A two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method and operating platform

Abstract

The present invention discloses a two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method and an operating platform, which specifically includes: receiving a first ciphertext sent by an Internet of Things device; decrypting the first ciphertext using a private key of an operating platform to obtain a decryption random number; generating a platform random number, and encrypting the platform random number with the decryption random number using a public key of the Internet of Things device to generate a second ciphertext; sending the second ciphertext to the Internet of Things device, and receiving a third ciphertext sent by the Internet of Things device; generating a platform session key based on the decryption random number and the platform random number, decrypting the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verifying the second decryption result; and transmitting data to the Internet of Things device if the verification is successful.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention belongs to the technical field of data transmission, and specifically relates to a bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method, an operating platform, an Internet of Things device, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium. Background Art

[0002] With the rapid development of smart grid technology and the widespread application of IoT devices in substations, remote capacity control technology for substations has entered a new era with extremely high requirements for data security and reliability.

[0003] The substation's remote capacity control system monitors the battery's capacity, health status, and charge and discharge efficiency in real time to ensure stable power supply in emergency situations, which is directly related to the safety and reliability of the entire power system.

[0004] However, the widespread deployment of IoT devices and the complexity of remote core operations also bring new challenges to the security, privacy and real-time performance of data transmission.

[0005] Faced with the dramatic increase in data volume and the complexity of data interaction in smart grid systems, traditional security protocols can no longer fully meet the stringent requirements of substation remote core capacity systems for high efficiency, low latency and privacy protection. Summary of the Invention

[0006] In response to the defects existing in the above-mentioned prior art, the present invention provides a multi-system interactive communication authentication method with bidirectional remote encryption for an operating platform, a multi-system interactive communication authentication method with bidirectional remote encryption for an Internet of Things device, an operating platform, an Internet of Things device, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium.

[0007] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform is provided, the method comprising:

[0008] Receiving a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using a public key of the operating platform;

[0009] Decrypting the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number;

[0010] Generate a platform random number, and combine the platform random number with the decryption random number and encrypt the resultant data using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext;

[0011] Sending the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receiving a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, where the third ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by encrypting the response message by the IoT device using the device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device using the first decryption result and the device random number to decrypt the second ciphertext;

[0012] generating a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypting the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verifying the second decryption result;

[0013] If the verification is successful, the data is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0014] According to a second aspect of the present disclosure, a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for bidirectional remote encryption of an Internet of Things device is provided, the method comprising:

[0015] Generate a device random number, and encrypt the generated device random number using the public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext;

[0016] Sending the first ciphertext to the operating platform, and receiving a second ciphertext sent by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the IoT device to encrypt a combination of a platform random number and a decryption random number; the decryption random number is a random number obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is a random number generated by the operating platform;

[0017] decrypting the second ciphertext to obtain a first decryption result, and generating a device session key based on the first decryption result and the device random number;

[0018] encrypting the response message using the device session key to obtain a third ciphertext, and sending the third ciphertext to the operating platform, so that the operating platform decrypts the third ciphertext using the platform session key and verifies the obtained second decryption result; the platform session key is a key generated based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number;

[0019] Receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0020] According to a third aspect of the present disclosure, an operating platform is provided, comprising:

[0021] a first decryption module, configured to receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext being ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform; and decrypting the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number;

[0022] a platform encryption module, configured to generate a platform random number, and encrypt the platform random number with the decrypted random number using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext;

[0023] a second decryption module, configured to send the second ciphertext to the IoT device and receive a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, wherein the third ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by encrypting the response message by the IoT device using the device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device using the first decryption result and the device random number to decrypt the second ciphertext;

[0024] a platform verification module, configured to generate a platform session key based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result;

[0025] The platform transmission module is used to transmit data to the IoT device when the verification is passed.

[0026] According to a fourth aspect of the present disclosure, an Internet of Things device is provided, comprising:

[0027] A first encryption module is used to generate a device random number, and encrypt the generated device random number using a public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext;

[0028] a device decryption module, configured to send the first ciphertext to the operating platform and receive a second ciphertext sent by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the IoT device to encrypt a combination of a platform random number and a decryption random number; the decryption random number is a random number obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is a random number generated by the operating platform; decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain a first decryption result, and generate a device session key based on the first decryption result and the device random number;

[0029] a second encryption module, configured to encrypt the response message using the device session key to obtain a third ciphertext, and send the third ciphertext to the operating platform, so that the operating platform can decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key, and verify the obtained second decryption result; the platform session key is a key generated based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number;

[0030] The device transmission module is used to receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0031] According to a fifth aspect of the present disclosure, an electronic device is provided, including:

[0032] one or more processors;

[0033] a memory having one or more programs stored thereon, which, when executed by the one or more processors, causes the one or more processors to implement the above method;

[0034] One or more I / O interfaces are connected between the processor and the memory and configured to implement information interaction between the processor and the memory.

[0035] According to a sixth aspect of the present disclosure, a computer-readable medium is provided, on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, the method according to the claim is implemented.

[0036] The multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform, the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an Internet of Things device, the operating platform, the Internet of Things device, the electronic device, and the computer-readable medium provided by the present invention have at least the following beneficial effects:

[0037] (1) Ensures the identity security of IoT devices and operating platforms, avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks.

[0038] (2) The two-way authentication process uses advanced technologies such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the accuracy of two-way authentication. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0039] Figure 1 A schematic flow chart of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by the present invention;

[0040] Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating some steps of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 3A flowchart illustrating some steps of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 4 A flowchart illustrating some steps of a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

[0043] Figure 5 A schematic diagram of the process flow of the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for IoT devices provided by the present invention;

[0044] Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the composition of a power system in a specific embodiment of the present invention;

[0045] Figure 7 A block diagram of the composition of an operating platform provided by the present invention;

[0046] Figure 8 A block diagram of the composition of an Internet of Things device provided by the present invention;

[0047] Figure 9 A schematic diagram of the composition of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0048] In order to better understand the above technical solution, the above technical solution will be described in detail below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and specific implementation methods. Obviously, the embodiments described are only part of the embodiments of the present invention, not all of them. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by ordinary technicians in this field without making creative efforts are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0049] The terms used in the embodiments of the present invention are for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and are not intended to limit the present invention. The singular forms "a," "an," "the," and "the" used in the embodiments of the present invention and the appended claims are also intended to include plural forms, and unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, "a plurality" generally includes at least two.

[0050] It should also be noted that the terms "include," "comprises," or any other variations thereof are intended to encompass non-exclusive inclusion, such that a product or device comprising a series of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to such product or device. In the absence of further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprises a..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the product or device comprising the element.

[0051] Because remote substation capacity management involves the real-time collection and transmission of massive amounts of data, any security vulnerabilities or data tampering in the substation environment could significantly impact the stability of the entire power grid. Using secure protocols for data transmission, in the complex IoT environment and with massive amounts of sensor data, presents unprecedented pressures and challenges. The introduction of 5G (fifth-generation mobile communication technology) networks, in particular, has placed even higher demands on data security for remote substation capacity management.

[0052] Traditional protocols such as TLS (Transport Layer Security) / SSL (Secure Socket Layer), DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security), and IPSec (Internet Protocol Security) are widely used on the internet and in local area networks, ensuring communication security through encryption and authentication. However, in remote substation nuclear capacity systems, due to the more complex environment and higher transmission requirements, these protocols are gradually exposing their limitations in the face of the surge in the number of IoT devices and the frequent data transmission.

[0053] TLS / SSL, the most widely used encryption protocol for internet communications, ensures data privacy and integrity during transmission by establishing a secure communication channel between the client and server. However, the TLS / SSL encryption and decryption process requires significant computing resources, which can lead to significant performance overhead and impact real-time performance, especially for IoT devices with limited computing power and power resources. In IoT scenarios requiring low latency, this protocol can increase latency and fail to meet the millisecond-level response requirements of substation core capacity.

[0054] The DTLS protocol provides TLS-like encryption security for UDP transmission and is widely used in IoT environments. However, due to the connectionless nature of UDP, DTLS can lead to increased latency and data retransmissions when data transmission is unreliable. This is particularly true in substation systems, where real-time requirements are crucial, and it cannot fully meet the real-time requirements of remote core capacity data. Furthermore, DTLS relies on digital certificates for security, which places higher demands on the computing and storage resources of IoT devices, increasing deployment costs and complexity.

[0055] The IPSec protocol is a network-layer security protocol widely used in VPNs (Virtual Private Networks), providing strong encryption and authentication for network transmissions. However, IPSec configuration is complex, requiring specialized knowledge for key management and certificate distribution. Furthermore, under high loads, the encryption process can impact transmission performance, increasing data transmission latency. This conflicts with the real-time data transmission requirements of IoT devices. Furthermore, IPSec implementations from different vendors may have compatibility issues. This incompatibility can hinder communication between devices, further impacting system scalability and reliability.

[0056] In addition to the aforementioned protocols, the widely used MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) protocol in the IoT is also a lightweight messaging protocol. Designed for low-resource scenarios, it has become widely adopted for communication between IoT devices. MQTT utilizes a publish / subscribe model, allowing devices to exchange messages through a central proxy server. It features quality of service (QoS) settings, allowing for customized data transmission reliability. However, MQTT typically implements only one-way authentication—verifying only the server's identity, not the client's—which can be a limiting factor in applications requiring two-way authentication. MQTT relies on TLS / SSL encrypted communications for data security, which also introduces complexity and performance overhead in encryption management. Furthermore, MQTT's centralized proxy model creates a single point of failure, potentially leading to overloaded proxy servers in large-scale deployments, impacting scalability and performance. Furthermore, MQTT lacks a built-in device discovery mechanism, requiring reliance on other protocols or services, further increasing system complexity and management difficulties.

[0057] The embodiments of the present invention provide a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for bidirectional remote encryption of an operating platform, a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for bidirectional remote encryption of an Internet of Things device, an operating platform, an Internet of Things device, an electronic device, and a computer-readable medium, which are intended to solve at least one of the above technical problems in the prior art.

[0058] The operating platform can be installed on different operating systems, such as Windows, Android, and Apple. Therefore, the operating platform can run on a variety of different types of devices (such as mobile devices, desktop computers, embedded systems, etc.), and then communicate and exchange data with IoT devices.

[0059] Therefore, operators can detect and control different IoT devices through the operating platform on different devices, manage the system composed of IoT devices, and achieve collaborative work and data sharing.

[0060] IoT devices connect the sensor network layer and the transmission network layer in the IoT, collecting data and sending it to the network layer. They are responsible for multiple functions such as data collection, preliminary processing, encryption, and transmission.

[0061] IoT devices can communicate and transmit data through the network, and IoT devices and operating platforms can also communicate and transmit data through the network.

[0062] Figure 1 The embodiment of the present invention provides a multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform. Figure 1 As shown, the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention may include:

[0063] S101. Receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device.

[0064] The first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform.

[0065] The IoT device generates a device random number and encrypts the device random number using the public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext. The IoT device sends the first ciphertext to the operating platform, which receives the first ciphertext.

[0066] The operating platform's public and private keys are pre-generated key pairs using an encryption algorithm. The operating platform's private key is stored on the operating platform, while the operating platform's public key is stored on the IoT device.

[0067] S102: Decrypt the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decryption random number.

[0068] The operating platform decrypts the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform, and uses the random number obtained after decryption as the decryption random number.

[0069] S103: Generate a platform random number, combine the platform random number with the decryption random number, and encrypt the result using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext.

[0070] The operating platform randomly generates a platform random number, combines the platform random number and the obtained decryption random number, and encrypts them using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext.

[0071] The embodiment of the present invention does not limit the method for the operating platform to generate the platform random number and the method for combining the platform random number and the decryption random number. Any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effect is within the protection scope of the embodiment of the present invention.

[0072] S104: Send the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receive the third ciphertext sent by the IoT device.

[0073] Among them, the third ciphertext is the ciphertext obtained by the IoT device using the device session key to encrypt the response message; the device session key is the key generated by the IoT device when decrypting the second ciphertext based on the first decryption result obtained and the device random number.

[0074] The operating platform sends the second ciphertext to the IoT device, which receives the second ciphertext sent by the operating platform. The IoT device decrypts the second ciphertext using its private key to obtain a first decryption result, and then obtains a combination of the first random number and the second random number based on the first decryption result.

[0075] The first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0076] The IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number and the device random number are identical. If they are, it uses the platform random number and the device random number obtained through decryption to generate a device session key using a key generation algorithm. The IoT device encrypts the response message using the device session key to generate a third ciphertext. The device then sends the third ciphertext to the operating platform, which receives the third ciphertext.

[0077] The response message may include a response header and a response body. The response body contains the data returned by the IoT device to the operating platform, which may be an HTML document, JSON data, an image, etc.

[0078] The embodiments of the present invention do not limit the key generation algorithm, and any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effects is within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0079] In some possible implementations, the IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number obtained is identical to the device random number. If they are identical, it is determined that there may be an error in the identity of the operating platform, and the next steps are not performed.

[0080] S105 . Generate a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, use the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result.

[0081] The operating platform uses the same key generation algorithm to generate a platform session key for the decrypted random number and the platform random number, and uses the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain a second decryption result, uses the second decryption result as decryption information, and verifies the validity of the decryption information.

[0082] S106. If the verification is successful, transmit the data to the IoT device.

[0083] When the validity of the decrypted information is verified, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device and receive data transmitted by the IoT device.

[0084] Since the first ciphertext is obtained by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform to encrypt the device random number, and the decrypted random number is obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext, if the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are not a pair of keys, the decrypted random number and the device random number obtained by decryption will not be the same number.

[0085] If the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are a pair of keys, the decrypted number should be the device random number, that is, the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same number.

[0086] The second ciphertext is obtained by combining the platform random number and the decryption random number and encrypting them using the public key of the IoT device. After receiving the second ciphertext, the IoT device uses the private key of the IoT device to decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain a combination of the first random number and the second random number.

[0087] The first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0088] If the public key used by the operating platform and the private key used by the IoT device are not a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption will naturally be different from the platform random number. The second random number obtained by decryption will also obviously be different from the decrypted random number. Furthermore, even if the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same, the second random number and the device random number will still be different.

[0089] If the public key used by the platform and the private key used by the IoT device are a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption is the platform random number, and the second random number obtained by decryption should be the decrypted random number. In other words, the decrypted random number and the second random number should be the same number. If the decrypted random number and the device random number are also the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are also the same number. However, if the decrypted random number and the device random number are not the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are different numbers.

[0090] Therefore, the second random number and the device random number are the same only when the public key of the operating platform stored in the IoT device and the private key of the operating platform are a pair of keys, and the public key of the IoT device stored in the operating platform and the private key of the IoT device are a pair of keys.

[0091] When the IoT device detects that the second random number is the same as the device random number, the IoT device can confirm the identity of the operating system. When the second random number is the same as the device random number, the first random number and the platform random number will obviously be the same.

[0092] After confirming the identity of the operating system, the IoT device generates a device session key based on the obtained first random number and the device random number, which is equivalent to generating a device session key based on the platform random number and the device random number.

[0093] The operating platform uses the decrypted random number and the platform random number to generate a platform session key. The IoT device encrypts the response message using the device session key to generate the third ciphertext. The operating platform decrypts the message using the platform session key to obtain the decrypted information.

[0094] Only when the platform session key and the device session key are consistent, the decrypted message will be consistent with the response message, that is, the decrypted message can be valid information.

[0095] Therefore, after determining that the decrypted message is a valid message, the operating platform can confirm that the platform session key and the device session key are consistent. In other words, the decrypted random number and the device random number are consistent, and the platform random number obtained by the IoT platform is also correct.

[0096] Therefore, the operating platform can also confirm that the public key of the operating platform stored in the IoT device is a pair of keys with the private key of the operating platform, and the public key of the IoT device stored in the operating platform is a pair of keys with the private key of the IoT device. The operating platform can also confirm the identity information of the IoT device and whether it is a trustworthy device.

[0097] At this point, the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, and can both confirm each other's identity and are trustworthy devices.

[0098] That is to say, in the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for the operating platform provided in the embodiment of the present invention, the operating platform can only transmit data to the IoT device when the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, thereby ensuring the identity security of the IoT device and the operating platform and avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks.

[0099] At the same time, this two-way authentication process uses advanced technical means such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the authentication accuracy of the two-way authentication.

[0100] The following is a detailed introduction to the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

[0101] As mentioned above, the public and private keys of the operating platform are pre-generated key pairs using an encryption algorithm. The private key of the operating platform is stored on the operating platform, and the public key of the operating platform is stored on the IoT device.

[0102] Specifically, the encryption algorithm may be SM2 (based on elliptic curve public key cryptography algorithm).

[0103] That is to say, the public key and private key of the operating platform are the key pair generated by SM2; the public key and private key of the IoT device are the key pair generated by SM2; the operating platform stores the public key of the IoT device; and the IoT device stores the public key of the operating platform.

[0104] As the system's encryption technology, SM2 is characterized by high compatibility and low cost in power system IoT devices.

[0105] In some specific implementations, depending on the needs of specific hardware and application scenarios, SM2 can be replaced with RSA (asymmetric encryption algorithm) or ECC (elliptic curve encryption algorithm) to improve execution efficiency and security.

[0106] RSA is widely used in power dispatch data networks to ensure data transmission security and protect critical data from unauthorized access. It provides a reliable encryption method for power monitoring systems and power dispatch data networks, ensuring secure communications.

[0107] Due to its high security and small key size, ECC is very suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices and can effectively prevent data tampering and privacy leakage.

[0108] As mentioned above, the operating platform is for use by operators. Therefore, the operating platform includes an interactive system for operators to operate. After completing the two-way verification, the operating platform will only transmit data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface.

[0109] In some specific implementations, the operator's operation on the interactive interface can be to send an operation command. The operating platform responds to the operator's operation on the interactive interface and transmits the corresponding operation command to the IoT device. The IoT device can respond to the operation command and perform the operation corresponding to the operation command.

[0110] In some possible implementations, in order to ensure that the operation command is issued by an operator with corresponding authorization, the identity of the operator needs to be verified.

[0111] Figure 2 A flowchart of an implementation method for verifying the identity of an operator is shown in FIG. Figure 2 As shown, verifying the operator's identity may include:

[0112] S201. In response to an operator's operation on an interactive interface, obtain a digital certificate corresponding to the operator.

[0113] The digital certificate is a certificate obtained by encrypting and signing the operator's identity information using the private key of the certificate issuing authority.

[0114] Before S201, the operator generates a pair of public keys Pub op and private key Priv op , and the public key Pub op and identity information ID op Submit to CA (Certificate Authority).

[0115] CA verifies the operator's identity ID op , to ensure its legality.

[0116] CA uses its own private key Priv CA Public key Pub for the operator op and its identity information ID op Sign and generate digital certificate Data op Specifically, Data op =(Priv CA ,ID op ).

[0117] CA for data block Data op Perform signature operation and generate digital signature Sig CA ,Specifically,Sig CA =Sign(Priv CA ,Data op ), where the signature function Sign is an encryption operation based on the private key.

[0118] The CA issues the generated digital signature and data block to the operator to form a digital certificate Cert op =(Data op ,Sig CA ).

[0119] In S201, in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, the operating system obtains the operator's corresponding digital certificate Cert op .

[0120] S202: Use the public key of the certificate authority to verify the signature of the digital certificate. If the verification is successful, obtain the certificate information of the digital certificate.

[0121] The certificate information includes the validity period and revocation status of the digital certificate.

[0122] The operating system uses the CA's public key Pub CA Verify the signature in a digital certificate.

[0123] Specifically, the operating system extracts the data block Data from the digital certificate op and signature Sig CA， The system uses the CA's public key Pub CA Signature Sig CA， Verify: Verify(Pub CA ,Data op ,Sig CA ), if the verification is successful, it means that the digital signature is generated by the CA's private key, the content of the certificate has not been tampered with, and the operator's identity is confirmed.

[0124] After the operator's identity is confirmed, the certificate information of the digital certificate is obtained. The certificate information includes the validity period and revocation status of the digital certificate (which may be revoked or not revoked).

[0125] S203: When the certificate information of the digital certificate meets the preset requirements, transmit data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0126] The preset requirement may be that the previous date is within the validity period of the digital certificate and the revocation status is not revoked.

[0127] That is, when the current date is within the validity period of the digital certificate and the revocation status is not revoked, the operating platform transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0128] In some possible implementations, after the operator's identity is confirmed, if it can be confirmed that the operation was performed by the operator, the operator's identity does not need to be confirmed again, and data corresponding to the operator's operation is directly transmitted to the IoT device.

[0129] Figure 3 A flow chart showing another implementation method for verifying the identity of an operator is shown in FIG. Figure 3 As shown, verifying the operator's identity may include:

[0130] S301 : In response to an operator's operation on an interactive interface, receiving a user name and password input by the operator and performing verification.

[0131] The operating system responds to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, displays an input box for the operator to enter a user name and password on the interactive interface, receives the user name and password entered by the operator into the input box, and verifies the correctness of the user name and password.

[0132] S302: If the verification is successful, receive the verification code input by the operator and verify the correctness and validity period of the verification code;

[0133] The verification code is a dynamic verification code generated by the operator using a hardware token.

[0134] A hardware token can be a device that generates a dynamic password using a unique key (seed) corresponding to time and a unique serial number of the token. It can generate a dynamic password with a time limit (i.e., validity period).

[0135] If the verification is passed, an input box for the operator to enter a verification code is displayed on the interactive interface, the verification code entered by the operator into the input box is received, and the correctness and validity period of the verification code are verified.

[0136] S303: If the verification code is correct and valid, transmit data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0137] When the verification code is correct and the current date is within the validity period of the verification code, the operation platform transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0138] In some possible implementations, after the operator's identity is confirmed, if it can be confirmed that the operation was performed by the operator, the operator's identity does not need to be confirmed again, and data corresponding to the operator's operation is directly transmitted to the IoT device.

[0139] In some possible implementations, after two-way authentication is established and the operator's identity is authenticated, in order to prevent erroneous operations, the operating system may require the operator to perform multiple confirmations before performing key operations.

[0140] Figure 4 The flowchart shows an implementation method in which the operating system requires the operator to perform multiple confirmations before performing key operations, as shown in FIG. Figure 4 As shown, the operating system requires operators to perform multiple confirmations before performing key operations, which may include:

[0141] S401. In response to an operator's operation on an interactive interface, risk warning information corresponding to the operator's operation is displayed on the interactive interface.

[0142] In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, risk prompt information corresponding to the operator's operation is displayed on the interactive interface so that the operator can know the operation risk and confirm to execute the operation.

[0143] S402: When the operator confirms the risk warning information, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0144] When the operator is aware of the operation risk and confirms the execution of the operation (i.e., the operator confirms the risk prompt information), the operation platform transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device.

[0145] In some possible implementations, S401 and S402 are executed only when the operator performs a critical operation. When the operator performs a non-critical operation, data corresponding to the operator's operation is directly transmitted to the IoT device.

[0146] In some possible implementations, since a critical operation is being performed, in order to further ensure the security of the operation execution, the operator identity is confirmed again, that is, the operator identity is authenticated again.

[0147] Before transmitting data corresponding to the operator's operation to the Internet of Things device, if the operator confirms the risk warning information, input prompt information prompting the operator to enter identity information is displayed on the interactive interface; if the identity information entered by the operator is verified, the data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

[0148] That is, before transmitting data corresponding to an operator's operation to an IoT device, and after the operator confirms the risk warning, an input box for the operator to enter identification information, specifically a one-time password (OTP) or physical token, is displayed on the interactive interface. The operator's input of the one-time password (i.e., dynamic verification code) or physical token (i.e., digital certificate) is received and verified to ensure that the operator is aware that they are performing a critical operation. If the verification is successful, the data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the IoT device.

[0149] Multiple confirmations and secondary authentication ensure that only operators who have passed multiple layers of verification can perform key operations, reducing the possibility of incorrect operation.

[0150] In some possible implementations, to increase communication security and confidentiality, data can be signed using the platform session key and transmitted to the IoT device. After receiving the signed data, the IoT device can verify and decrypt it using the device session key.

[0151] Similarly, IoT devices can sign data based on the device session key and transmit the signed data to the operating platform. After receiving the signed data, the operating platform can use the platform session key to verify and decrypt it.

[0152] In some possible implementations, an identifier corresponding to the data may be generated, and a data transmission frequency may be determined based on the identifier. If the transmission frequency is greater than a preset frequency value, data transmission to the IoT device may be refused.

[0153] Specifically, each operation command issued by the operator is accompanied by a unique identifier (which can be generated based on a timestamp or sequence number). This way, even if the same operation command is issued multiple times, the operating system can determine the time interval between the operation commands based on the identifier and calculate the frequency of the operation command transmission.

[0154] If the sending frequency is greater than the preset frequency value, it means that the same operation command is sent repeatedly in a very short period of time, and the operating system can prevent their execution.

[0155] In addition, for different types of operation commands, the operating system can set different response times to ensure that various operation commands are effectively processed within a reasonable range, thereby further enhancing the security and flexibility of the system.

[0156] In some possible implementations, when the operating system transmits data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, the operating information is saved to provide a basis for tracking and subsequent analysis of the operation.

[0157] Specifically, in response to an operator's operation on the interactive interface, operation information corresponding to the operation is obtained, and the operation information is encrypted and stored in a log file.

[0158] The operation information includes the operator's identity information, the operator's operation, and the corresponding operation time.

[0159] In other words, the system monitors all operator actions in real time and records a detailed log of each step, including the time, specific operation content, and operator identity. All operator actions are encrypted and stored in an unalterable log file to facilitate future audits. Any attempt to bypass authentication or perform unauthorized operations will be immediately recorded and trigger an alarm mechanism.

[0160] Figure 5 Schematic diagram of the process of multi-system interactive communication authentication method for IoT devices provided by the embodiment of the present invention. Figure 5 As shown, the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for IoT devices provided by the embodiment of the present invention may include:

[0161] S501: Generate a device random number, and encrypt the generated device random number using the public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext.

[0162] The IoT device generates a device random number and encrypts the device random number using the public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext.

[0163] The operating platform's public and private keys are pre-generated key pairs using an encryption algorithm. The operating platform's private key is stored on the operating platform, while the operating platform's public key is stored on the IoT device.

[0164] S502: Send the first ciphertext to the operating platform, and receive the second ciphertext sent by the operating platform.

[0165] Among them, the second ciphertext is the ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the Internet of Things device to encrypt the combination of the platform random number and the decryption random number; the decrypted random number is the random number obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is the random number generated by the operating platform.

[0166] The IoT device sends the first ciphertext to the operating platform, which receives the first ciphertext and decrypts the first ciphertext using its private key, using the random number obtained after decryption as the decryption random number.

[0167] The operating platform randomly generates a platform random number, combines the platform random number and the obtained decryption random number, and encrypts them using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext.

[0168] The embodiment of the present invention does not limit the method for the operating platform to generate the platform random number and the method for combining the platform random number and the decryption random number. Any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effect is within the protection scope of the embodiment of the present invention.

[0169] The operating platform sends the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and the IoT device receives the second ciphertext sent by the operating platform.

[0170] S503: Decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain a first decryption result, and generate a device session key according to the first decryption result and the device random number.

[0171] The IoT device decrypts the second ciphertext using the private key of the IoT device to obtain a first decryption result, and obtains a combination of the first random number and the second random number based on the first decryption result.

[0172] The first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0173] The IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number obtained by decryption is the same as the device random number. If they are the same, the platform random number and the device random number obtained by decryption are used to generate a device session key using a key generation algorithm.

[0174] The embodiments of the present invention do not limit the key generation algorithm, and any method that can achieve the corresponding technical effects is within the protection scope of the embodiments of the present invention.

[0175] In some possible implementations, the IoT device determines whether the decrypted random number obtained is identical to the device random number. If they are identical, it is determined that there may be an error in the identity of the operating platform, and the next steps are not performed.

[0176] S504. Use the device session key to encrypt the response message to obtain a third ciphertext, and send the third ciphertext to the operating platform so that the operating platform can decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key and verify the obtained second decryption result.

[0177] The platform session key is a key generated based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number. The response message may include a response header and a response body. The response body contains the data returned by the IoT device to the operating platform, which may be an HTML document, JSON data, an image, etc.

[0178] The IoT device encrypts the response message using the device session key to generate a third ciphertext, and sends the third ciphertext to the operating platform, which receives the third ciphertext.

[0179] The operating platform uses the same key generation algorithm to generate a platform session key for the decrypted random number and the platform random number, and uses the platform session key to decrypt the third ciphertext to obtain a second decryption result, uses the second decryption result as decryption information, and verifies the validity of the decryption information.

[0180] S505: Receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0181] When the validity of the decrypted information is verified, the operating platform can transmit data to the IoT device, and the IoT device receives the data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0182] IoT devices can also send data to the operating platform, and the operating platform can also receive data transmitted by IoT devices.

[0183] Since the first ciphertext is obtained by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform to encrypt the device random number, and the decrypted random number is obtained by the operating platform using the private key of the operating platform to decrypt the first ciphertext, if the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are not a pair of keys, the decrypted random number and the device random number obtained by decryption will not be the same number.

[0184] If the public key used by the IoT device and the private key used by the operating platform are a pair of keys, the decrypted number should be the device random number, that is, the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same number.

[0185] The second ciphertext is obtained by combining the platform random number and the decryption random number and encrypting them using the public key of the IoT device. After receiving the second ciphertext, the IoT device uses the private key of the IoT device to decrypt the second ciphertext to obtain a combination of the first random number and the second random number.

[0186] The first random number corresponds to the platform random number, and the second random number corresponds to the decryption random number.

[0187] If the public key used by the operating platform and the private key used by the IoT device are not a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption will naturally be different from the platform random number. The second random number obtained by decryption will also obviously be different from the decrypted random number. Furthermore, even if the decrypted random number and the device random number should be the same, the second random number and the device random number will still be different.

[0188] If the public key used by the platform and the private key used by the IoT device are a pair of keys, the first random number obtained by decryption is the platform random number, and the second random number obtained by decryption should be the decrypted random number. In other words, the decrypted random number and the second random number should be the same number. If the decrypted random number and the device random number are also the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are also the same number. However, if the decrypted random number and the device random number are not the same number, then the second random number and the device random number are different numbers.

[0189] Therefore, the second random number and the device random number are the same only when the public key of the operating platform stored in the IoT device and the private key of the operating platform are a pair of keys, and the public key of the IoT device stored in the operating platform and the private key of the IoT device are a pair of keys.

[0190] When the IoT device detects that the second random number is the same as the device random number, the IoT device can confirm the identity of the operating system. When the second random number is the same as the device random number, the first random number and the platform random number will obviously be the same.

[0191] After confirming the identity of the operating system, the IoT device generates a device session key based on the obtained first random number and the device random number, which is equivalent to generating a device session key based on the platform random number and the device random number.

[0192] The operating platform uses the decrypted random number and the platform random number to generate a platform session key. The IoT device encrypts the response message using the device session key to generate the third ciphertext. The operating platform decrypts the message using the platform session key to obtain the decrypted information.

[0193] Only when the platform session key and the device session key are consistent, the decrypted message will be consistent with the response message, that is, the decrypted message can be valid information.

[0194] Therefore, after determining that the decrypted message is a valid message, the operating platform can confirm that the platform session key and the device session key are consistent. In other words, the decrypted random number and the device random number are consistent, and the platform random number obtained by the IoT platform is also correct.

[0195] Therefore, the operating platform can also confirm that the public key of the operating platform stored in the IoT device is a pair of keys with the private key of the operating platform, and the public key of the IoT device stored in the operating platform is a pair of keys with the private key of the IoT device. The operating platform can also confirm the identity information of the IoT device and whether it is a trustworthy device.

[0196] At this point, the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, and can both confirm each other's identity and are trustworthy devices.

[0197] That is to say, in the multi-system interactive communication authentication method for IoT devices provided in the embodiment of the present invention, the operating platform can only transmit data to the IoT device when the IoT device and the operating platform have completed two-way verification, thereby ensuring the identity security of the IoT device and the operating platform and avoiding unauthorized access and potential network attacks.

[0198] At the same time, this two-way authentication process uses advanced technical means such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors in the two-way authentication process and improving the authentication accuracy of the two-way authentication.

[0199] As mentioned above, the encryption algorithm can be SM2. That is, the public and private keys of the operating platform are a key pair generated by SM2; the public and private keys of the IoT device are a key pair generated by SM2; the operating platform stores the public key of the IoT device; and the IoT device stores the public key of the operating platform.

[0200] As the system's encryption technology, SM2 is characterized by high compatibility and low cost in power system IoT devices.

[0201] In some specific implementations, depending on the needs of specific hardware and application scenarios, SM2 can be replaced with RSA or ECC to improve execution efficiency and security.

[0202] RSA is widely used in power dispatch data networks to ensure data transmission security and protect critical data from unauthorized access. It provides a reliable encryption method for power monitoring systems and power dispatch data networks, ensuring secure communications.

[0203] Due to its high security and small key size, ECC is very suitable for resource-constrained IoT devices and can effectively prevent data tampering and privacy leakage.

[0204] The following describes a specific embodiment for a power system to introduce the bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention.

[0205] Figure 6 The schematic diagram of the power system is shown in Figure 1. Figure 6 As shown, the Internet of Things device in the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention can be an Internet of Things device of a substation, which can be used for remote capacity verification of substation batteries. The operating platform can be a capacity verification platform, and the operator of the operating platform can be a capacity verification personnel.

[0206] The bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by the embodiment of the present invention can ensure the security of operations, the accuracy of data and the reliability of the system in the remote capacity verification of substation batteries by implementing a strict multi-factor identity authentication process, using encryption technology based on the SM2 algorithm, and establishing a bidirectional authentication mechanism between the capacity verification platform and the IoT devices of the substation, thereby effectively preventing unauthorized access and man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0207] The specific implementation is as follows:

[0208] 1. Identity verification phase

[0209] Operators must be authenticated before attempting to access a remote core capacity system. This can be achieved in several ways:

[0210] Digital certificate: The operator uses a digital certificate for authentication. The system will check the validity of the certificate, including whether it is issued by a trusted certificate authority, whether it is within the validity period, and whether it has been revoked.

[0211] Multi-factor authentication: The operator first enters the username and password, and then performs a secondary verification through a one-time password generated by a hardware token to ensure that the operator's identity is verified in multiple ways.

[0212] Biometric technology: Introducing fingerprint recognition or facial recognition technology to provide a higher level of security.

[0213] 2. System initialization and key generation

[0214] The operating platform and IoT device each generate a pair of public and private keys based on the SM2 algorithm. These keys will be used in the subsequent two-way authentication process.

[0215] 3. Two-way authentication process

[0216] The IoT device generates a random number V1 and uses the public key P of the operating platform uPerform SM2 encryption to generate ciphertext C1: C1=SM2_Encrypt(P u ,V1), where SM2_Encrypt is the SM2 encryption operation.

[0217] The IoT device sends the ciphertext C1 to the operating platform. After receiving C1, the operating platform uses its private key d u Decrypt to get V1 ’ :V1 ’ =SM2_Decrypt(d u ,C1), where SM2_Decrypt is the SM2 decryption operation.

[0218] The operating platform generates a random number V2 and compares it with V1 ’ Combined use of IoT device's public key Encrypt to generate ciphertext C2: C2=SM2_Encrypt(P v ,V1 ’ ||V2).

[0219] The operating platform sends the ciphertext C2 to the IoT device. After receiving C2, the IoT device uses its private key Decrypt to get V1 ” and V2 ’ :(V1 ” ,V2 ’ )=SM2_Decrypt(d v ,C2).

[0220] IoT Device Check V1 ” Is it the same as the previously generated V1? If so, proceed to the next step.

[0221] IoT device generates session key K s :K s =H(V1,V2), where H is the key generation algorithm.

[0222] The IoT device generates a response message (b1, S1) and uses the session key K s Encrypt and generate ciphertext C3: C3=SM2_Encrypt(K s ,b1||S1), the IoT device sends the ciphertext C3 to the operating platform.

[0223] After the operating platform receives C3, it decrypts the V1 ’ and the self-generated V2 to calculate the session key K s . Due to K sThe generation of the session key depends on the random number of both parties, thus ensuring that only after the two-way authentication is successful can both parties obtain the same session key. s Decrypt to get b1 and S1: (b1 ’ ,S1 ’ )=SM2_Decrypt(K s ,C3).

[0224] Operating platform inspection b1 ’ and S1 ’ Is it valid? If the verification is successful, the operating platform will confirm the session key K s This means that the IoT device and the operating platform have successfully achieved mutual authentication and generated a shared session key. The two-way authentication mechanism thus ensures strict verification of both parties' identities and secure management of session keys, thereby improving the security and reliability of the overall system.

[0225] Through a two-way authentication process, a secure communication channel is established between the operating platform and IoT devices, ensuring the security and accuracy of data transmission. This mechanism effectively prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and ensures that only verified devices and operators can communicate.

[0226] 4. Guarantee of operational safety and accuracy

[0227] To further prevent misoperation, the system incorporates a multi-level confirmation mechanism before critical operations. When an operator issues an operation (such as remote capacity verification), the system first prompts the operator for confirmation through the user interface, detailing the nature of the operation and its potential impact. This confirmation step requires the operator to enter secondary authentication information, such as a one-time password (OTP) or biometric verification, to ensure that the operator is fully aware of the critical operation being performed. This ensures operational security not only relies on the security of the communication channel but also reduces the possibility of misoperation through multiple layers of verification.

[0228] 5. Remote core capacity operation

[0229] After completing identity verification and two-way authentication, the operator can start remote capacity verification operations. The system provides a user-friendly interface that allows operators to easily perform remote battery detection and management.

[0230] To prevent misoperation, the system incorporates a multi-confirmation feature into the user interface. Before executing critical operations, operators must confirm multiple times through system prompts and complete additional authentication steps to ensure the intent and accuracy of their actions. Furthermore, the system signs each command and appends a unique identifier (such as a timestamp) to prevent duplicate execution or tampering by unauthorized entities.

[0231] 6. Monitoring and Auditing

[0232] The system keeps detailed records of all identity verification and two-way authentication processes, as well as every operator action. This log data is stored in encrypted form to ensure it cannot be tampered with, facilitating subsequent monitoring and auditing. It includes timestamps, operation details, authentication results, and every key step in the execution process, ensuring transparency and traceability of system operations. This comprehensive audit capability not only enables post-event tracing and analysis but also issues timely alerts when operator behavior deviates, providing real-time monitoring and further ensuring system security and operational accuracy.

[0233] In this specific embodiment, a multi-layered authentication approach significantly improves system security by combining digital certificates, hardware tokens, and biometric technologies such as fingerprint and facial recognition. Digital certificates guarantee the credibility and validity of the certificate issuer; the one-time password generated by the hardware token increases dynamism and uniqueness; and biometric technologies provide a higher level of authentication through unforgeable biological characteristics.

[0234] The bidirectional authentication mechanism, using the SM2 algorithm, ensures the authenticity of both the operating platform and the IoT device. Through the random number generation and verification process, the system effectively resists man-in-the-middle and replay attacks, ensuring the uniqueness and security of each communication.

[0235] The session key generated by two-way authentication is used to encrypt data transmission, ensuring that the data cannot be tampered with during transmission. Even if the data is intercepted, the valid information cannot be read without decrypting it with the session key, thus ensuring data integrity and confidentiality.

[0236] During the two-way authentication process, both parties generate and verify random numbers to ensure the consistency of the communication data. This mechanism not only prevents replay attacks but also verifies the validity of each communication, ensuring accurate data transmission.

[0237] Multi-factor authentication ensures that only operators who have passed multiple verifications can access the system, preventing unauthorized personnel from operating. The use of digital certificates further enhances the credibility of authentication.

[0238] The operating platform and device each generate a public key and a private key based on the SM2 algorithm to ensure key uniqueness and security. This mechanism not only ensures the reliability of the authentication process but also prevents the key from being stolen or tampered with.

[0239] Specifically, the process of this specific embodiment can be based on privacy computing. By combining privacy computing technology, the substation remote core capacity system can achieve multiple security protections during data transmission, making communication between devices more secure and reliable, and data will not be tampered with or leaked. In addition, privacy computing can cope with the challenges of complex electromagnetic environments and external attacks, improve the system's anti-interference ability, and provide substations with a safer and more reliable remote core capacity data transmission solution. For example, in a complex electromagnetic environment, privacy computing can effectively prevent data injection and interference attacks, ensuring that data will not be affected by external factors during transmission, thereby ensuring the security and stability of the entire power grid. By introducing privacy computing technology, the system can achieve millisecond-level response and real-time monitoring during the transmission process, further improving the timeliness of data transmission.

[0240] Therefore, by optimizing traditional protocols and applying privacy-preserving computing technologies, remote power substation systems can achieve efficient data transmission and real-time equipment monitoring while ensuring security, reliability, and privacy. In the future, remote power substation systems will require more efficient, flexible, and multi-layered security solutions to adapt to the increasingly complex challenges of the IoT environment. Through the continuous development of privacy-preserving computing technologies and protocol optimization, remote power substation systems will gradually evolve from single-source data transmission protection to multi-layered security protection. This will not only improve data integrity, security, and privacy, but also further enhance the stability and emergency response capabilities of the power grid, driving the continuous innovation and development of smart grid technology.

[0241] Privacy computing, through technologies such as multi-party secure computing, federated learning, and homomorphic encryption, allows data to be computed and transmitted without being exposed, thus protecting sensitive data throughout its lifecycle. This approach is particularly applicable to remote nuclear capacity substation systems, where data sensitivity is high. In remote nuclear capacity scenarios, privacy computing ensures that data is protected from leakage, tampering, or unauthorized access during transmission and processing, meeting the system's multiple requirements for data integrity, authenticity, and security.

[0242] Specifically, multi-party secure computing enables collaborative data processing between different parties without compromising data privacy. This allows remote core capacity systems to obtain the required computational results without exposing the original data, thus improving data security. Homomorphic encryption technology allows operations to be performed directly on encrypted data, ensuring that even if the data is intercepted during transmission or processing, external parties cannot decrypt and obtain the original data, further enhancing data privacy and security. Federated learning technology enables the sharing of models between different devices or nodes without the need to aggregate data on a central server. This effectively avoids the security risks of data leakage and centralized management, and is suitable for the data processing needs of large numbers of distributed IoT devices in substation scenarios.

[0243] Based on Figure 1 The same principle as shown in the method, Figure 7 FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the structure of an operating platform provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 7 As shown, the operating platform may include:

[0244] A first decryption module is configured to receive a first ciphertext sent by the IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform; and decrypt the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number.

[0245] The platform encryption module is used to generate a platform random number, and encrypt the platform random number with the decryption random number using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext;

[0246] a second decryption module, configured to send the second ciphertext to the IoT device and receive a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, where the third ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by encrypting the response message using the device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device using the first decryption result and the device random number to decrypt the second ciphertext;

[0247] a platform verification module, configured to generate a platform session key based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result;

[0248] The platform transmission module is used to transmit data to the IoT device if the verification is passed.

[0249] In the operating platform provided by the disclosed embodiments, the operating platform can only transmit data to an IoT device after both devices have completed bidirectional authentication. This ensures the identity security of both the IoT device and the operating platform, preventing unauthorized access and potential network attacks. Furthermore, this bidirectional authentication process utilizes advanced technologies such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors and improving the accuracy of bidirectional authentication.

[0250] It is understandable that the above modules of the operating platform in the embodiment of the present disclosure have the function of realizing Figure 1 The functions of the corresponding steps of the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in . This function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing the corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions. The above modules can be software and / or hardware, and the above modules can be implemented separately or integrated into multiple modules. For the functional description of each module of the above operating platform, please refer to Figure 1 The corresponding description of the bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in will not be repeated here.

[0251] Based on Figure 5 The same principle as shown in the method, Figure 8 FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of the structure of an Internet of Things device provided by an embodiment of the present invention, such as Figure 8 As shown, the IoT device may include:

[0252] A first encryption module is used to generate a device random number, and encrypt the generated device random number using a public key of the operating platform to generate a first ciphertext;

[0253] The device decryption module is configured to send a first ciphertext to the operating platform and receive a second ciphertext sent by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is the ciphertext obtained by the operating platform using the public key of the IoT device to encrypt a combination of a platform random number and a decryption random number; the decryption random number is the random number obtained by the operating platform using the operating platform's private key to decrypt the first ciphertext; the platform random number is the random number generated by the operating platform; the second ciphertext is decrypted to obtain a first decryption result, and a device session key is generated based on the first decryption result and the device random number;

[0254] a second encryption module, configured to encrypt the response message using the device session key to obtain a third ciphertext, and send the third ciphertext to the operating platform, so that the operating platform can decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key and verify the obtained second decryption result; the platform session key is a key generated based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number;

[0255] The device transmission module is used to receive data transmitted by the operating platform.

[0256] In the IoT devices provided by the disclosed embodiments, the operating platform can only transmit data to the IoT device after the IoT device and the operating platform have completed bidirectional authentication. This ensures the identity security of the IoT device and the operating platform, preventing unauthorized access and potential network attacks. Furthermore, this bidirectional authentication process utilizes advanced technologies such as digital signatures to ensure the integrity and authenticity of information during transmission, reducing the probability of errors during bidirectional authentication and improving the accuracy of bidirectional authentication.

[0257] It is understandable that the above modules of the operating platform in the embodiment of the present disclosure have the function of realizing Figure 5The functions of the corresponding steps of the two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in . This function can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing the corresponding software. The hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above functions. The above modules can be software and / or hardware, and the above modules can be implemented separately or integrated into multiple modules. For the functional description of each module of the above operating platform, please refer to Figure 5 The corresponding description of the bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method in the embodiment shown in will not be repeated here.

[0258] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 9 As shown, the electronic device provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes:

[0259] One or more processors 901;

[0260] A memory 902 having one or more programs stored thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, causes the one or more processors to implement any one of the above-mentioned two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication methods;

[0261] One or more I / O interfaces 903 are connected between the processor and the memory and are configured to implement information exchange between the processor and the memory.

[0262] Among them, the processor 901 is a device with data processing capabilities, including but not limited to a central processing unit (CPU); the memory 902 is a device with data storage capabilities, including but not limited to random access memory (RAM, more specifically such as SDRAM, DDR, etc.), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), and flash memory (FLASH); the I / O interface (read-write interface) 903 is connected between the processor 901 and the memory 902, and can realize information exchange between the processor 901 and the memory 902, including but not limited to a data bus (Bus), etc.

[0263] In some embodiments, the processor 901 , the memory 902 , and the I / O interface 903 are connected to each other via a bus, and further connected to other components of the computing device.

[0264] This embodiment also provides a computer-readable medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method provided by this embodiment is implemented. To avoid repeated description, the specific steps of the bidirectional remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method are not repeated here.

[0265] Although preferred embodiments of the present invention have been described, those skilled in the art may make additional changes and modifications to these embodiments once they are aware of the basic inventive concepts. Therefore, the appended claims are intended to be interpreted as including the preferred embodiments and all changes and modifications that fall within the scope of the invention. Obviously, those skilled in the art may make various changes and modifications to the present invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Thus, the present invention is intended to include such changes and modifications as fall within the scope of the claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. A two-way remote encrypted multi-system interactive communication authentication method, characterized in that: The method is used for operating a platform, and the method comprises: Receiving a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext is a ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using a public key of the operating platform; Decrypting the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number; Generate a platform random number, and combine the platform random number with the decryption random number and encrypt the resultant data using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext; Sending the second ciphertext to the IoT device, and receiving a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, where the third ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by encrypting the response message by the IoT device using the device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device using the first decryption result and the device random number to decrypt the second ciphertext; generating a platform session key according to the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypting the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verifying the second decryption result; If the verification is successful, the data is transmitted to the IoT device.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein The operating platform includes an interactive interface for an operator to operate, and the data transmission to the IoT device includes: In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein The transmitting data to the IoT device in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface includes: In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, displaying risk warning information corresponding to the operator's operation on the interactive interface; When the operator confirms the risk warning information, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

4. The method according to claim 3, wherein When the operator confirms the risk warning information, transmitting data corresponding to the operator's operation to the Internet of Things device includes: When the operator confirms the risk warning information, an input prompting information prompting the operator to input identity information is displayed on the interactive interface; When the identity information input by the operator is verified, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

5. The method according to claim 2, wherein The method further comprises: In response to an operation of an operator on the interactive interface, obtaining operation information corresponding to the operation, the operation information including identity information of the operator, the operation of the operator, and the corresponding operation time; The operation information is encrypted and stored in a log file.

6. The method according to claim 2, wherein The transmitting, in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device includes: In response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, a digital certificate corresponding to the operator is obtained; the digital certificate is a certificate obtained by encrypting and signing the operator's identity information using a private key of a certificate issuing authority; Verify the signature of the digital certificate using the public key of the certificate issuing authority, and if the verification is successful, obtain certificate information of the digital certificate, the certificate information including the validity period and revocation status of the digital certificate; When the certificate information of the digital certificate meets the preset requirements, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the Internet of Things device.

7. The method according to claim 2, wherein The transmitting, in response to the operator's operation on the interactive interface, data corresponding to the operator's operation to the IoT device includes: In response to an operator's operation on the interactive interface, receiving a user name and password input by the operator and performing verification; If the verification is successful, the verification code input by the operator is received and the correctness and validity period of the verification code are verified; the verification code is a dynamic verification code generated by the operator using a hardware token; When the verification code is correct and valid, data corresponding to the operator's operation is transmitted to the IoT device.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein The transmitting data to the IoT device includes: Generate an identifier corresponding to the data, where the identifier is generated based on either a timestamp or a serial number corresponding to the data; determining a data transmission frequency according to the identifier, and refusing to transmit data to the IoT device if the data transmission frequency is greater than a preset frequency value; The data is signed based on the platform session key, and the signed data is transmitted to the IoT device.

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein The public key and private key of the operating platform are a key pair generated based on the elliptic curve public key cryptography algorithm; the public key and private key of the Internet of Things device are a key pair generated based on the elliptic curve public key cryptography algorithm; The operating platform stores the public key of the IoT device; The Internet of Things device stores the public key of the operating platform.

10. An operating platform, characterized in that: The multi-system interactive communication authentication method using bidirectional remote encryption as described in any one of claims 1 to 9, wherein the operating platform includes: a first decryption module, configured to receive a first ciphertext sent by an IoT device; the first ciphertext being ciphertext obtained by encrypting a device random number generated by the IoT device using the public key of the operating platform; and decrypting the first ciphertext using the private key of the operating platform to obtain a decrypted random number; a platform encryption module, configured to generate a platform random number, and encrypt the platform random number with the decrypted random number using the public key of the IoT device to generate a second ciphertext; a second decryption module, configured to send the second ciphertext to the IoT device and receive a third ciphertext sent by the IoT device, wherein the third ciphertext is ciphertext obtained by encrypting the response message by the IoT device using the device session key; the device session key is a key generated by the IoT device using the first decryption result and the device random number to decrypt the second ciphertext; a platform verification module, configured to generate a platform session key based on the decrypted random number and the platform random number, decrypt the third ciphertext using the platform session key to obtain a second decryption result, and verify the second decryption result; The platform transmission module is used to transmit data to the IoT device when the verification is passed.

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