Bidirectional remote encryption multi-system interactive communication authentication method and operation platform

Abstract

The invention discloses a bidirectional remote encryption multi-system interactive communication authentication method and an operation platform. The method specifically comprises the following steps: receiving a first ciphertext sent by Internet of Things equipment; decrypting the first ciphertext by using a private key of the operation platform to obtain a decryption random number; a platform random number is generated, the platform random number and the decryption random number are combined and then encrypted by using the public key of the Internet of Things equipment, and a second ciphertext is generated; sending the second ciphertext to the Internet of Things equipment, and receiving a third ciphertext sent by the Internet of Things equipment; generating a platform session key according to the decryption random number and the platform random number, decrypting the third ciphertext by using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verifying the second decryption result; and under the condition that the verification is passed, transmitting data to the Internet of Things equipment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of data transmission, and specifically relates to a two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method, an operating platform, an Internet of Things device, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of smart grid technology and the widespread application of IoT devices in substations, remote nuclear capacity technology of substations has entered a new era with extremely high requirements for data security and reliability.

[0003] The remote nuclear capacity system of the substation monitors the capacity, health status and charging and discharging efficiency of the battery in real time to ensure that the battery can provide stable power supply in an emergency, which is directly related to the safety and reliability of the entire power system.

[0004] However, the widespread deployment of IoT devices and the complexity of remote core operations have also brought new challenges to the security, privacy and real-time performance of data transmission.

[0005] Faced with the dramatic increase in data volume and the complexity of data interaction in smart grid systems, traditional security protocols can no longer fully meet the strict requirements of substation remote core capacity systems for high efficiency, low latency and privacy protection. Summary of the invention

[0006] In response to the defects existing in the above-mentioned prior art, the present invention provides a multi-system interactive communication authentication method with two-way remote encryption for an operating platform, a multi-system interactive communication authentication method with two-way remote encryption for an Internet of Things device, an operating platform, an Internet of Things device, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium.

[0007] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform is provided, the method comprising: Receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using a public key of the operating platform; Decrypting the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number; Generate a platform random number, and combine the platform random number with the decryption random number and encrypt them using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext; Sending the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receiving a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, wherein the third ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting the response message by the IoT device using a device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device for decrypting the second ciphertext based on the first decryption result obtained and the device random number; generating a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypting the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verifying the second decryption result; If the verification is successful, data is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0008] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for two-way remote encryption of an Internet of Things device is provided, the method comprising: Generate a device random number, and encrypt the generated device random number using a public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext; Sending the first ciphertext to the operating platform, and receiving a second ciphertext sent by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the IoT device to encrypt a combination of a platform random number and a decryption random number; the decryption random number is a random number obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is a random number generated by the operating platform; decrypting the second ciphertext to obtain a first decryption result, and generating a device session key according to the first decryption result and the device random number; The response message is encrypted using the device session key to obtain a third ciphertext, and the third ciphertext is sent to the operating platform, so that the operating platform uses the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext and verify the obtained second decryption result; the platform session key is a key generated according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number; Receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0009] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, there is provided an operating platform, comprising: A first decryption module is used to receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using a public key of the operating platform; and decrypt the first ciphertext using a private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number; A platform encryption module, used to generate a platform random number, and encrypt the platform random number with the decryption random number using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext; a second decryption module, configured to send the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receive a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, wherein the third ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a response message by the IoT device using a device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device for decrypting the second ciphertext based on the first decryption result obtained and the device random number; a platform verification module, configured to generate a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, use the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result; The platform transmission module is used to transmit data to the IoT device when the verification is passed.

[0010] According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, an Internet of Things device is provided, including: A first encryption module, used to generate a device random number, and encrypt the generated device random number using a public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext; A device decryption module, configured to send the first ciphertext to the operating platform, and receive a second ciphertext sent by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the IoT device to encrypt a combination of a platform random number and a decryption random number; the decryption random number is a random number obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is a random number generated by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is decrypted to obtain a first decryption result, and a device session key is generated according to the first decryption result and the device random number; a second encryption module, configured to encrypt the response message using the device session key to obtain a third ciphertext, and send the third ciphertext to the operating platform, so that the operating platform can decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key, and verify the obtained second decryption result; the platform session key is a key generated according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number; The device transmission module is used to receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0011] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, an electronic device is provided, the electronic device comprising: one or more processors; A memory having one or more programs stored thereon, when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the above method; One or more I / O interfaces are connected between the processor and the memory and are configured to implement information interaction between the processor and the memory.

[0012] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, a computer-readable medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, the method according to the above claim is implemented.

[0013] The multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform, the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an Internet of Things device, the operating platform, the Internet of Things device, the electronic device, and the computer-readable medium provided by the present invention have at least the following beneficial effects: (1) Ensures the identity security of IoT devices and operating platforms, avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks.

[0014] (2) The two-way authentication process uses advanced technologies such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the accuracy of two-way authentication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0015] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of the flow of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by the present invention; Figure 2 A flowchart diagram of some steps of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 A flowchart diagram of some steps of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 A flowchart diagram of some steps of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the process flow of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an Internet of Things device provided by the present invention; Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the composition of a power system in a specific embodiment of the present invention; Figure 7 A block diagram of the composition of an operating platform provided by the present invention; Figure 8 A block diagram of the composition of an Internet of Things device provided by the present invention; Fig. 9 A schematic diagram of the composition of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0016] In order to better understand the above technical solution, the above technical solution will be described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods. Obviously, the described embodiments are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of the embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without creative work are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0017] The terms used in the embodiments of the present invention are only for the purpose of describing specific embodiments, and are not intended to limit the present invention. The singular forms "a", "said" and "the" used in the embodiments of the present invention and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms, unless the context clearly indicates other meanings, and "multiple" generally includes at least two.

[0018] It should also be noted that the term "includes", "comprising" or any other variation thereof is intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a commodity or device including a series of elements includes not only those elements, but also other elements not explicitly listed, or also includes elements inherent to such commodity or device. In the absence of more restrictions, the elements defined by the sentence "comprising a ..." do not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the commodity or device including the elements.

[0019] Since the remote core capacity of substations involves the real-time collection and transmission of a large amount of data, the environment of the substation determines that any security loopholes or data tampering may have a significant impact on the stability of the entire power grid. When using security protocols for data transmission, when facing a complex IoT environment and a large amount of sensor data, it will face unprecedented pressure and challenges. In particular, the introduction of 5G (5th Generation Mobile Communication Technology) networks has put forward higher requirements for the data security of remote core capacity of substations.

[0020] Traditional protocols such as TLS (Transport Layer Security) / SSL (Secure Socket Layer), DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) and IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) are widely used in the Internet and LAN environments to ensure the security of communications by providing encryption and authentication. However, in the remote nuclear capacity system of substations, due to the more complex environment and higher transmission requirements, these protocols have gradually exposed many limitations in the face of the surge in the number of IoT devices and frequent data transmission.

[0021] As the most widely used encryption protocol in Internet communications, TLS / SSL ensures the privacy and integrity of data during transmission by establishing a secure communication channel between the client and the server. However, the encryption and decryption process of TLS / SSL requires a lot of computing resources, which will bring significant performance overhead and affect real-time performance, especially for IoT devices with limited computing power and power resources. This protocol may increase latency in IoT scenarios that require low latency and cannot meet the millisecond-level response requirements of substation core capacity.

[0022] The DTLS protocol provides TLS-like encryption security for UDP transmission and is widely used in IoT environments. However, due to the connectionless nature of UDP, the DTLS protocol may cause increased latency and data retransmission when data transmission is unreliable, especially in substation systems with high real-time requirements, and cannot fully meet the real-time requirements of remote nuclear capacity data. In addition, the DTLS protocol also relies on digital certificates for security, which places higher requirements on the computing and storage resources of IoT devices, increasing deployment costs and complexity.

[0023] The IPSec protocol is a security protocol for the network layer, widely used in VPNs (virtual private networks), and can provide strong encryption and authentication services for network transmission. However, the configuration of the IPSec protocol is relatively complex, key management and certificate distribution require high expertise, and the encryption process will affect transmission performance under high load, resulting in increased data transmission delays, which conflicts with the requirements of IoT devices for real-time data transmission. In addition, there may be compatibility issues between the implementations of the IPSec protocol by different manufacturers. This incompatibility may cause communication between devices to be blocked, further affecting the scalability and reliability of the system.

[0024] In addition to the above protocols, the MQTT (Message Queue Telemetry Transport) protocol, which is widely used in the Internet of Things, is also a lightweight message transmission protocol. It was designed for low-resource scenarios at the beginning, so it is widely used in the communication of IoT devices. MQTT adopts a publish / subscribe model, allowing devices to exchange messages through a central proxy server. It has a quality of service level setting and can adjust the reliability of data transmission according to demand. However, the MQTT protocol usually only implements one-way authentication, that is, only verifies the identity of the server but not the client, which becomes a limiting factor in applications that require two-way security verification. The MQTT protocol relies on TLS / SSL encrypted communication to protect data security, which also makes it complex and has performance overhead problems in encryption management. In addition, the centralized proxy mode of MQTT makes it have a single point of failure risk. When the system is deployed on a large scale, it may face the problem of excessive proxy server load, affecting scalability and performance. At the same time, MQTT lacks a built-in device discovery mechanism and needs to rely on other protocols or services, which further increases the complexity and management difficulty of the system.

[0025] The embodiments of the present invention provide a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for bidirectional remote encryption for an operating platform, a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for bidirectional remote encryption for an Internet of Things device, an operating platform, an Internet of Things device, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium, which are intended to solve at least one of the above technical problems in the prior art.

[0026] Among them, the operating platform can support installation on different operating systems, such as Windows, Android, Apple, etc. Therefore, the operating platform can run on many different types of devices (such as mobile devices, desktop computers, embedded systems, etc.), and then communicate and exchange data with IoT devices.

[0027] Therefore, operators can detect and control different IoT devices through the operating platform on different devices, manage the system composed of IoT devices, and achieve collaborative work and data sharing.

[0028] IoT devices are devices that connect the sensor network layer and the transmission network layer in the IoT to collect data and send data to the network layer. They are responsible for multiple functions such as data collection, preliminary processing, encryption, and transmission.

[0029] IoT devices can communicate and transmit data through the network, and IoT devices and operating platforms can also communicate and transmit data through the network.

[0030] Figure 1 The embodiment of the present invention provides a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform. Figure 1As shown, the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention may include: S101. Receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device.

[0031] The first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a generated device random number using a public key of an operating platform by the IoT device.

[0032] The IoT device generates a device random number, and encrypts the device random number using the public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext. The IoT device sends the first ciphertext to the operating platform, and the operating platform receives the first ciphertext.

[0033] Among them, the public key and private key of the operating platform are key pairs pre-generated using encryption algorithms. The private key of the operating platform is stored in the operating platform, and the public key of the operating platform is stored in the IoT device.

[0034] S102: Decrypt the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number.

[0035] The operating platform decrypts the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform, and uses the random number obtained after the decryption as the decryption random number.

[0036] S103: Generate a platform random number, and encrypt the platform random number with the decryption random number using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext.

[0037] The operating platform randomly generates a platform random number, combines the platform random number and the obtained decryption random number, and encrypts them using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext.

[0038] The embodiment of the present invention does not limit the method for the operating platform to generate a platform random number and the method for combining the platform random number and the decryption random number. Any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effect is within the protection scope of the embodiment of the present invention.

[0039] S104: Send the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receive the third ciphertext sent by the IoT device.

[0040] Among them, the third ciphertext is the ciphertext obtained by the IoT device using the device session key to encrypt the response message; the device session key is the key generated by the IoT device when decrypting the second ciphertext based on the obtained first decryption result and the device random number.

[0041] The operating platform sends the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and the IoT device receives the second ciphertext sent by the operating platform. The IoT device decrypts the second ciphertext using the private key of the IoT device to obtain the first decryption result, and obtains the combination of the first random number and the second random number according to the first decryption result.

[0042] Among them, the first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0043] The IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number obtained by decryption is the same as the device random number. If they are the same, the platform random number obtained by decryption and the device random number are used to generate a device session key using a key generation algorithm. The IoT device encrypts the response message using the device session key to generate a third ciphertext, and sends the third ciphertext to the operating platform, which receives the third ciphertext.

[0044] The response message may include a response header and a response body. The response body contains data returned by the IoT device to the operating platform, which may be an HTML document, JSON data, an image, etc.

[0045] The embodiments of the present invention do not limit the key generation algorithm, and any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effects is within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0046] In some possible implementations, the IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number obtained by decryption is the same as the device random number. If they are the same, it is determined that there may be an error in the identity of the operating platform, and the following steps are not continued.

[0047] S105. Generate a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, use the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result.

[0048] The operating platform uses the same key generation algorithm to generate a platform session key for the decrypted random number and the platform random number, and uses the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext, obtains a second decryption result, uses the second decryption result as decryption information, and verifies the validity of the decryption information.

[0049] S106. When the verification is passed, data is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0050] When the validity of the decrypted information is verified, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device and receive data transmitted by the IoT device.

[0051] Since the first ciphertext is obtained by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform to encrypt the device random number, and the decrypted random number is obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext, if the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are not a pair of keys, the decrypted random number and the device random number obtained by decryption will not be the same number.

[0052] If the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are a pair of keys, the decrypted number should be the device random number, that is, the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same number.

[0053] The second ciphertext is obtained by combining the platform random number and the decryption random number and encrypting them using the public key of the IoT device. After receiving the second ciphertext, the IoT device uses the private key of the IoT device to decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain a combination of the first random number and the second random number.

[0054] Among them, the first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0055] If the public key used by the operating platform and the private key used by the IoT device are not a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption will naturally be different from the platform random number. The second random number obtained by decryption will also obviously be different from the decrypted random number. Furthermore, even if the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same number, the second random number and the device random number will be different numbers.

[0056] If the public key used by the platform and the private key used by the IoT device are a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption is the platform random number, and the second random number obtained by decryption should be the decrypted random number. In other words, the decrypted random number and the second random number should be the same number. If the decrypted random number and the device random number are also the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are also the same number. However, if the decrypted random number and the device random number are not the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are different numbers.

[0057] Therefore, the second random number and the device random number are the same number only when the public key of the operating platform stored in the IoT device and the private key of the operating platform are a pair of keys, and the public key of the IoT device stored in the operating platform and the private key of the IoT device are a pair of keys.

[0058] When the IoT device detects that the second random number is the same as the device random number, the IoT device can confirm the identity of the operating system. When the second random number is the same as the device random number, the first random number and the platform random number will obviously be the same.

[0059] After confirming the identity of the operating system, the IoT device generates a device session key based on the obtained first random number and the device random number, which is equivalent to generating a device session key based on the platform random number and the device random number.

[0060] The operating platform uses the decrypted random number and the platform random number to generate a platform session key. The IoT device uses the device session key to encrypt the response message to generate a third ciphertext. The operating platform uses the platform session key to decrypt and obtain the decrypted information.

[0061] Only when the platform session key and the device session key are consistent, the decrypted message will be consistent with the response message, that is, the decrypted message can be valid information.

[0062] Therefore, after determining that the decrypted message is a valid message, the operating platform can confirm that the platform session key and the device session key are consistent, that is, the decrypted random number and the device random number are consistent, and the platform random number obtained by the IoT platform is also correct.

[0063] Therefore, the operating platform can also confirm that the public key of the operating platform saved by the IoT device and the private key of the operating platform are a pair of keys, and the public key of the IoT device saved by the operating platform and the private key of the IoT device are a pair of keys. The operating platform can also confirm the identity information of the IoT device and that it is a trustworthy device.

[0064] At this point, the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification and can confirm each other's identity, making them trustworthy devices.

[0065] That is to say, in the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for the operating platform provided in the embodiment of the present invention, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device only when the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, thereby ensuring the identity security of the IoT device and the operating platform and avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks.

[0066] At the same time, this two-way authentication process uses advanced technical means such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the accuracy of two-way authentication.

[0067] The following is a detailed introduction to the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0068] As mentioned above, the public key and private key of the operating platform are key pairs pre-generated using an encryption algorithm. The private key of the operating platform is stored in the operating platform, and the public key of the operating platform is stored in the IoT device.

[0069] Specifically, the encryption algorithm may be SM2 (based on elliptic curve public key cryptography algorithm).

[0070] That is to say, the public key and private key of the operating platform are the key pair generated by SM2; the public key and private key of the IoT device are the key pair generated by SM2; the operating platform stores the public key of the IoT device; and the IoT device stores the public key of the operating platform.

[0071] As the encryption technology of the system, SM2 has the characteristics of high compatibility and low cost in the IoT devices of the power system.

[0072] In some specific implementations, according to the needs of specific hardware and application scenarios, SM2 can be replaced with RSA (asymmetric encryption algorithm) or ECC (elliptic curve encryption algorithm) to improve execution efficiency and security.

[0073] Among them, RSA is widely used in power dispatching data networks to ensure the security of data transmission and protect key data from unauthorized access. It provides a reliable encryption method for power monitoring systems and power dispatching data networks to ensure secure communication.

[0074] Due to its high security and small key size, ECC is very suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices and can effectively prevent data tampering and privacy leakage.

[0075] As mentioned above, the operating platform is for operators to use, so the operating platform includes an interactive system for operators to operate. After completing the two-way verification, the operating platform will transmit data corresponding to the operator's operation to the Internet of Things device only in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface.

[0076] In some specific implementations, the operator's operation on the interactive interface may be sending an operation command, and the operating platform responds to the operator's operation on the interactive interface by transmitting the corresponding operation command to the IoT device, and the IoT device may respond to the operation command and perform the operation corresponding to the operation command.

[0077] In some possible implementations, in order to ensure that the operation command is issued by an operator with corresponding authorization, the identity of the operator needs to be verified.

[0078] Figure 2 A flowchart of an implementation method for verifying the identity of an operator is shown in FIG. Figure 2 As shown, verifying the identity of the operator may include: S201. In response to an operator's operation on an interactive interface, a digital certificate corresponding to the operator is obtained.

[0079] The digital certificate is a certificate obtained by encrypting and signing the operator's identity information using a private key by the certificate issuing authority.

[0080] Before S201, the operator generates a pair of public keys Pub op and private key Priv op , and the public key Pub op And identity information ID op Submit to CA (Certificate Authority).

[0081] CA verifies the operator's identity ID op , ensuring its legality.

[0082] CA uses its own private key Priv CA The operator's public key Pub op and its identity information ID op Sign and generate digital certificate Data op Specifically, Data op =(Priv CA ,ID op ).

[0083] CA for data block Data op Perform signature operation and generate digital signature Sig CA ,Specifically, Sig CA =Sign(Priv CA ,Data op ), where the signature function Sign is an encryption operation based on the private key.

[0084] The CA issues the generated digital signature and data block to the operator to form a digital certificate Cert op =(Data op ,Sig CA ).

[0085] In S201, in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, the operating system obtains the operator's corresponding digital certificate Cert op .

[0086] S202: Use the public key of the certificate authority to verify the signature of the digital certificate, and if the verification is successful, obtain the certificate information of the digital certificate.

[0087] The certificate information includes the validity period and revocation status of the digital certificate.

[0088] The operating system uses the CA's public key Pub CA Verify the signature in a digital certificate.

[0089] Specifically, the operating system extracts the data block Data from the digital certificate op and signature Sig CA， The system uses the CA's public key PubCA Signature Sig CA， Verify: Verify(Pub CA ,Data op ,Sig CA ), if the verification is successful, it means that the digital signature is generated by the CA's private key, the content of the certificate has not been tampered with, and the operator's identity is confirmed.

[0090] After the identity of the operator is confirmed, the certificate information of the digital certificate is obtained, and the certificate information includes the validity period and revocation status (which may be revoked or not revoked) of the digital certificate.

[0091] S203: When the certificate information of the digital certificate meets the preset requirements, transmit data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0092] Among them, the preset requirement may be that the previous date is within the validity period of the digital certificate and the revocation status is not revoked.

[0093] That is, when the current date is within the validity period of the digital certificate and the revocation status is not revoked, the operating platform transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0094] In some possible implementations, after the operator's identity is confirmed, if it can be confirmed that the operation was performed by the operator, there is no need to confirm the operator's identity again, and data corresponding to the operator's operation can be directly transmitted to the IoT device.

[0095] Figure 3 A flow chart showing another implementation method of verifying the identity of an operator is shown in FIG. Figure 3 As shown, verifying the identity of the operator may include: S301 . In response to an operator's operation on an interactive interface, receiving a user name and password input by the operator and performing verification.

[0096] The operating system responds to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, displays an input box for the operator to input a user name and password on the interactive interface, receives the user name and password input by the operator into the input box, and verifies the correctness of the user name and password.

[0097] S302: If the verification is successful, receiving a verification code input by the operator, and verifying the correctness and validity period of the verification code; The verification code is a dynamic verification code generated by the operator using a hardware token.

[0098] A hardware token can be a device that generates a dynamic password using a unique key (seed) corresponding to time and a unique serial number of the token, and can generate a dynamic password with a time limit (i.e., validity period).

[0099] If the verification is passed, an input box for the operator to enter a verification code is displayed on the interactive interface, the verification code entered by the operator into the input box is received, and the correctness and validity period of the verification code are verified.

[0100] S303: When the verification code is correct and valid, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0101] When the verification code is correct and the current date is within the validity period of the verification code, the operation platform transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0102] In some possible implementations, after the operator's identity is confirmed, if it can be confirmed that the operation was performed by the operator, there is no need to confirm the operator's identity again, and data corresponding to the operator's operation can be directly transmitted to the IoT device.

[0103] In some possible implementations, after two-way authentication is established and the operator's identity is authenticated, in order to prevent misoperation, the operating system may require the operator to perform multiple confirmations before performing key operations.

[0104] Figure 4 A flowchart showing an implementation method in which the operating system requires the operator to perform multiple confirmations before executing key operations is shown. Figure 4 As shown, the operating system requires operators to perform multiple confirmations before performing key operations, which may include: S401. In response to an operator's operation on an interactive interface, risk warning information corresponding to the operator's operation is displayed on the interactive interface.

[0105] In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, risk warning information corresponding to the operator's operation is displayed on the interactive interface so that the operator can be aware of the operation risk and confirm the execution of the operation.

[0106] S402: When the operator confirms the risk warning information, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0107] When the operator is aware of the operational risk and confirms the execution of the operation (i.e., the operator confirms the risk warning information), the operating platform transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0108] In some possible implementations, S401 and S402 are executed only when the operator performs a critical operation. When the operator performs a non-critical operation, data corresponding to the operator's operation is directly transmitted to the IoT device.

[0109] In some possible implementations, since a critical operation is being performed, in order to further ensure the security of the operation execution, the operator identity is confirmed again, that is, the operator identity is authenticated again.

[0110] Before transmitting data corresponding to the operator's operation to the Internet of Things device, if the operator confirms the risk warning information, input prompt information prompting the operator to enter identity information is displayed on the interactive interface; if the identity information entered by the operator is verified, the data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

[0111] That is, before transmitting the data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device, if the operator confirms the risk warning information, the interactive interface displays an input box for the operator to enter the identity information, which can be a one-time password (OTP) or a physical token. The one-time password (i.e., dynamic verification code) or physical token (i.e., digital certificate) entered by the operator is received and verified to ensure that the operator is aware that a critical operation is being performed. And if the verification is passed, the data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0112] Multiple confirmations and secondary authentication ensure that only operators who have passed multiple layers of verification can perform key operations, reducing the possibility of incorrect operation.

[0113] In some possible implementations, in order to increase the security of communication and the confidentiality of transmitted data, data can be signed based on the platform session key and the signed data can be transmitted to the IoT device. After receiving the signed data, the IoT device can use the device session key for verification and decryption.

[0114] Similarly, IoT devices can sign data based on the device session key and transmit the signed data to the operating platform. After receiving the signed data, the operating platform can use the platform session key to verify and decrypt it.

[0115] In some possible implementations, an identifier corresponding to the data may be generated, and a data transmission frequency may be determined based on the identifier. When the transmission frequency is greater than a preset frequency value, data transmission to the IoT device may be refused.

[0116] Specifically, each operation command issued by the operator is attached with a unique identifier (the identifier can be generated based on a timestamp or a sequence number). In this way, even if the same operation command is issued multiple times, the operating system can determine the time interval between the operation commands based on the identifier and calculate the sending frequency of the operation command.

[0117] If the sending frequency is greater than the preset frequency value, it means that the same operation command is sent repeatedly in a very short period of time, and the operating system can prevent their execution.

[0118] In addition, for different types of operation commands, the operating system can set different response times to ensure that various operation commands are effectively processed within a reasonable range, thereby further enhancing the security and flexibility of the system.

[0119] In some possible implementations, when the operating system transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, the operating information is saved to provide a basis for tracking and subsequent analysis of the operation.

[0120] Specifically, in response to an operator's operation on the interactive interface, operation information corresponding to the operation is obtained, and the operation information is encrypted and stored in a log file.

[0121] The operation information includes the operator's identity information, the operator's operation and the corresponding operation time.

[0122] That is to say, the system will monitor all the operator's operations in real time and record a detailed log of each operation step, including the operation time, specific operation content, operator identity, etc. All operator operations are encrypted and stored in a tamper-proof log file for easy auditing in the future. Any attempt to bypass authentication or perform unauthorized operations will be immediately recorded and trigger an alarm mechanism.

[0123] Figure 5 A flowchart of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an Internet of Things device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 As shown, the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for IoT devices provided by the embodiment of the present invention may include: S501. Generate a device random number, and use the public key of the operating platform to encrypt the generated device random number to generate a first ciphertext.

[0124] The IoT device generates a device random number, and encrypts the device random number using the public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext.

[0125] Among them, the public key and private key of the operating platform are key pairs pre-generated using encryption algorithms. The private key of the operating platform is stored in the operating platform, and the public key of the operating platform is stored in the IoT device.

[0126] S502: Send the first ciphertext to the operating platform, and receive the second ciphertext sent by the operating platform.

[0127] Among them, the second ciphertext is the ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the Internet of Things device to encrypt the combination of the platform random number and the decryption random number; the decrypted random number is the random number obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is the random number generated by the operating platform.

[0128] The IoT device sends the first ciphertext to the operating platform, and the operating platform receives the first ciphertext. The operating platform uses the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext, and uses the random number obtained after decryption as the decryption random number.

[0129] The operating platform randomly generates a platform random number, combines the platform random number and the obtained decryption random number, and encrypts them using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext.

[0130] The embodiment of the present invention does not limit the method for the operating platform to generate a platform random number and the method for combining the platform random number and the decryption random number. Any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effect is within the protection scope of the embodiment of the present invention.

[0131] The operating platform sends the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and the IoT device receives the second ciphertext sent by the operating platform.

[0132] S503: Decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain a first decryption result, and generate a device session key according to the first decryption result and a device random number.

[0133] The IoT device decrypts the second ciphertext using the private key of the IoT device to obtain a first decryption result, and obtains a combination of the first random number and the second random number according to the first decryption result.

[0134] Among them, the first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0135] The IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number obtained by decryption is the same as the device random number. If they are the same, the platform random number and the device random number obtained by decryption are used to generate a device session key using a key generation algorithm.

[0136] The embodiments of the present invention do not limit the key generation algorithm, and any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effects is within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0137] In some possible implementations, the IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number obtained by decryption is the same as the device random number. If they are the same, it is determined that there may be an error in the identity of the operating platform, and the following steps are not continued.

[0138] S504: Use the device session key to encrypt the response message to obtain a third ciphertext, and send the third ciphertext to the operating platform so that the operating platform can use the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext and verify the obtained second decryption result.

[0139] The platform session key is a key generated based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number. The response message may include a response header and a response body, and the response body contains the data returned by the IoT device to the operating platform, which may be an HTML document, JSON data, an image, etc.

[0140] The IoT device encrypts the response message using the device session key to generate a third ciphertext, and sends the third ciphertext to the operating platform, which receives the third ciphertext.

[0141] The operating platform uses the same key generation algorithm to generate a platform session key for the decrypted random number and the platform random number, and uses the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext, obtains a second decryption result, uses the second decryption result as decryption information, and verifies the validity of the decryption information.

[0142] S505: Receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0143] When the validity of the decrypted information is verified, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device, and the IoT device receives the data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0144] IoT devices can also send data to the operating platform, and the operating platform can also receive data transmitted by IoT devices.

[0145] Since the first ciphertext is obtained by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform to encrypt the device random number, and the decrypted random number is obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext, if the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are not a pair of keys, the decrypted random number and the device random number obtained by decryption will not be the same number.

[0146] If the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are a pair of keys, the decrypted number should be the device random number, that is, the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same number.

[0147] The second ciphertext is obtained by combining the platform random number and the decryption random number and encrypting them using the public key of the IoT device. After receiving the second ciphertext, the IoT device uses the private key of the IoT device to decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain a combination of the first random number and the second random number.

[0148] Among them, the first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0149] If the public key used by the operating platform and the private key used by the IoT device are not a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption will naturally be different from the platform random number. The second random number obtained by decryption will also obviously be different from the decrypted random number. Furthermore, even if the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same number, the second random number and the device random number will be different numbers.

[0150] If the public key used by the platform and the private key used by the IoT device are a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption is the platform random number, and the second random number obtained by decryption should be the decrypted random number. In other words, the decrypted random number and the second random number should be the same number. If the decrypted random number and the device random number are also the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are also the same number. However, if the decrypted random number and the device random number are not the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are different numbers.

[0151] Therefore, the second random number and the device random number are the same number only when the public key of the operating platform stored in the IoT device and the private key of the operating platform are a pair of keys, and the public key of the IoT device stored in the operating platform and the private key of the IoT device are a pair of keys.

[0152] When the IoT device detects that the second random number is the same as the device random number, the IoT device can confirm the identity of the operating system. When the second random number is the same as the device random number, the first random number and the platform random number will obviously be the same.

[0153] After confirming the identity of the operating system, the IoT device generates a device session key based on the obtained first random number and the device random number, which is equivalent to generating a device session key based on the platform random number and the device random number.

[0154] The operating platform uses the decrypted random number and the platform random number to generate a platform session key. The IoT device uses the device session key to encrypt the response message to generate a third ciphertext. The operating platform uses the platform session key to decrypt and obtain the decrypted information.

[0155] Only when the platform session key and the device session key are consistent, the decrypted message will be consistent with the response message, that is, the decrypted message can be valid information.

[0156] Therefore, after determining that the decrypted message is a valid message, the operating platform can confirm that the platform session key and the device session key are consistent, that is, the decrypted random number and the device random number are consistent, and the platform random number obtained by the IoT platform is also correct.

[0157] Therefore, the operating platform can also confirm that the public key of the operating platform saved by the IoT device and the private key of the operating platform are a pair of keys, and the public key of the IoT device saved by the operating platform and the private key of the IoT device are a pair of keys. The operating platform can also confirm the identity information of the IoT device and that it is a trustworthy device.

[0158] At this point, the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification and can confirm each other's identity, making them trustworthy devices.

[0159] That is to say, in the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for IoT devices provided in the embodiment of the present invention, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device only when the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, thereby ensuring the identity security of the IoT device and the operating platform and avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks.

[0160] At the same time, this two-way authentication process uses advanced technical means such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the accuracy of two-way authentication.

[0161] As mentioned above, the encryption algorithm may be SM2. That is, the public key and private key of the operating platform are the key pair generated by SM2; the public key and private key of the IoT device are the key pair generated by SM2; the operating platform stores the public key of the IoT device; and the IoT device stores the public key of the operating platform.

[0162] As the encryption technology of the system, SM2 has the characteristics of high compatibility and low cost in the IoT devices of the power system.

[0163] In some specific implementations, SM2 can be replaced with RSA or ECC to improve execution efficiency and security according to the needs of specific hardware and application scenarios.

[0164] Among them, RSA is widely used in power dispatching data networks to ensure the security of data transmission and protect key data from unauthorized access. It provides a reliable encryption method for power monitoring systems and power dispatching data networks to ensure secure communication.

[0165] Due to its high security and small key size, ECC is very suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices and can effectively prevent data tampering and privacy leakage.

[0166] The bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention is introduced below with a specific embodiment for a power system.

[0167] Figure 6 The schematic diagram of the power system is shown in Figure 1. Figure 6 As shown, the Internet of Things device in the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention can be an Internet of Things device of a substation, which can be used for remote capacity verification of substation batteries, the operating platform can be a capacity verification platform, and the operator of the operating platform can be a capacity verification personnel.

[0168] The two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention can ensure the security of operations, the accuracy of data and the reliability of the system in the remote capacity verification of substation batteries by implementing a strict multi-factor identity authentication process, using encryption technology based on the SM2 algorithm, and a two-way authentication mechanism established between the capacity verification platform and the IoT device of the substation, thereby effectively preventing unauthorized access and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0169] The specific implementation is as follows: 1. Identity verification phase Operators must be authenticated before attempting to access a remote core capacity system. This can be achieved in several ways: Digital certificate: The operator uses a digital certificate for identity authentication, and the system will check the validity of the certificate, including whether the certificate is issued by a trusted certificate authority, whether it is within the validity period, and whether it has been revoked.

[0170] Multi-factor authentication: The operator first enters the username and password, and then performs a secondary verification through a one-time password generated by a hardware token to ensure that the operator's identity is verified in multiple ways.

[0171] Biometric technology: Introducing fingerprint recognition or facial recognition technology to provide a higher level of security.

[0172] 2. System initialization and key generation The operating platform and IoT device each generate a pair of public and private keys based on the SM2 algorithm. These keys will be used in the subsequent two-way authentication process.

[0173] 3. Two-way authentication process The IoT device generates a random number V1 and uses the public key P of the operating platform u Perform SM2 encryption to generate ciphertext C1: C1=SM2_Encrypt(P u ,V1), where SM2_Encrypt is the SM2 encryption operation.

[0174] The IoT device sends the ciphertext C1 to the operating platform. After receiving C1, the operating platform uses its private key d u Decrypt to get V1 ’ :V1 ’ =SM2_Decrypt(d u ,C1), where SM2_Decrypt is the SM2 decryption operation.

[0175] The operating platform generates a random number V2 and compares it with V1 ’ Combined use of IoT device's public key Encrypt to generate ciphertext C2: C2=SM2_Encrypt(P v ,V1 ’ ||V2).

[0176] The operating platform sends the ciphertext C2 to the IoT device. After receiving C2, the IoT device uses its private key Decrypt to get V1 ” and V2 ’ :(V1 ” ,V2 ’ )=SM2_Decrypt(d v ,C2).

[0177] IoT Device Check V1 ” Is it the same as the previously generated V1? If so, proceed to the next step.

[0178] IoT device generates session key K s :K s =H(V1,V2), where H is the key generation algorithm.

[0179] The IoT device generates a response message (b1, S1) and uses the session key K s Encrypt and generate ciphertext C3: C3=SM2_Encrypt(K s ,b1||S1), the IoT device sends the ciphertext C3 to the operating platform.

[0180] After the operating platform receives C3, it decrypts the obtained V1 ’ And the self-generated V2 to calculate the session key K s . Due to K s The generation of the session key K depends on the random numbers of both parties, thus ensuring that only after the two-way authentication is successful can both parties obtain the same session key. s Decrypt to get b1 and S1: (b1 ’ ,S1 ’ )=SM2_Decrypt(Ks ,C3).

[0181] Operation platform inspection b1 ’ and S1 ’ Is it valid? If the verification is successful, the operating platform will confirm the session key K s This means that the IoT device and the operating platform have successfully achieved mutual authentication and successfully generated a shared session key. The two-way authentication mechanism thus achieves strict verification of the identities of both parties and secure management of the session key, thereby improving the security and reliability of the overall system.

[0182] Through the two-way authentication process, a secure communication channel is established between the operating platform and the IoT device to ensure the security and accuracy of data transmission. This mechanism effectively prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and ensures that only verified devices and operators can communicate.

[0183] 4. Guarantee of operational safety and accuracy To further prevent misoperation, the system adds a multi-level confirmation mechanism before key operations. When the operator issues an operation instruction (such as remote capacity control), the system will first prompt the operator to confirm through the user interface and explain in detail the nature of the operation and its potential impact. This confirmation step requires the operator to enter secondary authentication information, such as a one-time password (OTP) or verify through biometrics to ensure that the operator is clearly aware of the important operation to be performed. In this way, the security of the operation not only relies on the security of the communication channel, but also reduces the possibility of misoperation through multiple verifications.

[0184] 5. Remote core capacity operation After completing identity verification and two-way authentication, the operator can start remote capacity verification operations. The system provides a user-friendly interface that enables operators to easily perform remote battery detection and management.

[0185] To prevent misoperation, the system also introduces a multiple confirmation function in the operation interface. Before performing key operations, operators must confirm multiple times prompted by the system and go through additional identity verification steps to ensure the intention and accuracy of their operations. At the same time, the system will sign each operation command and attach a unique identifier (such as a timestamp) to prevent the same command from being executed repeatedly or tampered with by unauthorized entities.

[0186] 6. Monitoring and Auditing The system will record all identity authentication and two-way authentication processes, as well as every operation of the operator, in detail. These log data will be stored in encrypted form to ensure that they cannot be tampered with, which is convenient for post-event monitoring and auditing. Its content includes timestamp, operation content, authentication results, and every key step in the execution process, ensuring the transparency and traceability of system operations. This comprehensive audit function can not only be used for post-event tracing and analysis, but also can issue alarms in time when the operator's behavior is abnormal, provide real-time monitoring, and further ensure the security of the system and the accuracy of operations.

[0187] In this specific embodiment, by combining digital certificates, hardware tokens and biometric technologies such as fingerprint recognition and facial recognition, the multi-level identity authentication method significantly improves the security of the system. Digital certificates guarantee the credibility and validity of the certificate issuer; the one-time password generated by the hardware token increases the dynamicity and uniqueness; and biometric technology provides a higher level of identity authentication through unforgeable biological features.

[0188] The two-way authentication mechanism using the SM2 algorithm ensures the authenticity of the identities of both the operating platform and the IoT device. Through the random number generation and verification process, the system can effectively resist man-in-the-middle attacks and replay attacks, ensuring the uniqueness and security of each communication.

[0189] The session key generated by two-way authentication is used to encrypt data transmission to ensure that the data is not tampered with during transmission. Even if the data is intercepted, the valid information cannot be read without decryption of the session key, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of the data.

[0190] In the two-way authentication process, the consistency of communication data is ensured by generating and verifying random numbers by both parties. This mechanism not only prevents replay attacks, but also verifies the validity of each communication and ensures the accurate transmission of data.

[0191] Multi-factor authentication ensures that only operators who have passed multiple verifications can access the system, preventing unauthorized personnel from operating. The use of digital certificates further enhances the credibility of identity authentication.

[0192] The operating platform and the device each generate a public key and a private key based on the SM2 algorithm to ensure the uniqueness and security of the key. This mechanism not only ensures the reliability of the authentication process, but also prevents the key from being stolen or tampered with.

[0193] Specifically, the process of this specific embodiment can be based on privacy computing. By combining privacy computing technology, the remote core capacity system of the substation can achieve multiple security protections during data transmission, making the communication between devices more secure and reliable, and the data will not be tampered with or leaked. In addition, privacy computing can cope with the challenges of complex electromagnetic environments and external attacks, improve the system's anti-interference ability, and provide a safer and more reliable remote core capacity data transmission solution for substations. For example, in a complex electromagnetic environment, privacy computing can effectively prevent data injection and interference attacks, ensuring that data will not be affected by external factors during transmission, thereby ensuring the security and stability of the entire power grid. By introducing privacy computing technology, the system can achieve millisecond-level response and real-time monitoring during the transmission process, further improving the timeliness of data transmission.

[0194] Therefore, the optimization of traditional protocols and the application of privacy computing technology enable the remote core capacity system of substations to achieve efficient data transmission and real-time equipment monitoring on the basis of meeting security, reliability and privacy protection. In the future, the remote core capacity system of substations will require more efficient, flexible and multi-level security protection solutions to adapt to the increasingly complex challenges of the Internet of Things environment. Through the continuous development of privacy computing technology and protocol optimization, the remote core capacity system will gradually evolve from a single data transmission guarantee to a multi-level security protection, which will not only improve the integrity, security and privacy of data, but also further enhance the stability and emergency response capabilities of the power network, and promote the continuous innovation and development of smart grid technology.

[0195] Among them, privacy computing allows data to be calculated and transmitted without exposure through technical means such as multi-party secure computing, federated learning and homomorphic encryption, realizing the full life cycle protection of sensitive data, which is particularly suitable for remote nuclear capacity systems of substations with high data sensitivity. In remote nuclear capacity scenarios, privacy computing can ensure that data is not leaked, tampered with or accessed without authorization during transmission and processing, meeting the system's multiple requirements for data integrity, authenticity and security.

[0196] Specifically, multi-party secure computing can enable different parties to collaboratively process data without leaking data privacy, so that remote core capacity systems can obtain the required computing results without exposing the original data, thereby improving data security. Homomorphic encryption technology can directly perform operations on encrypted data, ensuring that even if the data is intercepted during transmission or processing, the outside world cannot decrypt and obtain the original data, thereby further improving the privacy and security of the data. Federated learning technology can share models between different devices or nodes without aggregating data on a central server, which can effectively avoid data leakage and centralized management security risks, and is suitable for the data processing needs of a large number of distributed IoT devices in substation scenarios.

[0197] Based on Figure 1 The same principle as shown in the method, Figure 7 A schematic diagram of the structure of an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention is shown. Figure 7 As shown, the operating platform may include: A first decryption module is used to receive a first ciphertext sent by the IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using a public key of the operating platform; the first ciphertext is decrypted using a private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number; The platform encryption module is used to generate a platform random number, and encrypt the platform random number with the decryption random number using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext; A second decryption module is used to send the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receive a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, where the third ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by the IoT device using the device session key to encrypt the response message; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device for decrypting the second ciphertext based on the obtained first decryption result and the device random number; a platform verification module, configured to generate a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result; The platform transmission module is used to transmit data to the IoT device when the verification is passed.

[0198] In the operating platform provided by the embodiment of the present disclosure, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device only when the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, thereby ensuring the identity security of the IoT device and the operating platform and avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks. At the same time, this two-way authentication process uses advanced technical means such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the authentication accuracy of the two-way authentication.

[0199] It can be understood that the above modules of the operating platform in the embodiment of the present disclosure have the function of implementing Figure 1 The functions of the corresponding steps of the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in . This function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions. The above modules can be software and / or hardware, and the above modules can be implemented separately or integrated with multiple modules. For the functional description of each module of the above operating platform, please refer to Figure 1 The corresponding description of the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in will not be repeated here.

[0200] Based on Figure 5 The same principle as shown in the method, Figure 8 FIG. 4 shows a schematic diagram of the structure of an Internet of Things device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 8 As shown, the IoT device may include: A first encryption module, used to generate a device random number, and encrypt the generated device random number using a public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext; The device decryption module is used to send the first ciphertext to the operating platform and receive the second ciphertext sent by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is the ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the IoT device to encrypt the combination of the platform random number and the decryption random number; the decryption random number is the random number obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is the random number generated by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is decrypted to obtain a first decryption result, and a device session key is generated according to the first decryption result and the device random number; a second encryption module, configured to encrypt the response message using the device session key to obtain a third ciphertext, and send the third ciphertext to the operating platform, so that the operating platform can decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key, and verify the obtained second decryption result; the platform session key is a key generated according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number; The device transmission module is used to receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0201] In the IoT device provided by the embodiment of the present disclosure, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device only when the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, thereby ensuring the identity security of the IoT device and the operating platform and avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks. At the same time, this two-way authentication process uses advanced technical means such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the authentication accuracy of the two-way authentication.

[0202] It can be understood that the above modules of the operating platform in the embodiment of the present disclosure have the function of implementing Figure 5 The functions of the corresponding steps of the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in . This function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions. The above modules can be software and / or hardware, and the above modules can be implemented separately or integrated with multiple modules. For the functional description of each module of the above operating platform, please refer to Figure 5 The corresponding description of the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in will not be repeated here.

[0203] Fig. 9 Schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Fig. 9 As shown, the electronic device provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes: One or more processors 901; A memory 902 having one or more programs stored thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, enables the one or more processors to implement any one of the above-mentioned two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication methods; One or more I / O interfaces 903 are connected between the processor and the memory and are configured to implement information exchange between the processor and the memory.

[0204] Among them, the processor 901 is a device with data processing capabilities, including but not limited to a central processing unit (CPU); the memory 902 is a device with data storage capabilities, including but not limited to random access memory (RAM, more specifically SDRAM, DDR, etc.), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory (FLASH); the I / O interface (read-write interface) 903 is connected between the processor 901 and the memory 902, and can realize information interaction between the processor 901 and the memory 902, including but not limited to a data bus (Bus), etc.

[0205] In some embodiments, the processor 901 , the memory 902 , and the I / O interface 903 are connected to each other through a bus, and further connected to other components of the computing device.

[0206] This embodiment also provides a computer-readable medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by this embodiment is implemented. To avoid repeated description, the specific steps of the bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method are not repeated here.

[0207] Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, additional changes and modifications may be made to these embodiments by those skilled in the art once the basic inventive concepts are known. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the present invention. Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the present invention. Thus, if these modifications and variations of the present invention fall within the scope of the claims of the present invention and their equivalents, the present invention is also intended to include these modifications and variations.

Claims

1. A two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method, characterized in that: The method is used for operating a platform, and the method comprises: Receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using a public key of the operating platform; Decrypting the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number; Generate a platform random number, and combine the platform random number with the decryption random number and encrypt them using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext; Sending the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receiving a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, wherein the third ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting the response message by the IoT device using a device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device for decrypting the second ciphertext based on the first decryption result obtained and the device random number; generating a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypting the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verifying the second decryption result; If the verification is successful, data is transmitted to the IoT device.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The operating platform includes an interactive interface for an operator to operate, and the data transmission to the IoT device includes: In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The transmitting of data to the IoT device in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface comprises: In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, displaying risk warning information corresponding to the operator's operation on the interactive interface; When the operator confirms the risk warning information, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that When the operator confirms the risk warning information, transmitting data corresponding to the operator's operation to the Internet of Things device includes: When the operator confirms the risk warning information, input prompt information prompting the operator to input identity information is displayed on the interactive interface; When the identity information input by the operator is verified, data corresponding to the operation of the operator is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The method further comprises: In response to an operation of the operator on the interactive interface, obtaining operation information corresponding to the operation, the operation information including the identity information of the operator, the operation of the operator and the corresponding operation time; The operation information is encrypted and stored in a log file.

6. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, transmitting data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device includes: In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, a digital certificate corresponding to the operator is obtained; the digital certificate is a certificate obtained by encrypting and signing the identity information of the operator using a private key by a certificate issuing authority; Verify the signature of the digital certificate using the public key of the certificate issuing authority, and if the verification is successful, obtain the certificate information of the digital certificate, the certificate information including the validity period and revocation status of the digital certificate; When the certificate information of the digital certificate meets the preset requirements, data corresponding to the operation of the operator is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

7. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, transmitting data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device includes: In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, receiving the user name and password input by the operator and performing verification; If the verification is successful, receiving the verification code input by the operator and verifying the correctness and validity period of the verification code; the verification code is a dynamic verification code generated by the operator using a hardware token; When the verification code is correct and valid, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the IoT device.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The transmitting data to the IoT device comprises: Generate an identifier corresponding to the data, wherein the identifier is generated according to any one of a timestamp or a sequence number corresponding to the data; Determine a data transmission frequency according to the identifier, and refuse to transmit data to the IoT device when the transmission frequency is greater than a preset frequency value; The data is signed based on the platform session key, and the signed data is transmitted to the IoT device.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The public key and private key of the operating platform are a key pair generated based on the elliptic curve public key cryptography algorithm; the public key and private key of the Internet of Things device are a key pair generated based on the elliptic curve public key cryptography algorithm; The operating platform stores the public key of the IoT device; The Internet of Things device stores the public key of the operating platform.

10. An operating platform, characterized in that: Using the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method as claimed in any one of claims 1 to 9, the operating platform includes: A first decryption module is used to receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using a public key of the operating platform; and decrypt the first ciphertext using a private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number; A platform encryption module, used to generate a platform random number, and encrypt the platform random number with the decryption random number using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext; a second decryption module, configured to send the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receive a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, wherein the third ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a response message by the IoT device using a device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device for decrypting the second ciphertext based on the first decryption result obtained and the device random number; a platform verification module, configured to generate a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, use the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result; The platform transmission module is used to transmit data to the IoT device when the verification is passed.

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