Authentication method and device, equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The invention discloses an authentication method and device, equipment and a storage medium, and relates to the field of wireless communication. The method is executed by an STA and an AP, and comprises the steps that an authentication frame is transmitted between the STA and the AP to execute an authentication process, and a field in the authentication frame indicates that identity authentication is executed by adopting at least one of the following authentication modes: an extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with complete forward secrecy, an extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication and an extended PASN supporting 802.1 X authentication. And using the PTK generated in the authentication process to protect a message in the STA and AP association establishment process, wherein the message comprises at least one of an association request message, a response message, a four-way handshake message and a group key handshake message. After the association is established, data communication is carried out by using the PTK generated in the authentication process; or, creating a new PTK after the association is established, and performing data communication by using a new PTS.

Description

Authentication method, device, equipment and storage medium Technical Field

[0001] The present application relates to the field of wireless communications, and in particular to an authentication method, apparatus, device, and storage medium. Background Art

[0002] A WiFi (wireless network communication technology) connection consists of three phases: Probe, Authentication, and Association. During the Probe phase, a STA (Station) searches for an Access Point (AP). During the Authentication phase, the AP authenticates the STA. After successful authentication, the STA connects to the AP during the Association phase.

[0003] According to the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 802.11az protocol, in an infrastructure-type Basic Service Set (Infrastructure BSS) network, STAs that are not associated with an AP can use the PSAN (Pre-association Security Negotiation) process to establish a PTKSA (Pairwise Transient Key Security Association) with the AP. Related technologies provide an extended PASN method to protect association request and response messages. This method extends the Base Authentication and Key Management (Base AKM) method used in PASN.

[0004] Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides an authentication method, apparatus, device, and storage medium. The technical solution is as follows:

[0006] According to one aspect of the present application, an authentication method is provided, where the method is performed by an STA and includes:

[0007] An authentication frame is transmitted between the access point AP to perform the authentication process. The first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment with perfect forward secrecy FILS shared key authentication, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0008] According to one aspect of the present application, an authentication method is provided, where the method is performed by an AP and includes:

[0009] An authentication frame is transmitted between the STA and the STA to perform the authentication process. The first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation (PASN) that supports fast initial link establishment (FILS) shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0010] According to another aspect of the present application, an authentication device is provided, the device comprising:

[0011] The first authentication module is used to transmit an authentication frame with the access point AP to perform the authentication process, wherein the first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0012] According to another aspect of the present application, an authentication device is provided, the device comprising:

[0013] The second authentication module is used to transmit an authentication frame with the STA to perform the authentication process, where the first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment with perfect forward secrecy FILS shared key authentication, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0014] According to another aspect of the present application, a STA device is provided, the device including:

[0015] processor;

[0016] a transceiver connected to the processor;

[0017] a memory for storing executable instructions for the processor;

[0018] The processor is configured to load the executable instructions so that the STA device implements the authentication method as described in the above aspects.

[0019] According to another aspect of the present application, an AP device is provided, the device comprising:

[0020] processor;

[0021] a transceiver connected to the processor;

[0022] a memory for storing executable instructions for the processor;

[0023] The processor is configured to load the executable instructions so that the AP device implements the authentication method as described in the above aspects.

[0024] According to another aspect of the present application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores executable instructions, and the executable instructions are loaded and executed by a processor to enable a communication device to implement the authentication method as described in the above aspects.

[0025] According to one aspect of the present application, a chip is provided, which includes a programmable logic circuit or a program, and a communication device equipped with the chip is used to implement the authentication method as described in the above aspect.

[0026] According to one aspect of the present application, a computer program product is provided, which includes computer instructions, the computer instructions are stored in a computer-readable storage medium, the processor of a communication device reads the computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium, and the authentication device executes the computer instructions, so that the communication device performs the authentication method described in the above aspect.

[0027] The technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application include at least the following beneficial effects:

[0028] The first field in the authentication frame is enhanced to indicate the authentication method used: Extended PASN supporting FILS (Fast Initial Link Setup) shared key authentication with Perfect Forward Security (PFS), Extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication, or Extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication. The message formats for extending the PASN to support these authentication methods are clarified. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0029] In order to more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application, the following briefly introduces the drawings required for use in the description of the embodiments. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present application. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without any creative work.

[0030] FIG1 is a block diagram of a communication system provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0031] FIG2 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0032] FIG3 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0033] FIG4 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0034] FIG5 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0035] FIG6 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0036] FIG7 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0037] FIG8 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0038] FIG9 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0039] FIG10 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0040] FIG11 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0041] FIG12 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0042] FIG13 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0043] FIG14 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0044] FIG15 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0045] FIG16 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0046] FIG17 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0047] FIG18 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0048] FIG19 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0049] FIG20 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0050] FIG21 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0051] FIG22 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0052] FIG23 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0053] FIG24 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0054] FIG25 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0055] FIG26 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0056] FIG27 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0057] FIG28 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0058] FIG29 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0059] FIG30 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0060] FIG31 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0061] FIG32 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0062] FIG33 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0063] FIG34 is a schematic diagram of an authentication frame provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0064] FIG35 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0065] FIG36 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0066] FIG37 is a block diagram of an authentication device provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0067] FIG38 is a block diagram of an authentication device provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application;

[0068] Figure 39 is a structural diagram of an authentication device provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0069] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the present application more clear, the embodiments of the present application will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Exemplary embodiments will be described in detail herein, with examples shown in the accompanying drawings. When the following description refers to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numbers in different drawings represent the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with the present application. Instead, they are merely examples of devices and methods consistent with certain aspects of the present application, as detailed in the appended claims.

[0070] The terms used in this disclosure are for the purpose of describing specific embodiments only and are not intended to limit the disclosure. As used in this disclosure and the appended claims, the singular forms "a," "an," "the," and "the" are intended to include the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term "and / or" as used herein refers to and encompasses any and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items.

[0071] It should be understood that although the terms first, second, third, etc. may be used in this disclosure to describe various information, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish information of the same type from each other. For example, without departing from the scope of this disclosure, first information may also be referred to as second information, and similarly, second information may also be referred to as first information. Depending on the context, the word "if" as used herein may be interpreted as "at the time of" or "when" or "in response to determining."

[0072] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as Wireless Local Area Networks (WLAN), Wireless Fidelity (WiFi), or other communication systems.

[0073] Figure 1 is a block diagram of a communication system provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The communication system includes an access point (AP) 10 and a station (STA) 20, though this application does not limit this concept. This application uses the communication system comprising an AP and a STA as an example. APs and STAs may also be referred to as communication devices or authentication devices.

[0074] In some scenarios, an AP may be referred to as an AP STA, that is, in a sense, an AP is also a type of STA.

[0075] In some scenarios, STAs are also called non-AP STAs. Communication in a communication system can be between an AP and a non-AP STA, between a non-AP STA and a non-AP STA, or between a STA and a peer STA. A peer STA refers to a device that communicates with a STA. For example, a peer STA can be an AP or a non-AP STA.

[0076] It should be understood that the role of STA in the communication system is not absolute. For example, in some scenarios, when a mobile phone is connected to a router, the mobile phone is a non-AP STA. When the mobile phone serves as a hotspot for other mobile phones, the mobile phone plays the role of AP.

[0077] In some embodiments, STAs may include AP STAs and non-AP STAs.

[0078] An AP acts as a bridge between wired and wireless networks, connecting wireless network clients together and then connecting the wireless network to the Ethernet. An AP can be a terminal device (such as a mobile phone) or a network device (such as a router) equipped with a Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) chip.

[0079] It should be understood that the role of STA in the communication system is not absolute. For example, in some scenarios, when a mobile phone is connected to a router, the mobile phone is a non-AP STA. When the mobile phone serves as a hotspot for other mobile phones, the mobile phone plays the role of AP.

[0080] APs and non-AP STAs can be devices used in the Internet of Vehicles, IoT nodes and sensors in the Internet of Things (IoT), smart cameras, smart remote controls, smart water and electricity meters in smart homes, and sensors in smart cities.

[0081] In the embodiment of the present application, both the station and the access point support the IEEE 802.11 standard, but are not limited to the IEEE 802.11 standard.

[0082] In some embodiments, non-AP STAs may support, but are not limited to, 802.11bf. Non-AP STAs may also support various current and future 802.11 family WLAN standards, such as 802.11ax, 802.11ac, 802.11n, 802.11g, 802.11b, and 802.11a.

[0083] In some embodiments, the AP may be a device supporting 802.11bf. The AP may also be a device supporting various current and future 802.11 family WLAN standards, such as 802.11ax, 802.11ac, 802.11n, 802.11g, 802.11b, and 802.11a.

[0084] In the embodiment of the present application, the STA may be a mobile phone, tablet computer, computer, virtual reality (VR) device, augmented reality (AR) device, wireless device in industrial control, set-top box, wireless device in self-driving, in-vehicle communication equipment, wireless device in remote medical care, wireless device in smart grid, wireless device in transportation safety, wireless device in smart city, wireless device in smart home, wireless communication chip / ASIC / SOC / etc. that supports WLAN / Wi-Fi technology.

[0085] WLAN technology can support frequency bands including but not limited to: low frequency bands (2.4GHz, 5GHz, 6GHz) and high frequency bands (60GHz).

[0086] One or more links exist between a station and an access point.

[0087] In some embodiments, stations and access points support multi-band communications, for example, communicating simultaneously on the 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, 6 GHz, and 60 GHz frequency bands, or communicating simultaneously on different channels within the same frequency band (or different frequency bands), thereby improving the communication throughput and / or reliability between devices. Such devices are generally referred to as multi-band devices, or multi-link devices (MLDs), and are sometimes also referred to as multi-link entities or multi-band entities. A multi-link device can be an access point device or a station device. If the multi-link device is an access point device, the multi-link device includes one or more APs; if the multi-link device is a station device, the multi-link device includes one or more non-AP STAs.

[0088] A multi-link device including one or more APs is called an AP, and a multi-link device including one or more non-AP STAs is called a Non-AP. In the embodiment of the application, the Non-AP can be called a STA.

[0089] In an embodiment of the present application, the AP may include multiple APs, the Non-AP may include multiple STAs, multiple links may be formed between the APs in the AP and the STAs in the Non-AP, and data communication may be performed between the APs in the AP and the corresponding STAs in the Non-AP through the corresponding links.

[0090] An AP is a device deployed in a wireless local area network to provide wireless communication capabilities for STAs. A station may include: User Equipment (UE), an access terminal, a subscriber unit, a subscriber station, a mobile station, a mobile station, a remote station, a remote terminal, a mobile device, a wireless communication device, a user agent, or a user device. Optionally, a station may also be a cellular phone, a cordless phone, a Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) phone, a Wireless Local Loop (WLL) station, a Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), a handheld device with wireless communication capabilities, a computing device or other processing device connected to a wireless modem, an in-vehicle device, or a wearable device, but the embodiments of the present application are not limited to this.

[0091] The following technologies involved in the embodiments of this application are introduced below:

[0092] 1. Three stages of WiFi connection;

[0093] 2. Pre-Association Security Negotiation (PASN);

[0094] 3. PMKSA (Pairwise Master Key Security Association, Pairwise Master Key Security Association Context);

[0095] 4. PTKSA (Pairwise Transient Key Security Association, pairwise temporary key security association context);

[0096] 5. GTKSA (Group Transient Key Secure Association);

[0097] 6. IGTKSA (Integrity Group Temporal Key Security Association);

[0098] 7. BIGTKSA (Beacon Integrity Group Temporal Key Security Association);

[0099] 8. Fast Initial Link Setup authentication (FILS authentication);

[0100] 9. FILS shared key without PFS (FILS shared key without perfect forward secrecy);

[0101] 10. FILS shared key with PFS (FILS shared key with perfect forward secrecy);

[0102] 11. FILS public key;

[0103] 12. 802.1X authentication;

[0104] 13. 4-way handsake;

[0105] 14. Group key handsake;

[0106] 15. SAE certification (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals).

[0107] 1. Three stages of WiFi connection

[0108] Includes: Probe, Authentication, and Association

[0109] 1. Detection phase

[0110] There are two detection methods in the detection phase:

[0111] (1) STAs discover networks by listening to Beacon frames periodically sent by APs. Beacon frames provide information about the AP and the BSS (Basic Service Set) in which the AP resides.

[0112] (2) The STA sends Probe Request frames on 13 channels in sequence, carrying the SSID (Service Set Identifier) ​​and STA capability information, to find an AP with the same SSID as the STA.

[0113] The AP replies with a Probe Response frame, which carries the AP's capability information.

[0114] The purpose of the detection phase is as follows: the STA obtains the capabilities of the AP and decides whether to access the network; the AP obtains the capabilities of the STA and decides whether to allow the STA to join the network based on its own situation.

[0115] 2. Certification stage

[0116] After receiving the Probe Response frame, the STA decides whether to join the network. If so, it sends an Authentication frame for identity authentication. Otherwise, the process ends.

[0117] 3. Association stage

[0118] After receiving the authentication pass message, if the STA decides to join the network, it sends an Association Request frame, indicating the network type to join, the Listen Interval, and the STA's capability information.

[0119] After receiving the Association Request frame, the AP confirms whether the Listen Interval is acceptable and whether the STA's capability information matches. If yes, it replies with an Association Response frame carrying the AID (Association ID) and successful information, indicating that the association is successful. Otherwise, it replies with an Association Response frame carrying failed information.

[0120] 2. Pre-Association Security Negotiation (PASN)

[0121] According to the IEEE 802.11az protocol, as shown in FIG2 , in an infrastructure type basic service set (Infrastructure BSS) network, a STA that has not established an association with an AP can use a PASN procedure to establish a PTKSA with the AP.

[0122] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG2 , the PASN process includes the following steps:

[0123] Step 101: The AP periodically sends Beacon frames.

[0124] The Beacon frame includes fields such as RSNE (Robust Security Network Element), PASN AKM (Authentication and Key Management), Base AKM, and RSNXE (Robust Security Network Extension Element).

[0125] Step 102: The STA sends an 802.11 Authentication 1 frame (first authentication frame) to the AP.

[0126] The Authentication 1 frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 1 (used to indicate Authentication 1), PASN, RSNE, Base AKM, PMK (Pairwise Master Key) ID, RSNXE, S-Ephemeral Pub (public key of the authenticated party, i.e., the public key of the STA), PASN Parameters, and Base AKM Data-1 (basic AKM first data).

[0127] Step 103: The AP sends an 802.11 Authentication 2 frame (second authentication frame) to the STA.

[0128] The Authentication 2 frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 2 (used to indicate Authentication 2), PASN, RSNE, Base AKM, PMK (Pairwise Master Key) ID, RSNXE, A-Ephemeral Pub (authenticator public key, i.e., AP's public key), PASN Parameters, Base AKM Data-2 (basic AKM second data), and MIC (Messages Integrity Code).

[0129] Step 104: The AP sends an 802.11 Authentication 3 frame (the third authentication frame) to the STA.

[0130] The Authentication 3 frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 3 (used to indicate Authentication 3), Base AKM Data-3 (basic AKM third data), and MIC.

[0131] Depending on the selected Authentication and Key Management Protocol (AKMP), the PTKSA generated by the PASN process may be mutually authenticated (i.e., the Base AKMP is other authentication and key management protocol authentication described below) or not (i.e., the Base AKMP is the PASN AKMP identified by the identifier 00-0F-AC:21). The PASN process supports tunneling (i.e., embedding messages of other protocols into messages of this protocol, for example, wrapping EAPOL (Extensible Authentication Protocol Over Lan) frames in Wrapped Data elements, or wrapping SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals) authentication message bodies in Wrapped Data elements) by other authentication and key management protocols (SAE authentication identified by identifier 00-0F-AC:8, or FILS authentication identified by identifier 00-0F-AC:14, or FILS authentication identified by identifier 00-0F-AC:15, or FT (Fast BSS) authentication identified by identifier 00-0F-AC:3). The PASN process generates a PMKSA (Pairwise Master Key Security Association) using the Fast BSS Transition (Fast BSS Transition) authentication, or the FT authentication identified by the identifier 00-0F-AC:4, or the FT authentication identified by the identifier 00-0F-AC:13, or the FT authentication identified by the identifier 00-0F-AC:19. The PASN process also supports authentication using a cached PMKSA. The PSAN process does not generate a GTKSA (Group Transient Key Secure Association), an IGTKSA (Integrity Group Transient Key Secure Association), or a BIGTKSA (Beacon Integrity Group Transient Key Secure Association). For details, please refer to IEEE 80211az_D5.0.

[0132] The PASN process generates a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) as follows:

[0133] PTK=KDF-HASH-NNN(PMK,"PASN PTK Derivation",SPA||BSS ID||DHss)

[0134] KDF (Key Derivation Function); HASH; NNN is the number of digits and should be set as needed. "PASN PTK Derivation" is a fixed string.

[0135] When the Base AKMP is PASN AKMP, the PMK is the string "PMKz" padded with 28 end characters (whose character value is 0). When the Base AKMP is not PASN AKMP, the PMK is the PMK generated by the corresponding authentication method (i.e., the other authentication and key management protocols mentioned above).

[0136] DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman (key exchange) process based on the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub).

[0137] In PASN authentication, the generated PTK may or may not be bidirectionally authenticated. If it is not bidirectionally authenticated, the PTK cannot be used to protect unicast data frames or management frames. Furthermore, this process does not generate GTKSA, IGTKSA, or BIGTKSA, so it cannot protect multicast data frames or perform integrity checks on multicast management frames or beacon frames.

[0138] 3. PMKSA (Pairwise Master Key Security Association)

[0139] The PMKSA is typically established through the IEEE 802.1X protocol (IEEE 802.1X exchange), the OWE exchange (see RFC (Request For Comments) 8110), the SAE authentication (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals authentication), the FILS authentication (fast initial link setup authentication), or through pre-shared key information. The STA and AP maintain the same PMKSA, while different STAs and APs maintain different PMKSAs. The PMKSA generated this time can be cached for future use. For details, see IEEE 80211-2020 and IEEE 80211az_D5.0.

[0140] PMKSA generally includes the following content: PMK ID used to identify the security context, MAC (Media Access Control Address) addresses of the device requesting authentication (usually the non-AP or non-AP MLD (Multi-Link Device)) and the device providing authentication (usually the AP or AP MLD), PMK, lifetime, and AKMP identifier.

[0141] The PMKSA may also include authorization parameters (eg, authorized accessible SSIDs) and an identifier of the cache where the PMKSA is located (Cache Identifier).

[0142] 4. PTKSA (Pairwise Transient Key Security Association)

[0143] PTKSA primarily consists of a pairwise transient key (PTK) derived from a pairwise master key (PMK) and multiple subkeys derived from it. For example, the subkeys include the EAPOL-Key KCK (Key Confirmation Key), the EAPOL-Key KEK (Key Encryption Key), the TK (Temporal Key), and the KDK (Key Derivation Key). The TK is used to encrypt and decrypt protected unicast data frames and management frames, while the KDK is used to derive additional keys. PTKSA is typically established through a four-way handshake, the Fast BSS Handoff four-way handshake (FT 4-way handshake), the Fast BSS Handoff authentication sequence, the Fast Initial Link Setup authentication (FILS) process, or the PASN process. For details, see IEEE 80211-2020 and IEEE 80211az_D5.0.

[0144] A PTKSA typically includes the following: PTK, a pairwise cipher suite selector (Pairwise Cipher Suite Selector) identifying the algorithm being used, a key identifier (Key ID), the MAC addresses of the device requesting authentication (typically the non-AP or non-AP MLD), and the device providing authentication (typically the AP or AP MLD). The PTKSA may also include R1KH-ID (MAC address of the authenticator) for fast BSS handoff authentication, S1KH-ID (MAC address of the authenticated party) for fast BSS handoff authentication, PTKName (PTK name) for fast BSS handoff authentication, and WTK for Wake-Up Radio (WUR).

[0145] 5. GTKSA (Group Transient Key Secure Association)

[0146] GTKSA mainly includes a group transient key (GTK), which is used to encrypt and decrypt protected multicast data frames. The use of GTK is generally one-way, that is, AP encryption and STA decryption. GTKSA is generally established through a four-way handshake process, or through the fast BSS switching four-way handshake (FT 4-way handshake) process, or through the fast BSS switching protocol (FT protopol) process, or through the fast BSS switching resource request protocol (FT resource request protopol) process, or through the group key handshake process, or through the Fast Initial Link Setup authentication (FILS authentication) process. For details, please refer to IEEE 80211-2020.

[0147] A GTKSA typically includes the following: a direction vector indicating whether the GTK is used for encryption on the sender or decryption on the receiver; a group cipher suite selector identifying the algorithm to be used; the GTK; a key ID identifying the key; and the MAC address of the device providing authentication (typically the AP or AP MLD). The GTKSA may also include authorization parameters (e.g., authorized SSIDs).

[0148] 6. IGTKSA (Integrity Group Temporal Key Security Association)

[0149] IGTKSA mainly includes an Integrity Group Temporal Key (IGTK), which is used to generate the Message Integrity Code (MIC) of multicast management frames. The use of IGTK is generally unidirectional, that is, the AP generates the MIC of the multicast management frame, and the STA verifies it.

[0150] IGTKSA generally includes the following contents: direction indication (Direction vector), that is, whether the IGTK is used to generate MIC at the sending end or to verify MIC at the receiving end, IGTK, identifier (Key ID) for identifying the key, and MAC address of the device providing authentication (usually the AP or AP MLD).

[0151] 7. BIGTKSA (Beacon Integrity Group Temporal Key Security Association)

[0152] BIGTKSA mainly includes a Beacon Integrity Group Temporal Key (BIGTK), which is used to generate the MIC of the beacon frame. The use of BIGTK is generally one-way, that is, the AP generates the MIC of the beacon frame, and the STA verifies it.

[0153] BIGTKSA generally includes the following contents: direction indication (Direction vector), that is, whether the BIGTK is used to generate MIC at the sending end or to verify MIC at the receiving end, BIGTK, an identifier (Key ID) for identifying the key, and the MAC address of the device providing authentication (usually the AP or AP MLD).

[0154] 8. Fast initial link setup authentication (FILS authentication)

[0155] According to the IEEE 802.11 protocol, in an infrastructure-type basic service set (BSS) network, STAs and APs can use FILS to perform authentication.

[0156] If shared key authentication is used, the STA and a trusted third party (TTP) first complete Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication to generate the same rRK (re-authentication root key). After receiving the STA's authentication frame, the AP obtains the rRK from the TTP. The STA and AP then generate the PMKSA and PTKSA based on the rRK and a random number they exchanged. Shared key authentication is divided into two types: without PFS (Perfect Forward Security) and with PFS.

[0157] If public key authentication is used, the STA and AP exchange their public keys in the authentication frame and verify the public key signature. The STA and AP generate PMKSA and PTKSA based on their public keys and the random number they exchange.

[0158] When the FILS shared key mode is adopted, both the STA and the AP interact with the TTP.

[0159] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG3 , the method includes the following steps:

[0160] Both STA and TTP have an rRK from the full EAP authentication.

[0161] Step 201: The STA sends an IEEE 802.11 authentication frame to the AP.

[0162] After receiving the authentication frame, the AP obtains the rRK from the TTP through an interface that is beyond the scope of this specification, for example, the interface can be RADIUS / Diameter.

[0163] Step 202: The AP sends an IEEE 802.11 authentication frame to the STA.

[0164] Step 203: The STA sends an IEEE 802.11 association request to the AP.

[0165] Step 204: The AP sends an IEEE 802.11 association response to the STA.

[0166] When the FILS public key method is used, the STA and AP do not interact with the TTP. As shown in Figure 4, the method includes the following steps:

[0167] Step 301: The STA sends an IEEE 802.11 authentication frame to the AP.

[0168] Step 302: The AP sends an IEEE 802.11 authentication frame to the STA.

[0169] Step 303: The STA sends an IEEE 802.11 association request to the AP.

[0170] Step 304: The AP sends an IEEE 802.11 association response to the STA.

[0171] The AP and STA perform secure data communication.

[0172] FILS shared key without PFS (FILS shared key without perfect forward secrecy)

[0173] When the FILS shared key without PFS authentication method is adopted, the authentication frame of step 201 in FIG. 3 is shown in FIG. 5 , and the authentication frame of step 202 in FIG. 3 is shown in FIG. 6 .

[0174] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG5 , the MAC header of the authentication frame in step 201 includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT (High-Throughtput) Control fields.

[0175] The frame body of the authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0176] The authentication frame also includes an FCS (Frame Check Sequences) field.

[0177] The Body field includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 4, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, RSNE, MDE (Mobility Domain Element), FILS Nonce, FILS Session, and FILS Wrapped Data. Authentication Algonrithm Number = 4 indicates a FILS shared key without PFS.

[0178] The FILS Wrapped Data field includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Initiate / Re-auth Packet.

[0179] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG6 , the MAC frame header of the authentication frame of step 202 includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT (High-Throughtput) Control fields.

[0180] The frame body of the authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0181] The authentication frame also includes an FCS (Frame Check Sequences) field.

[0182] Among them, the Body field includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number (authentication algorithm number) = 4, Transaction Sequence Number (transaction sequence number) = 2, Status Code (status code) = 0, RSNE, MDE, FILS Nonce (FILS random number), FILS Session (FILS session), FILS Wrapped Data (FILS wrapped data), and Association Delay Info (association delay information) fields.

[0183] The FILS Wrapped Data field includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Finish / Re-auth Packet.

[0184] The above EAP-Initiate / Re-auth and EAP-Finish / Re-auth message formats are specified by RFC 6696.

[0185] The PMK is generated as follows:

[0186] rMSK=KDF(rRK,"Re-authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org"||"\0"||SEQ||length)

[0187] PMK=HMAC-Hash(SNonce||ANonce,rMSK)

[0188] PMK ID=Truncate-128(Hash(EAP-Initiate / Reauth)).

[0189] Among them, rMSK (re-authentication Master Session Key); SNonce is a random number generated by the STA, and ANonce is a random number generated by the AP.

[0190] At this time, the method for generating FILS-Key-Data (equivalent to PTK) is as follows:

[0191] FILS-Key-Data=PRF-X(PMK,"FILS PTK Derivation",SPA||AA||SNonce||ANonce)

[0192] ICK=L(FILS-Key-Data, 0, ICK_bits)

[0193] KEK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits,KEK_bits)

[0194] TK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits,TK_bits)

[0195] FILS-FT=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits+TK_bits,FILS-FT_bits)

[0196] KDK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits+TK_bits+[FILS-FT_bits],KDK_bits).

[0197] 10. FILS shared key with PFS

[0198] When the FILS shared key with PFS authentication method is adopted, the authentication frame of step 201 in FIG. 3 is shown in FIG. 7 , and the authentication frame of step 202 in FIG. 3 is shown in FIG. 8 .

[0199] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG7 , the MAC header of the authentication frame in step 201 includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT (High-Throughtput) Control fields.

[0200] The frame body of the authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0201] The authentication frame also includes an FCS (Frame Check Sequences) field.

[0202] The Body field includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 5, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, Finite Cyclic Group, FFE (Finite Field Element), RSNE, MDE (Mobility Domain Element), FILS Nonce, FILS Session, and FILS Wrapped Data. Authentication Algonrithm Number = 5 indicates a FILS shared key with PFS.

[0203] Among them, the FFE field includes: encoded ephermeral public key (encoded temporary public key) field.

[0204] The FILS Wrapped Data field includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Initiate / Re-auth Packet.

[0205] It's important to note that the "element" in FFE refers to an element in a finite field (a mathematical concept), not an element in an 802.11 frame. In an 802.11 frame (such as an authentication frame), a field generally refers to a fixed-format field, while an element refers to a variable-length field with an element ID + length.

[0206] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG8 , the MAC frame header of the authentication frame of step 202 includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT (High-Throughtput) Control fields.

[0207] The frame body of the authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0208] The authentication frame also includes an FCS (Frame Check Sequences) field.

[0209] Among them, the Body field includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number (authentication algorithm number) = 5, Transaction Sequence Number (transaction sequence number) = 2, Status Code (status code) = 0, Finite Cyclic Group (finite cyclic group), FFE field (FFE field), RSNE, MDE, FILS Nonce (FILS random number), FILS Session (FILS session), FILS Wrapped Data (FILS wrapped data), and Association Delay Info (association delay information) fields.

[0210] Among them, the FFE field includes: encoded ephermeral public key (encoded temporary public key) field.

[0211] The FILS Wrapped Data field includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Finish / Re-auth Packet.

[0212] The PMK is generated as follows:

[0213] rMSK=KDF(rRK,"Re-authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org"||"\0"||SEQ||length)

[0214] PMK=HMAC-Hash(SNonce||ANonce, rMSK||DHss)

[0215] PMKID=Truncate-128(Hash(EAP-Initiate / Reauth)).

[0216] DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman key exchange process.

[0217] At this time, the method for generating FILS-Key-Data (equivalent to PTK) is as follows:

[0218] FILS-Key-Data=PRF-X(PMK,"FILS PTK Derivation",SPA||AA||SNonce||ANonce||DHss)

[0219] ICK=L(FILS-Key-Data, 0, ICK_bits)

[0220] KEK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits,KEK_bits)

[0221] TK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits,TK_bits)

[0222] FILS-FT=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits+TK_bits,FILS-FT_bits)

[0223] KDK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits+TK_bits+[FILS-FT_bits],KDK_bits).

[0224] 11. FILS public key

[0225] When the FILS public key authentication method is adopted, the authentication frame of step 301 in FIG. 4 is shown in FIG. 9 , and the authentication frame of step 302 in FIG. 4 is shown in FIG. 10 .

[0226] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG9 , the MAC header of the authentication frame in step 301 includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT (High-Throughtput) Control fields.

[0227] The frame body of the authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0228] The authentication frame also includes an FCS (Frame Check Sequences) field.

[0229] The Body field includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 6, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, Finite Cyclic Group, FFE field, RSNE, MDE, FILS Nonce, and FILS Session fields. Authentication Algonrithm Number = 6 indicates the FILS public key.

[0230] Among them, the FFE field includes: an encoded ephermeral public key (encoded temporary public key) field.

[0231] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG10 , the MAC header of the authentication frame in step 302 includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT (High-Throughtput) Control fields.

[0232] The frame body of the authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0233] The authentication frame also includes an FCS (Frame Check Sequences) field.

[0234] Among them, the Body field includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number (authentication algorithm number) = 6, Transaction Sequence Number (transaction sequence number) = 2, Status Code (status code) = 0, Finite Cyclic Group (finite cyclic group), FFE field (FFE field), RSNE, MDE, FILS Nonce (FILS random number), and FILS Session (FILS session) fields.

[0235] Among them, the FFE field includes: encoded ephermeral public key (encoded temporary public key) field.

[0236] The PMK is generated as follows:

[0237] PMK=HMAC-Hash(SNonce||ANonce,DHss)

[0238] PMKID=Truncate-128(Hash(gSTA||gAP)).

[0239] gSTA is the Diffie-Hellman value of the STA; gAP is the Diffie-Hellman value of the AP; DHss is the shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman key exchange process.

[0240] At this time, the method for generating FILS-Key-Data (equivalent to PTK) is as follows:

[0241] FILS-Key-Data=PRF-X(PMK,"FILS PTK Derivation",SPA||AA||SNonce||ANonce||DHss)

[0242] ICK=L(FILS-Key-Data, 0, ICK_bits)

[0243] KEK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits,KEK_bits)

[0244] TK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits,TK_bits)

[0245] FILS-FT=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits+TK_bits,FILS-FT_bits)

[0246] KDK=L(FILS-Key-Data,ICK_bits+KEK_bits+TK_bits+[FILS-FT_bits],KDK_bits).

[0247] 12. 802.1X Authentication

[0248] According to the IEEE 802.11 protocol, STAs and APs can use 802.1X authentication in an infrastructure Basic Service Set (BSS) network. The STA and the 802.1X authentication server (AS) generate the same PMK through Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). During the authentication process, the AS sends the generated PMK to the AP using other protocols.

[0249] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG11 , performing authentication using the 802.1X authentication process includes the following steps:

[0250] Step 401: The STA sends an IEEE Std 802.11 probe request to the AP.

[0251] Step 402: The AP sends an IEEE Std 802.11 probe response to the STA. The probe response carries security parameters.

[0252] Step 403: The STA sends an IEEE Std 802.11 open system authentication request to the AP.

[0253] Step 404: The AP sends an IEEE Std 802.11 open system authentication response to the STA.

[0254] Step 405: The STA sends an IEEE Std 802.11 association request to the AP, where the association request carries security parameters.

[0255] Step 406: The AP sends an IEEE Std 802.11 association response to the STA.

[0256] Step 407: The AP sends an IEEE Std 802.11 EAP request (EAP Request) to the STA.

[0257] Step 408: The STA sends an IEEE Std 802.11 EAP response (EAP Response) to the AP.

[0258] Step 409: The AP sends a success request / EAP request to the AS.

[0259] Step 410: The AS performs EAP authentication control exchange with the STA.

[0260] Step 411: The AS sends an Accept / EAP Success / Key Material message to the AP.

[0261] Step 412: The AP sends an IEEE Std 802.11 EAP Success message to the STA.

[0262] The STA and the AP perform a four-way handshake process.

[0263] The EAP Request / Response / Success message formats are specified by the 802.1X-2020 protocol and RFC 3748 protocol, and are transmitted in the frame body of the IEEE 802.11 data frame.

[0264] Optionally, before the AP sends the EAP Request message to the STA, the STA can send an EAPOL-START message to the AP. The EAPOL-START message format is specified by the 802.1X-2020 protocol. The EAPOL-START message is carried in the frame body of an IEEE 802.11 data frame. The EAPOL-START message includes the Protocol Version, Packet Type (EAPOL-Start), and Packet Body Length fields.

[0265] When the Protocol Version field value is less than or equal to 2, the message body length of the message is 0.

[0266] When the Protocol Version field value is greater than or equal to 3, the message body of the message contains authentication information related to authorization and authentication policies.

[0267] 13. 4-way handsake

[0268] According to the IEEE 802.11 protocol, in an infrastructure Basic Service Set (BSS) network, after a STA establishes an association with an AP, the AP (the Authenticator) initiates a four-way handshake with the STA (the Supplicant) to establish the PTKSA, GTKSA, IGTKSA, and BIGTKSA. For details, see IEEE 802.11-2020.

[0269] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG12 , the four-way handshake process includes the following steps:

[0270] After the supplicant establishes an association with the authenticator, each of them holds a PMK. The supplicant generates an SNonce, and the authenticator generates an ANonce.

[0271] Step 501: The authenticator sends Message 1 to the requester.

[0272] The authenticator sends an EAPOL-Key frame carrying ANonce and Individual to the supplicant.

[0273] The supplicant generates a device PTK (Derive PTK).

[0274] Step 502: The requester sends Message 2 to the authenticator.

[0275] The supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key frame carrying the SNonce, Individual, and MIC to the authenticator.

[0276] The authenticator generates the device PTK (Derive PTK) and, if necessary, generates the GTK, IGTK, and BIGTK.

[0277] Step 503: The authenticator sends message 3 to the requester.

[0278] The authenticator sends an EAPOL-Key frame to the supplicant, carrying the Install PTK, Individual, MIC, Wrapped GTK, Wrapped IGTK, and Wrapped BIGTK.

[0279] Step 504: The requester sends Message 4 to the authenticator.

[0280] The supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key frame carrying the Individual and MIC to the authenticator.

[0281] The supplicant and authenticator each set the PTK, GTK, IGTK, and BIGTK.

[0282] 14. Group key handsake

[0283] According to the IEEE 802.11 protocol, in an infrastructure Basic Service Set (BSS) network, after a STA establishes an association with an AP, if the GTKSA and / or IGTKSA and / or BIGTKSA need to be changed, the AP (the Authenticator) initiates a group key handshake process with the STA (the Supplicant) to establish a new GTKSA and / or IGTKSA and / or BIGTKSA. For details, see IEEE 802.11-2020.

[0284] In an optional embodiment, as shown in FIG13 , the group key handshake process includes the following steps:

[0285] The authenticator generates GTK, IGTK, or BIGTK and wraps the GTK, IGTK, or BIGTK with the KEK.

[0286] Step 601: The authenticator sends Message 1 to the requester.

[0287] The authenticator sends an EAPOL-Key frame carrying Wrapped GTK, Wrapped IGTK, Wrapped BIGTK, and MIC to the supplicant.

[0288] The requester sets GTK, IGTK, and BIGTK.

[0289] Step 602: The requester sends Message 2 to the authenticator.

[0290] The supplicant sends an EAPOL-Key frame carrying the Group and MIC to the authenticator.

[0291] 15. SAE (Simultaneous Authentication of Equals)

[0292] According to the IEEE 802.11 protocol, in an infrastructure-type Basic Service Set (BSS) network, the TA and AP can use the SAE process for authentication. In this process, the device requesting authentication (usually the non-AP or non-AP MLD) and the device providing authentication (usually the AP or AP MLD) hold the same network key (password). Authentication is completed through four Authentication messages, and the PMKSA is generated based on the password.

[0293] In the SAE authentication method, the PTK used to encrypt and decrypt unicast data frames and management frames is generally generated after the four-way handshake. As a result, frames before the four-way handshake cannot be protected.

[0294] FIG14 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The method may be executed by a STA and includes:

[0295] Step 210: An authentication frame is transmitted to the AP to perform the authentication process. The first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0296] An authentication frame is a message transmitted between a STA and an AP during the authentication process. Exemplarily, the authentication frame includes at least one of a first authentication frame, a second authentication frame, a third authentication frame, and a fourth authentication frame.

[0297] Optionally, the first field is present in at least one of the first authentication frame, the second authentication frame, the third authentication frame, and the fourth authentication frame. In one optional embodiment, the first field is present in both the first authentication frame and the second authentication frame. In another optional embodiment, the first field is present in the first authentication frame, the second authentication frame, the third authentication frame, and the fourth authentication frame.

[0298] Optionally, the authentication process includes three authentication frames. For example, after detecting a Beacon frame sent by an accessible AP, the STA sends a first authentication frame to the AP. Subsequently, the AP sends a second authentication frame to the STA. The STA then sends a third authentication frame to the AP, completing the authentication process.

[0299] Optionally, the authentication process includes four authentication frames. For example, after detecting a Beacon frame sent by an accessible AP, the STA sends a first authentication frame to the AP. Subsequently, the AP sends a second authentication frame to the STA. The STA sends a third authentication frame to the AP. Finally, the AP sends a fourth authentication frame to the STA, completing the authentication process.

[0300] Illustratively, the extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy and the extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication have three authentication frames.

[0301] Exemplarily, the extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication has four authentication frames.

[0302] Different values ​​of the first field correspond to the extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, the extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication, and the extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0303] By reading the value of the first field, the AP or STA can determine whether the authentication method used is Extended PASN with FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, Extended PASN with FILS public key authentication, or Extended PASN with 802.1X authentication. The AP and STA can then use one of the three authentication methods to authenticate the STA.

[0304] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment adds a value to the first field in the authentication frame to indicate the authentication method used: extended PASN supporting FILS (Fast Initial Link Setup) shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy (FILS shared key with PFS), extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication, or extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication. This method clarifies the message format for extending the PASN to support the above authentication methods.

[0305] FIG15 is a flow chart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The method may be executed by an AP and includes:

[0306] Step 220: Transmit an authentication frame with the STA to perform the authentication process. The first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0307] Optionally, the first field may be an Authentication Algorithm Number field and a Wrapped Data Format field in the authentication frame.

[0308] The Authentication Algorithm Number field indicates the PASN or extended PASN. The Packet Data Format field indicates the specific authentication method, namely, extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication, or extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0309] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment adds a value to the first field in the authentication frame to indicate the authentication method used: extended PASN supporting FILS (Fast Initial Link Setup) shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy (FILS shared key with PFS), extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication, or extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication. This method clarifies the message format for extending the PASN to support the above authentication methods.

[0310] This application embodiment provides three authentication methods:

[0311] 1. Support extended PASN with FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy;

[0312] 2. Support extended PASN for FILS public key authentication;

[0313] 3. Support extended PASN for 802.1X authentication.

[0314] The following introduces the three authentication methods respectively.

[0315] 1. Support extended PASN with FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy

[0316] Exemplarily, two ways of taking the value of the first field are given, so that the first field indicates an extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0317] The first value selection method: the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is the first newly added value to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0318] The first newly added value can be any value between 4 and 255. Values ​​1 to 3 are used values ​​for the Packed Data Format field, and 4 to 255 are currently reserved values ​​for the Packed Data Format field. For example, the first newly added value is 4.

[0319] In this embodiment, the Authentication Algorithm Number field in the authentication frame may use the value 7 (7 represents PASN authentication). The authenticating parties use the newly added value 4 (4 to 255 are currently reserved values) in the Wrapped Data Format field to identify that the method used is an extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0320] For example, the Authentication Algorithm Number field is 7, which indicates that the PASN authentication algorithm is used. The Packaging Data Format field is the first newly added value, which indicates that the authentication method is extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0321] The second value-taking method: the identity authentication algorithm number field is the second newly added value, and the package data format field is the first newly added value, which is used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0322] The second added value can be any value between 8 and 65534. Values ​​1 to 7 are used values ​​for the identity authentication algorithm number field, and 8 to 65534 are currently reserved values ​​for the identity authentication algorithm number. For example, the second added value is 8.

[0323] In this embodiment, the Authentication Algorithm Number field in the authentication frame may also adopt a newly added value of 8 (representing Extended PASN authentication, i.e., extended PASN, 8-65534 is currently reserved). The authenticating parties use the newly added value 4 (4-255 is currently reserved) in the Wrapped Data Format field to identify that the method adopted is an extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0324] Illustratively, the identity authentication algorithm label field is the second newly added value for indicating that the identity authentication algorithm of the extended PASN is used. The package data format field is the first newly added value for indicating that the authentication method is the extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0325] By way of example, a specific process of using an extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy is given.

[0326] FIG16 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The method may be performed by a STA and an AP, and the method includes:

[0327] Step 701: The AP periodically sends a beacon frame.

[0328] Step 702: The STA sends a first authentication frame to the AP.

[0329] Step 703: The AP sends a second authentication frame to the STA.

[0330] Optionally, after receiving the second authentication frame, the STA generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0331] Step 704: The STA sends a third authentication frame to the AP.

[0332] Optionally, after receiving the third authentication frame, the AP generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0333] In an optional embodiment, at least one field of PMK public key, PMK public key length, PMK Finite Cyclic Group, PMK Group and Key Present is added to the authentication frame.

[0334] The first authentication frame format:

[0335] As shown in FIG17 , the MAC header of the first authentication frame includes the Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0336] The frame body (Frame Body) of the first authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0337] The first authentication frame further includes an FCS (Frame Check Sequences) field.

[0338] The Body field of the first authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data element, and PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0339] The Wrapped Data element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID (element identification), Length (length), Element ID Extension (element identification extension), and EAP-Initiate / Re-auth Packet (EAP-Initiate / Re-auth Packet) fields.

[0340] The PASN Parameters element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format = 4, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, Ephemeral Public Key (= FILS SNonce), PMK Finite Cyclic Group, PMK public key length, and PMK public key.

[0341] The Control field of the first authentication frame includes: come back info Present (return information validity bit), Group and Key Present (group and key validity bit), PMK Group and Key Present (PMK group and key validity bit), and Reserved.

[0342] As shown in FIG18 , the MAC header of the second authentication frame includes the Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0343] The frame body (Frame Body) of the second authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0344] The second authentication frame further includes MIC and FCS (Frame Check Sequences) fields.

[0345] The Body field of the second authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 2, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data element, and PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be 8.

[0346] The Wrapped Data element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID (element identifier), Length (length), Element ID Extension (element identifier extension), and EAP-Finish / Re-auth Packet (EAP-Finish / Re-auth Packet) fields.

[0347] The PASN Parameters element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format = 4, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, Ephemeral Public Key (= FILS ANonce), PMK Finite Cyclic Group, PMK public key length, and PMK public key.

[0348] The Control field of the second authentication frame includes: come back info Present (return information validity bit), Group and Key Present (group and key validity bit), PMK Group and Key Present (PMK group and key validity bit), and Reserved.

[0349] As shown in FIG19 , the MAC header of the third authentication frame includes the Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0350] The frame body (Frame Body) of the third authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0351] The third authentication frame further includes MIC and FCS (Frame Check Sequences) fields.

[0352] The Body field of the third authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number (Authentication Algonrithm Number) = 7, Transaction Sequence Number (Transaction Sequence Number) = 3, Status Code (Status Code) = 0, PASN Parameters element (PASN parameter element). Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number can also be equal to 8.

[0353] The PASN Parameters element field of the third authentication frame includes: Element ID (element identification), Length (length), Element ID Extension (element identification extension), Control (control), and Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format)=0.

[0354] In another optional embodiment, no new fields are added to the authentication frame.

[0355] The second authentication frame format:

[0356] As shown in FIG20 , the MAC frame header of the first authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0357] The Frame Body of the first authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0358] The first authentication frame also includes an FCS field.

[0359] The Body field of the first authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data (wrapped data), PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number can also be equal to 8.

[0360] The Wrapped Data field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Initiate / Re-auth Packet (EAP-Initiate / Re-auth Packet) fields.

[0361] The PASN Parameters element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 4, come back info (return information), Finite Cyclic Group ID (finite cyclic group identifier), Ephemeral Public Key Length (temporary public key length), Ephemeral Public Key (temporary public key) (= FILS SNonce).

[0362] As shown in FIG21 , the MAC frame header of the second authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0363] The Frame Body of the second authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0364] The second authentication frame also includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0365] The Body field of the second authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 2, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data, PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0366] The Wrapped Data field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Finish / Re-auth Packet (EAP-Finish / Re-auth Packet) fields.

[0367] The PASN Parameters element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 4, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, Ephemeral Public Key (= FILS ANonce).

[0368] As shown in FIG22 , the MAC frame header of the third authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0369] The Frame Body of the third authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0370] The third authentication frame further includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0371] The Body field of the third authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number=7, Transaction Sequence Number=3, Status Code=0, and PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0372] The PASN Parameters element field of the third authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, and Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 0.

[0373] It should be noted that the frame format diagram in this embodiment of the present application is only used to describe the fields contained in the authentication frame, and is not used to limit the arrangement order of the various fields in the authentication frame.

[0374] For the first authentication frame format mentioned above, the first method for generating PMK and PTK is provided:

[0375] (1) Generate PMK:

[0376] The AP and / or STA generates a first PMK based on a first DHss (shared key), wherein the first DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

[0377] rMSK=KDF(rRK,"Re-authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org"||"\0"||SEQ||length)

[0378] PMK=HMAC-Hash(SNonce||ANonce, rMSK||DHss)

[0379] PMKID=Truncate-128(Hash(EAP-Initiate / Reauth))

[0380] HMAC is a hash-based message authentication code; SNonce is a random number generated by the STA, and ANonce is a random number generated by the AP. SNonce (or FILS SNonce) is replaced by the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub), and ANonce (or FILS ANonce) is replaced by the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub). DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman (key exchange) process based on the newly added PMK public key of both parties (PMK public key field in Figures 17 and 18).

[0381] (2) Generate PTK:

[0382] The AP and / or STA generates a first pairwise transient key PTK based on the first PMK and the second DHss; wherein the second DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0383] PTK=KDF-HASH-NNN(PMK,"PASN PTK Derivation",SPA||BSSID||DHss)

[0384] DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman process based on the public key of the authenticated party (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the public key of the authenticator (A-Ephemeral Pub). The Diffie-Hellman process is included in the authentication frame exchange process. That is, during the authentication frame exchange process, the AP and STA exchange the A-Ephemeral Pub and S-Ephemeral Pub.

[0385] In an extended PASN with FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub) are independently generated by both parties using the same or similar generation mechanism as the STA's PMK and the AP's PMK. For example, the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub) are not signed by the certificate authority.

[0386] For the second authentication frame format mentioned above, a second method for generating PMK and PTK is provided:

[0387] (1) Generate PMK:

[0388] The AP and / or STA generates a second PMK based on the third DHss;

[0389] The third DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0390] rMSK=KDF(rRK,"Re-authentication Master Session Key@ietf.org"||"\0"||SEQ||length)

[0391] PMK=HMAC-Hash(SNonce||ANonce, rMSK||DHss)

[0392] PMKID=Truncate-128(Hash(EAP-Initiate / Reauth))

[0393] The SNonce (or FILS SNonce) is replaced by the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub), and the ANonce (or FILS ANonce) is replaced by the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub). DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman process based on the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub).

[0394] (2) Generate PTK:

[0395] Generate a second PTK based on the second PMK and the third DHss.

[0396] PTK=KDF-HASH-NNN(PMK,"PASN PTK Derivation",SPA||BSSID||DHss)

[0397] DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman process based on the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub).

[0398] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment clarifies the specific process and message format of how to extend PASN to support FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy (FILS shared key with PFS), and provides the method for generating PMK and PTK.

[0399] 2. Support extended PASN for FILS public key authentication

[0400] Exemplarily, two ways of taking the value of the first field are given, so that the first field indicates an extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0401] The third value selection method: the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the packaging data format field is the third newly added value used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0402] The third newly added value can be any value between 4 and 255. Values ​​1-3 are used values ​​for the Packed Data Format field, and 4-255 are currently reserved values ​​for the Packed Data Format field. For example, the third newly added value is 5.

[0403] In this embodiment, the Authentication Algorithm Number field in the authentication frame may use the value 7 (7 represents PASN authentication), and the authenticating parties use the newly added value 5 (4-255 are existing reserved values) in the Wrapped Data Format field to identify that the method used is an extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0404] For example, the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, which indicates that the PASN identity authentication algorithm is used. The package data format field is the third newly added value, which indicates that the authentication method is the extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0405] The fourth value-taking method: the identity authentication algorithm number field is the fourth newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the third newly added value, which is used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0406] The fourth newly added value can be any value between 8 and 65534. Values ​​1-7 are already occupied by the identity authentication algorithm number field, and 8-65534 are currently reserved values ​​for the identity authentication algorithm number. For example, the fourth newly added value is 8.

[0407] In this embodiment, the Authentication Algorithm Number field in the authentication frame may also adopt a newly added value of 8 (8 represents Extended PASN authentication, and 8-65534 are currently reserved values). The authenticating parties use the newly added value 5 (4-255 are currently reserved values) in the Wrapped Data Format field to identify that the method adopted is Extended PASN with FILS public key authentication.

[0408] Illustratively, the identity authentication algorithm label field is the fourth newly added value to indicate that the identity authentication algorithm of the extended PASN is used. The package data format field is the third newly added value to indicate that the authentication method is the extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0409] By way of example, a specific process of using an extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication is given.

[0410] FIG23 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The method may be performed by a STA and an AP, and the method includes:

[0411] Step 801: The AP periodically sends a beacon frame.

[0412] Step 802: The STA sends a first authentication frame to the AP.

[0413] Step 803: The AP sends a second authentication frame to the STA.

[0414] Optionally, after receiving the second authentication frame, the STA generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0415] Step 804: The STA sends a third authentication frame to the AP.

[0416] Optionally, after receiving the third authentication frame, the AP generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0417] In an optional embodiment, at least one field of PMK public key, PMK public key length, PMK Finite Cyclic Group, PMK Group and Key Present is added to the authentication frame.

[0418] The third authentication frame format: at least one field among the PMK public key, PMK public key length, and PMK limited cyclic group is carried in the packaging data element field of the authentication frame.

[0419] As shown in FIG24 , the MAC frame header of the first authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0420] The Frame Body of the first authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0421] The first authentication frame also includes an FCS field.

[0422] The Body field of the first authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data element, PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0423] The Wrapped Data element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, PMK Finite Cyclic Group (PMK finite cyclic group), PMK public key length (PMK public key length), PMK public key (PMK public key) fields.

[0424] The PASN Parameters element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 5, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, Ephemeral Public Key (= FILS SNonce) fields.

[0425] The Control field of the first authentication frame includes: come back info Present (return information validity bit), Group and Key Present (group and key validity bit), and Reserved.

[0426] As shown in FIG25 , the MAC frame header of the second authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0427] The Frame Body of the second authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0428] The second authentication frame also includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0429] The Body field of the second authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 2, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data element, PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0430] The Wrapped Data element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, PMK Finite Cyclic Group (PMK finite cyclic group), PMK public key length (PMK public key length), PMK public key (PMK public key) fields.

[0431] The PASN Parameters element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 5, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, Ephemeral Public Key (= FILS ANonce) fields.

[0432] The Control field of the second authentication frame includes: come back info Present (return information validity bit), Group and Key Present (group and key validity bit), and Reserved.

[0433] As shown in FIG26 , the MAC frame header of the third authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0434] The Frame Body of the third authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0435] The third authentication frame further includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0436] The Body field of the third authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number=7, Transaction Sequence Number=3, Status Code=0, PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0437] The PASN Parameters element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, and Wrapped Data Format = 0.

[0438] The fourth authentication frame format: at least one of the PMK public key, PMK public key length, and PMK limited cyclic group fields is carried in the packaging data element field of the authentication frame; the PMK limited cyclic group field is carried in the control field of the authentication frame.

[0439] As shown in FIG27 , the MAC frame header of the first authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0440] The Frame Body of the first authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0441] The first authentication frame also includes an FCS field.

[0442] The Body field of the first authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, PASN Parameters element (PASN parameter element). Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number can also be equal to 8.

[0443] The PASN Parameters element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 5, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, Ephemeral Public Key (= FILS SNonce), PMK Finite Cyclic Group (PMK finite cyclic group), PMK public key length (PMK public key length), PMK public key (PMK public key) fields.

[0444] The Control field of the first authentication frame includes: come back info, Group and Key Present (group and key validity bit), PMK Group and Key Present (PMK group and key validity bit), and Reserved.

[0445] As shown in FIG28 , the MAC frame header of the second authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0446] The Frame Body of the second authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0447] The second authentication frame also includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0448] The Body field of the second authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 2, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, PASN Parameters element (PASN parameter element). Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number can also be equal to 8.

[0449] The PASN Parameters element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 5, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, Ephemeral Public Key (= FILS ANonce), PMK Finite Cyclic Group (PMK finite cyclic group), PMK public key length (PMK public key length), PMK public key (PMK public key) fields.

[0450] The Control field of the second authentication frame includes: come back info, Group and Key Present (group and key validity bit), PMK Group and Key Present (PMK group and key validity bit), and Reserved.

[0451] As shown in FIG29 , the MAC frame header of the third authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0452] The Frame Body of the third authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0453] The third authentication frame further includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0454] The Body field of the third authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number=7, Transaction Sequence Number=3, Status Code=0, PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0455] The PASN Parameters element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, and Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 0.

[0456] It should be noted that the frame format diagram in this embodiment of the present application is only used to describe the fields contained in the authentication frame, and is not used to limit the arrangement order of the various fields in the authentication frame.

[0457] For the third and fourth authentication frame formats, a third method for generating PMK and PTK is provided:

[0458] (1) Generate PMK:

[0459] The AP and / or STA generates a third PMK based on the fourth DHss; wherein the fourth DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

[0460] PMK=HMAC-Hash(SNonce||ANonce,DHss)

[0461] PMKID=Truncate-128(Hash(gSTA||gAP))

[0462] Where gSTA is the STA's Diffie-Hellman (key exchange) value; gAP is the AP's Diffie-Hellman value. SNonce (or FILS SNonce) is replaced with the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub), and ANonce (or FILS ANonce) is replaced with the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub). DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman process based on the newly added PMK public key of both parties (the PMK public key field in Figures 24 and 25, or Figures 27 and 28).

[0463] The public key of the authenticated party (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the public key of the authenticator (A-Ephemeral Pub) in the extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication are preset within both parties or obtained in advance by both parties through out-of-band methods. Generally speaking, the public keys here are signed by the Certificate Authority (CA).

[0464] (2) Generate PTK:

[0465] The AP and / or STA generates a third PTK based on the third PMK and the fifth DHss; wherein the fifth DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0466] PTK=KDF-HASH-NNN(PMK,"PASN PTK Derivation",SPA||BSSID||DHss)

[0467] DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman process based on the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub).

[0468] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment clarifies the specific process and message format of how to extend PASN to support the FILS public key authentication method, and provides the method for generating PMK and PTK.

[0469] 3. Support extended PASN for 802.1X authentication

[0470] Exemplarily, two value-taking modes of the first field are given, so that the first field indicates an extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0471] The fifth value selection method: the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the packaging data format field is the fifth newly added value to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0472] The fifth newly added value can be any value between 4 and 255. Values ​​1-3 are used values ​​for the Packed Data Format field, and 4-255 are currently reserved values ​​for the Packed Data Format field. For example, the third newly added value is 6.

[0473] In this embodiment, the Authentication Algorithm Number field in the authentication frame may use the value 7 (7 represents PASN authentication). The authenticating parties use the newly added value 6 (4-255 are currently reserved values) in the Wrapped Data Format field to identify that the method used is the extended PASN of the 802.1X authentication method.

[0474] For example, the identity authentication algorithm label field is 7, which indicates that the PASN identity authentication algorithm is used. The package data format field is the fifth newly added value, which indicates that the authentication method is the extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0475] The sixth value selection method: the identity authentication algorithm number field is the sixth newly added value, and the package data format field is the fifth newly added value, which is used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0476] The sixth newly added value can be any value between 8 and 65534. Values ​​1-7 are already occupied by the identity authentication algorithm number field, and 8-65534 are currently reserved values ​​for the identity authentication algorithm number. For example, the sixth newly added value is 8.

[0477] In this embodiment, the Authentication Algorithm Number field in the authentication frame may also adopt the newly added value 8 (representing Extended PASN authentication, 8-65534 is currently reserved). The authenticating parties use the newly added value 6 (4-255 is currently reserved) in the Wrapped Data Format field to identify that the method used is the extended PASN authentication method of the 802.1X authentication method.

[0478] For example, the identity authentication algorithm label field is the sixth newly added value, which is used to indicate that the identity authentication algorithm of extended PASN is used. The package data format field is the fifth newly added value, which is used to indicate that the authentication method is extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0479] By way of example, a specific process of using an extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication is given.

[0480] FIG30 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The method may be performed by a STA and an AP, and the method includes:

[0481] Step 901: The AP periodically sends Beacon frames.

[0482] The Beacon frame includes fields such as RSNE, Extended PASN AKM, Base AKM, and RSNXE.

[0483] Step 902: The STA sends a first authentication frame to the AP.

[0484] The first authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 1 (used to indicate Authentication 1), Extended PASN, RSNE, PASN AKM, PMK ID, RSNXE, S-Ephemeral Pub (public key of the authenticated party, i.e., the public key of the STA), PASN Parameters, and Base AKM Data-1.

[0485] Step 903: The AP sends a second authentication frame to the STA.

[0486] The second authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 2 (used to indicate Authentication 2), Extended PASN, RSNE, PASN AKM, PMK ID, RSNXE, A-Ephemeral Pub (authenticator public key, i.e., AP's public key), PASN Parameters, Base AKM Data-2 (basic AKM second data), and MIC.

[0487] Optionally, after receiving the second authentication frame, the STA generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0488] Step 904: The STA sends a third authentication frame to the AP.

[0489] The third authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 3 (used to indicate Authentication 3), Base AKM Data-3 (basic AKM third data), and MIC.

[0490] Optionally, after receiving the third authentication frame, the AP generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0491] Step 905: The AP sends a fourth authentication frame to the STA.

[0492] The fourth authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 4 (used to indicate Authentication 4), Base AKM Data-4 (basic AKM fourth data), and MIC.

[0493] The fifth authentication frame format: the Packaging Data Format field of the first authentication frame indicates the start of the Extended Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAPOL); the Packaging Data Format field of the second authentication frame indicates the Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP) request / identity information; the Packaging Data Format field of the third authentication frame indicates the EAP response; the Packaging Data Format field of the fourth authentication frame indicates EAP success.

[0494] As shown in FIG31 , the MAC frame header of the first authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0495] The Frame Body of the first authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0496] The first authentication frame also includes an FCS field.

[0497] The Body field of the first authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 1, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data element, PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0498] The Wrapped Data element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAPOL-Start.

[0499] The PASN Parameters element field of the first authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 6, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, and Ephemeral Public Key fields.

[0500] As shown in FIG32 , the MAC frame header of the second authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0501] The Frame Body of the second authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0502] The second authentication frame also includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0503] The Body field of the second authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 2, Status Code = 0, RSNE, TIE (key lifetime interval), RSNXE, Wrapped Data element, PASN Parameters element. Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number may also be equal to 8.

[0504] The Wrapped Data element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP Request / Identity message (EAP-Request / Identity information) fields.

[0505] The PASN Parameters element field of the second authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 6, come back info, Finite Cyclic Group ID, Ephemeral Public Key Length, and Ephemeral Public Key fields.

[0506] As shown in FIG33 , the MAC frame header of the third authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0507] The Frame Body of the third authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0508] The third authentication frame further includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0509] The Body field of the third authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number=7, Transaction Sequence Number=3, Status Code=0, Wrapped Data (wrapped data), PASN Parameters element (PASN parameter element). Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number can also be equal to 8.

[0510] The Wrapped Data field of the third authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Response fields.

[0511] The PASN Parameters element field of the third authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 6 fields.

[0512] As shown in FIG34 , the MAC frame header of the fourth authentication frame includes: Frame Control, Duration, Address 1, Address 2, Address 3, Sequence Control, and HT Control fields.

[0513] The Frame Body of the fourth authentication frame includes a Body field.

[0514] The fourth authentication frame further includes MIC and FCS fields.

[0515] The Body field of the fourth authentication frame includes: Authentication Algonrithm Number = 7, Transaction Sequence Number = 4, Status Code = 0, Wrapped Data (wrapped data), PASN Parameters element (PASN parameter element). Optionally, the Authentication Algonrithm Number can also be equal to 8.

[0516] The Wrapped Data field of the fourth authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, and EAP-Success fields.

[0517] The PASN Parameters element field of the fourth authentication frame includes: Element ID, Length, Element ID Extension, Control, Wrapped Data Format (wrapped data format) = 6 fields.

[0518] For the fifth authentication frame format described above, a fourth method for generating PMK and PTK is provided:

[0519] (1) Generate PMK:

[0520] The PMK generation method in this embodiment is consistent with the 802.1X PMK generation method. The STA and the 802.1X authentication server (AS) generate the same PMK through Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) authentication. During the authentication process, the AS sends the generated PMK to the AP using other protocols.

[0521] (2) Generate PTK:

[0522] PTK=KDF-HASH-NNN(PMK,"PASN PTK Derivation",SPA||BSSID||DHss)

[0523] DHss is a shared key generated by the Diffie-Hellman process based on the authenticated party's public key (S-Ephemeral Pub) and the authenticator's public key (A-Ephemeral Pub).

[0524] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment clarifies the specific process and message format of how to extend PASN to support the 802.1X authentication method, and provides a method for generating PMK and PTK.

[0525] The embodiment of the present application also provides a method for protecting messages during the process of establishing association between STA and network by extending PASN, including association request and response messages, and / or four-way handshake messages, and / or group key handshake messages.

[0526] Exemplarily, the PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt association process messages. And / or, the PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

[0527] In an optional embodiment, the data communication message includes a group key handshake message. The group key handshake message is used to distribute at least one of the keys GTK, IGTK, and BIGTK.

[0528] FIG35 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The method may be performed by a STA and an AP, and the method includes:

[0529] Step 1001: The AP periodically sends Beacon frames.

[0530] The Beacon frame includes fields such as RSNE, extended PASN AKM, Base AKM, and RSNXE.

[0531] Step 1002: The STA sends a first authentication frame to the AP.

[0532] The first authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 1 (used to indicate Authentication 1), Extended PASN, RSNE, PASN AKM, PMK ID, RSNXE, S-Ephemeral Pub (public key of the authenticated party, i.e., the public key of the STA), PASN Parameters, and Base AKM Data-1.

[0533] Step 1003: The AP sends a second authentication frame to the STA.

[0534] The second authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 2 (used to indicate Authentication 2), Extended PASN, RSNE, PASN AKM, PMK ID, RSNXE, A-Ephemeral Pub (authenticator public key, i.e., AP's public key), PASN Parameters, Base AKM Data-2 (basic AKM second data), and MIC.

[0535] Optionally, after receiving the second authentication frame, the STA generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0536] Step 1004: The STA sends a third authentication frame to the AP.

[0537] The third authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 3 (used to indicate Authentication 3), Base AKM Data-3 (basic AKM third data), and MIC.

[0538] Optionally, after receiving the third authentication frame, the AP generates a PMK and a PTK.

[0539] This embodiment uses steps 1001 to 1004 as an example for the authentication process. Of course, this authentication process can also be replaced with steps 701 to 704 shown in Figure 16 , or steps 801 to 804 shown in Figure 23 , or steps 901 to 905 shown in Figure 30 . After this replacement, the STA and AP can perform the authentication process using the corresponding extended PASN authentication method.

[0540] Step 1005: The STA and AP use the PTK generated during the authentication process to encrypt and decrypt the messages during the association process.

[0541] The STA encrypts the association request message with the PTK and sends the encrypted association request message to the AP.

[0542] The AP uses the PTK to decrypt the association request message and encrypts the association response message using the PTK. The AP sends the encrypted association response message to the STA.

[0543] The STA decrypts the association response message using the PTK to complete the association process.

[0544] Step 1006: The AP encrypts message 1 of the group key handshake process using the PTK generated during the authentication process, and the AP sends the encrypted message 1 to the STA.

[0545] The AP uses the PTK generated during the authentication process to encrypt the EAPOL-Key frame. The EAPOL-Key frame includes the encapsulated GTK, encapsulated IGTK, encapsulated BIGTK, Group, and MIC.

[0546] STA uses the PTK generated by the authentication process to decrypt Message 1.

[0547] Step 1007: The STA uses the PTK generated during the authentication process to encrypt message 2 of the group key handshake process, and the STA sends the encrypted message 2 to the AP.

[0548] The STA uses the PTK generated during the authentication process to encrypt the EAPOL-Key frame, which includes the Group and MIC.

[0549] The AP decrypts Message 2 using the PTK generated by the authentication process.

[0550] The method provided in this embodiment extends the Basic Authentication and Key Management Method (Base AKM) used in PASN, as shown in Table 1.

[0551] Table 1

[0552]

[0553] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment uses the PTK generated during the extended PASN authentication process to encrypt and decrypt association request and response messages. Once association is complete, secure data communication can begin. This PTK can be used to encrypt and decrypt both unicast data frames and management frames. After association is complete, the GTK, IGTK, and BIGTK are distributed using the group key handshake process. Group key handshake messages are unicast data frames and can be encrypted and decrypted using the PTK.

[0554] Exemplarily, the PTK generated by the above authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt four-way handshake messages. The four-way handshake process is also used to create an updated PTK, wherein the updated PTK is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

[0555] FIG36 is a flowchart of an authentication method provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The method may be performed by a STA and an AP, and the method includes:

[0556] Step 1101: The AP periodically sends Beacon frames.

[0557] The Beacon frame includes fields such as RSNE, extended PASN AKM, Base AKM, and RSNXE.

[0558] Step 1102: The STA sends a first authentication frame to the AP.

[0559] The first authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 1 (used to indicate Authentication 1), Extended PASN, RSNE, PASN AKM, PMK ID, RSNXE, S-Ephemeral Pub (public key of the authenticated party, i.e., the public key of the STA), PASN Parameters, and Base AKM Data-1.

[0560] Step 1103: The AP sends a second authentication frame to the STA.

[0561] The second authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 2 (used to indicate Authentication 2), Extended PASN, RSNE, PASN AKM, PMK ID, RSNXE, A-Ephemeral Pub (authenticator public key, i.e., AP's public key), PASN Parameters, Base AKM Data-2 (basic AKM second data), and MIC.

[0562] Optionally, after receiving the second authentication frame, the STA generates a PMK and a PTK1.

[0563] Step 1104: The STA sends a third authentication frame to the AP.

[0564] The third authentication frame includes fields such as Transaction Sequence Number 3 (used to indicate Authentication 3), Base AKM Data-3 (basic AKM third data), and MIC.

[0565] Optionally, after receiving the third authentication frame, the AP generates a PMK and a PTK1.

[0566] This embodiment uses steps 1101 to 1104 as an example for the authentication process. Of course, this authentication process can also be replaced with steps 701 to 704 shown in Figure 16 , or steps 801 to 804 shown in Figure 23 , or steps 901 to 905 shown in Figure 30 . After this replacement, the STA and AP can perform the authentication process using the corresponding extended PASN authentication method.

[0567] Step 1105: The STA and AP use the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt and decrypt the messages during the association process.

[0568] The STA encrypts the association request message using PTK1 and sends the encrypted association request message to the AP.

[0569] The AP decrypts the association request message using PTK1 and encrypts the association response message using PTK1. The AP sends the encrypted association response message to the STA.

[0570] The STA decrypts the association response message using PTK1 to complete the association process.

[0571] Step 1106: The AP uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt the message 1 of the four-way handshake process, and the AP sends the encrypted message 1 to the STA.

[0572] The AP uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt the EAPOL-Key frame. The EAPOL-Key frame includes ANonce and Individual.

[0573] STA uses PTK1 generated during the authentication process to decrypt Message 1.

[0574] The STA generates PTK2 based on ANonce in Message 1 and its own generated SNonce.

[0575] Step 1107: The STA uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt Message 2 of the four-way handshake process, and the STA sends the encrypted Message 2 to the AP.

[0576] The STA uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt the EAPOL-Key frame. The EAPOL-Key frame includes the SNonce, Individual, and MIC.

[0577] The AP uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to decrypt Message 2.

[0578] The AP generates PTK2 based on the SNonce in Message 2 and the ANonce generated by itself.

[0579] If necessary, AP generates GTK, IGTK, BIGTK.

[0580] Step 1108: The AP uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt message 3 of the four-way handshake process, and the AP sends the encrypted message 3 to the STA.

[0581] The AP uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt the EAPOL-Key frame. The EAPOL-Key frame includes the set PTK, Individual, MIC, encapsulated GTK, encapsulated IGTK, and encapsulated BIGTK.

[0582] STA uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to decrypt Message 3.

[0583] Step 1109: The STA uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt message 4 of the four-way handshake process, and the STA sends the encrypted message 4 to the AP.

[0584] The STA uses the PTK1 generated during the authentication process to encrypt the EAPOL-Key frame. The EAPOL-Key frame includes the Initial, MIC, and.

[0585] The AP decrypts Message 4 using PTK1 generated during the authentication process.

[0586] The STA and AP each set PTK2 (replace PTK1 with PTK2), GTK, IGTK, and BIGTK.

[0587] Subsequently, the STA and AP try to use PTK2 to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

[0588] PTK1 is the PTK generated during the authentication process, and PTK2 is the updated PTK created during the four-way handshake process.

[0589] The method provided in this embodiment extends the Basic Authentication and Key Management Method (Base AKM) used in PASN, as shown in Table 2.

[0590] Table 2

[0591]

[0592] In summary, the method provided in this embodiment uses PTK1, generated during the extended PASN authentication process, to encrypt and decrypt association request and response messages. After association is complete, a new PTK2 is created during the four-way handshake, replacing the PTK1 created by the PASN. Four-way handshake messages are encrypted and decrypted using PTK1. After the four-way handshake is complete, secure data communication can resume, with PTK2 used to encrypt and decrypt both unicast data frames and management frames.

[0593] FIG37 is a block diagram of an authentication device provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The device is used to become a STA or a part of a STA, and the device includes:

[0594] The first authentication module 1201 is used to transmit an authentication frame with the site AP to perform the authentication process, where the first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment with perfect forward secrecy FILS shared key authentication, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0595] In an optional design, the first field includes an identity authentication algorithm number field and a packaging data format field.

[0596] In an optional design, the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a first newly added value for indicating that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy;

[0597] or,

[0598] The identity authentication algorithm number field is the second newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the first newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method adopted is: extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0599] In an optional design, the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a third newly added value for indicating that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication;

[0600] or,

[0601] The identity authentication algorithm number field is the fourth newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the third newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method adopted is: extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0602] In an optional design, the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a fifth newly added value for indicating that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication;

[0603] or,

[0604] The identity authentication algorithm number field is the sixth newly added value, and the package data format field is the fifth newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0605] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication mode using extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy;

[0606] The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a pairwise master key PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

[0607] In an optional design, the authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the apparatus further includes:

[0608] A first key module 1202 is configured to generate a first PMK based on a first shared key DHss;

[0609] The first DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

[0610] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0611] A first key module 1202 is configured to generate a first pairwise transient key PTK based on the first PMK and the second DHss;

[0612] The second DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0613] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication method using an extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy; the apparatus further includes:

[0614] A first key module 1202 is configured to generate a second PMK according to a third DHss;

[0615] The third DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0616] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0617] The first key module 1202 is used to generate a second PTK according to the second PMK and the third DHss.

[0618] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication method using an extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication;

[0619] The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

[0620] In an optional design, at least one field among the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in the packaging data element field of the authentication frame.

[0621] In an optional design, at least one field among the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in a packaging data element field of the authentication frame;

[0622] The PMK limited cyclic group field is carried in the control field of the authentication frame.

[0623] In an optional design, the authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the apparatus further includes:

[0624] The first key module 1202 is configured to generate a third PMK according to the fourth DHss;

[0625] The fourth DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

[0626] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0627] A first key module 1202 is configured to generate a third PTK based on the third PMK and the fifth DHss;

[0628] The fifth DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0629] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication method using an extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication;

[0630] The authentication frame includes a fourth authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA.

[0631] In an optional design, the authentication frame includes:

[0632] A first authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein a Packet Data Format field of the first authentication frame indicates that EAPOL-Start is an Extended Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network (EAPOL-Start);

[0633] A second authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA, wherein the package data format field of the second authentication frame indicates an Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP) request / identity information;

[0634] A third authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein the package data format field of the third authentication frame indicates an EAP response;

[0635] The fourth authentication frame, wherein the package data format field of the fourth authentication frame indicates EAP success.

[0636] In an optional design, the PTK generated by the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt association process messages.

[0637] In an optional design, the PTK generated by the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

[0638] In one optional design, the data communication message includes a group key handshake message;

[0639] The group key handshake message is used to distribute at least one of a group temporary key GTK, an integrity group temporary key IGTK, and a beacon frame integrity group temporary key BIGTK.

[0640] In an optional design, the PTK generated by the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt four-way handshake messages.

[0641] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0642] A first handshake module 1203 is configured to create an updated PTK using a four-way handshake process;

[0643] The updated PTK is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

[0644] FIG38 is a block diagram of an authentication device provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The device is used to become an AP or a part of an AP, and the device includes:

[0645] The second authentication module 1204 is used to transmit an authentication frame with the STA to perform the authentication process. The first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment with perfect forward secrecy FILS shared key authentication, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

[0646] In an optional design, the first field includes an identity authentication algorithm number field and a packaging data format field.

[0647] In an optional design, the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a first newly added value for indicating that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy;

[0648] or,

[0649] The identity authentication algorithm number field is the second newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the first newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method adopted is: extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

[0650] In an optional design, the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a third newly added value for indicating that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication;

[0651] or,

[0652] The identity authentication algorithm number field is the fourth newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the third newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

[0653] In an optional design, the identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a fifth newly added value for indicating that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication;

[0654] or,

[0655] The identity authentication algorithm number field is the sixth newly added value, and the package data format field is the fifth newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

[0656] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication method using extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy;

[0657] The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a pairwise master key PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

[0658] In an optional design, the authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the apparatus further includes:

[0659] The second key module 1205 is configured to generate a first PMK according to the first shared key DHss;

[0660] The first DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

[0661] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0662] The second key module 1205 is configured to generate a first pairwise transient key PTK according to the first PMK and the second DHss;

[0663] The second DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0664] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication method using an extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy; the apparatus further includes:

[0665] The second key module 1205 is used to generate a second PMK according to the third DHss;

[0666] The third DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0667] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0668] The second key module 1205 is used to generate a second PTK based on the second PMK and the third DHss.

[0669] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication method using an extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication;

[0670] The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

[0671] In an optional design, at least one field among the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in the packaging data element field of the authentication frame.

[0672] In an optional design, at least one field among the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in a packaging data element field of the authentication frame;

[0673] The PMK limited cyclic group field is carried in the control field of the authentication frame.

[0674] In an optional design, the authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the apparatus further includes:

[0675] The second key module 1205 is configured to generate a third PMK according to the fourth DHss;

[0676] The fourth DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

[0677] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0678] The second key module 1205 is configured to generate a third PTK based on the third PMK and the fifth DHss;

[0679] The fifth DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

[0680] In an optional design, the first field is used to indicate an authentication method using an extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication;

[0681] The authentication frame includes a fourth authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA.

[0682] In an optional design, the authentication frame includes:

[0683] A first authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein a Packet Data Format field of the first authentication frame indicates that EAPOL-Start is an Extended Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network (EAPOL-Start);

[0684] A second authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA, wherein the package data format field of the second authentication frame indicates an Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP) request / identity information;

[0685] A third authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein the package data format field of the third authentication frame indicates an EAP response;

[0686] The fourth authentication frame, wherein the package data format field of the fourth authentication frame indicates EAP success.

[0687] In an optional design, the PTK generated by the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt association process messages.

[0688] In an optional design, the PTK generated by the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

[0689] In one optional design, the data communication message includes a group key handshake message;

[0690] The group key handshake message is used to distribute at least one of a group temporary key GTK, an integrity group temporary key IGTK, and a beacon frame integrity group temporary key BIGTK.

[0691] In an optional design, the PTK generated by the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt four-way handshake messages.

[0692] In an optional design, the device further includes:

[0693] A second handshake module 1206 is configured to create an updated PTK using a four-way handshake process;

[0694] The updated PTK is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

[0695] It should be noted that the device provided in the above embodiment only uses the division of the above-mentioned functional modules as an example to implement its functions. In actual applications, the above-mentioned functions can be assigned to different functional modules according to actual needs, that is, the content structure of the device can be divided into different functional modules to complete all or part of the functions described above.

[0696] Regarding the apparatus in the above embodiment, the specific manner in which each module performs operations has been described in detail in the embodiment of the method, and will not be elaborated here.

[0697] Figure 39 is a structural diagram of an authentication device (STA and / or AP) provided by an exemplary embodiment of the present application. The authentication device 3300 includes: a processor 3301, a receiver 3302, a transmitter 3303, a memory 3304 and a bus 3305.

[0698] The processor 3301 includes one or more processing cores. The processor 3301 executes various functional applications and information processing by running software programs and modules.

[0699] The receiver 3302 and the transmitter 3303 may be implemented as a communication component, which may be a communication chip.

[0700] The memory 3304 is connected to the processor 3301 via a bus 3305. The memory 3304 may be used to store at least one instruction, and the processor 3301 may be used to execute the at least one instruction to implement each step in the above method embodiment.

[0701] In addition, the memory 3304 can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or a combination thereof. Volatile or non-volatile storage devices include but are not limited to: magnetic disks or optical disks, Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EPROM), Static Random-Access Memory (SRAM), Read-Only Memory (ROM), magnetic memory, flash memory, and Programmable Read-Only Memory (PROM).

[0702] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is further provided, in which at least one program is stored. The at least one program is loaded and executed by a processor to implement the authentication method provided by each of the above method embodiments.

[0703] In an exemplary embodiment, a chip is further provided. The chip includes a programmable logic circuit and / or program instructions. When the chip runs on a communication device, it is used to implement the authentication methods provided by the above-mentioned various method embodiments.

[0704] In an exemplary embodiment, a computer program product is further provided. When the computer program product is run on a processor of a communication device, the communication device is enabled to perform the above authentication method.

[0705] Those skilled in the art will appreciate that in one or more of the above examples, the functions described in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented using hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof. When implemented using software, these functions can be stored in a computer-readable medium or transmitted as one or more instructions or codes on a computer-readable medium. Computer-readable media include computer storage media and communication media, wherein communication media include any media that facilitates the transmission of computer programs from one place to another. The storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a general-purpose or special-purpose computer.

[0706] The above description is merely an optional embodiment of the present application and is not intended to limit the present application. Any modifications, equivalent replacements, improvements, etc. made within the spirit and principles of the present application shall be included in the scope of protection of the present application.

Claims

1. An authentication method, characterized in that: The method is performed by a station STA, and the method includes: An authentication frame is transmitted between the access point AP to perform the authentication process. The first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment with perfect forward secrecy FILS shared key authentication, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that The first field includes an identity authentication algorithm number field and a packaging data format field.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is the first newly added value to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy; Alternatively, the identity authentication algorithm number field is the second newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the first newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method adopted is: extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

4. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a third newly added value used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication; Alternatively, the identity authentication algorithm number field is the fourth newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the third newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method adopted is: extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

5. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that The identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a fifth newly added value used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication; Alternatively, the identity authentication algorithm number field is the sixth newly added value, and the package data format field is the fifth newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The first field is used to indicate the authentication method of extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy; The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a pairwise master key PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that The authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the method further includes: Generate a first PMK based on the first shared key DHss; The first DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that The method further comprises: Generate a first pairwise transient key PTK based on the first PMK and the second DHss; The second DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

9. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The first field is used to indicate that an extended PASN authentication method supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy is adopted; the method further includes: Generate a second PMK based on the third DHss; The third DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that The method further comprises: Generate a second PTK according to the second PMK and the third DHss.

11. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The first field is used to indicate the authentication method of the extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication; The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

12. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that At least one field among the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in a packaging data element field of the authentication frame.

13. The method according to claim 11, characterized in that At least one of the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in the Packing Data Element field of the authentication frame; The PMK limited cyclic group field is carried in the control field of the authentication frame.

14. The method according to any one of claims 11 to 13, characterized in that: The authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the method further includes: Generate a third PMK based on the fourth DHss; The fourth DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

15. The method according to claim 14, characterized in that The method further comprises: Generate a third PTK based on the third PMK and the fifth DHss; The fifth DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

16. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 5, characterized in that: The first field is used to indicate the authentication method of using extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication; The authentication frame includes a fourth authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA.

17. The method according to claim 16, characterized in that The authentication frame includes: A first authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein a Packet Data Format field of the first authentication frame indicates that EAPOL-Start is an Extended Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network (EAPOL-Start); A second authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA, wherein the package data format field of the second authentication frame indicates an Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP) request / identity information; A third authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein the package data format field of the third authentication frame indicates an EAP response; The fourth authentication frame, wherein the package data format field of the fourth authentication frame indicates EAP success.

18. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 17, characterized in that: The PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt the association process messages.

19. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 17, characterized in that: The PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

20. The method according to claim 19, characterized in that The data communication message includes a group key handshake message; The group key handshake message is used to distribute at least one of a group temporary key GTK, an integrity group temporary key IGTK, and a beacon frame integrity group temporary key BIGTK.

21. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 17, characterized in that The PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt the four-way handshake message.

22. The method according to claim 21, characterized in that The method further comprises: Use the four-way handshake process to create an updated PTK; The updated PTK is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

23. An authentication method, characterized in that: The method is performed by an AP, and includes: An authentication frame is transmitted between the STA and the STA to perform the authentication process. The first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation (PASN) that supports fast initial link establishment (FILS) shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

24. The method according to claim 23, wherein The first field includes an identity authentication algorithm number field and a packaging data format field.

25. The method according to claim 24, characterized in that The identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is the first newly added value to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy; Alternatively, the identity authentication algorithm number field is the second newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the first newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method adopted is: extended PASN that supports FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy.

26. The method according to claim 24, characterized in that The identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a third newly added value used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication; Alternatively, the identity authentication algorithm number field is the fourth newly added value, and the packaging data format field is the third newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method adopted is: extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication.

27. The method according to claim 24, characterized in that The identity authentication algorithm number field is 7, and the package data format field is a fifth newly added value used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication; Alternatively, the identity authentication algorithm number field is the sixth newly added value, and the package data format field is the fifth newly added value, which are used to indicate that the authentication method used is: extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication.

28. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 27, characterized in that The first field is used to indicate the authentication method of extended PASN supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy; The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a pairwise master key PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

29. The method according to claim 28, characterized in that The authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the method further includes: Generate a first PMK based on the first shared key DHss; The first DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

30. The method according to claim 29, wherein The method further comprises: Generate a first pairwise transient key PTK based on the first PMK and the second DHss; The second DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

31. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 27, characterized in that The first field is used to indicate that an extended PASN authentication method supporting FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy is adopted; the method further includes: Generate a second PMK based on the third DHss; The third DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

32. The method according to claim 31, characterized in that The method further comprises: Generate a second PTK according to the second PMK and the third DHss.

33. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 27, characterized in that The first field is used to indicate the authentication method of the extended PASN supporting FILS public key authentication; The authentication frame further includes at least one field of a PMK public key, a PMK public key length, a PMK limited cycle group, a PMK group, and a key validity bit.

34. The method according to claim 33, wherein At least one field among the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in a packaging data element field of the authentication frame.

35. The method according to claim 33, wherein At least one of the PMK public key, the PMK public key length, and the PMK limited cyclic group is carried in the Packing Data Element field of the authentication frame; The PMK limited cyclic group field is carried in the control field of the authentication frame.

36. The method according to any one of claims 33 to 35, characterized in that The authentication frame further includes a PMK public key; and the method further includes: Generate a third PMK based on the fourth DHss; The fourth DHss is a shared key generated based on the PMK public key of the STA and the PMK public key of the AP.

37. The method according to claim 36, wherein The method further comprises: Generate a third PTK based on the third PMK and the fifth DHss; The fifth DHss is a shared key generated based on the authenticated party public key of the STA and the authenticator public key of the AP.

38. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 27, characterized in that The first field is used to indicate the authentication method of using extended PASN supporting 802.1X authentication; The authentication frame includes a fourth authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA.

39. The method according to claim 38, wherein The authentication frame includes: A first authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein a Packet Data Format field of the first authentication frame indicates that EAPOL-Start is an Extended Authentication Protocol over Local Area Network (EAPOL-Start); A second authentication frame sent by the AP to the STA, wherein the package data format field of the second authentication frame indicates an Extended Authentication Protocol (EAP) request / identity information; A third authentication frame sent by the STA to the AP, wherein the package data format field of the third authentication frame indicates an EAP response; The fourth authentication frame, wherein the package data format field of the fourth authentication frame indicates EAP success.

40. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 39, characterized in that The PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt the association process messages.

41. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 39, characterized in that The PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

42. The method according to claim 41, wherein The data communication message includes a group key handshake message; The group key handshake message is used to distribute at least one of a group temporary key GTK, an integrity group temporary key IGTK, and a beacon frame integrity group temporary key BIGTK.

43. The method according to any one of claims 23 to 39, characterized in that The PTK generated during the authentication process is used to encrypt and decrypt the four-way handshake message.

44. The method according to claim 43, wherein The method further comprises: Use the four-way handshake process to create an updated PTK; The updated PTK is used to encrypt and decrypt data communication messages.

45. An authentication device, characterized in that: The device comprises: The first authentication module is used to transmit an authentication frame with the access point AP to perform the authentication process, wherein the first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment FILS shared key authentication with perfect forward secrecy, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

46. ​​An authentication device, characterized in that The device is executed by an AP, and the device includes: The second authentication module is used to transmit an authentication frame with the STA to perform the authentication process, where the first field in the authentication frame is used to indicate that identity authentication is performed using at least one of the following authentication methods: extended pre-association security negotiation PASN that supports fast initial link establishment with perfect forward secrecy FILS shared key authentication, extended PASN that supports FILS public key authentication, and extended PASN that supports 802.1X authentication.

47. A STA device, characterized in that: The device comprises: processor; a transceiver connected to the processor; a memory for storing executable instructions for the processor; The processor is configured to load the executable instructions so that the STA device implements the authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 22.

48. An AP device, characterized in that: The device comprises: processor; a transceiver connected to the processor; a memory for storing executable instructions for the processor; The processor is configured to load the executable instructions so that the AP device implements the authentication method as described in any one of claims 23 to 44.

49. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that The readable storage medium stores executable instructions, which are loaded and executed by a processor to enable the communication device to implement the authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 44.

50. A chip, characterized in that: The chip includes a programmable logic circuit or a program, and a communication device equipped with the chip is used to implement the authentication method according to any one of claims 1 to 44 based on the programmable logic circuit or the program.

51. A computer program product, characterized in that The computer program product includes computer instructions, which are stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The processor of the communication device reads the computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium, and the processor executes the computer instructions, so that the communication device performs the authentication method as described in any one of claims 1 to 44.

Images