APs in a frequency band. The subordinate APs may include various layers such as a media access control (MAC) and / or a physical (PHY) layer and various possibilities. The subordinate APs may use different basic service sets (BSSs) and / or different BSS identifiers (BSSIDs), such as Figure 8 BSSID 1-3 illustrated in .

[0160] As illustrated, the non-AP MLD 106 may operate three subordinate STAs corresponding to three subordinate APs. For example, STA 806a may operate in a 2.4 GHz band, STA 806b may operate in a 5 GHz band, and STA 806c may operate in a 6 GHz band. The STAs may communicate with the corresponding APs (e.g., STA 806a may communicate with AP 812a, STA 806b may communicate with AP 812b, and so on). In addition, any number of subordinate STAs may be used in any combination of frequency bands. For example, the non-AP MLD may operate multiple subordinate STAs in one frequency band and / or may not operate any subordinate STA in a frequency band. The non-AP MLD may operate STAs corresponding to some or all of the APs of the AP MLD, or to none of the APs of the AP MLD. The subordinate STAs may include various layers such as a PHY and / or MAC layer and various possibilities. The subordinate STAs may use different addresses, such as Figure 8 Addresses 1-3 are shown in the example.

[0161] A non-AP MLD may provide attached STAs from a single physical device (e.g., a single shared housing, and potentially using the same antenna). In some embodiments, a non-AP MLD may provide STAs from multiple different devices (e.g., a first device may provide one or more STAs, and / or a second device may provide one or more different STAs, etc.). In some embodiments, the various attached STAs may be spatially separated (e.g., using beams in different directions, using different antennas with a shared housing (e.g., antennas of the same physical device) and / or different antennas of different devices, etc.).

[0162] Various affiliated STAs and APs may communicate concurrently / simultaneously. For example, STA 806a may exchange uplink and / or downlink data with AP 812a on a first link, while STA 806b may exchange uplink and / or downlink data with AP 812b on a second link, and so on. In addition, concurrent communications may include different data being exchanged on different links at the same time, overlapping times, and / or different times. For example, data between an AP MLD and a non-AP MLD may be routed via a first available link and / or a link selected based on other criteria (e.g., minimum energy usage, etc.). Additionally or alternatively, a first data packet or portion may be sent via a first link, and concurrently, a second data packet or portion may be sent via a second link.

[0163] In some embodiments, the AP MLD and the non-AP MLD may include a corresponding multi-link (ML) entity. The ML entity may provide upper layer MAC functions that control individual APs and / or STAs, and may additionally or alternatively control the delivery of traffic over available links (e.g., between various APs and STAs). In addition, the corresponding MLD (e.g., AP and non-AP) may have only one corresponding MAC service access point (SAP) interface, and the ML entity may manage the SAP interface. In addition, the ML entity may also manage transmission buffering (e.g., bookkeeping and link selection in the transmitter) and data reordering buffering in reception (e.g., combining of data transmitted in different links).

[0164] According to some embodiments, the AP MLD 112 and the non-AP MLD 106 may exchange information about their respective operations, operating parameters, and / or capabilities. For example, the non-AP MLD and the AP MLD may have various capabilities for operating a STA in a particular frequency band. The capabilities may be different for different frequency bands. For example, the capabilities in the frequency band may be associated with one or more maximum (e.g., fastest, most flexible, most powerful, highest throughput, etc.) parameter values ​​that the STA of the non-AP MLD can use. Additionally or alternatively, the AP-MLD and / or the non-AP MLD may support integrity protection capabilities. The operations or operating parameters may describe parameter values ​​that are currently being used or that may be planned to be used at a future time (e.g., associated with integrity protection capabilities, as an example).

[0165] For example, the parameters (e.g., parameter values) may include applicable physical (PHY) versions and their associated parameters. The parameters may describe available supported services and transport formats. Additionally or alternatively, the parameters may describe available resources, bandwidth, and number of spatial streams. In some embodiments, the parameters may apply integrity protection to various fields and subfields so that frames transmitted between a STA and an AP (or a non-AP MLD and an AP MLD) benefit from integrity protection. For example, it may be beneficial for a client privacy enhancement (CPE) station (STA) or client (and AP) to change or adjust certain parameters used to perform communications with an AP or STA.

[0166] According to some embodiments, the links may be located too close (e.g., spatially and / or in frequency) so that non-AP STAs may not be able to operate the links independently (e.g., due to device limitations and / or due to management resources or performance). Additionally, according to some embodiments, some APs may support STAs that cannot transmit and receive simultaneously on a link pair (e.g., non-AP MLDs).

[0167] In some embodiments, a non-AP MLD may operate a STA that communicates with multiple AP-MLDs. For example, a first STA may communicate with a first AP MLD, and a second STA may communicate with a second AP MLD. Similarly, an AP MLD may communicate with multiple STAs. For example, one subordinate AP may communicate with multiple STAs.

[0168] In the illustrated example, the non-AP MLD operates a number of STAs equal to the number of APs provided by the AP MLD. However, different numbers are possible. For example, the AP MLD may provide more APs than the number of STAs operated by the non-AP MLD, or vice versa. The number of APs and / or the number of STAs may change over time.

[0169] By changing or adjusting certain parameters used to perform communications with the AP and / or STA, it may be more difficult for an eavesdropper (e.g., a cyber criminal, a hacker, etc.) to intercept, extract, or listen to communications between a STA and an AP (as an example of various other device-to-device communications). Therefore, the client may attempt to use various techniques involving integrity protection or related parameter adjustments to perform more secure communications between the STA and the AP. For example, according to some embodiments, it may be beneficial for the client (e.g., STA) and the AP to change the frame number (FN), frame control field, QoS control field, or other various parameters transmitted on the downlink and uplink to new values ​​without any connection loss. Some or all of these changes described may be used to achieve increased privacy of communications between a CPE STA and an AP by making it more difficult for unwanted people to eavesdrop.

[0170] Fig. 9 -Physical layer protocol data unit (PPDU)

[0171] Fig. 9 An example structure of a physical layer protocol data unit (PPDU) according to some embodiments is illustrated. More specifically, Fig. 9 The Aggregate MAC PDU (A-MPDU) subframe parameters field is illustrated along with the subfields and associated bit values.

[0172] For example, Fig. 9 An example PPDU including a legacy preamble, an extremely high throughput (EHT) preamble, and multiple A-MPDU subframes according to some embodiments is illustrated. In other words, the PPDU starts with a PHY preamble, and the data frame has one or more A-MPDU subframes in the payload.

[0173] Additionally, Fig. 9 The field structure of an A-MPDU in an A-MPDU in a PPDU is illustrated. For example, Fig. 9 An A-MPDU according to some embodiments is illustrated, which includes fields such as A-MPDU subheader, frame control, duration / identifier (ID), address 1-4, sequence control, quality of service (QoS) control, high throughput (HT) control (if applicable and / or present), counter mode with cipher block chaining message authentication code protocol (CCMP) header, aggregate MAC service data unit (A-MSDU) header, data payload, message integrity check (MIC) and frame checksum (FCS). In addition, Fig. 9 Subfield parameters of the A-MPDU, Frame Control, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields according to some embodiments are illustrated, including bit assignments associated with the subfield parameters. According to some embodiments, in an A-MPDU subframe, the values ​​of the Traffic Identifier (TID), Sequence Number (SN), and Packet Number (PN) may change, while other header fields may have common or unchanged values.

[0174] FIG. 10A to FIG. 10B - MAC header field with integrity protection

[0175] FIG. 10A to FIG. 10B An example structure of a data medium access control (MAC) protocol data unit (MPDU), an example control field, and an associated integrity protection (IP) scheme according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig. 10A Various levels of integrity protection across the MPDU and unencrypted (e.g., plaintext) or encrypted additional portions of the MPDU are illustrated. In addition, according to some embodiments, while the Frame Control, QoS Control, and Sequence Control fields may be characterized by partial integrity protection, the Address 1-4, CCMP Header, Data Payload, and MIC fields of the MPDU may have full integrity protection.

[0176] Fig. 10B Illustrated Fig. 10A The subfields of the frame control and QoS control fields of the MPDU and the subfields that are integrity protected. More specifically, Fig. 10B Example According to some embodiments, in the Frame Control field, the Protocol Version, Type, Subtype, To DS, From DS, and Protected Frame subfields may be integrity protected, while other subfields may not be integrity protected. Similarly, according to some embodiments, for the QoS Control field, the TID subfield may be integrity protected, while the EOSP, Acknowledgement Policy Indicator, A-MSDU Present, and Queue Size / TXOP Limit subfields may not be integrity protected.

[0177] In some embodiments, some MAC header fields, such as power management (PM) and HT control, may not be integrity protected. Therefore, since QoS null frames do not have integrity, replay, or encryption protection, security attacks using QoS null frames may be relatively simple for a skilled eavesdropper to perform. In other words, the lack of integrity protection may enable an eavesdropper to launch a simple security attack. For example, an attacker or eavesdropper may use the PM field to bypass AP encryption, which results in obvious or poorly protected frame leaks. Therefore, if the PM field is integrity protected, these attacks may be avoided.

[0178] Additionally, the STA may send an Operation Mode Indication (OMI) HT Control field value to control its support for the number of spatial streams (NSS), bandwidth (BW), and / or whether the STA supports uplink (UL) multi-user (MU) transmissions (e.g., whether the AP can trigger the station). However, in some instances, an attacker may use the OMI field control value to cause transmissions in a format that the attacked STA cannot receive. For example, an attacker may use the OMI field to indicate to the AP that the STA is capable of receiving a BW or NSS that is actually greater than the STA is capable of receiving. Additionally or alternatively, an attacker or eavesdropper may use the OMI field value to enable a very inefficient transmission mode (e.g., 1 synchronization signal (SS) at 20 MHz, 6 GHz). Therefore, these attacks may result in delays and reduced communication efficiency between the AP and the STA, so preventive techniques involving integrity protection may help mitigate the occurrence of these attacks.

[0179] Fig.11 -Integrity protection for each PPDU

[0180] Fig.11 Example aspects of integrity protection for each PPDU according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.11A plurality of A-MPDU subframes (e.g., A-MPDU subframes 1-3) are illustrated, followed by block acknowledgements (ACKs) with sequence numbers (SN) 103 and 107. In some embodiments, the A-MPDU subframes may include MAC headers that also include sequence numbers (SN) and packet numbers (PN), which may be part of a counter pattern with a Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code Protocol (CCMP) header. Thus, a retransmission of A-MPDU subframe 2 may occur because a block acknowledgement for SN 104 was not received.

[0181] Additionally, for A-MPDU subframes 1-3, the PM field is equal to 0, while for retransmitted A-MPDU subframe 2, the PM field is equal to 1. This change from PM=0 to PM=1 may result in a security vulnerability because the WLAN data payload integrity protection may not be able to protect the MAC header fields whose values ​​may change in retransmissions. More specifically, this change from PM=0 to PM=1 may cause the STA to inadvertently enter a power saving mode, in which the STA may not be able to receive transmissions of frames. In other words, an attacker may exploit this change in PM value to instruct the STA to shut down. Alternatively, when the STA is not actually in power saving mode (e.g., PM=1) but is actually available for receiving transmissions of frames, the attacker may notify the AP (e.g., via a QoS null frame) that the STA is in power saving mode. These scenarios may in turn result in communication delays between the AP and the STA.

[0182] In some embodiments, payload integrity protection may be performed once for each MPDU payload and selected MAC header fields. Furthermore, since payload integrity protection uses the MPDU-specific packet number (PN), the protected MAC header field values ​​may not change in retransmissions. Additionally, More Data field or HT Control field values ​​may change for each transmitted PPDU, so they may not take advantage of payload integrity protection. However, according to some embodiments, per-PPDU integrity protection of More Data or HT Control fields may be achieved using a separate PPDU-specific frame number (FN) and key.

[0183] Enhanced integrity protection techniques for wireless communication systems

[0184] As eavesdroppers, attackers, and / or hackers become increasingly aware of potential security vulnerabilities (such as those discussed above), the enhanced integrity protection of the MAC header and QoS null frames (as some examples) described above may provide more robust protection and mitigate successful attacks.

[0185] One potential technique for implementing integrity protection of the MAC header and QoS null frame may include the AP requesting information about the integrity protection capabilities of the STA from the STA. Thus, in response to the STA supporting one or more integrity protection capabilities, the AP MLD may adjust a parameter field of a downlink frame (e.g., MAC PDU (MPDU), as an example) to be transmitted to the STA.

[0186] According to some embodiments, the AP may adjust the parameter fields of the MPDU to allow one or more subfields to benefit from integrity protection. For example, integrity protection of a message or frame between an AP and a STA (including MLD or non-MLD) may involve verifying the integrity of the message or frame. More specifically, message integrity (e.g., a message that is integrity protected) may allow the receiving STA or AP to verify that the message / frame has been correctly received (e.g., from the expected / intended AP / STA). According to some embodiments, this verification may involve performing an integrity checksum of one or more parameter fields of the message / frame. Additionally or alternatively, the checksum may be compared to a previously received value to ensure that the frame is being received by the correct receiver (e.g., STA) and / or being transmitted by the correct transmitter (e.g., AP).

[0187] Fig.12 - Example method of integrity protection

[0188] Fig.12 is a communication flow diagram illustrating an example method for integrity protection by a STA and an AP according to some embodiments. More specifically, Fig.12 Embodiments of systems, methods, and mechanisms for adjusting parameter fields of frames to allow STAs to verify that the frames have been correctly received from the correct transmitter are illustrated. Such techniques may help provide improved security in wireless communications between MLD STAs and APs and non-MLD STAs and APs.

[0189] Fig.12Aspects of the method may be implemented by a non-AP (STA) communicating with an AP. Additionally or alternatively, the STA and the AP may be MLDs. The AP and / or non-AP may be illustrated and described as in the various figures of this document, or more generally, may be illustrated and described in conjunction with any of the computer circuits, systems, devices, elements, or components shown in the above figures as needed. For example, a processor (and / or other hardware) of such a device may be configured to cause the device to perform any combination of the method elements shown and / or other method elements. For example, one or more processors (or processing elements) (e.g., processors 101, 204, 302, 402, 432, 434, 439, baseband processors, processors associated with communication circuits such as 130, 230, 232, 329, 330, 430, and various possibilities) may cause a wireless device, STA, UE, non-AP, and / or AP or other device to perform such method elements.

[0190] Note that although described in relation to the use of communication techniques and / or features associated with IEEE and / or 802.11 (e.g., 802.11bn) specification documents, Fig.12 but this description is not intended to limit the present disclosure, and Fig.12 The various aspects of the method can be used in any suitable wireless communication system as desired. Similarly, although described in a manner related to STAs and APs that are not MLDs, Fig.12 elements of the method, but this description is not intended to limit the present disclosure, and Fig.12 Aspects of the method may be used by a STA and / or an AP acting as an MLD as desired.

[0191] In addition to other devices, the method shown can also be used with any one of the systems, methods or devices shown in the accompanying drawings. In various embodiments, some of the method elements shown can be performed concurrently in an order different from the order shown, or can be omitted. Additional method elements can also be performed as needed. As shown in the figure, the method can be operated as follows.

[0192] In 1202, according to some embodiments, the STA 106 may receive an integrity protection (IP) capability request from the access point (AP) 112. For example, before making any IP-related decisions or performing IP-related actions, the AP 112 may first determine whether the STA 106 supports one or more IP capabilities. In other words, before applying IP technologies related to the IP capabilities, the AP 112 may first verify that the STA 106 supports the IP capabilities. As an alternative embodiment, the STA 106 may transmit the IP capability request to the AP 112.

[0193] In 1204, according to some embodiments, STA 106 may transmit an IP capabilities response to AP 112. For example, in response to an IP capabilities request from AP 112, STA 106 may transmit a response including an indication of whether it supports one or more IP capabilities. As an alternative embodiment, STA 106 may receive an IP capabilities response to AP 112.

[0194] In 1206, according to some embodiments, the AP 112 may adjust one or more parameter fields of a downlink (DL) frame to be sent to the STA 106. In some embodiments, the AP 112 may adjust one or more parameter fields of the DL frame to a zero value. For example, the AP 112 may adjust the frame control and / or QoS control fields to a zero value. Alternatively, the AP 112 may adjust one or more parameter fields of the DL frame to increase the value by one. For example, the AP 112 may adjust the frame number field value to increase by one for each subsequent transmission of the DL frame. As an alternative embodiment, the STA 106 may adjust one or more parameter fields of an uplink (UL) frame to be sent to the AP 112.

[0195] In 1208, according to some embodiments, the STA 106 may receive the adjusted DL frame from the AP 112. In some embodiments, the one or more DL frames may include a header message integrity check (MIC) field and a frame number field. Additionally or alternatively, the header MIC field may allow the STA 106 to perform an integrity check and procedure to verify the transmitting AP 112. According to some embodiments, the one or more DL frames may be at least one of a trigger frame or a block acknowledgement (BA) frame. As an alternative embodiment, the STA 106 may transmit the adjusted UL frame to the AP 112.

[0196] In some embodiments, if one or more DL frames are transmitted to the group address, STA 106 may receive a header MIC value associated with the group key from AP 112 and verify that the header MIC value associated with the group key matches the value of the header MIC field in order to confirm that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received.

[0197] According to further embodiments, the plurality of parameter fields may include at least one address, and the STA 106 may determine, based on a comparison of the at least one address with the address of the STA 106, whether the STA 106 is the intended recipient of the one or more DL frames or whether the AP 112 is the correct (e.g., intended) transmitter of the one or more DL frames.

[0198] In some embodiments, one or more DL frames may be Quality of Service (QoS) NULL frames. Additionally or alternatively, QoS NULL frames may include a protected Medium Access Control (MAC) header field and a High Throughput (HT) Control field.

[0199] In some examples, the one or more DL frames may be beacons transmitted during one or more beacon periods. In addition, the beacon may include one or more beacon integrity protection numbers (BIPNs), wherein the values ​​of the one or more BIPNs are respectively increased by a value of one for beacons transmitted in corresponding beacon periods after a first beacon period. In other words, the BIPN may increase by a value of one in each subsequent beacon period.

[0200] In some embodiments, one or more BIPNs and one or more corresponding frame numbers (FNs) may be included as part of one or more corresponding physical packet units (PPDUs). For example, one or more BIPNs may be six octets in length, and one or more corresponding FNs may be one, two, or three octets in length. Thus, according to some embodiments, the PPDU may be seven, eight, or nine octets in length.

[0201] At 1210, the STA 106 may verify that one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP 112 based on the value of the adjusted parameter field or at least one of the one or more parameter fields in the plurality of parameter fields. For example, if the one or more DL frames may include a header MIC field, this may allow the STA 106 to perform an integrity checksum procedure to verify that the transmitting AP 112 is the expected AP. As an alternative embodiment, the AP 112 may verify that one or more UL frames have been correctly received from the STA 106 based on the value of the adjusted parameter field or at least one of the one or more parameter fields in the plurality of parameter fields. For example, according to some embodiments, the AP may utilize the PM field and its value (e.g., PM=1 or PM=0) to determine whether one or more UL frames are received from the correct STA.

[0202] FIG. 13A to FIG. 13C -MAC header integrity protection

[0203] FIG. 13A to FIG. 13C Example aspects of integrity protection techniques for MPDUs according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.13A The selective integrity protection technique for the MAC header of the MPDU is illustrated. For example, Fig.13A illustrates multiple levels of integrity protection used across MPDUs according to some embodiments, including payload integrity protection (e.g., FIG. 13A to FIG. 13B ), partial payload integrity protection (for example, FIG. 13A to FIG. 13B) and header integrity protection (for example, FIG. 13A to FIG. 13B More specifically, the frame control, QoS control, HT control, frame number, and header MIC fields may be characterized as having header integrity protection, the address 1-4 fields, CCMP header, data payload, and MIC fields may be characterized as having payload integrity protection, and the sequence control field may be characterized as having partial payload integrity protection. In addition, FIG. 13A to FIG. 13C Fields with header encryption are illustrated according to some embodiments (e.g., bold dashed border).

[0204] According to some embodiments, the MPDU payload may be encrypted only once, and the payload encryption may remain the same when transmitting the payload. In addition, the payload encryption may include the address field, packet number, and sequence number as input parameters, and further provide integrity protection for these MAC header fields. The values ​​of these fields may remain the same for encrypted payload transmissions and retransmissions. Additionally, according to some embodiments, the payload may have a separate MIC field for integrity protection.

[0205] In some embodiments, the MAC header field values ​​may change according to each transmitted MPDU, and these fields may generally signal the state of the transmitter. For example, these fields may signal the transmitter power management mode. In other words, these fields may signal whether the device is in active mode or in power saving mode. However, according to some embodiments, the transmitter may change these values ​​according to the transmitted MPDU.

[0206] According to further embodiments, the per-MPDU MAC header integrity protection mechanism may perform integrity protection on all MAC header fields or only a partial set of MAC header fields. For example, partial MAC header field set protection may only protect fields that are not protected by data frame integrity protection. Thus, this may enable security attacks against STAs. Therefore, according to some embodiments, it may be beneficial to protect all MAC header fields, and the receiver may verify MAC header integrity before starting to decrypt the MPDU payload.

[0207] According to some embodiments, a PPDU may be considered to be an entire transmission that may include a preamble and one or more MPDUs. Additionally, an MPDU may include a MAC header and a payload. Furthermore, some MAC header fields may have the same value in an MPDU of a PPDU. Alternatively, according to some embodiments, some MAC header fields may have different values ​​for an MPDU of a PPDU.

[0208] In some embodiments and with Fig. 13CRelated, MAC header integrity protection may be signaled in the MAC header. According to some embodiments, this signaling may allow the receiver to detect the structure of the MAC header and correctly distribute the payload to the different MAC header fields and payload. In addition, MAC header integrity protection may be signaled by using the second bit (e.g., bit 2) of the fourth octet of the CCMP or Galois / Counter Mode Protection (GCMP) header (e.g., as Fig. 13C ). Since this bit is reserved, no additional field is required in the MAC header to signal MAC header integrity protection. According to some embodiments, GCMP can be characterized as a cryptographic protocol used in wireless security that provides data privacy (encryption) and authentication to ensure the integrity and authenticity of the data.

[0209] In some embodiments, MAC header integrity protection may have a key (e.g., key ID) change. According to some embodiments, during the key change process, the transmitter and receiver may set a new key via key update signaling. In addition, for the key update process, the MAC header may need to identify the key used to integrity protect the current MAC header. For example, according to some embodiments, a high data rate (HDR) key ID bit may be used to signal the key used to integrity protect the MAC header in transmission. In some embodiments, an HDR key ID value of 0 (e.g., zero) may be assigned to a specific integrity protection key in an association procedure, and a value of 1 may be assigned to the integrity protection key setting in a key update negotiation procedure. In addition and as Fig. 13C As illustrated in , according to some embodiments, the HDR Key ID bit can be the third bit of the fourth octet of the CCMP or GCMP header (e.g., B3 (bit 3)). Since this bit is reserved, no additional field is required in the MAC header to signal MAC header integrity protection.

[0210] According to some embodiments and Fig. 13C As illustrated in , the modulated Hermitian pulse (MHP) field may include a 4-octet HDR PN field and a 12-octet HDR MIC field. In some examples, MHP may be utilized to mitigate narrowband interference in high data rate ultra-wideband (UWB) body area networks (BANs).

[0211] In some embodiments, a frame number field and a header MIC field may be added to the MPDU and may also have header encryption (e.g., as in Fig.13A The frame number and header MIC fields and additional Fig. 13B), and the data payload and MIC field may have data encryption (e.g., as shown by the additional bold dashed lines around the MAC header field and A-MSDU field in FIG. 13A to FIG. 13B ). The header MIC field may be 64 or 96 bits in length. Additionally, according to some embodiments, the remaining fields (except the legacy preamble and FCS fields) may not be encrypted and may therefore be considered "plaintext". As an alternative, according to some embodiments, header integrity protection may be applied across all plaintext fields (except the FCS and legacy preamble fields) and header encryption fields. In other words, a complete (rather than selective) header integrity protection scheme or technique may be applied across plaintext and header encryption fields. Furthermore, according to some embodiments, since it may be difficult to provide integrity protection for the duration / ID field due to the possible need to extend the value of the duration of receiving the A-MPDU, an additional alternative may be to provide integrity protection for all fields except the duration / ID field. However, if the duration / ID field value can be determined prior to receiving the A-MPDU, integrity protection may be extended to the duration / ID field.

[0212] Fig. 13B An alternative selective integrity protection technique for the MAC header of an MPDU is illustrated. For example, Fig. 13B The same multiple levels of integrity protection across MPDUs are illustrated. However, in some instances, certain fields of the MPDU (e.g., frame control and QoS control) are changed to zero values ​​(e.g., Fig. 13B In other words, by "zeroing" certain fields, certain values ​​may be excluded from being received. More specifically, according to some embodiments, the recipient will not know the true value (e.g., the value before being adjusted to zero).

[0213] According to some embodiments, including the MAC header field and the A-MSDU header field in the header encryption portion of the MPDU may be beneficial to provide enhanced integrity protection. For example, if the frame control and QoS control fields are adjusted to zero (e.g., in order not to provide this information to the recipient), the previously assigned values ​​of these fields may be included in the header encrypted MAC header field and will therefore benefit from being integrity protected. In some embodiments, two formats of addresses may be used in the MPDU. For example, the A-MSDU header field may be added as a payload to integrity protect the address field as part of a format (e.g., by being included in the header encryption), while address fields 1-4 remain unencrypted.

[0214] In some embodiments related to a selective protection scheme or technique, the frame number, MAC header field, A-MSDU header, and header MIC field may be characterized as having header integrity protection, the address 1-4 fields, CCMP header, payload, and MIC field may be characterized as having payload integrity protection, and the sequence control field may be characterized as having partial integrity protection. Additionally or alternatively, according to some embodiments, header integrity protection may be applied across all plaintext fields and header encryption fields. In other words, a complete (rather than selective) header integrity protection scheme or technique may be applied across plaintext and header encryption fields. Fig. 13B Also illustrated are the subfields of the MAC header field (and associated bit assignments) and the subfields of the A-MSDU (and corresponding number of octets), including the destination address (DA), sender address (SA), and length.

[0215] exist Fig.13A and Fig. 13B In the MPDU, the frame number used in the header field encryption is included. Additionally, the header MIC field is added to include the integrity checksum calculation of the header field. Additionally or alternatively, according to some embodiments, the value of the MAC header field may be included as an encrypted payload to improve STA privacy.

[0216] In some embodiments, the STA can determine whether it is the correct receiver of the frame by checking whether its MAC address is the receiver address. In other words, the STA can compare its MAC address with the address 1-4 fields to confirm that its address is included. Therefore, according to some embodiments, if its MAC address is not included in the address fields 1-4, the STA can determine that it is not the correct receiver of the frame. In addition, according to some embodiments, if the STA address is not included, it can be further determined that the frame is transmitted by a potential attacker / hacker, and therefore the STA can terminate the frame reception.

[0217] Additionally or alternatively, according to some embodiments, the STA may determine whether the STA is the correct recipient of the frame by checking or verifying that the frame has been transmitted to the group address and that the header MIC matches the calculated header MIC value. If the STA determines that one or both of these situations are not true, the STA may terminate frame reception. Additionally, some STAs may check the frame checksum (FCS) field to ensure that the frame is correctly received. In some embodiments, the header MIC field uses group keys that allow all STAs in the BSS to calculate the MIC. In these cases, if the calculated MIC matches the received MIC, the STA can verify that it has received the MAC header correctly. In some embodiments, FIG. 13A to FIG. 13B The aspects can be compared with Fig.12The example methods shown are used together. For example, FIG. 13A to FIG. 13B At least some of the parameter fields described in 1210 may be used to verify that one or more DL frames have been received from the correct AP (as shown in 1210).

[0218] Fig.14 -MLD integrity protection

[0219] Fig.14 Example aspects of integrity protection techniques involving access points (APs) and non-AP multi-link devices (MLDs) according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.14 An example method for MAC header protection for AP MLD and STA MLD communications using frame number space is illustrated.

[0220] For example, Fig.14 The example includes an AP MLD including AP 1, which can communicate with STA 1, which is not an AP MLD, via Link 1. Therefore, for downlink (DL) communication on Link 1, there may be corresponding downlink frame numbers, including individual FN Link1,DL and / or group FN Link1 (eg, a group addressed frame). Additionally, for uplink (UL) communications on link 1, there may be a corresponding uplink frame number, such as an individual FN Link1,UL Additionally, the AP MLD may include AP 2, which may communicate with non-AP MLD STA 2 via Link 2. Thus, for DL ​​communications on Link 2, there may be corresponding downlink frame numbers, including individual FN Link2,DL and / or group FN Link2 Additionally, for UL communications on link 2, there may be a corresponding uplink frame number, such as an individual FN Link2 ,UL.

[0221] According to some embodiments, replay attacks can be avoided and MAC header field integrity protection can be made secure. For example, since the frame number (FN) and sequence number (SN) can be maintained at the link level (e.g., as Fig.14 The AP MLD may combine the appropriate FNs and SNs from AP 1 and AP 2 and use the reorder buffer to properly receive frames from each STA (eg, STA 1 and STA 2) as shown in the individual FN [STA, AP] and group FN [AP]).

[0222] In some embodiments, each PPDU that is integrity protected may have a new FN. Thus, the receiver may maintain a link-specific replay counter by incrementing each transmitted UL / DL protected frame (e.g., UL / DL FN) by +1. Thus, upon each received transmission, the receiver checks that the UL / DL individual frame has a UL / DL FN+1 (e.g., the uplink or downlink frame number has been incremented from the previous value) to verify that it is being received from the correct transmitter. In other words, the MLD may use a corresponding counter for the corresponding link as part of an integrity protection technique that involves incrementing the FN of a frame received from a particular link.

[0223] Alternatively, the receiver may verify that the received FN value (e.g., UL / DL FN+1) is greater than the old value. This may allow for situations where the AP or STA did not receive the PPDU. Additionally or alternatively, the STA may check that the group frame has a group FN value greater than the previously received group FN value. Furthermore, according to some embodiments, if the AP uses a group key for integrity protection, the AP may use only one FN for all frames. In some embodiments, Fig.14 The aspects can be compared with Fig.12 For example, by Fig.14 The FN may be incremented as described in , which may be used for verification purposes (eg, as shown in 1210). More specifically, the MLD may maintain a link-specific replay counter in order to verify that one or more DL frames have been received from the correct AP.

[0224] FIG. 15A to FIG. 15B -Integrity protection for beacon signaling

[0225] FIG. 15A to FIG. 15B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques related to beacon signaling according to some embodiments are illustrated. According to some embodiments, beacons may be sent at regular intervals by an AP for a variety of purposes including passive discovery by finding clients, power saving management, and communicating, updating, and synchronizing BSS features.

[0226] More specifically, Fig.15A Illustrate how beacons (and subsequent trigger, data, and block acknowledgement (BA) signaling) transmitted on a link (e.g., Link 1) can benefit from integrity protection techniques. For example, the Beacon Integrity Packet Number (BIPN) is increased by +1 and the Trigger FN is additionally increased. DL +1、UL data FN UL +1 and DL BA FN DL +1 allows receivers (similar to Fig.14Thus, upon each received transmission, the receiver checks that the BIPN, trigger, UL data, and DL BA FN have increased by one to verify that they are communicating with the correct transmitter.

[0227] Additionally, Fig.15A The BIPN values ​​allowed in an example transmission of a beacon are illustrated. Beacons may be sent by an AP at regular intervals defined as a target beacon transmission time (TBTT), which is measured in time units (TUs) equal to 1024 microseconds. The TBTT is called the target transmission time because it does not always occur exactly at 102.4ms (corresponding to the default value of 100TU). For example, if a link is available at the TBTT, a beacon may be transmitted at that time. However, if a link is not available at the TBTT, the AP may contend for access, which results in a delay.

[0228] According to some embodiments, due to the aforementioned random nature of the channel access process and potential beacon transmission delays, the transmitter may additionally delay the increase of the TBTT value. For example, before the TBTT, beacons transmitted on link 1 may be associated with a BIPN with an old value (e.g., BIPN (old)). According to some embodiments, during the grace period extending from TBTT to TBTT+Xms, beacons transmitted on link 1 may be associated with BIPN (old) or BIPN (old) + 1. However, after TBT+Xms marking the end of the grace period, the beacon should be associated with BIPN (old) + 1, rather than BIPN (old). In other words, the receiver receives frames using the old TBTT value during the grace period to ensure a simple transmitter implementation. In some embodiments, the duration of the grace period may be defined in the specification or negotiated in association.

[0229] Fig. 15B A PPDU number including a concatenated BIPN and FN is illustrated. More specifically, according to some embodiments, the BIPN may have a fixed length of six octets, transmitted in the beacon, and may also be common to all associated STAs. Additionally, the frame number (FN) may be transmitted in the MAC header of the PPDU. In some embodiments, the payload integrity protection may have a packet number (PN) that is 6 octets long. Therefore, one option for providing integrity protection in beacon signaling would be to have a unique PPDU number that is eight octets long and shorten the MAC header overhead to 2 octets. Therefore, the BIPN is increased by +1 in each beacon period, and the FN is increased by +1 for each transmitted PPDU with PPDU integrity protection. Therefore, the PPDU number should not have the same value in any PPDU integrity protection frame.

[0230] Although Fig. 15BA scenario where the length of the FN is two octets is illustrated, but the length of the FN may be 1, 2, or 3 octets. For example, according to some embodiments, a two-octet FN may allow up to 65,536 PPDU transmissions per beacon period, which corresponds to one PPDU every 1.535 μs in the default beacon interval (e.g., approximately 100 ms). Additionally or alternatively, a one-octet FN may allow up to 256 PPDU transmissions per beacon period, which corresponds to one PPDU every 390 μs in the default approximately 100 ms beacon interval. Furthermore, a three-octet FN may allow up to 16,777,215 PPDU transmissions per beacon period, which corresponds to one PPDU every 5.9 ns in the default approximately 100 ms beacon interval. In some embodiments, FIG. 15A to FIG. 15B The aspects can be compared with Fig.12 For example, by FIG. 15A to FIG. 15B BIPN and FN are increased as described in , which may be used for verification purposes (eg, as shown in 1210). More specifically, the STA may maintain a counter in order to verify that one or more DL frames have been received from the correct AP.

[0231] FIG. 16A to FIG. 16C - Protected QoS Null Frame

[0232] FIG. 16A to FIG. 16C Example aspects of integrity protection techniques associated with Quality of Service (QoS) null frames according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.16A QoS empty frames without encryption (e.g., plaintext) and integrity protection are illustrated. QoS empty frames can be characterized as data frames transmitted over the air (OTA) without payload, integrity protection, encryption, and / or packet numbers. However, the SN of a QoS empty frame can be set to any value. In some instances, an attacker (e.g., a hacker or eavesdropper) can use a QoS empty frame to carry a PM or OMI value in an attempt to intercept or manipulate communications between devices. Therefore, it may be beneficial to provide integrity protection for QoS empty frames.

[0233] Fig. 16B A first option or version (e.g., "v1") of a protected QoS null frame that provides header integrity protection for frame control, address 1-4, sequence control, QoS control, HT control, and frame number fields according to some embodiments is illustrated. In addition, this first version also incorporates header encryption for the frame number and header MIC fields.

[0234] Fig. 16CA second option or version (e.g., "v2") of a protected QoS null frame that adjusts the values ​​of the frame control and QoS control fields to zero values, provides header integrity protection for addresses 1-4, frame number, protected MAC header fields, HT control, and header MIC fields, according to some embodiments, is illustrated. In addition, this second version also incorporates header encryption for the frame number, protected MAC header fields, HT control, and header MIC fields.

[0235] In some embodiments, FIG. 16A to FIG. 16C The aspects can be compared with Fig.12 For example, Fig. 16C As described in , by adjusting the frame control and QoS control fields to zero values ​​(e.g., from previously assigned values), the true (e.g., unadjusted) values ​​of the frame control and QoS control field values ​​may be included in the protected MAC header fields and further used for verification purposes (e.g., as shown in 1210). More specifically, the STA may perform a checksum procedure to verify whether one or more DL frames have been received from the correct AP.

[0236] FIG. 17A to FIG. 17B -Integrity protection of control frames

[0237] FIG. 17A to FIG. 17B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques associated with control frames according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.17A A plurality of A-MPDU subframes (e.g., A-MPDU subframes 1-3) are illustrated, followed by block acknowledgments with sequence numbers 231, 232, and 233 from an attacker (e.g., an eavesdropper / hacker). Therefore, although the real receiver never receives these MPDUs, the transmitter may incorrectly determine that they have been successfully received at the correct address based on receiving the block acknowledgment. In other words, the attacker may use the block acknowledgment to signal the transmitter that all frames have been received, which may cause the transmitter to incorrectly consider frames received by the real receiver / attacked STA. Alternatively, the attacker may use the block acknowledgment to signal the transmitter that no frames have been received. This, in turn, may cause the transmitter to retransmit the frames again.

[0238] Fig. 17BIllustrated is how when a victim STA responds to an initial control frame (ICF) on link 1, the victim STA is unaware of (e.g., "invisible to") link 2. For example, the attacker may send an Enhanced Multi-Link Single Radio (EMLSR) with an ICF to the victim STA. Thus, when the victim STA receives the ICF, it turns on the data radio and "locks" or connects to the link in which the frame is transmitted. Therefore, when the triggered STA is locked to a different channel (e.g., link 1), the triggered STA may not be aware of what is happening in another channel (e.g., link 2), and when the STA needs to turn on its data radio, the STA power consumption may increase.

[0239] Therefore, it may be beneficial to combine integrity protection with ICF in order to mitigate attacks using the ICF. FIG. 17A to FIG. 17B The aspects can be compared with Fig.12 The example method shown in the embodiment of the present invention is used together. For example, by adjusting the field value of the ICF and / or including the parameter field value of the ICF in a protected (e.g., encrypted) MAC header field, this can allow the STA to verify or determine whether the ICF is from a legitimate source. Additionally, this can enable the STA to prevent its data radio from being turned on due to an illegal source, thereby causing unnecessary power consumption increase.

[0240] FIG. 18A to FIG. 18B - Integrity protection for multi-STA block acknowledgment

[0241] FIG. 18A to FIG. 18B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques for multi-station (multi-STA) block acknowledgement (BA) frames according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.18A An example of a multi-STA BA frame, its corresponding fields, and which of these fields may be provided with integrity protection is illustrated. For example, according to some embodiments, the Frame Control, Address 1-2, BA Control, and List per AID fields may be integrity protected, while the Duration / ID and FCS fields may not be integrity protected. Additionally, the fields of the multi-STA BA frame may be considered to be "plain text" or unencrypted.

[0242] In addition, since the multi-STA BA may contain block confirmation information for multiple STAs, and the BA information contains multiple per-AID TID information, there is no need to change the multi-STA block confirmation frame format to provide integrity protection. For example, according to some embodiments, the group-addressed BA will use a group integrity protection key and frame number.

[0243] Fig.18B Example per-AID fields of a multi-STA BA frame and the associated number of octets for each field are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.18BThe two-octet length Association Identifier (AID) Transaction Identifier (TID) information field, the Block Acknowledgement (Ack) Start Sequence Control field (which can be zero or two octets in length), and the newly added Block Acknowledgement Bitmap field (which can be zero, four, eight, sixteen, or thirty-two octets in length) are illustrated. Additionally, Fig.18B An example AID TID information field and its associated subfields and bit assignments are illustrated. For example, according to some embodiments, the AID11 field may be defined by eleven bits from B0 to B11 (eg, with a possible 2048 possible values).

[0244] In some embodiments, the AID11 field value may be associated or correspond to the content of the block confirmation bitmap field. For example, according to some embodiments, the AID11 field value 2044 (TBC) may correspond to the frame number (24 bits) and the block confirmation bitmap field content of X reserved bits, and the AID11 field value 2045 (TBC) may correspond to the block confirmation bitmap field content of the header MIC value. In addition, the AID11 field value 2044 (TBC) (e.g., a new dedicated AID or STA-ID) may correspond to a BA content size of four octets and a BA bitmap content of 16 bits of frame number and 12 reserved bits. Alternatively, according to some embodiments, the AID11 field value 2045 (TBC) may correspond to a MIC content size of sixteen or thirty-two octets and a BA bitmap content of the header BA value.

[0245] Additionally or alternatively, according to some embodiments, AID11 field value 20 may correspond to the BA bitmap of TID 1 of STA 1, AID11 field value 21 may correspond to the BA bitmap of TID 2 of STA 1, AID11 field value 22 may correspond to the BA bitmap of TID 0 of STA 2, and AID11 field value 23 may correspond to the BA bitmap of TID 7 of STA 1.

[0246] In some embodiments, FIG. 18A to FIG. 18B The aspects can be compared with Fig.12 For example, by adjusting the AID value of the BA and / or including a specific block confirmation bitmap field value, this may allow the STA to verify or determine whether the BA frame is from a legitimate source.

[0247] FIG. 19A to FIG. 19B - Trigger frame integrity protection

[0248] FIG. 19A to FIG. 19B Example aspects of integrity protection techniques associated with trigger frames according to some embodiments are illustrated. More specifically, Fig.19AExamples of trigger frames, their corresponding fields, and which of these fields may have integrity protection are illustrated. For example, according to some embodiments, frame control, address 1-2, common information, and user information lists may be integrity protected, while duration / ID, padding, and FCS fields may not be integrity protected. Additionally, the fields of the trigger frame may be considered "plain text" or unencrypted.

[0249] Furthermore, since the user information list contains the UL RU allocation, and the frame number and MIC are carried as part of the user information list, there is no need to change the trigger frame format. Therefore, according to some embodiments, the trigger frame format can be considered to be fully legacy compatible and use the same AID value as in the BA (e.g., as in FIG. 18A to FIG. 18B ).

[0250] Fig.19B The subfields of the user information list of the trigger frame field and the corresponding bit assignments are illustrated. Additionally, according to some embodiments, Fig.19B The subfields of the user information list other than AID12 and the trigger-related user information field are illustrated (for example, Fig.19B ) includes bits that AID 2044 and AID 2045 can use to carry a frame number or MIC. For example, the AID / STA-ID in the trigger frame may be associated or correspond to the content of the user information field. For example, according to some embodiments, the AID / STA-ID value 2044 (TBC) may correspond to the frame number (16 bits) and the 12 reserved bits of the user information field content, and the AID / STA-ID value 2045 (TBC) may correspond to the user information field content of the header MIC value. Additionally or alternatively, according to some embodiments, a header MIC value associated with the AID / STA-ID value 2045 (TBC) may be provided in one or more fragments. For example, according to some embodiments, the AID / STA-ID value 2045 (TBC) may be associated with one-third (e.g., 1 / 3), two-thirds (e.g., 2 / 3), and / or three-thirds (e.g., 3 / 3) of the header MIC value fragment.

[0251] In some embodiments, FIG. 19A to FIG. 19B The aspects can be compared with Fig.12 For example, according to some embodiments, by adjusting the AID value of the user information list of the trigger frame, this may allow the STA to verify or determine whether the trigger frame is from a legitimate source.

[0252] It is understood that the use of personally identifiable information should be subject to privacy policies and practices that are generally recognized to meet or exceed industry or government requirements for maintaining user privacy. Specifically, personally identifiable information data should be managed and processed to minimize the risk of unintentional or unauthorized access or use, and the nature of the authorized use should be clearly stated to users.

[0253] The embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented in any of a variety of forms. For example, some embodiments may be implemented as computer-implemented methods, computer-readable storage media, or computer systems. Other embodiments may be implemented using one or more custom-designed hardware devices such as ASICs. Other embodiments may be implemented using one or more programmable hardware elements such as FPGAs.

[0254] In some embodiments, a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium may be configured such that it stores program instructions and / or data, wherein if executed by a computer system, the program instructions cause the computer system to perform a method, such as any one of the method embodiments described herein, or any combination of the method embodiments described herein, or any subset of any of the method embodiments described herein or any combination of such subsets.

[0255] In some embodiments, the wireless device may be configured to include a processor (and / or a set of processors) and a memory medium, wherein the memory medium stores program instructions, wherein the processor is configured to read and execute the program instructions from the memory medium, wherein the program instructions are executable to cause the wireless device to implement any of the various method implementations described herein (or any combination of the method implementations described herein, any combination of these subsets). The device may be implemented in any of a variety of forms.

[0256] Although the above embodiments have been described in considerable detail, numerous variations and modifications will become apparent to those skilled in the art once the above disclosure is fully appreciated. It is intended that the following claims be interpreted to include all such variations and modifications.

Claims

1. A method, comprising: receiving an integrity protection (IP) capability request from an access point (AP); transmitting an IP capabilities response to the AP based at least in part on a station (STA) supporting one or more IP capabilities; receiving one or more downlink (DL) frames from the AP, the one or more downlink (DL) frames including at least one adjusted parameter field of a plurality of parameter fields; and Based on the adjusted parameter field or at least one value of one or more parameter fields of the plurality of parameter fields, verifying that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more DL frames include a header message integrity check (MIC) field and a frame number (FN) field.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein as part of verifying that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP, the method further comprises: An integrity checksum calculation is performed using the header MIC field.

4. The method of claim 2, wherein the one or more DL frames are associated with a group address, and wherein the method further comprises: receiving, from the AP, a header MIC value associated with a group key; as well as As part of verifying that the one or more DL frames have been correctly received from the AP, it is determined that the header MIC value associated with the group key matches a value of the header MIC field.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein the plurality of parameter fields comprises at least one address, and wherein the method further comprises: Determine at least one of the following based on a comparison of the at least one address with an address of the STA: whether the STA is an intended recipient of the one or more DL frames; or Whether the AP is the correct transmitter of the one or more DL frames.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein the one or more DL frames are at least one of: trigger frame; or Block Acknowledgement (BA) frame. The method of claim 1 , wherein at least one parameter field of the plurality of parameter fields is adjusted to a zero value. The method of claim 1 , wherein a value of a parameter field among the plurality of parameter fields is increased by one.

9. A baseband processor, the baseband processor comprising a circuit, the circuit being configured to: Receive an integrity protection (IP) capability request from a station (STA); transmitting an IP capability response to the STA indicating that an access point (AP) supports one or more IP capabilities; receiving one or more uplink (UL) frames from the STA, wherein the one or more UL frames include at least one adjusted parameter field among a plurality of parameter fields; as well as Based on the adjusted parameter field or at least one value of one or more parameter fields of the plurality of parameter fields, verifying that the one or more UL frames have been correctly received from the STA.

10. The baseband processor of claim 9, wherein as part of verifying that the one or more UL frames have been correctly received from the STA, the circuit is further configured to: The AP is determined to be an intended recipient of the one or more UL frames transmitted from the STA based on a value of a power management (PM) field of the one or more UL frames.

11. The baseband processor of claim 9, wherein the at least one adjusted parameter field among the plurality of parameter fields is adjusted to a zero value or a value increased by one.

12. The baseband processor of claim 9, wherein the one or more UL frames are Quality of Service (QoS) NULL frames.

13. The baseband processor of claim 12, wherein the QoS NULL frame further comprises a protected medium access control (MAC) header field and a high throughput (HT) control field.

14. The baseband processor of claim 12, wherein the QoS null frame further comprises a header message integrity check (MIC) field and a frame number (FN) field.

15. The baseband processor of claim 14, wherein the header MIC field allows calculation of an integrity checksum by the AP to verify that the one or more UL frames have been correctly received from the STA.

16. A method comprising: Transmitting an integrity protection (IP) capability request to a non-access point (non-AP); receiving an IP capabilities response from the non-AP; adjusting a value of at least one parameter field of one or more downlink (DL) frames based at least in part on the non-AP supporting one or more IP capabilities; as well as The one or more DL frames are transmitted to the non-AP, wherein the at least one parameter field is adjusted to provide IP for the one or more DL frames. The method of claim 16 , wherein the value of the at least one parameter field is adjusted to zero or increased by one.

18. The method of claim 16, wherein the one or more DL frames are beacons transmitted during one or more beacon periods.

19. The method of claim 18, wherein the beacon includes one or more beacon integrity protection numbers (BIPNs), and wherein for beacons transmitted after a first beacon period, values ​​of the one or more BIPNs are each increased by one.

20. The method of claim 19, wherein the one or more BIPNs and one or more corresponding frame numbers (FNs) are included in one or more corresponding physical packet data units (PPDUs), wherein the one or more BIPNs are six octets in length, and wherein the one or more corresponding FNs are one, two, or three octets in length.

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