A double-authentication-resistant signature generation method, device, equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The application provides a double-authentication-resistant signature generation method, device, equipment and storage medium, wherein the double-authentication-resistant signature generation method comprises the following steps: obtaining security parameters and an address set of a target system, and determining public parameters and a system master private key of the target system; obtaining a user identity of a target user, and generating a user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and the system master private key of the target system; obtaining a time index, and generating a user time private key of the target user in a current time period based on the user private key of the target user; receiving a message, generating a signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, and verifying the signature. Through the application, illegal user behaviors such as "one vote, multiple votes" and "double spending" can be prevented, and the problem of poor signature security performance in the prior art is solved.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] The present application relates to the field of information security technology, and in particular to a double-authentication-resistant signature generation method, device, equipment and storage medium. BACKGROUND

[0002] Digital signature technology is a key cryptographic tool designed to verify the integrity of messages and prevent forgery. As part of the public key encryption system, it plays an important role in many scenarios in our daily life. By using the signer's private key and hash function, additional data can be added or encrypted on the message data unit, so that the recipient can verify the source of the data and ensure its integrity and authenticity. According to different application requirements, digital signature has developed into various forms, including group signature, ring signature, blind signature and threshold signature, etc.

[0003] Double-authentication-resistant signature (DAPS) is a signature technology whose purpose is to sign two messages with the same first part (called address) but different second part (called content payload), allowing the secret signature key to be extracted publicly without revealing the identity of the signer. DAPS is mainly applied to suppress and punish the behavior of creating double signatures on different content payloads under the same address, such as punishing the certificate authority that distributes different key certificates for the same domain name in the PKI system, or resisting double payment attacks in transaction systems. However, in practical applications, the restriction on double authentication usually has a time limit, and the existing double-authentication-resistant signature conditions are often too absolute, with poor security performance.

[0004] There is no effective solution to the problem of poor signature security performance in the prior art. SUMMARY

[0005] The present application provides a double-authentication-resistant signature generation method, device, equipment and storage medium to solve the problem of poor signature security performance in the prior art.

[0006] In a first aspect, the present application provides a double-authentication-resistant signature generation method, comprising:

[0007] Obtaining the security parameters and address set of a target system, and determining the public parameters and system master private key of the target system;

[0008] Obtaining the user identity of a target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and system master private key of the target system;

[0009] Obtaining a time index, and generating the user time private key of the target user in the current time period based on the user private key of the target user;

[0010] Receiving a message, generating a signature based on a user time private key of the target user and a corresponding time index, and verifying the signature.

[0011] According to the anti-double authentication signature generation method provided by the application, the security parameters and address set of the target system are obtained, and the public parameters and system master private key of the target system are determined, including:

[0012] A pseudo-random generation function is selected based on a trapdoor generation algorithm, and a private key is determined; the private key belongs to the key space of the pseudo-random generation function;

[0013] For each address in the address set of the target system, an address public key is determined based on the private key;

[0014] A time interval value is determined, and the public parameters of the target system are determined based on the time interval value, and the system master private key of the target system is determined.

[0015] According to the anti-double authentication signature generation method provided by the application, the user identity of the target user is obtained, and the user private key of the target user is generated based on the public parameters and system master private key of the target system, including:

[0016] The user identity of the target user is obtained;

[0017] The user private key of the target user is generated by taking the user identity of the target user as input based on the original image sampling algorithm.

[0018] According to the anti-double authentication signature generation method provided by the application, a time index is obtained, and a user time private key of the target user in the current time period is generated based on the user private key of the target user, including:

[0019] The time index is obtained;

[0020] The user time private key of the target user in the current time period is generated by taking the time index as input based on the original image sampling algorithm.

[0021] According to the anti-double authentication signature generation method provided by the application, a message is received, and a signature is generated based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, including:

[0022] Accepting a message, parsing the message and the corresponding address public key;

[0023] Extracting a random vector, determining a hash value based on the random vector, and generating the signature according to the hash value calculation result; if the signature cannot be generated, a random vector is re-extracted.

[0024] According to the signature generation method for preventing double authentication provided by the application, the signature is verified, comprising:

[0025] The message and the corresponding address public key are parsed;

[0026] Based on the parsing result, it is judged whether the signature meets the preset condition, and the signature is verified.

[0027] According to the signature generation method for preventing double authentication provided by the application, the signature is verified, comprising:

[0028] The message and the signature of the target user are parsed, and the long-term private key of the target user is extracted.

[0029] In a second aspect, the application further provides a signature generation device for preventing double authentication, comprising:

[0030] The initialization module is used for obtaining the security parameters and address set of the target system, and determining the public parameters and system master private key of the target system;

[0031] The acquisition module is used for obtaining the user identity of the target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and system master private key of the target system;

[0032] The processing module is used for obtaining the time index, and generating the user time private key of the target user in the current time period based on the user private key of the target user;

[0033] The generation module is used for receiving the message, generating the signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, and verifying the signature.

[0034] In a third aspect, the application further provides an electronic device, comprising a memory, a processor and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the processor implements the signature generation method for preventing double authentication according to the first aspect.

[0035] In a fourth aspect, the application further provides a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, wherein the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the signature generation method for preventing double authentication according to the first aspect.

[0036] In a fifth aspect, the application further provides a computer program product, comprising a computer program, wherein the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the signature generation method for preventing double authentication according to the first aspect.

[0037] Compared with the prior art, the application has the following beneficial effects:

[0038] The application provides a double-authentication-proof signature generation method. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DRAWINGS

[0039] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the application or the prior art, the following will briefly introduce the drawings needed to be used in the embodiments or the prior art description. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are some embodiments of the application, and other drawings can be obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort on the basis of these drawings.

[0040] Figure 1 is a flowchart of the double-authentication-proof signature generation method provided by the application;

[0041] Figure 2 is a structural block diagram of the double-authentication-proof signature generation device provided by the application;

[0042] Figure 3 is a structural schematic diagram of the electronic device provided by the application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0043] In order to make the objects, technical solutions and advantages of the application clearer, the technical solutions in the application will be described clearly and completely in combination with the drawings in the application. Obviously, the described embodiments are some embodiments of the application, rather than all the embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort belong to the protection scope of the application.

[0044] The application provides a double-authentication-proof signature generation method, Figure 1 is a flowchart of the double-authentication-proof signature generation method provided by the application, as shown in the figure, the method comprises the following steps: Figure 1

[0045] Step S101: obtaining the security parameters and address set of a target system, and determining the public parameters and system master private key of the target system.

[0046] Step S102: obtaining the user identity of a target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and system master private key of the target system.

[0047] ​Step S103, obtaining a time index, generating a user time private key of the target user in a current time period based on a user private key of the target user.

[0048] Step S104, receiving a message, generating a signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, and verifying the signature.

[0049] Exemplarily, obtaining security parameters of a target system and an address set , the address set has elements, determining public parameters of the target system and a system master private key based on the security parameters pp and the address set msk . Then, obtaining a user identity ID of a target user, determining a user private key pp of the target user according to the public parameters msk of the target system, the system master private key and the address set for the target user. Then, obtaining a time index t j , generating a user time private key pp j of the target user in a current time period according to the public parameters msk of the target system, the system master private key ID , the user identity t and the time index tsk j . Finally, receiving a message μ, generating a signature tsk j based on the user time private key t j of the target user and the corresponding time index , and verifying the signature . In the method, the corresponding user private key is generated based on the public identity information of the target user, the target user signs two messages under the same address in the same time period, which triggers the user private key extraction condition, exposes the user private key of the target user, signs two messages in different time periods, which is legal, can prevent illegal user behaviors such as “one vote multiple voting” and “double spending”, and solves the problem of poor signature security performance in the prior art.

[0050] In some embodiments, the step S101 of obtaining the security parameters and the address set of the target system, and determining the public parameters and the system master private key of the target system, comprises: selecting a pseudo-random generation function based on a trapdoor generation algorithm, and determining a private key; the private key belongs to a key space of the pseudo-random generation function; for each address in the address set of the target system, determining an address public key based on the private key; determining a time interval value, and determining the public parameters of the target system based on the time interval value, and determining the system master private key of the target system.

[0051] For example, the trapdoor generation algorithm is run, and the formula of the trapdoor generation algorithm is as follows:

[0052]

[0053] wherein, q is a prime number, n is a parameter on a lattice, denotes a generated matrix, denotes a trapdoor thereof, denotes an integer set, m is a parameter on a lattice. The pseudo-random generation function is selected, and a private key thereof is selected , and the formula of the pseudo-random generation function is as follows:

[0054]

[0055] wherein, denotes the pseudo-random generation function, denotes a key space, denotes an input space, denotes an output space. The formula of the hash function is as follows:

[0056]

[0057]

[0058]

[0059] wherein, n , k is a parameter on a lattice, q is a prime number, denotes an integer set, v denotes an output vector, denotes a system parameter. For each address , , the address public key is calculated, and the formula is as follows:

[0060]

[0061] wherein, Represents a pseudo-random generation function The key, Indicates the address. Represents a pseudo-random generation function The output results, k For the grid parameter. Select the indicated time interval value. and output common parameters. pp System Master Private Key msk The specific formula is as follows:

[0062]

[0063]

[0064] in, pp Indicates common parameters, q It is a prime number. n , m , k For lattice parameters, τ Here is a time parameter, and here is a time interval value. Indicates the system master public key. Represents a set of addresses; msk Indicates the system master private key. This represents a portion of the system's master private key. β This represents a portion of the system's master and private keys.

[0065] In some embodiments, step S102, obtaining the target user's identity and generating the target user's private key based on the target system's public parameters and system master private key, includes: obtaining the target user's identity; and generating the target user's private key based on the preimage sampling algorithm, using the target user's identity as input.

[0066] For example, the preimage sampling algorithm is run, and the formula for the preimage sampling algorithm is as follows:

[0067]

[0068] in, Represents the generated matrix, It indicates that it is a trap door. Represents the Gaussian parameters. Here, the hash function is used, and ID represents the user's identity. This indicates the specific content of the user's long-term private key. q It is a prime number. m , k For lattice parameters, This represents the set of integers. Based on the preimage sampling algorithm, the target user's private key is generated using the following formula:

[0069]

[0070] wherein, usk denotes the user private key, denotes the user long-term private key specific content.

[0071] In some embodiments, step S103, obtaining the time index, generating the user time private key of the target user in the current time period based on the user private key of the target user, comprises: obtaining the time index; based on the original image sampling algorithm, taking the time index as the input, generating the user time private key of the target user in the previous time period.

[0072] For example, running the original image sampling algorithm, the formula of the original image sampling algorithm is as follows:

[0073]

[0074] wherein, denotes the generated matrix, denotes its trapdoor, denotes the Gaussian parameter, is a hash function, and ID is the user identity, t j is the time index, denotes the user time private key specific content, q is a prime number, m , k is a lattice parameter, denotes the integer set. Based on the original image sampling algorithm, the user time private key of the target user is output, and the specific formula is as follows:

[0075]

[0076] wherein, tsk j denotes the user time private key, denotes the user time private key specific content.

[0077] Based on the above embodiments, step S104, receiving a message, generating a signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, comprises: accepting a message, parsing the message and the corresponding address public key; extracting a random vector, determining a hash value based on the random vector, and generating a signature according to the hash value calculation result; if the signature cannot be generated, a random vector is extracted again.

[0078] For example, first, the received message is parsed μ , wherein, denotes the address, p denotes the payload. And, the corresponding address public key is parsed, , represents an address public key, v represents an output vector, k is a parameter on a lattice. Then, a random vector is extracted, y represents a mask vector, and D represents a Gaussian distribution, represents a corresponding Gaussian parameter, m represents a parameter on a lattice. And a hash value is calculated, and the specific formula is as follows:

[0079]

[0080]

[0081]

[0082] wherein, h represents an output value of , H 2 represents a hash function, represents a generated matrix, represents a mask vector, μ represents a message; z represents an intermediate calculation result, represents a specific content of a user long-term private key. With P a probability of 1, outputs , and with P a probability of 2, outputs w . P 1 and P 2, the specific formula is as follows:

[0083]

[0084]

[0085] wherein, m represents a parameter on a lattice, represents a corresponding Gaussian parameter, represents a specific content of a user long-term private key, and M represents an algorithm average repetition round parameter. If all can output, a signature is generated; otherwise, a random vector is extracted again for calculation.

[0086] On the basis of the embodiment, the signature is verified, including: analyzing a message and a corresponding address public key; based on the analysis result, judging whether the signature satisfies a preset condition, and verifying the signature.

[0087] Specifically, the message and the signature are analyzed, the message , , and the corresponding address public key wherein a represents an address. Determine whether the preset condition is established, if yes, output 1, indicating that the signature is legal, otherwise, output 0, indicating that the signature is illegal. The specific formula of the preset condition is as follows:

[0088]

[0089] wherein, z represents a partial signature, m represents a parameter on the lattice, represents a corresponding Gaussian parameter, w represents a partial signature, H 1, H 2 represents a hash function, A represents a generated matrix, h represents the output value of, μ represents a message, q represents a prime number, ID represents a user identity, t i represents a time index, represents an address public key.

[0090] Further, after verifying the signature, it also includes: parsing the message and the signature of the target user, and extracting the long-term private key of the target user.

[0091] For example, for the message , , and the corresponding signature , . Parsing the message and the corresponding signature, the specific formula is as follows:

[0092]

[0093]

[0094]

[0095]

[0096] wherein, and represent an address, and represent a load, t 1 and t 2 represent two specific time indexes. If the condition is met, the long-term private key of the target user is extracted, and the specific formula is as follows:

[0097]

[0098] in, This represents the long-term private key. If the condition is not met, output the following: .

[0099] The present invention also provides a signature generation device for preventing two-factor authentication. The signature generation device for preventing two-factor authentication provided by the present invention is described below. The signature generation device for preventing two-factor authentication described below can be referred to in correspondence with the signature generation method for preventing two-factor authentication described above. Figure 2 This is a structural block diagram of the anti-dual authentication signature generation device provided by the present invention, as shown below. Figure 2 As shown, the device includes:

[0100] Initialization module 201 is used to obtain the security parameters and address set of the target system, and to determine the public parameters and system master private key of the target system;

[0101] The acquisition module 202 is used to acquire the user identity of the target user and generate the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters of the target system and the system master private key;

[0102] Processing module 203 is used to obtain the time index and generate the target user's time private key within the current time period based on the target user's private key;

[0103] The generation module 204 is used to receive messages, generate a signature based on the target user's private time key and the corresponding time index, and verify the signature.

[0104] When this device is in use, the initialization module 201 acquires the security parameters of the target system. and address set The address set contains Each element, based on security parameters and address set Determine the common parameters of the target system pp and the system master private key msk Then, module 202 obtains the target user's identity. ID For this target user, based on the common parameters of the target system pp System Master Private Key msk and address set Determine the target user's private key Then, processing module 203 obtains the time index. t j Based on the common parameters of the target system pp System Master Private Key msk ,User ID ID and time index t jGenerate the target user's private time key for the current time period. tsk j Finally, the generation module 204 receives message μ, based on the target user's user time private key. tsk j and the corresponding time index t j Generate signature and the signature Verification is performed. When this device is used, a corresponding user private key is generated based on the target user's publicly disclosed identity information. If the target user signs two messages at the same address within the same time period, the user private key extraction condition will be triggered, exposing the target user's user private key. Signing two messages at different time periods is legal, which can prevent illegal user behaviors such as "multiple votes for one vote" and "double spending," and solves the problem of poor signature security performance in existing technologies.

[0105] Figure 3 An example is a schematic diagram of the physical structure of an electronic device, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the electronic device may include: a processor 301, a communication interface 302, a memory 303, and a communication bus 304. The processor 301, communication interface 302, and memory 303 communicate with each other via the communication bus 304. The processor 301 can call logical instructions in the memory 303 to execute a dual-authentication signature generation method, which includes:

[0106] Obtain the security parameters and address set of the target system, and determine the public parameters and system master / private key of the target system;

[0107] Obtain the target user's identity and generate the target user's private key based on the target system's public parameters and the system's master private key;

[0108] Get the time index and generate the target user's time private key for the current time period based on the target user's private key;

[0109] Upon receiving a message, a signature is generated based on the target user's private time key and the corresponding time index, and the signature is verified.

[0110] Moreover, the logic instructions in the memory 303 described above can be implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, and can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solutions of the present application essentially or the parts that make contributions to the prior art or parts of the technical solutions can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, and includes several instructions to make a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the embodiments of the method of the present application. The aforementioned storage medium includes: a U disk, a mobile hard disk, a read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), a random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), a magnetic disk or an optical disk, and various media that can store program codes.

[0111] In another aspect, the present application also provides a computer program product, which comprises a computer program, the computer program can be stored on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, and the computer program can be executed by a processor to enable a computer to execute the anti-double authentication signature generation method provided by the above-mentioned methods, the method comprising:

[0112] obtaining the security parameters and the address set of the target system, and determining the public parameters and the system master private key of the target system;

[0113] obtaining the user identity of the target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and the system master private key of the target system;

[0114] obtaining the time index, and generating the user time private key of the target user in the current time period based on the user private key of the target user;

[0115] receiving a message, generating a signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, and verifying the signature.

[0116] In another aspect, the present application also provides a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, which stores a computer program, the computer program is executed by a processor to implement the anti-double authentication signature generation method provided by the above-mentioned methods, the method comprising:

[0117] obtaining the security parameters and the address set of the target system, and determining the public parameters and the system master private key of the target system;

[0118] obtaining the user identity of the target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and the system master private key of the target system;

[0119] obtaining the time index, and generating the user time private key of the target user in the current time period based on the user private key of the target user;

[0120] receiving the message, generating the signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, and verifying the signature.

[0121] The apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components can or can not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units can or can not be physical units, i.e., can be located in one place, or can be distributed on multiple network units. Part or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of the embodiment scheme according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement without creative labor.

[0122] Through the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the embodiments can be realized by means of software and the necessary universal hardware platform, and of course can also be realized by hardware. Based on such understanding, the above technical solutions can be embodied in the form of a software product, which can be stored in a computer readable storage medium, such as a ROM / RAM, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, etc., and includes a plurality of instructions for causing a computer device (which can be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in each embodiment or some parts of the embodiments.

[0123] Finally, it should be noted that: the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present application, and not to limit them; although the present application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that: it can still modify the technical solutions recorded in the foregoing embodiments, or make equivalent replacement for part of the technical features; and these modifications or replacements do not make the essence of the corresponding technical solutions deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application.

Claims

1. A method for generating a double-resistant authentication signature, characterized by, The method comprises the following steps: obtaining the security parameters and address set of a target system, and determining the public parameters and system master private key of the target system; obtaining the user identity of a target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and system master private key of the target system; obtaining a time index, and generating the user time private key of the target user in a current time period based on the user private key of the target user; receiving a message, generating a signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, and verifying the signature; obtaining the security parameters and address set of a target system, and determining the public parameters and system master private key of the target system, comprising: selecting a pseudo-random generation function based on a trapdoor generation algorithm, and determining a private key; the private key belongs to the key space of the pseudo-random generation function; for each address in the address set of the target system, determining an address public key based on the private key; determining a time interval value, and determining the public parameters of the target system based on the time interval value, and determining the system master private key of the target system; the formula of the trapdoor generation algorithm is as follows: wherein, q is a prime number, n is a parameter on the lattice, denotes a generated matrix, denotes a trapdoor thereof, denotes a set of integers, m is a parameter on the lattice; a pseudo-random generating function is selected, and a private key thereof is selected The formula of the pseudo-random generating function is as follows: wherein, denotes a pseudo-random generation function, denotes a key space, denotes an input space, denotes an output space; the calculation formula of the hash function is as follows: wherein, n , k is a parameter on the lattice, q is a prime number, denotes the set of integers, v denotes an output vector, denotes a system parameter; for each address , , the address public key is calculated, and the calculation formula is as follows: wherein, denotes a pseudo-random generation function of a key, denotes an address, denotes an output result of a pseudo-random generation function , and k is a parameter on a lattice; a value of a selected time interval , and outputs a public parameter pp , a system master private key msk , and the specific formula is as follows: wherein, pp denotes a public parameter, q is a prime number, n , m , k denotes a parameter on the lattice, τ denotes a time parameter, is a time interval value, denotes a system master public key, denotes a set of addresses; msk denotes a system master private key, denotes a system partial master private key, β denotes a system partial master private key.

2. The anti-repudiation signature generation method of claim 1, wherein, obtaining the user identity of a target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and system master private key of the target system, comprising: obtaining the user identity of the target user; generating the user private key of the target user based on the original image sampling algorithm by taking the user identity of the target user as input.

3. The anti-repudiation signature generation method of claim 1, wherein, obtaining a time index, and generating the user time private key of the target user in a current time period based on the user private key of the target user, comprising: obtaining the time index; generating the user time key of the target user in the current time period based on the original image sampling algorithm by taking the time index as input.

4. The anti-repudiation signature generation method of claim 1, wherein, receiving a message, generating a signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, comprising: accepting the message, parsing the message and the corresponding address public key; extracting a random vector, determining a hash value based on the random vector, and generating the signature according to the hash value calculation result; if the signature cannot be generated, a random vector is re-extracted.

5. The anti-repudiation signature generation method of claim 4, wherein, verifying the signature, comprising: parsing the message and the corresponding address public key; based on the parsing result, judging whether the signature meets the preset condition, and verifying the signature.

6. The anti-repudiation signature generation method of claim 1, wherein, After verifying the signature, it further comprises: parsing the message and the signature of the target user, and extracting the long-term private key of the target user.

7. A double authentication preventing signature generating apparatus characterized by comprising: The method comprises the following steps: an initialization module for obtaining the security parameters and address set of a target system, and determining the public parameters and system master private key of the target system; an obtaining module for obtaining the user identity of a target user, and generating the user private key of the target user based on the public parameters and system master private key of the target system; a processing module for obtaining a time index, and generating the user time private key of the target user in a current time period based on the user private key of the target user; a generating module for receiving a message, generating a signature based on the user time private key of the target user and the corresponding time index, and verifying the signature; Obtaining a security parameter and an address set of a target system, and determining a public parameter and a system master private key of the target system, comprising: selecting a pseudo-random generation function based on a trapdoor generation algorithm, and determining a private key; the private key belongs to a key space of the pseudo-random generation function; for each address in the address set of the target system, determining an address public key based on the private key; determining a time interval value, and determining a public parameter of the target system based on the time interval value, and determining a system master private key of the target system; the formula of the trapdoor generation algorithm is as follows: wherein, q is a prime number, n is a parameter on the lattice, denotes a generated matrix, denotes a trapdoor thereof, denotes a set of integers, m is a parameter on the lattice; a pseudo-random generating function is selected, and a private key thereof is selected The formula of the pseudo-random generating function is as follows: wherein, denotes a pseudo-random generation function, denotes a key space, denotes an input space, denotes an output space; the calculation formula of the hash function is as follows: wherein, n , k is a parameter on the lattice, q is a prime number, denotes a set of integers, v denotes an output vector, denotes a system parameter; for each address , , the address public key is calculated, and the calculation formula is as follows: wherein, denotes a pseudo-random generation function of a key, denotes an address, denotes an output result of a pseudo-random generation function , and k is a parameter on a lattice; a value of a selected time interval , and outputs a public parameter pp , a system master private key msk , and the specific formula is as follows: wherein, pp denotes a public parameter, q is a prime number, n , m , k denotes a parameter on the lattice, τ denotes a time parameter, is a time interval value, denotes a system master public key, denotes a set of addresses; msk denotes a system master private key, denotes a system partial master private key, β denotes a system partial master private key.

8. An electronic device comprising a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored on the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, The processor implements the anti-double authentication signature generation method of any one of claims 1 to 6 when executing the program. 9.A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium having stored thereon a computer program, characterized in that, The computer program is executed by the processor to implement the anti-double authentication signature generation method of any one of claims 1 to 6.

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